

Studies *in* Intelligence

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Book Review Essays

Covert Action in China Early in the Cold War

Putin's People

Rigged


Rethinking Analytic Disciplines

From the Archives

Intelligence Implications of Disease

Allen Dulles on State Political Reporting, 1925

Intelligence in Public Media
Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf
Books Reviewed in 2020



Studies in Intelligence Volume 64, Number 4 (Unclassified Extracts, December 2020)

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Cover: A pair of UN officials in South Korea looking across the Yalu River into Northeast China on November 21, 1950. Five days later a Communist Chinese force began a devastating counteroffensive against US and UN forces. The conflict on the Korean Peninsula influenced US decisions about covert action in the People's Republic of China. Image © Everett Collection Inc/Alamy Stock Photo

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Rethinking Analytic Disciplines, Reordering the Profession

J. Eli Margolis

*Introduction*¹

The future of intelligence analysis appears daunting. The profession seems to face in the years ahead more data of less reliability, greater competition from multiplying outside voices, an ever-quicken pace of operations, and increasingly complex analytic tools.

And yet, as Joseph Gartin noted in his article in *Studies* in June 2019,^a the basic nature of analysis is likely to remain the same. Amid disruption, officers still make sense of the world by “reading stuff [and] writing stuff.” He writes that “knowing where we started is key to charting the future.”²

This article follows Gartin’s lead in seeking continuity between the old and the new. It goes “back to the future,” revisiting old concepts to sketch a way forward for the profession. Specifically, it applies typological methods to strengthen old analytic categories. The disciplines that result open new ways to order theory, warning, discourse, doctrine, education, evaluation, and technology in the years to come.

From taxonomies of craft . . .

The Intelligence Community for decades has drawn on a wide range of organizing principles to classify analysis through type distinctions. Various, it has conceptualized analysis by region (e.g., Asia, Africa), theme (often termed “functional,” e.g., biographic, economic, scientific), scope (e.g., strategic, tactical), timescale (e.g., current, long-range), practice (e.g., descriptive, predictive), purpose (e.g., inform, warn), and complexity (e.g., linear, nonlinear). Other categories have reflected organizational divisions (e.g., national, departmental), nature of sources (e.g., single-source, all-source), collection method (e.g., SIGINT, HUMINT, OSINT), analytic method (e.g.,

qualitative, quantitative), or bureaucratic posture (e.g., detached, close support).³

Two models that integrate and order attributes created by the above principles have come to dominate thinking in this area. In the following, I offer basic descriptions of each, which I label “traditional” and “contemporary.” These models are taxonomies of craft, intuitive rather than structured.

The traditional taxonomy is pragmatic and groups together distinctions in scope, timescale, practice, and purpose that often align in day-to-day work. In 1949, Sherman Kent identified three families of analysis: basic-descriptive, current-reportorial, and speculative-estimative.⁴ The rapidly evolving CIA soon mirrored these three approaches in its organization. By 1951, the agency’s primary analytic office had been divided into the Office of Research and Reports, which handled basic research; the Office of Current Intelligence, which assessed new developments; and the Office of National Estimates, which addressed particularly challenging and prospective issues.⁵

Today, the common understanding of each type remains largely unchanged, even as the community has since appended a fourth type, warning analysis, and periodically reevaluated the structure. Basic analysis or research has become “foundational analysis” but still focuses on facts. Current analysis remains urgent, evaluative, and policy-relevant. Estimative analysis, though less dominant today than in Kent’s time, still carries its original branding as farsighted and strategic. Warning analysis has survived considerable debate conceptually intact as, at its core, a direct communication of threat.

The contemporary taxonomy is conceptually bolder. It reflects both advances in related academic fields and

a. Joseph W. Gartin, “Looking Ahead: The Future of Intelligence Analysis,” *Studies in Intelligence* 63, No. 2 (June 2019).

The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government.

The two elements most meaningful in reducing uncertainty are the two kinds of uncertainty themselves: epistemic uncertainty and aleatory uncertainty.

lessons learned from decades of experience and experimentation. It creates three analytic types by grouping distinctions in scope, timescale, and complexity. In both 2014 and 2019, the *National Intelligence Strategy* defined these types as strategic, current-operational, and anticipatory.⁶

These types are defined only loosely in authoritative guidance. Strategic analysis focuses on “deep understanding” within a broad, deliberative orientation attuned to policy development. Conversely, current-operational analysis is narrow, timely, and tailored for policy implementation. Anticipatory analysis stands apart, reserved for foresight of emerging issues or discontinuities amid high uncertainty.

Neither model meets the criteria of a successful typology.⁷ Specifically, a typology should

- organize by the most meaningful attributes,
- apply those principles consistently,
- contain mutually exclusive types that collectively exhaust all possibilities, and
- be as simple as possible.

In particular, both taxonomies fail to apply organizing principles uniformly, denying the resulting frameworks internal consistency and completeness. They lack strict defining distinctions. Instead, they are constituted by clusters of attributes with uneven salience. For example, the traditional model defines current

analysis largely by timescale; basic, by practice; and warning, by purpose. The contemporary system defines strategic analysis predominantly by scope, but anticipatory analysis by complexity.

This shortcoming prevents mutual exclusivity and invites blending. Can a line of current analysis keep an estimative outlook and include meaningful warning? Can a strategic analysis of adversary intentions also anticipate discontinuous decisions? If so, these distinctions seem closer to attributes than to fully developed types that the profession can use to prepare for the future.

... to a typology of disciplines

This section develops the more promising traditional model into a formal typology of analytic disciplines. The proposed approach relies on three related foundational commitments. It accepts that the purpose of analysis is to provide decision advantage by reducing uncertainty.⁸ This presumes that uncertainty hinders clients as they work. It also assumes that uncertainty, though inevitable in theory, can be reduced by degree in practice.

The two elements most meaningful in reducing uncertainty are the two kinds of uncertainty themselves.⁹ **Epistemic uncertainty** reflects incomplete knowledge; the less we know about an issue, the less certain we can be in its development. The *unknown* holds us back even when an issue is theoretically knowable. In contrast, **aleatory uncertainty** reflects natural variability; the more

inherently variable or seemingly random an issue, the greater our uncertainty in its development. Here, the *unknowable* is what limits us.

The matrix (Table 1 on the facing page) structured by these two elements, outlines four domains: defined, complicated, complex, and undefined. These are ideal types rather than categories of specific cases. They abstract useful representations by simplifying and accentuating the poles of the two continuous framework variables.

Two observations clarify the boundaries of these domains. First, some attributes align with the framework variables. For example, the degree of abstraction changes alongside epistemic uncertainty; a discrete object (e.g., new sanctions, a missile test) permits greater knowledge than an abstract one (e.g., bilateral coercion, the evolution of multilateral institutions). We may hope to know more of what can be known about a particular thing than about a concept. Similarly, timescale changes alongside aleatory uncertainty; the more prospective the object of analysis, the greater its inherent variability. There is more room for randomness in the next decade than in the next month.

Second, the placement of an object of analysis depends on its framing. What are we assessing? Generally, a narrow framing limits its uncertainty while a broad one expands it. In this way, a single dynamic in the world—say, an election—might span all of the domains, appearing in each as the question asked of it changes. The fate of today’s vote could be straightforward (defined), but its impact on each party’s agenda (complicated),

competitive interactions in the legislature this year (complex), and long-term development (undefined) would involve progressively greater uncertainty.

This framework defines four types of analysis: descriptive, evaluative, estimative, and exploratory (Table 2 on the next page). Each corresponds with one of the uncertainty domains. Additionally, the makeup of the matrix implies the existence of a fifth type: epistemic analysis expands our knowledge, affecting one of the two variables in the framework. Like the uncertainty domains, these are notional ideal types—deductively derived possibilities rather than an inductively recorded catalog of actual practices.

Analytic disciplines in concept

These ideal types of analysis align broadly with those in the traditional model despite the divergent foundations of the approaches.

- Epistemic analysis resembles basic research or foundational analysis;
- Descriptive and evaluative analysis seem similar to current analysis; and
- Estimative and exploratory analysis rhyme with what Kent initially called speculative analysis.

However, a number of elements distinguish the new typology and the traditional model. This new approach identifies types that the traditional model combined, seeing two kinds each of current and anticipatory analysis. It also adjusts the meaning of these familiar terms, as we will see. And it introduces insight from the contemporary model, integrating

Table 1: A Typology of Uncertainty Domains

		Aleatory Uncertainty: How naturally variable is the object of analysis?	
		Low	High
Epistemic Uncertainty: How limited is our knowledge of the object of analysis?	Low	Defined domain	Complex domain
	High	Complicated domain	Undefined domain

The **defined domain** approaches regularity. It is marked by significant knowledge about an object that is nearly predictable. In it, concepts appear ordered. Actors, capabilities, intentions, and relationships are largely understood. And change is mostly linear, the result of evident cause-and-effect relationships—an attribute that makes the past a reasonable guide to thought. This ideal is artificial, but conditions similar to it are enabled by a narrow framing of the object of analysis, particularly by issue and time—a discrete event in the present or just-past.

The **complicated domain** centers on ambiguity. It is marked by limited knowledge of a mostly steady object of analysis. Much is unknown, but the object is theoretically knowable. Patterns seem linear even as the capabilities, intentions, and relationships of actors are cloudy, requiring interpretation. Conditions similar to the complicated domain follow a broader framing of the object by issue, but not of time. It remains centered on the present or just-past.

The **complex domain** reflects indeterminacy. It is marked by a high natural variability that persists despite significant knowledge. In it, actors' capabilities and intentions seem familiar, but their interactions are obscured by contingency, emergent system effects, and discontinuities. As a result, the past, which appears linear in hindsight, is less valuable as a guide to thought. Conditions similar to the complex domain pertain when a narrowly framed object of analysis is carried into the future.

The **undefined domain** approaches true uncertainty. It is marked both by limited knowledge and high variability, attributes that severely restrict understanding despite occasional pattern stability. In this domain, nearly everything is questionable, including actors and their characteristics, constitutive analytic concepts, and presumptions about cause-and-effect relationships. Conditions similar to the undefined domain follow an expansive framing of an object of analysis in a future context.

complexity as a constitutive element of the framework.¹⁰

Some of the subtler changes are easier to see through examples. Table 3 draws on historical events in China to derive hypothetical intelligence questions organized into the five new types offered here. It also notes in shorthand how these issues would

be categorized by the traditional and contemporary models.

The comparison suggests that some earlier categories might be too broad—particularly current analysis, which appears in both previous taxonomies and seems to mask a wide range of distinct work. The contemporary model's framing of strategic analysis also seems underdefined,

frequently stretching across the evaluative-estimative boundary, which is marked not by the thin line of knowledge (epistemic uncertainty) but by the bold one set by natural variability (aleatory uncertainty).

Analytic disciplines in practice

The proposed typology can also be clarified through a hypothetical exploration of practical demands. The below descriptions explain the five ideal analytic disciplines in such a practical context, showing each to be distinct and held together by an internally consistent logic. As before, these descriptions are notional, teasing out the implications of a conceptual framework rather than recording actual practice.

Epistemic, or foundational, analysis defines reality, indirectly supporting clients through accuracy. It works through reference products and factual responses to questions. Such references are diverse—maps, biographies, and weapon system characteristics are all included—but share a commitment to a very high evidentiary standard. Here, the demands on analysts center on knowledge-building and include collection, technical, and subject expertise.

Descriptive analysis enables action and policy implementation by delivering situational awareness. Its products are first-order summaries and timely updates. They stay close to the information base and do not set a broader, interpretive analytic line. As a result, they demand less of analysts than work in other analytic types. Descriptive analysis requires background knowledge, procedural rigor, and comfort with a rapid, high-stress work tempo—but not deep

Table 2: A Typology of Analytic Disciplines

		Aleatory Uncertainty: How naturally variable is the object of analysis?	
		Low	High
Epistemic Uncertainty: How limited is our knowledge of the object of analysis?	Low	Defined domain <i>Descriptive Analysis</i>	Complex domain <i>Estimative Analysis</i>
	High	Complicated domain <i>Evaluative Analysis</i>	Undefined domain <i>Exploratory Analysis</i>

Descriptive analysis reduces uncertainty by ordering and updating understanding in the defined domain. Here, clients might not seem to need analysis; they have available a large body of knowledge about an object that is relatively predictable. But no object is static. Time and change create uncertainty everywhere. There is value in regular updates and first-order summaries, especially when clients are unable to do such work themselves. Descriptive analysis delivers the news.

Evaluative analysis reduces uncertainty in the complicated domain by filling in gaps, providing context, identifying trends, and interpreting their meaning. Clients broaden a descriptive framing through abstraction, reducing available knowledge even as the object of analysis remains relatively predictable. Analysts piece together fragments of what is known in order to extrapolate what is not. Evaluative analysis provides commentary, interpreting the news.

Estimative analysis reduces uncertainty by setting expectations in the complex domain, an area in which they do not come naturally—and in which clients can mistakenly presume predictability. Clients can struggle despite deep knowledge when an object is complex, interactive, or prone to emergent rather than linear outcomes. This is frequently the case when the object of analysis is in the future, such as a country’s response to a potential action, or inherently unknowable, as with a leader’s decision calculus. Estimative analysis is nearer a map; it cannot capture its object’s richness, but it can provide a model defined just enough to be useful.

Exploratory analysis reduces uncertainty by bounding expectations in the undefined domain, the most challenging of all areas, in which both knowledge and natural order seem to be absent. Clients cast their eyes over broad objects, framing them ambitiously. Analysts develop concepts, order frameworks, and delineate possibilities. Exploratory analysis is a compass, enabling orientation.

Epistemic analysis reduces uncertainty by expanding knowledge, directly lowering the framework variable of epistemic uncertainty. It establishes provisional truths—functionally, facts—through historical study of objects that are theoretically knowable. In effect, epistemic analysis provides an encyclopedia.

subject, policy, or methodological expertise.

Evaluative analysis enables critical reflection and policy development by delivering strategic awareness. In practice, these second-order

assessments reduce uncertainties of situation, meaning, and trajectory, interpreting developments with reference to a larger context. They set the analytic line. The ideal is similar to mainstream foreign policy analysis and the work of private

Table 3: The Typology in Substantive Context

	Foundational	Current		Anticipatory	
	Epistemic	Descriptive	Evaluative	Estimative	Exploratory
E.g., Nuclear weapons in China (1960s) ¹¹	What is the organization of China's nuclear weapons research effort? (1, 4) What is the size and makeup of China's nuclear arsenal? (1, 4)	What device did Beijing test yesterday? (2, 4) How did the region respond? (2, 4)	How capable is the new weapon design? (2, 4) Where is Beijing's nuclear weapons program going? (3, 5)	How would Beijing respond to a strike on its nuclear program? (3, 5) What arms control schemes would interest Beijing, if any? (3, 5)	How might the proliferation of this technology affect security dynamics elsewhere? (3, 6) What is the future of deterrence in East Asia? (3, 6)
E.g., Military reforms in China (1980s) ¹²	Who leads China's military? (1, 4) What is the organization of the military after reforms? (1, 4)	What changes did Beijing just announce? (2, 4) How did the first post-reform exercise go? (2, 4)	What patterns are emerging in the reform effort? (2, 5) Why is Beijing reforming its military? (2, 5)	What are the prospects of the reform effort? (3, 5) How will the Soviet Union and Vietnam respond? (3, 5)	What is the future conventional military balance between Beijing and Moscow? (3, 6) How might China's civil-military relations evolve? (3, 6)
E.g., Handover of Hong Kong (1980s-90s) ¹³	What are the provisions of the Basic Law? (1, 4) What international businesses operate in Hong Kong? (1, 4)	How did the region respond to the Joint Declaration? (2, 4) How are citizens reacting to accounts of Tiananmen? (2, 4)	What are Beijing's plans for Hong Kong? (2, 4) What are Beijing's redlines? (3, 5)	How stable will the transition be? (3, 5) What could trigger the flight of international businesses—and how would it unfold? (3, 5)	What is the future of "one country, two systems"? (3, 6) How might China's posture toward the West change? (3, 6)
Traditional Framework Types			Contemporary Framework Types		
1=Basic 2=Current 3=Estimative			4=Current operational 5=Strategic 6=Anticipatory		

risk assessment firms. The products are short but rich, substantive, and thoughtfully organized. Evaluative analysis requires more of analysts than descriptive work, including significant subject expertise and critical thinking abilities.

Estimative analysis enables planning and strategy development by providing a structure to thought. Its products are forecasts of well-known or well-defined issues that

reduce uncertainties of interaction in order to set expectations; they do not predict events. They can be longer than evaluative pieces because they convey an approach in addition to an assessment. These products are based in—but free to move away from—the analytic line as they rethink settled judgments in future contexts dense with complexity, variability, and systems effects. Estimative analysis relies more on models and

reasoning than evidence, requiring creative methodological skills—and a rare mix of analytic boldness and humility.

Exploratory analysis enables alignment and posture development by providing a broad orientation. Its products are projections—often, scenarios—that reduce uncertainty by bounding possibilities and creating a space within which clients can consider key questions. The paucity

The logic of each discipline holds even across once-dominant organizing principles, such as region, theme, or technical field.

of both knowledge and predictability makes replicable reasoning extremely difficult; in practice, exploratory analysis often curates uncertainty as much as reduces it. These “think pieces” by necessity depend on conceptual reasoning far more than evidence, demanding of their authors a great deal of expertise, flexibility, and methodological invention.

This is where the abstract types start to become disciplines. Each takes on an identity, animated by distinct tangible expressions of a unique conceptual grounding. Both the meaning and the experience of the work shifts fundamentally from type to type; there is no single “analysis” or image of analytic success.

These differences are durable. The logic of each discipline holds even across once-dominant organizing principles, such as region, theme, or technical field. An update on a protest movement is of a piece with the latest trade figures and notice of yesterday’s weapons test (all descriptive)—not a biography of an activist leader (epistemic) or assessment of the evolution of protestors’ grievances (evaluative), despite the similarities in topic in the latter two products. The framing of the object of analysis is more essential than its surface attributes.

What of “Warning Analysis”?

One past organizing principle—purpose—raises a difficult question: What about warning analysis? Few subjects in the intelligence literature have inspired so much debate or seem as central to the history and identity of the analytic corps. But

warning is absent from the proposed typology. Where does warning analysis fit?¹⁴

The typology integrates warning, treating it as it does other non-essential, past organizing principles. Warning is an attribute within a discipline rather than a discipline of its own because it lacks a unique foundation in uncertainty. There is not one “warning”; there is a kind unique to each discipline.

The most intuitive types warn of vivid threats, such as a feared event (descriptive) or unanticipated shock (estimative).¹⁵ Also important are larger transformations, paradigm shifts, or system changes (exploratory).¹⁶

Less studied are two others that the field treats as warning in all but name.

- **Epistemic warning** is the communication of threat that accompanies an alarming reassessment of basic research, as in the Air Force’s mistaken discovery of bomber and missile gaps in the 1950s.
- **Trajectory warning** is a threat communication rooted in ongoing trends: “If this continues . . .” We rarely label it a warning despite its function because it is often implied, taken as obvious, or woven naturally into evaluative analysis.

Overall, the proposed typology of analytic disciplines outperforms the traditional and contemporary models when held against the same five criteria cited on page 2 at

the beginning of this article. The new model takes the variables in its framework directly from a concept of the purpose of analysis, ensuring they are meaningful. The framework itself applies these variables largely consistently and keeps the resulting types mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. Last, the structure as a whole is coherent and relatively simple.

The most notable exception is the use of a variable, epistemic uncertainty, on its own to structure an analytic discipline. This compromises a degree of consistency and raises questions about exclusivity; there is a degree of knowledge-building involved in each of the disciplines. The score in these areas is lower, though still comparatively improved, as a result.

Addressing potential objections

This section addresses several potential objections to the proposed typology. They are valuable and, though answered here briefly, worthy of additional debate and research.

First, a critic could advance a different purpose for intelligence, subverting our point of departure. In particular, some scholars have argued that leaders need more uncertainty, not less.¹⁷ To them, the problem is oversimplification by close-minded, incurious, or ideological leaders. Surely, there is nothing to be gained by reducing the uncertainty of the already-certain.

This objection misreads the aim of this effort, which is deductive. The proposed typology is a model defined by ideal types of analysis. By necessity, it is set against a similarly

ideal-typical representation of leadership. It seeks to set a model—and, as a result, norms—for our profession. And it is no use founding a profession on a presumption of bad faith or incompetence.

The objection also stops a bit too short. An extended consideration would return to a purpose of reducing uncertainty. Consider the client implied by the critic: decisive but close-minded. Strong analysis might complicate the leader's views, as suggested, but the result would be a loss of decisiveness. Analysis would have created the opposite of decision advantage. Ultimately, the task would remain reducing uncertainty—bringing the leader through the fog to arrive at the simplicity on the far side of complexity, so to speak.

Second, a skeptic might assert that the framework's variables are a muddle because there is no difference between the two types of uncertainty.¹⁸ In this view, aleatory uncertainty is really just an extreme form of epistemic uncertainty. Things only appear random or highly variable because we know so little and our theories are so poor. And so the framework itself makes no sense.

Surprisingly, this objection is largely irrelevant for our purpose even as it remains debated among scholars. To leaders and analysts wrestling with a complex international system, the epistemic-aleatory distinction holds firm in practice. Sometimes we can narrow our framing of an issue and presume linearity. Other times, things are just too complex. The practical constraint remains the same whether it is due to inherent natural variability or radical

What do these disciplines mean for the community? Conceptually, they open new ways to advance longstanding debates over theory and warning.

ignorance, making the framework valuable despite this concern.

Third, a critic might disagree with the proposed typology's reliance on the framing of the object of analysis to determine its uncertainty domain. He or she might assert that uncertainty is a feature of the world. Some objects are more complex than others in themselves, regardless of how we see them. Uncertainty is objective, not something we construct. Uncertainty is not what we make of it.

This objection attacks a straw man. The approach accepts that events in themselves can raise or lower an observer's uncertainty. A military exercise is less uncertain than the course of a pandemic, for example. There is a basic difference inherent in the nature of each event; the former is closed, defined by command, order, and timespan, while the latter is open, characterized by emergence and discontinuity.

To recognize that, beyond an event, the perspective of the observer also matters accepts (not constructs) reality. For example, the notional military exercise would be less uncertain to a participating officer than an uninvolved soldier in a distant garrison. Our perspectives and questions shape our uncertainty, making the framing of the object of analysis a critical variable—one which it would be more disruptive to exclude than to incorporate.¹⁹

Last, a reader could protest the absence of prediction, the standard by which analysis is often judged. Scholars have used prediction to evaluate

expert political judgment.²⁰ Policy-makers looking back on surprises like the Arab Spring lament the lack of prediction. And the Intelligence Community itself has poured a great deal of effort into innovating predictive analytic techniques.²¹ Where is it?

The typology approaches prediction cautiously.²² It accepts forecasting—a very soft form of prediction—in estimative analysis, which “sets expectations” about (rather than predicts) system dynamics, actor interactions, and event pathways. The approach does not admit probabilistic judgments about discrete events because they violate its foundational commitment to aleatory uncertainty. Beyond that, the typology rules out a hard form of prediction categorically. The framework explores forms of uncertainty; there is no place for strong, singular—certain—claims about the future.

A pathway to profession

What do these disciplines mean for the community? Conceptually, they open new ways to advance longstanding debates over theory and warning. Practically, they suggest opportunities to adjust discourse, doctrine, education, certification, and self-evaluation. Finally, they suggest a model for integrating new technology, including big-data, artificial intelligence, and machine learning tools.

Sharpening theory

The proposed typology develops intelligence theory by clarifying concepts and mechanisms within a leading approach. Specifically, it advances adaptive realism by

The proposed typology also contributes to the community's exploration of warning by rethinking the nature of the field.

defining the ways in which analysis produces decision advantage.

Adaptive realism casts intelligence as an instrument of competition in the anarchic world of realism.²³ Unable to rely on order, states face pressures to accrue power. States undertake intelligence activities in pursuit of decision advantage, a kind of power created by enhancing one's own awareness while degrading that of an adversary. In this way, uncertainty itself becomes a domain of competition.

However, adaptive realism leaves the mechanism through which analysis provides decision advantage underspecified. It treats awareness—or “anticipation” in the foundational text—as a natural result of research, pattern recognition, and case interpretation: analysis leads to anticipation, which in turn leads to decision advantage. But neither link is automatic. The question remains: How does analysis work?

The proposed typology suggests an answer by recasting the disciplines as explanatory pathways. Analysis provides decision advantage by reducing uncertainty in five ways: these include expanding knowledge, reporting events, interpreting events, setting expectations, and bounding expectations. The ideal-typical model can inform new hypotheses and tests of how analysis works.

The model also creates new possibilities for strategy in the theory because it suggests each discipline carries distinct strengths and weaknesses. For example, a state might

seek advantage through *agility* in action and policy development, prioritizing current analysis. It might pursue *prudence* through the strategy and posture decisions enabled by anticipatory analysis. Or, absent that, it might offensively stoke uncertainty by disrupting those activities in its adversaries—a strategy some observers credit to North Korea.

With more room for strategy, the theory becomes richer. It suggests ways particular environments might shape intelligence activity. This view expects a state at risk and frequently managing crises, such as Israel or South Korea, to prioritize current analysis amid scarce resources, for example. Conversely, it expects a relatively secure state like the United States to invest more in anticipatory analysis. Additionally, this turn in the theory adds texture to explanations of intelligence sharing by suggesting ways states might choose to complement one another. States with an advantage in one discipline might be drawn to those with an advantage in another.

Clarifying warning

The proposed typology also contributes to the community's exploration of warning by rethinking the nature of the field. Specifically, it recasts warning as embedded in other disciplines and steps away from prediction.

First, the approach redefines the field: warning is an activity within all disciplines rather than a discipline in its own right because it lacks a unique grounding in uncertainty. Warning

practices share more with their disciplines than with one another.

Consider two high-profile warning practices: traditional indications and warning (I&W) and more recent quantitative models such as that of the Political Instability Task Force (PITF). An indicator list for a possible attack by an adversary takes as its focus discrete activities, which it monitors in order to update situational awareness.²⁴ This is descriptive work (updates) that centers on events (defined domain)—albeit structured in a sophisticated way. Similarly, a model of state collapse focuses on unknown discontinuities, which it sketches in order to set expectations within a framework.²⁵ This is estimative work (framework) centered on nonlinear developments (complex domain). These practices, strangers to one another, are familiar to others within their disciplines.

To warning advocates this might at first look like an affront—the subordination of a rich tradition in service of the uniformity of a framework. But with reflection, advocates might also see victory. The integration of warning within analytic disciplines is an embrace of the field—an identification of it as an integral, ubiquitous, and shared responsibility. Simultaneously, it remains set apart. Here, we can say that “every analyst is a warning analyst” and understand it to signal the preservation rather than dissolution of warning practices.²⁶

In a way, the typology's reconceptualization even expands the field by inviting it into new areas. The approach identifies new forms of warning analysis. Epistemic warning alerts clients to threats caused by a

reevaluation of knowledge—something done frequently but never named. Trajectory warning alerts clients to threats within linear projections. Each of these can be developed as subfields within the warning family.

Second, the typology draws back from warning-as-prediction because it embraces uncertainty. It works with a broad concept of warning as a direct communication of threat. It avoids the narrow view that warning should involve probabilistic event predictions. To the framework, such predictions are unsupportable shortcuts to certainty that bypass the complexity of reality.²⁷

The framework also raises a pragmatic objection. Probabilistic event prediction is often not very useful because it does not help clients with the bulk of their work, the full range of which is highlighted by this typology. Should the community assign odds to the likelihood an adversary will attack, a client would still ask us to check our facts (epistemic), track military movements (descriptive), identify possible aims given the strategic context (evaluative), forecast the most likely main effort and concept of operation (estimative), and sketch dynamics shaping a post-conflict order (exploratory). There are actions to take, policies to develop, plans to make, and realignments to get underway—almost none of which depend on an analyst’s guess of a 30- or 60-percent chance.

This conclusion is less disruptive than it appears. It does not constrain research, experimentation, or development of methods—all of which are meant to push the boundaries of uncertainty. Nor does it prevent the

The proposed typology presents an opportunity to change how we talk about analysis.

use of historical base rates, model forecasts, or a source’s predictions as forms of evidence. Instead, it softens claims about the future in judgments, working within the constraints of uncertainty rather than ignoring them.

Raising the discourse

More practically, the proposed typology presents an opportunity to change how we talk about analysis. Its implications are challenging and occasionally pointed. Specifically, the approach suggests a discourse that dethrones evaluative analysis, defends epistemic analysis, and devalues some past organizing principles.

First, the typology asserts boundaries that “right size” evaluative analysis, ending the community’s habit of giving the discipline a normative role in our discourse. Over time, “analysis” without an adjective has come to mean evaluative analysis, universalizing a set of ideas that are in fact specific to one discipline among many. We presume “analysis” involves interpretation that sets an analytic line cast in the present to support policymakers—all attributes that the typology shows are limited only to a specific domain.

This habit is harmful because it encourages us to hold diverse work to a single standard. In this light, descriptive analysis looks thin and underdeveloped. Estimative analysis appears too bold, drawing misplaced criticism. And exploratory analysis seems like outright conjecture.

The typology gives us a chance to update this view with a more precise discourse informed by disciplines.

We can change how we talk about our work in everyday conversation, product coordination, intelligence scholarship, and even doctrine to reflect the basic distinctions between analytic types, guarding against pressures to enforce a single standard.

Such a change legitimizes epistemic analysis in particular—the second way the typology raises the discourse. The community has come to view the discipline as somehow subordinate to other forms of analysis, taking as given that it provides facts but falls short of interpreting them. This is a mistake; the building of knowledge is a monumental effort, both distinct from and equal to other types of analysis.

Third, the typology also challenges a range of past organizing principles as irrelevant. For example, the ways we reduce uncertainty do not change by region (e.g., Asia, Africa) or theme (e.g., political, economic). We can stop speaking about these groups as distinct analytic disciplines.

However, a withdrawal from casual “disciplines” does not imply a rejection of tailored support. Groupings like “defense intelligence” or “East Asia analysis” are unsupported as disciplines, but might be helpful as principles for institutional organization, budgeting, oversight, branding, or other non-analytic activities beyond the scope of this article.

Formalizing specialization

The proposed typology enables specialization, a hallmark of professions. Specifically, it creates opportunities to improve doctrine, education,

and certification by moving each beyond a default embrace of evaluative analysis to encompass the full range of disciplines.

The central idea is to hold each discipline to its own standard. One size does not fit all in the work of analysis. There is no one way to “connect the dots.” Each discipline has its own domain, supported function, and associated skills and practices. An embrace of these distinctions through specialization both corrects a past imbalance in the profession and creates new opportunities for innovation.

First, the community might revisit doctrine. At a basic level, it could revise ICD 203 “Analytic Standards” and JP 2.0 “Joint Intelligence” to acknowledge unique aspects of each discipline and to discourage the evaluation of products of one type by the standards of another. Separately, analysts might group, tailor, or develop structured analytic techniques for each discipline—testing and validating them with reference to a discipline’s standards, not a generic conception of analysis. In the future, the community could even issue a series of expositions comparable to the military’s joint publications, with a slim volume tracing the purpose, history, and practices of each discipline.²⁸

Second, we might reconsider education and certification. Initial entry-on-duty training could introduce the basics of each discipline. Specialized courses and certification could follow, starting perhaps with an entry-level accreditation program for descriptive analysis. And the National Intelligence University could lead advanced education and certification, such as a credential in estimative or exploratory analysis.

