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Journal of the American Intelligence Professional

Sputnik and US Intelligence

The Warning Record

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Cover: Image of a replica of the Sputnik that hangs in the Missile & Space Gallery at the National Museum of the United States Air Force.

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Sputnik and US Intelligence: The Warning Record

Amy Ryan and Gary Keeley



That Sputnik's ascent surprised the US public and press is now common knowledge, but not everyone was surprised.

Editor's Note: This article is a declassified, redacted version of an article published in the classified issue of the journal in September 2016. It is timed to accompany CIA's public release of documents related to this topic. They can be found at https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/historical-collections.

Introduction

The soul-searching about US technological competence that enveloped the nation in the wake of the successful launching into space of the world's first artificial satellite, *Sputnik-1*, by the Soviet Union (USSR) on 4 October 1957 came as a psychological shock to the American public and engendered a period of reflection that reshaped US priorities and scientific programs in the 1960s.

Sputnik-1 was the first in a four-satellite program planned as the USSR's contribution to the International Geophysical Year (IGY; July 1957 to December 1958). Sputnik ("traveling companion" in Russian) circled the earth every 100 minutes in an elliptical orbit of 215 kilometers (km) perigee and 939 km apogee. Slightly larger than a basketball, the satellite was an aluminum, 22-inch sphere packed with radio and telemetry equipment sprouting four long antennae. It weighed about 180 pounds and transmitted a periodic rhythmic signal—a "beep"—to ground controllers.

Sputnik's sudden appearance, in addition to raising questions about the standing of US technological competence, also brought to the fore the critical question of whether the USSR had or would shortly have an intercontinental ballistic missile capability. Once the Soviets paired the rockets with the atomic weapons they had developed unexpectedly quickly by 1949, the United States, it was thought, would be at a severe military disadvantage.[a] Americans panicked, and accusations of "intelligence failure" and "missile gap" spread across the nation like a virus.

That Sputnik's ascent surprised the US public and press is now common knowledge, but not everyone in the United States was surprised. US intelligence, the military, and the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower not only were fully informed of Soviet planning to launch an earth satellite but also knew a Soviet satellite would probably achieve orbit no later than the end of 1957. For intelligence and administration

a. The Soviets set off their first test/demonstration explosion earlier than expected partly because they had been able to steal atomic secrets from Los Alamos Proving Ground during World War II.

officials, there was no surprise and no intelligence failure, but the Soviets achieved a political and propaganda triumph because Eisenhower had believed a rush into space was unwarranted and that a Soviet arrival there first would have little meaning. For Eisenhower, there was no "space race."

Nevertheless, Eisenhower's explanation during a press conference on 9 October of US plans and his administration's lack of concern about the Soviet achievement was believed neither by the press nor by the public. That the United States had matched Soviet technological advances and was able to launch its own satellites early in 1958 calmed no one. The press disregarded the president and wrote a "first draft of history" about how the Soviets surprised the United States and how CIA had failed to provide warning that was wholly inaccurate and that can still be heard today.


"All the News That's Fit to Print"

The New York Times.

LATE CITY EDITION

VOL. CVII..No. 36,414. NEW YORK, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 5, 1957. FIVE CENTS

SOVIET FIRES EARTH SATELLITE INTO SPACE; IT IS CIRCLING THE GLOBE AT 18,000 M. P. H.; SPHERE TRACKED IN 4 CROSSINGS OVER U. S.

HOFFA IS ELECTED TEAMSTERS' HEAD; WARNS OF BATTLE

Defeats Two Foes 3 to 1 —Says Union Will Fight 'With Every Ounce'

COURSE RECORDED

Navy Picks Up Radio Signals—4 Report Sighting Device

560 MILES HIGH

Visible With Simple Binoculars, Moscow Statement Says

Device Is 8 Times Heavier Than One Planned by U.S.

FAUBUS COMPARES HIS STAND TO LEE'S

Says He Will Remain Loyal to People of Arkansas—All Is Quiet at School

Flu Widens in City; 10% Rate Predicted; 200,000 Pupils Out

ARGENTINA TAKES EMERGENCY STEPS

State of Siege Proclaimed in Buenos Aires Region —Arrests Reported

SATELLITE SIGNAL BROADCAST HERE

The New York Times depiction on 5 October 1957 of the launch of Sputnik-1 the day before. The issue of the fourth included a front page story detailing a Soviet scientist's briefing of his nation's IGY rocket developments. No mention was made of Sputnik. The issue of the 6th included multiple articles addressing details of the satellite, explaining the status of the US effort (a launch seemed likely in 1958), and introducing early rumblings of political discontent in an item about congressmen decrying cuts in spending on US missile programs. © New York Times.

That Sputnik had not been a surprise to the US government began to be rediscovered in the 1970s, with more information becoming available each subsequent decade, but the story still remains out of the mainstream in declassified government documents, academic articles and niche books. Phrases like "Sputnik stunned the world" or "completely surprised the Eisenhower administration" continue in common use. The fact that the press and public were surprised has, in the minds of many observers, meant that CIA and the Eisenhower administration also were surprised.

This focus on intelligence failure has also had the unfortunate effect of obscuring the important lesson that foreknowledge of an adversary's planning a future event (strategic warning) does not always come with detailed information about the adversary's schedule (tactical warning). The focus on failure also obscures the truth that even with one or both levels of warning, policymakers bear ultimate responsibility for their responses to the warnings they receive.

The White House Was Well-Informed

Eisenhower's reaction to the Sputnik's launch contrasted sharply with the reaction of the American public. He remained calm, and his much-quoted claim on 9 October that Sputnik "does not raise my apprehensions, not one iota"—although borne out by the record—was met with skepticism.[1] The reason for the president's calm, according to former Eisenhower adviser James R. Killian,[a] was Eisenhower's knowl-

a. Killian was the President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and in 1954, chaired Eisenhower's Technological edge of Soviet plans and intentions based on intelligence provided to him over several years: "The U.S. public was unaware of how much was on the boards in their own country when *Sputnik* burst upon their unprepared consciousness, and this lack of information contributed to their alarm. But Eisenhower was amply informed."[2]

In the years before Sputnik was launched, CIA had been keeping Eisenhower and his advisers informed about Soviet missile capabilities and warned them of Soviet plans to go into space, a fact Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, Eisenhower's staff secretary, confirmed in 2000. Speaking of Sputnik, he recalled that Eisenhower had remarked that a Soviet satellite launch was "not anything I haven't been worrying about for three years or more." Goodpaster added that, for Eisenhower, Sputnik itself was not a threat; rather, "the important thing was what it told us about [Soviet] capabilities for long-range missile attack. That had been very much on his mind for three or four years before that time." Goodpaster added that intelligence in the 1950s was generally better than is believed today: "So far as being caught by surprise, I don't know that we ever were, even on Sputnik."[3]

