During the period covered by this volume,
July 1970–January 1972, the Nixon administration expanded the Vietnam war into Cambodia
and Laos as part of its strategy. This volume covers South Vietnam in the context of
this larger war in Southeast Asia; therefore, the volume begins in July 1970 in the
aftermath of the Cambodian incursion. At the time, a variety of topics dominated the
policy discussions of President Nixon and his principal advisers. Among these topics
were U.S. troop withdrawals, Vietnamization, negotiations in Paris (both the public
plenary sessions and the secret talks between Kissinger and North Vietnamese Politburo
member Le Duc Tho), and possible South Vietnamese operations in Cambodia, Laos, and
North Vietnam. Throughout the rest of 1970 these themes moved forward on separate paths
that occasionally intersected with one another. South Vietnamese operations, first in
Cambodia and then in Laos, were seen in policy terms as providing South Vietnam
additional time to develop a more effective military, to generate economic growth, and
to achieve some degree of political stability. The operations were also to demonstrate
the success of Vietnamization and justify the continuing withdrawal of U.S.
troops.
In late 1970 and early 1971, the focus
shifted to decision making regarding plans to implement a major South Vietnamese
out-of-country operation called Lam Son 719, launched in early February 1971. The
strategic purpose of the operation was to halt or slow the flow of military supplies to
Communist forces in South Vietnam via the panhandle of Laos. At the same time, it would
demonstrate the growing military prowess of the South Vietnamese Army. On the
negotiating front, Kissinger continued in 1970 and throughout1971 to meet periodically
in Paris with Le Duc Tho and other senior Vietnamese Communist functionaries, but made
no progress. At the same time, representatives of both sides also met publicly in the
plenary meetings. Each side used the public Paris meetings to exchange carefully
calibrated propaganda, making the meetings, if possible, less productive than the secret
talks. The volume focuses on the Kissinger–Le Duc Tho talks with only occasional
documentary coverage of the public talks.
This volume also documents President Nixon’s
penchant for secret operations and covert warfare: his continued support for secret
bombing campaigns in Cambodia and Laos and his approval of the November 1971 Son Tay
raid into North Vietnam to rescue American prisoners of war. Nixon also signed off on
new and continuing information gathering initiatives and propaganda that supported
intelligence operations against Communist forces, organizations, and governments in
South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Additionally, he approved clandestine
support for South Vietnamese political entities friendly to the United States. These
operations are documented in some detail to demonstrate the role of covert actions in
support of overt political and military operations.
In the waning months of the period covered by
this volume, deadlock had set in. Neither side appeared able to win militarily, or even
to weaken his adversary sufficiently to make him negotiate in good faith. There were
signs, however, that Hanoi might be preparing to mount a major military effort in 1972.
Its purpose would be to break through this impasse without having to travel a diplomatic
path. The volume concludes at this point.