More generally, the disciplines might order and sequence education. They can be interpreted as a path of development moving from less uncertainty to more uncertainty, nurturing unique analytic competencies along the way (page 2). Such a sequence would expose new analysts in an ordered way to the diversity of analytic work so that they entered into “full performance” grades capable in each discipline.

Enabling evaluation

The proposed typology also unlocks a promising new approach to self-evaluation. It takes advantage of each discipline’s distinct supported functions to create two useful standards for analytic products: sufficiency and indispensability.

Self-evaluation is an old quest in the IC; observers have long sought to grade analytic performance but struggled to find the appropriate measures. The most common benchmarks—accuracy, prediction (preventing surprise), and usefulness—are problematic in practice.²⁹ Notably, they also presume a uniform application across all kinds of analytic work.

The proposed typology enables a tailored standard of usefulness that ties a product to its discipline’s supported function. What is the purpose of that discipline? An evaluator with hindsight could look back and ask if a specific product had met it. A soft test would ask if a product had been sufficient: Would a reasonable client based on the work have been prepared to fulfill his or her duties? A hard test would ask if a product had been indispensable: Would that client have been unprepared without it?

Consider the *President’s Daily Brief (PDB)*, a canonical product

line.³⁰ The *PDB* is nearest the evaluative ideal type, providing strategic awareness (purpose) to facilitate policy development (supported function) for a small group of top officials. An officer evaluating a *PDB* article might ask: Did the analysis foster “good enough” strategic awareness to support related policies? Would those policies have drifted or been undermined without it?

The same tests of sufficiency and indispensability might be applied to high-profile product lines in other disciplines. The NIE is nearest the estimative ideal type, setting expectations (purpose) to enable planning and strategy development (supported function).³¹ Here, an evaluator might ask: Did the analysis set “good enough” expectations to support a related strategy? Would that strategy have been lost without it?

Such a discipline-based approach to evaluation breaks from past models in two ways. First, it devalues accuracy and prediction, viewing them only as one of many attributes that could contribute to sufficiency and indispensability.³² Second, it redefines usefulness, cueing it not to specific clients’ feedback—or professional fate—but to the duties of a notional “reasonable client.” This saves the community from customer service, a self-subordination anathema to profession.

Interestingly, it also highlights a way analysis can fail without any drop in quality: Demand can rise. In a crisis, for example, the pressures on policy and strategy grow, raising the corresponding analytic need. The same *PDB* or NIE that would have been sufficient yesterday might no longer be enough. Past models of

evaluation ignore this interaction, presuming a steady need that has never existed.^a

Separately, this approach also subtly reimagines intelligence failures in light of the disciplines. Failures become examples of insufficiency or dispensability in facilitating a supported function. In this view, major failures might extend across multiple disciplines. For example, US analysis in 1950 of China's entry into the Korean War misread Beijing's warnings and changes in force posture (descriptive), the evolution of Beijing's threat perception and ties with Moscow (evaluative), and the most likely and most dangerous courses of action for military intervention (estimative); the analysis was insufficient for command action, regional policy, and military planning all at once.³³ More modest failures—times when work within a single discipline proved unnecessary, for instance—might be more common, but are less common in the literature.

Integrating technology

Finally, the typology suggests a direction for the profession's integration of new technology: back to basics. Low-uncertainty epistemic and descriptive work is both readily suited for new tools and increasingly in need of them. Conversely, high-uncertainty work, such as attempts at big-data event prediction, remains out of reach.

In the end, typology is a tool. It does its work through abstraction and succeeds if a given example sharpens concepts, clarifies relationships, and enables meaningful advances in related work.

The heart of this distinction is the type of uncertainty involved. New big data, artificial intelligence, and machine learning tools are able to expand what officers know, reducing epistemic uncertainty. However, they are unable to smooth the variability inherent in the world, making them just as vulnerable as traditional methods to aleatory uncertainty.

Even this limited scope is important, though, because the contours of epistemic uncertainty are changing. Data is growing more plentiful but also less trustworthy, making it more difficult to answer basic questions about reality. Increasingly, a profession that once established truth is being asked to adjudicate “truthiness.” Clients encountering misleading reports on social media, rushed articles from questionable outlets, or suspected deception or disinformation will want to know: “Is this real?” A back-to-basics integration of technology answers this evolving mission need by reinforcing epistemic analysis.

New tools also promise to bolster descriptive analysis by speeding updates, enabling a fuller story to reach clients more quickly. They could even provide for some prospective work, such as event warning through the near-automated

monitoring of indicator lists informed by more data than previously possible.

Conversely, however, the typology suggests a skeptical view of predictive analytics applied to high-uncertainty questions. This includes some common ideas, such as unbounded real-time forecasts, prediction markets, analyst prediction rankings, and aggregated scores for unrealized potentialities like situational risk or opportunity. Here, investment seems to promise more frustration than progress, however attractive the image of such capabilities might be.

Back to the Future

In the end, typology is a tool. It does its work through abstraction and succeeds if a given example sharpens concepts, clarifies relationships, and enables meaningful advances in related work. Here, the effort seeks to go “back to the future,” revisiting old concepts to help the profession adapt to a rapidly changing world.

What does the new typology discover? It finds in analytic disciplines a path to the future of the profession, with opportunities to rethink theory, warning, discourse, doctrine, education, evaluation, and technology for the years to come.



a. The exception to both departures is epistemic analysis, which accepts a standard of accuracy and exists independently from clients' duties. Here, an evaluator would look for correspondence between a claimed fact and reality. At that time, was the adversary's First Corps organized the way the product claimed? Is that really what a foreign leader studied in school?

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Endnotes

1. The criteria for professions in general have occupied a great deal of social science and intelligence literature. For example, Randy Hodson and Teresa Sullivan suggested that the criteria of professions in general include abstract, specialized knowledge; autonomy; authority over clients and subordinate occupations; and altruism. (Randy Hodson and Teresa Sullivan, *The Social Organization of Work* [Wadsworth, 2012]) Older studies, though not without objection, also discuss criteria of discretionary skill, functional exclusivity, and a system of credentials. (Eliot Freidson, *Professionalism: The Third Logic* [University of Chicago Press, 2001]. For an opposing point of view see Robert Dingwall, "Accomplishing Profession" *Essays on Professions* [Ashgate, 2008].) The criteria of professions usually applied to the Intelligence Community include a governing body, performance standards, a system of education, a system of certification, a system of knowledge management, reliable methodology, and institutionalized organizational learning. (James Bruce and Roger George, "Professionalizing Intelligence Analysis," *Journal of Strategic Security* 8.3 [2015]. Rebecca Fisher, Rob Johnston, and Peter Clement, "Is Intelligence Analysis a Discipline?" in Roger George and James Bruce, *Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners' Perspectives* [Georgetown University Press, 2014]. See also a special issue of *Intelligence and National Security* addressing this subject: 32:5 [2017].)
2. Joseph Gartin, "The Future of Analysis," *Studies in Intelligence* 63 no. 2 (June, 2019).
3. Other typologies have been less consequential. For example, Jennifer Sims, Jack Davis, and John Gentry each identify four types ordered by practice. Sims describes basic work (cataloging knowledge), analysis (recognizing patterns), assessments (interpreting cases), and estimates (judging probability). In a similar way, Davis identifies facts (verifying information), findings (recognizing patterns), forecasts (making judgments and predictions), and fortunetelling (making poor, unsupported assessments). Separately, Gentry outlines monitoring, warning of threats, warning of opportunities, and estimates as distinct analytic practices. (Jennifer Sims, "Decision Advantage and the Nature of Intelligence Analysis" in Loch Johnson, ed., *Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence* (Oxford University Press, 2010); Jack Davis, "Defining the Analytic Mission: Facts, Findings, Forecasts, and Fortunetelling," *Studies in Intelligence* 39 no. 3 (1995); John Gentry, "Assessing Intelligence Performance," in Johnson, ed., *Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence*.
4. Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (Princeton University Press, 1949).
5. John Hedley, "The Evolution of Intelligence Analysis in the US Intelligence Community," in George and Bruce, *Analyzing Intelligence*. Woodrow Kuhns, "The Beginning of Intelligence Analysis in CIA," *Studies in Intelligence* 51 no. 2 (2007).
6. Director of National Intelligence, *National Intelligence Strategy, 2014* at https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2014_NIS_Publication.pdf; Director of National Intelligence, *National Intelligence Strategy, 2019* at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/National_Intelligence_Strategy_2019.pdf?utm_source=Press%20Release&utm_medium=Email&utm_campaign=NIS_2019.
7. David Collier, et al., "Typologies: Forming Concepts and Creating Categorical Variables," in Janet Box-Steffensmeier, et al., eds, *Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology* (Oxford University Press, 2008); David Collier, et al., "Putting Typologies to Work: Concept Formation, Measurement, and Analytic Rigor," *Political Research Quarterly* 65.1 (2012); Kenneth Bailey, *Typologies and Taxonomies: An Introduction to Classification Techniques* (Sage, 1994).
8. This formulation joins a leading theory of intelligence generally (adaptive realism) with a convincing craft explanation of analysis specifically. (These ideas are broadly compatible, as Warner suggests.) It is deliberately narrow in focusing only on the analytic component of the theory. On adaptive realism, see Jennifer Sims, "A Theory of Intelligence and International Politics," in Gregory Treverton and Wilhelm Agrell, eds, *National Intelligence Systems: Current Research and Future Prospects* (Cambridge University Press, 2009); Jennifer Sims, "Defending Adaptive Realism: Intelligence Theory Comes of Age," in Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin, and Mark Phythian, eds, *Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates* (Routledge, 2009); and Sims, "Decision Advantage." On reducing uncertainty, see Kristan Wheaton and Michael Beerbower, "Towards a New Definition of Intelligence," *Stanford Law & Policy Review* 17:2 (2006); and Thomas Fingar, *Reducing Uncertainty* (Stanford University Press, 2011). On the compatibility of these ideas, see Michael Warner, "Intelligence as Risk Shifting," in Peter Gill et al., *Intelligence Theory*.
9. There are many different ways of conceptualizing uncertainty. Daniel P. Thunnissen, "Uncertainty Classification for the Design and Development of Complex Systems," California Institute of Technology, 2003, at <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.128.133&rep=rep1&type=pdf>; Aleksandra Bielska and Chris Pallaris, "Understanding Uncertainty in Intelligence Analysis," *i-intelligence.eu*; Brian Rathbun, "Uncertain about Uncertainty: Understanding the Multiple Meanings of a Crucial Concept in International Relations Theory," *International Studies Quarterly* 51 (2007). However, the distinction between epistemic and aleatory uncertainty is both common and promising for understanding analysis; see David Tannenbaum, et al., "Judgment Extremity and Accuracy Under Epistemic vs. Aleatory Uncertainty," *Management Science* 63:2 (2017); Michael Mazarr, *Rethinking Risk in National Security* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016)
10. Josh Kerbel, "Coming to Terms with Anticipatory Intelligence," War on the Rocks, 13 August 2019 at <https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/coming-to-terms-with-anticipatory-intelligence/>.

11. William Burr and Jeffrey Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle’: The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960–64,” *International Security* 25.3 (2000-01).
12. June Teufel Dreyer, “Deng Xiaoping And Modernization Of the Chinese Military,” *Armed Forces & Society* 14.2 (1988); Nan Li, “Organizational Changes of the PLA, 1985–1997,” *China Quarterly* 158 (1999). Taylor Fravel, *Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy Since 1949* (Princeton University Press, 2019).
13. Michael Dillon, “Hong Kong” *Contemporary China: An Introduction* (Routledge, 2009).
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15. John Gentry and Joseph Gordon, *Strategic Warning Intelligence* (Georgetown University Press, 2019); Cynthia Grabo, *Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning* (University Press of America, 2004).
16. In different contexts, both scholars and analysts have noted the considerable obstacles to this type of warning. Richard New Lebow, “Contingency, Catalysts, and International System Change,” *Political Science Quarterly* 115: 4 (2001). See also the National Intelligence Council’s *Global Trends* series, available at <https://www.dni.gov/index.php/global-trends-home>.
17. Richard Betts, “Strategic Intelligence Estimates: Let’s Make Them Useful” *Studies in Intelligence* 25 no.1 (1981); Stephen Marrin, “Why Strategic Intelligence Analysis Has Limited Influence on American Foreign Policy,” *Intelligence and National Security* 32: 6 (2017).
18. Armen Der Kiureghian and Ove Ditlevsen, “Aleatory or Epistemic? Does it Matter?” Special Workshop on Risk Acceptance and Risk Communication, Stanford University, March 2007.
19. On both the challenges and inevitability of subjective probability, see Jeffrey A. Friedman, *War and Chance: Assessing Uncertainty in International Politics* (Oxford University Press, 2019), Chapter 2: “Subjective Probability in International Politics.”
20. Philip Tetlock, *Expert Political Judgment* (Princeton University Press, 2005).
21. In recent years, IARPA has pursued a number of programs exploring predictive analysis, including prediction markets and forecasting tournaments. For example, ODNI, “IARPA Announces the Geopolitical Forecasting Challenge to Improve Crowdsourced Forecasts,” ODNI News Release 4-18, 16 Jan 2018.
22. Paul Pillar, “Predictive Intelligence: Policy Support or Spectator Sport?” *SAIS Review of International Affairs* 28.1 (2008).
23. Sims, “A Theory of Intelligence and International Politics”; Sims, “Defending Adaptive Realism”; Sims, “Decision Advantage and the Nature of Intelligence Analysis.”
24. Cynthia Grabo, *Anticipating Surprise*.
25. J. Eli Margolis, “Estimating State Instability,” *Studies in Intelligence* 56 no. 1 (2012).
26. This notion has long been contentious, with senior officials lining up on both sides of the issue. Christopher Kojm, “Intelligence Integration and Reform: 2009–2014,” in Robert Hutchings and Gregory Treverton, eds, *Truth to Power: A History of the U.S. National Intelligence Council* (Oxford University Press, 2019); Gregory Treverton, “From Afghanistan to Trump: 2014–2017,” in Hutchings and Treverton, *Truth to Power*.
27. Notably, others well-versed in uncertainty take the opposite view, arguing that explicitly probabilistic judgments are not only possible but a professional responsibility. See Jeffrey A. Friedman, *War and Chance*. However, a detailed discussion of the ongoing debate about the role of prediction in analytic practice is beyond the scope of this article.
28. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “ICD 203: Analytic Standards,” 2 Jan 2015, <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD%20203%20Analytic%20Standards.pdf>. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “JP-2.0: Joint Intelligence,” 22 Oct 2013, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp2_0.pdf.
29. Stephen Marrin, “Evaluating the Quality of Intelligence Analysis: By What (Mis) Measure?” *Intelligence and National Security* 27: 6 (2012). Daniel Byman, “Intelligence and Its Critics,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 39.3 (2016).
30. Loch Johnson, “Glimpses into the Gems of American Intelligence: The President’s Daily Brief and the National Intelligence Estimate,” *Intelligence and National Security* 23: 3 (2008).
31. *Ibid.*
32. Notably, Sims also devalues accuracy, although for different reasons. Sims, “A Theory of Intelligence and International Politics.”
33. P. K. Rose, “Two Strategic Intelligence Mistakes in Korea, 1950,” *Studies in Intelligence* 45 no. 5 (2001).



Intelligence Implications of Disease

Warren F. Carey and Myles Maxfield

Editor's note: This article originally appeared in the Spring issue of *Studies in Intelligence* in 1972, Vol. 16, No. 2. The authors were members of the Life Sciences Division of the Office of Scientific Intelligence in CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology. Dr. Carey had passed away only months before the article was published. Dr. Maxfield would serve in CIA for many more years. He died in retirement in 2007.

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Genesis of a project

INTELLIGENCE IMPLICATIONS OF DISEASE

Warren F. Carey and Myles Maxfield

Outbreaks of meningitis in China are not unusual, but the winter of 1966–1967 was something else again. It began innocently enough with a few reports of school closings in Canton. News of this routine precaution turned out to be the signal for one of the worst series of epidemics to hit China in many years, and the beginning of Project IMPACT. The concept of this project—forecasting disease problems and epidemics, and the assessment of their effects on military and civilian activities—had hardly scratched the surface of implementation in the CIA's Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI); but the opportunity was present in December 1966. China was in turmoil as millions of its people were participating in the Great Cultural Revolution. The demonstrations, riots, large dislocations of the population, and general chaos attendant on this revolution were, epidemiologically speaking, some of the best ingredients for a successful epidemic. On the other hand, this mass upheaval had no precedent, there

was no up-to-date quantifiable disease information of any sort on China; and the status of China's public health conditions and medical capabilities were uncertain to say the least.

In the early stages of the project there was even uncertainty over the actual cause for the school closings in China. Two disease names, meningitis and Japanese B encephalitis, were being cited in reports describing the same outbreak in Canton (some reports combined both diseases into one—"Japanese B meningitis"). The confusion of reporting terminology was soon clarified. Distinct but similar Chinese words were being used to describe the disease; but which disease was it? Encephalitis is a viral disease, transmitted by mosquitoes, and is usually associated with seasonal periodicity of occurrence in warm weather. With the advent of colder weather the mosquitoes die and the disease subsides. By contrast, meningitis is a bacterial disease, having in temperate climates its

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greatest prevalence during cooler weather; although large outbreaks have occurred in hot, dry climates. The disease is mainly one of children and young adults and is more common where living conditions are crowded, as in barracks and institutions. The key to the correct diagnosis was a report that cited the specific use of antibiotic nosedrops to treat encephalitis. The disease was thus remotely diagnosed as meningitis because antibiotics are not effective against viral encephalitis.

Identification of the etiology of this outbreak was crucial to our forecasting—meningitis had the greater potential for spreading rapidly from person to person by discharges from the nose and throat of infected persons. A significant point too was that the general pattern of behavior of meningitis epidemics tends markedly to repeat itself over a two to three year cycle. Thus it appeared that China was going to have an extended disease crisis. The first intelligence assessment was made in an OSI publication in January:

“It is becoming increasingly evident that Communist China is being confronted with a serious disease control problem. Factors suggest a breakdown of public health measures under the impact of mass movement of people, and perhaps the beginning of a series of new disease problems.”

Subsequent reports on the magnitude of the epidemic exceeded the prediction: travellers arriving in Hong Kong reported meningitis raging throughout Kwangtung Province, Radio Canton repeatedly advised people to guard against exposure to the disease—but it was too late. By mid-January, the epidemic in Canton was out of control, as supplies of sulfadiazine used in the prevention as well as the treatment of the disease became depleted. Red Guards took over the hospital facilities to care for their personnel only and some additional 900,000 visitors in Canton with the Cultural Exchange Program were exposed to meningitis. As the epidemic gained momentum, the entire public health infrastructure began to collapse.

A pattern of spread began to develop primarily to the north of Kwangtung Province. It became possible to predict a chronological sequence from one province to the next by tracing the movements of Red Guard units. In mid-January the epidemic was reported in Fuch'ing, Fukien Province (bordering Kwangtung Province on the northeast) and a Red Guard unit from Chi-mei diverted its march at this time to avoid Fu-ch'ing. At Ching-kang Shan,

over 60,000 Red Guard each day were visiting the cradle of the Chinese Communist Revolution. Following an outbreak of the disease, the area was placed under quarantine. So it went—little being done to restrict mass movements until an outbreak occurred. In almost perfect order, meningitis infected one province after another all the way to the northeast Soviet border, and, as it struck, the movement and activities of Red Guards were hampered.

At this point, OSI analysts knew the identity of the disease and where it was going. The question now was how to quantitatively estimate the impact on the Chinese population? The only reports received were general descriptions such as “many sick and dying”; “many dead”; “no drugs”; “hospitals overcrowded”; “quarantines”; and “the most serious thing that has happened since the liberation.” An attempt was made to model the epidemic on paper based on an analysis of outbreaks that have occurred in Western countries. In such disease outbreaks a very high percentage of people are known to carry the infection and about one-half to one percent of these will become ill with the disease. Given the estimated Chinese population in the infected provinces and also the ones in the path of the epidemic, a range of about 2.5 to 5.0 million cases was arrived at. It was an impressive range but descriptive accounts of the epidemic still appeared to be in excess of calculations.

The medical situation was presented to analysts in the Office of Economic Research (OER) who were able to complement the analysis. Projected population figures showed that there were 130 million children in the 0-4 age group and in the 0-24 age group about 500 million. Well over half of China's population consisted of young people—the very ones most “at risk” in a meningitis epidemic. It became apparent that in addition to the actual epidemic problems, considerable alarm and panic was being generated, which could impede control of the disease. Real and imagined symptoms would initiate frantic appeals for medical assistance and drugs, thereby disrupting internal distribution systems. OER analysts also indicated that in addition to producing sulfadiazine, China imports small amounts of this drug to meet the normal requirements. Overall, there existed a close balance between supply and demand. The amounts needed for treatment based on the calculated incidence rate was small in comparison to that needed to provide broad prophylactic protection to a large segment of the population.

State Department officials were advised of these new developments. It was clear that an excellent opportunity was present to help “reduce tensions” between the U.S. and Chinese Governments by rescinding the U.S. ban on exports of drugs and other medical supplies. A formal offer to assist China in controlling the epidemic was made by the State Department. China did not respond to this gesture. Nevertheless, by February, shortages of sulfadiazine began to occur, with reports of many Chinese resorting to ineffective traditional medicines and urgent calls for sulfadiazine being placed on higher echelons by local health units. Soon thereafter China solicited Western European and Asian pharmaceutical companies to make available substantial quantities of sulfadiazine. An accounting of the total amounts imported to China was attempted but much of the information was related to negotiations on purchase prices. At least several hundred metric tons were known to have been shipped between February and April to supplement China’s internal production. Calculations based on chemoprophylactic dosage requirements (0.5 grams for children, 1.0 grams for adults each 12 hours for four doses) indicated that enough had been imported to protect about 100 million persons.

Chinese authorities broadcast many appeals for “masses” of doctors and nurses to act in halting the contagious disease that was erupting and flowing from place to place. They then attributed the epidemic to medical workers who had not followed Chairman Mao’s orders for the care of the country’s 700 million persons. In retrospect, the “barefoot doctors” program to provide medical services and disease reporting in rural areas was a logical outgrowth of this massive epidemic. Whether the ensuing decline of the disease was due to the extensive use of sulfadiazine or to the normal decline of the epidemic cycle was never ascertained. It was followed by other predicted disease outbreaks (i.e., hepatitis, measles), and a recurrence of a much less severe meningitis epidemic in the winter of 1967–1968. As a postscript, China’s failure to prevent and control the spread of diseases was viewed by the USSR as a fundamental weakness of the Chinese health services and the Soviet Ministry of Health abruptly rescinded the 1960 Sino-Soviet agreement on mutual abolition of vaccination requirements for travellers between these countries.

Project IMPACT went global in the summer of 1968 when a new strain of influenza rolled out of China and within a short period of time affected one out of every

four persons in the world. The strain was not an unusually lethal one but it was only by chance that it was not. Again, various Agency sources provided the first indication of the beginning of this worldwide pandemic when the disease moved from China via travellers to Hong Kong in late June. An estimated 500,000 cases resulted in Hong Kong alone including 30 percent of the personnel at the American Embassy. At this time a unique opportunity was available to review statistical data on influenza, (a program to computerize disease information to derive trends, cycles and predictions had already been initiated under a CIA Project called BLACKFLAG); the current epidemic in Hong Kong was causing the highest incidence since the first Asian Type A2 epidemic of 1957. While the epidemic appeared to be progressing in a new way, initial curiosity subsided when a laboratory report from Hong Kong identified the strain as the common Type A2 variety.

Soon, however, separate reports from laboratories in Japan, U.S., and England identified antigenic (genetic) changes in specimens isolated in Hong Kong. Investigators at the Japanese National Institute of Health identified the Hong Kong influenza virus as a new Asian Type A3. In the U.S., isolates of the disease showed a magnitude of antigenic dissimilarity which had not been observed previously with Type A2 specimens. The World Health Influenza Center in London also noted an antigenic shift from previous A2 strains. Summarized findings noted: “the emergence of a, new strain occurs every 10–15 years and together with rapid transportation, and in the absence of specific vaccines, leads us to believe that the disease may cause extensive outbreaks throughout the world in the coming months.” Medical members of the Scientific Intelligence Committee were informed of these developments. The Defense Intelligence Agency member, in turn, alerted representatives of the Army Surgeon General’s Office and following their conference with scientists at the Communicable Disease Center, an overall emergency plan was approved. Orders were issued to produce as rapidly as possible, large quantities of vaccine to protect military, public health and Government personnel, and civilians in high risk categories. The World Health Organization in August officially designated the new virus strain as Hong Kong/ A2/68.

The race began in many countries to manufacture vaccine before the disease struck. Data was available on earlier flu epidemics from which could be derived a projected pattern of an eastward movement across Europe

enabling a forecast of this spread. The disease would be in the Soviet Union about February, 1969, some two to three months after it reached Europe. Thus, the Soviets had an estimated seven month lead time, and reports on their progress in manufacturing and distributing Hong Kong flu vaccine were anticipated. Instead, the Soviets continued to vaccinate the urban population (about 75 percent) with the standard A2 vaccine which was shown even in August, to have very little protective value against Hong Kong flu (this decision later was reported to be based on their inability to make the new vaccine in less than a year and their gamble that A2 vaccine would help). By late January, the flu was present in many Soviet cities and incidence rates began to increase sharply. Central Asian areas also were facing their worst winter in 90 years as record snow fall and cold temperatures helped to disrupt medical assistance plans. A massive educational campaign on TV and local news media was initiated in Soviet cities on how to avoid the disease. "Flu stations" were set up on corners to dispense cold remedies, but in the absence of specific prophylaxis, this effort was largely academic. Workers were given an extra day of sick leave in addition to the usual five days granted for flu cases. About 25 percent of the Moscow population was stricken (about 30 percent in Leningrad) and it was assumed that comparable figures occurred in most other population centers known to have been infected. The disease produced an ever widening ripple of effects on military and civilian activities (i.e., disruption of military training and industrial production schedules, which were costly in terms of sick relief payments, medical assistance, etc.). As the effects were felt in the Soviet Union they called the disease "Mao's flu." The direct and indirect cost of the epidemic was calculated to be several billion rubles.

Soviet health officials were criticized for their inept handling of the epidemic which caused considerable harm to the economy and to the health of the people. It caused five to six times as much illness as the total of all other infections. In response, health officials in the USSR recommended that they be freed from "petty supervision by dozens of incompetent authorities." The Soviet Medical Gazette in an excellent review of the controversy noted that in the absence of more specific preventive measures, scientists, doctors, and particularly the Soviet population, are still indebted to the practical health workers.

Influenza also reached Southeast Asia and project IMPACT was applied to forecast, and quantify the effects

upon Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army (VC/NVA) forces. A chronology of the times and locations of outbreaks was made from reports over the 1968–1970 period including any quantifiable figures on the rates of sickness and the frequency of VC/NVA requests for drugs and other medical supplies. There evolved a pattern which showed that the occurrence of influenza was a function of traffic density and personnel moving south from North Vietnam and coincided with the dry season, when the bulk of all military supplies moved down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Incapacitation rates ranged from about 40 to 70 percent and there was very good evidence that except for the isolation and quarantine of patients, no capability existed to specifically protect their military personnel by mass vaccinations. In December 1970, reports of outbreaks among VC/NVA forces in North Vietnam-Laos border area began to be noted with increased frequency — the stage was set for the beginning of the 1971 influenza epidemic there.

Staff personnel of the Special Assistant/Vietnam Affairs (SA/VA) were consulted, and together with their data on traffic routes, troop concentration, and locations of way stations (Binh Trams), made it possible to construct a model of the direction of the influenza epidemic. Tchepone was a key junction on the Communist roadnet which extends into Southern Laos—if Tchepone became infected, the disease would move from Binh Tram to Binh Tram north and south in Laos and back to North Vietnam. In late December there were indications that the NVA 4th and 16th AAA Battalions at Tchepone had become infected. It was estimated that in the primary infected area of Quang Binh Province the epidemic peak would occur about 30 January 1971 and in the secondary infected area south of Tchepone the peak would be about mid-February 1971. An overall 50 percent infection rate was calculated for VC/NVA personnel in those areas and it was estimated that one-half of those infected would be incapable of performing normal duties for about a week.

A warning was sent to indigenous intelligence teams operating in Laos and Cambodia to take special precautions during these peak influenza periods. Inasmuch as vaccination was not practical, an anti-flu drug, amantadine HCL, which had been shown to help prevent the disease was recommended for these teams. During February 1971, South Vietnamese army units entered Laos and conducted extensive operations near Tchepone and other areas in and near the primary infectious zone. Unfortunately, these operations took place just after the predicted

time for the peak incidence. Combat effectiveness of committed VC/NVA forces probably was affected to a lesser degree by the declining incidence rate of influenza during February. This aspect was, however, difficult to quantitate.

The Future

Keeping ahead of meningitis and influenza required an extended all-out effort to assess, in each case, the disease with its special conditions so that the epidemic consequences could be projected. Analysts in what appeared to be completely unrelated fields of interest, all had significant bits of data to support and extend the forecasts. Disease intelligence can provide an initiating and vital role in the more familiar political, military and economic categories of intelligence. Project IMPACT clearly indicated that nothing is more international than diseases, which recognize no political boundaries and few natural ones. Human diseases move freely across national frontiers and spread as conditions permit from one area to another. Even in the case of diseases of plants and animals, there is little doubt today that pathogenic organisms themselves are either already globally distributed or can rapidly become so. The appearance of something new like Hong Kong influenza or the recent and costly spread of Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis into the U.S. from Mexico can have demonstrable intelligence implications. Such disease events undoubtedly will occur in the future, and they will be much nastier to all facets of human activity.

Disease impact predictions require the retrieval and analysis of immense amounts of unclassified and classified data. This must be done in a very short time period if it is to be responsive to the current world disease situation. The techniques learned in working out the basic approaches on a few selected situations has led the Office of Scientific Intelligence to initiate an extensive effort to develop computer assisted working tools to retrieve the desired data quickly and to calculate statistical summaries and the probability of an epidemic spread. Mathematical models also are being designed for a multitude of epidemic diseases to give a rapid up-date and display capability. Project IMPACT depends upon such systems, but its best asset is still the cooperation of analysts in varied disciplines who help in the predictive processes.

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
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


Allen Dulles on Political Reporting, 1925

David A. Langbart

Allen Dulles is known today primarily for his service in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II and as director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 1953 to 1961. Dulles, however, began his government career in the Department of State in 1916. His uncle by marriage, Robert Lansing, was then Secretary of State. Dulles graduated from Princeton University in 1915, taught English in India for a year, and after examination received an appointment as a Secretary of Embassy or Legation.¹ Over the next decade he received a number of short appointments in various locales, all the while rising in the ranks.² Dulles survived the 1918–19 flu pandemic while overseas. In April 1922, he was designated as Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, serving in that position until 1926.