CIA informed Eisenhower and the National Security Council (NSC) through a combination of finished intelligence products and briefings. Before October 1957, CIA published two National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) that included assessments of when the Soviets could orbit an "earth satellite vehicle" (ESV), as it was called at the time. In December 1955, an NIE predicted that the Soviets could orbit a "relatively uninstrumented vehicle by 1958." By March 1957, another NIE concluded that the Soviets were capable of launching a satellite before the end of the year.[4]

IGY First day cover. Photo © Matt Knannien

The primary focus of these NIEs was on overall Soviet military capabilities, with the estimates on satellite developments presented after the arguably more important intelligence on Soviet missile and bomber capabilities. However, CIA also produced numerous current intelligence products for senior policymakers and the president focusing specifically on Soviet earth satellite developments. Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Allen Dulles also briefed the NSC and the president multiple times on these subjects.[5, 6, 7]

Policy Context: Science Over Speed

Both the United States and Soviet Union had raced to capture German scientists at the close of World War II to take advantage of their demonstrated expertise in rocketry. The Germans had already designed and successfully used rockets such as the V-1 (simple drone or cruise missile) and V-2 (ballistic missile). Each expected that rocketry would advance after the war and feared the other might be the first to gain a decisive advantage in the ability to deliver devastating weapons.

US plans to launch satellites, which would require advanced rocket technology, began to develop in the late 1940s. As early as 1946, a RAND report projected that the United States could launch the first satellite in 1951, and proponents of the idea began advocating urgency in rocket and satellite development. A second RAND study in 1947 already was suggesting that a satellite might be able to transmit images back to earth. However, according to Paul Dickson in *Sputnik: The Shock of the Century,* supporters of satellite development lacked political influence, and it was 1950 before the US government began to seriously consider forays into space.[8]

Capabilities Panel. After Sputnik, Eisenhower appointed him Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.

Eisenhower and his advisers decided in 1955 to advance a policy that ostensibly kept the satellite program separate from military guided missile programs

The satellite project gained traction with the institution of the IGY, a period during which nearly 70 countries participated individually and jointly in research projects involving the earth sciences. At a meeting in Rome in October 1954, the International Council of Scientific Unions approved a resolution that called for satellites to be launched during the IGY. The United States and the Soviet Union each had representatives at the meeting.[9] Launching a satellite for scientific purposes and under the peaceful auspices of the IGY intrigued Eisenhower and led him to initiate the US satellite program the following year.[10]

Several key considerations influenced Eisenhower's decisions in the mid-1950s on US satellite development. Eisenhower and his advisers decided in 1955 to advance a policy that ostensibly kept the satellite program separate from military guided missile programs, despite the fact that no "civilian" rocket program existed because the military labs conducted the research for all rockets. Eisenhower wanted to emphasize the peaceful nature of the satellite effort, prevent exposure of military technology to the Soviets, and ensure that satellite research would not impede the military's progress on the higher priority guided missiles. Finally, Eisenhower was eager to prove the concept of "freedom of space," which would allow any nation to pass over another's territory without incurring military threat. The principle was expressed in his July 1955 "Open Skies" proposal, in which he suggested freedom for both the United States and the Soviet Union to conduct aerial reconnaissance of each other's territory. A scientific satellite would aptly demonstrate that principle and pave the way for reconnaissance satellites.[11]

In July 1955, the White House announced a plan to launch a satellite during the IGY. Shortly after the US announcement, the Soviets also declared their intention to launch satellites as part of the IGY.[12] Branches of the US military put forward proposals for the first satellite, and in the fall of 1955, the administration chose to pursue the Naval Research Laboratory's Vanguard program. Vanguard was an unclassified project and, because it offered a more sophisticated level of satellite instrumentation than other proposals, played to the administration's goal of emphasizing the scientific mission. However, Vanguard did not promise to be the most expedient option, because two stages of the rocket were still under development. It would not be ready before 1958, a full year later than the Army's proposal, which involved use of the already-developed Redstone rocket.[13]

The Vanguard decision risked allowing the Soviets to steal a march on the United States. As historian Yanek Mieczkowski wrote, "The administration rated science higher than speed."[14] Karl Weber wrote in his 1972 history of CIA's Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) that CIA believed the first satellite launch in history would generate considerable prestige and propaganda value for the country that achieved it,[15] but those concerns did not resonate with Eisenhower. Weber criticized the administration's belief that a speedy launch was not important with the exasperated observation that, for Eisenhower, "Time was a secondary factor!" He believed the administration failed to consider the satellite proposals from "a political or psychological warfare viewpoint" and instead based the decision on "which [system] would provide the most valuable research tool for the least money." Weber called Vanguard "in essence, a program to 'reinvent the wheel'" because the United States could have accomplished the same result, and sooner, had it incorporated existing, advanced military technology.[16, 17]

Concern about Prestige

Before the Vanguard decision was made, CIA analysts were well aware of Soviet intentions and of the propaganda value of a first satellite launch, and CIA leaders pressed policymakers to initiate a US satellite program. As early as September 1954, Special Assistant to the Director for Policy and Coordination Richard Bissell[a] advised DDCI General Charles Cabell that, in the context of the broader Soviet missile program, "the launching of a small earth satellite in the next three years is almost certainly feasible… . The capability of the Soviet Union and the United States of placing in orbit a satellite to collect basic scientific data is approximately the same." Bissell suggested the United States be the first to place an artificial satellite in orbit, perhaps during the IGY, to "gain the prestige of this achievement" and drafted a letter the DCI could give to President Eisenhower along with CIA studies

a. Bissell became deputy director for plans on 1 January 1959 and in 1997 was named a CIA Trailblazer.

