What Does A Terrorist Look Like?

We just received some valuable Intel today… We now know what terrorists look like. BOLOs are being sent internationally as we speak. Terrorists wear colorful oversized clothing and have round red noses. They’ve been known to paint smiles or frowns on their faces and often wear wigs and large honking shoes.

In all seriousness…At airports all over the country, day in and day out, Transportation Security Officers hear over and over: “Do I look like a terrorist? You should be spending your time looking for the real terrorists instead of wasting time on me.”

Which got me thinking - what exactly does a terrorist look like? There’s no manual showing you what terrorists look like. We could put a Magic 8 Ball at each checkpoint lane and shake it every time a passenger comes through asking “Is this person a terrorist?” Some of the answers would really prove troublesome:

*Reply hazy, try again.
*Concentrate and ask again.
*Better not tell you now.
*Cannot predict now.
*Ask again later.

If my Magic 8 Ball idea sounds silly, it is. I used that example, because it would be just as effective as taking somebody’s word who says “I’m not a terrorist.”

In a perfect world, TSO training would include a class on what a terrorist looks like. But the fact is, terrorists look like anybody else coming through the checkpoint. All races, sexes, ages, and sizes… They can be an evil genius or dumb as a rock.

You don’t have to be taller than the sign to be a terrorist. You get the point…

I can’t count how many times I’ve heard somebody say “I don’t pose a threat.” Intelligence has shown that western acting/looking terrorists are being recruited just for that reason.

What I’m trying to say is you know you’re not a terrorist, but we don’t…and we can’t take any chances and just take your word. This is another reason why our Behavior Detection Program is so important. We focus on behaviors to flush out the possible terrorists, not appearance.

Blogger Bob

EoS Blog Team

BWI Checkpoint Rollout Anniversary (And More...)

Did you know this is the 7th anniversary of TSA rolling out the first federalized airport checkpoint? It was at Baltimore Washington International Airport. (BWI)

It’s also the 1st anniversary of the day we launched Evolution at BWI. The nationwide re-training of our frontline officers is just about completed.

To celebrate these milestones in our short but rich history, I figured I’d post a few interesting TSA stories on the blog that I came across recently.

First off, check out this article from Rick Seaney, FareCompare.com CEO, on ABCNews.com: The TSA Nightmare: Airport Security. The headline is a bit misleading - it actually dispels a few common myths about our officers.

Secondly, while scanning the blogosphere as I do every morning, I came across a weekly column from a Transportation Security Officer in the Londonderry Online Hometown News called “Joe’s Two Cents.” His latest article describes a day where his checkpoint screened a group of Wounded Warriors. Check out his touching story: No Big Deal…

I just came across this one a few minutes ago on process improvement at TSA.

I hope you enjoy these links as much as I enjoyed my wife’s PB&J sandwiches she packed in my lunch today. Mmmm…

Blogger Bob

EoS Blog Team

Dishing the Dirt

I’ve been reading some statements around the web about a recent incident at Piedmont Triad Airport (PTI) in North Carolina involving dirt and fossils being mistaken for a possible bomb.

To the flying public, I fully understand that it has to seem ridiculous that dirt and fossils could be mistaken for a bomb. If I didn’t know anything about how x-ray images looked or what TSA was looking for, I’d probably be on the “you guys actually thought that was a bomb?” bandwagon.

I’m going to try to make this as simple as I can, saying what I am able to say.

1) Images of items on the x-ray monitor often look nothing like they normally do to the naked eye.

2)Dirt and fossils as well as many other normal day to day items can resemble what our officers are trained to look for on the x-ray monitor.

3) Bags often contain electronics and wires that overlap these items making them look even more suspicious.

As a former TSO I can think of a couple of times where by chance, everyday normal harmless items were laid out in a bag in such a way to look exactly like a textbook improvised explosive device. (IED)

In this particular case, a Bomb Appraisal Officer (BAO) was summoned and they eventually determined there was no threat. When you think there might be an explosive in a bag, you don’t just whip it out of the x-ray tunnel and dive into it. There are procedures that must be followed for the well-being of everybody involved. Of course, once the bag was opened, it was obvious what the items were and that they did not pose a threat.

I hope this clears things up a little bit in regards to items being mistaken for IEDs.

Thanks,

Blogger Bob

EoS Blog Team

See SPO. See SPO Screen. Screen, SPO, Screen!

Keeping the flying public safe from curbside to cockpit is a major part of TSA’s mission. This post will hopefully provide some more insight about what’s going on before you even reach the security checkpoint.

Concerns about public areas in airports have been brought up time and again by security wonks and commenters on this and other blogs—and we’ve been listening.

Surveillance of non-sterile areas in airports is a no-brainer when it comes to mitigating risk in an efficient manner. There’s really no way to get around that. For a while now, several different TSA programs have been in place to satisfy this security need—and thus far, Behavior Detection has been getting most of the attention. However, Passive MMW, a.k.a SPO-7, might just steal the spotlight.

Since April 21, TSA has been testing and evaluating two tripod-mounted, highly mobile SPO-7 units at Boston’s Logan International (BOS). You may recall Blogger Bob’s post about Passive MMW back in September ’08; however, a few things have happened since then. Just as a quick recap, Passive MMW has been used in mass transit and maritime environments since 2007. In 2008, TSA tested the technology in non-sterile areas of Denver International and Minneapolis/St. Paul International during the 2008 Democratic and Republican national conventions.

The name “Passive MMW” may imply that this technology operates in the exact same way as the stationary Whole Body MMW machines at the checkpoint. This is definitely not the case. Both technologies are non-invasive and completely safe, but other than that, the only similarity is that both systems make use of millimeter waves in one way or another. To be clear, Whole Body MMW machines bounce harmless millimeter waves off of your body to generate a metallic image. Passive MMW on the other hand receives energy generated by an individual and the objects that they are carrying on their person. This energy can be detected by an appropriate receiver and can be used to detect anomalies.

Here’s an example of the image an operator would see:

As you can see, it looks a lot different than the robotic images generated by stationary MMW machines at the checkpoint. For this reason, Passive MMW machines and their operators will be in full view of the public in the non-sterile areas of BOS.

Security officers operating the Passive MMW will work closely with Behavior Detection Officers on the floor. If either group detects a potential threat, they will alert their counterparts. From there a variety of scenarios can occur, up to and including calling local law enforcement.

Signs will be placed in the vicinity of the screening area to make sure everyone is relatively well informed about Passive MMW:

So…Passive MMW…awesome idea right? Let us know what you think.

Blogger Paul

EoS Blog Team

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*Edit: The second sign was changed from "WARNING" to "ALERT"

Missing Crematory Remains

Many stories are circulating that TSA lost crematory remains that were checked as baggage at the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. After working with the airline, TSA was able to determine the bags belonging to the passenger in question were never handled or opened by TSA officers. The bags were screened by our automated inline baggage system and sent directly to the airline. Each bag has an ID number and the computer logs every bag that alarms and is sent to the resolution room for secondary screening. The bags in question did not alarm and therefore went directly to the airline..

To date, the family has not contacted TSA.TSA has made attempts to contact the family and will continue to try to do so. TSA regrets the family has to deal with this during their time of mourning.

The guidelines for traveling with crematory remains are correct and up to date on TSA.gov.

Bob

Eos Blog Team

TWIC Casts a Security Net Over Ports

Today is not only the deadline for your taxes, it’s the national compliance day for TWIC! Through a maze of streamers, cake, and party hats, I found my way to Greg, (The TWIC-Meister) and asked him to write a little about TWIC for us. What is TWIC? Read on… ~ Blogger Bob

To most folks, TSA is synonymous with airport security, planes and really spiffy blue uniforms. But for the past few years we have been working hard to add a layer of port security that the maritime industry has never seen before. That’s right; spread the word, TSA is involved in securing other modes of transportation too. They don’t call us the Transportation Security Administration for nothing.

Today, the U.S. Coast Guard began ensuring port workers and mariners nationwide have a new security biometric card known as a TWIC (Transportation Worker Identification Credential). Having a TWIC in hand means the holder received a thorough background check, and is now allowed unescorted access to secure areas of ports and vessels. Beginning today, the card must be presented at the more than 3,200 U.S. maritime facilities and 10,000 vessels from Maine to Guam to gain access. It is a huge win for security to know the folks working at our nation’s ports are not known terrorist threats.

The card itself is huge security benefit. Now instead of security guards examining more than 500 different driver’s licenses and hundreds of other port IDs, there is one uniform card accepted to gain access. TWIC uses advanced technology to embed a template of the owner’s fingerprints as well as a host of other security features that make it nearly impossible to fake.

TWICs are designed to be read by a card reader. TWIC card readers have gone through initial lab testing and approved equipment will be tested further in severe port environments (extreme heat, cold, wind, salt water, etc). At this time, some ports have already installed new readers and more will be soon. Readers are not mandatory yet because TSA listened and responded to industry concerns about cost and the need to test readers at port facilities and on vessels to ensure durability and functionality. We have worked closely with industry every step of the way to maximize security and minimize the effect on commerce.

To date, approximately 1.1 million workers have been vetted and participated in making the Homeland more secure.

Greg, EoS Guest Blogger

Traveling With Large Amounts of Cash

Since the St. Louis incident blog post, we have received many questions about traveling with cash and whether or not you are required to answer questions about the cash you are traveling with. Francine Kerner, TSA’s Chief Counsel was kind enough to take some time and address your questions. ~ Blogger Bob

Sometimes a TSA officer may ask a passenger who is carrying a large sum of cash to account for the money. You have asked why such a question is posed and whether a passenger is required to answer.

In reacting to potential security problems or signs of criminal activity, TSA officers are trained to ask questions and assess passenger reactions, including whether a passenger appears to be cooperative and forthcoming in responding.

TSA officers routinely come across evidence of criminal activity at the airport checkpoint. Examples include evidence of illegal drug trafficking, money laundering, and violations of currency reporting requirements prior to international trips.

When presented with a passenger carrying a large sum of money through the screening checkpoint, the TSA officer will frequently engage in dialog with the passenger to determine whether a referral to law-enforcement authorities is warranted.

The TSA officer may consider all circumstances in making the assessment, including the behavior and credibility of the passenger. Thus, a failure to be forthcoming may inform a TSA officer’s decision to call law-enforcement authorities.

Francine Kerner, TSA Chief Counsel

What to Know Before You Go

All I’ve done here is basically take all of the links for air travelers from TSA.gov and placed them on one page. You can bookmark this or copy and paste it and save it on your desktop.

To stay up to date, follow this link and you can subscribe to an e-mail announcement service that will notify you as changes are made.

What would you like to know that you can’t find in these links? Please take a look and post a comment with your suggestions.

How to Get Through the Line Faster
Step-By-Step Screening (WMV, 3 MB)
Female business traveler (WMV, 3 MB)
Male business traveler (WMV, 3 MB)
Traveling with a baby or small child (WMV, 3 MB)
Travelers with special needs (WMV, 3 MB)
Ad Council 3 Simple Steps to Security Video (WMV, 3.5 MB)
Windows Media Player Plug-in

Liquid Rules: 3-1-1 for Carry-Ons
Why the bag?
Learn more about packing your liquids and gels
Important information on duty-free items

Prohibited Items

Acceptable Identification at the Checkpoint
Click here to view samples of acceptable documents (PDF, 159 KB).

Safe Travel with Batteries & Devices

"Checkpoint Friendly" Laptop Bags

Special Items
Alcoholic Beverages
Batteries and Devices
Camping
Compressed Gas Cylinders
Crematory Containers and Deceased Remains
Currency, Coins, Precious Metals, or Valuable Jewelry
Firearms & Ammunition
Food & Beverages (through security checkpoints)
Hunting & Fishing
Knitting Needles, Needlepoint & Sewing
Lighters and Matches
Medications
Musical Instruments
Paintball Equipment
Parachutes
Pets
Photographic Equipment & Film
Scuba Equipment
Service Animals
Sporting Equipment

Baggage Locks
Safe Skies Luggage Locks
Travel Sentry

Travelers with Disabilities and Medical Conditions
Introduction
Before You Go
Tips For The Screening Process
Mobility Disabilities
Hearing Disabilities
Visual Disabilities
Hidden Disabilities
Pacemakers, Defibrillators, Other Implanted Medical Devices, & Metal Implants
Continuous Positive Airway Pressure (CPAP) Machine
Medical Oxygen and Respiratory-Related Equipment
Diabetes
Medications
Assistive Devices and Mobility Aids
Prosthetic Devices, Casts, and Body Braces
Walkers, Crutches, and Canes
Augmentation Devices
Orthopedic Shoes, Support Appliances, and Exterior Medical Devices
Dressings
Service Animals
Children with Disabilities
Medical Conditions and Special Situations
Military Severely Injured Program

Traveling with Children
Travel Tips
Baby Formula, Breast Milk, Juice, and Other Liquids
Children with Disabilities

Customer Service
TSA Contact Center
Claims Management Office
Discrimination
Lost & Found
Screening Process
Travel Links
Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP)
Got Feedback

Have a great weekend!!!

Blogger Bob

EoS Blog Team

What In the Heck Does That Person Do: TSA Customer Support & Quality Improvement Manager (CSQIM)

First off, I decided the use of “A Day in the Life Of” was cliché, so I changed it to “What in the Heck Does That Person Do?” It’s going to be a long running series highlighting various TSA positions across the nation. Our first one was a few weeks ago with Jim’s Transportation Security Inspector post.

For this installment, I reached out to Paul who works with TSA at the Orlando International airport. Paul is the Customer Support & Quality Improvement Manager.

So, what in the heck does he do? Let’s find out…

Blogger Bob: When, why and how should a passenger contact a TSA Customer Support Manager?

Paul: Should travelers require additional information or care to share more detailed concerns or express a compliment related to their experience, they can reach me through the TSA Contact Center, Got Feedback, or complete a Comment Card. Passengers can always leave general feedback on the TSA blog.

Blogger Bob: You mentioned comment cards. Some of our readers in the past have posted comments stating that they were required to show a supervisor their ID prior to receiving a comment card. Should this happen?

Paul: Not that I’m aware of. Passengers are welcome to submit a comment card without fear of retribution. Naturally we do receive a number of ‘anonymous’ cards. We review them and then share comments with the workforce.

Bob: I actually knew the answer to that one in advance. I was just testing you. That’s one of the main things that lit the fire for us to launch Got Feedback. We cringed when we read that passengers were being required to show their ID prior to receiving a comment card. Speaking of Got Feedback, I notice that you’re really active with the Got Feedback program. Your airport is among the top 10 most popular airports in the Got Feedback program. Tell me a little about your experiences with Got Feedback and how the program is working out for Orlando International Airport. Are problems resolved faster when a passenger uses Got Feedback?

Paul: Yes, we do resolve them more efficiently. It provides a quick snap shot of the issue with easy contact info to initiate a reply to the traveler. We receive all types of inquiries: What can I take on a plane, lost items, why was my prohibited item taken, rude, inattentive employees etc. I do want to note that we actually do receive compliments and requests for advance assistance through the passengers with disabilities lane.
Traveler concerns are important to us and we take great pride in working to address their inquiries. Keep in mind that more than 40 million travelers process through the Orlando International Airport annually … that is a LOT of feedback!

Blogger Bob: Which Disney character has the most difficulty with airport security and why?

Paul: Sleepy (For obvious reasons) and Buzz Lightyear because he always needs to undergo secondary inspection. (Can’t divest!)

Blogger Bob: What did you do prior to working for TSA?

Paul: 33 years with the Government. 26 years with US Customs (Law Enforcement, Customs Inspector, Supervisor, Passenger Service Representative) and 7 years with TSA. (Started 2 months after the federal roll out) It’s also important to mention our program assistant Bill has spent 35 years working for the Government. 28 years with the Air Force. (Aircraft Maintenance Manager/stock clerk in grocery store) 7 years with TSA.

Blogger Bob: As a customer support manager, do you coordinate with passengers who have special needs to help make their travel experience a little better?

Paul: We provide support to travelers with special needs as well as to support local community groups. We are sensitive to providing the utmost attention to travelers with disabilities and children who may require special attention as well as wounded soldiers. As this is a tourist destination, you can image that we are busy working to provide necessary support. We also work with our airport stakeholders to coordinate various travel groups. Recently, we became aware of a local high school girls softball team (15th in the country) that was traveling to California for the tournament. We gave them a rousing send off! Our partnership with the airport and the local community has greatly improved the perception / image that travelers have of TSA.

Blogger Bob: I think that’s great that passengers with special needs can plan ahead and coordinate their travel. I’m sure that makes things much easier for all involved. What is the one best piece of advice you could give to a traveler?

Paul: Divest your items before entering the checkpoint.

Blogger Bob: Like what? The usual phones, keys and change? Do people still forget to do this? I imagine that could hold the line up quite a bit.

Paul: Yes … these items still become the most frequently forgotten items. It does impede the throughput quite a bit.

Blogger Bob: How often is a Transportation Security Officer accused of theft by a passenger who later finds the misplaced item and notifies you?

Paul: We rarely hear of this when it happens because they are too embarrassed to call back. One was a contact we received from an older woman who did call back to tell us that the missing envelope containing one thousand dollars was located on her kitchen table when she returned home. Her husband packed the luggage and forgot the envelope!

Blogger Bob: I get to read the incoming Got Feedback emails from all of the airports around the nation and I see this does happen from time to time. I just wanted to add that it’s much appreciated when the passenger calls back to admit the mistake, because it halts investigations and clears any officers who may have been wrongly accused of theft.

Blogger Bob: What is the oddest experience you have had as a TSA Customer Support Manager?

Paul: A traveler called stating that a mouse was found in her checked baggage. She later called back to say that her husband had killed the mouse and her cat placed it next to the laundry pile with all of the unpacked dirty clothes!

Blogger Bob: Ha! I hope it wasn’t Mickey or Minnie. It’s been great talking with you and I’m sure our readers will enjoy our interview. Thanks for taking the time to talk with me. I know you and Bill are extremely busy. By the way, I don’t care what Snopes says, I know Walt Disney is cryogenically frozen in a secret compartment beneath the Magic Kingdom. \

Please note this is not an interview with Blogger Paul from DC. This is an interview with Customer Support Paul in Orlando. ~ Bob

Incident at St. Louis International Airport

At approximately 6:50 p.m. on March 29, 2009, a metal box alarmed the X-ray machine at Lambert-St. Louis International Airport, triggering the need for additional screening. Because the box contained a number of items including a large amount of cash, all of which needed to be removed to be properly screened, it was deemed more appropriate to continue the screening process in a private area. A Transportation Security Administration (TSA) employee and members of the St. Louis Airport Police Department can be heard on the audio recording. The tone and language used by the TSA employee was inappropriate. TSA holds its employees to the highest professional standards. TSA will continue to investigate this matter and take appropriate action.

Movements of large amounts of cash through the checkpoint may be investigated by law enforcement authorities if criminal activity is suspected. As a general rule, passengers are required to cooperate with the screening process. Cooperation may involve answering questions about their property, including why they are carrying a large sum of cash. A passenger who refuses to answer questions may be referred to appropriate authorities for further inquiry.


Bob

EoS Blog Team

Click here to view Comments 201 & above.

Blogger Paul's Visit to the TSIF

What’s a “TSIF” you ask? Well, it’s one of several hundred acronyms I’ve had to learn since I’ve been here—but this one is special. The TSA Systems Integration Facility is a newly renovated 128,000-square-foot test facility located at Ronald Reagan National Airport. Here’s a little tour through the facility. Enjoy!



http://www.tsa.gov/weekly/033009_tsif.shtm

Blogger Paul
EoS Blog Team

Traveling With Homemade Gadgets

The internet, as I am sure you all would agree, is a marvelous thing. People from coast to coast and around the world have used it for everything… researching term papers, reading the news, paying bills and even writing blogs. The internet is also a marvelous tool for those looking to save or spend money.

These tough economic times have led many passengers to search for discount flights on the Internet and even, as we have learned at TSA, used the Internet to learn to make homemade gadgets. It’s these gadgets that have caused some …. How shall we say, second and third looks at the checkpoint. By second and third looks I’m not talking about just TSA, I’m talking our Bomb Appraisal Officers (BAO) and local bomb squads.

In a matter of minutes this morning, Blogger Bob found Internet sites with “how to build” instructions for a desulfator and radio receiver in a common mint tin (a desulfator is used to put high voltage pulses into a battery), a guitar amp out of a cigarette pack, a mint tin made into a guitar and a circuit bender made from an old plastic parts kit. While none of these items are threatening in and of themselves, imagine what a mint tin with wires, batteries and a switch looks like in an x-ray machine.

While each of these items gets the award for creativity, it might be a good idea to put these items in your checked baggage or maybe even leave them at home. However, if you have to bring them with you, maybe letting our folks know that you are the master innovator could prevent any unnecessary surprises from occurring. Nonetheless, expect some extra scrutiny…

What do I mean by further scrutiny? Yesterday, March 24, an item very similar to those described above, was blown into a zillion pieces in Palm Springs, California, because neither our officers, our BAO or the local bomb squad could determine with 100% certainty the item didn’t pose a threat after seeing it on the x-ray.

So, if you are traveling with a homemade charger, amp, desulfator or anything with batteries, screws and wires sticking out of it that could be deemed out of the ordinary, please tell us. It will probably allow us and the local bomb squad to help keep your items in one piece, not a zillion. Probably…

Nico

EoS Blog Team

Clarification Update: 03.26.2009 1137

Based on the comments, Nico & I felt a clarification was needed. This post purposely never mentioned a passenger because the bag was left unattended and there was no passenger available to interview. We're not implying that you cannot travel with these types of items, we're just pointing out that they could be of concern, or possibly even hold you up a little bit. Listen, we think these things are cool too, but this is just a friendly "heads up" and not a threat.

Also, explosive detection systems would not identify these types of items in checked baggage, because they aren't explosives. Our checked baggage machines use CT technology and can actually recognize and alarm on potential explosives.

Bob

EoS Blog Team

Gate Screening

Many travelers have noticed that strange things are afoot at departure gates across the nation. Should you pack your tinfoil hats? Nope… Save them for December 21, 2012 when the Martians attack.

Anybody who keeps up with TSA knows that static security is not our cup of 3.4 oz. tea. We’re constantly evolving in an effort to make things more difficult and unpredictable for those wishing to do us harm. And that’s the case here. Over 2 years ago, we started an employee screening program that included unpredictable gate screening. Just recently, we strengthened our layers of security by increasing the frequency of gate screening. Travelers haven’t seen this much gate activity since TSA rolled out in 2002, so people are taking notice.

In some cases, travelers have become concerned about the safety of their flight after being selected for gate screening. There’s no reason to worry. It’s not being screened due to any specific threats.

Gate screening allows us to screen anybody who has access to the aircraft. Oh yeah, and there are signs at the checkpoint or at the gates informing passengers they may be subjected to gate screening.

Blogger Bob

EoS Blog Team

Traveling 101 for Diabetics

I was reading a blog post today from Diabetics Daily and while this issue doesn’t pop up on our blog too often, it's apparently a concern on other diabetes related blogs and message boards.

From Diabetics Daily, Sara Knicks writes:
I just got back from a recent work trip that involved some airlines flights. I have noticed (especially on the message boards) that a lot of diabetics worry about being stopped and forced to endure extra inspections because of their diabetic supplies.

As a Type II Diabetic, I can definitely see why people would be concerned about this.

First and foremost, if you’re concerned about your disability in relation to the screening process, let a Transportation Security Officer (TSO) know what’s going on and what you’re concerned about. Of course, you don’t have to do this, but as a former TSO, I can tell you that the screening of people with disabilities goes much more smoothly if everybody involved knows what to expect.

Also, don't go lettin' the checkpoint get you all hypogleycemic. Be sure to let a TSO know if your sugar is dropping or if you need medical assistance. Tell them what you need.

If you’re concerned about any of your diabetes related items, let the TSO know what you’re traveling with. The following items are permitted for diabetic passengers:

Insulin pump and insulin pump supplies (cleaning agents, batteries, plastic tubing, infusion kit, catheter, and needle); Insulin pumps and supplies must be accompanied by insulin. If you are concerned or uncomfortable about going through the walk-through metal detector or Mill with your insulin pump, notify the TSO that you are wearing an insulin pump and would like a full-body pat-down and a visual inspection of your pump instead. Advise the Security Officer that the insulin pump cannot be removed because it is inserted with a catheter (needle) under the skin.

Insulin and insulin loaded dispensing products (vials or box of individual vials, jet injectors, biojectors, epipens, infusers, and preloaded syringes; Insulin in any form or dispenser must be clearly identified.

Unlimited number of unused syringes when accompanied by insulin or other injectable medication; lancets, blood glucose meters, blood glucose meter test strips, alcohol swabs, meter-testing solutions; Urine ketone test strips
Glucagon emergency kit;

Unlimited number of used syringes when transported in Sharps disposal container or other similar hard-surface container. Sharps disposal containers or similar hard-surface disposal container for storing used syringes and test strips.

You have the option of requesting a visual inspection of your insulin and diabetes associated supplies.

Be sure to check out another blog post titled “Diabetes and the TSA.” A passenger named “James” writes about his experiences traveling with his insulin pump. You can also read more about traveling with other disabilities at TSA.gov.

Blogger Bob

EoS Blog Team

Smooth...

Lotion is designed to keep you smooth, but apparently not smooth enough to fool our Millimeter Wave (MMW) machines. Recently, a passenger concealed a 4 oz. bottle of lotion on their person for the sole reason that it was expensive and they didn’t want to lose it.

Of course, many of you are saying, “Thank the heavens for the TSA. Without them, a harmless bottle of lotion would have made it onto an airplane. “

While the sarcasm is expected, what you don’t know is our intelligence has shown us that terrorists with dry flaky skin are unable to fulfill their missions. So it’s vital to keep all lotions off of airplanes.

I kid, I kid, but on a serious note, what if it wasn’t lotion? What if it was liquid explosives, or a block of plastic explosives?

The success story here is not that we kept a bottle of lotion off of a plane, but we found an intentionally hidden item on a passenger. We found a hidden item and knew exactly where it was without having the passenger undergo a hand-wanding or patdown.

Blogger Bob

EoS Blog Team

A Day In The Life Of: Transportation Security Inspectors (TSI)

In an effort to explain the many different positions we have in the field, I've asked a Transportation Security Inspector (TSI) from Cincinnati to talk a little about his position.

Jim is from the Aviation side of Inspections, so keep in mind that TSA has a cadre of inspectors in the field. We’ll highlight their jobs in the future as well.

Now, the next time you see the folks in the fancy "TSA Inspector" jackets, you'll know what they do. ~ Bob

When most people think about TSA, the dedicated men and women performing the duties of the Transportation Security Officer (TSO) come to mind; and why not? It is by far the most visible public component of TSA and usually the first thing we see as we approach the checkpoint. Much like the many layers that make up TSA’s security “system of systems”, other components of TSA are tasked with duties not so visible to the traveling public, but are just as fundamental to securing our nation’s transport systems. Today I will discuss one of those components...TSA’s Transportation Security Inspectors, or TSIs.

As with most things governmental, regulations abound! Especially with respect to airline operations, airport operations and the wide variety of security programs that these entities adopt and implement. That’s where the TSI comes in. I’m an aviation inspector, so I’ll refrain from commentary on the cargo inspection program or the surface (rail and mass transit) inspection program. The duties and responsibilities of a TSI are quite varied due in no small part to an industry that can be complex, market driven, evolving and critical to our nation’s economy. Bear with me as I reach deep into my mind-numbing facts hat and reference the actual regulations that drive what TSIs actually inspect. Our beloved Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) has many titles and parts, but for the aviation TSI, it’s all about 49 CFR part 1500 and the relevant subchapters. Within that body of work, those who find themselves regulated by TSA will know what is expected of them as well as what can be expected from us. If you find yourself unable to sleep on a given night, look them up on the web at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/ under the executive resources portion.

So, what does it all mean? TSIs in the field conduct comprehensive inspections, assessments and investigations of regulated entities to determine how well they comply with the regulations as well as identifying areas of weakness that need to be fixed. Exactly how is it done? Well, TSIs will use a variety of methods to determine compliance which may include surveillance, interview, document review and/or testing. But it doesn’t end there. Those findings are archived so we can get a snapshot of trouble areas that are common and adjust our security priorities to meet those needs.