After leaving the Department in 1926, Dulles had a multi-faceted career in and out of government. He worked at the Sullivan & Cromwell law firm with his brother John Foster Dulles, ran (unsuccessfully) for public office, was a foreign policy intellectual during the 1930s with distinctly interventionist views, served in the OSS during World War II (mostly in Bern), served in high positions in the CIA during the Truman administration, and was named director of the CIA by President Eisenhower. Some of the notable events of his tenure as head of the CIA were the covert actions in Iran, Guatemala, and Cuba (Bay of Pigs), the development of the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, and



Allen W. Dulles at work in 1924. Photo © Everett Collection/AlamyStockPhoto

the movement to overhead collection. He was dismissed as director after the failure of the Cuba operation. His final governmental position was on the Warren Commission examining the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Dulles died in 1969.

In August 1925, Dulles was called on to give a series of lectures at the Foreign Service School on the subject of “political reporting.” His experience in the Department as both a producer and consumer of political reporting gave him a unique perspective on the subject and clearly influenced his presentations. Those lectures present a snapshot of Dulles’s early attitudes about the gathering of information overseas as

well as a general understanding of the uses of political reporting in the Department. Based on the arc of his governmental career, it is clear that his opinions changed over time. Indeed, given his later activities in the OSS and CIA, parts of the lectures read somewhat ironically.

A key development in the official representation of the United States overseas was the creation of a unified foreign service in 1924. This came about as the culmination of the long-standing movement to professionalize official American representation abroad that began before World War I. The complexity of issues raised during the war and the increased involvement of the United States in the international sphere after the conflict ended further called for changes. After several years of work, Congress passed

1. A secretary in the Diplomatic Service was a substantive position, not a clerical one.

2. Dulles was assigned to Vienna in August 1916, to Bern in April 1917, to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace in Paris in December 1918, to Prague in May 1919, to Berlin in October 1919, to the Department of State in August 1920, to the High Commission in Constantinople in October 1922, and back to the Department in March 1922.

The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government.

and President Calvin Coolidge signed a law commonly known as the Rogers Act, after representative John Jacob Rogers who spearheaded the legislative effort.

Under the provisions of the Rogers Act, the formerly separate Diplomatic Service and Consular Service were combined into the Foreign Service of the United States. In order to provide for the systematic training of newly appointed Foreign Service Officers, the Department established the Foreign Service School on June 9, 1924, under the provisions of Departmental Order 296 which was issued pursuant to Executive Order 4022 of June 7.

Those attending the school split their time between classroom lectures and practical training in the various offices of the Department. The numerous lectures

included administrative topics such as “Documentation of Merchandise, Invoices, Customs Regulations, Etc.,” “Shipping and Seamen,” and “Allowances and Estimates” as well as substantive subjects like “The Monroe Doctrine,” “The Petroleum Situation,” “The Baltic States and Russia,” and “Relations with Japan.” The first class of 17 officers, all men, graduated on September 1, 1925.

The following is the text of the lectures given by Allen Dulles on August 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1925, as prepared for dissemination. The version for distribution included the following disclaimer: “The views expressed in these lectures give the personal opinions of the lecturer and are not to be taken as an authoritative or official statement of the Department’s views with respect to the various questions asked.”



POLITICAL REPORTING.³

I. Scope of Subject, Definition and Primary Object –

Political reporting for the purpose of these lectures will be considered to include in general all that is not covered by “commercial reporting”—such as reports on negotiations, on the protection of American interests and nationals as well as general reports on the political, or politico-economic situation in a particular country.⁴

Political reporting in its restricted sense might be defined as assembling and transmission to the Department of information and data pertaining to the political and politico-economic condition in the country in which you are stationed and its relation to other States.

Primary object of Political Reporting is to enable this Government to promote and protect its interests.

There is nothing adequate in existing Consular or Diplomatic regulations for the guidance of foreign service officers except on subject of form.

It is impossible to lay down cut and dried rules—equally impossible to become a good political reporter by following formulas alone. All that can be given are general suggestions and each officer will have to work out his own salvation with the help of his chief, colleagues and his own good sense. However, you cannot be good political reporters unless you can write clear and expressive English. Reports must be accurate in all statements of facts. The officer must possess sound judgment and a sense of proportion and of relative values. This is obtained only through experience and each officer must adopt or modify any general suggestion according to the particular problem he has to meet.

It is important to have an idea of the philosophy of your job; what you are in the Foreign Service for; why there is a Foreign Service. The theory has sometimes been advanced in the past that foreign envoys are unnecessary; that it is sufficient for sovereigns or sovereigns

3. Source: Lectures Before the Foreign Service School, 1922–27, Entry AI-423, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, National Archives. The distribution text presented here was slightly rewritten in a more idiomatic form than the typescript notes and some major changes were made. The major changes are described in the notes. While paragraph numbering remains as in the original, line formatting has been modified to save space. The lectures were sent to the field under cover of Diplomatic Serial No. 446, November 27, 1925, file 124.0664/57a, 1910–29 Central Decimal File, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, National Archives.

4. In the typescript, this sentence ends with “the press, personalities and movements.”

acting through the Secretary of State to write directly to sovereigns with whom they had dealings. That theory is scouted at the present time, even with the improved means of communication and travel, as negotiation requires not only a channel of communication but also adequate information for the shaping of policy.

II. Relation of political reporting to other duties of Foreign Service Officers – Some officers spend so much time at their desk writing reports that they are not able to get about to find out what is going on and others are so busy collecting information that they do not have quiet to really analyze and report. It is important to strike an average. Efficiency is not judged by length or bulk, but by accuracy, timeliness and judgement displayed.

III. Primary objects of political reporting.

- a. To furnish information and conclusion that will enable the Department to shape its policy and furnish its officers with proper instructions.
- b. To keep the Department informed of all negotiations in progress and of action taken by Foreign Service officers in the furtherance of American interests or for the protection of American nationals.

(Officers in the field often fail to keep Department informed of each step in negotiations that are being carried on.)

- c. To give Department a general idea of the political situation in a given country with particular reference to the relations of the United States toward that country.
- d. To indicate the political developments that affect peace in general, or the general economic condition.

IV. Individual preparation for political reporting.

- a. Familiarize yourself with the diplomatic, political and economic factors, and history of the country to which you are assigned.
- b. Study American diplomatic relations with the country in question. Take as text books: Foreign Relations; Moore's Digest; Hyde's International Law; Malloy's Treaties and later Supplement.

Read over all treaties, both those in effect and those denounced, with country to which assigned. Many of your problems are covered by treaty provisions.

- c. For general background, read diplomatic memoirs, published despatches, etc. Take as an example of political reporting in time of crisis the published correspondence of the 1914 crisis—the so-called Kautsky publications, Red Books, etc.

V. General outline of the subject matter of Political Reports and suggestions as to some of the material which the Department expects and needs.

a. General political developments.

1. Important to indicate the possible relation of such developments to the United States.

2. Keep in mind the relative importance to the Department at a given time of developments on which you are reporting. Take, for instance, China at the present moment (1925)—anything from China is of importance. Officers in that part of the world should be particularly active in increasing the number of their reports and send in bits of information which under ordinary circumstances might be of minor interest, but which now have significance. Try to keep in mind the center of importance of political reporting—may be one or more—certain centers always retain their importance. (British Empire questions, for example). It is important to gauge relative importance to the Department of the field in which the officer is stationed. People in field do not perhaps realize how quickly centers of importance change.

b. Political developments abroad affecting United States—our treaty relations—our foreign policy. The attitude abroad towards our foreign policy. The developments affecting the Monroe Doctrine, the Open Door. The Treaty policy of other countries in their relation to our own treaty policy.

c. Politico-economic questions —debt funding questions. At this particular time anything relating to the financial situation in France, its taxation policy, its foreign loans, etc. are of great interest. The same applies to Belgium, Italy and other debtor nations. Effect of American loans to foreign countries.

d. The foreign press—what they say and what weight to give to it. The Press often is a fair reflection of attitude of people of that country, but be on your guard against propaganda. If there is propaganda about the United States, send it in; but state that it is propaganda and give reasons for your opinion. Most diplomatic missions abroad send in every week press clippings collected as far as possible according to subjects. Such clippings are helpful to the Department, but they are more helpful still if the officer expresses his idea as to the accuracy and importance of particular items. Department furnishes cards for reporting on newspapers, which are used as

reference by the Department in ascertaining reliability of a given paper.

e. Important personalities. It is very helpful for the Department to have officers prepare a “who’s who” of important persons in different countries and of the attitude of these people towards the United States. This should be prepared by the officer as he has the opportunity and supplemented from time to time.

f. International conferences held or attended by other powers but not by the United States. Officers are often stationed in a country where conferences are held with which we are not directly concerned, but it is important for the Department to know what is going on in these conferences, the questions discussed, and the final outcome.

g. League of Nations. Attitude of different countries towards League is of importance to Department.

h. Treaty policy of other countries—particularly regarding immigration, tariff, shipping, territorial waters, arbitration, naturalization, extradition, customs immunities, etc.

i. Diplomatic correspondence of other governments as far as properly available. Officers are not expected to engage in any underhanded activities to obtain documents not available through proper channels. But through maintaining proper personal contacts officer may often get through his colleagues unpublished diplomatic correspondence, notes written to the Government or notes written to their colleagues on points which may be, of interest to this Government.

j. Diplomatic precedents—also other precedents established in the country where officer is stationed. Even if of no immediate interest to the Department, they are very valuable for future reference.

k. Legal or other decisions involving Diplomatic or Consular precedents of immunities;—claims precedents, etc. United States may not be directly involved at the moment but precedent cases established in other countries might be of use in connection with our own diplomatic correspondence if a similar question were later raised affecting the United States.

l. Documents—standard publications, etc. Foreign Office lists—Diplomatic register, etc., White Papers- Blue Books—“Who’s Who. Collections of Treaties etc. should be transmitted. Also especially accurate or valuable maps of country in which stationed.⁵

m. Parliamentary debates, calling attention to all matters of direct interest to the United States. (For example, take the French Chambre at present—anything relating to the debt of France to the United States is of interest. A short while ago the same was true in regard to the ratification of the Nine Power Treaty by France.)

Send actual texts and documents. Too often these are summarized or paraphrased. They are of little use to the Department in this form.

n. Text of notes sent to Foreign Office. It is important that texts be sent to the Department, even if note was sent under instruction from Department. The exact form should be on file in the Department. Also report the character of all oral or informal representations to the Government or to local authorities.

Do not try to hide mistakes from the Department. If officer is frank and open, mistakes are more likely to be forgiven than if attempt is made at concealment and later discovered.

If officer writes letters in which certain principles are laid down, copies should be sent to the Department. Precedents may be established at individual posts of interest to the Department.⁶

o. Memoranda of conversations with Foreign Office officials and other important persons. If you go to Foreign Office or have important conversations with one of your colleagues, promptly make an outline of points brought out, be exact in stating what you said and what he said. The same principle can advantageously be followed in case of all important conversations, whether with officials or with private citizens.

It is helpful to successor to leave with him a documentation of what has been said to you and what you have said on all important questions.

If important political information is given you by a colleague, make memorandum of it and make it a basis of a report.

5. The August 10 lecture ended at this point.

6. The ideas in the last two sentences of this paragraph are not reflected in the typescript.

p. Diaries. Many officers find it useful to keep diaries. It serves as a check in determining whether you have covered all important developments in your reports.

q. Hypothetical future contingencies. Foreign Service officers are not expected to be prophets but should have some idea of probable future trend of events. It is often important to know whether the Government with which the United States is negotiating is strong or weak. Don't prophesy merely for the sake of prophesying and carefully distinguish opinions, or opinions of others, as to future developments, from facts. But don't be afraid to express your views as to important future developments if you are able to give sound reasons for your opinion.

VI. Devices which may aid in selecting suitable subjects for Political Reports.

a. Department's general instruction 258, April 12, 1924 and enclosure. This instruction has been superseded because it was found to be too complicated for general application throughout the field, but the Department still considers that the list of subjects may be helpful to officer in the field as guide in political and other reporting.

b. Keep on file in your office your own list of important questions in your own field of work and supplement this list from time to time. Do not make the list too long- keep only important subjects. Do not give undue weight to one subject to the neglect of others.

c. Follow American press to see what problems are being presented to American people. If American public is being interested in certain subjects which are within your field of reporting, the Department wishes to know all about that subject. Also follow comment of local press about this country.

d. Follow Congressional Record, read it or have some one in the office read it and bring to your attention all references to foreign affairs, particularly to country in which you are stationed. This gives a clue to profitable subjects for reporting.

e. Many missions are now receiving reports of the Secretary's conferences with the press. This gives an idea of what our press is following. If there are any inquiries in

regard to the country in which you are stationed, it will be an interesting clue to follow in the preparation of reports on the subject of the inquiry.

f. The Department's instructions often refer to continuing problem. Do not consider them answered by one reply if they relate to a continuing problem. If the Department has shown interest in a particular problem put it on list and when anything new comes up send a supplementary report. Very often it takes three or four reports or telegrams to answer one instruction from the Department.

VII. Collecting information for reports—Sources.

a. Your colleagues, Government officials and important personalities are essential sources of information. Successful personal contacts depend upon mutual confidence and personal liking, confidence of the other man that if he tells you a thing it will be treated with discretion, will be used in way not to get him into trouble—confidence that if he asks that source be not betrayed, you will not betray it.

b. Contacts with American and foreign press representatives often help in giving clues for political reports and for valuable information.^{7 7}

c. Valuable information sometimes secured through contacts with opposition leaders or persons out of power or sympathy with authorities in Power. This sometimes raises a very delicate question, but the Department wishes to know both sides of the story. There are certain countries where from social point of view people on the "outs" are more attractive socially than those in power, but that does not mean that they are better sources of information. Quite the opposite is generally the case.

The whole story is seldom heard in one place or at one time. Officers should learn to be quick and accurate in deduction. Very often it is valuable for the Department to get isolated bit of information on an important point, as the Department may have here the link to complete the chain.

d. The Press and Publications. It is important to analyze the press. If you know who is writing a particular article, this may give clue to the reason for

7. In the typescript, this paragraph reads: "American and foreign press representatives most helpful with regard to giving clues for political reports and for valuable information. Be sure to know to whom you are talking but great majority of press men are men of discretion and ability and patriotic."

sentiment expressed. It is important to the Department to have press clippings with proper analysis by officer. Be sure to indicate sources. If important articles appear in foreign press they should be sent forward with analysis.⁸

e. It is important to have various sources to check up information you obtain. Do not allow yourself to become biased by propaganda, flattery or special attention so that you give only the point of view of the country where you are stationed. On the other hand, do not become prejudiced against a country.

f. Travel. Improve all opportunities to see the country where you are stationed. Travel regulations are unfortunately rigorous, but the Department appreciates the need of an officer seeing more of the city where he is posted and will do what it can to authorize travel.⁹ Situations should be judged and reports based on a thorough knowledge of the country as a whole.¹⁰

g. In order to be in a position to secure information from foreign colleagues, foreign government officials, and other sources it is naturally necessary to give information in return. This does not mean that confidential information regarding your government's negotiations should ever be disclosed. There is, however, much information that can quite properly be given and while sound discretion must be used as to what is and what is not proper to discuss it rarely serves any useful purpose to make an undue mystery out of what you are doing. Within proper limits a frank, candid policy is generally best, and in return you are likely to establish contacts with your colleagues

which will result in making it possible for you to secure useful information from them.¹¹

h. It is also most important to cultivate cordial relations not only with your colleagues of the Foreign Service but also with the American military, naval, commercial and other attaches assigned to the country where you are stationed. Avoid secrecy among your own associates of the service or of other departments of the government. If you secure military, naval or commercial information or learn of sources of information that can better be handled by someone else on the staff be sure that the information or the sources are made available to the proper person.¹²

VIII. Mail and Cable Reports: When should cable rather than mail reports be sent.

The amount of your appropriation for cables will influence the question as to how much information you will be able to telegraph in a given period of time.¹³ In general it may be stated that the following are proper subjects for cable reports:¹⁴

a. Information relating to safety and welfare of American citizens —the Department is deluged with inquiries by those interested in an American citizen in difficulty abroad.

b. Important facts relating to pending American negotiations.

c. Crises affecting American lives and property.

8. In the typescript, this sentence reads: "If important articles appear in foreign press they should be sent in toto with analysis."

9. In this sentence, the word "city" most probably should be "country."

10. The August 11 lecture ended at this point.

11. In the typescript, this paragraph reads: "In order to get information from foreign colleagues, one of the most valuable sources of information, it is often necessary to give them information—which raises rather a delicate point. Discretion must be used as to what is proper information to give them. Do not make undue mystery out of what you are doing. Frank candid policy generally the best and in return you are likely to get valuable information."

12. In the typescript, this paragraph reads: "In connection with securing information important to cultivate cordial relations with military, naval and commercial attaches. Avoid secrecy as far as possible among your own associates of the service or of other Departments of this Government. If you get military, naval or commercial information or sources that can better be handled by some one else on the staff, turn it over to him."

13. At the time of these lectures, the United States Government did not have its own overseas communications system. Rather, it relied upon the facilities of commercial telegraph companies, which could be expensive.

14. In the typescript, this section reads: "The amount of your appropriation for cables may settle question as to whether to send information by mail or telegraph. It is important to know what should be telegraphed and what can wait to go by mail. In general telegraph—"

d. Political developments of real importance.¹⁵

Before telegraphing ask yourself whether the time a certain item of news or a note reaches Department will seriously affect its usefulness.

Safety of means of communication often a factor — code often safer than mail. Pouch service not entirely adequate as it does not reach all diplomatic missions and relatively few consular offices. Where we have no pouch service safety of lines of communication not always certain. If important information of a highly confidential character reaches you, you would be safer in telegraphing than in sending it by mail. Avoid unnecessarily putting into telegrams or despatches anything so confidential that it would seriously embarrass you or your Government if it fell into other hands.¹⁶

Instances have occurred where use of old codes has been of serious consequences- (Zimmerman and Luxburg telegrams).

In use of codes make messages as fool proof as possible. Repeat figures where accuracy of vital importance, also sums of money. Often well to repeat “not.” It is often possible to avoid use of negative by employing another word. Example, instead of “do not grant visa” use “refuse” visa.

IX. Organization of Department for the handling of political reports.

Reports coming in to Department from field are generally sent first to Index Bureau, where files are searched to see if there may be other correspondence on same subject, indexed, and sent to division handling country

or subject in question. There it goes to officer in Division handling that particular country, or subject, who goes over it and makes notations of his views and sends along to Chief of Division, who in turn goes over it, together with notations or recommendations. If no reply or action is necessary it is sent to files.

The Department has made provision for marking certain material of a highly confidential or extremely important character “Confidential for the Secretary or Under Secretary.”¹⁷ This notation should only be used in exceptional cases, as it is the practice of the chiefs of the divisions and bureaus to bring to the attention of the executive officers of the Department reports that they have received which are of real importance.¹⁸

The volume of material coming into the Department from the foreign service is so great that it is physically impossible to acknowledge or to comment upon individual reports except in rare instances. This means that even in the case of good reports the officer preparing the report does not always receive formal notification of the excellence of his work. However, the general rating of an officer is very greatly affected by the character of his political reporting work and in a great many instances excellent reports are sent to the Personnel Board for notation on the efficiency record of the officer in question.¹⁹

It is inevitable that the officer who knows how to write an interesting report and to secure the attention of the officers in the Department by the manner and form of presentation will have more attention paid to his report than the officer who may have equally good material to

15. In the typescript, this sentence ended with “—revolutions, etc.”

16. At this point, the typescript included the following paragraph which has been deleted in its entirety: “Sometimes you may desire your communication to be read by officials of Government to which accredited but this is a rare and often dangerous expedient. Telegrams sometimes sent clear for this purpose.”

17. At the time, the Under Secretary of State was the second ranking official in the Department.

18. This paragraph does not appear in the typescript.

19. In the typescript, at this point are the following paragraphs:

“In case of consular reports, before coming to Chief of Division it would be rated. Not the case with diplomatic officers for reasons that political reports usually signed by Chief of Mission. Department gives very careful consideration to political reporting work as a whole and individual officer preparing political reports receives credit therefore through his chief, foreign service inspectors and otherwise.

“In case officer in field writes or telegraphs for instructions - reply would be drafted by officer in political or other Division handling that country or subject, then it would come to the Chief of Division, then in case it should be of interest to Chief of any other Division, it would be sent to him for initialing, then to CR, then to signing officer. In case signing officer does not approve it is returned to officer preparing for amendment. “Great mass of material coming into Department and officers should not be discouraged if he does not receive answer or acknowledgment even in case of reports to which he has devoted great attention.”

submit but who fails to make a clear, logical or interesting presentation of his subject.²⁰

X. Dissemination of political reports:²¹

Many political reports received by the Department are of interest to other branches of the Government or to other diplomatic or consular missions. To meet the situation the Department has set up the following machinery for the adequate dissemination of such reports:

a. In the Department of State. Political reports received in the Department are carefully studied with a view to determining whether they would be helpful to another branch of the Government. Example: the Treasury Department in the case of a report on the financial situation of a given country; to the Department of Commerce in the event that a politico-economic situation were being treated; to the Military Intelligence Division or the Office of Naval Intelligence (in the case of the War and Navy departments) in the event of any military matter being considered.

The officers in the field should, as far as the pouch service or mail facilities permit, send directly to neighboring missions political reports of interest to such missions. If this is done the copy of the report sent to the Department should clearly indicate the action taken. If there is no such notation the Department will take it for granted that no distribution has been made by the officer preparing the report and will then send to the field to all interested missions copies of the report in question.

b. The Department has arranged for the centralized dissemination of political reports received from European diplomatic missions through an office established in the Embassy in Paris called the European Information Center (E.I.C.). The Department realizes that much time is wasted in sending reports from Europe to the Department and back again to other interested missions and has therefore arranged for centralized distribution from Paris, a copy of each political report being sent to E.I.C. at the same time as the report itself is dispatched to Washington.

Section X as it appeared in the typescript

“(a) By Department -

1. To other branches of the Government.
2. To missions abroad.

—officer sending in report to Department may send copy to other interested missions abroad, in which case notation made on report. Otherwise Department sends copy. Every incoming report examined to see whether it might interest any other mission in the field and if a copy not already sent to that mission it is sent by Department.

(b) Directly or through E.I.C.-

Appreciating that much time is wasted in sending reports from Europe and back again there is now in Paris Embassy a Division called European Information Center in charge of diplomatic officer, to which copies of all political reports prepared in European missions are sent at the same time as the reports are sent to the Department. Copies sent out from E.I.C. to interested missions.

Original coming to Washington bears stamp to effect that copy has been sent to E.I.C.

(c) Deal as frankly and openly as possible with your own colleagues. If at consular post, consul at neighboring post may be interested in your report. Send him a copy. It adds to good feeling and effectiveness of service to have full cooperation, particularly along line of political reporting.

“(d) The Monthly Bulletin - contains monthly information on pending negotiations of this Government and of status of our international relations which cannot yet be given out to public. Sent to diplomatic missions where it is possible to send them safely.

In addition to Monthly Political Report publication covering particular subjects of negotiations and Diplomatic Correspondence are issued and circulated from time to time.

(e) To the press. Important for Department to have idea of what reporting officer considers as confidential both as regards other Departments and the Press - Fact should be clearly stated by officer sending in report.”

c. From time to time the Department gives out to the Press important information received from its officials abroad, particularly telegraphic reports. This is done through the Office of Current Information in the Department of State. In the event that an officer in the field

20. In the typescript, this paragraph reads: “More attention given in Department to reports which arouse interest of officer handling them in first two or three paragraphs.”

21. This section had been completely rewritten. The typescript version can be seen in the text box above.

reports on a matter which would be of interest to the Press but does not desire any part of this particular report to be given to the Press because of the source through which it is received or for any other reason, he should mark his telegram or report "confidential" or "Strictly Confidential" as the case may be so that the Department may be on its guard and not give out information which would embarrass the officer making the report.

XI. Relation of Foreign Service Officers to their Chiefs in connection with Political Reporting.

Do not be discouraged if in the first few years of your work you do not get your name attached to all the work you do. This is particularly true in the diplomatic service. All political reports from diplomatic missions are signed by the Chief of Mission, who must assume responsibility for diagnosis of the political situation of the country where he is stationed. You may disagree with him at times but remember that he is responsible. In the long run an individual officer's work in political reporting becomes well known to the Department.

XII. Relations between Diplomatic and Consular Officers in Political Reporting.

Diplomatic officers stationed in capita—consular officers very often stationed in outlying districts—they may view situation from different angles. Diplomatic officers try to give picture as whole in any given country. When consular officers make political reports copies should be sent to diplomatic mission.²²

If it is just as expeditious to send consular political reports through Diplomatic Mission, it should be done in that way. That would give the Embassy or Legation, as centralizing office, opportunity to express judgment on political reports and give the Department a coordinated view of the situation. The Department desires to know if there is just ground for differences of opinion. But it is proper in some instances to send consular political reports direct to Washington and this would be justifiable in important cases if any serious delay would result from sending them through the Diplomatic Mission.

The time has gone by when diplomatic officer did all the political reporting and consular officer all the commercial reporting, now a fair division of work depending upon the special facilities and opportunities of each officer, but at the same time the Diplomatic Mission is responsible for the political side of the work except in countries, dependent colonies, etc. where there is no Diplomatic Mission.²³

XIII. Periodic Reports—General Reports.

In the case of certain diplomatic missions, particularly the larger ones in Europe, the Department has sent instructions that there should be periodic reports sent in—perhaps once each week—perhaps fortnightly—perhaps monthly. Officer must be largely responsible for deciding when political reports necessary.

But all important subjects should be treated in separate reports.

If more than one subject treated in one report it is difficult to file or to have easily available later for reference. For practical reasons where there is one distinct political movement, event, etc., make that the subject of a separate report. It may be supplemented by general political reports covering a definite period of time.

XIV. Writing for Publication by Foreign Service Officers.

Department on February 26, 1925, sent an instruction to diplomatic and consular officers in which it was pointed out that the Department would be glad to have officers in the field write for publication, under certain safeguards and avoiding anything that might be embarrassing to country in which stationed. Articles must first be sent to the Department to be passed upon as to whether it contains anything that should not be published. The Department may also make helpful suggestions as to what magazine would be interested.

XV. General suggestions.

Whenever possible, put human interest into your reports—Deal with personalities and their policies.

22. At this point, the following paragraph appears in the typescript: "No adequate instructions as to political reporting by consular officers. Circular of July, 1917, sent out largely to stimulate consular reporting on political questions."

23. The August 12 lecture ended at this point. In the typescript, this paragraph reads: "Time gone by when diplomatic officer did all the political reporting and consular officer all commercial reporting, now a fair division of work depending upon the special facilities and opportunities of each officer."

Indicate at beginning of the report, if possible, what it is about and try to arouse interest of Department from very first paragraph.

If you wish instructions on a given point and are writing to get instructions, make it clear what you want.

Do not submit hypothetical questions to the Department unnecessarily. The Department does not generally answer such questions. In case you know of a serious contingency that may arise which you would be embarrassed in not knowing how to meet, the Department may give a reply to your request for instructions but must be convinced of importance of situation.²⁴

Be fair with your sources of information. Do not betray identity by name in cases where that would be embarrassing but wherever possible names and sources should be given, but with a word of caution to the Department to guard the source.

Diplomatic or consular officer may jeopardize usefulness for other duties by attempting to engage in secret political intelligence. Secret reports not necessarily of great value to the Department, which is rarely able to judge whether the report is accurate. Secret documents are being fabricated all the time in certain parts of the world.

Be careful to distinguish fact from fancy. Be very candid in advising the Department if you think the report is based on information that may be inaccurate.²⁵

Accuracy in reporting probably most essential point, as a chain of reasoning is no stronger than its weakest link.

If an inaccurate report is sent in and it is found out, it is not soon forgotten- may lead to serious embarrassment.

Telegrams from Foreign Service Officers are not supposed to take place of newspapers or daily press. If you know certain information of general political interest is being well reported through newspapers or Associated Press for example, you would probably be justified in merely calling Department's attention to Press reports. But where a real American interest is involved the Department looks to its officers for a report even though the Press has already carried the story.²⁶

It is of vital importance to keep one's balance. Do not become unduly prejudiced for or against country to which you are accredited—often difficult—we are all influenced by flattery, attention and propaganda, but try to prevent factors of that sort from biasing your views.

Political reporting really can only be understood by actual practice. It forms one of the most interesting and important phases of an officer's work. Prepare for it by learning how to write English, and to analyze clearly and discriminatingly.



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24. In the typescript, this paragraph reads: "Do not create hypothetical questions - Department does not answer such questions. In case you know of a contingency that may probably arise within a month or so that you would be embarrassed in not knowing how to meet properly, Department may give reply to request for instructions but must be convinced of importance of situation."

25. In the typescript, this paragraph reads: "Be careful to distinguish fact from fancy. Be very candid if you think report based on information that may be fabricated."

26. The last sentence of this paragraph is not included in the typescript.

Review Essay: Covert Action to Promote Democracy in China during the Cold War

Nicholas Dujmović

Roger Jeans *The CIA and Third Force Movements in China during the Early Cold War* (Lexington, 2018), 342, glossary, bibliography, index.

China's prominence in current events—and the ongoing intelligence challenge China presents—requires us to understand the historical context. A chapter of Cold War history that deserves to be better known concerns CIA's "Third Force" operations against the People's Republic of China. From 1949 into 1954, CIA covertly supported anticommunist, ostensibly democratic movements that were not associated with the Chinese Nationalist Party (*Guomindang*), comprising therefore a Third Force.

The idea behind the Third Force project, which CIA called HTMERLIN, was that the Nationalist Chinese government had discredited itself in the eyes of the Chinese population (and of the Truman administration) for its corruption and dysfunction when it ruled the mainland before its ouster by Mao Zedong's People's Liberation Army.¹ Confusing the history is that, at the very same time the Third Force project was ongoing, CIA was also working with the Nationalist government, which had fled to the island of Taiwan, to destabilize Communist rule on the mainland. CIA's operations with the Nationalists came under the codeword BGMARQUE, and it's important not to conflate these two major projects, which were quite separate (though they competed within CIA for personnel, assets, facilities, and money).²

While the CIA program with the Nationalists has been rather well known by intelligence historians and scholars of Chinese foreign relations,³ information on the Third Force was hard to come by until recently. Early and brief treatments of just a few pages can be found in William Leary's history of Civil Air Transport, former CIA officer James Lilley's cleared memoir, and my own treatment in this journal of a CIA Third Force operation gone awry, the Fecteau-Downey story.⁴ While I was still a CIA staff historian, I collected a couple of shelves of Third Force-related documents, internal studies, and oral histories, thinking I would write a study of it, which would

necessarily be classified but perhaps would be released in time. The project was a low priority, however, and never came to fruition. I remember thinking that the main lesson from this history would be how *not* to run a large, complex covert action program.

Asia scholar Roger Jeans of Washington and Lee University, however, has addressed this gap with his recently published book, *The CIA and Third Force Movements in China during the Early Cold War*. Jeans has produced a unique history of this little-known but important chapter in US-China relations and specifically in CIA history. That he has done so without access to most of the classified record is a tribute to his expertise as a China scholar and his skills as a historian.