Richard Bissell. Undated CIA file photo

on earth satellites. Bissell analyzed the psychological and military implications of a Soviet satellite launch and warned that "a capability in this area, not properly anticipated and neutralized, would represent a serious threat to U.S. national security."[18]

In March 1955, Dulles asked Bissell to contact Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles about the earth satellite program.[19] Bissell in late April wrote another memo to the DCI suggesting that Quarles and he recommend the satellite project to the NSC and again expressed the need for haste. Bissell wrote,

> *The project for an earth satellite vehicle has now reached a stage where a Governmental decision is urgently required.… You may wish to recommend that such action be taken forthwith.… I should advise you that there is understood to be much support for this project in the Pentagon but the rate of progress toward any kind of decision in that imposing building seems to be little better than glacial.*[20]

These discussions culminated in the NSC policy statement 5520 of 20 May 1955, which Eisenhower approved and which outlined the purpose and scope of the US satellite program. The NSC noted that "considerable prestige and psychological benefits will accrue to the nation which first is successful in launching a satellite."[21]

CIA's was not the only voice prompting Eisenhower to consider the psychological impact of the first satellite launch. Nelson Rockefeller, who served as Eisenhower's special assistant on governmental operations, sent a memo in May 1955 to the executive secretary of the NSC, noting, "I am impressed by the psychological… advantages of having the first successful endeavor in this field result from the initiative of the United States… The stake of prestige that is involved makes this a race that we cannot afford to lose."[22]

CIA Intelligence Assessments and Briefings, 1955–57

——1955——

President Eisenhower's CIA, still in its infancy, routinely attempted to address gaps in intelligence, particularly about Soviet military and scientific developments, by conceiving and executing innovative collection plans such as the Berlin Tunnel cable-tap operation; launching camera-equipped balloons over the Soviet Union; overseeing design and use of U-2 reconnaissance aircraft; and leading planning and development of reconnaissance satellites. To assist in organizing and overseeing these collection efforts, Eisenhower created the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA) in February 1955.

That year, CIA and the fledgling Intelligence Community (IC) beefed up analytic and collection efforts on Soviet missile development. CIA supplemented the Guided Missiles Branch in the Office of Research and Reports (ORR) with an *ad hoc* Guided Missiles Staff, added a Guided Missiles Intelligence Coordinator in the Directorate of Intelligence, and created a Guided Missiles Division in OSI. These units focused on the industrial and economic aspects of the Soviet program. An IC-wide organization to follow Soviet progress, the Guided Missiles Intelligence Committee, began work in January 1956; one of its first statements concerned large gaps in US knowledge of Soviet missiles.[23]

The first finished intelligence product CIA published specifically on the Soviet earth satellite program in 1955 was an item in the *Current Intelligence Weekly Summary,* a product typically distributed to customers at the NSC and to the president. On 21 April, OSI's article, "Soviet Research on Earth Satellite," noted a public announcement of six Soviet scientists on the Permanent Interdepartmental Commission for Interplanetary Communication of the Academy of Science. OSI judged the Soviets had assembled this group to examine "the theoretical problems involved in the establishment of a space station" and noted that "construction of the propulsion device required to place a small object into an orbit around the earth is considered scientifically possible."[24]

In December, CIA released NIE 11-12-55, *Soviet Guided Missile*

During the mid-1950s, the Soviets routinely discussed space and offered to coordinate Soviet and American satellite programs,

Capabilities and Probable Programs, which included this assessment on earth satellites: "We estimate that the Soviets are attempting to develop such a vehicle at the earliest practicable date and could have a relatively uninstrumented vehicle by 1958."[25]

——1956——

In January 1956, CIA designated OSI as the "focal point" for intelligence on the Soviet ESV.[26] CIA officers were also assisting the Department of Defense (DoD) in its research into Soviet satellites and supplied intelligence to Dr. C. C. Furnas, assistant secretary of defense for research and development. Dulles wrote Furnas personally to advise him that Dr. Herbert Scoville, a noted CIA scientist and the assistant director of scientific intelligence, would be the CIA's representative to DoD "on matters relating to the scientific earth satellite program."[27]

Within a week, CIA had prepared and supplied to DoD's Furnas a four-page paper, *Status of the Soviet Earth Satellite Program*, that reviewed what the IC knew in early 1956 about Soviet progress. The article reviewed early Russian and later Soviet interest in space travel and ESVs from 1903. It took note of the December 1953 statement of the president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences that an earth satellite was "becoming practical."[a] OSI knew of the creation of the Soviet Commission for Interplanetary Communication in late 1954, before the Soviets announced it the following April, and wrote that it indicated serious Soviet emphasis on developing a satellite.[28]

During the mid-1950s, the Soviets routinely discussed space and offered to coordinate Soviet and American satellite programs, and CIA reviewed a number of significant announcements for Furnas. Finally, CIA referred Furnas to the most recent NIE,[b] which estimated the Soviets could orbit a simple satellite by 1958 but noted that, as of January 1956, "we in OSI/CIA now estimate that if the Soviets consider the psychological advantages of obtaining the world's first satellite vehicle of prime significance, and if no cost or effort is spared, the Soviet Union could launch a satellite vehicle in late 1956 or early 1957."[29]

The NSC in May 1956 discussed the status of the satellite program and whether it should be continued, given the rising cost of Vanguard and other budgetary and national security priorities. The director of the National Science Foundation even argued that, on the contrary, it should be expanded, with six satellites added to the six already planned.[30] Eisenhower decided to forge ahead with the Vanguard program, given that the White House had already publicly announced its intentions. He deferred a decision on the additional satellites. Minutes of the meeting reflect Eisenhower's lukewarm attitude toward the program in general: "The President said that he had not been notably enthusiastic about the earth satellite program when it had first been considered by the National Security Council, but that we certainly could not back out of it now."[31]

CIA leaders supporting these discussions cited indications of Soviet progress and urged advancement of the US program. For example, ahead of the May NSC meeting, on 10 April 1956, Scoville wrote to Allen Dulles echoing Bissell's 1954 concerns, noting that "serious damage would be done to United States international scientific prestige" if it did not launch satellites during the IGY and before the Soviets. And, in the same paragraph: "Abandonment or deferment of the program in the face of what may well be a successful Soviet counterpart program might impair world confidence in U.S. advanced scientific and technical capabilities." Scoville wrote those words to support a pending letter to President Eisenhower about possible US courses of action with regard to its satellites.[32]

On the same day, at the DCI's request, Scoville sent another memorandum summarizing OSI analysis on Soviet ESVs. Scoville asserted that "the USSR possesses all the necessary knowledge and basic components to attain the altitude and velocity necessary for an orbiting earth satellite vehicle." He repeated the January OSI analysis that the "numerous statements by Soviet officials" reveal a "strong Soviet interest" in ESVs and reminded Dulles that while

a. CIA had had formal responsibility for tracking the careers and activities of Soviet scientists since 1948. It was hoped that the collection effort would offer clues to Soviet technological development and identify future collection directions. (See NSCID 8, 25 May 1948—pursuant to National Security Act of 1947—approved for release 26 Aug 2008.)

b. Specific NIE not given in the record, but the most recent NIE at the time on this topic probably was NIE 11-12-55, 20 December 1955.