In addition to our normal inspection workload, TSIs conduct investigations into alleged violations of security regulations at the screening checkpoint. Normally this would be the result of a person attempting to bring something prohibited through the screening checkpoint – things like guns, explosives and incendiaries. On occasion, and it doesn’t happen all too often, someone will cause a fracas at the checkpoint that rises to level of interference with the screening process. When that happens, the TSI will investigate the circumstances surrounding the alleged violation and determine what enforcement action is appropriate. An enforcement action may be administrative in nature (warning notice), or result in a monetary fine (civil penalty). However, if the investigation demonstrates that no violation occurred, the matter will be closed with no action and a letter advising the person of that determination will be mailed out. I could go on and on regarding enforcement actions because those can be thorny and it doesn’t simply end with a fine because the TSI recommends it. There is a process and I will defer to our legal team regarding the steps that it entails.

Lastly, TSIs conduct outreach activity with our industry partners and local/Federal agencies in order to foster that open relationship and share information critical to our mutual success. There is more to a TSI’s job than what I have written about today, but my post is getting long so I’ll wrap it up. Perhaps I can post another time with some more riveting TSI tidings. Until then, travel safe and thanks for checking out our blog!

Guest Blogger

Jim

Frozen Monkey Heads & Other Fun Stuff

I saw this story today and thought it would be a fun link to share with our readers. Among the usual pocket knives, lotions and bottles of water, our officers often find some, well… not so usual things.

Check out this Daily News article on the weird and wacky stuff that’s found during searches by TSA and Customs at JFK.

I encourage any of our officers that are reading to chime in and talk about some of the out of the ordinary things you’ve found.

Blogger Bob

EoS Blog Team

3 oz or 3.4 oz? What gives???

Short answer: 3.4 oz. For more details, read on…

OK, here’s the scoop. If the U.S. would have switched to the metrics system in the 70s, this wouldn’t be an issue. How many of you out there had to learn the metric system in school only to never use it…

When TSA lifted the total liquid ban and implemented the 3-1-1 program, the permissible amount of liquids, aerosols and gels was 3oz. Press releases went out, WebPages were updated, and signs were printed and shipped out nationwide to 457 airports.

When TSA rolled out 3-1-1, the European Union was not on board yet. When the EU decided to lift the ban and allow liquids to travel, the amount permitted was 100ml. Well, as those of you who like me had to learn metric conversion in grade school, youmight remember that 100ml = 3.4oz. not 3 oz. In order to align with the EU, we decided to allow liquids in containers up to 3.4oz. We also decided to keep our signage the same to maintain consistency. (Besides, 3.4-1-1 just doesn’t have the same ring to it.)

From a marketing perspective, 3 ounces was easier to remember than 3.4. For the European Union, 100 milliliters was easier to remember than 89. So, behind the scenes, we’ve been allowing up to 3.4 ounces, but it hasn’t been reflected on the web or in signage.

We’ve read your concerns here on the blog, so from now on, we’ll use 3.4 on the blog when talking about liquid limits, and also make changes (as soon as possible) to the TSA web site. I worked with Lynn on this and she has crafted a new response for the contact center to use when communicating with the public. We are also going to send a message to the workforce as a reminder.

Some people have asked why we don’t convert the net weight of the toothpaste to volume since they are different. Good question. The 3.4 container/volume rule was created to make it simple and streamlined for both passengers and our officers. As you could imagine, taking weight into consideration would be a wrench in the spokes. I’m sure the public doesn’t want our officers using scales or conversion charts, etc.

I hope this has helped you better understand the 3.0/3.4 oz. conundrum.

Thanks,

Bob

EoS Blog Team

Why We Do What We Do: Shift Briefs

Lynn’s husband asked a question similar to this after a recent trip, and we also get this question from people on the blog:

“When I’m going past the checkpoint, I see a group of officers standing over to the side. What are they doing? “

Maybe it’s happened to you, too: you’re in the line waiting go to through the checkpoint and you see a large group of officers near the checkpoint standing around and talking. Your first thought is probably “why in the heck don’t they use these officers to open more lanes?”

Are they trying to figure out how many officers it takes to change a light bulb? Are they getting ready to make a human pyramid? Nope…

The most likely reason is that it’s time for a shift change. Officers receive an in-brief and out-brief at the beginning and end of their shifts. During the course of a day, officers on the same shift are routinely assigned different tasks and are never in the same place at the same time. These two occasions are opportune times to get the entire shift together and disseminate important information and assign tasks for the day etc. This is a time when officers can communicate with their supervisors and managers and bring things to light. This is when critical intelligence is shared or information relating to an FBI BOLO or Amber Alert is distributed.

Sometimes these briefings take place in rooms outside of the public view and other times there just isn’t any space at a particular airport and briefings have to be conducted in a public area.

There can also be other reasons for smaller groups of officers to convene at the checkpoint.

Officers are sent to breaks and lunches in groups and before they return to duty, they usually meet near the checkpoint to wait for a lead or supervisor to give them their next assignment.

We also have teams of officers sent to various locations to randomly screen airport employees. Even if nobody is being screened, officers need to stay at this location for a specific period of time.

Officers also frequently use cell phones to communicate in larger airports where radios might not reach everywhere. So while it may look like an officer is making a personal call, they are in fact doing their job. Use of personal cell phones while on duty is not permitted.

We understand it’s human nature to assume folks are just doing nothing, but in a public job like this one, our officers are like the gold fish in the bowl swimming around for everyone to see. Everything they do is open to a different interpretation by each passenger. I just wanted to give you a few explanations to clear things up.

Bob

EoS Blog Team

Why We Do What We Do: Screening People in Wheelchairs

On February 4 at Los Angeles International Airport (better known as LAX), TSA officers found two 6x6x2 packages taped to the abdomen of a passenger.

The passenger arrived at the checkpoint in a wheelchair and was given the option of walking through the metal detector or being patted down in his wheelchair. He chose to walk through the metal detector. Because he was wearing bulky clothing, he also received additional screening - in this case a pat down.

That's when an officer found the two packages. The packages were tested and initial results were positive for explosive content. A TSA Bomb Appraisal Officer eventually cleared the packages through additional tests at the checkpoint and LAX police determined that the packages contained cocaine. The passenger was arrested, and federal charges are pending.

Now we know what some of you are thinking - TSA’s mission is not to find drugs, and that’s true. But finding drugs isn’t the success story here – the success story is that the officers found suspicious items intentionally concealed on a person’s body and that person was someone who would appear to pose no threat. We know that people who want to sneak something through a checkpoint – like improvised explosives devices and their components – often look to the techniques of drug and money smugglers and other criminals. In this case, it was drugs (which are admittedly not a threat to a plane), but when an officer finds these kinds of items, they don’t know what the contents are until the package is tested.

And because it’s a hot topic, it bears repeating that because transportation security officers are federal officers, if they find drugs, they must report it to law enforcement. Often on the blog we get questions like: “how is granny a threat?,” “what can a person in a wheelchair do on a plane,” etc. To us, this story is about the importance of screening everyone, and not giving anyone an exemption that a terrorist could use to their advantage.

Case in point: in 2005 in Colombia, a man in a wheelchair was allowed to bypass the metal detectors to board his flight. He and his son then tried to hijack the plane with two hand grenades they got through security. According to the media reporting:

“Duque said the older hijacker boarded the plane in a wheelchair. It may have helped him smuggle the grenades aboard. The wheelchair was too large to pass through an airport metal detector, and the man was not patted down by security agents, Luis Octavio Rojas, director of the Florencia airport, told The Associated Press.

“But they did give him and the chair a visual inspection,” Rojas added.”

______

- Lynn

EoS Blog Team

Welcoming the New Secretary

Former Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano is now officially on board as the new Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security.

Earlier this week, she published her first post on the DHS Leadership Journal titled “Getting to Work.” I suggest you follow the link and give it a read.

Also, TSA was happy to welcome Secretary Napolitano to its headquarters earlier this week for her first visit.



The Secretary was given three brief presentations on Security Operations, Technology, and Public Engagement. I was lucky enough to be able to present the latter, and the Secretary seems to be very interested in social media and wants to look into various ways the blog can be used. She has also stated that she plans to be a regular poster at the DHS Leadership Journal.



I look forward to seeing what new challenges we can all tackle together.

Vlogging With Blogger Bob

Vlog. No, it's not an Eastern European surname, (Vlog the Vlogger) it's short for Video Log. Vlogging is basically blogging with a video. We're not switching to a Vlog format, but we are going to start vlogging occasionally.

In this vlog, we show you some footage of the inauguration. As history was being made, more than 300 of our Transportation Security Officers were there partnering with the US Secret Service to help keep the record breaking crowd safe.




For the snarks out there, we were funded by the United States Secret Service. TSA along with the its other DHS components worked with federal, state, and local authorities at the inauguration helping to keep nearly 2 million people safe. The inauguration was designated a National Special Security Event by DHS.

Check out our web page to see what part TSA played in this mammoth security undertaking. TSA.GOV



Bob



EoS Blog Team

The Ad Council: A Final Post From Ellen Howe

In my final days here at TSA as the Assistant Administrator for Public Affairs (I’m one of four TSA political appointees leaving on January 20th), I wanted to get one last blog post in on our partnership with the Ad Council that supports our security operations. It’s something that was pretty important for me to get done before I left.

TSA interacts with two million people a day, and of that number, only a tiny fraction present a potential threat. The challenge for us is to get the majority of passengers through security efficiently so that we can focus on real threats, derived from intelligence gathering, watch lists and on-the-spot observations. Critical to this effort is getting the public on our side as active players in the security process. So in addition to reading blogs, web forums and the like, we held focus groups in several major cities in late 2007 to engage both frequent fliers and less experienced travelers to get their feedback on airport security.

What we heard wasn’t pretty, but it gave us insights to improve the process.

The first sessions were held in New York City just two blocks from the Ground Zero. It was surprising that people could be there, so close to where the towers once stood, and say that they never think about 9/11 when they fly. We learned the “road warriors” had to harden themselves to that possibility in order to fly so frequently. They also are frustrated by inexperienced travelers and families who slow down the lines.

Less frequent travelers said that they still think about 9/11 every time they fly. They worry about feeling stupid at the checkpoint for not knowing all the rules and getting barked at by officers and other passengers. Some didn't realize airline security was carried out by a federal agency, and many didn’t know TSA had a Web site where they could find information to help them get through security easier.

It was apparent that the participants largely saw TSA as a hindrance and inconvenience, as do many others that comment on this and other blogs. Overwhelmingly, participants were interested in knowing why they had to do what they do and said it would help them prepare for and participate at the checkpoint.

TSA had issued press releases, posted information on the web, even started this blog to reach out to travelers, but we had never used an organization like the Ad Council to conduct a comprehensive public awareness effort. The Ad Council is well-known and well-respected for its ability to raise awareness of critical issues and impact public behavior. They partnered with us just in time for the busiest travel weekend of the year: Thanksgiving. The results of this partnership were very positive – over the holiday season, we reached 41 million Americans.

The campaign includes videos that address common travelers’ concerns (shoes, ID, traveling with kids, laptops, etc.), web banners on travel-related sites and outreach to airline and travel sites encouraging them to post links to tsa.gov so passengers can get security-related information. Our goal is to reach people when they’re most focused on preparing for travel – when they book their flights or print out their boarding passes. The more people are prepared, the better it is for everyone.

Before I leave, I want to thank the people at TSA who built, maintain and participate on the blog – many didn’t think we could launch it and weren’t sure what would happen once we did. I’d also like to thank everyone who reads and comments on the blog. Good and bad, your input is appreciated and useful to many of us here at TSA.

Ellen Howe

Guest Blogger

TSA Outside of the Airport

Next month I will celebrate my 7th anniversary with TSA and the one constant over these past years has been the added elements of responsibility. What started as concentration on aviation security after the attacks of 9/11 has evolved into a web of security tools and partnerships that span all modes of transportation, local and state governments and stakeholders near and far.

While this may be seen as a “puppy post” by some, I thought it would be helpful and informative to let you all know that we are about more than just the TSOs and the FAMS you always hear about.

For instance, we get lots of questions about why this or why that in a foreign country. The fact is, TSA is responsible for implementing and enforcing security standards in domestic airports, that’s about 450 airports in our country. We work with our foreign partners to harmonize measures. For instance, approximately 80 countries are on the same regime for liquids. Flights from foreign countries to the United States must adhere to our security standards. TSA has security representatives in 19 countries around the globe. These individuals are responsible for working with local governments and carriers, US and foreign, that fly to, from or over the US to ensure they're complying with regulations.

The agency is working aggressively with our U.S. Coast Guard colleagues to complete the enrollment of all USCG-credentialed mariners and all personnel requiring unescorted access to secure areas of Maritime Transportation Security Act regulated vessels and facilities into the Transportation Worker Identification Card program. With an estimated 1.2 million people to enroll, TSA has already signed up more than 700,000 mariners and is well on the well to meet the nationwide compliance date of April 15.

The original compliance date of September 15 was extended to April 15 as a direct result of collaboration with port officials and industry, and realigns the enrollment period with the original intent of the TWIC final rule. The original compliance date was based on an 18 month enrollment period scheduled to begin March of 2007. The beginning of enrollment was suspended and the first port (Wilmington, DE) began enrolling workers in October 2007. This allowed for less than one year to enroll more than 1.2 million workers.

While nationwide enforcement is being realigned to April 2009, several ports have already complied and several more will become compliant in the coming months.

In Transportation Sector Network Management or TSNM, we lead the unified national effort to protect and secure a wide range of our nation’s transportation systems. TSNM covers highway and motor carriers, maritime, mass transit, pipelines, freight rail and general aviation.

As our Web site states, “every day, the transportation network connects cities, manufacturers, and retailers, moving large volumes of goods and individuals through a complex network of approximately 4 million miles of roads and highways, more than 100,000 miles of rail, 600,000 bridges, more than 300 tunnels and numerous sea ports, 2 million miles of pipeline, 500,000 train stations, and 500 public-use airports.”

How do we help? Well, essentially through grants and other supporting programs. Unlike aviation security, TSA is not charged with providing the physical security itself but with coordinating and regulating it. So we work with our industry partners and develop tools and exercises that help each “Sector” become more secure and therefore more safe.

For instance, recently TSA worked with local authorities by funding an exercise with a goal of being able to safely and predictably stop a transit bus remotely. Why would we want to stop a bus? Transit buses could be appealing to terrorists because of their unprecedented access to large population centers, critical infrastructures, etc., so stopping a bus might occur if the bus was hijacked by terrorists or was stolen for use as a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED).



The system, developed in coordination with TSA and industry, uses cellular communications and patches into the existing safety controls on the bus to restrict speed and activate the brake system on the bus to bring it to a safe stop and opens the doors for unobstructed access by law enforcement. The commands are received at the speed of texting, giving law enforcement a way to predict, and therefore choose, a location to stop the bus. This is just one example of things TSNM is doing to make all modes of transportation more safe.

Of course one blog post is not enough space to write about the dozens of proprietary K9 teams now charged with screening cargo, the hundreds of rail inspectors working with industry to enhance the secure infrastructure of that system, the men and women of TSA working to shore up general aviation or pipelines or subways or on and on.

I just thought that while so many bicker and argue about shoes or coats or laptops, thousands of folks at TSA are doing good work that keeps Americans safe each and every day.
So I hope you are as intrigued as I am about the work this agency does, because I would almost bet, you never even knew we did some of the things we do. I know I didn’t.

Nico

EoS Blog Team

Artful Concealment?

So, what exactly is artful concealment? Prior to working for TSA, I had never heard the term before. I used the term in a blog post a couple of months ago and based on the responses I got, many of our readers didn't seem to be too familiar with the term either.

So what does it mean? Does it mean to artfully conceal something you need to have Bob Ross paint a happy little tree on it so we won’t see it? Nope…

Let me give you a few examples, and then I’ll give you a definition.

A sword in a cane. A gun umbrella. A derringer belt buckle. A cell phone stun gun. A crucifix knife. A hollowed out bible with a gun inside. A gun taped to the bottom of a steel plate. I could give many more examples, but I don’t really want to give folks any ideas.

So basically, artful concealment is when you disguise an object by modifying its natural form to the form of something that will conceal it. This can be done by modifying the object to look like a permissible object, or it can be done by hiding the object in a belt, or shoe, bag lining etc. An artfully concealed item can also be an item that has been intentionally shielded by another object to hide its view from the x-ray.

In many cases, folks go through a lot of trouble concealing something with an item our x-rays can see right through. It’s sometimes comical to see the things that people think will fool an x-ray.

Here are some of the artfully concealed items that came through various checkpoints around the country just yesterday.

• A passenger was arrested after an officer found 19 rounds of .38 caliber ammunition hidden in their carry-on bag. The ammunition was taped together, wrapped in aluminum foil, and placed inside the handle of his carry-on bag.

• An artfully concealed 3-inch bladed belt buckle knife was detected in the carry-on bag of a passenger. The passenger surrendered the knife and was allowed to continue on their flight.

• A 2-inch pocketknife was hidden inside a laptop. The knife was located between the keyboard and the laptop screen. The passenger stated he knew the knife was in the laptop and that it was a prohibited item. Law enforcement officers issued a summons to appear in court and allowed the passenger to continue on the flight.

• A cane with an 18-inch sword blade was found during checkpoint screening. The police responded, confiscated the cane and interviewed the passenger who stated she did not know the cane (which was given to her by her husband) contained a sword. Law enforcement officers allowed the passenger to continue on the flight.

• A passenger was arrested after an artfully concealed 4½-inch knife was found inside a Santa Claus ornament. Police responded, confiscated the knife, and interviewed the passenger who stated she received the item as a gift and did not know there was a knife inside.

• A concealed pocketknife was detected during checkpoint screening. The passenger alarmed the metal detector and said that he had metal implants in his left hip. The passenger again alarmed the metal detectors and was referred to secondary screening. During hand wanding procedures, the passenger alarmed on his right side. The passenger produced a utility knife with a 2½-inch blade and wooden handle from his right pocket. State Police responded, confiscated the knife and arrested the passenger on the state charge of attempting to circumvent security screening.

• A 2½-inch knife was found inside a passenger’s belt buckle. The County Sheriff’s Department responded, took possession of the knife, and interviewed the passenger. Law enforcement officers allowed the passenger to surrender the prohibited item to a non-traveling family member and continue on the flight.

There are also a few blasts from the past I’d like to mention. We’ve had a gun in a teddy bear and a diaper bag, a knife in a baby carrier, and too many cane-swords to mention. Many of these canes are hand-me-downs or were purchased at an antique store or yard sale and the passenger had no idea whatsoever that there was a sword inside.

So what’s the moral of this story? It’s not worth getting arrested or delayed in your travels to sneak a small knife on a plane. And before you leave for the airport, double check your bags, belt and pocket for items that could cause you trouble at a checkpoint.

Bob

EoS Blog Team

Update 12/17/08 1846: This happened after our blog post went live, but we wanted to share it with you anyway. After noticing a piece of metal in a shoe on the x-ray monitor, a passenger was caught artfully concealing a crack pipe under their shoe insert.



Bob

EoS Blog Team


Update 12/26/08 1500: Five rounds of .38 caliber ammunition were detected artfully concealed in a deck of cards in the carry-on bag of a passenger. The deck of cards were glued together and had five individual bore holes drilled out in order to hold the five rounds. Police responded and interviewed the passenger, who stated he “wanted to keep the bullets out of the reach of his kids.” Police arrested the passenger on the State Charge of Unlawful Possession of Ammunition.


Bob

EoS Blog Team

Thanksgiving Holiday Airport Traffic Decreased Nationwide

The Wednesday before Thanksgiving is usually a very busy day at the nation’s airports, and traditionally, the second busiest travel day of the Thanksgiving holiday weekend. As we noted in an earlier post, the Air Transport Association forecasted a 10 percent drop in the number of passengers traveling on U.S. airlines during that time.

TSA data collected from airports nationwide proved the forecast right. Based on data collected from this past Wednesday, the number of passengers going through TSA checkpoints decreased 16 percent nationwide - and 14 percent at the nation’s 40 busiest airports - compared to last year.

Of the top 40 U.S. airports, the biggest decreases in passenger volume through security checkpoints on Wednesday were at Honolulu International Airport (35 percent); John Wayne Airport in Orange County, CA (32 percent); Tampa International Airport (27 percent) and Newark International Airport (22 percent).

Airports with the smallest drop in passenger volume were San Francisco International Airport (5 percent), Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (5 percent), Boston Logan International Airport (6 percent), Denver International Airport (9 percent) and Indianapolis International Airport (8 percent).

Update: The above data reflects the number of people screened by TSA at security checkpoints, not the total number of enplanements at airports. TSA data doesn't include people who had connecting flights through airports who do not go through the checkpoint. The post has been updated above to reflect this clarification.

Just Back from BWI - A Thanksgiving Checkpoint Report

I just spent five hours working alongside Transportation Security Officers at Baltimore Washington International's Southwest Terminal A to help out with the traditional Wednesday-before-Thanksgiving-rush. Thing is, no rush ever occurred. Sure, there was a steady flow of traffic through the checkpoint without much of a break, but the queue never really grew beyond 30 people.

Officers were out in full force manning five separate lanes-including the Family Lane that rolled out November 20. While families and those with special needs certainly appreciated Family Lane availability, the checkpoint was moving so smoothly, that all lanes were readily able to handle all types of passengers regardless of their particular situation.

Like many of my fellow headquarters colleagues who volunteered for the Thanksgiving weekend, I helped officers with bin removal and replacement in the lanes. I also helped spread traffic around to each of the five lanes to expedite the entire process. As I stood behind the Travel Document Checker podium, a frazzled mother approached me and asked:

"Is that the Family Lane over there?"

I replied, "Yes it is."

"Should we go over there?"

"Do you have any medical liquids over 3.4 ounces?"

"Nope. We're traveling pretty light here."

"Then you're good to go right where you are [which happened to be lane 2-the shortest line at the moment]."

Another good thing I noticed during my time at BWI: pies, cakes, and other holiday food items went through checkpoints without incident-though some items were subjected to additional screening.

The holiday spirit was on display as another passenger approached "TSO Dave" while he was helping bags through the X-ray machine and said: "You guys are doing a heck of a job today." Little things like that mean a lot.

While things went smoothly for the most part, there was one interesting moment around noon. As I was chatting with passengers and helping them with their bins, I noticed an Evian bottle with less than three ounces of red liquid in it under one of the metal tables situated in front of the X-ray conveyor belt. I picked it up, and let an officer know where I found it. He quickly placed the bottle into a little bowl and sent it through the X-ray machine. Based on the image displayed on our end, the officers was able to verify that the liquid was not in fact dangerous and disposed of it.* I love technology.

There's been plenty of articles out there about the decrease in traffic over the 2008 holiday season, but it was very clear from my first hand experience at BWI that TSA's officers, expeditious security features, and prepared travelers certainly helped the flow of traffic today.

It was an awesome experience to work with the BWI team and experience firsthand what they do every day.

Hopefully my experience at the checkpoint will continue through Sunday and Monday. Look for another post from my colleague Christine, who will be volunteering at Washington DC-Reagan National Airport on Monday.

Quick update: Traffic has just started to pick up (2:45pm), but all five lanes are still running smoothly. Family Lane is being used primarily by families. Special needs individuals (wheelchairs, etc.) are still being taken care of in all lanes.

Happy Thanksgiving and safe travels to all.

- Poster Paul


* Clarification: While X-ray can detect many things, it cannot detect all types of liquid explosives. That's why the 3-1-1 liquids rule was put in place in September 2006 and will remain in place until a technology solution is tested and deployed. In this case, when an abandoned item was found at a checkpoint, officers used available technology to screen it to ensure passengers' safety and then disposed of it.

Easy as Pie

I spoke with the TSA Contact center today to see what the number one travel question was so far this holiday season. Drum roll please…

Can I take my pie with me on the plane?

The answer is yes! Just send it through the X-ray and you’ll be one step closer to enjoying your delicious pie. We do suggest you take it as a carryon so it doesn’t get squashed in your checked luggage.

Mmmm. I like pie. I dig Pecan, Rhubarb and Sesame Seed pie. Mmmmm!

Have a great Thanksgiving!

Bob

TSA EoS Blog Team

Blogger Roundtable at TSA HQ with Secretary Chertoff and Administrator Hawley

On November 17, several bloggers gathered together at TSA Headquarters for a roundtable chat with DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff and TSA Administrator Kip Hawley.

The following bloggers accepted the invitation and participated in the roundtable:

Rich Cooper – Security Debrief

Jonah Czerwinski – Homeland Security Watch

Barbara Peterson – Conde Nast Traveler & Daily Traveler

Matt Phillips – Wall Street Journal & The Middle Seat Terminal

Tom Smith - ACI-NA

Benet Wilson – Aviation Week & Towers and Tarmacs

Chad Wolf – Security Debrief

You can read the entire transcript of the roundtable by clicking here.

Thanks,

Bob

EoS Blog Team

FAMS Director Comments on USA Today Story

A story in USA Today does a great disservice to the Federal Air Marshal Service. Like any law enforcement agency, a small percentage of bad apples always garner more media attention than the overwhelming number of outstanding professionals. While sensationalizing the regrettable acts of a very few may make for good front page news, it doesn’t tell anywhere near the whole story of an organization.

Since coming to the Federal Air Marshal Service more than five years ago and becoming Director in July, I have had the honor of serving alongside air marshals from all over the country. These are fine men and women who proudly carry out their mission of keeping air travel safe. One law enforcement officer joined the Federal Air Marshal Service after some of his family members were killed on one of the planes on 9/11. Another joined after helping to evacuate people from the Pentagon on 9/11, where his focus was so much on helping people that he didn’t notice the burns on his own body until later that day. In the last two years, more than 30 percent of our new hires were veterans.

While air marshals work behind the scenes, we cannot underestimate the value they add to aviation security throughout the country and the world. They put their lives on the line every day to keep passengers and flight crews safe. Among our ranks are military veterans, law enforcement officers, and other dedicated professionals from varied and accomplished backgrounds. All who join the ranks of the air marshal service have met the most stringent suitability standards and have successfully completed a rigorous 15-week training program.

That being said, there have been incidents of criminal misconduct with air marshals over the years. We take every allegation seriously, we investigate them thoroughly and if the allegations are true, we work to quickly remove the individual from our ranks while assuring them due process. Although the actual number of FAMs cannot be discussed publicly, the number of offenders is exceedingly small compared to the total members of our workforce.

As an organization that was quickly enlarged in the wake of 9/11, growing pains are expected. To understand the needs and concerns of our workforce, FAMS leadership has been engaging with our frontline workforce and maintaining regular dialogues with air marshals both in person and in other methods. We have held formal listening sessions with significant numbers of air marshals, and established communications networks to ensure we’re aware of field concerns that could affect our work.

I am proud of the men and women of the Federal Air Marshal Service, and I don’t want the public to think that the vast majority of federal air marshals are represented by the acts of a few who chose to misuse their position. Our workforce is highly trained, sincerely dedicated to their security mission and they work without personal credit for their successes.

Bob Bray

Director, Federal Air Marshal Service

Paperless Boarding Pass Testimonial

While scouring the internet for TSA related information, I came across an interesting testimonial regarding paperless boarding passes from a passenger who travelled through the Detroit Metro Airport. (DTW)

“Checked in online for my flight today and saw a new option show up for an E-Boarding pass at DTW (note: only for direct flights). I had to try it, clicked and within 20 seconds a SMS message showed up on my phone with a link to the E-Boarding pass with a barcode on my cell phone (PDA). Not wanting to risk missing my flight, I also went back in and printed a boarding pass as a backup, that I never had to use.