Neither Communist nor Nationalist

The first two chapters detail CIA's efforts to organize a Third Force anticommunist resistance on the mainland, even before the final Chinese Communist victory in October 1949, as well as the new salience of these efforts with the entry of Chinese forces into the Korean conflict in the fall of 1950. The search for a Third Force initially was spurred by US military assessments of the fecklessness of the Nationalists and by Truman administration directives blocking aid to the Nationalists and offering support to "indigenous Chinese elements" through "clandestine channels." Jeans's findings, in other words, corroborate internal CIA documentation I saw that indicated the Third Force was not CIA's idea or initiative. Under pressure from the White House, State Department, and the Pentagon, CIA's new covert warfare organization, the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), sent officers to China with the goal of supporting any anticommunist resistance they could find.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

Although Jeans does not say so explicitly, his narrative makes clear that CIA's operations in China, unlike many CIA operations in its history, included people who knew the country, having served there during World War II. One of the colorful CIA men that Jeans identifies as key to the Third Force was Alfred Cox, an OSS veteran with China combat experience. Cox played a leading role both in the covert support for the "Fighting League" pro-Third Force propaganda efforts based in Hong Kong as well as with Cai Wenzhi's "Free China" paramilitary operations against the mainland. (4) According to Jeans, assisting Cox were two true "China hands," both experts and linguists who had served as combat intelligence officers in China with General Clair Chennault's Fourteenth Air Force. After the war, one became a journalist and was recruited into OPC because of his contacts among Muslim generals in northwest China and with Mongolian leaders. The other went into US academia as a China specialist and then joined the Central Intelligence Group in 1947; he would remain with CIA and serve in the region during this period.

But it's also clear that CIA's experts were too few for the task at hand. Alfred Cox had overall responsibility for OPC's increasingly ambitious covert operations in East Asia, while at the same time he was put in charge of the newly acquired CIA proprietary airline Civil Air Transport (CAT was soon flying more than 500 hours per month in support of CIA operations). On top of these duties, Cox was the OPC local chief in Hong Kong, busily recruiting ethnic Chinese for the Third Force. (30, 48 fn 11)

When Chinese troops entered the Korean conflict in November 1950, the Truman administration increased pressure on CIA to stir up guerrilla activity in China in order to "distract and slow down the Chinese advance." (39) Jeans rightly questions this logic, making the apt observation that Mao Zedong could send hundreds of thousands of troops into Korea and still have vast numbers to deal with anticommunist resistance on the mainland. He might have quoted Richard Helms on this score, that in the early Cold War US policymakers either expected CIA to "do something" or demanded CIA "try anything" to fight communism.⁵

Jeans describes how the outbreak of the Korean War and the China's entry into it caused official Washington to mitigate its "disgust" with the Nationalist regime of

Chiang Kai-Shek on Taiwan. Chiang, who at least had an island, a military, and a government, was perhaps not so bad at all, while it was proving difficult for CIA to create a unified Third Force that could actually do something. (chapter 3 passim) This beginning of a shift of perspective among some CIA officers, State Department diplomats, and the Joint Chiefs helps explain the apparently contradictory policies of supporting a Third Force while at the same time engaging in joint operations with the Nationalist government that, understandably, hated the Third Force and protested US support of it.

Political vs. Paramilitary Wings

As Jeans explains, the CIA Third Force program had two major elements, one mainly political and the other paramilitary. His chapter three (of eight) is about the "political wing" of the Third Force, the CIA-supported Fighting League for Chinese Freedom and Democracy (*Zhongguo ziyou minzhu zhandou tongmeng*), which, despite its name, did no actual fighting. Based in Hong Kong, the Fighting League engaged in propaganda, political and cultural education and publishing, recruiting among students and refugees, and lots and lots of talking. Early on, the League rebuffed CIA attempts to engage it in resistance operations on the mainland but claimed to have a network of intelligence agents engaged in collection. However, its leader Zhang Fukui said that almost all the intelligence was falsified by young agents reluctant to infiltrate the mainland but eager for "American gold." (120–21)

Comprising mostly intellectuals and out-of-work politicians, the Fighting League's membership did not exceed several hundred, and CIA's expenditures on it mostly went to subsidizing its various journals (with print runs of 2,000 copies, most of which never left Hong Kong), and its leaders' individual monthly stipends. Jeans estimates CIA spent less than \$350,000 on the Fighting League over three years, a pittance "considering the group was supposed to help overthrow Communism in China." (83–85). It operated under constant threat of being shut down by the British authorities and from penetration from the Communist and Nationalist regimes alike.

The other, and more consequential, Third Force element was the Free China Movement (*Ziyou Zhongguo yundong*), led by Cai Wenzhi, the former deputy chief

of staff of the Nationalist Army, assisted by other former Nationalist military officers. Chapter four deals with this paramilitary program, which employed CIA-trained Chinese ethnic agents to engage in resistance operations and to collect intelligence on the mainland. Bases for training and launching operations were set up in Japan, Okinawa, and Saipan. (111) Two of the six CIA field units in Japan were part of the Third Force complex, and CAT pilots and aircraft based at another airfield also supported Third Force operations. (114)

Despite training hundreds of Chinese at the various OPC training sites for insertion operations into China, the Third Force paramilitary project managed, according to Jeans, to launch only a half-dozen or so missions, and every one of them failed. (chapter 5 *passim*) It seems likely more operations took place than the few Jeans unearthed, but in any case his assessment reflects the reality that the Third Force enterprise, as a paramilitary or political project, was a grand failure.

The greatest single failure is the subject of an entire chapter (six), entitled “CIA Debacle: The Downey-Fecteau Third Force Mission to Manchuria.” Here Jeans relates the story of the November 1952 shootdown of a C-47 transport aircraft and the capture of young CIA paramilitary officers Dick Fecteau and Jack Downey, whose saga of imprisonment and release two decades later has been documented in these pages.⁶ Jeans provides some interesting context from the Chinese perspective but otherwise provides a straightforward summary of what is already known without making any major errors. The most egregious of the minor errors, however, is Jeans’ assertion that the men’s lengthy imprisonment was the result of CIA’s “stubborn refusal” to admit their affiliation. In fact, CIA was in favor of disclosure but could not do so unilaterally in the face of opposition from the White House, State, and the Pentagon. Jeans suggests this sorry episode may have been a factor in the demise of the Third Force project as a whole, (145) and I see no reason to dispute this assessment.

Jeans notes, however, that the most important factor in the withdrawal of US support for the Third Force was the end of the Korean War; the 1953 armistice obviated the urgency of creating a diversion to weaken Chinese commitment to that conflict. Other factors included the change of administration in 1953; the Republicans were more favorably disposed toward the Nationalists than

the Democrats had been. Indeed, Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, lately the CIA director who had been skeptical of the Third Force project during the Truman administration, observed that there was “no alternative” to supporting Chiang Kai-Shek. (192) According to Jeans, CIA support for the Fighting League ended in 1953, and this political wing of the Third Force disbanded in Hong Kong the following year. Likewise with the Free China Movement: CIA curtailed its support to Cai Wenzhi’s men in early 1954, and the agency began arranging for their resettlement. A few went back to Hong Kong, but surprisingly, most went to Taiwan, helped in part, writes Jeans, by bribery. (194)

After Communist China began shelling Nationalist-held islands in the fall of 1954, Taiwan and the United States grew closer and signed a mutual defense agreement that December; with this act, Jeans writes, “the Third Force idea was effectively dead.” (204)

Strengths and Weakness of CIA and Third Force Movements

Overall, Jeans weaves together a complex narrative that makes use of an impressive range of sources, including memoirs and interviews with Third Force participants (from CIA officers and Chinese agents alike), Communist Chinese documents, declassified US diplomatic correspondence and intelligence assessments, and important secondary sources. Even with its flaws of storytelling—sometimes excruciating detail about secondary personalities, repetition, and lots of chronology hopping—his book is an impressive accomplishment and, as a pioneering work on little-known CIA operations, a valuable contribution to intelligence history.

That said, intelligence officers should be warned that there is much herein to set one’s teeth on edge. Most annoyingly, Jeans throughout insists on using “agent” when he means CIA officer, and he even cites something I wrote to support his usage. Yes, “staff agent” and “contract agent” were CIA job titles in the early 1950s (the equivalent, respectively, of “staff officer” and “non-official cover officer”), but it will not do simply to drop the adjectives and call CIA officers “agents,” and it’s indefensible when referring to someone like career CIA officer James Lilley. (xxvi, 31, 238 and *passim*) At one point, we read of “agents” paying off “agents”—what is

meant is that OPC officers paid Chinese assets (or agents). One consequence of this confusion is that, when Jeans writes that more than 1,000 “OPC agents” were operating *in Korea* by the end of 1950, (32), we don’t know what he means. The confusion is compounded 80 pages later, where he writes that there were more than 1,000 “OPC agents” at the end of 1950, but this time *in Japan*. (114)

Jeans is confused on other intelligence terms. “Plausible deniability” was a concept to protect the president from political responsibility for ordering covert action; the phrase should not be used to describe operational cover stories. (60 and elsewhere)

There are other indications that Jeans is not an expert on US intelligence and its history. It’s not true, as he asserts, that CIA was created “almost solely” to collect intelligence (1)—deliberately vague language in the National Security Act of 1947 provided for secret operations, including covert action, that had already been going on. His frequent use of “OPC/CIA” is confusing, as it obscures the fact that the Office of Policy Coordination, created in 1948 to undertake all forms of covert action, was part of CIA even if it took guidance from the State Department and the Joint Chiefs. A more accurate and less confusing usage would have been “CIA/OPC.”

It’s a mystery that Jeans never seemed to discover the HTMERLIN codeword for the Third Force project (or, for that matter, BGMARQUE for the joint operations with the Chinese Nationalists), something a careful researcher should have found in declassified documents or, indeed, in a major secondary source that Jeans cites often.⁷

Finally, Jeans displays an obvious animus for CIA. He seems to take personally CIA’s reluctance to declassify relevant documents, which leads him into repeated asides about CIA’s lack of historical transparency (xxvii–xxx, 72, 231–232, 236, and elsewhere) and distracting non sequiturs about failing to catch spies like Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen. (xxx) I don’t believe it is true, as he asserts, (xxix) that CIA withholds information on past activities simply because they are embarrassing failures. There are lots of reasons, some defensible, others not, why historical information that could and should be released isn’t, but it’s a bit much to say that there’s a “CIA cover-up” (xxvii) about its history, given how much material the CIA and its History Staff make available—much of it unfavorable.

History’s Lessons

Intelligence officers should look past all that and focus on the major strength of Jeans’s book: his analysis of the reasons for the failure of the Third Force, for they are legion. The most pertinent lessons for covert action practitioners today are these:

CIA learned the wrong lessons from history. The agency believed a Third Force could be successful in establishing itself on the mainland just as OSS operations in wartime China, Burma, and France were successful. Those operations, however, enjoyed support from populations under occupation from an invader. By contrast, the Chinese people after Mao’s victory did not see the Communists as invaders, but as a homegrown movement that had opposed the invaders. CIA should not have counted on even benign support from the population of the mainland.

CIA officers gave too much credence to émigré stories that turned out to be implausible or fantastic. One of the ex-Nationalist generals of the Third Force claimed to be in touch with half a million guerilla fighters in South China alone, where they had stashed a million weapons into hidden caches. The Chinese Nationalists themselves estimated there were as many as 2 million anticommunist guerillas on the mainland. (35–37, 58). Working with admittedly little information other than these claims, CIA and the fledgling “intelligence community” of the early 1950s estimated the number of anticommunist fighters on the mainland was between 600,000 and 700,000. (44, 46). The leaders of the Free China Movement said their “brigades” of guerrillas on the mainland would rise up when the Third Force made landings on the mainland. (117–19). All these claims were pure fantasy. Even when CIA knew that Third Force leaders were making spurious claims, (69) the agency, under continued pressure from State and the Pentagon, went forward with training and operations.

Disunity among the foreigners CIA was working with was crippling. The political and military wings of the Third Force remained separate organizations because the Chinese anticommunists could not unite in their aims or agree on the leadership of the Third Force. Neither CIA nor State could fix this. Because of deep-seated personality clashes among the Chinese, the Americans could not get the leaders of the Fighting League and the Free China

Movement, which itself changed its name four times, to unite their forces. (115–16) The League was beset with internal backbiting and rivalry; (90) even before its creation, “two of its major participants had become rivals for leadership,” leading to the expulsion of a leading Third Force figure. (63)

CIA suffered greatly from a lack of qualified people.

Some leading CIA officers in the Third Force project knew China well, so I disagree with Jeans’s blanket condemnation of CIA’s “almost complete ignorance of the language and culture,” (257) but clearly there were far too few China experts for the task. For example, when OPC wanted to recruit Manchurian refugees in Hong Kong for operations in northeast China, it got southern Chinese who were attracted by the prospect of working with the Americans, and OPC apparently could not tell the difference. (118) I know from my own research that CIA personnel working with the Third Force were overworked and often overwhelmed by their duties. CIA officer Alfred Cox’s doubling and tripling up of his duties with OPC and CAT led him to the point of a nervous breakdown. (225)

The expertise deficit extended to paramilitary matters. As I have detailed in the *Journal of Military*

History (an article Jeans cites), OPC used recent college graduates with no military experience to train Chinese agents (many of them former Nationalist officers!) in paramilitary duties, while US military detailees to CIA often were assigned to work espionage (in the Office of Special Operations) rather than paramilitary operations in OPC.⁸

In an epilogue, Jeans details how the United States made many of the same mistakes in pursuing a democratic Third Force in Vietnam in the early 1950s. The idea of Third Forces in Asian countries was, as Jeans quotes Graham Greene, the “Great American Dream” that was destined, tragically, to fail.⁹

With his groundbreaking study, Roger Jeans amply demonstrates the anticipated conclusion of my never-written classified history of CIA’s Third Force project: this is, indeed, how *not* to run covert action. It is hard to disagree with his final assessment that “there are limits to the ability of an outside force to influence a country.” (263) It is entirely apt that the last two words of his narrative are “wishful thinking.”



The reviewer: Nicholas Dujmović is the founding director of the Intelligence Studies Program at The Catholic University of America. He retired from CIA after 26 years of service as analyst, manager, editor of the *President’s Daily Brief*, and CIA historian.

Endnotes

1. For the codeword HTMERLIN, see Joe Leeker, “CAT and Air America in Japan,” <https://www.utdallas.edu/library/specialcollections/hac/cataam/Leeker/history/Japan.pdf>
2. BGMARQUE operations are described, and HTMERLIN is mentioned, in the declassified “Director’s Log” for DCI Walter B. Smith, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1951-09-01.pdf>, and also appears in the declassified history by Gregory Pedlow and Donald Welzenbach, *The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance* (CIA History Staff, 1992), 222; see <https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2014-004-doc01.pdf>.
3. A compelling memoir of BGMARQUE operations is found in Frank Holober, *Raiders of the China Coast* (Naval Institute Press, 1999).
4. William Leary, *Perilous Missions: Civil Air Transport and CIA Covert Operations in Asia* (University of Alabama Press, 1984); James Lilly, *China Hands* (Public Affairs, 2004); and Nicholas Dujmović, “Extraordinary Fidelity: Two CIA Prisoners in China, 1952–1973,” *Studies in Intelligence* 50, No. 4 (December 2006): 21–36.
5. Richard Helms, *A Look Over My Shoulder* (Random House, 2003), 124.
6. Dujmović, “Extraordinary Fidelity.”
7. Leeker, “CAT and Air America in Japan.”
8. Nicholas Dujmović, “Drastic Actions Short of War: The Origins and Application of CIA’s Covert Paramilitary Function in the Early Cold War,” *The Journal of Military History* 76 no. 3 (July 2012): 775–808.
9. See Thomas L. Ahern, Jr., *The Way We Do Things: Black Entry Operations into North Vietnam, 1961–64* (CIA, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005). It is available in CIA’s FOIA Electronic Reading Room and at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB-284/5-THE_WAY_WE_DO_THINGS.pdf. The 71-page lightly redacted declassified monograph details numerous failed entry operations—and provides testimony that CIA historians are willing to tell bad news stories.

Review Essay: Two New Contributions to “Putin Studies”

J. E. Leonardson

Putin’s People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and Then Took on the West

Catherine Belton (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2020), 624, notes, illustrations, index.

Rigged: America, Russia, and One Hundred Years of Covert Electoral Interference

David Shimer (Alfred A. Knopf, 2020 [Kindle Edition]), 367, endnotes, bibliography, index.

Writing about Vladimir Putin, the former KGB officer and apparent President for Life of Russia, is a growth industry. Visit any bookstore, physical or virtual, and you will see no shortage of biographies, analyses of how his regime operates, and warnings of the threat Russia poses to the West. Many of these have been written by prominent academics and journalists, so anyone who wants to study Putin faces a daunting task just deciding where to start.

This genre, let’s call it “Putin Studies,” has evolved since the first serious works appeared toward the end of the 2000s. The narrative of Putin’s rise from a childhood in poverty in Leningrad to absolute power in Moscow, by way of KGB service in Dresden and then as deputy mayor of St. Petersburg in tumultuous days after the collapse of the USSR, was covered in the first generation of Putin literature. In the past decade, academics and journalists have focused internally, on the development of the criminal/autocratic political culture he built.^a Now, however, as Russia behaves more aggressively in the world, new Putin studies are focusing on the roots of his external behavior and, especially, the importance of Putin’s intelligence background in understanding his actions.^b

Catherine Belton, a legal and business reporter for the *Financial Times* with many years of Moscow experience, focuses on how Putin and his gang have looted Russia and then used their gains to corrupt the West and undermine its political institutions. She begins her story in the mid-1980s when the KGB, realizing the deep troubles of the Soviet economy, systematically transferred state

and Communist Party funds overseas, where they could be preserved to finance operations if the USSR itself collapsed. This created networks of intelligence officers, co-opted foreign bankers, and Russian criminals that still endure, and further meant that the intelligence officers would have the resources to remain politically and financially powerful in post-Communist Russia. These officers also were determined, Belton points out, to avenge what they viewed as Moscow’s humiliation by the West and to restore Russia as a global power.

With this as background, Belton recounts Putin’s rise from the time of his return to Leningrad in 1990 until he consolidated power in the mid-2000s. She portrays him as a gray man, a background figure who did vital jobs in St. Petersburg (as Leningrad was renamed) and then in the Kremlin after he moved to Moscow in 1996. Despite Putin’s mix of case-officer skills, administrative capability, and ruthlessness, Belton believes that everyone underestimated him. Thus, when President Boris Yeltsin and his cronies sought a successor who would protect their financial interests and Russia’s nascent democratic institutions, they turned to Putin. Unfortunately, she writes, they “didn’t realize that he might have been lying when he appeared to support them,” and that he was loyal only to himself and his KGB colleagues. (151)

Belton portrays Putin as an uncertain leader at first, sometimes overwhelmed by such events as the *Kursk* sinking, but one who soon found his footing. During the early 2000s, he and his associates from the security services, the *siloviki*, gradually brought to heel potential

a. On Putin’s rise, see for example, Masha Gessen *Man Without a Face* (Riverhead Books, 2012), and Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy, *Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin* (Brookings Institution Press, 2013). For the development of his criminal state, see Karen Dawisha, *Putin’s Kleptocracy* (Simon & Schuster, 2014). On current political culture, see Shaun Walker, *The Long Hangover* (Oxford University Press, 2018).

b. For example, Thomas Rid, *Active Measures* (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2020).

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opposition in the media, business, and regional governments. Most important for the long run, however, were Putin's moves to reduce the power of the oligarchs—the seizure of Yukos and the jailing of Mikhail Khordokovskiy in 2003 set the pattern of using asset confiscation and show trials to eliminate potential political rivals. These successes, combined with an economy buoyed by high oil prices, led Putin to believe that he truly was a world-historical figure who had saved Russia “from certain collapse . . . from the thrall of the oligarchs and the destructive power” of the capitalist West. (248)

Saving Russia proved to be immensely profitable. With no effective check on their power, Putin and the *siloviki* moved from state seizures of large corporations to using the Russian legal system to grab companies of all types and sizes. Belton describes how they looted assets and then used the KGB networks established in the 1980s to launder the money in Western Europe. Their efforts, moreover, were aided by a new generation of Western bankers and lawyers who didn't ask inconvenient questions, as well as by ethnic Russians abroad who were pleased to assist in the restoration of Russian power. Within Russia, the system became self-reinforcing as the state sold expropriated assets to favored oligarchs for a pittance and then forced the oligarchs to pay enormous kickbacks for government contracts or to prove their continuing loyalty by undertaking various show projects without objection and at their own expense.

This system worked well, at least from Putin's perspective, until around 2008. The business confiscations caused a decline in investment, but Putin, with only a primitive understanding of economics, believed the resulting slowdown was caused by the same US-led machinations that had brought down the USSR. Then, in 2011, Muscovites took to the streets to protest the political sham that Putin had staged to regain the presidency (term limits had forced him to step down and serve as prime minister from 2008 to 2012); he viewed the demonstrations as engineered by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Ukraine, especially, became a sore spot. Putin believed the 2005 Orange Revolution was another American strike at Russia, and that the 2014 Maidan Revolution was just one more step in Washington's effort to wrest Kiev from Moscow's orbit and degrade Russia's resurgent power.

How to fight back? The best known case is Putin's post-Maidan strike at Ukraine, but more threatening to

the rest of the world, Belton argues, is the Kremlin's deployment of its stolen funds in the West. The United Kingdom plays an especially important role in this, and Belton provides a fascinating description of how Russian companies, often made up of stolen subsidiaries, corrupted British finance. UK financial regulations were so loose and politicians so accommodating that few questions were asked of the companies and their financing when they went public in London, especially as “British lords were paid lavish salaries to sit on the boards” of the companies even though they had no real oversight roles. (364) London gradually became a “laundromat” for tens of billions of stolen Russian dollars, and understaffed and underfunded Western financial law enforcement agencies could not cope with the influx. The Kremlin also has funneled money directly to such Western politicians as Silvio Berlusconi, Gerhard Schröder, the LePen family, and a long list of others from both the left and right, to stoke political turmoil in Europe. Revenge for the fall of the Soviet Union, indeed.

Even if it is overly long and at times becomes so detailed that parts are difficult to follow, *Putin's People* is valuable for understanding the thinking behind Russian foreign policies and the structure that supports its actions. With 500 pages of text backed by 90 pages of notes, *Putin's People* is the product of an extraordinary amount of research—Belton seems to have interviewed just about everyone worth talking to, including shady figures who warned her about asking the wrong questions—which updates what previous authors have reported and makes her points all the more compelling. The problem comes when she moves on to more speculative points. Did Putin, when he was posted to Dresden, help provide KGB support to Baader-Meinhof and other anti-Western terrorist gangs? Belton suggests that he did, if only as a minor functionary, but then admits the point is speculative, leaving the reader to wonder why she brought it up.

The same problem appears when Belton discusses whether Russian intelligence targeted then-businessman Donald Trump in the 1990s and early 2000s. In her final chapter, she describes how various sketchy Russian businessmen and criminals in New York and New Jersey seemed to flock to Mr. Trump and wonders if they might have been part of a Russian effort to compromise him. Belton acknowledges, however, that no firm evidence exists to support this speculation—her account is sprinkled with phrases such as “it's impossible to know”

and “we may never know”—and, in any case, that the schemes these Russian proposed never got off the ground. Moreover, Belton acknowledges that President Trump’s views on Russia—whether one agrees with them or not—are the products of his own convictions, not some Putin-controlled blackmail operation. The chapter is intriguing, but not convincing.

Belton concludes on a pessimistic note. Putin has created a true gangster state, one in which everyone is tainted and no one is secure. Putin loyalists can fall from favor in an instant and for the most bizarre reasons, and then find themselves arrested for theft, bribery, and tax evasion—charges that are as true as they are convenient. The insecurity extends to Putin himself. He has taken all power into his own hands and eliminated any potential rivals or successors, leaving him with no one in his inner circle he can trust and no way to change or reform his regime. The implication is chilling: as long as Putin is in charge, Russia is on a dead-end path and Putin, no doubt blaming his increasing problems on the West, will continue to lash out.



While *Putin's People* explains why Moscow behaves as it does, David Shimer’s *Rigged* provides an unsparing description of the consequences for the United States. Shimer, a journalist with a PhD from Oxford, has written several books in one—a nuanced political history of superpower interference in third countries’ elections, an intelligence history of covert action and its limitations, and an account of the consequences of a colossal US intelligence failure. Half the length of *Putin's People* and written in a more clear, concise style, Shimer relies not only on declassified archives and previously published material but also interviews with an impressive number of former CIA and KGB officers, retired directors and deputy directors of the CIA, former directors of national intelligence, Bill and Hillary Clinton, officials from the Obama and Trump administrations’ National Security Councils and State Departments, and executives from internet companies. The scope of his research provides a history that likely is as thorough as we will have for years to come.

Shimer starts with a brief history of electoral interference, beginning with Soviet efforts in the years between the world wars to meddle in Western elections. These

efforts generally failed, but he points out that the Soviets developed the basic tools of blackmail, fraud, bribery, disinformation, and intimidation that Moscow continues to use today. After World War II, driven by the fear of Soviet expansionism, the United States began its own covert election manipulation efforts, of which the Italian election of 1948 and repeated efforts in Chile to prevent the election of Salvador Allende are the best-known examples. Lest anyone be confused, however, Shimer is careful to point out the differences between US and Soviet efforts. Washington used the tools of American electoral politics—advertising and persuasion, backed by large amounts of cash—in efforts to strengthen democratic institutions, while the Soviets sought to weaken those institutions and sow discord within democratic societies.

The Soviets, too, tried to manipulate US elections, and their efforts were admirably bipartisan. Fearing the policies of a potential Richard Nixon presidency, they offered support in 1960 to Adlai Stevenson and in 1968 to Hubert Humphrey; in 1976, they attempted to smear Sen. Henry Jackson, a strongly anti-Soviet Democrat. Their efforts went nowhere, however. Stevenson and Humphrey firmly rejected the Soviet offers, and the attempt to disseminate a fake dossier on Jackson fizzled because, as Shimer writes, in the pre-internet era when the US media was dominated by a few major newspapers and the three television networks, “Moscow could not upload disinformation directly into America’s information ecosystem.”

The two sides’ efforts evolved, too. Shimer documents how the success in Italy made electoral interference appear easy and effective and shows how it became a go-to covert action for US policymakers during the next three decades. After Chile and the revelations of the investigations of the mid-1970s, however, Washington scaled back its electoral programs (though in some cases, such as in El Salvador in the 1980s, interference remained an important tool). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Washington no longer had an ideological competitor and, instead, saw an opportunity to expand democracy around the world. US efforts shifted from covert interference to a large-scale overt program of democracy promotion in East European and other nascent democratic states. Russia, meanwhile, also dropped its interference campaigns during the 1990s, and even became a recipient of US assistance for running open and fair elections.

Putin's ascension in 2000, soon followed by the rise of social media, changed everything. His goal, Shimer writes, was to "corrupt democracies from within, in part by corrupting their elections" and, conveniently for Putin, "the digital age has made covert electoral interference an increasingly appealing policy option," one that Moscow now uses to attack the democracies cheaply and without the risks of overt action. Many attacks relied on the use of disinformation techniques pioneered decades ago but now made far more potent by the internet—unlike in Soviet times, when a messaging campaign took months and could be blocked in the West by the major media companies, Moscow now disseminates its messages in real time directly through Facebook, Twitter, and a host of other platforms.^a The regime began experimenting with digital methods in its cyberattack on Estonia in 2007, and then refined its tools in Georgia and Ukraine. As the 2016 US elections approached, Shimer notes, Russian intelligence was well-practiced in a range of new methods for electoral interference.

The election was vitally important for Putin. Like almost all other observers, he expected Hillary Clinton to win the Democratic nomination and, once it became clear that Donald Trump would be her opponent, the general election. Putin, however, had a visceral hatred for the former secretary of state, whom he held responsible for the 2011 Moscow demonstrations and other perceived efforts to engineer his removal from office and undermine Russian power. The Russian effort, therefore, was meant to denigrate Clinton; whip up social divisions within the United States; and ensure that, after her presumably inevitable victory, she was politically weakened even before her inauguration. "They were already anticipating" a Clinton victory, former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper told Shimer, "and were bent then on what they could do to undermine the legitimacy of her presidency."

Shimer is searing in his criticism of the US government's performance in 2016. The Intelligence Community saw what was happening but did not realize the scope of the effort or imagine its potential impact. David Cohen, the CIA's deputy director in 2016, told Shimer that the community failed to understand that "what we were seeing was . . . the tip of the iceberg," and one of Cohen's predecessors, Michael Morell, simply labeled this an

"intelligence failure." President Obama, Shimer points out, watched the Russian messaging campaigns unfold but did little, in part because of Republican non-cooperation and in part because he did not want to appear to be trying to tip the election itself. Obama's characteristic tendency toward indecision, moreover, made matters worse. Fearing that publicizing Russian influence efforts would lead Moscow to escalate to hacking the vote itself, Obama decided that as long as the Russians "did not manipulate electoral systems, retaliation could wait until after the election," when it could be coordinated with, presumably, president-elect Clinton. This, says Rid, meant settling for a "policy of managed interference" and thus allowing the Russians to meddle in the election on their own terms.

Players outside of government did no better. Shimer quotes a *Washington Post* White House reporter as admitting that, in obsessively covering the trivial contents of emails that Russian hackers disseminated through Wikileaks rather than the hacking itself, the paper was "used as a tool of a foreign interference operation." Facebook's chief security officer also admitted culpability for missing the scope of Russian use of the platform. "Nobody had a full grasp of it," he told Shimer.

What, then, is to be done? Shimer expects that Russian electoral interference, both in the United States and elsewhere, will continue, if only because Moscow has discovered a cheap and effective tool. He believes an effective response requires two broad sets of steps at home and abroad. Domestically, Shimer's first and most important goal is to improve all facets of election security, to prevent the Russians (or anyone else) from manipulating voter lists or vote tallies. He also urges campaigns of public education to enable people to recognize and understand foreign efforts at disinformation, social media manipulation, and electoral interference. Finally, he proposes a private-public sector partnership with the goal of reducing the misinformation and distortions on social media. This certainly is a worthy set of suggestions, though how effectively they could be implemented is open to question, given the current divisions within the United States.

More promising are Shimer's proposals for external action. Washington should complement the work at home by partnering with its allies not only to educate and warn, but to retaliate against what is a threat to all democratic

a. Rid, in *Active Measures*, provides an extensive discussion of this aspect of Moscow's updating of its disinformation campaigns.

states. "Putin has suffered almost no consequences for interfering in elections," notes Shimer, and he quotes former Clinton and Obama administration officials as advocating retaliatory technological, financial, and media operations. "We should be prepared to respond with technology-enabled attacks on their infrastructure," Morell told him, for example. Shimer cautions, however, that Washington should not engage in covert electoral meddling of its own. Any such attempts in the internet age, wherever directed, would quickly be exposed and only undermine the US case against Putin.

Putin's People and *Rigged* both are important contributions to Putin studies, though together they make

for disturbing reading. Belton's is a portrait of a major country that has been hijacked by a gang of criminals, a depressing example of what can happen when a democratization project fails. That Belton believes Russia is on the road to nowhere is not much comfort; after all, North Korea has been on the same route for far longer and still lurches along. Nor can we take comfort in telling ourselves that Russia's woes are its own, not ours; Shimer has detailed how the Kremlin exports its problems to the West. Because political interference now is Russia's leading export, and the West is an expanding market, Moscow no doubt will develop improved and more sophisticated versions to sell. Don't say you weren't warned.



