Because of their political and military importance, destructive power, and the potential consequences of an accident or unauthorized act, nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon systems require special consideration and must be protected against risks and threats inherent in their peacetime and wartime environments. Oversight of the Department of Defense (DoD) nuclear surety program is provided by DATSD(NM). |
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Primarily, responsibility for weapon design, production, technology, and dismantlement, as well as the transportation of weapons to and from the military first destination (MFD), rests with the NNSA and its national weapons laboratories. Because nuclear weapons are in DoD custody for the majority of their lifetime, the DoD is responsible for a wide range of operational requirements to include maintaining, securing, and employing nuclear weapons (upon receipt of a Presidential order), as well as accident prevention and response. There are overlaps in responsibilities and considerable coordination takes place between the two departments (i.e. interface between the weapon (a DOE asset) and the delivery system (a DoD asset)). Nuclear Weapons Safety The DoD and the DOE maintain separate, but closely paralleled, nuclear safety standards. DATSD(NM) promulgates the DoD Safety Standards through DoD Directive 3150.2, DoD Nuclear Weapons Systems Safety Program. The DOE standards are codified in DOE Order 452.1C, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program. The DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program consists of key elements for program guidance, system evaluation, safety assurance, and for the conduct of safe nuclear weapon system operations. Those key elements are as follows:
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There shall be positive measures to:
For more information regarding Nuclear Weapons Safety, see DoD Directive 3150.2 DoD Nuclear Weapon System Program and DoD 3150.2-M DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program Manual. DATSD(NM) oversight of nuclear safety includes: developing DoD policy and guidance to include DoDD 3150.2 and DoDD 3150.2-M, DoD Nuclear Weapons System Safety Program (directive and manual); participating in the development of Weapons System Safety Rules (WSSRs); overseeing the Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection (NWTI) process, and through its executive agent the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), monitoring nuclear safety practices during surety inspections at military units. Nuclear Weapons Security
DATSD(NM) oversight of nuclear security includes developing DoD policy and guidance such as: DoDD 5210.42, Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program (PRP); DoDD 5210.41 and DoDD 5210.41-M, Physical Security of Nuclear Weapons (directive and manual); DoDD 5210.63, Security of Nuclear Reactors and Special Nuclear Materials; and participating on the Capabilities Based Assessment team, the Security Policy Verification Committee (SPVC), the Physical Security Enhancement Action Group (PSEAG), the Nuclear Forces Security Steering and Working Group, and the Transportation Security Working Group (TSWG). Threat-based exercises use a team replicating the actual threat against the DoD resource/posture while resident forces defend against that specific threat. The outcome of these exercises impact nuclear security standards, policy, guidance, and practices. Additionally, DATSD(NM) researches and analyzes security processes and weapons security protection systems to ensure the most accurate and reliable systems are used at installations and facilities possessing nuclear weapons. DATSD(NM), with the assistance of DTRA, takes an active role in developing physical security equipment to maintain security superiority. Nuclear Weapons System Reliability Nuclear weapon delivery systems are tested routinely by the individual Services through test-launches conducted under operational conditions from nuclear-capable aircraft, ICBM test silos, and submarines. These tests use dummy or instrumented warheads on test ranges to monitor bomb or missile performance and accuracy. Each weapons delivery platform, therefore, has extensive testing data through years of flight tests to demonstrate the reliability of the weapon delivery system. Nuclear warhead reliability is a complex challenge during an era in which the U.S. is not currently conducting underground nuclear tests. The key to warhead reliability is the DOE/NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP). Confidence in the predicted performance of the nuclear warheads is maintained through an ongoing process of surveillance, assessment and certification, and refurbishment. For more information on this process, see Nuclear Stockpile and Nuclear Weapons Council. Control of Use The DoD, DOE, and the National Security Agency (NSA) work closely to develop, implement, and maintain standards, plans, procedures, and other measures to control use of nuclear resources. Specifically, the DATSD(NM) oversight for control of use includes: developing DoD policy and guidance to include DoDD 5210.8, US Nuclear Weapons Command and Control, Safety and Security, DoDD 3150.7, Controlling the Use of Nuclear Weapons, DoDD 3150.6, Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS) US Nuclear C2 System Support Staff, and DoDD S-5210.82, Protection of Nuclear Coding Equipment; participating in the Use Control Project Officers Group (UC POG); working closely with DOE in development of TCG-UC-3 Classification Guide; and through DTRA, monitoring use control effectiveness/practices/procedures, while conducting surety inspections at military units. Nuclear Weapons System Survivability
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Survivability does not just apply to the nuclear weapon but applies to the entire weapon system, which include: all mission essential assets; the delivery system or platform; as well as associated support systems, equipment, facilities, personnel, command and control links, and supporting logistical elements. Nuclear weapons system survivability is concerned with the entire threat spectrum (conventional, electronic, nuclear, biological, chemical, terrorism, and sabotage). DATSD(NM) oversight of nuclear weapons system survivability includes developing DoD policy and guidance to include actively participating on the Nuclear Forces Survivability Steering and Working Group, and the Rad-Hard Oversight Council (RHOC), developing roadmaps based on nuclear weapons effects simulation from the Defense Science Board Task Force (DSBTF), and managing the DoD Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) Protection program.
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