I had a lot of questions on how it would really work, especially with having to show your boarding pass when you walk under the TSA metal detector and have to show your boarding pass and you are not allowed to bring your cell phone through. So he is how it went today:

TSA Boarding Pass Check - they have a new bar code reader that you hold your phone up to and it reads the bar code and you show them your ID to match the name that shows up on the screen. They then give you a Tuit (a Poker Chip with TSA on it).TSA Screening - Just like normal, except you hand them the Tuit instead of showing them your Boarding Pass with the TSA checkers initials on it. Sorry, they have to keep the Tuit, I was hoping to start a new game to see who could collect the most Tuits in 1 year.WorldClub - I use the Amex Plat. Card, so I have to show a Boarding Pass, ID and the Amex Card. They also have the same bar code reader and I put my phone in front of it and it scanned. Good to go. Gate - I held my phone on top of the normal reader the GA's use and it read it and I boarded without any problems. The only comment from the GA was the the last guy who tried it, didn't work. I'm sold, will be using the new E-Boarding Pass from now on. Didn't slow me down; however, I did get a lot of stares/attention from fellow pax's as I pulled out my PDA at screening, WorldClubs, Gate. “

I’d be interested to see if any of our other readers have tried this yet. So, if you've used this, please tell us about it.

Also, for your viewing pleasure, check out this MSNBC clip.

Bob

TSA EoS Blog Team

Blogger Paul's Intro

It is with great pleasure that I begin my first official blog post at the TSA. I arrived at HQ last week with aspirations common to most recent college graduates. Pumped full of “unique” ideas that could potentially change the entire world, I decided to start with the TSA. My plan was simple and straight forward. I just needed someone in a position of authority to lend me their ear.

While my “unique” ideas are certain to be called into question from time to time, as a recent college graduate, my writing will attempt to synthesize an outsider’s perspective with insider knowledge. Having monitored the ongoing debate between TSA authorities and the public, I’ve discovered that both sides are (believe it or not) in agreement more often than they realize.

Since I don’t have the frontline experience like my colleague Bob, I’ll be spending the next few weeks meeting people here at TSA, spending time at local airports, and monitoring the blogosphere to see what other folks are talking about to come up with blog topics to cover.

Since I’ve come on board, I’ve spent some time at Baltimore Washington International Airport’s Southwest Airlines’ Terminal B learning about Checkpoint Evolution [link]. Like many travelers, the first thing I noticed was a wall of holograms and a faint blue glow from the lights lining the perimeter. As I wound my way through the line, I was greeted every so often by portraits of security officers (sometimes out of uniform) with brief bios below their pictures. Clearly, the intent behind these signs is to remind us that Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) are people just like the rest of us, and dedicated to their security mission. It was interesting to see that some are veterans or former law enforcement officers.

So here’s the overarching theory: when the checkpoint environment is calm and the majority of passengers lined up at a security checkpoint are relaxed (or as relaxed as anyone can reasonably be when trying to catch a flight), a suspicious person will oftentimes stand out in stark contrast from the rest of the crowd. Also, encouraging clear communication between security officers and passengers helps passengers understand the “why” behind the rules, and facilitates the flow of traffic through the security checkpoint.




Sure, lights and signs are nice, but they are not in and of themselves the main focus of Checkpoint Evolution. Aside from targeted technological improvements—such as Whole Body Imaging, advanced technology X-ray machines, and inter-officer communication via ear-piece—the greatest benefits to security and passengers’ experience come from one thing in particular: enhanced training. TSA officers I met at BWI have completed a 16-hour training course (although training is ongoing) that focuses on explosives detection, intelligence analysis, and techniques for improved passenger engagement, with the ultimate goal being threat detection. This training will be given to every frontline employee, and has already started in some airports.

I asked the BWI officers what they thought of Checkpoint Evolution and the response was very positive. “It has made our job a lot easier,” said one of the officers. “Striking up a casual conversation with passengers allows us to get a better feel for the situation—not to mention that it makes our day more pleasant.”

Next, I hope to attend some of the training sessions to see what they’re like and get more feedback. I’ll report on that later.

Now for the all important question: What do passengers think? I haven’t had the chance to chat with any Checkpoint Evolution veterans just yet, but if you’ve been through BWI’s Southwest Airlines’ Terminal B, let us know what you think by posting comments.

The Path Forward on Liquids

When it comes to liquids, everybody involved with checkpoint operations -- passengers, airlines, airports, and TSA employees -- agrees that there has to be a better way. Here’s my take on the path forward.

For this discussion, I am using “liquids” as short-hand for liquids, aerosols, and gels and other novel types of explosives.

Intelligence shows that terrorists innovate in explosives formulas as well as the way they would bring them onboard an aircraft. That won’t change any time soon. If liquid restrictions are eased eventually it will be because of improved process and technology, not diminished threat.

Technology

TSA uses several technologies that are effective against liquid and other novel explosives.

Standard X-Ray is deployed everywhere and can effectively identify the presence of liquids and their containers. It is not reliable in differentiating all threat liquids from non-threat liquids. It is effective in the 3-1-1 environment by identifying whether there are liquids hidden in a bag – thus it is useful as a compliance tool.

Advanced Technology “AT” X-Ray is the next generation of X-ray equipment that has technology to examine the dimensions and density of objects within a carry-on bag. 500-600 (out of a total of about 2,000 lanes) will be deployed by the end of 2008. TSA will come close to doubling that number in 2009. AT X-Ray has two major advantages over standard X-Ray:

1) Better image resolution from the hardware side – it uses multiple view points; and

2) Smarter software. The image resolution benefit is immediate; the software will be improved over time.

More than 6,500 Trace Detection “ETD” units are deployed at both checkpoints and checked baggage areas to detect minute particles of explosives residue through the collection of trace samples. TSA has several hundred handheld ETD’s that are capable of detecting explosives particles as well as vapor.

Computed Tomography (CT) Scanners are checkpoint-sized versions of the large checked baggage scanners that have MRI-like capability that will detect anything – solids and liquids. They are large and expensive so TSA does not have many of them. We will be deploying them in smaller airports to screen both carry-on and checked baggage.

Several hundred bottle scanners - handheld or bench-top devices –are deployed throughout the country to provide TSA with the capability to differentiate liquid explosives from common, benign liquids. We use them to test exception liquids (medical needs above 3.4 ounces) and for spot checking passengers and bags.

Spectrometers, very advanced handheld units that can resolve any threat regardless of the chemistry involved, have been issued to TSA Bomb Appraisal Officers at major airports.

Hundreds of dropper-based or test strip-based chemical analyzers kits are deployed at smaller airports to resolve any concerns about individual exempt liquids larger than 3-1-1 in carry-ons.

About 40 Whole Body Imagers are deployed to larger airports around the country to date, and about 80 more will be deployed by spring-time. These are the walk-in portals that scan the body and can detect concealed items, including liquids.

And while they’re not actually a technology, it is important to note that about 2,000 TSA officers have been specially trained in Behavior Detection.

In addition, every officer in the country is receiving two days of specialized training – going on right now – to get at evolving threats, including liquids. To keep current, TSA runs IED drills every shift across the country, every day.

K-9 Teams (over 500) are another effective explosives detection capability and we use them in passenger areas, around the airport, and have several hundred additional teams just for air cargo.

Path Forward

We are deploying the best technology and training as fast as we can get it. The goal is to remove all the restrictions on liquids when we have automated systems that can accurately separate threat from non-threat liquids. Here’s the plan:

Now: We are pretty close to having a network of AT-X-Ray deployed so that nearly 70% of daily passengers will be using major airports with AT. TSA is getting the hardware installed so that when the software is ready in the next year or so, all we have to do is a software upgrade. We will be testing software versions in the coming months.

Fall-2009: Size restriction removed, but all liquids will have to be placed in a separate bin. AT X-Ray software will be advanced enough to tell the difference between threat and non-threat but not yet proven to tell the difference when it is hidden in a bag.

End of 2010: No restrictions. AT X-Ray will have upgraded software that is proven to detect threat liquids in any configuration and is deployed in enough places so that TSA can change the rules to meet one uniform standard for the country.

Next Steps

TSA is working with our partners around the world to share technology both ways and this has resulted in a faster development process and will mean that there could be common design standards with major partners like Canada, the EU, and Australia.

It is also likely that when the U.S. takes steps on liquid restrictions, we will do so in harmony with others, as we did with the 3-1-1 (three ounce container/one quart bag/one bag per person) liquids rule. It is fair to say that we and our global partners see the threat in the same way and know that a common, high level of security encompassing a large part of the world is in everybody’s best interests.

Right now at home, we’re looking at some short term options based on passenger feedback and input from airports and airlines. We think there is an opportunity to build on the Diamond Self-Select lanes systems that we have tried in 2008.

The Diamond Self-Select lanes system, where expert travelers and families choose the lane best suited for them, has worked well. The expert lanes are fast and the Family lanes are hassle-free and they are at 45 airports today. TSA, airports, and airlines can further develop that concept, and we’re looking at something along the following lines.

- Limit the Black Diamond (Expert) lanes more formally beyond self-select.

• By number or size of carry-ons?
• By 3-1-1 only, no exception liquids?

- Focus liquid detection technology at the Family/Special Needs lanes and ask those with exception liquids to go there – speeding up the other lanes in the process?

Liquids restrictions are with us for the better part of the next year but we all realize that a simple, hassle-free security process is good for passengers and security too. Thank you for coming to TSA.gov and I am looking forward to your feedback.

Kip Hawley

***Update 10/27/08***

3 oz or 3.4 oz? What gives???

OK, here’s the scoop. If the U.S. would have switched to the metrics system in the 70s, this wouldn’t be an issue.

When the TSA lifted the total liquid ban and implemented the 3-1-1 program, the permissible amount of liquids, aerosols and gels was 3oz. Press releases went out, WebPages were updated, and signs were printed and shipped out nationwide to 457 airports. A lot of work went into the 3-1-1 campaign.

When the TSA rolled this out, the European Union was not on board yet. When the EU decided to allow liquids to travel, the amount permitted was 100ml. Well, as we all know, 100ml = 3.4oz. not 3 oz.

In order to align with the EU, we decided to allow liquids in containers up to 3.4oz, but we decided to keep our signage the same. The 3-1-1 program was so successful, that it would have been a shame to change it to 3.4-1-1. J

TSOs nationwide should be allowing liquids up to 3.4oz. If they are not, you can ask for a supervisor or you can use our Got Feedback program.

Bob
EoS Blog Team

TSA’s Take on the Atlantic Article

Bruce Schneier and others have raised a number of good issues about TSA’s role in aviation security but veer off course when our work is described as ‘security theater.’ Some examples from a recent article in the Atlantic magazine are worth examining and I would put them in three categories as they represent three different layers of security: 1) items carried through checkpoints on the body; 2) watch-lists and boarding passes; and 3) behavior detection. The comments about TSA not hassling the reporter for carrying a Hezbollah flag or AQ T-shirt are more in the entertainment category along with the thought of splashing water on your face to simulate sweating as a demonstration that behavior detection doesn’t work.

Items carried on the person, be they a ‘beer belly’ or concealed objects in very private areas, are why we are buying over 100 whole body imagers in upcoming months and will deploy more over time. In the meantime, we use hand-held devices that detect hydrogen peroxide and other explosives compounds as well as targeted pat-downs that require private screening.

Watch-lists and identity checks are important and effective security measures. We identify dozens of terrorist-related individuals a week and stop No-Flys regularly with our watch-list process. Dozens more people with security concerns are identified through finding altered or forged documents, including boarding passes. Using stolen credit cards and false documents as a way to get around watch-lists makes the point that forcing terrorists to use increasingly risky tactics has its own security value. Boarding pass scanners and encryption are being tested in eight airports now and more will be coming.

Behavior detection works and we have 2,000 trained officers at airports today. They alert us to people who may pose a threat but who may also have items that could elude other layers of physical security.

The bigger point is that there are vulnerabilities everywhere and we use multiple layers of different security measures to protect us all from instances where one vulnerability can be exploited. The standard for TSA is not perfection, but material reduction of risk.

Clever terrorists can use innovative ways to exploit vulnerabilities. But don’t forget that most bombers are not, in fact, clever. Living bomb-makers are usually clever, but the person agreeing to carry it may not be super smart. Even if “all” we do is stop dumb terrorists, we are reducing risk.

Stopping the ‘James Bond’ terrorist is truly a team effort and I whole-heartedly agree that the best way to stop those attacks is with intelligence and law enforcement working together. Anyone who knows would tell you that TSA is, in fact, an intelligence-driven operation, working daily with our colleagues throughout the counter-terrorism community in that common effort.

Kip Hawley

From Obscurity to Oprah

A few weeks ago, I started what began as a normal day. I got up and got ready for work just as I would any other day. I'm a Behavior Detection Officer at TSA, working behind the scenes in airport security. Just before leaving my house, I noticed a message on my cell phone and checked it. Shortly thereafter, my day would be anything but normal. It was a call from TSA public affairs saying that they wanted me to fly to Chicago to tape a minute segment for the Oprah Winfrey Show. After a few moments of thinking "this must be some kind of joke," I called the office only to find out that it was very real. Six hours later, I was boarding a plane on my way to Chicago.

There were thunderstorms and traffic was horrible. We almost missed the meeting. Finally, discussions with the producers at Harpo studios made the trip worthwhile. Instead of a pre-recorded segment, they invited me to return to participate in taping the show with Oprah!

The issue of the episode: "Is America changing from the land of the free to the land of the rude?" Now granted, I am certain that we can all share some doozies - TSO's and passengers alike - but I can only speak for myself. Are we moving farther away from civility? Is rudeness the rule versus the exception? I had the opportunity to share my experiences as a uniformed transportation security and behavior detection officer. The episode will air tomorrow, Wednesday, October 15.

It was a wonderful experience that I will never forget. I hope the show sheds some light for people - it has certainly made me more aware of my actions and I hope it will do the same for others. As a result, I will try even harder to be kinder, gentler, and above all else, choose to be civil.

If you have the chance to watch the episode tomorrow - passengers and TSA officers - check back to the blog and share your thoughts. This could be an interesting dialogue to improve how we interact at the checkpoint.

Stephanie

Guest EoS Blogger

Zero Tolerance

Transportation security officers nationwide are shaking their heads after hearing about a fellow officer’s sticky fingers in Newark. It’s a kick in the gut for each of the 43,000 officers who are honest, hardworking, and take pride in their mission of keeping passengers safe. We are well aware of how folks forget about the important role TSA's officers have in security and remember events such as this one.

As a former officer myself, I just want to be clear that the actions of this individual are absolutely unacceptable and his actions in no way represent the overwhelming majority of hard working officers in airports around the country.

Federal investigators have charged the officer with theft and he is scheduled to appear in federal court today. TSA's Office of Inspection worked closely with DHS investigators to bring charges against the officer and execute a search warrant for the officer’s home. He faces 10 years in prison if convicted. The officer will eventually be terminated. Zero tolerance!

As we have mentioned before, when airports receive claims reports for stolen items, TSA's local management monitors them to look for trends and anomalies. If they see anything repetitive or suspicious, they can call in TSA's Office of Inspection to conduct an investigation. The Office of Inspection then works with federal and local law enforcement to resolve the case.

TSA has zero tolerance for theft and has gone as far as to terminate an officer for stealing pocket change totaling less than a dollar. Since May 1, 2003, less than 500* officers have been terminated for theft, which represents less than 1/2 of one percent of all officers. Unfortunately, this tiny fraction of officers causes damage that is hard to repair.

* Edited to change number from less than 300 to less than 500.

Bob

EoS Blog Team

Message In a Carry-On

As some of you might have seen on other blogs, Evan Roth is an artist who is designing personalized messages you can send to TSA security officers. He laser cuts the letters out of a sheet of stainless steel. The sheet is designed to be placed inside of a passenger’s bag so they can send personal messages to the officer. Have to give the guy credit, he’s creative. Even we got a laugh out of it.
This may seem like a clever gag, but actually the joke is on whoever decides to use one of these plates. Based on the preliminary examples shown on Mr. Roth’s web page, the metal plate will get the passenger’s bag searched every time. And no, it’s not because of what the plate says, it’s because the metal plate acts as a shield and conceals items below it. If an officer can’t get a good look at what’s in the bag, it’s “bag check” time. Fair warning: there are detailed procedures on how to search this type of bag and it’s not one of our quicker searches.

Mr. Roth goes on to explain that you can get your message across with his creation while also obscuring the contents you don’t want the TSA to see. After rubbing my goatee for a second, it was clear to me as to why Evan is an “artist” and not in the security business. Here’s the problem - many folks who might think it’s funny to “talk back” to TSA won’t be too happy when they find themselves spending extra time in the security line. Here’s the reality of what could happen:

1) You could be cited for interfering with the screening process by deliberately causing a distraction.

2) If there is a prohibited item concealed underneath the plate, you will be cited for artful concealment of a prohibited item.

3) If the message on the plate could be interpreted as a threat, you could be responsible for the closing of a checkpoint, not to mention the inconvenience you’ve just caused your fellow travelers.

4) Whoever is in line behind you will now have to wait even longer to get through the screening process.

So before you put your order in, please be aware of what could happen.

By the way, I thought this one was pretty funny.

Pilots for Pilots

One of the requirements of the 9/11 Bill asked TSA to look at ways to enhance security by identifying airline flight deck crew members (pilots) and giving them a faster way to get through security.

TSA is now piloting a couple of ways to meet this requirement, which will get pilots to their planes a little faster without compromising security.

The Airline Pilots Association (ALPA) is currently testing a system called CrewPass at Baltimore Washington Thurgood Marshall International Airport (BWI), Pittsburgh International Airport (PIT) and Columbia Metropolitan Airport (CAE) in South Carolina. At these three airports, pilots using specified exit lanes approach the Transportation Security Officer at the podium and present their airline badge. The officer enters the pilot’s badge number into a device. The pilot’s face appears on the screen allowing the officer to ensure that both faces match up.

Concurrently, testing of another system is being done at BWI called Secure Screen. Developed with Southwest Airlines, this program is currently in use for participating Southwest Airline pilots only flying out of BWI. Similar to CrewPass, they arrive at a specified exit lane and approach the officer on duty. They present their pilot’s badge and at the same time enter a “clear key” - similar to a USB drive - into a reader. The reader displays the photo of the pilot and waits for the pilot to place their thumb or finger on the clear key. The system verifies that the biometric thumb print matches the fingerprint being placed on it. This system combines identification verification with a biometric component.


Commercial flight deck crew members are responsible for the safety of hundreds of passengers at any time and are trusted to operate million dollar aircraft on a daily basis. Allowing them to move more efficiently through the security process, while also being able to verify they are who they say they are, fits into our risk-based security approach.


Bob

EoS Blog Team

Seven Years Later

As many of us reflect on 9/11, I wanted to share the story about how I came to TSA and what it meant to wear the TSA uniform. In September 2001, I lived in Fairfield, Ohio and was living the rock and roll dream as a musician. My wife was working third shift. When I got out of bed on 9/11, my wife was still sound asleep.

I went through my normal morning routine, making coffee and reading the news on the internet. I pulled up CNN and read a developing story about a plane that had just hit the World Trade Center. The first thing I thought of was the B-25 Bomber Plane that hit the Empire State Building in 1945. I was sure it had to be a similar type of accident.

I turned on the television and saw the World Trade Center tower on fire with giant plumes of smoke pouring out. Nobody quite knew what to make of it, but it was all too apparent what was going on after the second plane hit the south tower. America was under attack.

As I watched the news, my wife slept peacefully. I couldn’t bring myself to wake her. The world she knew when she went to bed that night would never be the same again.

It was hard for me to believe that I was feeling the same things as I had more than ten years earlier when the first Gulf War ground effort began. In 1991, I wore the uniform of a soldier of the United States Army while serving in the Persian Gulf with the 3rd Armored Division.

Thinking back, I remember wishing I was still in the Army so I could do something. In my college political science class, we talked about terrorism coming to America. I knew this was just the beginning and we’d get hit again eventually. So when I read about the formation of TSA, I was intrigued. I jumped at the chance to serve my country again. I proudly wore a new uniform, this time the one of at Transportation Security Officer, and serving again on the frontline to prevent another attack. Many other former military folks joined TSA along with me - today 25 percent of our frontline officers are veterans. Others also jumped at the chance to serve their country. I actually met people that took a pay cut to come work for TSA because the mission and the job meant that much.

The uniforms we wore weren’t the greatest, but we were proud to wear them. They identified us as frontline officers serving in the war against terrorism. Today, at airports around the country, passengers will see the new TSA uniform. I think the blue shirts look better, but most importantly, they better represent the dedication and professionalism of our officers. They also represent the evolution of our agency. The training, experience and nature of an officer's work today are far different than the job of a pre-9/11 "screener."

The uniform and badge are part of a series of changes at TSA, both cultural and operational. Soon, every person on the frontline, both officers and managers, will undergo two full days of revolutionary new training that will continue to change the focus from looking for bad things to looking for bad people. Security isn't better when officers follow a static checklist mentality - it's better when officers use their experience, judgment and training to assess the whole situation and look for the people with intent to do harm - people who might use common, everyday items like drinks or remote control toys converted into IEDs. That's why looking at behavior and other anomalies are so important.

Thinking back to 9/11 and when I joined TSA, I remember how people often said hello and even shook our hands. For the traveling public, it's been seven years without an attack in the U.S., and to many, the rules are now burdensome and our checkpoints are a necessary evil. For officers, it's one day at a time, with some days when you find a gun, a knife, hollowed out shoes, or items in bags that look like plastic explosives or an IED. Things that make the hair on the back of your neck stand up, your heart stop, because it's a threat until you can prove it's not one. It happens far more than you think, so when an officer asks to get a better look at you or your bag, know that it's because they want to make sure everything's okay.

Today, at airports around the country, officers on duty at 8:46 a.m. participated in a moment of silence to mark 9/11. The new uniform also carries a reminder of 9/11. If you look closely at the patch on an officer's left shoulder, you’ll see nine stars and eleven stripes behind the eagle. If you look at the eagle’s wing, you will see the Twin Towers. We think about it all the time so passengers can get safely to their destination. Our personal creed is “not on my watch.”

Bob

EoS Blog Team

An Update on Checkpoint Friendly Laptop Bags

It’s been almost a month since we launched our new laptop bag procedures. As expected, there have been a few folks (including my Dad) who thought they could just leave their laptops in any old bag with cables and gadgets galore. We expected some confusion and just like any new procedure we’ve rolled out, we’re hopeful that the majority of folks will get the hang of it pretty quick. We put together a video that might help some of you out.

Click here to see a video on new laptop bag procedures.

Here are a couple of laptop bag related stories I found on the web.

USA Today: Flyers Cheer Laptop Policy Change

Jet with Kids: Airport Security and Laptops – Reporting Back (Lessons Learned)

But enough of my yackin’ – I wanted to share what others who have tried the new process had to say. Please remember that TSA does not endorse any of these bags specifically, we’re just sharing the insights and experiences of the travelers.

ZD Net: The Mobile Gadgeteer

Laptop Mag: Checkpoint-Friendly Laptop Bag: It Works

PC World: Road Test: Checkpoint Friendly Laptop Bags

In case you missed it, check out our original blog post announcing the launch of the new laptop bag procedures.

Bob

EoS Blog Team

Information on the Chicago Aircraft Inspections

There have been some questions on our blog and elsewhere about the Chicago aircraft inspections.

Also, I've noticed some confusion out there, so please note that this involved a Transportation Security Inspector, (TSI) not a Transportation Security Officer. (TSO)

Here's what we posted on our website.

On August 19 a Transportation Security Inspector (TSI) was conducting a routine compliance inspection on aircraft parked on the airfield at Chicago’s O’Hare Airport (ORD). The TSI inspected nine American Eagle aircraft to look for and test, among other things, access vulnerabilities or areas were someone with ill intent could gain access to the aircraft.

Aircraft operators are required to secure each aircraft when left unattended.

The TSIs are encouraged to look for and follow through on vulnerabilities. During the inspection process at ORD the Inspector used a Total Air Temperature (TAT) probe – a probe that protrudes from the side of the aircraft that is used to measure outside air temperature – to pull himself up while investigating possible access vulnerabilities with the unattended aircraft.

The Inspector was following through on regulatory inspection activity. The Inspector was able to gain access to the interior of seven of the nine aircraft inspected, which is an apparent violation of the airline’s security program. TSA is reviewing the inspection results and depending on the conclusion, could take action with the airline, up to and including levying of civil penalties.

While the inspection process is a vital layer of aviation security, it is not TSA’s intent to cause delays or potential damage to aircraft as a result of our inspections. TSA took immediate steps to re-enforce education about sensitive equipment located on the exterior of a plane.

---

Facts:

• TSA has 1,465 Transportation Security Inspectors at almost 150 airports that can cover all modes of transportation.
  
  
  • 535 in air cargo (including 85 dedicated canine teams)
  
  
  • 755 in aviation
  
  
  • 175 in surface transportation modes)

TSIs undergo a 4-week basic training course that consists of security regulations overview, inspection procedures, and safety briefings. TSIs are also trained through a formal on-the-job training program and periodic formal recurrent training. Additionally, Inspectors receive local safety training at each airport when they receive their airport identification.

Bob
EoS Blog Team

Covert Testing Results Critical to Security

Recently, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report on TSA’s covert testing program. We’ve written about the report and posted it on our website. Some media and blogs have covered the report and created some misperceptions along the way –headlines like: “TSA Doesn’t Look Into Airport Security Screener Failures don’t help. So we wanted to talk a bit about the covert testing process at TSA.

TSA undergoes cover testing by three entities: The GAO, the DHS Inspector General and TSA’s own Office of Inspection. The recent GAO report focused on TSA’s covert testing procedures. During the course of the year long GAO review, the auditors examined all TSA covert test reports and recommendations, and had access to new policy or Standard Operating Procedure changes derived from the covert test recommendations. Many of the changes are in place today to further enhance the safety and security of the traveling public.

The report validated TSA’s covert testing program and included some recommendations. The recommendation that is causing confusion deals with the way TSA records test failures.

GAO recommended that TSA include a line item in our database for "failures." One would assume “failure” means someone missed an IED, but in fact the failure could be in how a rule is applied, how a technology functions in a specific airport, or how a procedure requires follow-up on an alarm. Because of the vast amount of qualitative information recorded by testers, they write more detailed explanations of failures in a written report instead of a line item in a database. We did, however, concur with the GAO recommendation and have now added a category to the data base on failures in addition to the more detailed reports we’ll continue to do.

The specific misperception we wanted to clear up is what we do with the test results. In some of the blog coverage I’ve seen, including the link mentioned above, some think we don’t do anything with the test results, which is far from the truth. These results are critical to closing security gaps in individual airports and throughout the entire aviation system. As soon as a covert test is completed in an airport, the findings are shared with the TSA leadership there, noting areas for improvement, whether it be in the application of Standard Operating Procedures, use of technology or other areas. The testers also meet with Transportation Security Officers after the testing is completed to show them where mistakes were made and offer suggestions to immediately close any security gap.

After the airport staff is briefed, the testers conduct a briefing to TSA senior staff to show them the failures and recommendations. Information is shared with the Office of Security Operations, which oversees TSA operations at airports nationwide. This gives headquarters an opportunity to look at results at one airport to see if there are implications for the whole aviation network. As needed, Standard Operating Procedures and training could be changed, technology is tweaked, and processes can be changed at the national level based on covert tests.

Bottom line: we take these results – and the results of GAO and the DHS Inspector General - very seriously and TSA constantly uses them to improve security.

Lynn,

EoS Blog Team

Keep Your Lap Top IN if you have a “Checkpoint Friendly” Bag

James Brown once sang Papa's Got a Brand New Bag. Well, it may be a different kind of bag than what the Godfather was singing about, but now everybody can feel better than James Brown and keep their laptop in their “checkpoint friendly” bag as long it meets certain criteria. You may already own a “checkpoint friendly” bag and not even know it.

Tomorrow (8/16) is the day that new laptop procedures roll out nationwide.

For all of you Debbie Downers out there, we realize that purchasing or owning one of these bags isn’t your free ticket to never have your laptop searched again. However, there is a darned good chance that your laptop won’t be searched. To put it in perspective, how many times has your laptop been searched when it’s been out of the bag? It’s pretty rare.

