Yes We Are Safer

Last week, the nation marked the seventh anniversary of the 9/11 attacks in solemn fashion, focusing on memorials and reflection, rather than on point scoring. Too bad Richard Clarke couldn’t manage to do the same.

Clarke, the official in charge of antiterrorism efforts before 9/11, commemorated the anniversary of the attacks by publishing a finger-pointing screed in U.S. News and World Report.

Clarke’s argument went something like the following: Here we are, seven years after 9/11. We haven’t been attacked. But we could be. Al Qaeda still exists, Bin Laden remains at large, and terrorists still commit terrorism. We’re backsliding, and no safer now then we were then. On the home front, our borders are still porous, we’re still not screening people, and security grants are too much about pork and not enough about real risk.

Clarke is mostly wrong.

In fact, we are safer today than we were seven years ago. We haven’t been attacked since 9/11 in part because we have destroyed al Qaeda’s headquarters, enhanced our intelligence assets across the globe, captured and killed terrorists on nearly every continent, and partnered with our allies on information sharing and other security-related efforts.

Today, al Qaeda no longer has a state sponsor. Contrary to Clarke’s claims, most of its original leadership has been captured or killed. It is losing in Iraq -- thanks to the surge and to the Awakening movement among the Sunni tribes--and its savage attacks on innocents have reduced its popularity there and across the Muslim world. Muslim scholars and clerics are increasingly condemning its beliefs and behavior as a desecration of Islam.

This progress has come because we abandoned the practice of treating terrorism solely as a criminal matter – exactly the kind of September 10 policy that Clarke celebrates in his article.

Closer to home, the Department of Homeland Security has made clear progress that belies Clarke’s claims.

At the border that Clarke thinks is so porous, DHS has built hundreds of miles of fence and will double the size of the Border Patrol. We’ve also deployed fingerprint-based screening and radiation portal monitors at all of our border entry points.

To protect against a repeat attack, DHS has built nearly two dozen layers of security into our aviation system, and it has developed comprehensive security plans for other critical infrastructure.

Clarke claims that the executive branch has proved incapable of managing new terrorism programs to success. Tell that to US-VISIT – a massive government IT project that compares fingerprints of travelers to a database of millions and does it in 30 seconds for officials all across the country and the world. We got it up and running from scratch, despite the doubters. And it’s so successful that we’re expanding it to collect all ten prints and to compare them to prints found in terrorist safe houses around the world. We’ve done all that since Dick Clarke left government – and without a word of support from him.

Despite his claims of backsliding, it’s DHS that has been battling complacency, and Clarke who seems to have been sitting on the sidelines.

We’re the ones who’ve been fighting for the carefully targeted, risk-based homeland security grants he favors. It’s Congress that has added billions and made them less risk-based. Has Clarke criticized Congress or praised DHS for our risk based approach? If so, I missed it.

On our southern border, DHS’s fence-building and increased border enforcement have been hampered by local NIMBY (“not-in-my-backyard”) forces and advocates for illegal immigration. Did Dick Clarke speak out against them? Not so I’ve noticed.

To secure our northern border, we’re implementing tougher document standards, and we were ready to require all travelers to produce a passport or passport-equivalent by the end of this year. Where was Dick Clarke when Congress decided to push back that deadline to mid-2009? I don’t remember an op-ed then complaining about how porous this would make our Canadian border.

Clarke says that terrorists who look European have been trained by al Qaeda and may have European Union passports and clean identities unknown to intelligence agencies. He thinks such people could enter the United States almost as easily as did the 9/11 hijackers. It’s indeed true that during Dick Clarke’s tenure, Europeans could come to the US without any opportunity to screen them before they were in the air. As of this January, though, no foreign travelers other than Canadians will be able to come to the US without supplying -- in advance -- the information we need to screen them. At last, we’ll have the time and information we need to investigate risky travelers (and to prepare a rude surprise for terrorists who try this route). That’s all happened since Dick Clarke left government, and without any support from him.

