Highlights taken from our Semiannual Report to Congress for the period ending September 30, 2008, include the following:

• In “Final Memorandum on the Standing Review Board for the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle Project,” we reported on a lack of independence as well as organizational conflicts among members of the Orion Project’s standing review boards (SRBs). NASA requires its space flight projects to establish an SRB to conduct independent reviews throughout a project’s life cycle. SRBs assess and report on the adequacy and credibility of the project’s technical and management approach, schedule, resources, cost, and risk; the project’s compliance with Agency management and systems engineering guidance; and the project’s readiness to proceed to the next life-cycle phase. During our audit of the Orion Project, we found that although the Orion SRB met the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) definition of a Federal advisory committee, NASA had not established the Orion SRB in accordance with Federal law or NASA guidance. The Orion SRB also included members who were employees or stockholders of Orion contractors, which created an organizational conflict of interest as defined in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) between the members’ employers and NASA. We recommended that NASA suspend the involvement of six SRB members until an evaluation of the legality and propriety of their membership is concluded. We also recommended that the Agency identify any new advisory committees that include non-NASA personnel and evaluate the purpose, responsibilities, and membership of all SRBs to determine the optimum approach for accomplishing the SRB mission while ensuring compliance with all applicable guidance. In response to our report, NASA management took action to determine the optimum approach for SRBs and to revise Agency guidance as appropriate. However, the former Associate Administrator for Program Analysis and Evaluation stated that he does not believe that FACA or the FAR applies to the Orion SRB. We continue to work with management to resolve the report’s recommendations concerning the Orion SRB issues of independence and conflict of interest, in particular, and the applicability of FACA and the FAR to SRBs in general.
• We initiated our audit to determine whether “[A NASA] Center’s Security Program Needed Improvement” in response to a congressional request. The Chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, requested that we investigate allegations received by his office of serious security concerns at a NASA Center to determine whether security services provided at the Center complied with NASA Security Program requirements, policies, and procedures. Specifically, we evaluated the Center’s decisions concerning staffing levels of contract security police and the Center’s physical security procedures. Our audit validated the overarching premise of the allegations in that we found the security posture at the Center had degraded over the last few years and the security posture was in jeopardy of degrading further. We also found that the Center’s Security Program was not in compliance with NASA Security Program requirements. Specifically, the Center had not conducted or considered threat assessments as required by NASA policy; critical infrastructure assets at the Center were not identified, assessed, and protected in accordance with NASA Security Program Requirements; and NASA Headquarters was not inspecting the Center’s Security Program, as required by NASA policy. As a result, NASA had no assurance that it was devoting the appropriate level of resources to protect the Center’s personnel, facilities, and equipment. The corrective actions taken or planned by management were responsive to our recommendations.
• In our “Final Memorandum on the Review of NASA’s Plan to Build the A-3 Facility for Rocket Propulsion Testing,“ we reported that NASA missed an opportunity to leverage expertise and resources when planning the facility. Our review of NASA’s plan to build a new rocket propulsion test facility at Stennis Space Center (Stennis) in Mississippi was initiated in response to a complaint forwarded to us from GAO. The complaint alleged that the planned rocket propulsion test facility would duplicate the capabilities of the Air Force’s Arnold Engineering Development Center (AEDC) in Tennessee. We found that the test stand NASA intends to build at Stennis would not duplicate existing capabilities at AEDC. We also found, however, that NASA’s Upper Stage Engine Element Manager, located at Marshall, reviewed the J-2X rocket propulsion testing options and selected the A-3 test stand to be built at Stennis without the required formal reviews or recommendations of the National Rocket Propulsion Test Alliance (NRPTA) or NASA’s Rocket Propulsion Test Management Board (RPTMB). This occurred because NASA did not appropriately engage the NRPTA as required by the NRPTA memorandum of agreement (MOA). The NRPTA MOA and the RPTMB Operating Procedures require member reviews and recommendations prior to major test facility investments or modifications. We made two recommendations: (1) NASA should issue a NASA Policy Directive (and NASA Procedural Requirements, if applicable) detailing the requirement for NASA’s rocket propulsion test organizations to request formal reviews and recommendations from the RPTMB and, as appropriate, the NRPTA, in accordance with the RPTMB and NRPTA guidelines, (2) NASA should take advantage of the technical expertise available in the rocket propulsion test community and request an independent review and assessment of the technical and cost risks associated with the planned A-3 test stand to develop a comprehensive risk mitigation strategy. NASA concurred with our recommendations and requested an independent review.