Just think of it this way, as long as there is nothing in your bag besides the laptop, you’re good to go. But, please remember that our Officers are trained to look for anomalies and if something looks odd or out of place, they will search your laptop. Next time you go through security, look around and see how many laptops are undergoing secondary screening. It’s rare.

Now I know what you’re thinking. You’re a road warrior and you’ve got all sorts of cables, adapters, gadgets and gizmos. You’re probably wondering where you’re going to put all of that stuff. Have no fear, several manufacturers have been hard at work designing bags that meet “checkpoint friendly” criteria. Just Google “checkpoint friendly laptop bags” and you’ll have a wide variety to choose from. Just remember, the TSA does not endorse any of these bags and you’ll need to be aware of our criteria to ensure you buy the right type of bag. These are some examples of bags that meet our criteria.

This new procedure will make things a little easier for our travelers while lessening the amount of preparation and recomposure time. Hopefully this will reduce your hassle factor at the checkpoint and make for happier passengers and happy passengers make the bad guys stand out.

Happy traveling and we hope to hear from you here about your experiences with the new procedures.

Blogger Bob

EoS Blog Team

You won’t be put on a TSA “List” if you forget Your ID

“Lack of ID put fliers on TSA list.”

This USA Today story perpetuates exactly the type of misperceptions that damage the credibility of a system designed to protect the traveling public in a post 9/11 world. The paper was careful not to be inaccurate but omitted information we provided that would have given a more balanced perspective.

An August 13 USA Today article overstated the Transportation Security Administration’s interest in passengers who come to airport checkpoints without identification but cooperate in establishing their identity. The story gives the public the impression they might be put on a “list” if they forget their ID. That is false.

Passengers whose identity is confirmed will not be added to any watch list or face additional scrutiny during future checkpoint visits.

When it comes to security, identity matters. Positively identifying passengers is a critical tool in TSA’s multi-layered approach to security and one that has been bolstered significantly during the past 18 months. On June 21 enhanced identification requirements went into effect and passengers now have to be positively identified before proceeding past the checkpoint. This makes sense because our law enforcement and intelligence partners go to great lengths to identify people planning attacks on aircraft. It is our obligation to stop them once they have been identified.

Since the new requirements went into effect, 16,434 people nationwide have come to the checkpoint without identification for a variety of reasons. The identity of these individuals was successfully resolved in all but 558 instances. This was during a period of time that 92 million people flew in the United States.

TSA collects real-time information from airports across the country so that our operation center can look for patterns and data points of significant security value. The information is only shared with other law enforcement partners on a need-to-know basis. The ability to "connect the dots" on emerging situations can not be underestimated. In the post 9/11 world, such analysis is so fundamental to protecting the American public that it was a recommendation of the 9/11 Commission.

Because our mission requires this capability, we do collect information about individuals who present false identification or misrepresent themselves to get in an airplane.

TSA EoS Blog Team

Furthering the Dialogue on IDs

This post is from TSA's Chief Counsel Francine Kerner. It was originally intended to be a response in the comments section to answer some ID questions, but we thought it deserved its own post. Thanks to Francine for taking the time to provide this well thought out and very informative response.

I would like to share my perspective of this issue and my legal analysis. From my perspective, in considering these matters, we need to go back to first principles: what security goals are we trying to achieve? One goal is to ensure that bad things are kept out of the sterile area. Another goal is to ensure that known or suspected terrorists are kept out of the secure areas of the airport and off airplanes. We simply do not want to provide a terrorist with access to the aviation transportation system to plan, plot or carry out criminal acts.

To achieve the first goal, keeping out bad things, we perform a physical examination of passengers, employees and other individual who enter the secure areas of the airport. We also perform a physical examination of their property. Sometimes these security measures take place at the checkpoint. Sometimes they take place at other entrances to the airport.

To achieve the second goal, prohibiting entry by known or suspected terrorists (regardless of what they are carrying), we perform or cause others to perform an identity check against government databases. Identity vetting of airport or airline employees is a rigorous process that is based on a collection of fingerprints, a criminal history records check, and a security threat assessment.

Of obvious necessity, identity vetting of passengers is handled differently. I think of it as a two-step process, a responsibility shared between the air carriers and TSA. The air carriers compare a passenger's name to government watch-lists, while TSA ensures that the name provided to a carrier, as reflected on the boarding pass, matches the ID that the passenger is carrying.

It is instructive to note that before September 11, under government directive, air carriers were required to check a passenger's name against government watch-lists and confirm a passenger's identity by examining specified forms of identification.

Over the last year or more, TSA has taken over the identity verification process, stationing TSOs before the checkpoint to perform this function. More recently, TSA has determined that passengers who fail to show ID must otherwise assist in confirming their identity before being permitted sterile area entry. All of these steps have been taken to improve aviation security. Real ID and Secure Flight are other government programs that will continue to strengthen the identity vetting process.

As Chief Counsel, I firmly believe that TSA's ID requirements are warranted from a security perspective and entirely legal. Under a TSA regulatory provision, 49 C.F.R. § 1540.105(a)(2), a person may not enter the sterile area “without complying with the systems, measures, or procedures” applied to control access to the restricted area in question. Verifying the identity of passengers who access the sterile area falls within this rubric and is, in fact, part of TSA’s screening process. It is true that an earlier regulatory provision, 49 C.F.R. § 1540.5, which sets forth definitions, states that access to the sterile area is “generally” controlled through the “screening” of persons and property and that “screening function means the inspection of individuals and property for weapons, explosives, and incendiaries.” The definition of “screening function,” which focuses on physical inspection—the most intrusive form of screening—cannot be read to limit the Administrator’s broad expanse of authority under the operative language of section 1540.105(a)(2) to establish “systems, measures or procedures” governing sterile area access, including an ID screening process. Certainly, the common definition of screening encompasses methods other than physical intrusion. One definition of screening listed by Google reads as follows: “Is the person on a watch-list? Biometric information can be used to determine if a person is cleared to be in a restricted area, or if the person is on a watch list (eg the FBI Most Wanted list).” Similarly, under section 1602(a)(5) of the 9/11 Implementation Act, H.R. 1, the definition of cargo “screening” includes methods other than physical inspection. Given the Administrator’s fundamental statutory responsibility pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 44901 to secure the aviation transportation system, a unduly narrow construction of § 1540.105(a)(5) cannot be justified.

I hope my response furthers the dialogue on these important issues. Thank you again for raising your concerns.

Francine Kerner

EoS Blog Contributor

Encryption Is the Issue In Case of Missing Laptop

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) continues to investigate the circumstances surrounding the loss of a Clear®- owned laptop computer on July 26 that contained unencrypted data of approximately 33,000 customers. TSA has verified that a laptop was discovered by Clear® officials yesterday at San Francisco International Airport (SFO). It was voluntarily surrendered to TSA officials for forensic examination.

TSA’s regulatory role in this matter is as follows: Every commercial airport is required to have an approved airport security plan. So Registered Traveler is part of that comprehensive plan at the airports where it operates. Under the airport security plan, the sponsoring entity, (SFO in this case) is required to assure its vendors have an approved information security program. Because the computer at SFO was not encrypted it is in violation of the airport’s security plan.

TSA also has the ability to go directly to vendors when the plan is not being adhered to so TSA is conducting a broad review of all Registered Traveler providers’ information systems and data security processes to ensure compliance with security regulations.

Clear® needs to meet the information security requirements that they agreed to as part of the Register Traveler program before their enrollment privileges will be reinstated. Encryption is the wider issue as opposed to one incident with one laptop. So for now, Clear® enrollments remain curtailed.

Current customers will not experience any disruption when using Registered Traveler.

Eos Blog Team

Answers to Your Top 10 Questions

Here are the top ten questions we received from our recent request. We tallied the number of times we received each question or a similar version of it and noted the total for each question below. Thanks to the Office of Chief Counsel, Privacy Office and Kip for helping us provide you with the answers.

10) What immediate measures can a person take when encountering a less than friendly TSA agent? 12 of our readers asked this question.

First, you can request a lead or supervisor. If you're not satisfied after speaking with a lead or supervisor, you can request a manager. If you're in a hurry and don't have time to talk, or if you are not comfortable making your complaint in person, you can visit our new Got Feedback? web page. "Got Feedback?" is a new program that allows passengers to contact us via e-mail with very specific questions, comments, complaints, etc. Rather than your e-mail being sent to a single mail box where it sits in the queue waiting for a response, it is actually sent directly to the TSA Customer Support Manager at the airport your feedback concerns. Upon request, the Customer Service manager will contact you. Click here to read more about the "Got Feedback?" program.

Our officers have a tough job, and they are there to protect you and your family. Everyone at TSA appreciates the support of the traveling public, including those who express their support with their courteous behavior and words of support.

9) Do any members of the Blog team actively perform screening functions? 12 of our readers asked this question.

Not currently. When Bob joined the blog team, he was a Behavior Detection Officer based out of Cincinnati and a former Transportation Security Officer who performed screening duties. Bob eventually came to headquarters as a full-time blog team member. So, while Bob has 5 ½ years experience in various screening functions, he is no longer a TSO/BDO.

While not in a screening function, Jay is a Federal Security Director for an airport in the Midwest. He oversees screening operations at about 10 airports of varying sizes. Also, we had a TSO contribute as a guest blogger and write an article on Checkpoint Evolution.

There are currently many TSOs and other field employees actively involved commenting on the blog, and we appreciate their participation.

We will continue to invite members of the workforce to weigh in on the blog to keep it relevant to what is happening in airports. The blog will improve as we add new folks with various areas of expertise.

8) Why do you have access to my political affiliation? 13 of our readers asked this question.

"It's unequivocally not our policy to use political, religious, or other sensitive personal topics as identity validation. If it happened, it was wrong and will not be repeated." Administrator Kip Hawley

Perhaps you're asking this question because of a recent story about a person who said that their identity was verified at a checkpoint by asking their political affiliation. Early on, there was a case where the operations call center ran a passenger's information through their database (which includes commercial data) for a passenger without ID, and found no significant information to verify their identity. One thing that did come up was political donations for a person with the same name. Political donations are a matter of public record and accessible to anyone with basic Internet search skills. As a last ditch effort to help the passenger, a decision was made to ask them about their political affiliation. It was a mistake.

7) Why has TSA restarted the pointless gate screening? If the sterile area is in fact sterile, there's no need to screen those who have already been screened. 13 of our readers asked this question.

In reality, we do very little screening of bags at gates. We do, however, conduct a great deal of additional security in the sterile area. For instance, we have Behavior Detection Officers and K-9 teams on regular patrols as well as undercover Federal Air Marshals throughout the sterile area. Not to mention video coverage. We want to pick up on people who may be doing surveillance or attempting to prepare for a later attack. We are interested in activity around gates, but also restaurants, Duty Free shops, and other common areas.

As to gate screening itself, we have special purpose checks for specific items and behaviors. We may also have a particular interest in different flights. We layer in some random activities so as not to raise attention when we do have a specific interest. You may see our inspectors with new portable explosives detection devices that go onboard an aircraft ahead of boarding and check employees with access to the aircraft, including catering.

TSA’s overall strategy is to incorporate mobile, unpredictable, intelligence-driven security measures in ways that frustrate a terrorist planner seeking to engineer attacks against an easier, stationary target. We do not, as the question suggests, do gate screening of bags merely to re-do what we already did at the checkpoint.

Click here to watch a short video on gate screening.

6) I had a TSA agent tell me that each airport is free to implement security standards beyond those listed on the TSA site -- meaning that they could restrict items from being allowed in carry-on baggage that are explicitly allowed according to the TSA site. 14 of our readers asked this question.

There is a standard list of prohibited items that is available on our Web site to anybody with an internet connection, including terrorists. Clearly we have to pay attention to those items, since they are obvious tools of would-be attackers.

We cannot, however, fixate on those items and think that if we stop them, we're safe. Terrorists know TSA's standard operating procedures and work on how to engineer around them. Look no further than the August '06 London bomb plot with liquid sports drinks. If those terrorists had made it to the checkpoint, many of the items they were bringing would have been extremely hard to identify.

TSA is moving the focus of our officers from a checklist mentality to an empowered environment where officers use their experience and training -- and trust their instincts. The TSA workforce has screened more than 3 billion people, about half the population of the earth. We have a good handle on what "normal" looks like. Anything out of the "normal" range may get additional scrutiny, whether or not it is on the prohibited items list. That could mean a variety of things from a more thorough physical search to a seemingly casual conversation. It depends on what the anomaly might be. We know that with many layers of security the thinking, engaged and experienced TSO will be the one to stop an attack.

TSA is committed to using the judgment and experience of our officers to keep the security advantage. TSA is embarking on a two-day training for all officers that will tie together the latest intelligence analysis, more advanced explosives detection skills, and ways to engage with passengers in a way that promotes a calmer environment and better security result. It uses the physical checkpoint to our advantage to improve security.

5) Why doesn't TSA consider items being stolen from checked bags a security threat? Dangerous items could just as easily be ADDED to luggage. 15 of our readers asked this question.

We do! We consider every opportunity for someone to get a weapon or a bomb onto a plane and use a variety of methods to ensure there's something in place to mitigate that threat.

Specifically, there are video monitoring systems in places where individuals have access to checked bags, both airline baggage handling areas and TSA inspection stations.
Beyond that, we have a multi-layered approach to security, because if one layer gets breached, another layer or layers can step in to fill the gap. Let's focus on layers that directly affect your question.

TSA does background checks on and issues credentials to all employees who work in the secure area of the airport – which includes people handling baggage. TSA also conducts random employee screening every day in airports to ensure only people with proper and valid credentials get into the secure area.

TSA initiates internal investigations or ‘stings’ if we have a concern. When caught, arrests are made and serious federal charges are brought. Also, behavior detection officers are trained to spot suspicious behavior anywhere in the airport.

It's also important to note that employees who work in the airport often see the same people day in and day out, and know when something doesn't seem right. While they don't always work for TSA, they are another set of eyes and ears keeping watch for your safety.

4) Where is the Privacy Impact Assessment for the form that TSA provides to people who claim to be unable to present credentials at TSA airport checkpoints? 15 of our readers asked this question.

The Privacy Impact Assessment, or PIA, that covers the information collection and handling associated with identity verification is the Operations Center Information Management System PIA. Identity verification is one of several types of information associated with airport security efforts that fall within the coverage of this PIA.

For bonus points, we'll answer another question that some have asked: whether the form itself requires an OMB control number. Since the form entails no burden beyond identifying the individual and home address, it is exempt from Paperwork Reduction Act requirements pursuant to 5 CFR 1320.3(h)(1).

3) Given that it's trivially easy to forge a boarding pass, how does presentation of validated IDs do anything to ensure that people on selectee/no-fly lists don't enter the sterile area? 16 of our readers asked this question.

An excellent question. TSA's document checkers are looking at IDs and boarding passes. They are aware of the techniques that forgers use and are looking out for them. We are working with the airlines both in the U.S. and world-wide on this issue. There are encryption and other methods of validating a boarding pass. Some are sophisticated, some are very low-tech and simple. Some airlines are now using encrypted electronic boarding passes that appear on a passenger's cell phone or PDA. The International Air Transport Association, which secures international cooperation and uniformity in aviation regulations and standards, is moving all of its members to use this technology by the end of 2010.

Even so, it is important to remember that the different layers of security work together. We're not only checking IDs and boarding passes at the checkpoint, we have measures throughout the airport, at the gate, and on the aircraft, that identify someone who may be dangerous.

Lastly, one of the other Top Ten questions dealt with random gate screening, which is another way of closing the loophole. The random check can also be used to ensure additional security measures when our information suggests it is warranted.

2) In the context of ensuring air travel safety, what is the difference between two people, both of whom are willing to cooperate with TSA's invasive interrogations, one of whom politely declines to show ID, the other of whom claims he lost or misplaced his ID? 20 of our readers asked this question.

Bottom line is identity matters. We need to verify who is getting on the plane.
The best and quickest way for us to assure identity is with a photo ID issued by a federal or state government. We work with passengers who have something less than that, including no ID. Most passengers in that situation help us quickly resolve the matter by sharing whatever information they have, sometimes verified through our Ops Center in Virginia. Someone declining to show an ID that they have on them endures a lot of hassle for not much of a point since it is far more intrusive for us to resolve it through the Ops Center than showing a legitimate ID up front. It is only when someone refuses to identify themselves or attempts to use fake ID that we would deny entry to the sterile area based on ID.

Ever since airport security started decades ago, it was based on "things" – making sure a bad thing like a gun or a bomb didn't get on a plane. Problem is, terrorists kept finding new ways to disguise their tools to be almost identical to ordinary objects; most recently, bottles of sports drinks and batteries with explosives inside. They will continue to find more novel threats. That is why the additional layer of identity verification matters more now than ever. Watch lists are a valuable tool in keeping people with known ties to terror plotting off planes.

1) TSA cites 49 C.F.R. § 1540.107 and 1540.105(a)(2) as the law giving them authority to demand identification as a condition of granting access to a sterile area of an airport. 49 C.F.R § 1540.5 appears to limit such passenger screenings to searches for weapons, explosives, and incendiaries as the only requirement for granting access to the sterile area. How does TSA reconcile this conflict? 27 of our readers asked this question.

There is no conflict to reconcile. It is true that 49 C.F.R Section 1540.5 describes screening functions and screening locations in terms of the inspection of individuals and property for weapons, explosives, and incendiaries. However, 49 C.F.R. Section 1540.105(a)(2) doesn't use the word 'screening' at all. Section 1540.105(a)(2) simply states that persons may not enter the sterile area without complying with the systems, measures, or procedures being applied to control access to that area. TSA's identification requirement is one such system, measure or procedure that is used to determine who is permitted to access the sterile area.

By citing 49 C.F.R. § 1540.107 in our original post, we were trying to illustrate one of the ways (and indeed, the most visible way) in which TSA has used its statutory authority to establish security procedures at airports. But, it's important to note that TSA's responsibility for aviation security is not just limited to checkpoint screening. TSA has broad authority to develop policies, strategies, and plans for dealing with the changing threats to aviation security. See, for example, 49 U.S.C. §§ 114(d) and (f) (addressing TSA functions, duties, and powers); id. § 114(h) (addressing notification procedures concerning persons who may pose risk of air piracy or terrorism or a threat to the airline or passenger safety). This authority is in addition to TSA's responsibility for the screening of passengers and property. See, for example, 49 U.S.C. §§ 114(e) (addressing screening operations), 44901(a) (addressing screening of passengers and property).

Thanks,

Bob

EoS Blog Team

Leave your shoes on?

Wouldn’t it be great to show up at a checkpoint and just when you were reaching down to untie your shoes, you heard an officer say “You can leave your shoes on.”

The TSA is well aware that the removal of shoes is not our most popular policy. In fact, it probably ranks up there with root canals and doing your taxes.

What you’ve seen up until now has been our officers enforcing an unpopular policy that is based on the unfortunate truth that intelligence tells us that terrorists are still very interested in hiding items in their shoes.


Today, the X-ray is simply the quickest, most effective way to ensure nothing is hidden inside. What you haven’t seen is all the hard work that’s been going on behind the scenes trying to find an alternative. Our experts and the private sector have been looking for ways to screen footwear while allowing passengers to keep their shoes on for quite some time.

Last year, TSA tested a shoe scanner from General Electric in Orlando. Today, we’re testing shoe scanning technology at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) from L3 Communications. If all goes well, these tests could lead the way to quelling of one of our most unpopular policies.

LAX received two units from L3 Communications last week. Since this is a test to collect data, passengers will still need to remove their shoes prior to walking through the magnetometer. Hey, don’t kill the messenger. I’m just giving you a heads up! :)

DHS Science and Technology, a sister agency of TSA, is also testing this shoe scanner and will collaborate with us on their findings.

Programs like the shoe scanner, the checkpoint friendly laptop bag and diamond lanes are not only good for passenger convenience but they help to reduce the chaos and frustration at checkpoints. This is good for security because it allows more than 2,000 Behavior Detection Officers to better focus on passengers with harmful intent.

And yes, we are going to answer your top 10 questions. :)

Myth Buster: TSA's Watch List is More Than One Million People Strong

MYTH: TSA's watch list has more than 1 million names on it.

BUSTER: First, TSA doesn't have a watch list. TSA is a customer of the Terrorist Screening Center, a component of the FBI that is responsible for maintaining the consolidated terrorist watch list. The center has said publicly that there are less than 400,000 individuals on the overall consolidated watch list, 95 percent of whom are not U.S. persons and the vast majority of whom are not even in the U.S.

TSA uses two subsets of this list, the no-fly and selectee lists. These small subsets of the overall list are reserved for known or suspected terrorists that reach a threshold where they should not be allowed to fly, or should get additional scrutiny.

MYTH: There are 1 million names on U.S. Government terror watch lists.

BUSTER: There are less than 400,000 individuals on the consolidated terrorist watch list and less than 50,000 individuals on the no-fly and selectee lists. Individuals on the no-fly and selectee lists are identified by law enforcement and intelligence partners as legitimate threats to transportation requiring either additional screening or prohibition from boarding an aircraft.

MYTH: The ACLU's math estimates that there will be 1 million people on government watch lists this July.

BUSTER: Assumptions about the list are just plain wrong. While a September 2007 report may have said that there are 700,000 records on the terrorist watch list and it was growing by an average of 20,000 per month, that is not the same as the number of individuals on the watch lists. A new "record" is created for every alias, date-of-birth, passport and other identifying information for watch listed suspects. The ACLU does not account for the name-by-name scrub that took place in the Fall of 2007 by all government agencies involved with the lists through the Terrorist Screening Center. This review reduced the no-fly and selectee lists by almost 50 percent and eliminated records of individuals that no longer pose a threat.

MYTH: Ted Kennedy, Catherine Stevens, and "Robert Johnson" are all on the no-fly or selectee watch lists.

BUSTER: These individuals are NOT on the no-fly or selectee lists. They, and other Americans, are being misidentified as individuals on the selectee list. Today watch list matching is carried out by the airlines for every passenger manifest. In cases when individuals with similar names are misidentified, folks experience inconvenience like no remote check-in but they are allowed to fly. Once TSA's Secure Flight initiative is in place the number of misidentifications will be GREATLY reduced. Under Secure Flight, TSA assumes watch list matching from dozens of airlines and implements a uniform, efficient matching process. Today the Department of Homeland Security's Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP) is a single point of contact for individuals who have inquiries or seek resolution regarding difficulties they experienced during their travel screening at transportation hubs--like airports and train stations--or crossing U.S. borders.

FACTS ABOUT TERROR WATCH LISTS:

• Terror watch lists keep legitimate terror threats off of airplanes every day, all over the world.

• According to the Congress' investigative arm, the Government Accountability Office, terror watch lists have, "helped combat terrorism" and "enhanced U.S. counterterrorism effort."

• Our partners in the law enforcement and intelligence communities work tirelessly and in some cases under great physical danger to identify individuals that pose a terror threat. The simple truth is that it would be negligent to not use this information to our advantage.

Christopher

EoS Blog Team

Lost & Found in LA: $30,000.00 Watch Returned to Passenger

One has to figure, over the course of any trip, be it business or pleasure, there are dozens of opportunities to lose things.

Hotels, shuttles, restaurants, buses, rental cars, airplanes, taxis, restrooms, and yes, even security checkpoints present "opportunities" to lose that special piece of jewelry, the cell phone, laptop, bluetooth, belt, hat, car keys, DVD player, passports and the list goes on and on, up to and including dentures (which we have actually found, and no, weren't required to be removed).

Solving the mystery of who belongs to what is incredibly labor-intensive but TSA employees across the country work to get these items back to their rightful owner; all in addition to their “regular” jobs of protecting the traveling public. It should be clear, TSA doesn't manage lost and found in all airports, some police departments, air carriers or airports can handle lost and found responsibilities too.

I know of cases where our people have found a cell phone owner simply by calling a number in the address book. We have had success using Web sites like MySpace to find the owner of a lost driver's license. We've even had cases of officers calling that grocery store from the club card on key chains to find an owner. Whatever the case, we have had some success.

Other times, it's simply impossible to find the owner. There are no identifying characteristics from an owner on a belt, a hat or a scarf. Once in a while though, we'll have a name and number on a walker, cane, stroller or car seat. No lie, people lose this stuff.

So, when an items falls into our lap at an airport like L.A., we'll log it, the time it was found, the terminal, the airline servicing that terminal and the lane; all clues that help us identify the rightful owner, should that person call to claim it.

I spoke with Hector Moreno, an officer at LAX who provided this brief tour of our lost and found operation.




While I was with Hector, a passenger had come into the office to claim an item, here is his story.



Additionally, I received an email last week from a passenger who wanted to applaud the work officers had done to reunite him with his watch.

Jeffrey Neuman flew through LAX around Mother's Day and inadvertently left his collector Cartier watch in one of our bins. Knowing the value of his watch, he fully expected to never see it again. Boy, was he in for a surprise.



So given the huge volume of items that are left at the checkpoints at LAX and I am sure around the country, the next time one of your items goes missing, give the local lost and found a call, it's quite possible we have it.

However, don't wait too long, as we only hold onto items valued at less than 500 bucks for 30 days, at which point they are donated to the General Services Administration, the government's entity responsible for property. More expensive items are held at our national HQ warehouse for up to two years.

One last thought, if possible, put your name on your items or tape a business card to an item, especially laptops, it sure makes the process of reuniting these items with passengers much easier.

Nico

EoS Blog Team

The evolution of the Bag: Going "Checkpoint Friendly"

We’ve spent a lot of time talking about the evolution of the security checkpoint here during the past seven months. Some ideas like the Diamond Lanes and our screening of the MacBook Air have been tremendously well received while other topics like the science behind 3-1-1 and our recent ID requirement have generated lots of, let’s just call them spirited debates… In all cases, we’re working to create a system that is not only better for security but easier for passengers to navigate. We do this not because of a need to be loved, but because we increase security through a calmer checkpoint (think bad guys sticking out of the crowd more in a relaxed environment).

One project we’re currently working on that has been widely discussed on the Internet and several blogs is a “checkpoint friendly” laptop bag. This bag would allow our officers a clear, unobstructed view of the laptop and allow passengers to keep the laptop in the bag during screening.

Why do we keep calling it a “checkpoint friendly” bag you may ask? Because the simple truth is that if we were to “certify” bags or “TSA approve” bags, we’d be here for months and maybe years and not weeks developing an approved government standard for laptop bags. By not certifying or approving, we leave it to industry to develop bags that work and get out of their way. We expect these bags to hit the market in the Fall, in plenty of time for holiday shopping this year.

To support private industry’s foray into this new and exciting field, we have opened up our operations to bag manufacturers for a look see. The TSA screening operations at Ontario, California, Austin, Texas and Washington-Dulles have invited manufacturers in to see how their prototypes appear on our x-ray machines, both AT and standard. Officers working these checkpoints are providing valuable feedback on which bags work and which ones need more work. After all, the ultimate authority on whether a laptop will have to be removed from a bag will rest with the officer working the x-ray machine.

Once manufacturers think that their bags are indeed “checkpoint friendly,” then we expect them to produce bags for the market. Some things to look for in your “checkpoint friendly” bag, once they’re on the market, include:

o No metal snaps or zippers underneath or on-top of where the laptop would be X-rayed
o Plastic works much better than anything metal
o No pockets either underneath or on-top of where the laptop would be X-rayed
o Bags with thick dividers may cause officers to pull the bags for secondary screening and do not provide clear images
o No emblems or seals that are thick and placed on top of or underneath where the laptop would be
o Bags greater than 30 inches in length when unfolded often do not fit on a single image, requiring the TSA officer to view the contents of the bag as multiple images, which takes longer. It is faster to keep the fully opened bag to an opened length of 30 inches or less (although not critical for image clarity).
o If the bag does not present a clear image to the officer, he or she should be able to have easy access to the laptop computer for secondary screening to speed the process.



The key is a clear image of the laptop inside the bag. If wires, batteries or cords are on top of or under the laptop, it’s going to have to come out; which will slow security and anger a passenger that just bought this new “checkpoint friendly” bag.