There’s no question that Dick Clarke contributed to strengthening our national security, but his recent assertions are not only incorrect, they disrespect the work of many national security professionals he once called colleagues. That is indeed unfortunate.

Stewart Baker
Assistant Secretary for Policy

Answering Questions on Border Laptop Searches

We’ve received several comments from readers regarding my recent post about laptop searches at the border. I’d like to take a few minutes to try to answer some of your questions and set straight some misinformation that is circulating with regard to this long-standing policy.

First, it’s important to note that for more than 200 years, the federal government has been granted the authority to prevent dangerous people and things from entering the United States. Our security measures at the border are rooted in this fundamental fact, and our ability to achieve our border mission would be hampered if we did not apply the same search authorities to electronic media that we have long-applied to physical objects--including documents, photographs, film and other graphic material. Indeed, there are numerous laws that apply to such material at the border including laws regarding intellectual property rights, technical data that can be imported or exported only under state department license and child pornography.

In the 21st century, terrorists and criminals increasingly use laptops and other electronic media to transport illicit materials that were traditionally concealed in bags, containers, notebooks and paper documents. Making full use of our search authorities with respect to items like notebooks and backpacks, while failing to do so with respect to laptops and other devices, would ensure that terrorists and criminals receive less scrutiny at our borders just as their use of technology is becoming more sophisticated.

This result would be ironic given that this same technology actually enables terrorists and criminals to move large amounts of information across the border via laptops and other electronic devices. At the end of the day, we have a responsibility to search items — electronic or otherwise — that are being transported across our borders and that could potentially be used to harm our nation’s citizens or that are otherwise contrary to law.

Second, this is not a new policy. We’ve been searching laptops of those who warrant a closer inspection for years. In fact, we’ve taken the unprecedented step of posting online (PDF 5 pages - 161 KB) a policy that would typically be reserved for internal purposes. This information is not new and has been publicly debated countless times. Indeed, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals recently confirmed the constitutionality of suspicionless laptop searches at the border.

This brings me to my third point, which is that travelers whose laptops are searched represent a very small number of people. As Secretary Chertoff noted in a recent op-ed,

"Of the approximately 400 million travelers who entered the country last year, only a tiny percentage were referred to secondary baggage inspection…[and] of those, only a fraction had electronic devices that may have been checked.”

This number is less than one percent of people entering the United States. Contrary to some media accounts, we’re not rolling out a new strategy and screening an exorbitant number of travelers. We’re simply following a common sense border policy that has been in place for years, and has been reaffirmed by the courts.

And finally, to allay any concerns the business community or others may have that their personal or trade information might be put at risk by traveling with their laptops, I urge you to look at our track record. Every day, thousands of commercial entry documents, shipping manifests, container content lists, and detailed pieces of company information are transmitted to CBP so we can effectively process entries and screen cargo shipments bound for the United States. This information is closely guarded and governed by strict privacy procedures. Information from passenger laptops or other electronic devices is treated no differently.

Our Customs and Border Protection officers are trained professionals with a defined mission, and they have neither the time nor the desire to search travelers’ personal belongings for any reason other than to ensure compliance with our customs and related laws and to protect the United States. As the policy’s provisions make abundantly clear, officers are subject to numerous policy restrictions regarding the retention, sharing, and scrutiny of travelers’ documents and information.

I hope this has helped answer some of your questions. One of the lessons 9/11 taught us was that we must adapt to 21st century risks and anticipate rather than react to new threats. Our CBP officers are on the front lines every day ensuring that these lessons are heeded. We trust that travelers understand the need for these sensible security measures.

Jayson Ahern
Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Travel Authorization Via Computer

You may recall that in June we announced a program that would bring an antiquated aspect of international travel into the 21st century and at the same time improve our security. I’m pleased to say that starting August 1st, this new program, the Electronic System for Travel Authorization, or ESTA, will be up and running for use on a voluntary basis. This means that foreign travelers from Visa Waiver Program countries will be able to apply for travel authorization to the U.S. using a simple, secure website.

Let me explain some of the details and benefits of this system.