The reviewer: J. E. Leonardson is the pen name of a CIA Directorate of Analysis officer.

Intelligence in Public Media

Putin's People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and Then Took on the West

Catherine Belton (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2020), 624, notes, illustrations, index.

Reviewed by Matthew J.

In 1954, the Soviet Union created the Committee for State Security (KGB) and, as the Cold War intensified, the service grew in capability and status, advancing the Kremlin's interests around the world and stifling dissent at home. The "sword and shield" of the Communist Party—as the organization became known—ceased to exist in the wake of the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, but Catherine Belton demonstrates in *Putin's People* that remnants of the KGB remain alive and well.

A former Moscow-based reporter for the *Financial Times*, Belton tells the story of how Russian intelligence officers, particularly Vladimir Putin, maneuvered from the shadows to the corridors of power. Belton begins by tracing Putin's early years in the KGB and his posting to Dresden, East Germany, in 1985. While conceding that much is still unknown about his time there, Belton argues, primarily on the basis of interviews, that Putin and the KGB did much more than just meet with the Stasi and recruit sources. In her telling, KGB officers in Dresden worked to implement active measures against the West by supporting the Red Army Faction. At the very least, Putin's time in Germany helped Russia's future leader cement connections in the intelligence world that later helped propel him to the presidency.

Shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Putin was back in Russia and went to Leningrad (which soon afterward reverted to its original name, St. Petersburg). The KGB assigned him to work undercover in the rector's office at Leningrad State University, and he quickly connected with a former professor from his student days, Anatoly Sobchak. Putin became part of the inner circle and when Sobchak, a key leader in the democracy movement sweeping the country, became mayor in June 1991 their relationship became very important. It is at this point that Belton's thesis becomes clear: rather than trying to forestall the Soviet Union's tilt towards democracy, some former KGB officers sought to co-opt the movement. Putin rose to serve as one of the mayor's deputies and as Belton writes, "Sobchak came to rely on Putin, who maintained a network of connections with the top of the city's [former] KGB." (87) Putin's time in St. Petersburg

gave him status among two of the most important elements in Russian society at the end of the Soviet Union: pro-democracy advocates and the old guard of the KGB, who now held sway in the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). Political reformers respected Putin's close relationship with Sobchak, while members of the security services understood that Putin remained "one of them." Belton notes that, "true to his KGB training, Putin had reflected everyone's views back to them like a mirror: first those of his new so-called democratic master, and then those of the old-guard establishment he worked with, too. He would change his colours so fast you could never tell who he really was." (49)

In 1996, Sobchak lost his reelection bid and Putin moved on from St. Petersburg, taking an administrative position in the Kremlin for the Boris Yeltsin government. Once in Moscow, he experienced what Belton describes as a "dizzying rise." (112) Yeltsin's aides viewed him as a skillful bureaucrat and within just two years, Yeltsin appointed Putin to head the FSB. Putin's stock rose just as Yeltsin's health, and political standing, declined. Belton's chapter on the political dynamics surrounding Putin's ascension, "Operation Successor," is quite good, as she clearly lays out how—following the dismissal of Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, a former head of the KGB—Yeltsin was looking for a strong figure with a security background to serve as his second-in-command. Putin fit the bill, becoming prime minister in August, 1999, and when Yeltsin resigned at the end of that year, he was named acting president of Russia. One of Yeltsin's aides recalls receiving a warning from Putin's own mentor, Anatoly Sobchak, about elevating the former KGB man: "This is the biggest mistake of your life. He comes from a tainted circle. A *komitechik* [committee man] cannot change. You don't understand who Putin is." (149)

Following Putin's electoral victory in the March 2000 presidential election, the halls of the Kremlin were littered with former intelligence officials who came with the new president from St. Petersburg: Nikolai Patrushev, Sergei Ivanov, and Igor Sechin, just to name a few. While

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Belton writes that “for the first few years of Putin’s presidency, these Leningrad KGB men . . . shared an uneasy power with the holdovers from the Yelstin regime,” fairly quickly Putin went after the press and oligarchs. (187) He expressed outrage after receiving negative media coverage for his handling of the *Kursk* submarine incident and sought to eliminate the editorial independence of key Russian media outlets. The Putin regime also targeted Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the richest man in Russia and head of the powerful Yukos oil company, who was seeking to integrate his business interests with Western partners, which Putin probably feared meant Western encroachment on Russia’s energy sector. The conviction of Khodorkovsky on fraud charges sent a signal that in Putin’s Russia, oligarchs could exist, but they would serve the interests of the state.

Putin also looked to reestablish Russia as a regional power, building “a bridge to its imperial past” as Belton writes. (273) Putin’s Kremlin focused intently on keeping Ukraine within its orbit and when in 2004 the Orange Revolution prevented a pro-Russian leader from taking power in Kiev, Putin was incensed, viewing the events as being orchestrated by the United States and West European powers. A decade later, following the Euromaidan demonstrations that overthrew a pro-Russian government in Ukraine, Putin had seen enough. He sent forces into Crimea, eventually annexing the peninsula and, in August 2014, Russian security services helped foment an uprising in eastern Ukraine. Belton adeptly illustrates how the Kremlin utilized private business to covertly project power into Ukraine, a hallmark of how the KGB previously waged the Cold War and how Putin’s Russia now approached foreign policy. The Kremlin relied on Konstantin Malofeyev, a Russian businessman who became a billionaire in the 2000s. Belton writes that Malofeyev “was in the middle of it all . . . [his] former security chief . . . led the ad hoc Russian forces arriving in East Ukraine from Crimea . . . [and] Malofeyev was believed to be the linchpin in funneling cash to pro-Kremlin separatists, working through a network of charities.” (425–26)

The final chapters of *Putin’s People* cover Moscow’s saturating Western capitals with Russian money, as

Kremlin-aligned oligarchs looked to Western banks and financial institutions to continue growing their portfolios. Belton titles one chapter “Londongrad” and argues that the “companies coming to London were now mainly the new behemoths of Putin’s state capitalism, which had zero interest in liberalizing the Russian economy.” (351) In Belton’s view, Western leaders and institutions were too accepting of Russian businessmen, many of whom were doing the bidding of the Kremlin, writing that “emboldened by the apparent Cold War victory, and the expansion of the European Union into the countries of the former Eastern Bloc, the West believed in Russia’s global integration and opened its markets even wider to it.” (349) In fact, the West’s failure to understand that post-Soviet Russia had been become dominated by former KGB officers committed to manipulating the economy to help fund their operations abroad in order to reassert the Kremlin’s role in the global order is a key theme of Belton’s book.

On balance, this is a useful and thought-provoking book on the trajectory of post-Soviet Russia and the continued influence of the KGB inside the Kremlin. Belton probably goes too far at times, though, particularly when describing the collapse of the Soviet Union as a byproduct of a coordinated KGB plan to take power (the subject of chapter 2). The truth is more complicated, owing to political realities, economic decline, and, at times, happenstance. However, Belton is on much safer ground with the argument that Putin and his fellow KGB alums have been adept at taking advantage of political opportunities. In explaining the ability of former KGB officers to navigate post-Soviet Russia, Belton’s quoting Thomas Graham, former senior director for Russia at the US National Security Council, is instructive: “The institutions the security men worked in did not break down . . . the personal networks did not disappear. What they needed simply was an individual who could bring these networks back together.” (153) Ultimately, trying to understand what motivates the top man in the Kremlin will always be a challenge and as Putin begins his third decade in ruling Russia, Belton’s look back at how he took power and has wielded influence can be instructive for both intelligence professionals and policymakers.



The reviewer: Matthew J. serves in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Intelligence in Public Media

The Quiet Americans – Four CIA Spies at the Dawn of the Cold War – Tragedy in Three Acts

Scott Anderson (Doubleday 2020), 562, 24 unnumbered pages of plates/illustrations.

Reviews by Leslie C. and Peter Sichel

Origin stories have become a familiar trope in mass entertainment, and movie studios have reaped enormous profits from exploring the legends of comic book superheroes. In these narratives we learn how the hero became the hero, how the villain became the villain, and in the process, the foundational mythology becomes canonical. The CIA has not escaped this interest in origins, and the agency's founding amidst America's debut as a reluctant global superpower heightens the fascination. Like the pop culture origin stories, the CIA's has its heroes and villains, but the canon is more fluid and changes with time and fashion.

In *The Quiet Americans*, Scott Anderson endeavors to revise the canon and redefine familiar roles. He is not the first to tread this ground. The book, which uses group biography as an organizing principle to examine the early days of America's premier intelligence service, is reminiscent of Evan Thomas's *The Very Best Men* (Simon & Schuster, 1995) and Burton Hersh's *The Old Boys* (*Charles Scribner's Sons*, 1992), and Anderson acknowledges he stands on their shoulders.

One distinction between Anderson and his antecedents lies in his protagonists. Hersh did not limit himself to a handful. His research encompassed a larger group he characterized as "The American Elite." Thomas chose four: Frank Wisner, Richard Bissell, Tracy Barnes, and Desmond FitzGerald, all of whom loom large in US clandestine history and who comfortably fit the "Oh So Social" stereotype of the CIA's founding generation. Anderson took a different path, with Wisner, Edward Lansdale, and two lesser-known figures, Peter Sichel and Michael Burke. Wisner notwithstanding, this group cannot be so readily characterized. Lansdale was a Midwestern advertising executive; Sichel a German-Jewish refugee from a family of wine merchants; and Burke a college football star and sometime Hollywood screenwriter.

The Quiet Americans is revisionist. The morally compromised spymaster is a standard device in fiction and nonfiction alike, including this book's namesake, Graham

Greene's 1955 novel, *The Quiet American*. Anderson, however, provides his subjects with a degree of nuance rarely seen in that caricature. Anderson is revisionist also in his assessment of the wider enterprise and of the men at the top setting the policies. In his account, Wisner, Lansdale, Sichel, and Burke are sympathetic figures in contrast to George Kennan, J. Edgar Hoover, the Dulles brothers, and Dwight Eisenhower, whose character and actions Anderson calls into question.

Against the familiar backdrop of a prostrate Europe and a crumbling wartime alliance succumbing to mistrust, Anderson's editorial choices are notable. Because Germany formed the cradle of the intelligence struggle of the Cold War, beginning the narrative there, in the closing days of World War II, was wise. What the OSS and its successors did there became, in microcosm, the tragedy at the heart of this book. Anderson was wise also in identifying 1956 as an endpoint, rather than continuing the story into the 1960s, as Hersh and Thomas did. The Hungarian uprising and the Suez Crisis, together with the slide of South Vietnam's Ngo Dinh Diem toward his fate, illustrate the author's contention that over those dozen years the United States squandered the promise that animated Anderson's heroes, becoming in the eyes of most of the world just another imperial power. Less wise were lengthy discourses on Cold War events. While these form the book's context, most are familiar enough to need no recapitulation.

The chosen four transcend their treatment in standard accounts, most of which struggle to balance between two clichés: one, that the Americans were outclassed amateurs in what former MI6 officer Malcolm Muggeridge called "our frowsty old intelligence brothel"; and two, the CIA was a malevolent appendage of a nascent national security state, its rogue operatives hubristically rampaging across the seams between US and Soviet spheres of influence. Anderson is more imaginative, and too careful to fall into that trap. His characters are more realized, more human.

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Anderson describes the suave and charismatic former All-American Burke, who specialized in running Albanian emigres into Albania to roll back Stalin's empire, as "James Bond before James Bond existed." (34) If this is hyperbolic, Burke was not the only model. Lansdale, " . . . a kind of anthropologist in the field of human conflict" (81) whose work against a Filipino insurgency made him the confidante of two Southeast Asian heads of state, and "the thinly disguised protagonist of one best-selling book, *The Ugly American*, and quite possibly of a second, *The Quiet American*" (79) was another. Wisner, who rose to be Allen Dulles's deputy, was a far-beyond-driven pragmatist who believed in the need to *do something* in the face of Soviet provocations. Hersh regarded him as a zealot; Thomas Powers, as a crusader; a distinction with little difference. More grounded was Sichel, who rose from OSS Berlin Base's paymaster to head of operations for Eastern Europe, and, who as the only one of the four still living whom Anderson interviewed at length, serves as the book's moral conscience.

The notion of moral conscience is important, given Anderson's view that his story is classically tragic. Burke and Sichel left the agency early, burned out by the burden of repeatedly sending assets across the Iron Curtain to die. Wisner bore a similar load, compounded by America's failure to stand alongside the Hungarians in 1956 after it had encouraged their revolt. The weight of it drove him to despair, madness, and ultimately, suicide. When Lansdale finally retired, he had become a cautionary tale, the eponymous quiet American, if not a punch line, given his role in covert action against Castro's Cuba, which was uncharacteristic of anything he had done in Southeast Asia.

If this theme is familiar, Anderson's sympathy for these men is less so. However motivated they were, they are not one-dimensional caricatures. We learn, for example, that in the Philippines Lansdale grasped the complexity of insurgency and the importance of addressing the grievances of "the other side," and that in Vietnam he was the only US official in either Saigon or Washington who believed the 1956 reunification elections should have been held. We find that Sichel, and all of Berlin Base's leadership, rejected on practical grounds inheriting the Nazi Gehlen Organization from Army counterintelligence and that early covert action efforts were more sophisticated than the "sophomoric propaganda" they later became because CIA understood the need "to appeal to and co-opt the moderate left." (176) Anderson points out that Wisner regarded McCarthyism and Hoover's concomitant "Lavender Scare" purge of

homosexuals from the intelligence services—which ended the career of his aide de camp, Carmel Offie—were a national embarrassment.

Why does the chosen four's story turn tragic, their carefully calibrated efforts sacrificed on the altar of unimaginative policies? The author places responsibility at the feet of their superiors, including:

- George Kennan, the subject of a prize-winning biography by John Lewis Gaddis, the dean of Cold War historians, was a "two-faced weasel" who disingenuously guarded his reputation when critics drew a straight line from his Containment Doctrine to 58,000 American dead in Vietnam, (155) among countless other casualties of Cold War proxy fights. Anderson further regards Kennan as a "grand master of forgetfulness" for disavowing knowledge of working with former Nazis against the Soviets in post-war Germany. (197)
- Allen Dulles, the legendary "Great White Case Officer," was marked by "glibness and superficiality," and Anderson quotes Peter Grose, who wrote that Dulles "learned to deal comfortably in perfectly bad faith." Wisner's actions, by contrast, "were dictated by a sense of honor and fairness" and who, despite his reputation as a hardened Cold Warrior, was reluctant to approve many of the covert actions that Dulles urged upon him, (258, 311), including the overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mossadegh. The subsequent coup in Guatemala only deepened Third World disaffection with the United States.
- John Foster Dulles, President Eisenhower's secretary of state, seems to have earned his portrayal as a dour Presbyterian scold. During his tenure, the Cold War descended to new depths. Anderson tantalizes the reader with the notion that a rapprochement with Stalin's successors was possible after the tyrant's death, but the opportunity was lost, because, "in brief, John Foster Dulles happened." (316)
- Much of this occurred on Eisenhower's watch. Views of Ike have evolved, from a grandfatherly figure who oversaw a dull decade of conformity, to the "hidden hand" president who masterfully manipulated events from behind the curtain. Not for Anderson, who, noting the president's failure to defend his mentor George Marshall from McCarthy's attacks, wrote, "for all his carefully honed image of humility and integrity, [Eisenhower] was an intensely ambitious creature, one willing to compro-

mise on the most basic precepts of personal honor if it might play to his political advantage.” (331)

In *The Quiet Americans*, Anderson has produced an engaging account of four very different men who served the same cause, and whose service foundered on the sclerotic assumptions and ill-advised actions of their superiors. This is the tragedy of the title; this, and Anderson’s lament at the loss of America’s moral advantage for minimal Cold War gains. He concludes that the United States, for all its pretensions, was helpless in Hungary in 1956—though he acknowledges that Moscow took advantage of the Suez Crisis—a distraction for which Washington bore no responsibility. Perhaps worse, the United States backed itself into a corner that made low-end, low-risk engagements through covert action and proxy wars more tempting. Here lies one more fascinating theme of the book: the tension between the collection and analysis of intelligence that rests at the core of the CIA’s mission and the conduct of covert action—the impulse to act—that more than one critic has suggested underpins much of the CIA’s legacy.



Peter Sichel on *The Quiet Americans*

Though many books were written almost immediately after World War II about that war, it took almost 50 years for serious scholars to write well-researched books on German successes and failures, Allied successes and failures, and the horrors visited on Soviet Russia and its prime responsibility for the defeat of Nazi Germany. The best books, German, English, and Russian, have largely appeared in the last few years. It took that long to try to describe that “recent” history without giving in to the justifiable, moral outrage the subject elicited.

The same can be said about books on wartime and post-war clandestine political action and intelligence operations. Though a goodly number of books by retired intelligence officers and other authors have appeared almost from the end of WWII, they either dealt with highly sensational subjects—such as the Cambridge Russian spy

ring, with emphasis on Philby, Burgess and MacLean—or with failures of CIA—such as Tim Weiner’s *Legacy of Ashes*, which did not address successes or deal with the complexities involved in actions demanded by the executive branch of the government.

Spying and covert political actions are just a small element in the larger and more complex canvas of international relations and activity and the risk that the actions will lead to unintended consequences is high. A classic example was Britain’s view of Iran and London’s fear of being cut off from a landline to India and losing a cheap and secure supply of oil, which caused them, with US aid, to depose a democratically elected head of state in Iran. That ultimately contributed to a worse outcome in 1979, the institution of a regime led by religious zealots.^a

These complexities were recognized by Richard Bissell, the brilliant and unqualified head of the CIA clandestine services, who did not consult his deputy Richard Helms prior to the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. In his memoir he wrote:

Many, probably most, successes were successes only in the short run. Arbenz, for instance, was overthrown, but the long-term problems of Guatemala were not solved. Elections were won in several countries, but political parties and political systems were not permanently rejuvenated. Most covert action operations (like military operations) are directed at short-term objectives. Their success or failure must be judged by the degree to which these objectives are achieved. Their effectiveness must be measured by the degree to which achievement of the short term objectives will contribute to the national interest. It can be argued that, although few uncompromised operations actually failed, the successful achievement of their short term results made only limited contributions to the national interest. Covert political action is therefore usually an expedient and its long term value, like that of all expedients, can be questioned.^b

What most books on intelligence and covert political action lack, is a description of all the elements that contribute to the decision of ordering political action. The public has been under the false impression that it is the

a. See Brent Geary’s review of *Black Wave: Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Forty-Year Rivalry that Unraveled Culture, Religion, and Collective Memory in the Middle East* on page 53.

b. Richard Bissell, *Reflections of a Cold Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs* (Yale University Press, 1996), 220.

CIA that makes that decision, whereas both a large part of the collection of intelligence and all political action is undertaken if the executive branch of the government so orders. Whereas that decision might well result from deliberations of the National Security Council, it at times was ordered by the president based on the prejudice of members of his cabinet. A good example was John Foster Dulles' irrational attitude to communism or Robert Kennedy's hatred of Castro.

As a result of all these complexities, it is hard to write a book that describes not only specific operations but also how and why decisions are made and who made them. Often the operatives of the CIA are asked to act, when their own judgment does not agree with the policy of the executive charged with making the decisions. A good example is Roger Goiran, the CIA station chief in Iran at the time of Mossadegh's removal, who considered the action wrong, recognizing the danger of an Iranian drift to authoritarian rule.

Scott Anderson in his *The Quiet Americans* has anchored his story by describing four CIA officers and their involvement in various Cold War operations, both gathering intelligence and running political action operation.

He puts their action into the larger canvas of the political decisionmakers, the preconception of some of the key governmental players, and the common sense that at times was more important than intelligence provided by émigré groups. A misconception like "domino theory," so often mentioned by Eisenhower, is a good example of the degree of misjudgment of a president who made the final decision of most, if not all, political action operations, even if he denied it. By anchoring his story on four operatives, three of whom were involved in specific operations and a fourth, the chief of clandestine services during these formative years, Anderson is able to write the history of that time and the weighty decisions made by the presidents on advice of their cabinets and the National Security Council. Historical and cultural background were rarely taken into account and often economic interests of US companies were partially the motivator of actions, particularly in the Western Hemisphere.

Scott Anderson tells a good tale about many lessons never learned: that pride often is stronger than reason, and that sometimes it may make more sense to leave things as they are, instead of interfering in a process that otherwise might in the long run lead to an outcome favorable to the interests of the United States.



The reviewers: Leslie C. is a CIA operations officer. Peter Sichel served with OSS and CIA. He resigned from CIA in 1959. His memoir, *The Secrets of My Life: Vintner, Prisoner, Soldier, Spy* appeared in 2016 (ArchwayPublishing)

The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West

David Kilcullen (Oxford University Press, 2020), 336, notes, index.

Reviewed by George P. Lewis

In *The Dragons and the Snakes*, counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen persuasively shows how, over the past three decades, US adversaries have successfully adapted the way they fight the West by mitigating the effect of US primacy in conventional warfighting capability. The book's title is an allusion to the 1993 confirmation hearing of former DCI James Woolsey, during which he stated that the United States had defeated a "large dragon"—the Soviet Union—"but we live now in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes" (11), referring to the wide array of state and non-state actors threatening US interests. Kilcullen draws analogies from biology, ecology, and psychology to explain how countries (the "dragons") and non-state actors (the "snakes") learn from failure and adapt to new circumstances. He largely focuses on Russia, China, and several militant groups in the Islamic world, while sadly only briefly discussing Iran and North Korea, which he labels "little dragons." (224)

The non-state actors Kilcullen examines have robustly evolved since 9/11. He illustrates how some are taking advantage of off-the-shelf consumer electronics the West has proliferated, including Google Earth, GPS sensors, phones, tablets, and hobbyist drones, which they have used to create sophisticated artillery targeting systems and lethal air strike capabilities. They have also learned that, in spite of sophisticated Western SIGINT capabilities, it is still possible to hide in the noise of the enormous volume of communications data being generated every moment, Kilcullen alleges. He also claims that, in order to minimize the impact of Western air superiority, most groups have learned to avoid concentrating forces, decentralize leadership, and in some cases even operate underground.

Organizationally, non-state actors are adapting and specializing, too. Al-Qa'ida (AQ), in response to punishing Western counterterrorism pressure after 9/11, often aimed at leadership, and has since evolved into a largely leaderless organization focused on providing propaganda and targeting support to a nebulous group of AQ franchises and AQ-inspired homegrown terrorists, according to Kilcullen. Meanwhile, one AQ affiliate, al-Qa'ida in Iraq

(AQI), and its successor organization, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), have demonstrated a boom-and-bust cycle of surging fighters and resources that then contract under temporary Western pressure. Kilcullen speculates that this cycle will persist and that before long a new organization will arise from the ashes of ISIS. In contrast to AQI and ISIS, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Kilcullen argues, has charted a different course, opting to avoid large troop concentrations and instead focusing on cultivating support from the population through effective guerrilla-style governance.

But the organization that has evolved into the most capable non-state threat is Hezbollah, according to Kilcullen. Its decades of operations in Lebanon, persistent conflict with Israel, and involvement in the Syrian Civil War have turned it into a sophisticated governing organization with asymmetric combat capabilities that exploit Western—especially Israeli—weaknesses.

Shifting to state actors, Kilcullen argues that Russia is also steering clear of conventional conflict with the United States, while still seeking to compete with the United States and the West using other means. One example he offers is Russia's adapting to Western governments' intelligence capabilities. While numerous terms abound for Russia's recent geopolitical operations short of conventional or nuclear war—active measures, hybrid warfare, gray-zone operations, and asymmetric warfare, to name a few—Kilcullen creates his own term: "liminal warfare." (95) With liminal warfare, Russia conducts operations that are not immediately detected or attributed by its opponents, but he claims they understand that eventual detection, and sometimes even attribution, is often a foregone conclusion due to modern intelligence capabilities. So, he argues, Russia's operations also seek to exploit a "response threshold" (119), where their operations are tailored to fall just short of the transparent political limits and redlines of most Western governments, knowing that, while their actions may be condemned, they will not trigger a military response.

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Going one step further, Kilcullen suggests that Russia also uses liminal operations as the geopolitical equivalent of a one-two combo in boxing, where liminal operations temporarily disrupt Western governments' decisionmaking and allow Russia to conduct even more provocative operations, unimpeded. As an illustration of this theory, he claims that Russia's alleged 2016 election interference distracted Western governments from effectively responding to Russian offensives in Ukraine and Syria during the winter of 2016–17.

In the wake of the 1991 Gulf War, China also realized that it could not withstand a conventional attack from the United States, according to Kilcullen. While dedicating some of its enormous economic might to addressing shortfalls in their conventional warfighting capabilities, he claims China is also seeking to compete with the United States in a wide spectra of non-military domains, such as trade, cyberspace, and legal warfare. The latter, legal warfare, pertains to China's allegedly using the existing international order (led by the United States) against the United States, leveraging the order's rules, organizations, and norms. He even explores the possibility that China's leaders may be orchestrating (or at least willfully ignoring) the supply of Chinese-manufactured fentanyl to the United States as a form of "drug warfare," though he acknowledges this is at best a shaky hypothesis. (206, 311)

Throughout *The Dragons and the Snakes*, Kilcullen provides numerous examples of actions that fit his theories of how US adversaries have adapted to compete with the United States, such as his liminal warfare doctrine, but he struggles to supply evidence that the leaders of US adversaries are doing this intentionally. Of course, in some cases, especially those of the non-state actors, it hardly matters if it is intentional or not—the impact on the United States is the same—but knowing whether these actions are intentional is crucial to US decisionmaking. The main evidence he provides of Russia's use of liminal warfare as Russian doctrine is a speech and subsequent paper by Russian General Gerasimov, which Kilcullen willingly admits was never intended to be interpreted as Russian doctrine, and in fact was General Gerasimov's state perception of what the west was doing to Russia. For Chinese intentions, he cites a book written by two People's Liberation Army senior colonels with the English title *Unrestricted Warfare*. As with Gerasimov's speech, parts or all of the book could simply be a reflection of China's perception of Western actions. When

Unrestricted Warfare explicitly mentions drug warfare, it could simply be the authors suggesting that British opium smuggling in the 18th and 19th centuries was a form of warfare against China, not that China should use fentanyl smuggling to undermine the United States. That said, while acknowledging that a single book or speech hardly constitutes proof of a state's intentions, he uses these together with numerous Russian and Chinese actions to make a compelling case that both are using non-military methods to compete with the United States in at least some cases.

Thankfully, Kilcullen also highlights the danger of not understanding the intentions of one's adversaries. He shows that Russian and Chinese leaders sometimes have dubious and even preposterous ideas about Western intentions towards their own countries, which underscores the danger of the United States jumping to conclusions about adversary intent. If the United States fails to understand its adversaries' intentions, then it will not recognize when those countries are taking hostile actions to compete against the West—and, conversely, it may misinterpret benign or unintentional actions as aggressive. Similarly, if the United States fails to clearly and convincingly communicate the intent of its own actions, then its adversaries are liable to misinterpret well-meaning actions as subversive and aggressive. Such misinterpretations have dangerous consequences, particularly in a nuclear-armed world. However, establishing clear demarcations of what constitutes a hostile, non-military action would ironically create more opportunity for liminal warfare to exploit these same response thresholds.

While admitting that the threats facing the United States today are more grave than those at the turn of the century and that all countries that rise must also eventually fall, Kilcullen does not advocate for a defeatist attitude in US foreign policy. Instead, he suggests that the United States should learn from how the Byzantine Empire reigned for a thousand years by successfully parrying numerous and often simultaneous threats. The United States does not need to maintain global primacy in warfighting capability to still pursue its goals on the world stage. He recommends that the United States deliberately exercise its whole-of-government influence in pursuit of peace, prosperity, and liberty, while carefully avoiding so-called "forever wars" and attempts to reassert global US military primacy. (247)

In *The Dragons and the Snakes*, Kilcullen deftly marshals a wide range of reporting to suggest that US adversaries have adapted to US conventional military primacy and he offers a pragmatic solution for how the United States can counter-adapt. Readers will find his discussion on liminal warfare and the concepts of detection,

attribution, and response thresholds particularly insightful. Readers will also enjoy his persuasive illustration of the importance of understanding the intent of US adversaries' leaders, underscoring the value that good intelligence can add to policymaking.



The reviewer: George P. Lewis is the pen name of an officer in CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology.

Intelligence in Public Media

Chinese Spies: From Chairman Mao to Xi Jinping

Roger Faligot (translated by Natasha Lehrer), (C. Hurst & Co., 2019), 568, appendices, notes, index

Reviewed by David Ian Chambers

Over three decades ago, the Larry Chin case catapulted Chinese espionage into the headlines and onto the agendas of national security policymakers. Since then, continuing exposures of hostile intelligence, influence, and cyber operations have demonstrated the growing scale, diversity, and depth of China's covert activities against Western targets. In parallel, China's security services have developed sophisticated human and technical methods of surveillance against Chinese nationals and foreign residents in China.

Accompanying these changes, there has been a revival of many 1950s-style mass-campaign techniques to indoctrinate Chinese citizens about threats to national security presented by foreign espionage and subversion. But with a difference: whereas those who informed on suspicious activity in the 1950s might have counted on a red rosette or certificate as their reward, today's potential informants are offered incentives up to 500,000 RMB (over US \$70,000) for reporting any activity they believe may be threatening state security. Always a difficult target, China has thus become an increasingly challenging operational environment for foreign intelligence services. Nonetheless, these major developments have not been accompanied by the publication of a reliable narrative history of Chinese communist intelligence and security services. A study of their changing missions, organization, modus operandi, and their reflection of China's volatile political culture is long overdue.

This book, an update and translation of French journalist Roger Faligot's 2008 *Les Service Secret Chinois*, aims to fill that gap. It comprises 14 chapters grouped into three parts. The first examines the long haul from foundation of the Chinese Communist Party's first dedicated security/intelligence organs in the late 1920s to Hong Kong's retrocession in 1997. Parts 2 and 3 address subsequent developments up to a cut-off point around 2018–19. Various appendices include leadership name-lists, organization charts, and a selective chronology of Chinese espionage cases exposed in the United States between

1984 and 2017. No bibliography is provided, but the content and footnotes indicate that the author has drawn predominantly on secondary Western sources, spiced with material from overseas Chinese periodicals, discussions with fellow journalists and Western officials, and his own observations while visiting China. Overall, there is little in the book that is new, much that may frustrate intelligence professionals and academics familiar with the subject, and a great deal of that will mislead or misinform readers approaching the subject afresh.

The text is littered with errors and omissions that should have been eliminated before publication. Chinese names and terms are frequently misromanized, a problem that emerges as early as page 1, where the name of a former head of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) civilian intelligence service is misrendered. Western names are not immune—former CIA Director John Brennan is mis-named as Paul Brennan. (389) Footnotes are sparse and often missing: thus page 400 contains a lengthy quotation from a useful US article on the recent restructuring of Chinese military intelligence, but it gives no indication where the original may be found. Where footnotes to books do appear, relevant page numbers are uniformly omitted, creating an unnecessary chore for readers wishing to consult the cited source. In short, the book's scholarly architecture is lacking.