So, all this talk about laptops may leave you asking, “Why do laptops have to come out of the bag today?” The reason is so we can get a good, clear look at them. It’s easy to hide items inside of or underneath laptops. By removing the laptop from the bag and placing it in a bin, the officer can quickly make the determination that the laptop hasn’t been altered or is hiding anything.

Christopher
EOS Blog Team

Yet Another ID Post...With Some Answers to Your Questions

The ID topic has elicited lots of emotion. Many posters feel very strongly on this topic and I respect that discussion and their positions. This is a case where taking steps for aviation security touch other, related controversies that are larger societal/political issues. To the extent that there are legal issues relating to TSA’s actions, they will be resolved elsewhere.

I would like to move on to other topics since we are not going to solve the several complex issues here and we do have lots of other security issues to discuss.

The essential point is that validating a passenger’s identity matters a great deal from a security point of view. Our intelligence, military, and law enforcement colleagues -- at great risk to themselves -- develop sensitive information about potential attacks and the people behind them. They get that information to us so that TSA can do its part and keep those people off aircraft. It is our obligation to protect passengers and crew using the best information that we can get. That is what we are doing.

We will leave this open for further discussion and then move on with our next post. But before we move on, I wanted to provide answers to some of your questions.

Q: If requiring ID is truly instrumental in keeping the flying public safe, why did it take the TSA until June of 2008 to institute that policy?

A: Building blocks.

TSA put up a national security baseline in 2002. This involved creating the organization, staffing, buying and installing equipment -- and the very familiar magnetometer/x-ray checkpoint. No-Fly and Selectee lists were established and given to airlines for them to match versus their ticketed passengers. Airlines continued the pre-9/11 practice of hiring contractors locally to check ID’s. That created a basic physical screening process at the checkpoint (TSA operated) and a basic person screening process through the airlines.

In 2006 and 2007 TSA strengthened the person screening process by adding a new layer (behavior) and improving the watchlist matching. Along with the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), TSA scrubbed the No-Fly and selectee lists and essentially cut them in half. (CIA and FBI are the major players nominating people to the Watchlists, TSC maintains a consolidated, accurate, government-wide watchlist, and TSA operationally makes sure No-Flys don’t fly.) The system is vulnerable to people evading watchlists if they use a fake identity with the airline and then show a fake ID at the checkpoint. This vulnerability was called out by many on-line posters (and noticed by us) and we took a major step last year to upgrade the ID checks by integrating the checking of ID’s with the rest of TSA’s security. That is why you now have TSA officers, with lights and loupes examining ID’s throughout the system.

The ID requirements we’re talking about here, are the next building blocks to be added. First, to require identity verification and better define the hierarchy of good ID’s -- hence the ‘gold standard.’

We know that terrorists use fake ID's to evade security scrutiny. While I recognize that there are very valid philosophical issues and debates around ID’s, for TSA, this issue is about closing vulnerabilities and stopping attacks.

There is considerable operational complexity to resolving the identity of a person without an ID real-time at the checkpoint. It is getting done now but is still clunky at times. We will get better over the coming months. In answer to the question, all of the building blocks mentioned above, needed to be in place. They are now and aviation is safer as a result

Q: What will TSA do if a majority of the states refuse to issue REAL ID cards to their respective citizens?

A: We would attempt to verify identity with other means, it would just take longer.

Q: If TSA believes that 1) checking ID increases safety to the flying public and 2) the no-fly list is there to catch terrorists, then why are the TSOs that check IDs at the airport not comparing names to those on the no-fly list?

A: Because those checks are done before the boarding pass is issued. It is done in the background by a combination of the airlines and TSA. The system is automated and close matches are resolved on a one by one basis. For more on issues about passengers who have problems because someone else with their name is on the list, please see DHS Trip.

Q: Since it has been claimed by TSA that the 3-1-1 rule was implemented due to the circumstances surrounding the London bomb plot, what position will TSA take if the defendants are found not-guilty?

A: I can’t comment on the U.K. legal system but “certainty” in a criminal proceeding is very carefully defined. I can tell you from the intelligence and law enforcement information developed in this case that the threat to U.S. aircraft was chilling, lethal and the clock was ticking when they were arrested. Had that plot not been discovered, there may well have been thousands of casualties. Doubt about the reality or efficacy of that threat? Zero.

Kip

ID Q&A

Okay, we continue to receive questions on the ID requirement. I will attempt to answer as many as possible below. It’s kind of a virtual chat. We’d love to be able to do a live chat and we’re exploring that technological possibility.

There is also the very real possibility that civil people can agree to disagree…which is the direction I believe we’re heading.

Here goes:

Anonymous said... Could you please elaborate on those approximately 20 persons that weren´t allowed to fly? June 23, 2008 4:51 PM

Sure. The 20 people of the 10 million plus that did fly were turned away from the checkpoint. Some went and got their IDs, some tried to fly from other airports (and were stopped) and the rest just didn’t come back.

Phil said... TSA: If the people on your blacklist are so dangerous that we must restrict their movement, why don't you send the police to arrest them and put them in front of a judge? June 23, 2008 4:52 PM

Couple things here Phil. First off, TSA doesn’t have a “blacklist.” We use two of the Terrorist Screening Center’s watch lists, no-fly and selectee. The no-fly is reserved for known threats to aviation, most of which are not in this country and are not exactly sitting around, waiting for a visit from any government official, U.S. or otherwise. While the exact number of “no-flys” is secret, there are many, many less than 500,000. No Ted Kennedy and other are NOT on the no-fly list. If a person truly is, they “NO FLY” get it?

The other list is the selectee list. This list is for people that require additional screening before they fly. They fly after undergoing additional screening..

Anonymous said... So you're saying that you've been letting 10 people too dangerous to fly on planes each and every day since your misbegotten agency started? June 23, 2008 5:03 PM

Huh??? What we’re saying is that identity matters and we’re strengthening the system by verifying ID.

Chris Boyce said... 1. Where is the privacy impact assessment for the new form and the obviously commercial datamining check? I don't recall seeing it on line, nor do I remember a public comment period. We wouldn't be breaking the law, would we???

No Chris, we wouldn’t be breaking the law. A privacy impact assessment has been conducted and is pending review at DHS prior to being posted. There is no public comment period for Privacy Impact Assessments. Also, commercial “datamining” is not an accurate description of what is happening. We are simply using commercial data as a way to assist individuals in verifying their identity when they otherwise are unable to establish it through an acceptable identity document. Commercial data is not being used to predict criminal or terrorist activity.

2. Why would Hawley state on CNN that he was confident that his new policy would withstand a legal challenge if it weren't retaliatory in nature? Surely even he would know that it's unlikely that lawsuits are a known Al Qaeda tactic. June 23, 2008 5:13 PM

Huh? The question from the reporter was, “Would this new procedure withstand a lawsuit?” The answer was yes. Had the question been, “Will Al Qaeda sue you over this new procedure,” the answer would have been different.

Marshall's SO said... OK, so now we know what kinds of questions travelers, even those who are lying, are asked when they say they "forgot" their ID, i.e., birthdate, previous address, political party affiliation, where are you getting the data from to ask such questions? Can you verify that whatever data service you are using has "good" information? June 23, 2008 5:24 PM

Thanks Marshall. Just for the record, we’re not asking “political party affiliation” as you suggest nor are we asking other sensitive question like religion, charitable donations or things like that (see Kip’s comment on the ID post from the other day). Based on the publicly available data we’re using, we have a range of questions and it’s not a one strike and you’re out procedure. There are a number of questions we ask simply to determine if you are who you say you are. That’s it.

Because of the number of questions that could be asked, we’re also preventing someone from memorizing a simple set of facts to game the system.

Anonymous said... The average length of time for these ridiculous checks tells us nothing. What was the longest length of time you detained a citizen seeking to travel by air who did not have an ID? What was the shortest? June 23, 2008 5:40 PM

I feel like the average length of time is an important data point on how this is going. That said, the longest length of time we took to make an identity verification decision was 47 minutes. Yes that’s a long time and may have caused that one individual to miss his or her flight. The quickest is in the seconds.

Don’t know if the person waiting 47 minutes was a citizen or not but detained is not an accurate term either.

Boy, this anonymous character sure asks a lot of questions. :)

Travel_Medic said... how is checking IDs add anything to security when they are not compared to any list. June 23, 2008 7:31 PM

Hello Doc. You are compared to no-fly and selectee lists by the airlines. Verifying identity is an additional layer of security because it is added to the other layers…namely travel document checkers and the airlines checks against the above mentioned two watch lists. By doing all three, we’re verifying people are who they say they are, they are not on the no-fly list and their documents are legit.

Just yesterday (July 1), we identified a passenger with a fake social security card. Last week, we found a fraudulent passport. Altered documents are a staple of criminal and terrorist activity. We’re playing offense here and not giving free shots to a patient enemy.

Bob Eucher said... What became of the 20 people that were considered "too dangerous to fly"? Arrested? Let go? June 23, 2008 8:09 PM

Bob, I loved you in Major League (yes the last name is spelled differently but it was too close to resist). We’re not saying these people are “too dangerous to fly.” We’re saying we can’t verify they are who they say they are.

You and others might not care who sits next to you on that plane but we do.

Trollkiller said... ONCE AGAIN, I CHALLENGE THE TSA TO PROVE THE TWO SECTIONS OF 1540 THAT THEY CITE (§ 1540.107 & § 1540.105 (a)(2) ) GIVE THEM ANY AUTHORITY OR RIGHT TO DEMAND AN ID AS A CONDITION OF ACCESS TO A STERILE AREA June 23, 2008 10:06 PM

TROLLKILLER…MY VOICE IS GETTING TIRED FROM SCREAMING. Our attorneys interpret ATSA as saying we can do this, we think it’s important so we’re doing this. I’m not an Internet-based attorney but I probably could play one on TV.

Anonymous said... Again, if the airlines need to verify whether the person boarding the plane is the correct person, they could ask for ID at the gate. But why get the government involved in this? June 23, 2008 10:30 PM

The government is involved in this because we’re charged with aviation security. The airlines were charged with aviation security until TSA was formed in late 2001. We partner with said airlines to ensure no-flys aren’t getting on planes and that we do know who is. We supplement that with trained document checkers, identity verification, behavior detection officers and more than 15 other layers of security.

Anonymous said... So it only took 48 hours before the first reported instance of a question about political affiliation being required. I'll make two predictions: 1) The TSA employees who did this will never be reprimanded in any serious manner; the worst thing they will face will be some additional "training". June 23, 2008 10:35 PM

Nostranonymous, I think Kip was pretty clear when he wrote, “"It's unequivocally not our policy to use political, religious, or other sensitive personal topics as identity validation. If it happened, it was wrong and will not be repeated."

The person that did this made a mistake and has been corrected. Hope you never make a mistake at your job.

Anonymous said... Just out of curiosity, do you guys run my credit report if I show up with no ID? That's the only way I can think of you'd be able to validate I am who I say I am. June 23, 2008 10:46 PM

No. We’re not concerned about that Columbia House bill you never paid in college. We use publicly available info to verify you are who you say you are. It’s taking about 6 minutes for the .00005 percent of people that show up without ID every day.

Andy said... TSA, Question 1: You repeatedly claim this helps improve no-fly list enforcement. As we have told you over and over again, the ID checkers aren't checking names against a list. They're just comparing the name against the boarding pass, and the face to the ID. So, how exactly does this new policy enhance the NFL enforcement?

Andy, you can tell me “over and over again” that document checkers don’t check against the no-fly list and it’s still not the point. Airlines check against the no-fly, trained document checkers check validity of IDs, we verify identity of those without ID. The three work in combination.

You can say 1 plus 1 equals 7 a thousand times and it still doesn’t make it so.

Also, at the risk of hijacking this thread, we are also working on assuming responsibility for watch list matching from the airlines through our Secure Flight program. We believe this will also strengthen the watch list matching and greatly reduce the misidentifications that occur today.

Question 2: What exactly was wrong with the old policy (claim you have no ID, you get a SSSS and you're on your way)? We technically can still do that, and remember when there's a will, there's a way. There's no such thing as perfect security.

You’re 100 percent right on this on point Andy. There is no such thing as perfect security. The combo of the three layers above is better that the old system when anyone shows up, says “no ID” they get screened and go on their merry way. Keeping no-flys off planes is good security and simply patting down someone does not verify identity.

Question 3: Why are you targeting those who simply refuse to show ID? Some people refuse to show ID because of: identify theft concerns; religious reasons; self-privacy reasons; and/or their own principle. We are free people here in the USA, and we have a right not to show ID. People can lie and say they lost their ID, and get by, but those truly wanting to stand up for their rights will be punished. Is there a political connection to this? I think it's blatantly obvious what your purpose is here, TSA. June 24, 2008 5:08 PM

No political connection Andy, none at all. It’s all about strengthening security. There’s no “targeting.” People are showing up without ID and we’re verifying identity, simple as that. We believe we have the legal authority and we believe this increases security.

Anonymous said... Seriously, what happens if you are a physically disabled person and you've never had an official, government-issued photo ID made because you don't drive or use other services that require such ID? I know of several people with seizure disorders and severe dyslexia who have never gotten a state ID because they simply didn't need one. Their sole photo IDs were their college IDs - nothing official or certified. June 25, 2008 7:41 PM

No problem anon, we work with these individuals to establish their identity just like we would anyone else.

yangj08 said... How are you going to deal with foreign passports? I've already heard of someone having to go through a secondary because the TSO at an airport didn't recognize his Dutch passport. He had to go through a secondary (even though he had valid ID). So what happens to those people (especially if it's someone that doesn't speak English very well)? June 26, 2008 2:14 PM

Apples and oranges Yang. If a passenger has legit ID, including a Dutch passport, off they go. Being subjected to additional screening is not the same as verifying ID.

Anonymous said... Can you please elaborate on how the false positive problem will be addressed? I am currently on the Selectee list (and fed up with it) and want to know how soon this madness will end. June 27, 2008 9:04 AM

Well, anonymous does appear to be a very common name so it might just be a misidentification…Honestly, false positives on the selectee list is a different matter. One we’re planning on addressing on the blog in the next few weeks.

I do encourage you to apply for redress at: http://www.dhs.gov.trip/. You’ll also be glad to know (hopefully) that we’re in the process of taking over watch list matching and that will greatly (like 99 percent or greater) reduce misidentifications, which you are much more likely to be rather than a real-deal selectee.

Anonymous said... If they have no weapons, why does it matter WHO they are?
June 27, 2008 2:42 PM

Ah, this is the key argument. We honestly believe that identity is as important as going through the metal detector. Our partners in the law enforcement and intelligence communities work tirelessly and in some cases under great physical danger to identify individuals that pose a threat to aviation. The simple truth is that it would be negligent to not use this information to our advantage.

*** Anonymous said... How can requiring ID fit within our constitutional rights?

We’ve answered this repeatedly. Our position is that Gilmore v. Gonzalez affirmed our ability to require ID for transportation via air and the law that formed TSA, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) empowers the TSA to make these decisions.

How are the watch lists being improved? How did they come together in the first place? June 27, 2008 6:17 PM

While the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) maintains the lists and TSA is a customer of the no-fly and selectee lists we have worked closely with them to make the lists we use as useful as possible.

As was widely reported several months ago, TSC with TSA’s assistance completed a name by name scrub of the lists (no fly and selectee) and reduced them significantly. This reduces the number of misidentifications, making the list more effective.

As I have also said earlier, we’re also working to assume watch list matching from the airlines and this will have a great impact on the effectiveness of the watch lists.

means to authenticate the passenger's boarding pass.) June 27, 2008 6:50 PM

Abelard said...

1. If requiring ID is truly instrumental in keeping the flying public safe, why did it take the TSA until June of 2008 to institute that policy?

Good question Abelard. We’ve been increasing layers of security for years and now that TSA officers check documents at every airport in the country, we’ve effectively moved the issue and are trying to address this threat.

2. What will the TSA due if a majority of the states refuse to issue READ ID cards to their respective citizens?

What’s READ ID? :) We’re already reading IDs…

We will be prepared to address that issue if it happens. Thusfar, every state in the union is working with DHS on REAL ID.

3. In general, what disciplinary action will be taken against a TSO who asks someone questions regarding their religion or political beliefs in order to verify their identity?

The officer is not coming up with the questions, our 24/7 security operations center is using publicly available databases to determine the most appropriate questions. We’ve already said we don’t see the types of questions you bring up as appropriate.

1) Since anyone can photoshop a boarding pass to match their ID, couldn't someone just buy a ticket under any old name, change their boarding pass, and then proceed through security, with their own, legit ID, since none of your employees are checking the boarding passes to see if a) they're legit, or b) if the person whose name is on it is on your "no fly" list?

Why do that when someone could just print a fake boarding pass at home? That’s why we have these layers I keep talking about. No-fly passenger forges boarding pass at home, shows up and has to beat document checkers, behavior detection officers, and the other layers. No self respecting terrorist is going to say “no ID” when he/she knows they’ll get the extra attention this process now entails.

See, we’re doing is forcing people with bad intentions into additional layers of security here.

2)What happens when someone truly forgets their ID, and the company you contract out with to verify has the wrong information?

We don’t contract out with anybody. TSA employees at our ops center verify the identity with publicly available databases.

3) How does this stop someone who is not a known terrorist?

Totally clean skins are still subjected to the other layers of security, particularly behavior detection officers.

4) Why, in their right mind, would a known terrorist use a legitimate ID to buy their ticket? Wouldn't they just get a good fake?

My sentiments exactly. See above.

5) What if someone is a forgetful person...how many times can they have forgotten their ID?? June 27, 2008 10:09 PM

As many as they want….

Hope these answers helped clear up our position and why we think this is so important. As I wrote in the beginning, it’s perfectly acceptable for rational, intelligent people to disagree on important issues.

Christopher

EoS Blog Team

ID Update and Word on the Blog

June 27th Update to ID Requirements:

Now that the new ID requirement is almost one week old, we wanted to provide additional stats. Below are the latest numbers:

Saturday, June 21-Wednesday, June 25:

Total flyers: Approximately 10 million
Flyers without ID: 1705 (.000017 of total flyers)
Flyers denied access: 59 (.000005 of total passengers)
Average wait time for identity verification or decision: 6.9 minutes

And an editorial comment:

A few bloggers have asked us where we are and why we have not responded to questions. Questions like:

“Do these questions being to make you realize why TSA is a joke?”

“Of what are you so afraid that you refuse to address this issue?”

“Unless you are just going to turn the blog iinto (sic) a carnival or circus?”

That last one brings us to an interesting point. As Kip wrote in the opening post of this blog on January 30th, “Our ambition is to provide here a forum for a lively, open discussion of TSA issues… Our hosts…job is to engage with you straight-up and take it from there.”

I think we can all agree that comments like:

“I am just waiting for Kip to mutter "I would have gotten away with it if it wasn't for those meddling kids."

“My tinfoil hat theory is that the TSA knows it doesn't and have given up any pretense of spin control.”

“I agree -- more TSA crap. The sooner y'all are simply arrested for violating our rights, the happier I'll be.”

don’t really bring anything to the larger debate and really don’t beg for nor want a response.

The simple truth is that we’re just about the only government agency engaging in this type of dialogue on security issues and policies and we’re sincerely interested in rational debate and conversation...but we have neither the time nor the desire to respond to random, vitriol filled diatribes that don’t serve passengers or other bloggers in any way.

We’ve used this blog as a method of change and hope we have proven its merit on several occasions (ending the electronics problem in Hooray Bloggers, Diamond Lanes, etc.). These posts and the bloggers' comments have had a positive impact on your experience and mine at the checkpoint. We’re more than willing to engage in a vigorous debate on controversial issues and look forward to many more spirited debates without the poison for poison’s sake.

We’ve certainly proven over the past seven months that we can take a punch but the constant barrage of body (and low) blows without substance would tire even Mike Tyson in his heyday.

Christopher

EOS Blog Team

New ID Requirements: The First 48

UPDATE: We're aware of reports that someone was asked their political affiliation to verify their identity and it is being looked into. Here's a response given to us by Kip Hawley: "It's unequivocally not our policy to use political, religious, or other sensitive personal topics as identity validation. If it happened, it was wrong and will not be repeated."



We're 48 hours into the new procedure and things have been smooth so far. Approximately 650 people have shown up to security checkpoints without ID and a total of 20 people have not been allowed to fly. That is .0005 percent of the approximately four million people that flew this weekend.

Of the 650 people that showed up without ID, it's taking us an average of 10 minutes to verify their identity and get them on their way. We're able to do this so quickly because of the close coordination of our officers at airports and our 24/7 ops center.

Our critics say this has nothing to do with security and it only affects people that want to exercise their rights to anonymous air travel (which Gilmore v Gonzalez ruled on) and terrorists that aren't good liars.

What these folks aren't getting is that by requiring ID, you're closing that old loophole that allowed (up until Saturday) anyone, good or bad, to show up with any boarding pass (theirs or someone else's), say they lost their ID, get a pat-down and bag check and be on their way. Now, no self respecting terrorist is going to subject him or herself to all the additional attention the new procedures brings. This includes: the possibility of interviews with behavior detection officers, calls about them to our national counter-terrorism ops center, unpredictable physical and bag screening and the real possibility of a chat with a local or federal law enforcement officer. No, now we're funneling people with bad intentions towards our expert-trained document checkers and behavior experts. Could a bad person produce an excellent fake ID and get past document checkers... sure. We know that no single layer is invulnerable, but forcing terrorists into what we want as opposed to what they prefer is just good security.

We'll continue to update the stats here and continue to thank the 99.9995 percent of air travelers that work with us to quickly and easily establish their identity.

Sterling
EoS Blog Team

New ID Requirements Begin Tomorrow

If you're flying tomorrow, or anytime in the near future, you may want to make a note that tomorrow is the day the TSA enhances its ID requirements. There have been many misconceptions of the new requirements and I just wanted to attempt to clear things up a little bit.

We've all been there. You've got a million things to do before you fly. Pay bills, pack, get the kids ready, get your clothes from the dry cleaner, you name it. Whatever it is you have to do, it's inevitable that you'll forget at least one of them from time to time. (Hopefully not the kids) I usually forget my toothbrush.

What if you forget your ID? Is your vacation ruined? Are you going to miss your meeting? Are you going to miss the Elvis Costello show this weekend at the Glasgow Royal Concert Hall? Not at all… If you simply state you forgot your ID, we will work with you to verify your ID, you may undergo some additional screening and will be permitted to fly.

On the other hand, if you do not cooperate and state that you're not willing to show us your ID, you will not be permitted to fly.

You show your ID to test drive a car, view an apartment, buy a house, cash a check, buy cigarettes or alcohol, rent videos and so forth. The list could go on and in some of these circumstances; they hold onto your card or make a copy. We're just asking for a few moments of your time to ensure your name matches the name on your ticket.

Is this about control? No. It's about knowing who is getting on the plane. It's about shifting our focus towards people instead of items on a list. You know as well as we do that you can make a weapon out of anything. The naked human body of someone skilled in martial arts is far more dangerous than most people with a weapon. We know that and we're shifting towards that line of thought. It is going to be a huge change in our culture, but I and others firmly believe this is the proper evolution path for security.

If our goal is to keep bad people off of planes, and our law enforcement and intelligence partners have gone to the lengths of creating watch lists of known terrorists to keep them off said planes, we have to know for sure that each person who goes through matches the name on their boarding pass and is who they say they are. Most people are not a threat, but we know there are people out there that could pose a threat. Letting anyone go through who says "I don't want to show my ID" is not good security. It's not a poke in the eye to certain folks – it's about security for everyone and we view verifying identity as importantly as we view having passengers pass through metal detectors.

Make sure you also check out Christopher's blog post on IDs.

Bob
EoS Blog Team

The Evolution Continues

Ronald Reagan National Airport (DCA) became the latest airport to unveil Checkpoint Evolution today. They introduced passengers to the new uniform, training, and new signage all geared towards making the checkpoint a much more relaxing environment while also enhancing security.

We sent Jeremy (best known for his work spinning on our evolution Web site) to Reagan National today to get some photo and video from officers and passengers. Luckily, while Jeremy was on location, there were no sightings of puppies or poultry projectiles.

We’re excited to continue to introduce more passengers to the Evolution of Security and I personally can’t wait to fly through DCA again so I can give it a test drive.



Bob
TSA EoS Blog Team

Why Did the Chicken Cross the Road?

(Photo is a dramatic recreation)

While this story is not directly related to the TSA, it shows that a bomb can be hidden anywhere by those with fowl intent (pun intended). We thought we'd have a little fun, we hope you enjoy it:

We’re not sure why the chicken crossed the road, but we do know what happened after it did.

On June 10th in Simsbury, Connecticut, police found a pipe bomb stuffed inside of a raw roasting chicken. The chicken was noticed on the side of the road by a passing motorist with a bird’s eye view...

The Police Chief declined to comment due to the pending investigation, so at this point, we’re not sure who hatched this bird-brained plot or why.

It is possible that some misguided youth were egged on to make the poultry projectile. But the real intent is unknown.

The Hartford Police Department's bomb squad took stock in the incident and arrived on scene to detonate the chicken. The road was closed during the detonation, preventing anybody from crossing. (Including Chickens) One member of the squad stated it was poultry in motion (yes we're kidding).

We hope that nobody takes advantage of this incident by using tired old chicken puns (how lame would that be). Remember to report all suspicious activity.

Bob

EoS Blog Team

Why is ID Important for Security?

Last week we announced on our Web site a plan to begin REQUIRING ID from travelers on June 21st. This plan includes enabling our officers to refuse entry into the area beyond the security checkpoint to anyone who does not cooperate with us to establish his or her identity. The exclusive reason to do this is to ensure people are who they say they are and are not gaming the system by using a boarding pass with a fake name; a well-known endeavor of professionals and college kids alike that could potentially circumvent the no-fly list.

Does that mean that if you lose your wallet in the cab on the way to the airport you’re going to have to walk home?

Absolutely not…this rule is solely focused on the passenger who simply will not provide ID or help us establish their identity.

So for the security experts in the crowd (and you know you’re out there) you might be asking yourself a few questions, like:

So if a terrorist shows up and says his dog ate his ID, you’ll just let him go?

The answer is a simple and clear NO. Under today’s rules, you show up, say you lost your ID, get a quick pat down, have your bag searched and you’re on your way. One enterprising fellow has even advocated it as a quicker way through security in the past.

Starting June 21, that person could be subjected to a range of options, including interviews with behavior detection officers and local and/or federal law enforcement, enhanced pat-downs or other options. By increasing our options, people with bad intentions don’t know what exactly to plan against, have to beat multiple layers at the checkpoint and need to be ready to face any number of obstacles to their plans.

Why would a terrorist show up and say he has no ID when he can just show a fake and breeze right through?

Ah hah, that’s where layers of security really come into play. TSA has deployed thousands of highly-trained document checkers to identify fake IDs. We’ve caught everything from Spring Breakers with terrible IDs to fraudulent passports. Our officers are very adept at finding fake documents and work closely with behavior detection officers on a daily basis. The old story of the airline contractor not even looking up at a person while checking IDs is long in the rear view mirror.

This is just an assault on my personal freedoms and security theater.

The only reason we’re doing this is to make sure people are who they say they are and not someone who is a known threat to aviation.

Also, our partners in the law enforcement and intelligence communities work tirelessly to identify potential threats to aircraft. Enhancing our ID requirements further enables TSA security officers to ensure that individuals are who they say they are when they enter the security checkpoint and not individuals who may pose a threat.

And for all the legal eagles out there, it is my constitutional right to fly without ID.

Under the law that created TSA, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, the TSA administrator is responsible for overseeing aviation security (P.L. 107-71) and has the authority to establish security procedures at airports (49 C.F.R. § 1540.107). Passengers who fail to comply with security procedures may be prohibited from entering the secure area of airports to catch their flight (49 C.F.R. § 1540.105(a)(2). Additionally, in Gilmore v. Gonzalez, 435 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2006) the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiff’s constitutional challenges to a passenger identification policy.

This initiative is simply a way for us to better enforce the no-fly list and ensure the safety of the traveling public. No secret motives, no hidden agendas, just a security enhancement aimed at people trying to game the system.

For more information, go here.