Currently, there are 27 countries in the Visa Waiver Program, which means that citizens from places such as Austria, Italy, and Japan do not need to apply for visas to travel to the United States. In lieu of a visa, they currently fill out a paper I-94W form en route to the U.S. These forms ask for basic biographic, travel, and eligibility information, and provide our Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers an opportunity to ensure that travelers do not pose a threat before they’re admitted to our country.

With ESTA, we’re simply automating this process so passengers can complete these forms online before they even depart for the U.S. This is clearly a win-win for all involved.

First, it’s convenient for travelers.

• They can complete the forms online at their leisure whenever they begin making travel plans. (We recommend this be done at least 72 hours before departure but the system can accommodate last minute travel).
  
• Most travelers will receive a response within seconds, notifying them of their eligibility or that their request is pending.
  
• An approved ESTA authorization is valid for up to two years or until the traveler’s passport expires, whichever comes first.
  
• And ESTA authorizations are valid for multiple entries into the U.S.

Second, and more importantly, it provides significant security enhancements.

• CBP will know who is traveling to our country before they arrive, and can determine if they pose a threat earlier in the process.
  
• It helps us assess risk based on individuals, rather than groups or countries. We know that just being from a stable country with a friendly government doesn’t automatically exclude one from being a threat (for example, Richard Reid from Britain or Zacharias Moussaoui from France).
  
• And by increasing the convenience on our end (we will no longer have to decipher handwriting or manually transfer information from paper forms to electronic files), we can focus more time and resources on security matters.
  
• ESTA will also help us meet a legislative requirement that will allow us to expand the Visa Waiver Program to additional allies. An expanded, more secure VWP will provide an opportunity for millions of foreign citizens to travel to the U.S. to learn firsthand what a great country we have.

As I mentioned, ESTA applications will be accepted on a voluntary basis starting August 1st and will be mandatory for all individuals traveling under the VWP on January 12, 2009. I invite you to see this system for yourself and view a great example of how 21st century technology can improve security for Americans and enhance the travel experience for our international allies.

Thanks for reading.

Kathleen Kraninger
Director, Screening Coordination Office

Tool Needed to Prosecute Drug Traffickers Using Subs

I commend the Government of Mexico and the Mexican Navy for their superb interdiction of a self-propelled semi-submersible (SPSS) vessel carrying more than 10,000 pounds of cocaine last Wednesday. This was a remarkable example of the value of active international cooperation in combating drug smugglers and the great effectiveness of the U.S. Southern Command’s Joint Interagency Task Force South. The professionalism demonstrated by the CBP Marine aircrew, JIATF-South and Mexican Navy was one of the most impressive international interdictions I have seen in my 37-year career and sends a clear signal to drug traffickers and other transnational criminals that there is a unified effort to secure our maritime borders from all hazards.

SPSS vessels represent an increasingly significant threat to our safety and security. These vessels, which can be both manned and operated remotely, can transport multi-ton loads of cocaine and other illicit cargo to the U.S. The use of SPSS vessels has grown in recent years as a means to counter effective interdiction efforts. The SPSS, once perceived as an impractical and risky smuggling tool, has proven successful as an innovative and highly mobile, asymmetrical method of conveyance. After just 23 total SPSS events between 2000 and 2007, drug trafficking organizations conducted at least 45 SPSS transits during the first six months of FY 2008. SPSS now account for 32% of all maritime cocaine flow in the transit zone.

Success against this emerging threat requires a multi-faceted approach, including: international cooperation and coordination; a persistent patrol presence in the transit zone; active intelligence gathering and sharing; and effective legislation to facilitate prosecution. As demonstrated by last week’s case, the U.S. and its partners have the ability to aggressively pursue and interdict SPSS vessels, but it is the legislative piece that is currently missing. The Mexican Navy’s interdiction notwithstanding, the overwhelming majority of SPSS interdictions result in the successful scuttling of the vessel with its entombed cargo of cocaine. Absent contraband evidence, there are few practical options under existing U.S. law to pursue prosecution.