The report also shows that the Soviets made no apparent attempt to hide their plans and gave clues to the potential launching site.

the December NIE had allowed that a 1958 launch was possible, OSI had modified its position by January and assessed that the Soviets might be able to launch a satellite by 1957 if not earlier.[33] Finally, on what must have been a busy 10 April, Scoville sent a third memo to the DCI , this time with analysis supporting rapid movement on the satellite program to avoid incurring a psychological defeat were the Soviets to launch a satellite before the United States.[34]

In preparation for a DCI briefing at the NSC in early May, the CIA Collection Staff assembled a list of "Key Soviet Statements Re: Earth Satellite Vehicle." The statements ranged from Unclassified to Secret and demonstrated the difficulty of using them to predict Soviet actions. While some statements indicated that the Soviet plans were progressing and might even have been ahead of US efforts, the memo flagged a 12 April 1956 CIA report of a statement by Leonid Sedov, the lead scientist in the Soviet program, which appeared to walk back Soviet intentions.[a] According to the report, Sedov stated that "it is possible that the Soviet Union will not have its earth satellites ready for firing during the international geophysical year. He believes that the US has put itself on a spot by its optimistic statements."[35] The memo equivocally concluded that the statement "could represent Soviet recognition of greater difficulties in the earth satellite project or that it could be a deliberate plan intended to reduce pressure for haste in the U.S. program."[36]

An August 1956 report provided more complete analysis of Sedov's statements and those of another Soviet professor who had attended a conference that February. OSI noted that "the Soviets plan to launch 12 to 14 satellite vehicles from a launching site located in the 'middle' of the USSR and on such an orbit that the USSR will have 'maximum length of time for observation.'"[37] Analysts extrapolated from this information that the size of the Soviet program could be twice that of the US program, which had six vehicles, because CIA believed it likely the "12–14" number did not include test vehicles.

The report also shows that the Soviets made no apparent attempt to hide their plans and gave clues to the potential launching site. At the conference, Soviet delegates were asked if the Soviets would announce publicly the launch date, to which they replied that "the radar built by the United States will spot the Soviet satellite within a few minutes after launching." CIA analysts seized on that comment in a 6 August memorandum to the DDI: "This statement undoubtedly refers to [radar surveillance of] the Kapustin Yar Guided Missile Test Range and furnishes the first indication that the Soviets probably intend to launch their earth satellite vehicles from the Kapustin Yar area."[38]

In October, CIA analysts held to their belief that the Soviets would be capable of a launch in early 1957. Scoville reviewed the DoD progress report that Eisenhower had requested at the May NSC meeting and provided an update to the deputy director for intelligence on CIA's information. Scoville noted, "We believe that the USSR will make a major effort to be the first country to orbit an earth satellite. We further believe it has the capability of orbiting a small vehicle, in early 1957, which could acquire scientific information and data of limited military value."[39] The same week, CIA published a *Current Intelligence Weekly Summary* article describing as "noncommittal" public comments Soviets had made at recent conferences, including one in Barcelona."[40] The article concluded, however, that the Soviets might be limiting their public statements on purpose and again estimated that they had the capability to launch by early 1957.[41]

——*1957*——

The DCI conveyed OSI's assessment—that the Soviets were capable of a launch in early 1957—in a briefing to the NSC on 24 January 1957.[b] The written briefing noted that "we still do not have firm information on the numbers of vehicles, their size, and the Soviet launching plans."[42] NIE 11-5-57, released in March, repeated almost verbatim the conclusions Scoville conveyed in his October 1956 memo and presented

a. NASA scientist Wernher von Braun, in an oral history interview with OSI on 3 October 1961, noted the difficulty of eliciting information from Sedov. In his view, Sedov was "very, very astute in this field, and if he feels you're trying to pump him [for information], he just doesn't talk at all anymore."

b. The DCI used the word "capable" and for the record made clear to the NSC in March 1957 that the Soviets probably *could* launch a satellite in 1957. However, OSI did not know whether the Soviets *would* launch a satellite.

Soviet statements in the summer of 1957 strongly suggested an impending satellite launch; one scientist told the Soviet press it would occur "in the next few months."

little new information: "The USSR will probably make a major effort to be the first country to orbit an earth satellite. We believe that the USSR has the capability of orbiting, in 1957, a satellite vehicle which could acquire scientific information and data of limited military value.[43]

In April 1957 a big break in the intelligence occurred. CIA analysis of new information indicated that the Soviets appeared to be getting ready for a launch.[44] The question was how to interpret the new information– were the Soviets preparing to test an ICBM or launch an earth satellite?

- CIA published different versions of its analysis on these developments in current intelligence pieces on 5 and 11 April.[45] Both items noted that either interpretation—ICBM or satellite—could be correct, although the 11 April article included an assertion that the new information might be "related to Soviet plans to launch an earth satellite during the International Geophysical Year."[46]
- On 10 May 1957, Dulles decided at the last minute to include in his briefing to Eisenhower recently-obtained U-2 evidence of Soviet missile activities at a second missile site, Tyuratam, distant from Kapustin Yar. As intelligence scholar John Prados wrote, "analysts at CIA's Office of Current Intelligence associated the activity with preparations for a satellite launch using an ICBM vehicle."[47] Mentioning this intelligence also prepared Eisenhower for the Soviets' claim of a successful ICBM test in August 1957.
- By June 1957, OSI had also advised select members of Congress that the Soviets were capable of launching an ESV, according to Karl Weber's history of the office.[48]

Soviet statements in the summer of 1957 strongly suggested an impending satellite launch; one scientist told the Soviet press it would occur "in the next few months." The statements, combined with the missile site activity, may have provided a convincing picture of imminent launch. At the same time, CIA analysts appeared reluctant to convey a specific time frame to policymakers.

- A *Current Intelligence Weekly Summary* article published on 27 June 1957 hedged on interpreting Soviet statements as definitive, although its title, "Soviet Preparations for Early Launching of an Earth Satellite," suggested a launch early in the IGY was possible. The article caveated the Soviet press statement about "the next few months," noting that official Soviet announcements at a recent IGY conference "revealed nothing new."[49]
- On 5 July, Dulles sent a memo to Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles, updating him on OSI's analysis. He wrote, "Information concerning the timing of launching of the Soviet first earth satellite is very sketchy, and our people here [OSI] do not believe that the evidence is sufficient as yet for a probability statement on when the Soviets may launch their first satellite."[50] The memo discussed the possibility the Soviets might consider 17 September, the 100th anniversary of the birth of a founder of Soviet rocketry, but it also provided reasons the date was unlikely.
- According to a 17 July 1957 report, a Soviet scientist told another scientist that "we will launch it this September or October."[51]
- On 30 September 1957, CIA published a report based on material from a recent conference in Washington, DC, that left the impression a launch was not imminent. A Soviet scientist claimed that details of the satellite "will not be discussed in Washington because the satellite is still undergoing tests."[52] The Soviets launched Sputnik on the final day of the conference.