What of the content? As the centenaries of the CCP's first intelligence and security organs approach, the author sensibly devotes an opening chapter to the formative years before the Long March of 1934–35, a period when the party leadership first grasped the potential and basic techniques of intelligence work much in evidence today: penetration and disinformation operations, use of agents of influence and commercial cover, false-flag approaches, and the exploitation of vulnerable targets' venality and sexual appetites. These have long been common fare in Chinese and Western studies of the period, but the author's partial treatment adds little, notably omitting the key contributions of HUMINT, SIGINT and

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intelligence-led negotiations that enabled the Red Army to begin the Long March, a defining episode in modern Chinese intelligence history.

An ambitious chapter follows on the period from the late 1930s to the onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. Historically-inclined readers hoping for a detailed exploration of critical wartime intelligence casework will be frustrated as the author favors a meandering discussion about a Belgian cartoonist over analysis of classic CCP operations, (e.g., Shen Anna's long haul to become Chiang Kai-shek's confidential stenographer, SIGINT successes against Guomindang and Japanese targets, and Hua Kezhi's guileful penetration of the upper reaches of the Guomindang military and foreign diplomatic establishment). Several passages refer to the post-1949 role of the Central Social Department, the CCP's wartime civilian intelligence and security agency, overlooking the fact that it was abolished in 1949. Founding Minister of Public Security Luo Ruiqing is described as having received Moscow training in counterintelligence before being deployed in Paris against the *Deuxième Bureau*—overseas assignments not mentioned by Luo's many official and family biographers. Most importantly, there is no discussion of recurrent and intense post-1949 debates in the intelligence community and between it and its political masters about resources, recruitment of sources of foreign nationality or dubious backgrounds, or critical suggestions in the mid-late 1950s that intelligence work should be abolished, countered by civilian intelligence service chief Kong Yuan and his deputy Zou Dapeng with the help of then rising CCP star Deng Xiaoping.

The procession of errors and questionable research continues into and beyond the Cultural Revolution chapter: Faligot commits the strategic blooper of misidentifying the “Gang of Four,” and suggests incorrectly that Zou Dapeng, pioneer of foreign intelligence operations, was murdered by Red Guards in 1966—he committed suicide in April 1967. (Deaths and dates are not one of the author's strong points: elsewhere Faligot states that Sir Edward Youde died before taking up the post of Hong Kong governor; minimal research would have shown that Youde served as governor from 1982–86.)

Similar flaws characterize the author's discussion of the fate of China's intelligence community during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), undoubtedly the darkest period in its modern history. Much of the analysis draws explicitly on a speech allegedly given on November 9, 1978 by Hu

Yaobang which detailed Kang Sheng's role in the abuse and destruction of China's civilian intelligence service. There can be no doubt about Kang's malign activities, but Faligot fails to address significant doubts about the speech's provenance and content, not least the fact that Hu spent most of that day in Cambodia, not returning to Beijing until the evening that day. Additionally, rather than being “General Secretary of the CCP Central Committee and its overall number one,” (112) it should have been noted that Hu was not even a Politburo member at the time. In aggregate, such failings greatly diminish the credibility of the book, suggesting the author has overlooked readily-available memoirs of intelligence and security seniors who survived the worst days of the Cultural Revolution and well-sourced analyses of the period by Chinese historians.

Moving closer to the present, the 1983 formation of the Ministry of State Security (MSS) and its initial organization is covered adequately, but the author barely touches on the origins and consequences of a key characteristic of early MSS activity: its strategic shift away from the use of diplomatic cover in overseas operations. Similarly, while covering the familiar ground of the Larry Chin and Boursicot cases exposed in the mid-1980s, Faligot inexplicably fails to consider the Glen Duffie Shriver case, a classic 21st century attempt to penetrate CIA and harbinger of the subsequent Kevin Mallory and Jerry Chun Hsing Lee cases.

The final and better part of the book comprises chapters devoted to (i) PLA cyber activity (ii) security and intelligence operations related to the 2008 Olympics, and (iii) the mixed last decade, in which China's services have enjoyed major home-turf counterespionage successes and a significant expansion of their overseas collection activities despite being buffeted by elite political factionalism, charges of leadership corruption and, for the military intelligence services, substantial reorganization.

Even with the avalanche of open-source Chinese material over the past 30 years, Chinese intelligence history remains a hard nut to crack. No defector yet has taken the Mitrokhin path to document past Chinese intelligence operations and the seepage of classified material out of China remains glacial. Faligot's book is certainly much better-based and argued than its obvious predecessor, Richard Deacon's *A History of the Chinese Secret Service* (1974). By no means a definitive guide, it does at least offer a menu of issues and developments that will hopefully stimulate others to pursue further and more rigorous research. ❖

The reviewer: David Ian Chambers is a retired member of the British Diplomatic Service.

Intelligence in Public Media

Secrets and Spies: UK Intelligence Accountability after Iraq and Snowden

Jamie Gaskarth (Brookings Institution Press, 2020), 147, notes, index.

Reviewed by Jason U. Manosevitz

Intelligence accountability in the United Kingdom has changed tremendously in the last 30 years. Starting in the late 1980s and early 1990s the government began passing laws strengthening oversight of intelligence. These included the Interception of Communications Act, the Security Services Act, the Intelligence Services Act, and the Justice and Security Act. More recently, in 2016, the United Kingdom passed the Investigatory Powers Act, adding more scrutiny while also expanding authority to monitor communications. These laws broke the long-held British norm of avoiding public discussion of intelligence issues. More importantly, intelligence oversight is no longer exclusively an executive branch function because Parliament plays a role through its Intelligence Security Committee (ISC) and judicial commissioners scrutinize communication intercept warrants.

Scholars have closely watched these developments. Well-known researchers, such as Christopher Andrews, Peter Gill, David Omand, and Mark Phythian, have traced the emergence of legal mechanisms, Parliament's role, UK intelligence practices, and changes in British intelligence's ethics. Jamie Gaskarth's *Secrets and Spies: UK Intelligence Accountability after Iraq and Snowden* aims to fill a key gap by flipping the perspective from which accountability is viewed. Rather than looking simply at how those those charged with oversight view the issues, Gaskarth asks how British intelligence and security policymakers understand accountability and how their understanding links to institutional structures and organizational performance. (6)

Gaskarth, as a senior lecturer at the University of Birmingham teaching strategy and decisionmaking, is well poised for this work. For several years he has focused on ethical dilemmas of leadership and accountability in intelligence, foreign policy, and defense. He has authored, edited, or co-edited six books. Gaskarth is motivated to write by what he sees as a deepening debate between those who argue UK oversight is deeply flawed because the security services continue to miss threats and those who argue the services have improved based on lessons learned. Similar to some in the United States,

Gaskarth thinks a key problem is that the intelligence agencies respond well to crises but are poor at predicting them and that this issue gets little attention in oversight circles, even though it has major consequences for security policy. (4)

Gaskarth's typology and word choice is awkward for US readers. And despite the book's title, he spends no time on the intelligence or deliberations that led the United Kingdom to join the war against Iraq or the substantive issues surrounding Edward Snowden's leaks. Those seeking to learn about how the United Kingdom dealt with intelligence issues related to the Iraq War and Snowden's leaks would be better served by reading the Butler and Chilcot reports as well as the judgments from the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. Those quibbles aside, *Secrets and Spies: UK Intelligence Accountability after Iraq and Snowden* offers an important contribution to the study of intelligence oversight.

Gaskarth frames *Secrets and Spies* with a review of academic theories on oversight. He covers these theories through a series of classic questions academics have long grappled with—what does oversight mean, what are its limitations, why is it important, who should hold intelligence agencies accountable, what are the goals of accountability, and what new challenges are there to accountability in the United Kingdom? He breaks little new ground with this first chapter but it helps orient the reader to how UK scholars see political science's oversight theories. Gaskarth covers the waterfront—the difficulty of defining accountability, how secrecy can hide abuse, the complexity of intelligence work as an obstacle to understanding it, the role of the media, and the problems with external overseers' incentives and closeness to intelligence organizations. Naturally, he also discusses the age-old problem of oversight as an exercise in either “police patrolling” or “firefighting.” Although not explicit, Gaskarth essentially jettisons this US-favored rational choice approach to analyzing oversight.

Gaskarth moves from the theoretical to the practical, which is an examination of formal UK oversight

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mechanisms. He focuses on how primary oversight bodies, the media, and some commentators hold the United Kingdom's intelligence services accountable. Gaskarth's overall point in this chapter is that external actors focus on effectiveness, efficiency, and intelligence services' ethics. He acknowledges, however, that how these groups define these terms leads them to emphasize different aspects in carrying out their oversight roles. In his analysis, he sees effectiveness in the quality of policies initiated and the methods used to implement them. He further subdivides effectiveness into political and operational issues—but these are not what one might expect.

Political issues, for Gaskarth, are poor coordination among agencies, misinterpretation of intelligence, and failure to anticipate threats. Operational issues cover the handling, production, and analysis of intelligence. Efficiency boils down to recordkeeping, which readers learn is occasionally quite poor in the UK system. Ethical issues run the gamut from treatment of detainees, cooperation with intelligence partners, and asset running, particularly children. Gaskarth pulls details from several official UK reports and investigations over the last 20 years, touching substantively on UK counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and intelligence collection issues. Unfortunately, how intelligence support to policymakers fits into the external actors' rubric of effectiveness, efficiency, and ethics appears to be missing.

The most significant contribution of *Secrets and Spies*, I think, rests in its chapter on intelligence practitioners' views of accountability. Gaskarth conducted 40-some interviews with current and former practitioners, ISC members, and ministers, blending in public remarks and speeches for his analysis. He recounts that practitioners emphasize accountability as “following commands of elected leaders” and cites a former SIS officer who sees accountability as “performing against the objectives you are given and demonstrating an acceptable stewardship of state resources.” (80) This establishes a hierarchical structure, a familiar hallmark of principle-agent theory.

Gaskarth probes more deeply to look at how the UK services maintain high standards despite the limitations of external scrutiny. To do so, he separates internal oversight into two categories. These are the nature of the intelligence business, which he calls “task-oriented accountability” (86) and organizational culture, which he calls “vernacular accountability.” (90) Task-oriented accountability is about interpreting past mistakes and learning for the future. The key characteristic Gaskarth

brings forth here is that “intelligence professionals hold each other to account for errors, not because of fear of external oversight but because their sense of identity is inextricably bound up with the idea that they perform their tasks effectively.” (88) Implicitly (and surprisingly) he is arguing that analytic and operational tradecraft serve as oversight mechanisms because they guide intelligence officers on the methods to accomplish their work. Some key issues that need to be addressed within task-oriented accountability include how intelligence services can innovate, learn from successes, and stay ahead of strategic change because most “lessons learned” exercises stem from missteps. This helps an organization work better in the strategic environment within which it operates, but doesn't lend itself to predicting strategic shifts.

Internal culture—Gaskarth's “vernacular accountability”—boils down to ethics. This is a key part of his analysis. An intelligence organization's ethics are critical because so often the capabilities of a service outstrip what it or its overseers view as appropriate action, according to Gaskarth. Gaskarth relays that some SIS officers, particularly after the Iraq experience, gained a deep appreciation for avoiding groupthink, fostering a culture that challenged analytic lines, and stimulated contrary views no matter what one's seniority. (116) Neither Gaskarth nor his interlocutors address the need to come to analytic closure and avoid endless navel-gazing, however. Gaskarth does address the UK services' engagement of tech firms to tackle the dilemma of biases seeping into artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms and AI morphing into systems that challenge the moral compasses of the security services.

Gaskarth applies his external and internal approach of oversight in two chapters about how the UK services operate in practice as well as in liaison relationships. The chapter on the UK services in practice does not go much beyond what is laid out in previous chapters, but is still good and provides several examples that support his arguments. It reiterates how the UK intelligence and security services have gone through a tremendous transformation, particularly the creation of new structures and of using judicial commissioners to review communication surveillance warrants when operating domestically.

In addressing intelligence partnerships, Gaskarth finds that UK services are focused on performance—their own and that of their partners. He touches on what he and his interlocutors see as the transactional nature of intelligence partnerships. From this optic, Gaskarth argues that it's

not just the result of intelligence work that the United Kingdom provides or receives but how those outputs fit or clash with the United Kingdom and its partners' formal and informal oversight structures. As an example, he explains that the United Kingdom had difficulty working with Pakistani services because their collection methods would not hold up in the UK system for prosecuting counterterrorism cases. In a few brief, somewhat odd passages, Gaskarth asserts that liaison relationships may be useful for circumventing formal oversight structures. This does not seem well founded and cuts against Gaskarth's own argument. Specifically, he states that it is the internal culture and the myriad conversations about appropriateness and efficacy between and among colleagues that keep secret organizations honest when external scrutiny is partial and the demands from operational tasks are high. (121) As such, it seems unlikely that intelligence services would use liaison partners to circumvent their own oversight structures.

One aspect that begs for more explicit discussion is the interplay between formal and informal accountability.

One such example in the US context comes from former CIA Director Robert M. Gates, who related that often during his tenure, interlocutors would come up with a "really goofy idea" for covert action and he could dispense with it by reminding them he would have to brief the two congressional committees within 48 hours, which then made the proposal seem less like a "hot idea."^a A particularly useful aspect of this question would be to assess how the internal mechanisms of oversight evolved, specifically as British attitudes towards national security have changed over time.

Other useful lines of inquiry that would help round out Gaskarth's work include considering the implications of an increasingly "legalized" system on the internal forms of accountability. In the US case, the evolution of formal IC oversight mechanisms has led to the development of various IC legislative affairs offices and an expanding need for legal advice and interpretation. How these forces influence internal forms of accountability would be useful to know, as would how intelligence practitioners view an increasingly complex oversight system.



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a. Robert M. Gates, interview transcript, George W. Bush Oral History Project (July 2000), <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/robert-m-gates-deputy-director-central>.

Black Wave: Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Forty-Year Rivalry that Unraveled Culture, Religion, and Collective Memory in the Middle East

Kim Ghattas (Henry Holt and Company, 2020), 377, map, notes, index.

Reviewed by Brent M. Geary

In the assessment of journalist Kim Ghattas, in 1979 the world changed in profound and wildly destructive ways, sparking decades of turmoil in the Muslim world and beyond, that we still struggle to contain and even understand. She makes a compelling case, one that policymakers, intelligence officers, military commanders, and informed citizens should become more familiar with as we continue to manage the fallout from a Middle Eastern rivalry that continues unabated and threatens global peace and security. That rivalry, between Saudi Arabia and Iran, is the focal point of Ghattas's book *Black Wave*, a sweeping history of the past 40 years in which she explains how a political rivalry across the Persian (or Arabian) Gulf morphed into something more sinister and more far reaching than Riyadh or Tehran could have anticipated or probably intended. It sparked an arms race of intolerance between Sunni and Shia extremism that became the driving force behind decades of war, terrorism, famine, and the deaths and displacement of untold millions.

Raise your hand if you have ever heard someone say of the Middle East, "those people have been fighting each other for centuries," implying that the hatreds there are ancient and unyielding. To her great credit, Ghattas informs—or reminds—readers that this is not true, at least with regard to the sectarian conflict within Islam. Rather, Muslim leaders in the late 20th century consciously chose to upend a relatively peaceful, live-and-let-live status quo between sects that had been the rule rather than the exception for generations, and they did so to preserve or enhance their own political power. Before 1979, Sunnis and Shias lived next to each other, worked together, played together and even intermarried regularly. That, to Ghattas, is the *annus horribilis*, the horrible year that featured three cataclysmic events, gave new life to ancient grievances, and created others from whole cloth. In her introduction, Ghattas writes of how she interviewed people from North Africa to Pakistan, "across four decades and seven countries," and how seemingly "everyone had a story about how 1979 had wrecked their

lives, their marriage, their education, including those born after that year."⁽³⁾

Probably the best known of the three events—among Western readers, anyway—is the Islamic Revolution in Iran that ejected the secular, pro-American monarch Mohammed Reza Shah from his throne and brought to power the extremist Shia cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his "Islamic Republic." Khomeini quickly turned the traditional role of Shia clerics in Iran on its head, converting them almost overnight from the shah's spiritual advisers and go-betweens with the masses to earthly rulers claiming direct contact with the divine. At several points in the book, Ghattas describes the damage the Islamic regime did to the human rights of Iranian women, minorities, and political opponents. She is less interested in the consequences of Khomeini's revolution in Iran, however, than in the reaction to it across the region, especially in her home country of Lebanon and in Saudi Arabia, and the dominoes that began to fall as a result.

The second major event of 1979, to which Ghattas gives equal weight, was the violent occupation of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, by militant Sunni extremists led by Juhayman al-Otaibi, a veteran of the Saudi security services who called for the overthrow of the Saudi royal family. This was a calamity for the ruling Saudis, who proved unable to protect the holiest site in Islam and were eventually forced to hire French commandos to assist in its recapture. Otaibi and his men condemned the ostentatious wealth of the Saudi royals and what they deemed to be the decline of Islamic values in the kingdom. These men were devotees of what is known as Wahhabism, the fundamentalist Saudi strain of Sunni Islam closely linked to the ideologies of terrorist groups such as al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Ghattas briefly recounts the centuries-old ties between the ruling al-Saud family and that of the 18th century cleric Muhammad ibn Abdelwahhab, essentially a power-sharing agreement in the Arabian Peninsula. To

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Ghattas—and numerous experts on the region—the occupation of the Grand Mosque, following closely behind the Iranian Revolution, led the Saudi royal family to embrace anew puritanical Wahhabism to bolster its religious legitimacy and stave off further challenges from radicals such as Otaibi. Ghattas highlights how some of the same radical clerics who had inspired Otaibi—and later Usama bin Ladin, among others—led to the entrenchment of Wahhabi tenets across Saudi society, from school textbooks promoting intolerance of different religious beliefs to the rolling back of human rights for women and minorities, much like what had happened in Iran.

And Iran was very much on the minds of the ruling Saudi elites. Khomeini was a strident critic of the al-Sauds and called for their ouster over Iranian radio stations broadcasting across the Arab world, and exportation of the Islamic revolution became a central theme of Iranian foreign policy. Under rhetorical assault from the new rulers in Tehran, the Saudis began to promote abroad their own version of Islamism to protect and even expand their influence. To undermine potential threats across the Muslim world, as Ghattas recounts, the Saudis have spent billions to build mosques and religious schools overseas and to endow religious charities, all of which adhere closely to fundamentalist Wahhabi beliefs that regard the Shias as unbelievers. The Iranians have done much the same in countries with high numbers of Shias such as Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, promoting Iran and its leaders as the true vanguard of Islam against all its enemies, including the Saudis. This religious-political rivalry has spawned what Ghattas calls the unraveling of culture, religion, and collective memory across the region.

The third catastrophe of 1979, in Ghattas's assessment, was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December. The call to arms that resulted led militant Islamists to travel to Afghanistan to join the fight against the spread of atheistic communism. The headquarters for the so-called *jihad* against the Soviets was in Pakistan, whose ruler, the Islamist President Zia ul-Haq, accepted support from both the United States and Saudi Arabia in housing, arming, and training Afghan freedom fighters, or *mujahedeen*. For Ghattas, this situation created the perfect breeding ground for radical Islamism and, eventually, global terrorism. Among the foreign fighters who traveled to wage jihad were the Saudi, bin Ladin, the Egyptian, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and other founding members of al-Qa'ida, who

learned military tactics and formed a network of like-minded jihadists indoctrinated in Sunni extremism.

Above and beyond their desire to thwart Soviet expansionism, the Saudis also supported President Zia because of his efforts to make Pakistan more Islamic—and more Sunni. In the process, Zia empowered radical Sunni clerics in exchange for their support of his government, clerics funded by Saudi largess as part of their effort to promote Wahhabism (and support for the Saudi royal family worldwide) against Iranian efforts to the contrary. The result was a rapid decline in the treatment of women and minorities (including Shias) in Pakistan and, in the summer of 1987, what Ghattas called “the first premeditated, state-sponsored attack by one sectarian militia against another sect in modern times.” In July, after months of agitation by Pakistani Shias who resented having their towns used as launching pads for attacks into nearby Afghanistan, Zia ordered Sunni militants to crack down on those opposed to his policies. The result was the destruction of some 14 Shia villages and the deaths of 52 Shias and 120 Sunnis. (161) Human Rights Watch estimates that tens of thousands of sectarian killings have occurred in Pakistan since then. It is ironic, writes Ghattas, when one considers that Pakistan's founding father, Mohammad Jinnah, was a Shia Muslim. (148)

Ghattas spends the latter half of her book describing how radical Sunni and Shia militias, governments, and terrorist groups have proliferated since the 1980s across the region, often functioning with the direct support or acquiescence of either Riyadh or Tehran. Take, for example, the rise of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Ghattas—among many others—argues that Saudi-financed religious schools known as *madrassas* in western Pakistan were the incubators for the Taliban and other militant Sunni groups in the region. Recall that Saudi Arabia was one of the only governments that recognized the Taliban as the legitimate rulers of Afghanistan before the 9/11 attacks. On the other side of the coin is Lebanese Hezbollah, essentially the rulers of southern Lebanon for over three decades and one of the most dangerous terrorist organizations in the world. Hezbollah, made up of Lebanese Shias, is a close partner of Iran's security services, which helped to create the organization in the midst of the Lebanese Civil War (1975–90). People living under Hezbollah control are forced to endure social and legal restrictions and ideological indoctrination that were foreign to Lebanon before Iran exerted its influence there.

One of the strengths of Ghattas's work is her illustrations of the ways in which societies have been transformed by this Saudi-Iranian sectarian rivalry. The civil war in Iraq (2011–17) between Sunni and Shia Arabs, for example, and the current struggles for control in Syria and Yemen are largely proxy wars between Riyadh and Tehran, conflicts which Ghattas explores mostly in relation to their rivalry. Other societal changes are less obvious but still detrimental to the quality of life across the region, especially among women and minorities. In Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, for example, women were working as news anchors on national television programs before 1979, even appearing without the Islamic *hijab* head-coverings. People growing up there in recent years could not imagine that. Likewise, Ghattas highlights many individuals across the region who have spoken out against the sectarianism and puritanical restrictions over the years, calling them the “progressive thinkers who represent the vibrant, pluralistic world that persists beneath the black wave.”(3) By shining a light on these courageous few, she undermines another familiar trope in the West that no moderate voices are fighting against extremism in Islamic societies. Regrettably, many of the people

Ghattas highlights, such as her friend, the late *Washington Post* columnist and prominent critic of the Saudi royal family, Jamal Khashoggi, have paid a heavy price for their opposition.

While other journalists and scholars have written about specific aspects of this story, to this reviewer's knowledge, none have attempted the kind of sweeping examination of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry and its impact on the Middle East—and beyond—as has Ghattas. Her achievement is significant and should be required reading for anyone who seeks to better understand how we got here, particularly those whose duties or responsibilities necessitate it. Intelligence officers, in particular, will find nuanced explorations of the roots of many of the regions' current conflicts, but also glimpses of the deeply-held hopes for a better future among some of the people who live there.

For readers with an interest in this topic, this reviewer highly recommends a Public Broadcasting System documentary about the same topic from 2018 entitled “Frontline—Bitter Rivals: Iran and Saudi Arabia,” to which Ghattas contributed.



The reviewer: Brent Geary is a member of CIA's History Staff.

Shatter the Nations: ISIS and the War for the Caliphate

Mike Giglio (PublicAffairs, 2019), 303, index.

Reviewed by Brent M. Geary

At its peak in 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) controlled territory in those two countries roughly the size of Great Britain and home to some 10 million people. It is inarguably the most militarily successful terrorist organization in history and its influence has stretched across the Middle East and many parts of the world. In *Shatter the Nations*, journalist Mike Giglio chronicles the rise and fall of what ISIS leaders referred to as its “caliphate.” He tells us his story from the ground level and from the perspective of those who fought with and against ISIS, those who lived on the margins of the caliphate, and those who suffered from its depredations. Giglio—a foreign correspondent for *The Atlantic*—infuses his book with indelible stories of people struggling to survive in a chaotic time, stories he argues that precious few Americans know or care to know, even as Arabs, Kurds, and others across the region fought our common enemy. His book will help to fill that gap for those who take the time to read it, including intelligence practitioners whose areas of expertise do not include the ISIS fight.

Essentially a tragic travel saga, Giglio shares his own personal journey across the Middle East in the last decade, from bearing witness to both a revolution and counterrevolution in Cairo, to traversing the frontier between war-torn Syria and southern Turkey, to interviewing ISIS defectors, to riding into battle with elite but overstretched Kurdish and Iraqi special forces. The book is divided into three parts, beginning with Giglio’s virtual interview in early 2011 over chat messaging with “El Shaheed”—Arabic for “The Martyr”—the now-famous Egyptian cyber activist Wael Ghonim, who told him of the stark repression his country suffered under then-President Hosni Mubarak and how he feared for himself and his family. Weeks later, protests erupted across Egypt that quickly led, at the urging of President Barack Obama, to Mubarak’s ouster, perhaps the high-water mark of what became known as the Arab Spring.

Giglio argues that the ensuing revolution in Syria was obviously inspired by the events in Cairo, Tunisia, and

elsewhere, but to those who rose up against their rulers in Damascus, there was one tragic difference. By the time Syrian President Bashar al-Assad turned his regime’s army against his own people, Syrian oppositionists believed that the rest of the world was not prepared to help them in their hour of need. “I would meet rebels and activists in the ensuing years who never got over the sense of betrayal,” Giglio writes (19), and many would see that betrayal turn into rage against the West and lead them to join groups like ISIS. Others, mainly the foreign fighters who rushed to join the jihad, were simply bored with their lives or were attracted by a chance to gain power in a world that had otherwise denied it to them. “They imagined they would be bigger people than was possible at home; they dreamed of the glamour of violence, having no real sense of it.” (76)

From Egypt, Giglio quickly transitions to Syria and the rapid devolution there from peaceful protest movement to all-out civil war. He chronicles the way Syrian activists had held out hope that President Assad, the British-educated ophthalmologist and political heir to his brutal father Hafiz, would choose to embrace reform and democratize Syria. Instead, we now know, Assad chose open warfare, driving thousands of oppositionists into dozens of militant groups, ranging from the secular, pro-democracy Free Syrian Army to jihadist terror groups such as al-Qa’ida-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusrah and ISIS.

When Syria began to crumble, the jihadists vied for power with everyone else, and ISIS began to expand its territory. While that was happening, though, Giglio returned in 2013 to Egypt to cover the military counterrevolution against the government of Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood leader who had succeeded Mubarak. Giglio recounts being beaten and arrested along with other journalists by Egyptian security forces for filming their crackdown on Morsi supporters. When the military regained control, under now President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, Giglio argues that it only added further fuel to the Islamist fire, sparking a bloody insurgency in the Sinai Peninsula and prompting many to join ISIS and other

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jihadi groups. These are well-founded arguments and not new, but Giglio's description of the crackdown sheds more light on a country closely allied with the United States and on the ways in which thousands of Egyptians migrated to extremism.

Part Two, "Terror," details the rise of ISIS and its caliphate as Giglio experienced it. Based in Istanbul, from 2013 to 2016 he reported from the Turkish-Syrian border, eastern Syria, and northern Iraq. His first encounter with ISIS came in 2013, when a Syrian rebel encouraged him to see for himself what this new jihadist group was doing. Giglio crossed into territory controlled by Syrian Kurds, describing the deal they had made with Assad's regime to stay out of the civil war in exchange for regional autonomy. Kurdish forces, led by the People's Protection Units and known by the Kurdish acronym YPG, were defending the area against ISIS invaders, and he visited a town recently liberated after months of ISIS occupation. Residents told him of public beheadings of suspected Syrian government loyalists and imprisonment for offenses such as smoking cigarettes or owning a hookah. "It's a black and white world for them," one said of ISIS. "You can become their enemy very fast."(55)

Through a series of vignettes, Giglio illustrates the hold ISIS took not only on territory but on the minds and spirits of those under its control. One of the most memorable was a phone conversation he witnessed between a regional Syrian rebel commander, Mohamed Zataar, and his opposite number in ISIS, known as Abu Ayman al-Iraqi, in 2014. The two exchanged pleasantries before explaining why the other should quit the fight. Zataar said that he fought for the freedom of the Syrian people; Abu Ayman fought for Islam. They bickered bitterly about alleged affronts perpetrated by the other side such as the mistreatment of prisoners. In the end, Giglio writes, their differences were insurmountable. "Either you cleanse us or we cleanse you," Abu Ayman concluded. (63)

Giglio chronicles the ISIS destruction of the Iraqi town of Sinjar and the cleansing there of the local Yazidi sect through mass executions of men and the systematic kidnapping and raping of women and children. He details the collapse of the Iraqi Army in the face of a much smaller but fiercely committed ISIS invasion and the occupation

of Mosul, Iraq's third largest city. He made contacts in Turkey who acted as smugglers supporting ISIS by helping foreign fighters enter Syria and, later, escape the onslaught of coalition airstrikes and advancing Kurdish and Free Syrian Army forces, boasting of how they would often embed them with fleeing refugees. Giglio's descriptions of these soft ISIS supporters—some of whom agreed with the group's goals but rejected its methods, and others who were true believers—is invaluable in providing context for how the group was able to operate so successfully for so long.

The third and final section of the book describes Giglio's observations while accompanying Iraqi Army and Iraqi Kurdish forces as they forcibly retook Mosul from ISIS from 2016 to 2017. This is tense, firsthand combat storytelling, and it helps illustrate the ferocity of ISIS fighters, thousands of whom have acted as suicide bombers. He recounts riding in armored Humvees under attack from mortar and machine gun fire and armored truck bombs, one of which seriously injured him and killed several Iraqi soldiers nearby. Of greater importance than the combat sequences, though, are Giglio's descriptions of Iraqi special forces troopers, men who had trained with US Special Forces and had, in many cases, been fighting for their country for over a decade. Major Salam Hussein al-Obaidi, whom Giglio called "Iraq's most renowned ISIS killer," features prominently, at one point explaining to Giglio why he fights on well after he could have left it to others. "The way we feel is that we are preventing the crisis from reaching our families. From reaching our neighbors, our city, or province. And that is what makes Iraq in the end." (251)

Giglio provides nothing approaching a happy ending, highlighting the utter destruction ISIS left in its wake and the colossal rebuilding and healing that Iraq and Syria will face for years to come. But his observations on the ISIS phenomenon merit careful consideration, even when he fails to provide arguments for how the situation could have turned out better. To his lasting credit, Giglio has produced a book that should serve as one among many good starting points for understanding what happened in those lands that made up the caliphate and possibly as a warning to those whose jobs are or will be to prevent a similar conquest by violent extremists in the future. ❖

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Major General George H. Sharpe and the Creation of American Military Intelligence in the Civil War

Peter G. Tsouras (Casemate Publishers, 2019), 447, appendices, index.

Reviewed by David Welker

If William J. Donovan can rightly be called the “Father of the CIA,” then George H. Sharpe might properly be American intelligence’s grandfather. Where Donovan’s story has been told in numerous books over the years, Peter Tsouras’s fine volume is surprisingly the first such treatment of this important man’s story. It is long overdue.