If operation of and embarkation in an SPSS were illegal, U.S. interdiction forces and U.S. Attorneys would have the necessary legal tools to combat the SPSS threat even in the absence of recovered drugs or other contraband. Criminalizing the operation of stateless SPSS vessels on international voyages would improve officer safety, deter the use of these inherently dangerous vessels, and facilitate effective prosecution of criminals involved in this treacherous and emerging trend.

The penalty for any SPSS offense should be sufficiently strong to deter use and encourage cooperation by those interdicted at sea. Because the desired legislation is limited to stateless SPSS and submarines on international voyages, the law would not affect legitimate business users and law abiding hobbyists.

We strongly support the legislation introduced in both the House and Senate and urge passage of this legislation to enhance both national and regional security and fully empower our ongoing interdiction efforts.

Admiral Thad W. Allen
Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard

CBP Laptop Searches

As the nation’s frontline border agency, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) encounters more than one million travelers every day at U.S. ports of entry and is responsible for enforcing more than 600 federal laws at the border, including laws relating to narcotics, intellectual property, child pornography and other contraband, and terrorism.

Our ability to inspect what is coming into the United States is central to keeping dangerous people and things from entering the country and harming the American people. One of our most important enforcement tools in this regard is our ability to search information contained in electronic devices, including laptops and other digital devices, for violations of U.S. law, including potential threats.

These searches have helped limit the movement of terrorists, individuals who support their activities, and other threats to national security. During border inspections of laptops, CBP officers have found violent jihadist material, information about cyanide and nuclear material, video clips of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), pictures of high-level Al-Qaeda officials, and other material associated with people seeking to do harm to our country. For example:

• On November 14, 2006, Detroit CBP Officers inspected the baggage of an Ethiopian-born, naturalized U.S. citizen based on a law enforcement tip that he was attempting to smuggle currency into the United States. The inspection revealed approximately $79,000 in unlawful U.S. currency. CBP then reviewed his laptop computer and discovered information about cyanide and nuclear material. The individual pleaded guilty to bulk cash smuggling and making false statements. He was sentenced to twelve months in prison.
• On September 26, 2006, an individual, traveling on an F-1 student visa arrived at Minneapolis St. Paul Airport from Amsterdam. He was selected for secondary screening. A review of his laptop computer revealed numerous video clips of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) being exploded. Another file on the computer showed the individual reading his will and included pictures of high-level Al-Qaida officials. Based on this and further derogatory information uncovered by computer forensics, the individual was refused admission, convicted of visa fraud, and removed from the country.
• On February 22, 2007, an individual arrived at the San Francisco International Airport seeking admission as a U.S. lawful permanent resident. CBP referred him to secondary inspection based on his behavior and questions by CBP officers. During an inspection of the individual’s laptop computer, officers discovered violent jihadist materials. This evidence led to expert testimony in immigration proceedings that identified the individual as a target for a terrorist group recruiting. His laptop was seized as evidence in this case and he is in removal proceedings.

CBP border searches also have uncovered intellectual property rights violations and child pornography:

• On December 6, 2004, a Canadian national suspected of stealing proprietary software programs from a U.S. company and attempting to sell the software to the People’s Republic of China arrived in Orlando, Florida, to attend a defense conference. ICE agents coordinated with CBP to conduct a border search of the individual and his belongings when he entered the United States. A preliminary search of his laptop revealed software belonging to the American company. On June 18, 2008, he was sentenced in the Northern District of California to two years incarceration for violations of the Economic Espionage Act and the Arms Export Control Act. He also received a $10,000 fine and 3 years probation. This joint ICE and FBI investigation was made possible by information gained by the initial CBP border search of the individual’s laptop and portable hard drive.
• And on July 17, 2005, an individual arrived at Los Angeles International Airport on a flight from Manila, Philippines. He was selected for a secondary examination and exhibited nervous behavior when questioned about the purpose of travel to Manila. After failing to provide consistent answers about his occupation and purpose of travel, a declaration was obtained and the individual’s luggage was inspected. Upon inspection of his laptop and CDs found in the individual’s luggage, officers found images of child pornography.