In the weeks before the launch, CIA had received clues of an "impending event," as Dulles later phrased it, but CIA's coverage of Soviet missile sites was still incomplete, making it difficult to piece together information.

Years later a CIA historian wrote,

> *On 26 August 1957,* [the official Soviet news agency] *TASS reported the first successful flight of a Soviet super-long-distance intercontinental ballistic rocket, adding it is now possible to send missiles to any part of the world. The same item also reported a high-altitude thermonuclear weapons test. This Soviet launch had taken place on 21 August from the new test*

> *range at Tyuratam. Three days after the Soviet announcement, the Congressional Subcommittee on Military Applications of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy asked for a CIA briefing on the Soviet ICBM test. DDCI Cabell could only tell them that the available intelligence could neither confirm nor deny the Soviets' boast that they had successfully launched an ICBM.*[53]

Whatever the degree of uncertainty at the time, the concern was great enough that DCI Dulles was asked to brief the issue to the NSC on 12 September 1957.[54] The lack of information about Soviet activity at their missile sites also made it difficult for analysts to provide warning of a launch that October. Not long before the launch, CIA had indications that the Soviets were about to conduct a launch, but a definitive link to an earth satellite could not be made at the time. Dulles sent this information in a post-launch report to Eisenhower on 5 October, and it was published the same day in a Top Secret *Current Intelligence Bulletin* article on the launch.[55] For CIA, all the pointers to a specific launch date came together at the last minute.

Aftermath

Eisenhower Press Conference

In his first press conference, on 9 October, after Sputnik's entry into orbit, Eisenhower explained why the United States had failed to put up a satellite first. His principle reason—a preference for developing a valuable scientific tool while keeping military programs secure and on track—was intended to provide reassurance:

> *Merging of this scientific effort with military programs could have produced an orbiting United States satellite before now, but to the detriment of scientific goals and military progress. Vanguard, for the reasons indicated, has not had equal priority with that accorded our ballistic missile work. Speed of progress in the satellite project cannot be taken as an index of our progress in ballistic missile work. Our satellite program has never been conducted as a race with other nations."*[56]

Eisenhower repeatedly, and testily, downplayed the idea that the United States was in a space race with the Soviets, notwithstanding the media's treatment of the event. He spoke of the spending increases he had approved for the Vanguard program but deflected personal responsibility for the timing of the launch to the scientists, saying, "There never has been one nickel asked for accelerating the program. Never has it been considered as a race; merely an engagement on our part to put up a vehicle of this kind."[57]

Having dismissed earlier intelligence warnings of the potential propaganda and psychological consequences, Eisenhower continued to downplay the cost of being second, saying, "if we were doing it for science and not for security, which we were doing, I don't know of any reasons why the scientists should have come in and urged that we do this before anybody else could." He did acknowledge that the Soviets may have scored a psychological victory "in the political sense." Finally, Eisenhower promised that the US satellite, when launched, would deliv-

President Eisenhower wagging a finger at a questioner during his 9 September press conference in the Oval Office. Photo © Getty Images/Bettman Collection.

Eisenhower chose not to address the intelligence either because he prefered not to reveal US capabilities or because he thought his other statements would be sufficiently reassuring.

er even more promising results than Sputnik: "The satellite that we are planning to put in the air will certainly provide much more information, if it operates successfully throughout… it will provide much more information than this one can."[58]

During the press conference, Eisenhower did not allude to foreknowledge of the launch, other than mentioning Soviet attendance at the international conference in Rome in 1954, when satellites were proposed as IGY projects. Nor did he reveal that his confidence in US military capabilities vis-à-vis the Soviets and his lack of concern about Sputnik derived from credible classified intelligence reporting and analysis. Data from the U-2 flights had told Eisenhower the Soviets were not that far ahead of the United States in ICBM development.[59]

Eisenhower chose not to address the intelligence either because he preferred not to reveal US capabilities or because he thought his other statements would be sufficiently reassuring. As Killian wrote, however, the secrecy surrounding the US ballistic missile program left Eisenhower vulnerable to political criticism, which followed quickly.[60] Democratic Sen. Stuart Symington, who had long argued the Soviets were outpacing the United States in missile development, called on Eisenhower "to convene a special session of Congress, appoint a 'missile Czar' to direct the American ICBM effort, and lift the ceiling on defense spending." Other Democrats also criticized Eisenhower's claim that America's satellite program was superior, with Lyndon Johnson sarcastically noting, "Perhaps it will even have chrome trim and automatic windshield wipers."[a, 61]

CIA Faces Criticism

Themselves unaware of the state of Soviet space programs and the extent of intelligence information available about them, journalists almost immediately put CIA leaders on the defensive for the perceived lack of warning given to policymakers. In a meeting with his directorate chiefs on 11 October, Dulles heard Frank Wisner, deputy director for plans, propose

> *that in view of the unfavorable comments we have been receiving in a part of the press alleging another intelligence failure for lack of advance warning of the USSR earth satellite, we send a message to certain key stations to counteract these allegations.*

Dulles agreed with the proposal, although it is unclear what, if any, steps were actually taken.[62]

A flurry of press articles in early November 1957 noted a public disclosure from the President's Committee on Scientists and Engineers that CIA's Scoville had, a few hours before the launch on 4 October, warned that "it wouldn't surprise us if such an announcement came at any time."[63] One article mocked his statements as "foresight," erroneously indicting the government for having provided no "advance notice on the practical end" from the State Department, the military, or "the many billion dollar Central Intelligence Agency."[64] A Cleveland newspaper recorded the remarks of a congressman from Ohio, Rep. William E. Minshall (Republican), who accused CIA of being "asleep at the switch." He went on saying, "[CIA's] purpose is to collect, evaluate, and disseminate Soviet information. It failed badly in one, if not all three, of these functions."[65] In fact, Minshall had most likely been kept in the dark; he almost certainly was not among the very few members of Congress to receive CIA's briefings on Soviet earth satellite developments in 1956 and 1957.