Christopher

EOS Blog Team

Update: 6/14/08

Just a quick note… Our ticket checkers found a fraudulent ID at JFK. Just thought some of you might be interested.

At New York Kennedy Airport (JFK) on Thursday, June 12, a passenger was interviewed by police after attempting to enter into a security checkpoint with a fraudulent ID.

A TSA Travel Document Checker noticed a passenger trying to use a fraudulent New York driver’s license and notified the Port Authority Police Department who came and interviewed her. The Port Authority Police Department released the passenger after issuing a Summons to Appear.

Travel Document Checkers are TSA officers that are specially trained to detect fraudulent IDs and boarding passes to help keep our airports safe and secure.

Bob

EoS Blog Team

A Day in the Life of Checkpoint Evolution at BWI

Just like scientists strap cameras to wildebeests in the Serengeti, we have strapped a camera to a passenger. For the first time ever, you’ll be able to see exactly what a passenger sees as they walk through their brand new checkpoint at BWI. Watch as the passenger winds through the blue glow of the quiet jungle of machines. It’s like you’re actually there.



Listen to what passengers and Transportation Security Officers have to say about the new checkpoint.





Learn about the new passenger engagement training our Transportation Security Officers are receiving.



Read more about Checkpoint Evolution.

Thanks,

Bob
EoS Blog Team

Is this really a better checkpoint?

Blogger’s Note:

We thought you’d be interested in hearing directly from an officer first hand how some of the new technologies we’re putting in airports is affecting the job and in turn passengers’ experiences.

Below is the first installment of these first hand accounts. Enjoy:

“Are you kidding?” was my immediate answer. And it was the plain truth. It was how I answered the question “Is this really a better checkpoint?” from the most recent group of VIP’s that were touring the checkpoint where I work.

We have seen plenty of them recently. I work at BWI airport’s Pier B where two years ago Southwest Airlines redid the entire wing of the airport and in the last two months TSA has installed the Checkpoint Evolution.

There is a lot I like about it. And while the uniforms, badges, mood lights and music grab a lot of attention, for me the star of the show is the new X-ray machines.

We call them "ATIX" on the floor. Google that and you get the formal name “Advanced Threat Identification X-rays.” We got Baltimore’s first two at my pier and the whole airport gets them by June. TSA’s Web site says that we bought hundreds more to install nationwide this year.

Not much of that matters to me. What does matter is how much better my 30 minute rotation at the X-Ray is now. Start with the screens. High resolution flat screen monitors make picking stuff out tons easier. Plus they look right. Nobody will miss squinting into those huge, heavy 1982-era computer screens that look like they belong in a museum.

And we are probably doing only half the bag checks we used to because we now have two angles to view the bag. Plus we don’t need a TSO to lug the bag back to the front to rerun it anymore because the officer physically searching the bag has the same view as the officer doing the first screening. It is not as good as the COBRA machine we tested here last year that lets you spin the image on the screen. But it is very good and is a big step forward from where we were.

The automatic threat boxes help too. They pick up items we may not have focused our attention on that could possibly be explosives. This is just another tool that helps us do our job better.

On the downside, it is not lightning fast. And I’m not as fast with it as I was with the old X-Ray machines. Not yet. But in the meantime I will take the tradeoff any day. And so would any passenger that trusts us with their safety.

Paula Furman

EoS Blog Contributor

Can someone explain why there are so many different lines to a checkpoint?

Black/Blue/Green, First Class, Premier, Red Carpet-it seems like there are 18 different types of lines leading to a TSA checkpoint and only one for the "regular" traveler. What's the deal?

Well, there's the history and then there's where we're going.

Historically, TSA hasn't taken ownership over the security queue. This dates back to pre-9/11 and pre-TSA when airlines contracted with security companies to man checkpoints. Instead of taking control of the queues after 9/11 when we were established, we have relied upon the airport operator and the airlines to manage the queue for us so we could concentrate directly on screening passengers. This originally included checking passenger identification and boarding passes to ensure that only ticketed passengers were entering the queue and going through security. In general, TSA took the view that once you got to security, we treated everyone the same. Passengers may have progressed through the queue at a different speed, but they fed into the same security lines in the checkpoint itself.

In terms of real estate, the queue is not generally considered to be a part of the checkpoint. It's a part of the airport lobby where the line for people to enter into the checkpoint is setup. The actual screening takes place in the actual checkpoint. As a result, since it belonged to the airport, the airport operator and airline tenant were allowed to do what they wanted with it so long as everyone went through the checkpoint before they boarded their flight. Enter premium passenger lanes-without revenue coming to TSA. It was airport space, and we let the airport manage it.

Now for the Checkpoint Evolution view.

The first thing that our research on Checkpoint Evolution told us is that in terms of the passenger experience, the queue belongs to TSA-not entirely new to us, but something of which we should take more notice. We've tracked queue wait times for a long time; however, that data is used to make sure our airports are properly resourced, and our research has told us that the queue experience also has a critical element of which we needed to take notice. For example, inexperienced travelers and families feel like they need more time to prepare for screening, want more help with the process, and do not like being in the queue in front of a Road-Warrior traveler, tapping their foot, who doesn't really care about the queue experience as long as it moves quickly. (Road-Warriors can be irritated with the families and the slower travelers, but it's their lack of speed and not the fact they're a family that bothers them.)

So, we started looking for ways to put our research to good use with two goals in mind. First, we wanted to build a new environment that would make our behavioral observation programs more effective by helping to reduce the overall stress in the queue and the checkpoint. Second, we wanted to find a way to increase our efficiency and reduce x-ray alarm rates by allowing the fast passengers to move fast, and the slow passengers to take their time. End result - the "Black Diamond" pilot in Salt Lake City that joined the queue to the checkpoint and allowed passengers to pick a security line designed to meet their needs and let them move at their own pace (keeping Road-Warriors and the Families separate for the whole screening experience). For those new to the blog, "Black Diamond" was named after the ski logos that help snow skiers choose ski trails based on their level of difficulty.

The results were tremendously positive-especially with passengers who wanted an experience where they could take their time going through security. The queue and the security experience were much calmer for passengers, and our initial results show that the new multi-queue "Black Diamond" checkpoints are more efficient than regular checkpoints. We're now 20 airports later, and we're still seeing the same results. As a matter of fact, peak wait times at Salt Lake City this past Memorial Day weekend were about half as along as they were last year, even though the number of passengers going through the checkpoint actually went up by about 5 percent.

It's important to note that even under this new system, the queue still sits on airport real estate, so "Black Diamond" is only coming to a willing airport near you. TSA can't force an airport into a particular queue design-although more than a few airports are interested in the project. Security is a partnership between TSA, airport operators, airlines, and passengers, and TSA is looking to work with all comers. We're thankful for those airport operators who have been willing to experiment with us to build a better queue management mousetrap, but we also understand that airports have other needs, and even this project might not work everywhere.

Diamond lanes, family lanes, Elite lanes, whatever lanes, they all add up to a better experience for passengers and a safer environment for everyone.

Matt

EoS Blog Contributor

Which is it: Millimeter Wave or Backscatter?

As TSA continues to deploy new technology, some people continue to be confused about whole body imagers. Millimeter wave, backscatter, privacy filters… it all adds up to a confused traveling public.

Since one of our readers asked about the difference between millimeter wave and backscatter images in a previous post and we’ve also seen other blogs get the two confused, we thought we’d put the correct information and images out there to clear up any misinformation. Both millimeter wave and backscatter fall under the classification of whole body imaging, which gives security officers a virtual image of a passenger that highlights potentially dangerous items.

Here’s the lowdown on the two technologies:

How millimeter wave works:

Beams of radio frequency (RF) energy in the millimeter wave spectrum are projected over the body’s surface at high speed from two antennas simultaneously as they rotate around the body.


The RF energy reflected back from the body or other objects on the body is used to construct a three-dimensional image.

The three-dimensional image of the body, with facial features blurred for privacy, is displayed on a remote monitor for analysis. The image is not saved – once it’s off the screen it’s gone forever.

This is the millimeter wave image a security officer sees:

A millimeter wave machine looks like this:

Here’s how Millimeter Wave imaging works (WMV, 3.4 MB).

Here’s how Millimeter Wave technology detects threats (WMV, 3.4 MB).

How backscatter works:

A narrow, low intensity X-ray beam is scanned over the body's surface at high speed.
The technology relies on the X-ray radiation that is reflected back from the body and other objects placed or carried on the body, where it is converted into a computer image, embedded with a modesty filter and displayed on a remote monitor.

Passengers will walk up to the backscatter unit, assisted by a transportation security officer and remain still for several seconds while the technology creates an image of the body.
Images will be deleted immediately once viewed and will never be stored, transmitted or printed (the passenger imaging units have zero storage capability).

This is the backscatter image the security officer sees:




This is a backscatter machine.

Click here to see a demonstration of backscatter (2Mb, wmv).

And while we’re at it:

Because we see it time and time again, we wanted to clear up another bit of misinformation. This is a raw backscatter image with NO privacy algorithm. This is NOT what security officers see – this image was used to show what the capabilities of the technology are.

The Science Behind 3-1-1

Over the weekend, Fox News published a story about the UK liquids plot. Here’s an excerpt:

“Far-fetched as it sounds, bombs made from hydrogen peroxide and the breakfast powder drink Tang could have taken down seven planes bound for the U.S. and Canada - using flash cameras to trigger the explosions.

…The alleged plot, and the excellent police work that went into busting it, resulted in the tough carry-on restrictions passengers face before boarding an airplane. Knowing the dangers of liquid explosives should make the hassle of tossing your bottles when traveling a lot easier to bear.”

A recent BBC article described the liquid explosive:

“The alleged bombs would involve 500ml plastic bottles of the Oasis and Lucozade soft drinks. A sugary drink powder, Tang, would be mixed with hydrogen peroxide, used as a hair bleach, and other organic materials.

Hydrogen peroxide and the other ingredients can become explosive if mixed to a specific strength. Mr Wright said hydrogen peroxide had been used in "previous terrorist incidents".
The mixture would be injected into a bottle with the help of a syringe. The bottle's cap would not have been removed and the hole would have been resealed, said Mr Wright.

A second substance, a type of high explosive, would be hidden within an AA battery to form the small charge required to detonate the main bomb.

The charge would be detonated, said Mr Wright, by linking the bottle of explosives to a lightbulb and a disposable camera. The charge from the camera's flash unit would be enough to trigger the explosion, he said. The BBC has not comprehensively detailed the alleged bombs' composition.”

Since the 3-1-1 rule is a hot topic on the blog, I met with the head of TSA's Explosives Operations Division, Ed Kittel, to chat with him about the science behind 3-1-1. Before coming to TSA, Ed worked at the FAA Explosives Unit and Navy Explosives Ordnace Division. Ed was part of the team that investigated the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988 and numerous other actual and suspected airplane bombings worldwide. Ed and his staff, in conjunction with other federal and international explosives experts, analyzed the UK explosives mixture, tactics, techniques, and procedures and tested its capabilities.

Lynn: One of the most frequent questions we get is: Is the UK mix a binary explosive?

Ed: While there were two primary ingredients, this composition is not a binary explosive; it is a “solution,” as one ingredient was to be dissolved into the other – making it possible to inject into a container using a syringe. The explosive was going to be pre-mixed, in a predetermined ratio, and carried onto the airplanes with an intact security seal. The remaining components of the bomb would have been separated during screening and hooked together later. All of the pieces were artfully concealed to attempt to “beat the system.” That’s why Transportation Security Officers are trained to detect individual components of improvised explosive devices, not just a fully assembled device.

Lynn: So with this UK liquid explosive, would the men be mixing the components at the airport or on the plane?

Ed: The liquid explosives solution was to be prepared at their safe house and injected into the sports drink bottles prior to coming to the airport. Additionally, we have seen no indication that they intended to combine the contents of multiple smaller bottles after screening.

Lynn: How did explosives testing play a part in creating the 3-1-1 rule?

Ed: As part of our analysis, we looked at some of the more likely liquid explosives recipes and compared them to descriptions contained in the intelligence reporting. Following a series of explosives tests of these materials performed by the federal government, we recommended the 3-1-1 protocol to senior TSA leadership as a viable alternative to the total liquids, gels and aerosols ban. Understandably, I cannot comment on the specifics of intelligence, formulations or the testing, nor would you want me to. By understanding and managing the risks associated with this threat, TSA was able to permit some exceptions for small quantities of liquids, aerosols and gels to be carried by the flying public. We also consulted with a number of our international partners to harmonize 3-1-1 countermeasures across the European Union and North America. TSA didn’t go this alone. In fact, this is the first time that the flying public has had the exact same security measures consistently applied across most of the world’s airports. It’s a model that we want to follow in the future.

TSA also introduced a number of other measures both at and beyond the screening checkpoints to minimize the risk of explosives getting onboard. The 3-1-1 protocol is only one of the multiple layers of security; many of which are invisible to the public. Passengers who need to have some small quantities of liquids, gels and aerosols may now do so, and 3-1-1 accommodates those needs while adding a significant level of security designed to protect the flights. Without 3-1-1, we would have had to maintain the total liquids ban, which was virtually unenforceable in the long-term, as it had a serious impact on checked baggage screening and cargo operations. Remember, the liquids, gels, and aerosols ban is all about the container and its ability to hold an explosive; it’s not about the original contents. Sometimes, people may not understand that and they become frustrated by the protocol as a result. You can be sure that we put our very best people on this, as did our Federal and international partners. 3-1-1 was the result of some excellent research by some of the best people our country has to offer.

Lynn: Is there anything else coming out of the UK trial that you find interesting or important to note?

Ed: The conspirators were very determined to beat airport screening systems by disguising all of their bomb components in common carry-on articles. Their goal was to destroy seven aircraft on the same day in nearly simultaneous attacks. This is very similar to Ramzi Yousef’s “Bojinka Plot” back in January 1995 in Asia. This case shows us that terrorists still consider airplanes to be major targets. As a result, TSA is continually looking at homemade and new explosives as well as artful concealment techniques to train our Transportation Security Officers. Our new Bomb Appraisal Officer (BAO) Program is placing hundreds of seasoned bomb technicians at airports nationwide to coordinate those efforts and improve screening to thwart these kinds of plots.

Lynn: Many say that the liquid threat is not scientifically possible. What do you have to say about that?

Ed: The U.S., UK, and other European security partners have all tested the liquid explosive that was planned to be used in that plot and we have all found that it is a viable liquid explosive. In fact, we have posted a video clip of one of these tests that was conducted by one of the National Labs out west. Make no mistake about it, this is the “real deal.”

We have also seen liquid explosives attacks before. For example, on November 29, 1987, Korean Airlines Flight 858 exploded over the Andaman Sea killing all 115 on board. North Korean agents conducted that attack using a liquid explosive concealed in a duty free whisky bottle. That attack used a different homemade liquid explosive but there are quite a few of them out there that are very powerful explosives.

Lynn

EoS Blog Team

UK Liquid Explosives Trial

While American Idol fans debate the merits of the two Davids, across the pond, a terror trial has captured the attention of most of England and in fact the continent.

Eight alleged terrorists are on trial for planning to blow up seven airliners, five of which were destined for the U.S. While this trial is barely registering in the American press, had the plot succeeded, it would have been catastrophic, killing thousands of innocent passengers and rivaling 9/11 in its ferocity. It’s also the basis for one of our most controversial policies, 3-1-1.

Since 2006, U.S. and global explosives experts have been following this plot with great interest, because of its alleged use of novel explosives and methods. Until information became public during the trial, we have been extremely limited in what we could say about this plot. As the trial progresses, we are finally able to share information - things like the fact that the bottles of liquid explosives were pre-mixed, non-binary and would have almost certainly brought down those airliners;
things like showing the hollowed out batteries that would have hidden detonators; things like despite doing everything “right” this crew of alleged would-be killers would have walked right through airport security anywhere in the world under the rules at the time… Had it not been for intelligence leads, police intervention and eventual arrests there’s just no telling the eventual outcome of this diabolical plot.

Just this week, jurors were shown a video of the liquid explosive the suspected terrorists allegedly planned to use on airplanes. The liquid explosive mix was created in a government laboratory and placed in an Oasis soft drink bottle, just as the terrorists planned to do.

We will post more specific information on the plot as it is available and plan to post a Q&A with the chief of our explosives division on the plot and its ramifications here in the U.S. in the next few days. In the mean time, the Daily Telegraph of London has posted notes from the trial and the video shown to jurors here. We have also posted regular updates to the trial on our Web site, here.

Below is the liquid explosive video we prepared and released last year.

Christopher
EOS Blog Team

You asked for it...You got it, Millimeter Wave images.

Here are the much requested, much anticipated, full body images of millimeter wave - both front and back, male and female just like so many of you asked for.

These were provided to TSA by the manufacturer of the technology, L-3. We asked L-3 to blur the facial features just like they are blurred when our officers see the images in Phoenix, Baltimore, LAX and JFK. These are exactly what officers see at airports today and will see in future deployments.

While we have said this many times, it bears repeating, TSA will not keep, store or transmit images. Once deleted, they are gone forever. For additional privacy, the officer viewing the image is in a separate room and will never see the passenger and the officer attending to the passenger will never see the image. The officers have 2-way radios to communicate with other in case a threat object is identified.I venture to say, Mikhail Baryshnikov may have exposed more in his ballet costume than these robotic images portray.

Why did we decide to put them up now? Because you've asked for it... Hopefully the editors of Reader's Digest will consider these for their next cover.

What do you think?

- Bob

05/10/08 6:10 p.m. Christopher said:

There have been a couple of incorrect assumptions made regarding the actual screening that I feel are important to clear up.

The actual scan itself takes about 2.5 seconds. That is the length of time a passenger should stand still in the machine (which is clear Plexiglas, allowing passengers to view their items as they come out of the x-ray used to inspect carry-on bags). The remaining time, between 15-45 seconds, is used by the officer at the remote viewing location to evaluate the image. During that time, the passenger can move around at will next to the machine while the officer attending the machine waits to hear via wireless comms that the image is free of any potential threats. This is an important point as ALL items must be removed from passenger's pockets prior to entering the millimeter wave machine because they will show up and must be removed to ensure they are not threat items.

A couple of bloggers have advocated for the officer viewing the image to be out in the public area. We specifically require the remote location to protect the privacy of passengers using the machine. We just don’t think it’s appropriate for other passengers, airport, airline employees or just anybody walking by to see the images, much less snap a photo with a camera phone or anything else and post that image to TMZ.com or who knows where. That’s also why officers are not allowed to bring anything, including phones, bags or other items into the remote viewing location.

While we’re still collecting acceptance stats, the early word is that a great majority (more than 85 percent) of passengers prefer using this machine in lieu of a pat-down, which contrary to one poster takes much longer than 5 seconds and requires physical contact.

Hope this information helps.

Christopher
EoS Blog Team

So What Exactly Happens To All Of That Stuff?

As every passenger and visitor to this blog probably knows, hundreds of thousands of items are identified each year by our security officers that are prohibited from being carried onto an aircraft. Of course, occasionally, items get through, but that’s a whole different post.

There are two classifications of items, prohibited and illegal. The prohibited category includes things like knives, scissors (larger than 4 inches), some tools, chain saws, swords, boulders, replica guns, bottled water, soda, toothpaste, hair gel, snow globes and on and on.

Illegal items are obviously guns, brass knuckles, switch blades. When discovered at the checkpoint, we contact law enforcement and they do what they need to do, maybe arrest, maybe a citation,…. it really depends on each jurisdiction.

We often refer to prohibited items internally as Voluntary Abandoned Property. Passengers call them confiscated…, either way; these items become possessions of the federal government, and are deemed excess government property.

While it may seem like we enjoy taking this stuff, the fact is passengers have choices. A passenger can go back to the airline and place the item in his/her checked bag. Some airports have mailing facilities or mail back programs so travelers can mail the item home. The item can be given to a loved one seeing you off at the airport or, if you drove yourself to the airport, you can go place the items in your car. Or for that matter, a passenger can go throw the items away in a nearby trash can. If they decide to do none of these and "surrender" the prohibited item to a security officer, they are considered excess government property.

Now before you go and post a comment about the options, I’m not saying they are good or bad options, I’m just pointing out that there are options. I know if someone is late for a flight, the last thing they are going to do is go back to their car, and wait in line again. Can we just agree these are options? Of course, the best option is to know what is in your bag and not bring a prohibited item to the checkpoint to begin with, but that’s not the point of this post

Of interesting note, of all the items I have seen, most, almost all, could have made it from Point A to Point B, had the passenger simply taken the time to place it in a checked bag.

Depending on the size of the airport, each day, week or month, the items are picked up. Because the items are excess government property, we must follow General Services Administration guidelines for the disposition of the material. Many airports use a TSA-provided contractor who collects the “stuff” and disposes of it….. quite literally, throws it away. Or, as some airports do, we donate items to approved, non-profit organizations in accordance w/GSA regulations.

We have heard of local schools receiving the scissors. We have heard of local police departments training with the mace. Some VA hospitals sell some of the items to help make ends meet. Some non-profits, including several state surplus property divisions, sell the material on the auction web site eBay, and put the profits in THEIR coffers. TSA does not sell or profit in any way from the selling of this voluntarily abandoned property.

There have been references to this practice on this very blog, but the fact is, those news reports are plain wrong. Again, we are required to follow GSA guidelines for the disposition of this property and we do.

Now liquids are another story. As you can imagine we have voluminous amounts of liquid items surrendered daily and from airport to airport the disposition is different. Some airports have the local janitorial staff pick up the trashcans. Some are collected and picked up by our contractor and in some airports, both can happen, depending if a passenger throws the item away prior to screening or in the security checkpoint. Either way, it’s disposed of … that goes for liquor, water, lotions and everything in between.

Early on, there was a move to donate the liquid items to local homeless shelters but we were forced to suspend that practice after the determination was made that there is a liability risk. We couldn’t continue to donate items and not know if the if the water was truly water or if the shampoo was truly shampoo. While unfortunate, the litigious world in which we live forced the abandonment (pun intended) of that process. So now, those items are tossed out.

It is important to note, that currently there is a California state senator-sponsored bill that would require all California airports to donate these liquid items to homeless shelters. While it is unclear exactly how that would work, an effort to actually put these items to use is in the works; at least in one state.

A question raised many times on this blog is how can we justify throwing all of these liquids away in a trash can near the checkpoint if they are such a danger. While a fair question, the answer has been available in many different threads though not directly answered, so here it goes.

We have said since the institution of the liquid ban that the fear or threat is the combination of items, including liquid explosives while in flight to create an improvised explosive device. That combination means explosives, detonator and other components to have a fully assembled bomb. Take one component away and you have a collection of harmless items. Of course we don't want liquid explosives anywhere near us but without the other components, they're not causing catastrophic damage.

That’s why it is safe for us to store the items together in a trash can near the checkpoint and that's what we do with prohibited items.

Nico

TSA EoS Blog Team

Duty Free Debunked

Although more than 70 percent of air traffic routes are covered by the 3-1-1 liquids rule, differences in airport layouts and customs procedures have left some travelers with duty-free purchases like liquor and perfume they can’t take through an international checkpoint.

Here’s the scoop: When you fly to the U.S. from an international destination and have to change planes in the U.S., you get your checked bags back right before you go through customs. So if you have any item that you can’t take through the checkpoint, you can put it in your checked bag.

That’s not the case when you fly to Europe, Asia and other international destinations. You go through customs without them. So if you have a bottle of liquor, perfume or other liquid item, you have no chance to put it in your checked bag, and you risk having to toss them at the checkpoint.
Another glitch is that countries in Europe, Asia and elsewhere require that liquid duty-free items in excess of 3.4 ounces/100ml be sealed in an approved International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) tamper-evident bag in order to go through checkpoints. As a result, many passengers who buy liquid duty-free items in U.S. airports and have a connecting flight in Asia or Europe end up having to throw their liquor or perfume out because they can’t take it through the security checkpoint. Some people buy a suitcase in the airport and check the items. Some decide to drink the liquor instead of tossing it, which can lead to some other problems at checkpoints or on flights, but that’s for another post…

To sync up with our international partners, TSA is allowing U.S. duty-free stores to place liquid, aerosol and gel items in the tamper-evident bag for travelers headed overseas. As long as the liquid duty-free items are sealed in the bag when purchased, they can be taken through checkpoints in Europe, Asia and other international destinations.

Carrying the bags isn’t mandatory for duty-free stores here in the U.S., but we hope they’ll start carrying them soon. If you’re taking an international flight and want to pick up a bottle of cognac or a special perfume, be sure to ask for the tamper-evident bag. If the store doesn’t have them, you might want to wait until you get to the airport where you change planes or at your final destination to make a purchase.

One thing to note - because travelers coming into the U.S. do have the opportunity to place any liquid items that exceed 3-1-1 rules in their checked bag before going through customs, the international duty-free bag will not be allowed through U.S. checkpoints.

For more information, check out our web content on duty-free items.

Lynn

TSA EoS Blog Team

Checkpoint Evolution Up and Running at BWI: Even More Changes Announced to Reduce Hassle to Passengers

In February, Secretary Chertoff told an editorial board that he had directed TSA to do a sixty-day, no-holds-barred review of what we do at the passenger checkpoint to see if we can weed out things that used to be needed but perhaps today could be stream-lined. This effort ties in with our longer term effort to update our security measures -- to go on offense rather than just wait behind the magnetometer and try to find prohibited items. Today at Baltimore-Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport (BWI), those efforts come together. And, starting today, they become reality.

Here are the ‘greatest hits’ that are in the works:

Airlines may now allow kiosk/at-home printing of boarding passes for almost everyone. Secretary Chertoff challenged TSA to reduce the hassle thousands of passengers have every day when they can’t print a boarding pass online or at an airline kiosk. They have problems not because they pose a threat to aviation, but because their names are the same or similar to someone whose name is really on a watch list and does pose a threat.

Think of it this way: for every actual person on the watch list, there are thousands of people – who don’t pose a threat – but whose name is close enough that they are flagged in the system and not allowed to print their boarding pass. These passengers must go to the ticket counter to resolve the issue by showing photo identification, and it’s a huge inconvenience to them. Many of these ordinary travelers feel that they have been watch-listed, which would make anyone mad.


TSA has asked airlines to create a secure system to accept passengers’ dates of birth, first at the ticket counter and subsequently in their frequent flier or other secure database. Passengers will be encouraged, but not required, to provide airlines with limited identifying information like their date of birth. If they do so once, the airline can clear them on future flights and they will be able to print their boarding passes at home or at the kiosk.

Better ID verification.

A key to an accurate watch-list process is making sure that people are who they say they are. TSA officers already are using more sophisticated methods to validate a traveler’s identity. In addition, TSA is today outlining the types of ID that will get you through security faster. Essentially, driver’s licenses with photos and passports are what we are looking for. If you left your wallet in a cab, or for some reason do not have the right ID, we will work with you, but it will take longer.

Make the physical layout work for us.

BWI’s “B” Checkpoint has a different look today – it’s the first place to rollout the Checkpoint Evolution elements. We’ve integrated all the elements to work together and get us a calmer checkpoint environment that benefits our active security measures like behavior observation. Easier divesting and bin loading, better light and less noise are examples of things that help security and also lessen hassle for passengers.

We’re excited about these initiatives, because they will improve the passenger’s experience with TSA, but more importantly, they will help our security officers carry out their critical mission. If you fly through BWI, be sure to come back to the blog and let us know what you think.

Click here for more information.

Kip Hawley

The TSA Puppy Program

TSA announced in March we were going to be training and deploying TSA employee-led canine teams. Since then, we’ve had two classes graduate at Lackland Air Force base. That’s 18 K-9s!

The deployment of additional explosives detection canine teams will significantly enhance TSA’s threat readiness and response capabilities at air cargo facilities nationwide. There are currently 500 K-9 teams in the field. Over the next two years the TSA plans to add 400 more teams. Of those teams, 85 will be TSA-led teams while the rest will be TSA-certified teams through our law enforcement partnership program.