It is not our intent to subject legitimate travelers to undue scrutiny, but to ensure the safety of the American public. In conducting these searches, we are fully dedicated to protecting the civil rights of all travelers. Similar to our efforts with respect to vehicles, suitcases, backpacks, hard-copy documents, and conveyances, our examinations of laptops and other digital devices are consistent with longstanding constitutional authorities at the border and have been affirmed by federal courts throughout the country, including most recently the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Moreover, CBP officers adhere to strict constitutional and statutory requirements, including the Trade Secrets Act, which explicitly forbids federal employees from disclosing, without lawful authority, business confidential information they may access as part of their official duties. We also protect information that may be uncovered during examination as well as private information that is not in violation of any law.

We have a responsibility to ensure that any item brought into the country complies with the law and is not a threat to the American public. To treat our inspections of digital media at the border differently from any other documents or conveyances would give terrorists and criminals an advantage they should not have and that our nation cannot afford.

Jayson Ahern
Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Missing the Facts

This past weekend, I was surprised to open The Wall Street Journal and read a story that was riddled with inaccuracies about Project 28 – or the first 28 miles of our virtual border fence. I’d like to set the record straight and clear up any confusion about what we’re doing along the Southern border, and what role technology is playing in our overall strategy.

As anyone living in the Southwest will tell you, it’s a rugged, landscape with little geographic uniformity. Therefore a one-size-fits-all approach utilizing a single physical fence or a single virtual fence is doomed to fail. That’s why we’re applying a mix of technology, traditional fencing, and manpower to secure the roughly 2,000 mile border – and Project 28, or P28, is the first stretch of what will eventually be several miles of towers, radars, and sensors at strategic points along the border.

First, the Journal story stated that the initial 28 miles of virtual fence we recently installed in Arizona would be the end of the project. This is simply incorrect. From the outset, P28 was designed as a prototype, or a building block that would be tested and refined so it could be deployed elsewhere along the border.

The next glaring inaccuracy in the Journal’s article was their reference to “the effective mothballing of the concept” as “a setback for the government’s border-protection efforts.” Mothballing the concept? We just formally accepted the project last week, and have a budget request of $775 million next fiscal year to continue to develop and deploy technology and tactical infrastructure along the border – precisely P28’s purpose. One might surmise that the reporters confused the meaning of “mothballing,” with “full steam ahead.”

The article went on to report that we awarded a $64 million contract to Boeing late last year to fix the Common Operating Picture, an integral part of P28. This allows our Border Patrol agents to view images relayed from P28’s towers to their vehicles and acts as a force multiplier, allowing fewer agents to cover more ground. The fact of the matter is that this contract was not awarded to fix anything, but rather was a planned investment for the development of a new Common Operational Picture and to build on the progress Boeing had made throughout the project. Any assertions to the contrary are simply false.

I’ve seen this system work with my own eyes, and I’ve talked with the Border Patrol Agents who are using it. They assure me that it adds value. That’s what matters to me, and it’s a fact that cannot be denied.

Michael Chertoff

A Fresh Look at Port Security

It often amazes me how certain myths about our Department’s efforts continue to endure despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Take port security, for example. I regularly see stories in the media asserting that our nation’s seaports are insecure as if we’ve done nothing since 9/11 to protect them. Just yesterday, a columnist for the New York Times casually repeated that claim.

I suspect a lot of this venting is simply intellectual laziness by those who prefer to recycle old sound bites rather than do their homework. In some cases, a deeper misunderstanding is taking place about how ports function in the real world. I’m referring to those who contend that because we don’t physically inspect every one of the 11 million shipping containers arriving at our ports each year, our entire system of security is compromised. Incidentally, those same individuals never explain that if we did open every box, there’d be a line of ships stretching across the Atlantic and Pacific oceans waiting to enter our country.

As we approach our Department’s fifth anniversary, I’d like to step back for a moment and take a fresh look at what we’ve done since 9/11 to protect our ports and maritime commerce, and hopefully dispel some of the stubborn inaccuracies that continue to persist.