It was not illogical for some congressmen, such as Minshall, to believe CIA had failed. A memo prepared for the DDI in January 1958 noted that during 1956–57, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) had received five CIA briefings on Soviet guided missiles while the Senate Armed Services Committee received three briefings, but that "the records include no mention of our estimate on Soviet capabilities to launch an earth satellite prior to the actual launching of Sputnik I, although this might have been mentioned in some session where no record was made."[66]

a. In November, Allen Dulles had advised Eisenhower to make public US ability to photograph Soviet missile sites, but Eisenhower chose not to even though the disclosure might have stemmed the criticism. (Divine, *The Sputnik Challenge,* 41.)

CIA had briefed a small circle of senior congressmen about Soviet ESV developments, in addition to the president and his advisers. The chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sen. Richard Russell (D), told a journalist in October 1957 "that the CIA had kept the senior members of Congress completely informed of the Soviet progress in rocket development and regarding their capability to orbit the Sputnik."[67]

When the journalist sought comment from the DCI, Dulles replied that "CIA of course has been alert to the time and effort which the Soviets were devoting to such a project… and had kept some senior members of the Congress informed of the Soviet progress." Director Dulles also "humorously stated that of course we did not tell them the launching would occur on a particular day or month."[68]

The Perennial Warning Challenge

Dulles's comment highlights the distinction between strategic and tactical warning and the difficulty intelligence analysts have in delivering both. IC agencies have often provided strategic warning—stating that an event was likely to occur within a certain period of time, or that a country or group was militarily, logistically, or technologically *capable* of conducting a particular operation. But analysts have often been unable to offer tactical warning—a specific date or time the forecast events will actually occur.[a] In such cases, policymakers are left with the decision of what to do with clear strategic warning absent specific, tactical warning.

The search for greater specificity in scientific reporting was one outcome of the post-Sputnik CIA internal review.

The search for greater specificity in scientific reporting was one outcome of the post-Sputnik CIA internal review. CIA's estimates proved correct; the launch of Sputnik coincided with the time given in CIA's strategic forecasts from 1954 onward. However, those estimates contained little tactical information. As a history of OSI from 1953–60 noted,

> *The post mortem on NIE-11-5-57 found that the estimate was based more on educated guesses than on hard facts.… There was a continuing and pressing need for up-to-date intelligence on Soviet guided missile research and development organizations, facilities and personalities and on testing activities.*

A 1958 CIA review of NIEs on the Soviet Union took note of the difference between estimating when a certain capability will be within reach, and predicting when that capability actually will be achieved. With Sputnik, the achievement happened to coincide with CIA estimates on capability. The review explained, "We said that the Soviets could orbit an earth satellite in 1957. When the Soviets did so we were very proud of ourselves, and indeed our estimate was triumphantly proved valid. Yet we had not predicted that the Soviets would launch a satellite."[69]

A few years after Sputnik, Herbert Scoville also lamented the lack of tactical information on the Soviet launch until a few months beforehand. The following is an excerpt from a speech Scoville gave in 1961 to CIA's Junior Officer Training class:

> *For a period of about one year prior to the launching of that first Soviet earth satellite, we had repeatedly predicted that the Soviets would launch such a satellite. To some extent this prediction was based upon our knowledge of the Soviets' general scientific capabilities and on what we knew . . . they were doing in the missile field. On the other hand, we had no specific reports stating that they had a vehicle ready and that they were going to launch a satellite on a particular date. We thought originally that they might do it at the end of 1957 or early in 1958 at the very beginning of the International Geophysical Year. There was, however, no firm evidence to give backing to this belief. But as the summer wore on and we received more and more little bits of indications, public statements . . . and similar things, we were led to believe that the launching of a satellite was imminent and might occur at any time.*
>
> *We put these beliefs into the* National Intelligence Estimates*, the* Scientific Intelligence Digest[b]

a. A more recent, now famous, example of such a circumstance is the *President's Daily Brief* article of August 2001, which addressed al-Qa'ida's intention to directly attack the United States.

b. CIA's classified *Scientific Intelligence Digest* (SID) first appeared in July 1951. In 1957 CIA had evaluated ahead of the launch and published in the SID "several key

> *and into the* Current Intelligence Digest*, but we had no really hard facts to go on…. I quote this as an example of where we guessed right, but still did not succeed. We have got to do a better job of getting our product across so that it can be acted upon. One of the most important things in selling a given intelligence item is to have some facts. If you have some actual data to go on, then you're going to get better credibility for the point you're putting across. That is not the only reason we want facts. We need facts in order to make better judgments in the first place. In many respects we are very, very poor in terms of the factual material that we have available.*[70]

Scoville's comments reflected the pressure analysts were under to present accurate and detailed pictures of Soviet missile capabilities in the early 1960s. Scoville also raised the now age-old issue of how much responsibility IC leaders should bear for how policymakers choose to act, or not, on the intelligence they are given. While Scoville implies that more specific information might have spurred policymakers to act differently, in this case, given Eisenhower's recorded positions on a "space race" and protectiveness of military and intelligence technology, it is questionable that more detailed and "factual" reporting would have changed the president's approach to the coming Soviet triumph.



Herbert Scoville in undated CIA file photo.

"We Had Everything There Was To Know:" A Collector's Perspective

Scoville's speech presents an analyst's view of the issues surrounding the launch of Sputnik 1. For an operational perspective, we can look to OSI's counterpart in the DO, a collection unit in the Scientific Operations Division (SOD) known in the early 1950s as the Technical Guidance Staff.[a] CIA Trailblazer Eloise Page worked in this unit in the years preceding Sputnik, and in an interview years later she recalled the efforts to learn as much as possible about Soviet earth satellite developments.

Page rejected the idea that Sputnik represented an intelligence failure. She also appeared to take issue with Scoville's lament about the lack of factual reporting, suggesting that much, including the timing of the launch; had been acquired in the months before the launch: "We had been getting a lot of reports. We had dozens of them." Many of these would have come through the high-level contacts she maintained in the US geophysical sciences community.