Before our dogs can go through this training, they have to get through their puppy stages. You know… biting, barking, jumping, begging, digging and so forth. (My knuckleheaded dog is six and still does all of that) We have established a “puppy foster family” program to help accomplish the task of socializing our future bomb sniffers, and we’ve event sent some puppies to prison. I’m only kind of joking… they’re not bad and they’re not being punished. Like the puppies with the foster families, they are spending time every day socializing with people and getting used to sights and sounds and smells of their new unexplored surroundings.

The puppies are booked into the Travis County State Jail in Austin for a year and are cared for and offered companionship by prisoners on good behavior. It’s a win-win for all involved. The puppy foster family program is similar to puppy prison except the families are not paying a debt to society.

So if you’re interested, you either need to live in the San Antonio/Austin, Texas area or get locked up at the state pokey. (Make sure you stay on good behavior)



Shepherds, Belgian Malanoises, Labs, Vizslas and other types of dogs are used in the program because of their super sniffers and a successful history for this type of work. Each dog that is born into the TSA breeding program is named after a 9/11 victim.

The TSA provides all food, toys, veterinary care and kennels. Make sure you visit the puppy program Web page if you’re interested.

Bob

TSA EoS Blog Team

Safety & Privacy Concerns Regarding the Millimeter Wave Whole Body Imager

We've received many questions on the safety and privacy of the Millimeter Wave Whole Body Imager. As you can see from the chart above, the Millimeter Wave emits a smaller dose than simply walking outside on a sunny day.

I’ll quote a few noteworthy items from the Privacy Impact Assessment for TSA Whole Body Imaging. (PIA) I suggest you read the entire assessment for more information.

The Millimeter wave technology uses non-ionizing radio frequency energy in the millimeter wave spectrum to generate an image based on energy reflected from the body. The energy projected by the system is 100,000 times less than a cell phone transmission (.00000597 mW/cm2 for millimeter wave technology compared to 37.5 mW/cm2 for a cell phone)

The images created by whole body imaging technologies are not equivalent to photography and do not present sufficient details that the image could be used for personal identification.

While the equipment has the capability of collecting and storing an image, the image storage functions will be disabled by the manufacturer before the devices are placed in an airport and will not have the capability to be activated by operators.

The TSA is not the first organization to use Millimeter wave technology. It's currently used in various government locations across the United States, as well as international aviation and mass transit environments including:

Domestic locations Federal Court House (VA), Colorado Springs Court House (CO), Department of Corrections facility (PA), Los Angeles County Court House (CA), Cook County Court House (IL)

International airports U.K., Spain, Japan, Australia, Mexico, Thailand, Netherlands

The results in the first week of use at LAX and JFK speak for themselves.

LAX: 544 passengers were screened from 4/18 to 4/22 using Millimeter Wave technology. Only 18 passengers chose not to undergo the screening.

JFK: 1212 passengers were screened from 4/17 to 4/22 using Millimeter Wave technology. Only 33 passengers chose not to undergo the screening.

Bob

TSA EoS Blog Team

-----Update 5/25/2008-----7:00 PM EST-----

These are the signs that are displayed in front of the millimeter wave whole body imagers.

Bob

TSA EoS Blog Team

Catch a Wave and Avoid a Pat Down

Since we posted information about Checkpoint Evolution and the expanded use of millimeter wave technology, we’ve noticed a number of comments from many of you questioning the use of this technology and the images it captures during the screening process.

There are a lot of misconceptions out there so we thought it might be worth a few words to see if we can address some of your concerns.

The expanded use of the millimeter wave in our nation’s airports actually goes back to the 9-11 Commission report, which recommended increased use of explosives detection technology for passengers at the security checkpoint. Of course, with the timing of the commission’s report and the bombing of two Russian airliners shortly thereafter, TSA deployed the highly invasive physical pat-down and deployed explosive trace portals to many airports nationwide. Otherwise known as the puffer machines, we continue to help fine-tune this technology while working with private technology companies to develop additional screening equipment that will scan passengers for any and all concealed weapons and explosives, thereby eliminating the need for the invasive pat-down. We more than recognize that passengers don’t like being patted down by our officers and, though some of you may think differently, our officers don’t like patting down passengers either. It’s uncomfortable for everyone involved.

So over the last year, TSA has piloted the millimeter wave whole body imaging machines. We have been so pleased with the millimeter wave that we are moving to deploy additional machines to LAX and JFK airports. Assistant Secretary Hawley recently announced the purchase of 30 additional machines. The millimeter wave allows our officers to see a rotating image of the passenger so they can see any threat items that might be hidden on a person’s front or back without them having to turn around. Many of you have commented on a CNN story we rolled the dice on last month. We allowed CNN to film as we ran one of the many covert tests conducted at security checkpoints everyday. Using a physical pat-down, our officer was unable to locate the threat item that one of the covert testers concealed in a back brace and, while we demonstrated for the public that our officers are tested regularly and the tests are meant to be challenging, unfortunately we failed that test on a nationally televised stage. We are confident that millimeter wave whole body imaging technology would have found that threat item.

Now I do remember a post someone wrote a few days ago, asking about cell phone cameras, suggesting officers could use them to take photos of passengers’ whole body images. First of all, as we’ve shown you, the image looks like a fuzzy negative…there’s nothing to see. And second, every airport using whole body imaging technology installs a separate, closed and remote viewing room for our officers to view the image projected from the machine, and in each case so far, those viewing rooms have been at least 50 feet from the machine. This distance ensures the officer viewing the image for concealed items has no way of interacting with or identifying the passenger. The officer staffing the equipment communicates with the officer in the viewing room with wireless microphones. No one is allowed in the room while the officer is screening those images and the officers are not permitted to carry cell phones, back packs or any other devices while they work in the viewing room.

Additionally, these monitors have no ability to save, print or transmit the image. Once it’s deleted, or once the next passenger steps into the machine, the previous image is gone forever.

I believe it is worth noting that whole body imaging machines are already in use in state and federal facilities around this country, including public courthouses.

As a married father of five small children, I wouldn’t think twice about sending my wife, my four boys or little girl into this machine. I’ve seen the image it produces and I am not only confident as a TSA employee - but as a citizen - that TSA has done everything possible to address passengers’ privacy concerns regarding whole body imaging.

For those of you who remain skeptical, you’ll be happy to know that, as we expand the use of whole body imaging to JFK and LAX, it remains an optional screening method for passengers. It’s voluntary so if you’re selected for additional screening and you prefer the physical pat-down, just let our officers know.

Millimeter wave, a form of whole body imaging technology, is currently in use at Phoenix Sky Harbor Airport. Since its introduction there, more than 90 percent of passengers have elected to undergo screening with this technology instead of being subjected to a pat-down.

Nico Melendez

TSA EoS Blog Team

The First Significant Deployment of Aviation Security Technology Since the 1970s

If you weren’t watching C-SPAN today, you missed Kip's testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security's Subcommittee on Transportation and Infrastructure. The Congressional Hearing was centered on how the Transportation Security Administration will continue to enhance security for all modes of transportation.

Kip announced the purchase of 580 AT X-rays (in addition to the 250 we’ve already planned to deploy). While technology isn't the only answer, this is the first significant deployment of proven aviation security technology since the 1970s. This equipment is part of the Checkpoint Evolution and will greatly strengthen our Layers of Security while also streamlining the process for passengers making things a little faster.

The AT X-rays allow TSOs to view multiple views of the item in the X-ray which will reduce the amount of bag checks and allow the lines to move faster while improving the quality of security. The AT X-rays are upgradeable so they can evolve with any future threats. Once we deploy these 580 machines, nearly half of the lanes at our checkpoints will have this new technology.

Millimeter wave will allow our TSOs to view a noninvasive image of a passenger revealing any items that were not divested. These images are friendly enough to post in a preschool. Heck, it could even make the cover of Reader’s Digest and not offend anybody. Privacy and security go hand in hand, so the millimeter wave must pass muster with the public. It’s important to keep the public safe, but it’s equally important to protect the public’s privacy. The millimeter wave is currently in use at the Phoenix Sky Harbor Airport. More than 90 percent of passengers have elected to undergo screening with this technology instead of being subjected to a pat-down.

• Click here to read more about it on TSA.gov.

Bob
TSA EoS Blog Team

Passengers Asked For It, Passengers Got It: Passenger Feedback Used in Checkpoint Evolution

While screening 2 million people every day, you learn a thing or two. In addition to this on-the-job learning, we specifically sought out passenger feedback on how a checkpoint could be designed to make their lives a little easier. Easier processes equal more relaxed, patient people. More relaxed, patient people equal better security for everybody.

What we leaned and incorporated is: People want someplace to get ready for screening, people want to move at their own pace and people want somewhere to sit down and put themselves back together after screening.

That’s why we have introduced the prep stop and re-composure benches to the Checkpoint Evolution.

The prep stop allows passengers that need to prepare for screening an unhurried, plastic-bag, trash can and recycle bin-filled environment in which they can make those last minute preparations. This part of the Checkpoint Evolution also helps these travelers better prepare for screening without the cold shoulder from the pinstripe-suited business traveler tapping his wing-tips on the tile floor.



The re-composure benches are specifically designed to accommodate two people and are even split-level to foster sharing and tying those wing-tips when you're done with screening. It's a place to put yourself back together before heading off to your gate.



A lot of thought and feedback has gone into these and the other elements of Checkpoint Evolution and we welcome any suggestions you might have to make this concept even better.

Christopher
EOS Blog Team

Checkpoint Evolution: Passenger Engagement

Passenger engagement… What is it? Is it the new romantic comedy about two passengers who meet at an airport and decide to get married? Not quite.

Passenger engagement is all about the way we are moving to an entirely different environment at our checkpoints. Checkpoints are noisy, confusing places that often leave passengers feeling as if they just ran through a gauntlet.

While we are adopting process and technology upgrades, we are also enhancing the training of our officers to include a heavy focus on better communication at the checkpoint between officers and passengers.

We’d like to change the environment for two reasons. First off, passengers deserve to travel through our checkpoints without feeling stressed. We all have enough stress in our day to day lives don’t we?

Secondly, the more relaxed passengers are, the easier it will be for our Behavior Detection Officers to pick out folks who are displaying signs of fear and deception.

In a relaxed environment, someone with ill intent will stick out like a man in a plaid suit at the Oscars.

Bob

TSA EoS Blog Team

Behavior Detection Officers Lead to Arrest in Orlando

(UPDATE 04/02/2008: Read the updated story. )

You might have seen on the news or the web today that Behavior Detection Officers at Orlando International Airport spotted a passenger in the airport lobby, well before the screening checkpoint, who was behaving suspiciously. Because of the passenger's highly irregular behavior, the officers ensured he was under surveillance as he moved through the airport, and requested that his checked bags immediately be searched.

As a result of the bag search, a variety of suspicious items were found. (Since the FBI is leading the investigation, we're not saying exactly what these items are although there is speculation in the press and on the web). The individual was taken into custody by Orlando Police and the FBI is now questioning him. If you’ve been watching the news, you’ve probably seen the bomb squad removing the passenger's clothing curbside to ensure he did not pose a threat.

Since the passenger was stopped before he could get to the checkpoint, checkpoint operations were not affected and flights continued to take off and land. A perimeter was established in Terminal A while the bomb squad did their work.

This is an excellent example of the layers of security in action throughout the airport. This is also a good example of using specially trained Behavior Detection Officers to look for people with hostile intent as well as the items they intend to use. It's a further testament that the behavior detection program works (yes, I'm partial...).

For the official TSA statement, click here.

Thanks,

Bob

TSA EoS Blog Team

Checkpoint Changes Coming

In TSA's checkpoint of the future, passengers will approach the security kiosk, carry-on in hand, and put a biometric on the scanner. While the scanning system clears you after it confirms your identity and flight information, the technology in the kiosk will verify that there are no truly dangerous items on you or in your bag. Total elapsed time: about 1.75 seconds. Version Two will add a Teleporter so that you will not need to get on an airplane.

Your grandchildren will love it.

Technology is a wonderful thing but it's not an overnight process - it must be invented, funded, built, tested, bought, and deployed. Unfortunately, the security technology field has not sufficiently fired the imagination of scientists or the private capital markets to the point where truly breakthrough technology will soon transform the checkpoint experience. Yet the current security threat environment requires that we get smarter and more nimble, now.

We have some significant changes in store for the checkpoint starting this spring. I would like your thoughts and I hope TSA will earn your support in our common mission. Please take a look at our Checkpoint Evolution micro-site.

TSA has taken a fresh look at our checkpoint operations to see if we can improve security and the passenger experience with what we have today. We took what we know from the intelligence and security communities, we listened to our employees, we learned from passengers (including on this blog), we evaluated readily deployable technology, and have come up with changes that we have begun piloting.

There are three elements to what we are calling Checkpoint Evolution: people, process, and technology.

People. The threat environment makes it clear that we need to add layers of security to be effective against adaptive terrorists. This means adding a capability to detect a potential problem even if they are not carrying anything prohibited - in other words, more focus on people, not just things. That means deploying more officers specially trained in behavior detection and document checking to identify people that intend to do harm, not just waiting to find their prohibited item in a carry-on bag.

Process. We're making improvements to the checkpoint process, including better signs to tell you what's going on at the checkpoint and why, and what you need to do at various stages. There will be areas to divest - or prepare - for screening and also an area to get everything back together after you're done. You have seen some pilots with our Diamond Select and Family lanes and we will continue to make improvements.

Technology. We don't have the end-all-be-all machine yet, but there are some technologies we will be installing in many airports throughout the year that are an improvement to what currently exists, including multi-view x-ray for carry-on bags and whole body imaging for passengers. The deployment of these machines will represent the first significant addition to the checkpoint since metal detectors and X-ray machines were introduced in the 1970s.

Our enemies have the advantage of picking their time, place, and method of attack. Those advantages are more pronounced if our defenses are rigid and predictable - they could use our standard operating procedures and technology against us.

We do have some advantages. First, airports are our turf; we have the home field advantage and can set the rules. Keeping an element of randomness and calming the checkpoint are critical.

Second, TSA's officers have experienced more passengers and bags than anyone else on earth and that knowledge is priceless. They know what doesn't seem right. In a calmer checkpoint environment, hostile intent stands out from the behavior of regular passengers just trying to navigate the system. Behavior detection officers and document checkers will use their training and skills to identify people and things that stand out from the norm and give them added scrutiny.

Third, the advantage we need to bolster most is the fact that the numbers are overwhelmingly in our favor - two million people a day fly, every one of them with a vested interest in assuring the safety of our system. We know the overwhelming majority of passengers pose no threat, so we want to improve your checkpoint experience and get your help in making those who do pose a threat stand out.

In short, we are seeking to reduce our weaknesses while improving our strengths until the futuristic checkpoint with seamless security screening becomes a reality.

Please visit our Checkpoint Evolution Web site to find out more, and share your feedback. If we partner together, we can make flying safer and a lot easier - right now. Thank you for your participation and partnership with TSA in keeping travel safe.

Kip

TSA and Piercings

Your questions and comments on the incident in Lubbock, Texas have not gone unnoticed. Yesterday, as soon as TSA became aware of the situation, people in our Security Operations office looked into it. They interviewed the four Security Officers who at one point or another, screened or spoke to the passenger - two men and two women (if a passenger requests private screening, they must get an officer of the same sex to screen them there). TSA has also been in touch with the passenger’s lawyer on several occasions.

The bottom line: the security officers followed the procedures for when someone alarms the metal detector and did nothing wrong. But, after looking at the procedure the officers followed, it was determined that the procedures should be modified. An official statement has been posted on our website here.

Lynn

TSA EoS Blog Team

Layers of Security

By this time, most of you are getting pretty familiar with what TSA does on a daily basis. If you’re a regular reader of this blog, you’ve likely heard us mention layers of security. It’s a term we use a lot but it’s a lot more than just a catch phrase, it really is what we do.

Throughout my time at TSA, many analogies, metaphors and comparisons have been used to describe the layers. Some stick, some fall by the wayside. One way of describing it is like the combination to a lock. One correct number won’t get you access, all have to be correct. Today, I thought I’d take you inside the “layered security approach” for a closer look at what we do.

Each time a passenger boards a flight they’re subject to up to 20 of these layers. I know what you’re thinking…we’ve got the checkpoint, metal detector, screening process, etc but what else?

Before you ever step foot on an airplane, TSA intelligence officials have worked with their counterparts throughout the federal government and its international partners to determine any threats to aviation security. Concurrently, TSA collaborates with CBP and the Joint Terrorism Task Force on threats and security issues. TSA also leans heavily on relationships with local law enforcement. Their work around the airport is vital to successful security.

In addition, passengers are checked against no-fly lists and crews vetted. All of this occurs before the passenger ever reaches the airport.

Once at the airport the other layers of security begin to take shape. Each airport with commercial flights is required to have a TSA-approved security program. This program covers everything from the type of fencing required around the perimeter of the airport to how many police officers are needed to make sure vehicles don’t park too close to the curb. In addition to this plan, VIPR teams consisting of federal air marshals, local law enforcement, canine teams and behavior detection officers may be patrolling the area. This can occur before or beyond the checkpoint, anywhere at an airport.

Passengers entering the security checkpoint are subject to noninvasive screening by TSA’s behavior detection officers. BDOs are trained to detect involuntary physical and physiological reactions exhibited by those looking to avoid being discovered.

The passenger also hands their boarding pass and ID to a TSA travel document checker. This layer of security is relatively new, beginning in June 2007. Checking the validity of documents and the person holding them provides a significant security upgrade. Individuals with phony or suspicious documents are referred to local law enforcement for additional scrutiny.

TSA canine teams also patrol the airports perimeter and interior. These teams, composed of a local law enforcement officer and TSA provided canine, are one of the quickest, most efficient means of detecting possible explosive substances. TSA has trained and certified more than 500 teams in partnership with state and local law enforcement agencies. They’re working in 70 airports and 14 mass transit systems. TSA will certify more than 400 additional canine teams over the next two years, including teams led by TSA canine handlers that will focus on air cargo.

As previously mentioned, the checkpoint is one of 20 layers of security. Great work is done by TSOs there at over 450 airports nationwide, That said, not a whole lot of ink will be spilled here about it, we’ve done a lot of that already.

TSA also screens every piece of luggage that you’ve checked. Modern inline systems streamline the process in many airports (As demonstrated by this post). Stand alone systems are used in other airports.

The planes themselves are screened as well. Transportation Security Inspectors randomly screen planes and are also involved in VIPR teams and employee screening.

That leads us onto our next layer, which is employee screening. Those with access to the airport’s secure areas including gate workers and food service employees are subject to random screening in addition to going through thorough background checks and being checked everyday against terror watch lists.

TSA’s Bomb Appraisal Officers (BAOs) are also working to increase the strength of our security approach. BAOs were trained at one of two specialized schools and have extensive operational experience in the field as members of military Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units or accredited law enforcement/public safety bomb squads. They perform advanced alarm resolution at the checkpoint as well as expert training. Their presence in the airport environment helps security while increasing the abilities of those working with them.

Another vital layer of security is the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS). FAMs are TSA’s law enforcement arm. They are specifically trained to work within the aircraft but their role is ever expanding. They participate in VIPR missions and are on duty throughout the airport environment.

Through the Federal Flight Deck Officer program, TSA trains and authorizes pilots and other approved flight crew members to carry a firearm aboard the plane. TSA also offers course to train other members of the flight crew to defend themselves inside an aircraft. The program, known as Crew Member Self Defense, adds an additional layer to the security system.

The hardening of cockpit doors occurred after 9/11 and provides yet another layer preventing possible attack. The vigilance of the flying public in-flight and on the ground is an important piece of aviation security. Passengers’ willingness to work with TSA and local law enforcement is crucial to enhancing security.

Check this out for a clearer, more graphically appealing view of TSA’s layers of security.

Jim

TSA EoS Blog Team

Update: Bob Screens the Apple MacBook Air

We were able to get our hands on a MacBook Air and run it through the X-ray in our lab. My suspicions were correct. The MacBook does look completely different than your typical laptop or DVD player. I can't get into specifics of course, but there were a couple of areas on the X-ray that could pique some interest for TSOs.



I think this is a very unique experience and a good example of how this blog can be used. I simply came into work one day, browsed the blogosphere and read about the MacBook Air having problems at a checkpoint. No more had I started researching the MacBook Air before a post popped up on our blog. I have since been in contact with Training and we're going to get an image out to our workforce (45,000).

I hope you enjoy my acting debut on the blog.

Legal Note: TSA and DHS do not endorse any product referenced in this video and associated blog post and any reference to a specific product is provided for the information and convenience of the public. Please visit our comment policy for more information.

Diamonds Are a Passenger’s Best Friend (Diamond Lane Program Expands to 3 More Airports)

The Diamond Lane Self Select Program is spreading like snow on the hills of the ski resorts of Salt Lake City and Denver where the program first originated. The program rolled out yesterday in Spokane, Washington and rolls out today in Boston and Orlando.

We've all been there. You've got your jacket and shoes off, laptop out, liquids and gels in a baggie… You're ready to roll, but you have to wait behind a large family or group of inexperienced travelers. It's frustrating. It's also frustrating for the inexperienced passengers as well because they are feeling the pressure and hearing the obvious sighs of frustration and the foot tapping from the frequent flyers in line behind them.

It's almost like when you're at a grocery store and you only want to buy a pack of gum. You find yourself in line behind somebody with an overflowing cart of groceries and they aren't making any offerings of letting you jump ahead. That's exactly why grocery stores implemented the express lanes and that's what we're doing with the Diamond Lane Self Select program.

I know what you're thinking… Some folks who consider themselves to be experts most likely aren't. Kind of like the person who jumps into the express lane at the grocery store with 28 items instead of 12. How do you remedy that? There are a couple of ways. Part of the program requires an officer as a guide working in the front of the queue lines to help direct passengers and answer questions. Also, just as in the express lanes at grocery stores, anybody who jumps in the wrong line is likely to experience unhappy passengers who will greet them with comments and sighs. Self policing if you will…

What have we learned so far since our last update on the blog? Throughput has increased up to 35 percent during our busiest peak times in the expert lanes at the pilot airports. In fact, in Salt Lake City, a news crew covering the program had to wait several hours to experience a 5 minute wait time.

Also, now that inexperienced travelers aren't feeling the heat from road warriors, they're doing a much better job preparing for screening. We're seeing a dramatic drop in the number of banned items we're discovering in the family lane. All this adds up to a more satisfied passenger, a very good thing in itself but not the only benefit. By allowing passengers to self-select, the checkpoint as a whole is a less stressful place.

By creating this calmer environment, suspicious behavior stands out better, allowing our behavior detection officers to do their jobs more effectively. Where are we going? The TSA plans to roll out the Diamond Lane Self Select program at a minimum of 3 more airports by the end of April. Stay tuned…

Bob
TSA EoS Blog Team

How We Do What We Do: Baggage Screening

Click Here to watch how TSA does baggage screening (wmv, streaming).

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act, which created TSA, mandated 100 percent electronic screening of checked baggage. To meet this mandate, TSA installed minivan-sized explosive detection machines in airports across the country, typically in already crowded lobby areas.

Today, TSA is increasingly relying on advanced baggage screening technology. More than half of the 2 million people that fly each day use airports with automated, in-line baggage screening systems. The systems allow passengers to “drop-and-go” curbside or at the ticket counter instead of having to take bags to TSA after checking in with their airline.

This means pre-9/11 convenience for passengers and post-9/11 security for TSA, airports and airlines. Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International is one of many airports where an in-line system is used. Click here to view a short video of the in-line system in use.

Some of the Hardest Working Dogs in the Nation

So here we are in the year 2008, we have laptops as thin as a potato chip, cars that run on electricity or hydrogen and 400 channels of satellite TV beamed right to your living room…yet the best way we have to detect explosives in many environments is that 4-legged friend, the dog. That’s right, TSA uses all kinds of tools to ensure the safety of passengers; things like minivan-sized explosive detection systems How We Do What We Do: Baggage Screening, handheld liquid explosives scanners and many, many other devices but nothing out there today is as flexible or mobile as man’s best friend. None of these tools can search a plane in minutes or sniff a pallet of cargo without removing each individual box.

Today we announced that for the first time we will be training and deploying TSA employee-led canine teams to complement the 496 TSA trained and certified law enforcement teams stationed at 70 airports and 14 mass transit systems. These teams (one handler and one dog) go through the same exact training as our law enforcement teams but will focus on air cargo screening and be one part of our answer to screen all air cargo on passenger-carrying aircraft by August 2010. The handlers are all trained cargo security inspectors so they can cover both the explosive detection and screening side with their dog as well as making sure our partners are meeting their obligations from the regulatory side of the house.

Speaking of air cargo, some of you may not realize just how immense an operation it is to ship air cargo around the world. Commerce and customers have come to expect that millions of packages will fly around the world, arriving at their destination with amazing efficiency and accuracy. The volume is so large that, in addition to the cargo company’s trains, planes and automobiles, many packages often fly with your luggage in the belly of commercial passenger aircraft. Care packages sent to Billy in his dorm room or fruitcakes from your grandmother are sometimes stored below passenger’s feet, right next to suitcases. This is an important source of revenue for the airlines as well as a means for customers to get their packages on-time. Some less popular commercial flight routes survive solely as a result of the money brought in by transporting cargo.

Screening the large volume of cargo passing through the airports is a great challenge that TSA has been addressing since its inception. When the Baja Men so eloquently asked “Who Let the Dogs Out,” TSA answered the call by saying, “we did, we sir, let the dogs out.”

Since joining TSA in 2002 from the FAA, the expansion of the canine program has been huge but we are not stopping there. We plan to deploy 400 more specially trained bomb dogs in the next two years, 85 of which will be TSA teams (non-law enforcement teams) whose main duty will be to search cargo bound for passenger aircraft. The first 12 TSA teams graduated today and will be deployed in the coming months to Dulles International, John F. Kennedy International, Los Angeles International and Miami International Airports. So, by the end of 2009, we will have a force of about 800 bomb sniffing dogs from coast to coast.

While most of us are lucky if our family dog knows how to sit and stay, TSA’s specially trained dogs and handlers enhance the safety of the traveling public, one sniff at a time.

Make sure you read the canine article on the TSA web page.

Apple MacBook Airs are Cleared for Takeoff

Photo Courtesy Apple.com

So I was looking through my Google Alerts yesterday morning and something caught my eye. From a cursory glance of the day's blog entries, it looked as if the TSA was denying travel to Apple owners. I've never taken part in the war between Mac & PC users... I've used both and I enjoy using both, but I thought surely the TSA wasn't diving into the digital trenches and waging war against Apple. I know we're a versatile agency, but I would have to admit this would definitely be mission creep.

After digging into the articles, it turns out that a gentleman was traveling with his new MacBook Air. To make a long story short, it turns out the Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) gave some special attention to his new MacBook. Mac fans would tell you the TSOs simply couldn't resist getting a closer look at a fine piece of machinery. PC fans would tell you the TSOs are all PC fans and flagged the computer just to hassle the Mac guy. As a security fan, I can tell you that TSOs are trained to look for anomalies. Each TSO X-ray operator sees hundreds of laptops a day and some have been doing this for 6 years. They know what laptops are supposed to look like.

Here is my theory. Along comes the new MacBook Air. The thing is as thin as a potato chip, and looks completely different than any other laptop the TSOs have ever seen. They are seldom seen at TSA checkpoints due to their newness and the fact that they can be hard to find sometimes.

To help prove my theory, I've contacted Apple to see if I can process a MacBook Air through an X-ray and see how it looks. If it does indeed look odd, I'm going to take a picture and send it to TSA Training to help avoid future issues with MacBooks. The jury is out for now, but I'll post an update as soon as I can get my hands on the MacBook Air.

Click here to see my MacBook Air screening results (and, I've put together a movie).

One thing is for sure though. This was just a case of diligent TSOs paying special attention to something that caught their eye. Exactly what they are trained to do.

Bob
TSA Evolution Blog Team

*********** Update 3/12/08 ************

Still checking with Apple, but I wanted to highlight a post we received from Mr. Nygard. He’s the gentleman who posted about the experience he had while traveling with his MacBook Air. I’d like to thank Mr. Nygard for taking the time to comment on our blog. Here’s what he had to say:

It was my experience and blog post that got all this attention recently.