First of all, it is factually wrong to suggest we’ve shortchanged funding for our ports. In fact, we’ve invested more than $16 billion to date. This includes funding for the Coast Guard’s port security operations, deployment of our personnel and equipment overseas, research into science and technology development, $1.39 billion in port security grants to states and port authorities, and hardening of physical assets and infrastructure.

Second, we’ve pushed our security perimeter outward so that we can identify and interdict suspicious cargo before it even has a chance to threaten our country. We now require information and intelligence on every single U.S. bound shipping container before it’s loaded onto a foreign ship. We’ve stationed CBP officers at 58 overseas ports accounting for 86 percent of the container traffic that comes to the United States. We’ve deployed equipment overseas to scan cargo for radiation before it leaves for our country. And we’ve proposed new regulations to collect more commercial data from the private sector so we can better track international shipments.

Third, we’ve taken common-sense measures to protect our ports here at home. Every major port and maritime facility in our country must now file a security plan with the Coast Guard that identifies its vulnerabilities and sets a plan to address them. We’ve enrolled close to 80,000 maritime workers into our Transportation Worker Identification Credential program, which provides secure identification to workers who pass terrorist and criminal background checks. Most significantly, we now scan virtually 100 percent of containers for radiation upon their arrival to prevent the entry of potential weapons of mass destruction. Prior to 9/11, we scanned zero percent of such cargo.

Have we achieved perfect security at our ports? Of course not. No human endeavor will ever achieve perfection and no system of security is infallible. But we have dramatically elevated our protection and built successive layers of security that have made our ports more secure than they have ever been. And we’ve done this without destroying the underlying reason for having ports in the first place – the efficient movement of people and commerce.

Those who don’t put in the effort to get their facts straight, or who use misinformation to suggest we are ignoring our maritime sector, are not serving their readers or the American people. They also do a disservice to the men and women who stand watch over our ports and our frontlines every day.

Michael Chertoff

Securing Our Land Border

Earlier this month, I wrote about the new border-crossing requirement we’ll be instituting tomorrow, January 31. We’re replacing the outmoded honor system of oral declarations at our border with a common-sense requirement of tangible documentation.

Most Americans might find it hard to understand why, in our post-9/11 world, our country even has a system that allows anyone -- including potential terrorists, convicted felons, and illegal aliens -- to cross our border simply by declaring who they are and where they’re from without having to prove it.

They’d be surprised to learn that even when proof of citizenship and identity are required, more than 8,000 different documents are accepted, including easily forged student library cards and foreign baptismal certificates.

And they would be dismayed by the fact that in spite of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation that we take serious steps to identify who is crossing our border, our government faces mounting pressure from critics who strongly oppose replacing the current system.

We understand the concerns about commerce. We want commerce. But we can’t ignore the continued threat we face from dangerous people seeking entry.

They’re also ignoring the fact that -- as evidenced by last year’s immigration debate -- the American people rightly oppose open borders, care deeply about border security, and view secure ID as a national imperative.

And they seem unaware of the incongruity of building border fences to stop people from sneaking through America’s back door while failing to check adequately who’s walking through our front door.

Critics charge that our actions will harm commerce by slowing the processing of arriving travelers. In fact, with consistent identity and citizenship documents that are easily recognizable to our CBP officers, we expect processing speed to increase.

We’re also accused of springing these changes on people with little warning. On the contrary, we first gave notice to travelers and border communities in June of last year. We’ve since engaged in a sustained outreach campaign from regular briefings with stakeholders to participation in multiple media interviews. To this day, our outreach efforts continue. And starting tomorrow, when we begin implementation, we’ll do it in a flexible way, treating travelers with understanding and patience as they acclimate.

Michael Chertoff

No More Honor System

Currently, American and Canadian citizens wishing to enter the U.S. through land or sea ports of entry may use over 8,000 different documents to establish their identity. Or, in some cases, they are allowed to simply declare their citizenship to a Customs and Border Protection officer. Barring any red flags, that’s all they need to cross the border.