> *By May of 1957 we had everything there was to know about the Sputnik.*[b] *We had the angle of launch, we had the date. It was to be between September 20th and October 4th.* [Emphasis added.] *September 20th (sic.) was the 100th anniversary of the birth of the father of Soviet rocketry. The 4th of October was the last window that they could launch.*
>
> *We had everything else there was to know about it. By this time, all of the consumers were interested. There was a Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee (STIC), which was headed by Colonel White of OSI,*[c] *and they tried to get him to put something out that would go to the policymakers on this. They wanted to put out a STIC memo on it because we had all this information, and by this time it was obvious that it was good information. He said, "No. I'm not going to do that because*

aspects of the Soviet Satellite program" and pointed to those articles in late 1957 as part of the body of work CIA had carried out on Soviet earth satellite programs.

a. According to a 1951 survey of the Office of Special Operations (OSO), the branch was responsible for the "stimulation of the collection of scientific and technical information and for close liaison between OSO and the Office of Scientific Intelligence."

b. May 1957 is earlier than currently available reports suggest. The earliest report available to the authors was issued in July 1957 and stated that the Soviets would launch a satellite in September or October 1957.

c. Colonel Jack A. White was head of the missile division within OSI and a CIA representative to the Guided Missiles Intelligence Committee.

that comes from the Soviets and I don't believe anything the Soviets say [publicly].*" They started making noises about it, and he said, "Nope. We are not going to put it out."*

So finally I did something you are not supposed to do. In July I went over to see him and I said, "You really ought to put this out, because if you don't it's going to go off and we are going to have an intelligence failure." He said, "I don't care." So, there was nothing more I could do about that.

Page recalled in her interview:

I bet [Colonel White] *a case of champagne that* [the launch] *was going to go off. You should have seen my office on Monday morning. I had cases of champagne stacked up like that! The committee met in an emergency session on Sunday. They put a memorandum out with all of the information about Sputnik that they had. It was a great report, but, of course, it was after the fact. Then I got a letter of commendation from OSI."*

Indeed, the OSI letter notes that "the information obtained by SOD was essential and indispensable; the speed with which it was collected and made available to OSI and the complete cooperation and all out efforts made by SOD to comply with OSI requests make this a unique instance."

Eloise Page 1969 badge photo.

Conclusion: Policy Failure, Intelligence Success?

Although CIA had several times advised its customers of the impending launch, and perhaps *because* the US government had been fully apprised of Soviet ESV progress, the administration saw little need to attempt to blunt the effect of the Soviet political victory. That the Eisenhower administration had already planned to launch a satellite and did so in early 1958 made little difference in public perceptions. The Soviet launch shocked the American people and the rest of the world, and would result in profound national introspection followed by significant changes on the policy and intelligence front. As Weber noted, "Not since the investigation into causes of the Pearl Harbor disaster that led to the creation of CIA in 1947, perhaps, had so much soul searching into the strengths and aims of the U.S. been carried on."[71]

CIA's response to Sputnik presaged future instances in which a perceived intelligence failure has led the agency to review its collection capabilities and establish a task force to improve communication and collaboration across divisions. Even though CIA estimates had proven accurate on Sputnik, the agency still lacked specific information on Soviet guided missile developments.

The satellite launch sparked political concern that a "missile gap" existed between US and Soviet development. A panel of experts on guided missiles reviewed OSI's estimates and informed the DCI that "U.S. experience in ballistic missiles did not match that of the USSR and was, in fact, 'lagging by two to three years'… For this reason the consultants recommended that the technical competence of CIA should be expanded without delay and that direct connections between CIA and U.S. missile contractors be effected." CIA leaders subsequently ordered the establishment of a Guided Missiles Task Force, with representation from the analytic, operations, and technical components. Sputnik also led to greater collaboration and cooperation between OSI and ORR.

As in other crises in CIA history, analysts assigned to the hot topic of the day found themselves thrust into the limelight and experienced a boost in morale because of the attention their work received. From OSI's perspective,

The effect on OSI of the lively debates and discussions in Congress, Administration circles and the public press was an immediate rise in the requests for briefings and estimates on Soviet S&T capabilities… It was stimulating to most analysts to find that the products of their labors were at last sought after and found applicable to prob-

lems of national importance.[72]

In the lead-up to Sputnik's launch, CIA's support to its most important customer – the president – provided accurate strategic warning. The president was not surprised. This achievement is especially notable because it occurred in the first 10 years of the agency's existence, when scientific collection was still a relatively new field and during an era of rapid military and technological development in both the United States and the Soviet Union. That CIA foresaw the significance—politically, psychologically, and militarily—of satellite development and attempted to inform and shape policy discussions accordingly, demonstrated that it had the skilled employees and resources to meet the challenges of the day. Although most Americans were not aware of it at the time and probably are not today, the Sputnik episode was an instance of successful intelligence collection and warning.

The informal, internal US space race was won by the Army's Juno rocket (shown here), which took Explorer 1 into space on 31 January 1958. The Navy's Vanguard, which the president originally preferred, would not successfully orbit a satellite until 17 March of the same year.
Photo: NASA

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From Europe to China: An OSS Veteran's Reflections

Robert R. Kehoe

OSS reassigned some of the resources used in Europe to the China theatre—among them a number of Americans who had been members of Jedburgh teams. . .

In January 1945, the Allied armies in northern Europe were recovering from the setback in the Ardennes campaign and were poised for the advance into Germany. The power and resistance of German forces, demonstrated repeatedly, made it clear that this was to be a harsh and difficult advance. In the Pacific, Allied forces were moving steadily against the Japanese. The wide dispersal of Allied forces and circumscribed Japanese naval and transport capabilities were liabilities for Japan in its efforts to exert control and to prepare for invasion. The tenacity of the Japanese forces, despite shortages of all kinds, had been demonstrated repeatedly and would soon be reasserted in the Okinawa campaign.

One area, however, where the Japanese maintained a continual presence—and from which they exerted offensive action on several occasions during 1944—was China. Though scattered throughout China, Japanese forces there were rarely vulnerable.

As Allied naval and air power made the seas increasingly difficult, Japan concentrated efforts on exploiting China for its existing and potential communication routes, attempting to establish an area of operations there.

The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), CIA's predecessor organization, made the decision to reassign some of the resources used in Europe to the China theatre, among them a number of Americans who had been members of the Jedburgh teams.[a] The Jedburgh teams, generally comprised of three men (often one American, plus one French and one British national) were parachuted behind enemy lines to work with the resistance forces in France, Belgium, and Holland. The majority of these teams had completed their missions by 1945 and most of the American members had returned to the United States.

It was believed that these men—combat-experienced and knowledgeable in the peculiarities of partisan warfare—could apply their skills in China. They were all qualified as parachutists and a number were experienced radio operators. On the other hand, while most of these men had foreign language skills, few were familiar with the Chinese language. This was an important deficiency, but there was no way around it because few members of the Allied forces spoke Chinese. It was believed that this deficiency could be partially overcome through interpreters and

a. For more on the Jedburghs, see Robert R. Kehoe, "1944: An Allied Team With the French Resistance" *Studies in Intelligence* 42, no. 5 (Spring 1997), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol42no5/pdf/v42i5a03p.pdf.