Like Donovan, George Sharpe lacked any intelligence background and was thrust into creating an intelligence organization by his superiors amidst a great national crisis. George Sharpe came from a prominent Kingston, New York, family and was, by training, a lawyer who answered his nation’s call at the outbreak of civil war in 1861. Key in organizing and leading the 120th New York Infantry—seeing his first combat at the December 1862 Battle of Fredericksburg—Sharpe was tapped by new Union Army commander Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker in January 1863 to stand up an organization to collect and report information from Confederate prisoners, deserters, civilians, and escaped slaves.

Because the United States had forgotten similar efforts by Generals Washington, Scott, and other leaders during previous wars, Sharpe lacked a model or traditions to smooth his path and, like Donovan nearly 100 years later, charted his own organizational course. Given a free hand, Sharpe formed what eventually became known as the Bureau of Military Information (BMI), which included a corps of scouts to conduct intelligence collection and a group of four men to assess and write all-source intelligence reports for General Hooker.

Although Hooker’s command tenure lasted barely beyond the May 1863 Union disaster at Chancellorsville, Sharpe’s organization lived on to serve successive Union commanders, George Meade and Ulysses Grant. When barely two months old, the BMI proved its value by presenting Meade vital intelligence that after two days of fighting in July 1863, Lee’s Confederate army possessed but a single fresh infantry division—Pickett’s. That

knowledge enabled the Union army’s surge to victory at Gettysburg. As Tsouras notes, “in fewer than 120 days of its existence the BMI had become, from a standing start, a fully functioning all-source intelligence operation . . . an accomplishment that would not be replicated again by the US Army at field army level until 1918 in World War I.”

Tsouras’ thoroughly researched and well written book weaves together two integrally intertwined stories, George Sharpe’s life and the the history of the BMI. He uses accounts of Sharpe’s pre-war life and rise through Union military ranks to demonstrate that it was largely George Sharpe’s influence and energy that created the first modern American intelligence organization, where earlier efforts like Pinkerton’s discredited Secret Service and various disparate Confederate networks had failed. The author—a retired Defense Intelligence Agency and National Ground Intelligence Center analyst—bolsters this volume’s value for intelligence officers by frequently using both period-accurate and modern intelligence terminology to describe BMI missions, actions, and impact.

Tsouras’ considerable research also brings to light numerous lost or forgotten stories of Civil War intelligence that otherwise might have remained hidden in the US Archives and Library of Congress. Recounting, for example, incidents in which Sharpe placed Union BMI scouts under cover among Confederate prisoners to ensure the veracity of intelligence collected there; reporting to Grant the same day they arrived the return of Jubal Early’s Southerners from the Shenandoah Valley to the Petersburg trenches; exposing to Washington British agents shipping New York-made goods to the Confederacy via Bermuda, and many more.

As a final example of the BMI’s effectiveness, Tsouras reports that at Appomattox, Grant used Sharpe’s order of battle estimates of Lee’s force—off by only 4 percent, despite weeks of near-daily personnel fluctuations—to allocate sufficient food to the starving, newly-returned

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Americans even before the final surrender ceremony in the McLean's parlor. Tsouras similarly tells the sad tale of the BMI's flagrant elimination by a nation eager for peace, an act for which the United States would pay again and again.

In closing *Major General George Sharpe*, Tsouras similarly shares Sharpe's largely untold post-war life, an interesting tale in itself. Although the BMI was no more, the nation continued benefitting from Sharpe's intelligence skills when he was dispatched to Europe to chase escaped Lincoln murder conspirator Benjamin Surratt—son of Mary Surratt, hanged for the crime—and researching possible Confederate government ties to the crime (he found none). Tsouras notes that like intelligence professionals today, Sharpe became an advocate for his former assets, particularly persuading Washington to grant Richmond-based spy Elizabeth Van Lew—Sharpe's most valuable source and operations officer—financial support after the war.

In 1870, President Grant appointed Sharpe US Marshall for the Southern District of New York, a position in which he successfully led the fight to quash William "Boss" Tweed's powerful and corrupt Tammany Hall organization before Sharpe entered New York State politics to become an assemblyman and speaker, among other achievements.

This reviewer's only criticism is that the volume contains a few avoidable typographical errors and in some instances the author included more background and detail on otherwise well known battles and events than the reader needs to make sense of Sharpe and the BMI's role. Still, Tsouras's valuable biography of George Sharpe joins former NSA officer Edwin Fishel's *Secret War for the Union* (1996) as required reading for those interested in learning about intelligence during the American Civil War.



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Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf—December 2020

Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake

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In Deep: The FBI, The CIA, and the Truth About America's "Deep State," by David Rohde

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Current Topics

In Deep: The FBI, The CIA, and the Truth About America's "Deep State," by David Rohde (W. W. Norton & Co., 2020), 323, plates, endnotes, index.

The theme of *In Deep* hinted at in the subtitle of this book is that elements of the Intelligence Community and the Justice and State Departments—the deep state—are conspiring against the president; or at least he thinks so. But David Rohde, executive editor of *The New Yorker* website, whose study is based on interviews and historical documents, concludes “there is no deep state” aimed at a “politically motivated coup.” (267) *In Deep* explains why he believes that to be an important truth.

To make his point, Rohde reviews the short history of the term, which was first used in Turkey, later in Egypt, and then in 2007 in the United States. But it was an anonymous article in *Breitbart News* entitled “The Deep State vs. Donald Trump” that sparked the current usage of the term. And while the article expanded the definition to include the “whole of the federal government” and “the mainstream media,” Rohde focuses on the IC. (xv–xvii)

Acknowledging that CIA and FBI are “enormously powerful organizations,” Rohde points out that “no other American president has accused [them] of carrying out a ‘coup’ in the United States.” *In Deep* then “chronicles the CIA and FBI scandals of the past 40 years—from the

activities the Church and Pike Committees investigated in the 1970s to Iran Contra . . . to Edward Snowden”—to demonstrate that none of these troubles involved a threat to the presidency. (xxi)

Then Rohde reviews the deep state argument from the administration’s perspective with emphasis on former Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James Clapper, former CIA Director John Brennan, former CIA officer Richard Blee, and former FBI Director James Comey and General Counsel James Baker among others. They all believed the Russians were attempting to interfere with the election. But contrary to rumors in the press, Rohde found that these officers concluded in 2016 that “there was no clear evidence that Trump was cooperating with Russia.” (150) Convincing the White House of their position was another matter, as the actual abuses by the FBI that Rohde makes no attempt to hide became known. On these and other issues of the day Rohde shows how difficult it was for the IC to maintain its reputation for political neutrality.

In the end, Rohde not only demonstrates the absence of a deep state supported by the IC, he makes a case for looking elsewhere for such a conspiracy. (274)

Intelligence and the National Security Enterprise: An Introduction, by Roger Z. George (Georgetown University Press, 2019), 327, end of chapter notes, index.

During a 30-year career with the CIA, Roger George also had assignments with the State and Defense Departments and the National Intelligence Council. He subsequently taught national security strategy at the National War College and Georgetown University, where he became an author of books on intelligence. He is currently an adjunct political scientist at the RAND Corporation. *Intelligence and the National Security Enterprise* is a textbook worthy of attention.

It is important that the prospective reader understand that the book is not about collection operations, i.e., espionage; rather, it is about what is done with intelligence—how it is analyzed and contributes to the development of policy. The inclusion of the term *enterprise* is intended to

indicate that today intelligence is not mainly concerned with military and diplomatic issues but includes cyber and socioeconomic factors as well.

Before George deals with “the kinds of decisions that policymakers often confront,” he discusses some basic topics to provide a common foundation: the definition of intelligence, the Intelligence Community structure and the intelligence cycle. He then turns to the matters of concern to policymakers: strategic intelligence and its tactical implications, indications and warning, covert action, and policy support functions. (3) He starts each topic with a definition; discusses who produces it, stressing the importance of accuracy; and considers the various forms

of presentation—estimate, special estimate, information memorandum—and finally its value to the policymaker.

Of course, an estimate's value depends in part on the quality of relationships between analysts and policymakers, and George devotes considerable attention to that subject. His addresses politicization, presidents and their intelligence advisors, and intelligence at the center of policy disputes. In the last category his examples include Vietnam, the Iraq War decision in 2003, and Russian interference in the 2016 elections. The final comments in this area concern the dangers of politicization, for which he offers sound guidance.

O*ne Nation, Under Drones: Legality, Morality, and Utility of Unmanned Combat Systems*, edited by Capt. John E. Jackson, USN (Ret.) (Naval Institute Press, 2018), 229, end of chapter notes photos, index.

“Unmanned and robotic technologies are transforming the nature of conflict . . . and the conduct of military operations,” writes Francis Kelly, deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for unmanned systems in his foreword to this book. Capt. Jackson, who teaches a course in unmanned systems at the Naval War College, presents examples of how this came about and is occurring in the defense establishment in the 13 contributions found in *One Nation, Under Drones*.

What we think of as a drone today was once called a robot and variations could fly or operate below the sea. But that definition didn't allow for a human at the controls and was unsatisfactory. Who selected the term drone is unknown, but Jackson defines drones as “unmanned aircraft or ships guided by remote control or through an onboard computer system.” (2)

Although the term may be modern, drones are not. They were used during both world wars, though technologically less sophisticated. While describing their early development, Jackson makes a minor digression to note that Norma Jean Dougherty (Marilyn Monroe) was discovered working on a drone assembly line. (5)

Subsequent topics include the use of drones in maritime systems; how to defeat drones; the legal aspects, especially with armed and reconnaissance systems; the problem

Intelligence and the National Security Enterprise concludes with a thoughtful essay on intelligence and American democracy. Not a topic often found in a textbook, but George's observations are worth close attention. For example, he discusses whether intelligence can be ethical, secret, and transparent while preserving privacy and national security, especially in the post-9/11 era. Then he turns to the many variations of congressional and executive branch oversight intended to assure citizens that the IC does not abuse its authority.

Roger George has given readers a firm foundation for thinking about how analysts and policymakers work in the effort to secure the nation's security and interests.

of non-combatants; and the debate over the ethical use of drone weapons systems. Each of the contributors provides photos and compares system capabilities and performance.

The ethical debate is discussed by Air Force Maj. Joe Chapa, who teaches philosophy at the Air Force Academy. After another critique of the inadequacy of the term drone, he zeroes in on a key issue, the ability of a drone system “to discretely target one individual while sparing the rest.” While this is a choice made by every infantryman in combat, Chapa sees it in terms of its strategic and tactical implications while invoking Just War Theory. (189) It is a thoughtful assessment.

Captain Jackson's concluding essay looks at the future of drones and likely technical improvements that will in some cases be driven by artificial intelligence (AI). On that point he notes that more than one-thousand scientists signed a public letter “warning of the threat represented by further research into military-focused intelligence machines.” (208) He acknowledges the theoretical truth of such concerns but argues that human beings can overcome the threat of an AI-dominated world.

One Nation, Under Drones is well documented and presents solid background to all aspects of the topic.

Subordinating Intelligence: The DoD/CIA Post-Cold War Relationship, by David P. Oakley (University Press of Kentucky, 2019), 248, endnotes, bibliography, index.

David Oakley is an Army lieutenant colonel serving as assistant professor at the National Defense University. During a previous break in service, he completed the CIA's clandestine service staff operations officer course. In *Subordinating Intelligence*, he draws on both experiences and attempts to show that the CIA's traditional mission of "trying to understand the intentions of world leaders or informing policy and strategic development" has been subordinated to the DoD, making the "military the dominant player in foreign policy." (x) In practical terms, he raises the questionable argument that this leaves the CIA without "the ability to focus its foreign-intelligence collection capability on the world more broadly." (7)

Oakley discusses these and other opinions influencing the topic and, in the process, asserts the curious notion that within the Intelligence Community "there is not a consensus on the purpose of intelligence," (7) since informing the decisionmaker is too broad a definition. He provides no immediate evidence to support his view and leaves the reader anticipating it will be found elsewhere: it is not.

Subordinating Intelligence does provide examples of how the Gulf War, 9/11, the Iraq War and major terrorism incidents affected the DoD/CIA relationship. This includes an analysis of the new flag-officer deputy director position intended to improve liaison, and it acknowledges there have been exceptions to the subordination

argument, e.g., the bin Ladin operation in which CIA held the command position. Oakley also discusses DoD and CIA reforms—some congressional, some departmental—and their effect on the relationship. In the latter category he describes the herculean efforts of defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld to create his own CIA, not subordinate to DIA and reporting to his undersecretary of defense for intelligence. (129ff)

The views of previous secretaries of defense, CIA directors, and high-level subordinates are brought to bear on contentious issues such as HUMINT collection, organization, and policies. Some argue for a single HUMINT service, but the consensus is not to make the change. (98ff) This point of view is important because Oakley's subordination argument implies that CIA is devoting too much effort to supporting the military while espionage and analytical missions suffer as a result. While Oakley cites several former D/CIA's who warn of this possibility, (158) neither they nor he provides examples of where this occurred.

Perhaps it is fair to say that foreign policy may be taking on an increasingly military cast and that intelligence has in recent times played a closer supporting role to the military. But Oakley doesn't come close to making the case for CIA subordination to the DoD. He needs to learn more about CIA missions.

Historical

Atomic Spy: The Dark Lives of Klaus Fuchs, by Nancy Thorndike Greenspan (Viking, 2020), 400, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

On September 5, 1945, GRU code clerk Igor Gouzenko defected in Ottawa, Canada, setting in motion events that exposed the penetration of the Manhattan Project and other agencies of the Canadian, US, and British governments by Soviet intelligence services. One of the best known cases of atomic espionage revealed involved Klaus Fuchs, a German-born, naturalized British subject, who delivered atomic secrets to the Soviets from the early 1940s until 1949. Many books have been written about the case and the emergence of another one prompts the question: can

it contain anything new? In the case of *Atomic Spy*, the answer is a qualified "yes."

But the new material has little to do with Fuchs's espionage career, which for completeness, author Nancy Greenspan briefly reviews. This includes his arrival in Britain to attend graduate school in 1939 and his short internment in Canada that enhanced his dedication to communism. But it was his recruitment to work on the Tube Alloys project—Britain's atomic bomb research—and the

acceptance by the Soviets of his offer to provide details of his work that made him a traitor. Equally important, she describes his assignment to the United States, his work at Los Alamos, and his continued contacts with Soviet intelligence through his American contact, Harry Gold, who had links to the Rosenberg net. Finally, she describes his return to postwar Britain where he worked on the British atomic bomb program. He continued supplying the Soviets with secrets until his espionage was revealed by the VENONA decrypts. His 1950 confession followed.

What is new in Greenspan's account is her description of Fuchs's virtuous commitment to Soviet communism from his university days in Germany until his death. At university he joined and was active in the Communist Party, becoming leader of one of its youth organizations, the Red Spark, "an agitprop troupe" that was "part entertainment and part hard-core political propaganda." (41) Greenspan

concludes that his life "was consistent and constant to his unwavering set of ideals. He sought the betterment of mankind that transcended national boundaries. His goal was to balance world power and prevent nuclear blackmail. As he saw it science was his weapon in a war to protect humanity." (353)

A sympathetic Greenspan speculates that his espionage "might have kept the United States from dropping an atomic bomb on North Korea. If so, was that a bad outcome? Was the person who made that happen evil or good, guilty or innocent, traitor or hero?" (354)

Atomic Spy is well documented with primary sources and covers the subject well. The facts presented leave the reader wondering whether MI5 could have caught Fuchs sooner. But they don't justify speculating on his guilt or innocence.

Emperor of Spies: Onodera's Wartime Network in Northern Europe, by C. G. McKay (Spinx Books, 2019), 91, footnotes, no index.

In his 1993 book on WWII Swedish intelligence, independent intelligence historian, C.G. McKay called the "multifarious dealings" of Japanese military attaché in Stockholm, Lt. Gen. Makato Onodera, legendary.^a Thaddeus Holt echoed this judgment in his 2001 book *The Deceivers*, calling Onodera "one of the best."^b Neither author added much supporting detail. Since then Onodera's debriefings by the CIA have been declassified and other archival material has become available. They provide the sources for McKay's monograph.

After a summary of Onodera's early life and a synopsis of the events that led Japanese intelligence to develop "highly secret cooperation with some its European sister organizations" (7) during the interwar period, McKay focuses on Onodera's career as a military attaché specializing on Russia, Japan's longtime strategic nemesis. Russian was a language Onodera could speak. After service in Latvia, Onodera was assigned to Stockholm, where he was based throughout the war. His mission was to collect intelligence on Russia, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, the Baltic countries, and the Western Allies. (12) He did not attempt to disguise his

position. He developed sources "within the fraternity of military attachés" and among "a cadre of close associates," including selected journalists, one with links to Max Klatt (Richard Kauders) who fooled the Germans. (81) McKay gives examples of relationships built with both groups—in particular those in Poland, Germany, Britain, and Sweden.

Before Hitler invaded Poland, the Japanese embassy in Warsaw had been "the centre for Japanese intelligence on Russia." (46) McKay explains how Onodera secured Polish help in Stockholm, where a Polish intelligence officer served as his "chief of staff." (47) Among his German Abwehr contacts, Karl-Heinz Krämer demonstrated reliability problems. OSS reports showed that some of his reports were fabricated, thus raising questions about others, and McKay is left wondering whether Onodera ever thought "that Krämer was merely an intelligence fraudster." (87)

One contact with British intelligence was peripheral in nature and involved a double agent, OUTCAST, who served MI6 officer Harry Carr and Onodera. Although

a. C. G. McKay, *From Information To Intrigue: Studies in Secret Service Based on the Swedish Experience, 1939–1945* (Frank Cass & Co, Ltd., 1993), 240.

b. Thaddeus Holt, *The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War* (Scribner, 2001), 112.

mentioned in the Jeffery history of MI6^a using only his codename, McKay identifies him as Aleksei Bellegarde. (60) McKay goes on to show that the Swedish service determined that Bellegarde had contacts with other intelligence organizations.

Emperor of Spies also describes Onodera's wartime communications with Tokyo. He filed reports on all

foreign contacts, some using a one-time pad, others embassy encryption, which the Allies could often intercept and decrypt. Nevertheless, his superiors and the Germans were pleased with his efforts; he was promoted by the former and awarded by the latter. But from history's perspective, while McKay has filled an interesting gap, the reader is necessarily left wondering what, if anything, Onodera's intelligence service accomplished?

From Kites To Cold War: The Evolution of Manned Airborne Reconnaissance, by Tyler Morton (Naval Institute Press, 2019), 304, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

After more than 2,500 hours in various reconnaissance aircraft, Air Force Col. Tyler Morton decided to write a history of his passion, airborne reconnaissance. Beginning with the Chinese use of man-lifting kites sometime in the sixth century CE, *From Kites To Cold War* describes major developments in the field, with only tangential mention of satellites since they have been covered elsewhere.

Although experiments with man-lifting kites continued into the 20th century, hot-air balloons proved far more practical after they were first launched in France in June 1783. Benjamin Franklin, then ambassador to France, followed balloon experiments with interest as did George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison. And while some experiments were conducted in the United States, the main progress was made in Europe. Morton reviews their gradual adaptation to military uses there and eventually in the American Civil War. In this period, the use of balloons went beyond human visual observation with the introduction of photography and the telegraphy. Further experience was gained in the Spanish America War. Attempts in the early 20th century to create maneuverable rigid and non-rigid airships were unsuccessful from a military point of view. Thus, airborne reconnaissance did not become a reliable part of the intelligence equation until World War I, when aircraft gradually supplanted balloons. Morton recounts the pioneering contributions of Lt. Col. George Squire and Col. Billy Mitchell in the effort.

In the early interwar period, the former belligerents struggled to improve their airborne reconnaissance capabilities while dealing with high priority issues, the need for more versatile aircraft, improved cameras, and training of interpreters. Each succeeded in varying degrees,

but only the Germans were ready for World War II. The Allies made quick progress once the war started, however. Morton shows how they dealt with bureaucratic and organizational issues while solving equipment—aircraft and photographic—problems so essential to targeting for strategic bombing and learning about Hitler's V weapons program. The Allies ended the war with impressive ELINT, COMINT—including on-board linguists—and IMINT capabilities.

Despite major reductions in force after World War II, airborne reconnaissance gained in importance as the Cold War took shape; it was the principal source of imagery and electronic intelligence on the Soviet Union until the emergence of satellites systems in the 1960s. And it remained, then and now, the only collection source suitable for certain missions. Colonel Morton explains how the WWII airframes were adapted for reconnaissance and applied in the Korean and Vietnam Wars. He then describes the advent of the U-2 and the SR-71 and the impact they had on airborne reconnaissance, especially in cases in which satellite coverage was unavailable.

What does the future hold for airborne reconnaissance? Colonel Morton acknowledges the answer is something of a mystery, but in his view, while unmanned platforms will “do much of the airborne collection, manned airborne ISR [intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance] assets will remain indispensable.” (209)

From Kites To Cold War is thoroughly documented with sources and photos, and it has an excellent bibliography. A valuable contribution to the history of airborne reconnaissance and a solid basis for thinking about its future.

a. Keith Jeffery, *MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service* (Bloomsbury, 2010), 516.

Getting To Know The President: Intelligence Briefings of Presidential Candidates and Presidents-Elect (Third edition), by John L. Helgerson (Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2019), 269, footnotes, photos, index.

President Harry Truman established the practice of briefing presidential candidates and candidates-elect on world and intelligence affairs. John Helgerson has written the history of the program in the three editions of *Getting To Know The President*. Each edition summarizes the briefings given to the candidates and their staffs at various locations. The second edition ended with President George W. Bush, whom Helgerson characterized as a “Demanding Consumer.” The third edition adds President Barack Obama, “A Careful Reader,” and ends with the briefings given to Mitt Romney and Paul Ryan in 2012. Helgerson concludes with some general observations that make this edition some 60 pages longer than its predecessor.

What kind of things can one learn from such a book? The first lesson, writes Helgerson, is “the most fundamental truth of briefing presidents: no two are alike and you must tailor the approach to the commander.” Briefing President Bush on the *President’s Daily Brief (PDB)* was an interactive event, whereas for his successor, the *PDB* was presented as a book and Obama “read it . . . carefully and ideally, uninterrupted” before discussing supplementary issues. (195)

More generally, “the election of Obama and his transition to office were distinct in a number of respects.” Among them, the 2008 election was the first in which the Office of Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) had responsibility—assisted by CIA staff and other members of the Intelligence Community—for briefing the candidates and the president-elect. That the briefings went well, with a few exceptions, was due in large part to the cooperative attitude of the outgoing administration and the willingness of Obama’s transition team to comply with the many rules that his predecessor had set out and which Helgerson recounts.

The briefings began before the debates and the election. The topics, and those allowed to be briefed, changed after the election and Helgerson comments on the problems that were dealt with relating to those matters. For example, the first briefing of the president-elect occurred in the FBI office in Chicago, and one of his still-uncleared potential staff members asked to leave. Obama was not pleased but continued to attend. (202)

Helgerson notes the president-elect’s responses to the briefings he received on most days, wherever he was,

including Hawaii. He “thrived on exploring the reasons for analytical differences occasionally expressed by the various IC agencies.” (205) On occasion, “deep dive” briefings were presented on topics ranging from the “Middle East, South Asia, Iran, nuclear proliferation, homeland security and terrorism” and covert action. (210)

The vice president-elect received *PDB* briefings also, though not usually with the president-elect nor as frequently. Helgerson writes that “he impressed the briefers as being very knowledgeable about the subjects and having established views on most of the issues.” (207)

In the post inauguration era, President Obama continued to read his *PDB*—though eventually on a “tablet computer”—while briefers sat and waited to go over the material in their turn. Helgerson explains how DNI Clapper corrected this awkward situation while increasing the number of expert analysts who briefed the president. Obama continued to read the *PDB* throughout his presidency.

In 2012, President Obama followed the precedent set by earlier presidents in briefing the Republican candidates. Helgerson comments on the topics covered, including the “Issue of Benghazi” that was politically sensitive at the time. (227)

In a concluding assessment of the briefing program since its inception, Helgerson notes why the policy got off to a rocky start with Presidents Kennedy, Nixon, and Johnson and then includes the recommendations of four former presidents interviewed on this issue. All expressed the need for a president to have senior intelligence personnel who are apolitical—several cited William Casey as an example of a poor choice—and “with whom he feels comfortable.” (238) In a somewhat surprising conclusion, Helgerson writes that “the inescapable lesson from the history of the IC—albeit a lesson that neither presidents, DCIs, nor DNIs are eager to draw explicitly—is that it works better when a new president appoints his own director.” (239)

Getting To Know The President makes it clear that intelligence is important to presidents of both parties and that the IC has developed an effective means of meeting that need.

Guardians of Churchill's Secret Army: Men of the Intelligence Corps in the Special Operations Executive, by Peter Dixon (CLOUDSHILL Press, 2018), 225, footnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Former Royal Air Force pilot and now independent researcher Peter Dixon has found perhaps the only story unmentioned in the numerous accounts devoted to Special Operations Executive (SOE) exploits. In *Guardians of Churchill's Secret Army*, he tells about the officers and men in the British Army's Intelligence Corps Field Security Service (FSS) who were assigned to SOE F Section to train its officers how to conduct secure operations in occupied countries.

Dixon's "focus is on the relatively junior individuals" (3) whose job it was to keep "SOE's secret agents secure and safe." (4) But many of these guardians of security, for example Teddy Bisset, became SOE agents themselves. The book begins with his story, then provides historical background on SOE, and proceeds to describe some of its operations.

The Bisset case illustrates a key message of the book. Although Bisset was bilingual in French and English, what he contributed to SOE security training was more common sense than technical, and it is easy to understand why eventually he "applied to be relieved from F Section staff duties to take up other employment in the field." (28)

In a later chapter, "Securing SOE," Dixon describes how security procedures were "developed in an ad hoc way" (83) with the help of MI5, SIS, and Special Branch. While the basic field procedures were known and conveyed,

counterintelligence security was to some extent another matter. The most flagrant failure in this area occurred in the Dutch Section, where operations were thoroughly penetrated by the Germans, and SOE security ignored all signals to the contrary. Dixon doesn't claim a new revelation here and included the example for historical completeness.

Not all members of the Field Security Service were British, and Dixon discusses several. One example is the story of Canadian Rhodes Scholar Ken Macalister, who trained potential field agents in secure communication procedures and how to react to arrest by the Gestapo. How Macalister learned the procedures is not explained. He hadn't learned firsthand because, like Bisset, he, too, applied for and was granted a field assignment after his staff security work. But unlike Bisset, Macalister's field work was reported by M.R.D. Foot so that part of Dixon's account is not original.^a

Guardians of Churchill's Secret Army accomplishes the first of Dixon's objectives in that he focuses on the contributions of little known FSS/SOE officers. But, when it comes to the second, he conveys, perhaps unintentionally, the impression that the FSS security training mission was not particularly challenging to the personnel involved and could be handled by SOE staff. In the process he adds much SOE historical material covered elsewhere. Interesting while filling a narrow gap.

Information Hunters: When Librarians, Soldiers and Spies Banded Together in World War II Europe, by Kathy Peiss (Oxford University Press, 2020), 277, endnotes, photos, index.

Kathy Peiss is a history professor at the University of Pennsylvania. Reuben Peiss, an uncle she never met, was a librarian at Harvard who joined OSS in World War II. *Information Hunters* tells the story of his OSS career and the origins of what became the CIA's open source intelligence program.

Reuben was part of a group of "American archivists, scholars, spies and soldiers" OSS sent abroad to acquire "books, documents and . . . enemy publications" (6) in neutral cities and occupied zones of Europe. The concept

on which the program rested was that an intelligence service should know everything possible about the enemy's history, culture, and ideological proclivities. Books, newspapers, and other forms of propaganda from fascist and occupied nations were of particular importance. Little did the librarians realize that their mission would become "fraught with mystery, uncertainty, and even danger." (40)

What became the OSS information collection project grew out of discussions in 1941 between Archibald MacLeish, the Librarian of Congress (LOC), and William

a. M.R.D. Foot, *SOE In France* (Frank Cass, 2004), 278–80.

Donovan, the Coordinator of Information, soon to become director of OSS. Agents were dispatched to Europe before the United States entered the war and some were already in Europe. Among the latter was Maria Meyer, the LOC representative in Paris, “who quietly outmaneuvered German authorities to collect materials for the library,” while adding commentary on Nazi behavior. (34)

After the “phony war” ended in May 1940, agents were sent to operate out of neutral cities like Lisbon—where Reuben was first assigned—and Stockholm. Initially the tasking was open-ended and the collectors paid for what they found. As the war progressed, priorities changed and all sorts of material were acquired. Peiss writes, “even gossip columns provide clues to scandal which a secret agent could exploit.” (59) No examples of the latter are provided. Soon the sheer bulk of material overwhelmed the handling and shipping capabilities and microphotography laboratories were established.

As things became more organized, the collection effort was named the Interdepartmental Committee for the Acquisition of Foreign Publication (IDC for short). Peiss tells how its potential customers in the states provided tasking and the IDC made keyword lists, cataloged acquisitions, created finding aids, and arranged distribution. It was at that point she writes “that the IDC changed from an acquisition group to an active producer of intelligence.” (62)

Night of the Assassins: The Untold Story of Hitler’s Plot to Kill FDR, Churchill, and Stalin, by Howard Blum (HarperCollins, 2020), 373, photos, index.

At a press conference in Moscow on November 18, 2003, the Russian foreign intelligence service (SVR) announced the publication of a book by Yuri Kuznets, *Tehran 43: Operation Long Jump*, which purported to tell the story of a Nazi plot to assassinate the Big Three during the 1943 Tehran Conference. This was not the first time the topic had surfaced. British journalist Richard Deacon gave an abbreviated version in 1972^a; Anatoli Sudoplatov

After D-Day, some collectors were formed into rapid-strike document teams, known as T-Forces, which worked with the military as they occupied cities and towns. These teams acquired documentation that would be used for war crimes trials, some for holocaust authentication, some for denazification processing. Scientific publications were a high priority, as were materials stolen from Jewish families and libraries, which the teams attempted to recover and restore to their owners. Some of the IDC members continued collecting after the war ended. Peiss tells how her uncle was part of a team that managed to secure materials from Leipzig in the Soviet Zone, after paying \$106,000.

The IDC worked with and sometimes in competition with libraries in the United States and its allies. Peiss mentions the Hoover Institution Library at Stanford and the Yale library where Sherman Kent supported foreign book acquisition and preservation programs before and after he joined OSS.

Information Hunters concludes by noting that “OSS and military efforts to acquire open-source intelligence. . . offered a model for collecting open sources for postwar intelligence” agencies. While the principal legacy of the program “was the books and documents themselves,” (211) the book also shows the contributions of the dedicated, unheralded librarians to the intelligence profession that continues to this day.

mentions the plot briefly in his book, *Special Tasks*^b; and Nigel West included its codename, Long Jump, in his short account.^c A variation on the story was offered by historian Gary Kern when he suggested Stalin spread the rumor of a Nazi assassination plot as an excuse to get FDR to reside on the Soviet compound, where his quarters were bugged, rather than across town at the US embassy.^d And lastly, invoking the Soviet track record for truth telling,

a. Richard Deacon, *A History of the Russian Secret Service* (Taplinger Publishing, 1972), 395.

b. Anatoli Sudoplatov with Jerrold L. and Leona P. Schecter, *Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness—A Soviet Spymaster* (Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 130.

c. Nigel West, *Historical Dictionary of World War II Intelligence* (Scarecrow Press, 2008), 140–41.

d. Gary Kern, “How Uncle Joe Bugged FDR,” *Studies In Intelligence* 47, no. 1 (March 2003).