Amazingly, this means that baptismal certificates, student ID cards, and thousands of other easily-forged documents can be used to enter our country – hardly an efficient or secure process. The current system puts an onerous burden on our CBP officers while allowing too much opportunity for criminals, illegal aliens, and potential terrorists to slip into our country.

That’s why starting on January 31st of this year, we will end the practice of accepting oral declarations alone at land and sea ports of entry. U.S. and Canadian citizens 19 years of age and older will need to present a government-issued photo ID--such as a driver’s license--along with proof of citizenship--such as a birth certificate or naturalization certificate--to enter the country. Children 18 and under will only be required to show proof of citizenship.

We first announced this change months ago. The acceptable documents are all readily available and widely held. We are reminding travelers again so they will remember to carry the necessary documents, and grow accustomed to the new procedures at the border.

Ending oral declarations reduces a major vulnerability. So does decreasing the number of documents our CBP officers must assess from more than 8,000 to about two dozen. These measures are critical to securing the border – something which the American people rightly demand.

We will continue our vigorous education and outreach efforts to ensure that everyone is aware of these changes. We will also continue to work with the traveling public, our international partners, the private sector, and border communities as we implement these important security measures.

Michael Chertoff

Worth the Wait

Homeland security often is a balancing act between two ideals: vigilance and convenience. Nowhere does this dichotomy between security and facilitation play out more dramatically than at our borders and ports of entry, where we work to secure our nation from those who would do us harm, while welcoming legitimate travel and trade.

One area where the balancing act is difficult is at our land border ports of entry, where wait times can reach an hour or more. While we would love to reduce this, the fact is that most of these ports were built decades ago, and frankly are straining to accommodate today’s national security operations and increased traffic.

To keep bad people and bad things from entering America, at a minimum we scan all vehicles for radiation and check all individuals for proper documents. This process is not a bureaucratic game, but a security imperative. At our 99 land ports of entry, we processed just under 300 million people last year. We spend approximately 45-60 seconds with each person at the primary inspection booth, where we check for terror watchlist matches, outstanding criminal warrants, public health and narcotics lookouts and other indications of risk. Those who present some concern and require additional scrutiny are then referred for secondary inspection.

This process has yielded approximately 25,000 arrests during the 2007 fiscal year that just ended, a 10 percent increase over the previous year and a two-thirds increase from the launch of DHS in 2003. Keep in mind that these arrests are more than just a number; they represent the capture of murders, drug dealers, child molesters and potential terrorists. We’ve kept 300 tons of marijuana from entering the U.S. through the ports, as well as 93,000 pounds of cocaine. Last year we encountered 270 people suspected of having terrorist ties.

The additional security at our borders since 2001 (much like additional security at our airports) is incredibly important and there is no denying it has contributed to added wait times. So we work each day to find ways to ease waits and facilitate legitimate trade and travel. We would add lanes if we could - and in some places we have - but in many sites we cannot (remember, most of America’s ports of entry are not owned by the federal government, but by state and local officials and private businesses).

We are working with our partners in the General Services Administration and state governments to upgrade and expand port facilities so they better accommodate their current and future functions. We are trying to ensure all locations are fully staffed during peak hours. We also recommend that frequent travelers participate in the many “Trusted Traveler Programs” available at northern and southern border locations. While we regret the inconvenience, we cannot apologize for doing our jobs.

Let me also frankly say that there are limits to what we can do about this problem at DHS. Additional security is not the only cause of wait times at the border, and it shouldn’t become the scapegoat. Much like rush hour in any major American city, congestion at our border is as much a factor of a large number of people wanting to go to a particular place at a particular time on finite roadways. Wait times are further affected by everything from Mexican holidays to the relative strength of the Canadian dollar. Those who are serious about solutions need to start thinking of the wait times issue much more as a transportation, infrastructure, and volume problem than a “security” problem. We must acknowledge that solutions to those types of big problems take years and cost money.

But any way you look at it, a safer, more secure border is well worth the investment and the wait.

W. Ralph Basham
Commissioner
U.S. Customs and Border Protection