The Great Leap: An OSS Jedburgh Goes to China

education about the area of operations.

As one of the Jedburgh radio operators, I was among those assigned to this mission. Following home leave, we received some orientation in the Washington, DC, area along with inoculations for all sorts of dreaded diseases such as cholera and bubonic plague. I remember reading about these diseases in *National Geographic* articles about the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and adjacent Chinese provinces.

I traveled by train with a number of my colleagues to Miami Beach, Florida, to await transport to China. There were fewer than 100 of us, and about a third were radio operators. Traveling by train through the tidewater areas of the Carolinas, a poor area of pine woods and unpainted buildings, we were reminded that the Great Depression was not long past. I noted in my journal that there was not the same excitement in this move as there had been with our move to Britain a year earlier. I anticipated another parachute drop behind enemy lines, more escape and evasion, more late night radio transmissions, and so on. I was soon to learn, though, that expecting this level of sophistication in China was not very realistic.

Most transport to the Far East was by slow-moving ship across the Pacific or through the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean. The Air Force, however, had established an air route, designed to move its own personnel to that part of the world. We thought ourselves fortunate to use that route. It was to be a fascinating journey across remote and strange parts of the world. Most of my colleagues, like

The author's travels within China.

myself, had rarely been in an airplane except for parachute jumps and training. The planes used at this time were all low-flying by today's standards, and we were able to see the scenery of these varied countries close up and in detail.

On 4 February, we boarded a B-24 bomber that had been converted to transport duty. With eight men and their baggage, the plane was roomy and comfortable. We flew to Natal in eastern Brazil, stopping only for fuel. We made most of the trip over Brazil by moonlight, permitting a spectacular view of the Amazon and the vast rain forest.

We stayed at hot, humid Natal for 15 hours, departing at 2:00 a.m. for a voyage across the narrowest part of the Atlantic. Our only stop during the crossing was at Ascension Island, a rock almost on the Equator that had been a British colony since Napoleonic times. Our stay was 24 hours, longer than planned, owing to the need for repairs to the aircraft.

Because of hazardous undertow, swimming there was dangerous but we did go fishing in the Atlantic. The island has one green spot, high up; the remainder is rock. From Ascension we traveled on to the African mainland, first to Liberia and then to Accra in what was then the Gold Coast. Our few days there were pleasant with surf, swimming, and good food—benefits of the planning and work the Air Force had done to set up this remarkable series of stopover and refueling points across half a continent.

After Accra, we flew across Nigeria, equatorial Africa, and the Sudan with many stops, finally arriving in Aden. Our overnight at Aden was overshadowed by a brief set-down at a small airport on the south coast of Arabia. We arrived just as the local sheik—with his bodyguard of fierce looking riflemen—were arriving on beautiful Arabian horses to pay a courtesy call on the base commander: it was a scene out of *Lawrence of Arabia*. We soon resumed flight, traveling to Karachi, on the southwest coast of what was then India.

Karachi was a staging area for troops going to various parts of India and to China. For those of us headed for China, this was where we awaited transport to the Assam Province of Northeast India. After two-and-a-half weeks we took off across India to Chabua, and the plane circled the Taj Mahal en route. There was one, 10-hour stop for repairs, and our plane took fire twice (fortunately while still on the ground, on both occasions); but in retrospect, I see we were amazingly casual about the incidents—perhaps a by-product of being at war, or perhaps because we were all so young.

. . . we made the legendary trip over the mountains—crossing "The Hump"—into China.

After Chabua, we made the legendary trip over the mountains—crossing "The Hump" (below) —into China. Our trip, which took only about three hours, was smooth but spectacular, as was the landing at the airport near Kunming in southwest China: the pilots and crew were skilled at adjusting to hazardous winds, icing, and sudden storms, characteristic of the region, which sweep in from every direction, challenging the course of the planes. Kunming, in late February, was a beautiful sight with the fruit trees bordering the large lake adjacent to the city already in blossom.

After reporting in, we moved to a training site called the "Country House," where we remained for most of the next month or two. Members of our former Jedburgh teams arrived in Kunming over several weeks. The time here was spent in training and acclimating to this very different theatre of war. Signals training continued. We were well qualified in radio but the equipment we were to work with was different from and more powerful than what we had used in France. We also had a brief introduction to the Chinese language, which gave us a notion of its complexities and variations. From the very beginning, it was evident that we were going to have to depend on interpreters.

Although this was a beautiful region with a pleasant climate, we were anxious to get into action. This required, first, that the commanding officer assign us to teams, which he did in typical military fashion. I



was assigned to a team led by one of our Jedburgh officers, Capt. Henry MacIntosh. I was not well acquainted with MacIntosh. He was a hardworking and committed officer who tried to lead his team through what were often complex situations, although sometimes too much of a straight shooter for the convoluted situation in wartime China. Our second in command was Lt. Stanley Gromnicki. He was a former football player, powerfully built, a pleasant disposition; his size and muscle impressed the Chinese.

Cpl. Richard Hawkins was the other American on our team. He was one of those graduates of the Army Specialized Training Program who really had a "feel" for the language and had achieved much in his study of Chinese. Over the next few months, he would further develop his skills in speech and comprehension, even making progress in our regional dialect. "Hawk", as we called him, had been a full-time student in dramatic arts at Baylor University.

Our Chinese interpreter was a man of about 30, one Frank Chen Kou-Yen, whom we knew as "Frank." He was a student of the College of Agriculture at the University of Nanjing. He had developed his language skills while at the university and earlier schools. Frank was anxious to do a good job, and this sometimes forced him to juggle meeting the needs of our team while not failing to meet those of the Chinese officers with whom we worked. Frank was a man of integrity, always honest and conscientious. He was an interested and good natured person, and it was a pleasure to be with him.

On 27 April 1945 our team set out with a number of other OSS personnel and a considerable supply of weapons and supplies.

On 27 April 1945 our team set out with a number of other OSS personnel and a considerable supply of weapons and supplies. The personnel on board included a few of our old Jedburgh colleagues, as well as some OSS personnel who had been engaged in the recent operations in South China. There were also two or three Koreans, who were no better acquainted with the China scene than we, but who were closely tied in with the Korean independence movement. They were looked upon with some curiosity by the Chinese, and by us; I still do not know why they were in southern China.

We were traveling in Army two-ton trucks over a gravel road, parts of which were barely completed; in fact, some of the northern section was not at all completed, as we were to find out in the course of the journey. