Nuclear cooperation agreements outline conditions—such as physical security and peaceful use—for partner countries that may import civilian nuclear material and equipment from the U.S. It is unclear whether the Departments of State and Energy kept Congress “fully and currently informed” of nuclear cooperation negotiations with Saudi Arabia, as required by the Atomic Energy Act. These nego...

For nearly two decades, the United States and Russia cooperated to upgrade security at dozens of Russian sites containing materials that could be used to build a nuclear weapon. This included modern fencing, surveillance cameras, and other improvements. This work was incomplete when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014 and cooperation was dramatically curtailed. Today, little is known about security at...

Cyberattacks and natural disasters can pose risks to the electric grid across the country, potentially resulting in blackouts and other disruptions to daily life. Nuclear microreactors are an emerging technology that could help affected areas get back up and running faster. Compact and mobile, fully-assembled microreactors could be transported by rail, truck, or plane to wherever they are needed...

Nuclear terrorism remains among the most significant threats to the United States and other nations. Nuclear materials stolen from poorly secured facilities could be used for a nuclear device. The International Atomic Energy Agency’s nuclear security work includes helping countries protect these facilities. Among other things, we found the agency’s nuclear security program: Doesn’t have th...

In 2015 and 2017, federal law directed the President to submit a plan to Congress for monitoring the potential spread of nuclear weapons and materials. In earlier reports, we found those plans did not address required areas. A 2018 law again directed the President to produce a plan, which the National Nuclear Security Administration prepared. Most required subjects were included, such as plans fo...

What is the U.S. government doing to keep nuclear weapons out of the wrong hands? The National Nuclear Security Administration implements nonproliferation programs to reduce the threat of more nations or non-state actors acquiring nuclear weapons or radiological materials for a “dirty bomb.” The agency requested about $1.5 billion for 2018 to fund these programs, but we found that they do not...

NNSA manages research and technology development projects intended to help stop nuclear proliferation. What does it have to show for its $1 billion investment on these projects in fiscal years 2012–2015? There has been progress, but NNSA hasn't tracked or documented results consistently. We looked at a sample of 91 projects. Of those, 88 had made technological progress by, for example, building...

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) program has developed a program plan that includes four 5-year goals to guide its efforts; however, NSDD cannot measure its progress toward completing key activities and achieving these goals because its program plan does not fully incorporate leading practices for program management. Leading...

As outlined in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was asked to verify and monitor Iran's implementation of a range of nuclear-related commitments. IAEA is using its safeguards authorities and conducting additional activities agreed to by Iran under the JCPOA to do so. Iran's commitments include limits on uranium enrichment levels and on en...

The Department of Energy (DOE) achieved goals for two of its four key activities under the President's 2009 initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials within 4 years. Specifically, from April 2009 through December 2013, GAO's analysis of DOE's records found that DOE exceeded its goal for removing or disposing of 1,201 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium by more than...

The Department of Energy (DOE) has consistently missed its 30-day targets for the initial and interagency stages of the Part 810 review process (see table). From 2008 through 2013, DOE missed the target for the initial review stage for 80 of 89 applications processed, and interagency review times missed DOE's 30-day target for 85 applications. DOE has not established a target for the entire final...

The Department of Energy (DOE) has adhered to its practice of using only unobligated low-enriched uranium (LEU) to meet national security needs for tritium—a radioactive isotope of hydrogen used to enhance the power of U.S. nuclear weapons. LEU is considered unobligated when neither the uranium nor the technology used to enrich it carries an “obligation” from a foreign country requiring that...

Federal law directed the administration to submit and update an interagency plan to Congress for verifying and monitoring the proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials. We looked at the plan and update to determine if they met reporting requirements. We found that the documents—which were two and four pages long, respectively—did not address several requirements and lacked key details. T...

Agencies dealing with nuclear materials face critical management challenges. The Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) manages the nuclear weapons stockpile and supports nonproliferation efforts. DOE addresses contamination at nuclear weapons production sites through its Office of Environmental Management. We testified that: NNSA's plans and budget to modern...

The Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) manages the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and supports nonproliferation efforts. DOE's Office of Environmental Management addresses contamination at nuclear weapons production sites. We testified that NNSA’s plans to modernize its nuclear weapons do not align with its budget, raising affordability concerns DOE's...

The Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration manages the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and supports nonproliferation efforts. DOE's Office of Environmental Management addresses contamination at nuclear weapons production sites. We testified that NNSA hasn’t aligned budgets with plans to modernize its nuclear weapons, which raises affordability concerns NNSA has faced pr...

In the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) fiscal year 2016 budget materials, the estimates for efforts related to modernizing the nuclear weapons stockpile total $297.6 billion for the next 25 years—an increase of $4.2 billion (1.4 percent) in nominal dollar values (as opposed to constant dollar values) compared with the prior year's budget materials. However, for certain program...

The Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)—a separately organized agency within DOE—continues to face several ongoing challenges in modernizing the nuclear security enterprise, including challenges in managing life extension programs (LEP), contracts and major projects, and the alignment of plans with future budgets. As GAO reported in August 2015, NNSA es...

As outlined in the JCPOA, IAEA was asked to verify Iran's implementation of a range of nuclear-related commitments, and IAEA uses its authorities and conducts additional verification activities to do so, according to IAEA. Iran's commitments include limits on uranium enrichment levels and enriched uranium inventories. GAO's preliminary observations indicate that IAEA plans to verify Iran's impleme...

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)—a semiautonomous agency within the Department of Energy (DOE)—has used a variety of established methods in its “Over the Horizon” (OTH) initiative to assess potential proliferation threats, but the implementation of these methods had several limitations. NNSA used established methods in its OTH initiative, including: (1) a literature revi...

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) faces challenges implementing its plans to modernize the nuclear security enterprise. In its November 2014 report, the Augustine-Mies Panel observed that NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan, which is intended to communicate long-range plans and cost estimates, has varied from year to year in the costs and schedules for the delivery of se...

To date, the approach used by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and agencies has not led to the inventory of all federal programs, along with related budget and performance information, envisioned in the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA). In developing the inventory, OMB allowed for significant discretion in several areas—leading to a variety of approaches for defining programs and...