2014 Adrian O’Sullivan characterized the operation as “a Russian fabrication” and “a baseless epic.”^a

Night of the Assassins acknowledges these and other sources in its effort to sort out the truth by applying a curious method. Author Howard Blum asks the reader to accept that all the quotes, facts, statements, and deductions provided come from sources he has read and listed, without linking them to specific source notes. For example, he implies that an NKVD general informed the president’s bodyguard on arrival in Tehran that the “Nazis have dropped thirty-eight parachutists around Tehran over the past few days,” before adding that “they have all been captured by his men,” and that “six heavily armed commandos were still on the loose.” (283–84) The contradiction is not explained and no source is given.

At the same time, one cannot deny the book is an exciting read. From the opening account of the shootdown of the plane carrying *Gone With the Wind* actor Leslie Howard, Blum uses FDR’s Secret Service bodyguard, Mike Reilly, as a central character as he develops the evolution and planning of the assassination plot. We learn the roles of the British Secret Service, the NKVD, and the less than satisfactory—in Reilly’s eyes—contributions of the OSS and the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC). Then there is a German spy in the British embassy in Ankara—CICERO—and a key double agent (162–63) among the Nazis planted by the NKVD, who reveals the role of super commando Otto Skorzeny. (276)

Night of the Assassins reads like a novel and might make a good movie, but as intelligence history, it only qualifies as a great final exam for a fact-checking class.

Project Rainfall: The Secret History of Pine Gap, by Tom Gilling (Allen & Unwin, 2019), 306, bibliography, no index.

The function of the “Joint Defence Facility Pine Gap,” Australia, which is NSA codename RAINFALL, was a very controversial secret from its earliest days in 1965, until it was acknowledged publicly in 2017. Author Tom Gilling writes that the facility is staffed by Australian and US military and civilian personnel who perform its SIGINT and combat mission “including drone strikes.” (267) But it was not initially so, and he tells that story, too.

Project Rainfall describes how Pine Gap was selected as a base for intercepting Soviet ELINT signals during the Cold War and the political difficulties that had to be overcome in both countries to make it a reality. Gilling explains how its mission, kept secret under its official name, the Joint Defence Space Research Facility, created problems in the Australian Parliament as bits of its work leaked to the press. Examples of the latter include the books written by the late Australian academic Desmond Ball^b (9, passim), the details presented in Robert Lindsay’s book, *The Falcon and the Snowman* (105) and undocumented contributions from former CIA officer, the late Victor Marchetti. (124)

Much of the book is chronological as it examines how each prime minister and his cabinet dealt with the secrecy and domestic political issues that arose. As to secrecy, examples include the cover of American personnel, especially when their true affiliations were questioned in Parliament. Equally troubling was the mention of CIA and not the Department of Defense, as a major player, since that raised questions of nefarious secret operations that only resulted in further refusal to elaborate details. (149–51) And of course, the main reason for secrecy was to keep the true mission of Pine Gap from the Soviets. But as Gilling makes clear, the Soviets were very likely cognizant due to the “energetic KGB rezident in Canberra from 1977–1984,” Lev Sergeevich Koshlyakov.

In the domestic category, Gilling tells how the United States initially concurred with a Soviet request to establish a satellite tracking station in Australia, provided it was passive, but the Australians never allowed it to be built. (26) Of greater concern was the fact that Pine Gap made Australia a nuclear target for Soviet and Chinese missiles. And despite sharing the intelligence collected, the fact that it was an US facility over which they had little control was a constant source of irritation. (93ff)

a. Adrian O’Sullivan, *Nazi Secret Warfare in Occupied Persia (Iran): The Failure of the German Intelligence Services, 1939–1945* (Palgrave, 2014), 134.

b. Desmond Ball. *A Suitable Piece of Real Estate: American Installations in Australia* (Hake & Iremonger Pty Ltd., 1984).

Gilling doesn't provide endnotes, but he does cite some sources in the narrative, except in the final chapter. There, out of the blue, he attempts to link Pine Gap to UFOs, at

least in "the minds of some Australians." (298) *Caveat lector*.

RIGGED: America, Russia and One Hundred Years of Covert Electoral Interference, by David Shimer (Alfred A. Knopf, 2020), 367, endnotes, bibliography, index.

As a Yale University undergraduate, David Shimer spent the summer of 2017 as an intern in the Berlin office of *New York Times*. There he interviewed a former Stasi officer who had participated in rigging—at the Soviet's behest—of the no-confidence vote that kept the chancellor of Germany, Willy Brandt, in power in 1972. The parallels with the then-current stories about Russian interference in the 2016 US elections were obvious and when Shimer went on to graduate school at Oxford, he expanded his research into election meddling by the Soviet Union, Russia, and the United States. Then he wrote *RIGGED*.

The experiences of the two countries are quite different. The United States got a late start. After World War II it pressured Italy not to vote communist with the threat that "a Communist led Italy would not receive any Marshall Plan aid." (28) At the local level, the "Letters to Italy initiative" urged Italian Americans to "mail anti-Communist letters back home." (30) Shimer goes on to show how these efforts became a template of sorts for later operations in Latin America, Chile, South Asia, and Iran.

The history of Soviet meddling in foreign elections, by contrast, began with the revolution in 1917. Shimer gives examples of how it spread its ideology through influence operations and secret funding before World War II and by political coercion in the postwar era, mostly in East Europe. But the Soviets also attempted to influence the 1960 US election, when Khrushchev sent a letter to Adlai Stevenson urging him to run against Nixon because "we are concerned that America has the right president." (87) And when Nixon ran again in 1968, the Soviets secretly offered candidate Humphrey any conceivable help in his election campaign—including financial aid. (93) According to Shimer, the KGB also "worked against Nixon, Reagan, and 'Scoop' Jackson" because they were seen as anti-Soviet hawks. (99) He thus sets the table for Russian meddling in 2016, which he views as "the evolution of a practice rather than its creation." (7)

The purpose of Putin's meddling, since Russia cannot surpass the United States by strengthening Russia, was to

"reduce America's global influence by manipulating its allies and tearing apart its electorate. . . . The logical way to accomplish this mission is to support authoritarian-minded candidates in foreign democracies." And in today's world, the technical way to do it is to use the internet, which Putin once called a "CIA project." (144–5)

But the meddling requires more than internet skills to be successful; the target must not recognize the tools being utilized or at least not understand the nature of the media information warfare attacks deployed. Shimer demonstrates that this was the case prior to the 2016 elections by citing an impressive collection of interviews with high-level Obama administration officials who admitted they missed the meddling when it occurred and didn't know what to do about it when they finally realized what was happening. A typical response was, "Oh, this only happens in third world countries," admitted Jeh Johnson, Obama's secretary of homeland security. (154) Similarly, Susan Rice, the National Security Advisor, admitted that Russia's information warfare in social media remained "very poorly understood" through election day, (172) even though the Intelligence Community had already provided warnings of Russian meddling. Of course, the IC recognized its mission was to warn policymakers, not to take corrective action.

But when action was suggested, excessive caution prevailed. As CIA Director Leon Panetta characterized the president's response, "The more cautious [Obama] became, the more he sent a signal to adversaries that they could do things to take advantage of him." Even more damaging, Panetta, David Petraeus, and Michael Morell, each a former CIA director under Obama, believe "Obama signaled to Putin that he could interfere in an American election without suffering significant consequences." (159) Since they expected a Clinton victory, the worst that could happen was a Trump claim the election was rigged and that they could disprove.

Shimer concludes that "Moscow's objective has evolved from spreading communism to tearing down democracy,"

using the internet as his implement. Someone must “step in and defend America’s sovereignty,” hopefully before

the next election. (241) *RIGGED* is well argued and solidly documented.

The Saboteur: The Aristocrat Who Became France’s Most Daring Anti-Nazi Commando, by Paul Kix (Harper, 2017), 286, endnotes, no index.

Sixteen-year-old Robert de La Rochefoucauld was a young member of an old, wealthy, aristocratic French family, one member of which had been a friend of Benjamin Franklin. Rochefoucauld had been educated in France and Germany, where on an Alpine outing he had met Hitler. (32) When the Nazis invaded France and imprisoned his father, Rochefoucauld left his 47-room chateau and, answering de Gaulle’s call, escaped to London via Spain.

According to author Paul Kix, a deputy editor at ESPN magazine, Rochefoucauld soon received an offer of services from the newly formed Special Operations Executive (SOE) but hesitated to accept because “he wanted to join the Free French forces” under de Gaulle. (60) But, despite de Gaulle’s well known preference for the Free French forces and his antipathy toward SOE, Kix asserts, de Gaulle advised Rochefoucauld to join SOE since “It’s all for France even if its allied with the devil.” (62)

After completing the rigorous SOE training program, Rochefoucauld was parachuted into occupied France in 1943 and was met, writes Kix, by men “from the local

chapter of the Alliance . . . resistance and intelligence group formed by Marie Madeleine Fourcade.” (88) This is unlikely; the Alliance network was run by MI6, not SOE.^a Its mission was to collect intelligence, not conduct sabotage. A cause of Kix’s apparent confusion may be that none of the books written about the Alliance network mentions Rochefoucauld, either in true-name or pseudonym. The same is true of books written about SOE operations in France.^b

Whatever the correct name of Rochefoucauld’s first network affiliation, Kix describes a few instances of Rochefoucauld’s sabotage efforts and his later contacts with genuine SOE networks in the Bordeaux area. More exciting are his descriptions of the three times he is captured by and escapes from the Gestapo, though Kix adds little detail about Rochefoucauld’s interrogations.

Sourcing for *The Saboteur* may account for the factual inconsistencies. Kix relied on Rochefoucauld’s memoir—published in French—and interviews with family. And though he tells an interesting tale, he does not justify calling Rochefoucauld *France’s Most Daring Anti-Nazi Commando*.

Soldiers, Scouts & Spies: A Military History of the New Zealand Wars 1845–1864, by Cliff Simons (Massey University Press, 2019), 431, photos, index.

“The first Māori reaction to contact with the Europeans . . . was to kill and eat them.” So wrote the New Zealand historian James Belich in his study of the indigenous people of New Zealand, who settled on North Island in the 13th century. In 1642, Dutch explorer Abel Tasman was the first European to visit the island; there, four of his men were killed.^c After subsequent, less costly visits by Captain Cook and others, trade relationships with

the Māori were established, and New Zealand became a British colony in 1841. But that didn’t bring peace.

Soldiers, Scouts & Spies tells the stories of the seven or so wars—fought over land and weapons—that ensued between the British army and the indigenous tribes of New Zealand. The emphasis throughout is on how military

a. Lynne Olson, *Madame Fourcade’s Secret War* (Random House, 2019), xx.

b. *Ibid*; Marie Madeleine Fourcade, *Noah’s Ark: A Memoir of Struggle and Resistance* (E. P. Dutton, 1974); see also: M.R.D. Foot, *SOE In France* (Frank Cass, 2004).

c. James Belich, *The New Zealand Wars* (Penguin Books (NZ) Ltd, 1998), 19.

intelligence was applied in each one, a topic seldom addressed in histories of the New Zealand wars. (21)

Author Cliff Simons, director of the New Zealand War Studies Centre at the New Zealand Defence College, addresses the following questions: What happened when “two completely different cultures met on the battlefield?” (21) How did they learn about each other? What were their reasons for fighting? What weapons did they possess? What were their tactics? Did they have maps, informants, or allies? How did they overcome the language barrier?

While these are obvious questions British commanders would ask, Simons points out that at the time there was no Intelligence Corps in the British Army and that New Zealand was unknown territory. The Māori—and the several other tribes Simons mentions—on the other hand, were familiar with the terrain, were shrewd traders, and learned English from the missionaries. They also learned to do business with the British New Zealand Company

that controlled land distribution, (174) which in some cases led to the wars.

Simons tells of battles won and lost by both sides in which intelligence played significant roles, both positive and negative. For example, he explains why “the battle of Kororāreka, during what was called the Northern War, was an unmitigated disaster for the government.” (106) But overall, the British were successful in establishing their dominance.

In addition to explaining how intelligence contributed to New Zealand’s formative wars, *Soldiers, Scouts & Spies* conveys a good deal about the country’s colonial history, culture, and language. Simons uses many tribal terms, not all of which he defines—Google helps here. What stands out at the end is that the requirements of military intelligence are inherent to the task and both formal and tribal military forces learned quickly how to answer the questions war inevitably poses. A fine contribution to the canon of Five Eyes historical scholarship.

Spies On Trial: True Tales of Espionage in the Courtroom, by Cecil C. Kuhne, III (Rowman & Littlefield, 2019) 215, endnotes, appendices, index.

Cecil Kuhne is a lawyer in Dallas who has written extensively on litigation, but none of his cases touched on espionage. The closest he has come to that subject is his shelf of John le Carré novels. He does, however, know how to read court documents and extract the legal essence of decisions made. In *Spies On Trial* he discusses 16 espionage cases and analyzes their legal foundation, their trials, their verdicts and the results of their appeals. In each case Kuhne includes excerpts of the judges’ opinions.

Some of the cases will be familiar to readers. These include the suit on Philip Agee’s passport or travel restrictions, the Rudolph Abel hollow nickel trial, the CIA Ralph McGehee censorship case, the *Falcon and the Snowman* case, and the legal aspects of the MKULTRA project. Perhaps the Rosenberg case is the best known of all, though the legal facets Kuhne presents may be less so. These include the specifics of President Eisenhower’s refusal to grant clemency and the varied views of the

Supreme Court justices on the ruling upholding the verdict.

At the other end of the familiarity scale, Kuhne introduces the Ilya Wolston case. Some may recognize participants such as Boris Morros, a Hollywood producer of Laurel and Hardy films and musicals with Paulette Goddard and Fred Astaire. But Morros was also a Soviet agent and a double-agent for the FBI before Ernest Borgnine played him in the movie *Man On A String* (1960). In his memoir, *My Ten Years as a Counterspy*^a he named Wolston as a Soviet agent, a charge later repeated in a Senate Internal Security Subcommittee report. (122) But only after John Barron reiterated the charge in his book *KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Agents*^b did Wolston sue Barron and the publisher for libel. Non-lawyers may be astounded at the rationale the court applied; lawyers less so. In any case he eventually won on appeal to the Supreme Court. Kuhne

a. Boris Morris, *My Ten Years As A counterspy: The Fantastic Story of an America Double Agent* (Viking, 1959).

b. John Barron, *KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Agents* (Reader’s Digest Press, 1974), 188.

does not mention that Wolston was later identified in the VENONA decrypts as Soviet agent.^a

On a more recent topic, Kuhne discusses the legality of the NSA telephone metadata program exposed by Edward Snowden. A suit challenging the program on statutory and constitutional grounds was filed by the American Civil Liberties Union shortly after Snowden took refuge in Russia. The District Court granted the government's motion to dismiss the ACLU's petition. Kuhne summarizes the lengthy appeal that eventually favored the ACLU because the collection of data that might "become relevant

to a possible authorized investigation in the future" was an unwarranted expansion of the relevance concept. (105)

Five of the six appendices are extracts of various relevant laws: the Espionage Act, the National Security Act, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the Economic Espionage Act, and the Freedom of Information Act. The sixth is a discussion of the legal cases surrounding the James Bond movies, which serves as an interesting diversion. *Spies On Trial* provides a unique and informative view of the intelligence profession.

Spying From The Sky: At The Controls of U.S. Cold War Aerial Intelligence, by Robert L. Richardson (Casemate, 2020), 301, endnotes, appendices, photos, index. Preface by Col. William J. Gregory, USAF (Ret.).

When author Robert Richardson was working on a book about the 49th Fighter Squadron, of the US Army Air Corps during World War II, he interviewed its two surviving members. He found one, William Gregory, so interesting that he decided to write his biography. *Spying From The Sky* is the result.

After deciding that he wanted more out of life than being a sharecropper in Tennessee, Gregory attended college and became a civilian pilot before being accepted for Army flight school. His final flight assignment was as commander of the CIA's U-2 unit at Edwards Air Force Base. In between, he flew P-38s in Africa during World War II, was a Strategic Air Command pilot, and an original member the Black Knights, the Air Force's first high-altitude surveillance program that commenced operations in the mid 1950s. This was a mission crossover time for Air Force reconnaissance: balloons with cameras were still being sent over China, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union; U-2 flights began over the Soviet Union; and the Black Knights began flying RB-57D-2 ELINT missions along the borders of denied area countries. (137–38) Richardson provides photos of the aircraft and

detailed descriptions of the missions they performed until the program was shut down in the late 1950s.

It was in this period that Gregory joined the U-2 program at Edwards, where he commanded Detachment G, which performed operational and testing missions Richardson describes. In that position he became a U-2 pilot, and at one point flew a mission after taking off from an aircraft carrier. He deployed with the unit on all its missions, which included support of the Bay of Pigs operation and later the Cuban missile crisis.

In the mid 1960s, Gregory was offered the position of operations officer in the CIA's A-12 Archangel program at Groom Lake, Nevada. But families were not allowed at Groom, and he had had enough hardship deployments, so he declined the offer. After attending the National War College, he spent five years at the Pentagon before accepting his final assignment at the Air Force Institute of Technology.

Spying From The Sky presents a pilot's firsthand view of manned high altitude surveillance. Truly a unique and valuable source.

a. John Earl Haynes, Harvey Klehr, and Alexander Vassiliev, *SPIES: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America* (Yale University Press, 2009), 455.

Memoir

American Spy: Wry Reflections on My Life in the CIA, by H. K. Roy (Prometheus Books, 2019), 304, endnotes, photos, no index.

“A good spy must be an apolitical seeker and speaker of the truth” writes former CIA case officer H. K. Roy in his adventure-filled memoir. And “despite almost constant friction” with the CIA bureaucracy that he hated, he adhered to those principles during his 13-year career. (15)

American Spy begins with Roy running operations in the Balkans, where he is betrayed to the Iranians by a member of a “friendly” intelligence service. Someone leaked the details—not all of them correct—to the *New York Times* after Roy returned to the United States, and he tells that story, too. Only then does he flash back to his upbringing and explain how “a former Catholic altar boy and (nondenominational) Boy Scout ended up working for the CIA” (62) after getting a law degree and serving in the US Attorney’s office in Washington, DC. (68)

Roy tells how he was accepted into the CIA Career Training Program, which included clandestine operations and paramilitary and parachute training. The training he calls “one of the greatest experiences of my life.” (77) Now qualified for an overseas assignment, he was initially slated for Africa but ended up in Latin America with his wife, Stacy. She helped with operations in Cuba and Nicaragua against Soviet and Chinese targets, which he describes in some detail.

After his Latin American tour, Roy and Stacy were considered a team and both participated in the “grueling

but phenomenal Soviet-East European Internal Operations course” before their assignment to Yugoslavia. (158) Roy’s description of its content is unusually detailed and worthwhile.

Amidst accounts of operations in Yugoslavia, Roy digresses a bit to reveal the strains of the clandestine life on family—they had two girls by then—that resulted in divorce after returning to the States. From then on, the operations he describes occur during TDYs to war-ravaged Croatia and Bosnia.

By 1996 he had had enough, and he resigned from CIA, settled in California, remarried, and “formed a private business intelligence firm.” (195) The balance of the book deals with the operations his firm conducted in Bosnia and then the Middle East mainly after 9/11 in Iraq. He also tried to help CIA, he wrote. At one point he had a client with “access inside the Taliban’s only foreign ‘diplomatic mission’ in Pakistan.” Roy assumed the Taliban was supporting Osama bin Ladin and might speak of his whereabouts or have documents that revealed his location. He proposed that the US government exploit the opportunity and then explains why no action was taken.

American Spy is a field officer’s memoir written with a sense of humor and a respect for the profession of intelligence that is evident throughout; a valuable contribution.

The CIA War in Kurdistan: The Untold Story of the Northern Front in the Iraq War, by Sam Faddis (Casemate, 2020), 226, photos, no index.

In 2009, Mike Tucker and Charles Faddis^a published a somewhat confused account of a CIA advance team sent to Iraq to prepare the way for the 2003 invasion. *The CIA War In Kurdistan* is an unsourced memoir that provides a much expanded view.

Faddis, a career operations officer who specialized in counterterrorism, begins with a detailed description of

an attempted recruitment, prior to 9/11, of an al-Qa’ida member who was rejected by Headquarters for political reasons. He uses this story to suggest the CIA didn’t do all it could have to prevent the 9/11 attacks and to illustrate what becomes even more clear later, that he is no stranger to infuriating bureaucratic opposition.

a. Mike Tucker and Charles [S.] Faddis, *Operation Hotel California: The Clandestine War Inside Iraq* (The Lyons Press, 2009).

The latter becomes evident when Faddis, then working a desk at Headquarters, learns the United States is going to invade Iraq. As a first step, the CIA was to “put a team into Northern Iraq to work with the Kurds to prepare the battlefield for deployment of American military forces.”

(4) He immediately volunteered, or “demanded” to use his word, to lead the team. His persistence, and knowledge of Turkish, coupled with his prior experience in the region, gets him the job.

As he formed his team, Faddis monitored the diplomatic efforts to secure Turkish cooperation in allowing transit into into Kurdish-held areas of personnel and, even more important, heavy weapons promised the Kurds for their support. After initial agreements were reached, the Turks often changed them at critical points, sometimes at the borders, to gain an advantage since the Kurds were their enemies. After Faddis arrives in Turkey he must deal with these frustrations directly and, with help from Headquarters, manages to get his team into Kurd areas and commence operations.

In addition to providing the Kurdish factions with supplies, Faddis’s team conducted propaganda operations

with leaflets and radio broadcasts into Iraq, agent recruitment to assess conditions in the country, and double-agent operations to confound Iraqi intelligence.

Besides the classic intelligence mission, the CIA team had to convince a skeptical Kurd leadership it would support them until Saddam was toppled. After all, from their point of view we had left them to Saddam’s gas attacks after the 1990–91 Gulf War. This was not the only complicating factor. Eventually DoD Special Forces personnel arrived, but they were not subject to CIA direction, which created some awkward challenges for Faddis in his attempt to function as part of an integrated team. (130)

The CIA War In Kurdistan tells how Faddis managed to accomplish his mission despite constant operational and bureaucratic conflicts, many of which he left to those who replaced his team to resolve. The book concludes with an expression of frustration over how the United States dealt with Iraq militarily and politically after the fighting ended, and he lists a number of lessons which, if learned he argues, should avoid similar mistakes in the future.



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Books Reviewed in 2020

Studies in Intelligence

Reviews can be found on the Internet at <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/>

CURRENT TOPICS

The Hacker and the State: Cyber Attacks and the New Normal of Geopolitics, by Ben Buchanan (64, 2 [June 2020] Bookshelf)

In Deep: The FBI, The CIA, and the Truth About America's "Deep State," by David Rohde (64, 4 [December 2020] Bookshelf)

Information Wars: How We Lost the Global Battle Against Disinformation, by Richard Stengel (64, 1 [March 2020]) J. E. Leonardson

Intelligence and the National Security Enterprise: An Introduction, by Roger Z. George (64, 4 [December 2020] Bookshelf)

One Nation, Under Drones: Legality, Morality, and Utility of Unmanned Combat Systems, edited by Capt. John E. Jackson, USN (Ret.) (64, 4 [December 2020] Bookshelf)

Putin's People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and Then Took on the West, by Catherine Belton (64, 4 [December 2020]) J.E. Leonardson and Matthew J.

Subordinating Intelligence: The DoD/CIA Post-Cold War Relationship, by David P. Oakley (64, 4 [December 2020] Bookshelf)

GENERAL

Talking to Strangers: What We Should Know about the People We Don't Know, by Malcolm Gladwell (64, 2 [June 2020]) Bowman H. Miller, PhD

HISTORICAL

Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare, by Thomas Rid (64, 1 [March 2020]) J. E. Leonardson

Agent Moliere: The Life of John Cairncross, the Fifth Man of the Cambridge Spy Circle, by Geoff Andrews (64, 1 [March 2020] Bookshelf)

At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor, by Gordon W. Prange, with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon (64, 2 [June 2020]) Michael J. Hughes

Atomic Spy: The Dark Lives of Klaus Fuchs, by Nancy Thorndike Greenspan (64, 4 [December 2020] Bookshelf)

Following book titles and author names are the *Studies in Intelligence* issue in which the review appeared and the name of the reviewer. All bookshelf reviews are by Hayden Peake.

Betrayal in Berlin: The True Story of the Cold War's Most Audacious Espionage Operation, by Steve Vogel (64, 2 [June 2020]) Gary Keeley

Black Wave: Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Forty-Year Rivalry that Unraveled Culture, Religion, and Collective Memory in the Middle East, by Kim Ghattas (64, 4 [December 2020]) Brent M. Geary

Chinese Spies: From Chairman Mao to Xi Jinping, by Roger Faligot (64, 4 [December 2020]) David Ian Chambers

The CIA and Third Force Movements in China during the Early Cold War by Roger Jeans (64, 4 [December 2020]) Nicholas Dujmović

Cold War Exiles and the CIA: Plotting to Free Russia, by Benjamin Tromly (64, 1 [March 2020] Bookshelf)

Cold War Spy Stories from Eastern Europe, edited by Valentina Glajar, Alison Lewis, and Corina L. Petrescu (64, 1 [March 2020] Bookshelf)

Cold Warriors: Writers Who Waged the Literary Cold War, by Duncan White (64, 1 [March 2020]) Leslie C.

Dorwart's History of the Office of Naval Intelligence, 1865–1945, by Jeffrey M. Dorwart (64, 1 [March 2020]) Capt. David Belt, USN (ret.)

The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West, by David Kilcullen (64, 4 [December 2020]) George P. Lewis

Emperor of Spies: Onodera's Wartime Network in Northern Europe, by C. G. McKay (64, 4 [December 2020] Bookshelf)

The Force: The Legendary Special Ops Unit and WWII's Impossible Mission, by David Saul (64, 2 [June 2020]) J. R. Seeger

From Kites To Cold War: The Evolution of Manned Airborne Reconnaissance, by Tyler Morton (64, 4 [December 2020] Bookshelf)

Getting To Know The President: Intelligence Briefings of Presidential Candidates and Presidents-Elect (Third edition), by John L. Helgeson (64, 4 [December 2020] Bookshelf)

Guardians of Churchill's Secret Army: Men of the Intelligence Corps in the Special Operations Executive, by Peter Dixon (64, 4 [December 2020] Bookshelf)

House of Government: A Saga of the Russian Revolution, by Yuri Slezkina (64, 2 [June 2020]) Leslie C.

Information Hunters: When Librarians, Soldiers and Spies Banded Together in World War II Europe, by Kathy Peiss (64, 4 [December 2020] Bookshelf)

Japan's Spy at Pearl Harbor: Memoir of an Imperial Navy Secret Agent Takeo Yoshikawa (64, 2 [June 2020]) Stephen Mercado

Kim Philby and James Angleton: Friends and Enemies in the Cold War, by Michael Holzman (64, 2 [June 2020] Bookshelf)

"Lee Is Trapped and Must Be Taken": Eleven Fateful Days After Gettysburg, July 4–14, 1863, by Thomas J. Ryan and Richard R. Schaus (64, 1 [March 2020] Bookshelf)

- Major General George H. Sharpe and the Creation of American Military Intelligence in the Civil War**, by Peter G. Tsouras (64, 4 [December 2020]) David Welker
- Mapping The Great Game; Explorers, Spies and Maps in Nineteenth-Century Asia**, by Riaz Dean (64, 2 [June 2020] Bookshelf)
- Midnight in Chernobyl: The Untold Story of the World's Greatest Nuclear Disaster**, by Alex Higginbotham (64, 1 [March 2020]) J. E. Leonardson
- Monash's Masterpiece: The Battle of Hamel and the 93 minutes that Changed WWI**, by Peter FitzSimmons (64, 2 [June 2020]) James Noone
- Night of The Assassins: The Untold Story of Hitler's Plot to Kill FDR, Churchill, and Stalin**, by Howard Blum (64, 4 [December 2020] Bookshelf)
- The Nuclear Spies: America's Atomic Intelligence Operations Against Hitler and Stalin**, by Vince Houghton (64, 1 [March 2020] Bookshelf)
- Project Rainfall: The Secret History of Pine Gap**, by Tom Gilling (64, 4 [December 2020] Bookshelf)
- The Quiet Americans – Four CIA Spies at the Dawn of the Cold War – A Tragedy in Three Acts**, by Scott Anderson (64 4 [December 2020]) Leslie C. and Peter Sichel
- Return to the Reich: A Holocaust Refugee's Secret Mission to Defeat the Nazis**, by Eric Lichtblau (64, 1 [March 2020] Bookshelf)
- RIGGED: America, Russia and One Hundred Years of Covert Electoral Interference**, by David Shimer (64, 4 [December 2020] Bookshelf and J. E. Leonardson Review Essay)
- Russians Among Us: Sleeper Cells, Ghost Stories and the Hunt for Putin's Agents**, by Gordon Corera (64, 2 [June 2020] Bookshelf and J. E. Leonardson)
- The Saboteur: The Aristocrat Who Became France's Most Daring Anti-Nazi Commando**, by Paul Kix (64, 4 [December 2020] Bookshelf)
- Secret Documents of Intelligence Branch on Father of the Nation, Bangladesh: Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman: Volume I (1948–1950); Volume II (1951–1952); Volume III (1953); Volume IV (1954–1957)**, Sheikh Hasina, ed. (64, 2 [June 2020]) Ryan Shaffer
- Secrets and Spies: UK Intelligence Accountability after Iraq and Snowden**, by Jamie Gaskarth (64, 4 [December 2020]) Jason U. Manosevitz
- Shatter the Nations: ISIS and the War for the Caliphate**, by Mike Giglio (64, 4 [December 2020]) Brent M. Geary
- Soldiers, Scouts & Spies: A Military History of the New Zealand Wars 1845–1864**, by Cliff Simons (64, 4 [December 2020] Bookshelf)
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The Walls Have Ears: The Greatest Intelligence Operation of World War II, by Helen Fry (64, 2 [June 2020]) J. E. Leonardson

White House Warriors: How the National Security Council Transformed the American Way of War, by John A. Gans (64, 2 [June 2020]) J. E. Leonardson

The Zinoviev Letter: The Conspiracy That Never Dies, by Gill Bennett (64, 2 [June 2020] Bookshelf)

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The Unexpected Spy: From the CIA to the FBI, My Secret Life Taking Down Some of the World's Most Notorious Terrorists, by Tracy Walder (64, 2 [June 2020] Bookshelf)

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Agent Running in the Field (One Novel: Two Reviews), by John Le Carré (64, 1 [March 2020]) John Kavanagh and J. E. Leonardson

INTELLIGENCE ABROAD

ASSASSINS: The KGB's Poison Factory 10 Years On, by Boris Volodarsky (64, 2 [June 2020] Bookshelf)

Australia's First Spies: The Remarkable Story of Australia's Intelligence Operations, 1901–45, by John Fahey (64, 1 [March 2020]) Kevin Davies

The State of Secrecy: Spies and the Media in Britain, by Richard Norton-Taylor (64, 2 [June 2020] Bookshelf)

Turkish Intelligence & The Cold War: The Turkish Secret Service, the US and the UK, by Egemen Bezci (64, 1 [March 2020] Bookshelf)