One of my purposes in writing this piece was to point out something I thought was interesting: namely that the x-ray screeners are trained to look for certain things--"landmarks", if you will--in the images they review.

Before last week, I had never given a moment's thought to the training or procedures behind the ubiquitous screening. Like many people, I supposed that they were just looking for obvious problems: suspicious outlines, coils of wires, etc.

I found it interesting that there might be a similar checklist of things that should be present: battery, hard drive, optical drive, and so on. I don't think most people would realize that.

Some people have interpreted me as variously "blasting", "vilifying", or "insulting" the TSA agents in question. This was not my intention. It appears to come mainly from people reacting to second-hand information, instead of reading the original post. ~ Michael Nygard

Bob

TSA Evolution Blog Team

How Intelligence Drives Operations at TSA

Bloggers Note: Keith Kauffman heads up TSA’s Office of Intelligence. He is a 20-plus year veteran of the National Security Agency (NSA) and is a well-established and respected member of the Intelligence Community. He joined TSA in May 2007. Click here for his full bio.

The Office of Intelligence (OI), which I lead, is part of the larger Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise and is responsible for integrating timely and actionable information into TSA's daily operations. We also use intelligence to educate and inform the TSA workforce, our partners in airports, airlines, mass transit, etc., and law enforcement on terrorist threats and the tactics, techniques and procedures used by our adversaries.

My office staffs a 24/7 watch operation, which receives intelligence information around the clock from a variety of sources. We have analytic personnel integrated into Intelligence Community organizations, which also gives us insight into evolving threats to U.S. transportation systems. In addition, first thing every morning, Kip Hawley, Mo McGowan (who leads our Office of Security Operations) and I, attend a daily meeting led by the National Counterrorism Center and all the major players in counterterrorism activities, which enables us to discuss and track emerging and ongoing threats.

My office briefs the TSA senior leadership team every morning on the intelligence we obtain and analyze. It's after these briefings that we discuss and use the information presented to make operational decisions. Intelligence we provide routinely results in decisions, such as determining which flights will be covered by our Federal Air Marshals (FAMs). Intelligence also leads to the development of new operational policies at the checkpoints. One recent example has to do with remote control (RC) toys. Our adversaries have been observed using RC toy components to help build, or to detonate Improvised Explosive Devices. The policy developed to help counter this threat in the aviation domain did not mandate prohibiting passengers from carrying RC toys on commercial airplanes. Rather, it educated our Transportation Security Officers about the potential threat from these devices and directed them to use their judgment in selecting passengers with RC cars for additional screening. We also made this information public at the same time—a first for us.

We also routinely use intelligence to inform our government and industry partners about threats we receive to their respective transportation modes, so they can take appropriate actions. We focus on threats to the U.S., but track and report on threats abroad as well.
For example, if we receive intelligence about threat to a foreign airport used by U.S. carriers, we make sure all the carriers providing service to that airport are aware and might also use that information to increase FAM coverage at those locations. We also work with foreign governments to increase security as needed. We also use intelligence to assist with operational exercises and joint exercises. Along with the Federal Aviation Administration in December, we used intelligence to design 13 realistic terrorism scenarios. Those scenarios, which were played out during the exercise, helped us and our FAA partners review and refine contingency plans and determine how best to work together, in the event that any of those or similar scenarios occur in the future.

I spent 24 years as a member of the Intelligence Community before coming to the TSA. Often, intelligence agency personnel don’t see the results of their efforts. It’s been incredibly rewarding personally, to see how the work done by the dedicated men and women of our agencies involved with the counterterrorism mission, is put to great use at TSA each day.

I also travel with my family and talk to my friends, some of whom have been know to grumble from time to time (and you know who you are!) about taking off their shoes, etc. I wanted to join this blog effort, so I could relay the same message to you that I’ve discussed with my family and friends. There really is a robust and dedicated intelligence effort in place at the TSA, that is well connected to the larger Intelligence Community and which drives everything we do on a daily basis, to protect our Nation’s transportation systems and those who use them for travel and commerce.

The Truth Behind the Title: Behavior Detection Officer

Ever get the feeling you’re being watched? Usually it’s just nerves or a good dose of electromagnetic energy, but if you’re traveling through a TSA checkpoint, chances are there are several sets of eyes on you. What are they looking at? Is your hair messed up? Looking flustered after problems at the ticket counter? Have toilet paper stuck to the bottom of your shoe? No. You’re being watched by Behavior Detection Officers, or BDOs in government acronym-speak.

The program was designed by Paul Ekman (PhD), a psychology professor at the University of California Medical School, San Francisco. He’s been studying behavioral analysis for the past 40 years and has taught the TSA, Customs and Border Protection, CIA, FBI and other federal agencies to watch for suspicious facial expressions of tension, fear or deception. He has even taught animators at Disney-Pixar to create convincing faces for film characters. After passing along his skills to US Customs, their “hit rate” for finding drugs during passenger searches rose to 22.5 percent from 4.2 percent in 1998.

Behavior analysis is based on the fear of being discovered. People who are trying to get away with something display signs of stress through involuntary physical and physiological behaviors. Whether someone’s trying to sneak through that excellent stone ground mustard they bought on vacation, a knife, or a bomb, behavior detection officers like me are trained to spot certain suspicious behaviors out of the crowd. Once we make our determination, we refer these passengers for additional screening or directly to law enforcement.

Just recently at the Cincinnati Northern Kentucky International Airport, (CVG) two of my fellow BDOs spotted behaviors on a passenger and conducted secondary screening. They were unaware at the time the individual was an undercover “passenger” involved in covert testing. The concealed item was an unassembled weapon in a carry-on bag. The BDOs caught this right away, and when the testing was over, it was revealed that the passenger also had plastic explosive simulants in the cups of her bra. This was an excellent catch, and proof the behavior detection program works. If this were the real thing, we would have caught it.

Between July 1, 2007 and February 7, 2008, 514 people were arrested after being referred for additional screening or directly to law enforcement officers by behavior detection officers. The arrests include unlawfully carrying concealed firearms or other weapons, possession of fraudulent documents, transporting undeclared currency, possessing illegal drugs, immigration law violations, and outstanding warrants.

Some will say that it shouldn’t be TSA’s job to look for drugs, or money - our job is airport security. But when we spot someone behaving suspiciously, we don’t know what they have; all we know is they’re behaving in a way that says they might pose a threat. In many cases, we find things that might have otherwise gotten through security (money, drugs) and that’s a good sign because it could just as easily been plastic or liquid explosives. The behaviors these drug and currency smugglers exhibit are the same behaviors we expect a terrorist to exhibit.

In the ABC interview below, former United Airlines ticketing agent Mike Tuohey discusses gut feelings he had about behaviors Mohamed Atta and Abdulaziz al-Omari were displaying on 9/11. BDOs are trained to recognize behaviors and likely would have subjected them to secondary screening and questioning.



At a time when almost anything can be made into a weapon, it’s important to focus on the people with intent to do harm, not just on the items they might use. For more information on the program, click here.

Bob
TSA Evolution Blog Team and Behavior Detection Officer

Saturday Morning Strange But True...

Saturday morning, a Transportation Security Officer working the x-ray machine saw two razor blades in what appeared to be a book in someone's carry-on bag. During the bag check, the razor blades were found inside the pages of a Bible, and bag belonged to... a priest. Can't make this stuff up.

My job at TSA involves collecting, analyzing and sharing information. This includes regularly checking a TSA site run by our Transportation Security Operations Center that provides real-time reports on incidents that happen around the country. These reports include: weapons found at checkpoints, people behaving badly on planes, terminal evacuations, suspected IEDs, planes that lose contact with air traffic control and other incidents.

On any given day, there are dozens of reports sent in from airports ranging from routine to bizarre to truly scary. On Friday, we posted a story on our website about five incidents reported into the operations center that morning before 9:00 a.m. EST, including three guns (two loaded) and two knives found in carry-on bags. All of the people who got caught with guns said they didn't know the gun was in their bag, but the man with the knives said he knew he couldn't take them on the plane, but really wanted to anyway. He was arrested.

From time to time, I'll be posting stories about some of the things in the incident reports that catch my eye and might be of interest to you. Have a good weekend.

The TSA, Our Officers, The Public and Theft

As we know and you have reported on this very blog, theft in our nations' airports is a big problem. It's an issue that has plagued the industry for decades, but now, as the relatively new kid on the block and the agency charged with opening more than 1 million checked bags every day, the finger has been pointed directly at our workforce.

And in some cases, rightfully so... Unfortunately, TSA has experienced its problems with theft. To date, we have terminated and sought prosecution for about 200 of our employees who have been accused of stealing, either from checked bags, passengers’ carry-ons or fellow employees. While 200 out of more than 110,000 employees is a minuscule percentage (less than one half of one percent) over the short life of the agency, one theft is too many when you are in the position of public trust as we are. We do not tolerate, condone, cover up or minimize theft by our officers by any stretch of the imagination and in most cases, it is fellow employees uncovering the theft and the organization pushing hard for prosecution of those that would abuse their authority.

From our perspective, we don't want thieves in our workforce and will do all we can to root them out. We rely on security cameras, two to three person integrity - with managers present, reports of theft by fellow employees and sting operations conducted unilaterally or with law enforcement partners at our nation's airports.

For instance, you may have read a news article from the Chicago Tribune about an officer stealing gift cards from baggage at O’Hare. What you didn’t read in that article is that TSA’s Office of Inspection (our version of internal affairs) actually ran down the stolen gift cards at Target and Best Buy, obtained surveillance video of the thieves redeeming the gift cards and worked with the Chicago PD to make sure they did not get away with this.

A few other examples include: TSA working with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department during a sting operation last summer which netted two airline contractors who stole the weapons of two service members on their way to the Middle East; a TSA-led investigation conducted in New Orleans about three years ago had similar success in netting a small group of thieves working for us; and two years ago, a TSA baggage screener at LAX attempted to steal a high-priced watch from Paris Hilton, then had second thoughts and put it back. In that case, a fellow employee reported the incident and the TSA convinced the city attorney of Los Angeles to prosecute. All of these TSA employees were terminated immediately.

Additionally, to prevent theft, our employees are prohibited from taking backpacks, lunchboxes or any other personal carrying item into baggage screening operation areas. Some airports time and date stamp bag screening cards and today more than half of all travelers use airports that have “in-line” baggage systems. These systems greatly limit the personal handling of bags by our officers and enable them to screen these bags remotely. In short, we have implemented many tools to protect your belongings and ensure your safety.

The question will certainly arise... don't you do background checks on your employees? The answer: YES! The problem with background checks is they check the background, they don't predict the future.

Now many of you have referenced television reports that talk about claims and claim data that seem to implicate our workforce in wide-spread thievery. A Seattle television station aired the original story that was based on data they had requested through the Freedom of Information Act. The data, several hundred pages, listed claims that had been submitted by passengers from airports around the country. In the data, there were no categories for theft or disposition because that information was not requested. The facts, that went unreported and un-requested, were that the majority of those claims were denied or canceled because they lacked sufficient grounds for us to use your tax payer dollars to reimburse passengers.

Now, after the five or ten minutes of time that we have your bag...what happens to it? Well, we estimate that between five and eight airline employees touch that same bag, many times outside of the view of passengers, sometimes in the cargo hold of aircraft.

So what can you do if you feel you have been ripped off? First and foremost, file a police report. Most airports have law enforcement in the terminals, many airports could have a police officers respond in minutes. Second, file a claim with both TSA and the airline. We analyze this data and if we see a trend at a particular airport, we are in a better position to investigate further. Third, check to make sure you have all of your belongings prior to departing the checkpoint area. Fourth, check with lost and found. Everyday we itemize, catalog and store thousands of items that passengers may think were stolen, but in fact are waiting to be claimed. Our lost and found link on our web site can be found by clicking here, Fifth, when traveling through the security checkpoint, to prevent another passenger stealing from you, put your phone or watch or wallet in your briefcase, purse or carry-on bag. That way it all stays together and won't fall out of one of those bowls we have for screening or make for easy pickings from a thief.

Also, I can't tell you how many times I have heard of passengers putting expensive jewelry or even wads of cash in their checked bags! Keep it with you.

Christopher
TSA Evolution Blog Team

02.15.08, 2:10p.m.
Christopher said:

Couldn't agree more with anonymous at 12:31, "the screeners violated the public trust. That is completely unacceptable for a government employee at any level." That's what the post is all about. One case of officer theft is one too many and we're doing our level best to find, fire and aid in the prosectution of any officer that is stealing. Beyond the obvious lack of honesty and abuse of the public trust that has been mentioned, officers stealing sully the reputation of the great majority of the workforce and make their jobs much more difficult.

I'm not familiar with what a public affairs "gonk" is but I'm sure it's not a term of endearment. I was not trying to be intentionally vague when I wrote about 200. Let's agree to about 271, okay?

If you reply with a link to the Austin article, I'll track it down and get some facts and update this post later today. I've been with TSA three years and have never heard us characterize any theft as "minor" and am interested in this.

02.15.08, 3:10p.m.
Christopher said:

Great comments and questions about the locks. Hopefully this will clear up a couple issues. First, TSA is not cutting TSA recognized locks off your baggage. We have the keys and have no need to do this. In fact, it would take longer to grab bolt cutters (which we do keep for non-TSA recognized locks) and cut the lock off, pick up the pieces and replace the bolt cutters than it does to use the master keys we have.

The reality of the airport is that there are literally miles of belts with twists and turns everywhere. Belts the airlines use to get your luggage from the ticket counter to us, belts we use to move the bags through the mini-van sized explosive detection machines, belts to get the bags back to the airlines and to the areas where bags are collected for specific flights and of course belts to move the bags into the underside of the aircraft. This doesn't even include the belts at the destination airport that get bags from the plane to the carousel. The point about all these belts is that twists and turns in the belt system are notorious pinch points for bags and particularly locks. Go to any airport in America and the floor of these areas will have broken locks on them. Yes it's a design issue and it is being addressed in some of our more modern airports and systems but the plain truth about these locks is that more often than not, it's a belt that broke your lock, not a person.

As some have mentioned, these locks aren't built to withstand a serious pounding and can be broken, pulled apart, picked or otherwise disabled. These locks provide a modest amount of protection from opportunistic thieves, they will not stop someone bent on getting into a bag just like a lock on your front door would not prevent a burglar from breaking your window.

Christopher
TSA Evolution Blog Team

What It Takes to be a Transportation Security Officer

Many people at TSA are checking out our blog, from security officers on the front line to management here at TSA’s headquarters. Today, we received a post from Mo McGowan, who heads up aviation security operations at TSA:

Since there have been hundreds of comments about our Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) on this blog ranging from "they're great" to "they stink," I thought it might be interesting to take an inside look into what it takes to be an officer and what they do.

So what does it take to be hired as an officer? Applicants are tested before they’re hired, and have quite a bit of required training afterward. Applicants for “screening” jobs take a series of image interpretation tests before they are ever offered a job. (About one in 20 applicants actually becomes an officer.) Even after they’ve been on the job, TSA requires ongoing training throughout the year.

Once hired, officers:
- Participate in more than 120 hours of classroom and on-the-job training before they ever screen a person or a bag;
- Undergo a series of tests before receiving a work assignment;
- Complete even more training if they are going to screen both passengers and baggage (More than half of our officers do this); and
- Complete an annual certification process that includes more written tests, image interpretation tests, and a third party evaluation.

So training is a regular, important part of an officer’s job.

Seven times every day, every checkpoint in the U.S. is tested with ‘fake’ threats to ensure that our officers are on alert. Most of these fake items are very difficult to identify on the computer screen, and most of these items are detected. Unfortunately, we’re all most likely to hear about the few prohibited items that pass through undetected rather than the thousands of items that are identified at the checkpoint.

On a typical day in the U.S., security officers find two guns and around 2,800 knives and blades (of varying sizes) on passengers and in carry-on bags. Those are the most commonly discovered prohibited items, but it’s hard to imagine how many other potential threats are identified on a daily basis.

We at TSA don’t want anything to happen ‘on our watch.’ This means a lot to me when my family flies, or when I fly to see my grandkids. It means that officers want to be thorough even though it might be inconvenient for us sometimes. It means that they take our safety, security, and the threat seriously, and try their best to prevent and deter the individuals who wish to do us harm.

At TSA, we think about one passenger at a time, two million times a day.

Thanks,
Mo

A Few Thoughts on Consistency and Where We're Going...by Kip Hawley

Thanks for participating in the Evolution of Security blog. In the coming weeks we will ask for your opinions about some issues we have now in discussion -- balancing intrusions into personal space (pat-downs, imaging) with better detection, devoting dedicated lanes to 'speedsters' frequent flyers and how to manage who goes to that lane -- are two examples. We will also continue to go where you take us with the issues you raise. I would like to address one of those issues now: 'why do I get different results at different airports?'

There are two main issues: a) process consistency, where we want to have the same result everywhere; and, b) purposeful variation so as not to offer a static target.

Let me say up front that we have sometimes confused the issue ourselves, seemingly excusing unwanted results with 'well we do it differently on purpose' answers. While I understand the frustration of not having a completely identical process every time, I cannot say that you will ever be able to go through completely on autopilot. Here's my perspective...

Let's take process consistency first. Imagine we were a manufacturing business and that we wanted to crank out identical, high quality widgets. That's hard to do even when you use precision equipment and consistent materials. If TSA were a manufacturer, we would be processing over 700 million unique transactions a year, using over 40,000 different people, at over 400 locations. And, rather than combating maintenance woes (although we do) and the standard banes of manufacturing quality, our enemy is active, intelligent, malicious, patient, and adaptive.

Because TSA started from scratch, we used very defined 'standard operating procedures' in order to get the new organization up and running. Over time, that detailed process control started to work against us. It had the effect of making the job checklist-oriented. ('If I follow the SOP, then I am doing my job.') The tighter we squeezed to demand tighter adherence to the SOP, the more we squeezed individual initiative and thinking out of it.

While we had great people as TSO's, we were putting them in situations where they had to do things 'because it's SOP' whether or not it made sense. It was not helpful for public credibility or for keeping our people sharp.

Since nobody would care that we followed the SOP precisely if there was a successful attack, and since our enemy can observe our SOP and plan ways to beat it -- we needed something more.

This is the purposeful variation part. The idea is to have a menu of different security measures that TSOs add randomly to the standard process.

Everybody goes through the magnetometer and puts carry-ons through the x-ray and if there is an alarm, it is resolved. However, given the limits of technology and simple human fallibility, vulnerabilities inevitably exist. We are covering those vulnerabilities by adding, truly at random, additional measures. For example, in the last couple of months, I have had two versions of a quick pat-down. My computer was swabbed for an explosives check, as were my shoes even though I didn't alarm going through (Yes, I go through security just like everyone else). We also have new handheld liquid and solid explosives detection devices deployed as well as a variety of other measures. You may, and should, see what I mean in an upcoming trip.

I should also add that we have recently added other layers of security to address the same vulnerabilities that I have been discussing -- behavior detection, document checking, K-9 teams, undercover air marshals, etc.

So, our theory of how to achieve process consistency from a quality control perspective is to train well and set outcome goals that encourage individual initiative and judgment. We think that for a distributed workforce that sees endless variety in passenger situations and faces an adaptive enemy -- that is the way to go. This means that, yes, you will see some differences trip to trip on some judgment things that are not on purpose. That is the price for a thinking, switched-on front-line -- if you want people thinking, then you have to let them make decisions based on their training and experience.

You will also see some different measures applied trip to trip that are purposeful, put there to prevent someone from exploiting a vulnerability.

Thanks for working with us, Kip

Questions We Hear Everyday (Commenting Disabled)

Throughout the ages, there have been many unanswered questions that continue to baffle the human race. Who built Stonehenge? Is there life on other planets? Why does the TSA make me place my liquids in a clear sealable baggie?

Unfortunately, even the experts at the TSA were not able to solve all of the world's mysteries, but they were able to crack the code on a few.

For your viewing pleasure, we filmed some of our experts explaining a couple of TSA's most frequently asked questions from the flying public. We have others and will post those in the future but for today we have:

• Why do you screen the elderly and little children?
  (streaming .wmv)
• Why can't I bring certain liquids through the checkpoint? Why must they be in a bag?
  (streaming .wmv)
• Why do we scan Shoes? Why do we have to take them off?
  (streaming .wmv)

We know, we know, what about shoes? Well we're working on a video for this question and plan to update this post with that video this afternoon. In the meantime, check out our post on shoes in the link off to the right. We updated it this morning with a picture of a really funky pair of shoes we found on a guy flying from Alaska last year. We have also posted the x-ray image of a standard pair of shoes. We think it shows pretty clearly that we can actually tell if they've been altered.

You'll notice there's no mention of good old shoe bomber Richard Reid yet. That's because the current rule is not in place only because of one of the more famous residents of the Supermax in Kansas. No, it's all about intel and us knowing that terrorists are still interested in hiding explosives, detonators and other items we really don't want in the cabin of an airplane in their shoes.

Don't forget, we want your feedback but it has to be in the right place because we can't move comments around on this blog yet. Post shoe comments and questions in that link, post liquids issues and scientific research proving us wrong in the liquids page. For anyone interested in discussing screening the elderly and children, feel free to comment right here.

Finally, you'll be happy to know that Kip does not own shares in the plastic baggie business and he is fond of the elderly and small children. I'm also willing to bet you wouldn't even have to take your shoes off at his house. Enjoy...

Bob
Evolution Blog Team

Welcome

Two million travelers come in contact with the Transportation Security Administration every day. It is an intense experience all around -- extremely personal in some senses but also impersonal at the same time.

There is no time to talk, to listen, to engage with each other. There isn’t much opportunity for our Security Officers to explain the ‘why,’ of what we ask you to do at the checkpoint, just the ‘what’ needs to be done to clear security. The result is that the feedback and venting ends up circulating among passengers with no real opportunity for us to learn from you or vice versa. We get feedback verbally and non-verbally at the checkpoint and see a lot in the blogs, again without a real dialogue.

Our ambition is to provide here a forum for a lively, open discussion of TSA issues. While I and senior leadership of TSA will participate in the discussion, we are turning the keyboard over to several hosts who represent what’s best about TSA (its people). Our hosts aren’t responsible for TSA’s policies, nor will they have to defend them -- their job is to engage with you straight-up and take it from there. Our hosts will have access to senior leadership but will have very few editorial constraints. Our postings from the public will be reviewed to remove the destructive but not touch the critical or cranky.

Please be patient and good-humored as we get underway. The opportunity is that we will incorporate what we learn in this forum in our checkpoint process evolution. We will not only give you straight answers to your questions but we will challenge you with new ideas and involve you in upcoming changes.

One of my major goals of 2008 is to get TSA and passengers back on the same side, working together. We need your help to get the checkpoint to be a better environment for us to do our security job and for you to get through quickly and onto your flight. Seems like the way to get that going is for us to open up and hear your feedback...

Thanks for joining us,
Kip Hawley

Meet Our Bloggers

Moderators/Bloggers

Bob
Hi, I'm Bob, and I started with the TSA in September 2002. I worked at the Cincinnati-Northern Kentucky International Airport (CVG) for 5 years and am currently residing at TSA headquarters. I started as a Transportation Security Officer (TSO), and have since been promoted to a Program Analyst with the Office of Strategic Communications and Public Affairs.

In my nearly 6 years with TSA, I've also worked as an Operations Watch Officer, Instructor, Training Coordinator, Behavior Detection Officer, and I served as the Vice Chairman on TSA's first National Advisory Council - a group representing TSA's frontline workforce in discussions with TSA leadership on security and workplace issues.

I live in Northern Virginia with my wife, 4-year-old daughter, newborn daughter, and a 100 pound German shepherd named Clarence.

Prior to the TSA I was a singer songwriter and traveled the world with my band. Songwriting is now one of my hobbies along with record collecting, ugly ties and photography. My favorite type of music is pre-punk garage rock music from the 1960s.

Lynn
I’m Lynn, and I joined TSA on September 11, 2006. It’s somewhat coincidental because on September 11, 2001, I was nine months pregnant, headed to work in DC and heard about the first plane hitting the WTC as I was driving past the Pentagon. By the time I got to my office, the Pentagon had been hit. The image of dazed people crossing the highway and the smoke pouring out of the Pentagon as I drove home is still fresh in my mind. After my son was born, I spent the next five years as a full-time mom and got hooked on blogging. I also honed my skills in traveling with small children.

At TSA, I manage information sharing efforts, work on Web 2.0 initiatives, collect data and stats, and provide incident management support. I’m an information junkie, participate regularly on various message boards and travel sites, and I’m a huge fan of the Darwin Awards and the DC City Paper’s News of the Weird, which makes me want to post regularly on the wacky things we see at TSA on a regular basis.

Nico
I'm Nico and I have been with the TSA since just about the beginning, January 3, 2002 to be exact, 35 days after Congress created the agency. I currently manage public affairs for the agency in the Pacific region which includes California, Arizona and Hawaii, though I have served as the primary media POC for as many as 16 states at one time or another.

I came to the TSA after serving 10 active years in the Navy and am now a Navy Reserve officer with over 17 years in uniform. My wife served in the Navy for 10 years, my brother continues to serve, another brother served and my kids can't wait to serve. A Navy family some would say.

On September 11, I was scheduled to attend a meeting in the Pentagon, in the same corridor where the plane hit, though I avoided the meeting because I was watching television coverage of the World Trade Center. On that day it became clear that the world my children would grow up in is a significantly different world than the one we knew. Securing our homeland is certainly a passion for me.

Paul
Hello everyone, I’m Paul and I just arrived at the TSA fresh out of college. I have several years experience working with various types of news media, ranging from radio to magazines to online publications. I’m originally from Philadelphia—home of the *best* sports fans in the nation. Philadelphia Phillies 2008 World Champs.

For the past 8 years, I’ve spent countless hours rowing on the Schuylkill River in Philadelphia and the Charles River in Boston. Rowing competitively is one of the most satisfying experiences out there.

Commenters/Bloggers

Kelly
Hey ya’ll (yep, I’m from KY).… My name is Kelly and I have been with TSA at Louisville International Airport since Dec 2006. In my two years, I have enjoyed working with the public and have helped to train other TSOs. I work part-time and half of my time is spent on the checkpoint and the other half screening checked bags.

Before TSA, I worked mostly in restaurants. Until TSA, that is pretty much all I knew and I enjoyed it very much. Working with the public since I was 15 has helped me to develop great customer service skills that I apply to my job every day and try to utilize when helping out on this blog as well.

I have always enjoyed working with people, but outside of work, my true passion is animals. My boyfriend and I have an Australian Shepherd and a cat, who don't get along of course. I also love taking pictures and have been thinking about ways to combine my passions. Until then, I will be here and hope to be more helpful in answering your questions and giving feedback.

Tim
Hi, I'm Tim and I joined TSA in mid 2007. I'm currently a Transportation Security Officer at Sacramento International Airport (SMF) and take great pride in the support I receive.
I come from a US Army military intelligence background and am a combat veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom. As a Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO), I specialized in Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) and junior level analysis.

On September 11, I was one of the many US Army soldiers patrolling Fort Huachuca checking military IDs. Holding my M16-A2, I knew the United States was going to change and I would do everything in my power to make sure it changed for the good. Public service has been a great honor for me.

In my free time, I am a proud family man, hobbyist programmer, like to collaborate on open source software, and am currently finishing up my degree in software engineering.

West
Hi, my name is West, and I started with TSA in February of 2005. I work at GSO (Piedmont Triad International Airport in Greensboro, NC) and truly enjoy working at my airport. I was hired on as a Transportation Security Officer (TSO) and have since been promoted to Lead Transportation Security Officer (LTSO). I have worked as an On the Job Training (OJT) Monitor, and have been training new TSO’s since my first year with TSA.

I live in Greensboro, NC with my significantly better half Charlene, Jacob and Esau (the two cats that actually own the house), and Montana and Darwin (the dogs that are a pair of walking comedy reels).

Prior to working with the TSA, I put in 8 years with the US Army as a Military Police Officer. I also put in 8 years as a Silversmith Apprentice and am now a Journeyman Silversmith. My hobbies include sitting on a pier/boat with a fishing pole and being able to fix broken metal things.