Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Radiological Threats
DOE Helicopter Conducting an Aerial Background Radiation Survey
Source: Department of Energy.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there is heightened concern that terrorists may attempt to smuggle nuclear materials or a nuclear weapon into the United States, or try to use chemical or biological agents, to attack the homeland. If terrorists were to succeed in attacking the United States with such materials, the consequences could be devastating to the government's national and economic interests. Although preventing chemical, biological, nuclear, and radioactive material from being smuggled into or used in the United States has become a key national security objective, DHS's efforts to mitigate this threat have largely been limited to deploying radiation detection capabilities at ports of entry and monitoring for possible aerosol-based attacks. Specific challenges include the following:
- While DHS has completed some assessments of biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear threats and vulnerabilities, its overall assessment efforts are in the early stages. Until these assessments are completed, DHS has limited assurance that it is pursuing the appropriate technologies and countermeasures to mitigate existing threats and vulnerabilities.
Highlights of GAO-07-454 (PDF)
- Although efforts are under way to establish the National Biosurveillance Integration Center, it is unclear what operations the center will be capable of carrying out once established.
Highlights of GAO-08-960T (PDF)
- Local first responders do not have tools that can accurately and quickly identify the release of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear material in an urban environment. While DHS and other agencies have undertaken initiatives to improve first responders' tools, these tools have many limitations for identifying chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials released in urban environments, the extent of their dispersion, and their effect on urban populations. Additionally, DHS has adopted few performance standards for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear detection equipment.
Highlights of GAO-08-180 (PDF)
- Although currently deployed radiation portal monitors and hand-held devices used to detect nuclear material are capable of detecting radiation, they have limitations, including not being able to distinguish between benign naturally occurring radiological materials and dangerous materials. Moreover, personal radiation detectors are not available to all U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers who need them, and DHS has not provided Congress with the full scope or a reliable cost estimate of the radiation portal monitor program.
Highlights of GAO-08-598 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-126T (PDF)
- DHS has overall responsibility for coordinating the federal response during biological attacks, but other agencies have the lead responsibility for validating sampling methods used to detect contamination. However, there is uncertainty over which agency would take the lead role in improving the overall process for detecting anthrax, including validation of the methods used.
Highlights of GAO-07-687T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-06-756T (PDF)
^ Back to topWhat Needs to Be Done
- DHS should update and complete its threat and vulnerability assessments of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats.
Highlights of GAO-07-454 (PDF)
- DHS should complete the development, testing, and deployment of the next generation biological detection equipment as quickly as possible.
Highlights of GAO-08-960T (PDF)
- In order to guide and inform first responders on their purchases of chemical, biological, and radiological detection equipment, DHS needs to ensure testing and validation of manufacturers' claims about chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear detection equipment's sensitivity and specificity.
Highlights of GAO-08-180 (PDF)
- DHS needs to reach agreement with agencies regarding who will have the responsibility to develop, certify, and independently test first responders' equipment for detecting hazardous material releases.
Highlights of GAO-08-180 (PDF)
- DHS should conduct a new cost-benefit analysis to justify the purchase of new radiation detection portal monitors by using sound analytical methods, including actual performance data and a complete accounting of all major program costs and benefits.
GAO-07-133R (PDF)
- DHS should revise its estimate of radiation portal monitors' costs to include monitors' design and development, sustainment, maintenance, deployment, and procurement, and communicate the revised estimate to Congress.
GAO-08-1108R (PDF)
- U.S. Customs and Border Protection needs to more effectively communicate guidance on when its officers must verify the legitimacy of radioactive materials and take steps to ensure that this guidance is being followed.
Highlights of GAO-08-598 (PDF)
- DHS needs to develop a formal strategic plan, outlining how individual agency efforts would lead to the validation of the overall sampling process in cases of biological attacks.
Highlights of GAO-06-756T (PDF)
^ Back to topKey Reports
- Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS's Program to Procure and Deploy Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Is Likely to Exceed the Department's Previous Cost Estimates
- GAO-08-1108R, September 22, 2008
- Summary (HTML) Full Report (PDF, 52 pages) Accessible Text Recommendations (HTML)
- Biosurveillance: Preliminary Observations on Department of Homeland Security's Biosurveillance Initiatives
- GAO-08-960T, July 16, 2008
- Summary (HTML) Highlights Page (PDF) Full Report (PDF, 14 pages) Accessible Text
- Homeland Security: First Responders' Ability to Detect and Model Hazardous Releases in Urban Areas Is Significantly Limited
- GAO-08-180, June 27, 2008
- Summary (HTML) Highlights Page (PDF) Full Report (PDF, 79 pages) Accessible Text Recommendations (HTML)
- Nuclear Security: NRC and DHS Need to Take Additional Steps to Better Track and Detect Radioactive Materials
- GAO-08-598, June 19, 2008
- Summary (HTML) Highlights Page (PDF) Full Report (PDF, 53 pages) Accessible Text Recommendations (HTML)
- Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One Year Later
- GAO-08-126T, October 30, 2007
- Summary (HTML) Highlights Page (PDF) Full Report (PDF, 55 pages) Accessible Text
- Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of Mission and Management Functions
- GAO-07-454, August 17, 2007
- Summary (HTML) Highlights Page (PDF) Full Report (PDF, 328 pages) Accessible Text
- Anthrax Detection: DHS Cannot Ensure That Sampling Activities Will Be Validated
- GAO-07-687T, March 29, 2007
- Summary (HTML) Highlights Page (PDF) Full Report (PDF, 18 pages) Accessible Text
- Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS's Cost-Benefit Analysis to Support the Purchase of New Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Was Not Based on Available Performance Data and Did Not Fully Evaluate All the Monitors' Costs and Benefits
- GAO-07-133R, October 17, 2006
- Summary (HTML) Full Report (PDF, 28 pages) Accessible Text Recommendations (HTML)
- Anthrax: Federal Agencies Have Taken Some Steps to Validate Sampling Methods and to Develop a Next-Generation Anthrax Vaccine
- GAO-06-756T, May 9, 2006
- Summary (HTML) Highlights Page (PDF) Full Report (PDF, 32 pages) Accessible Text
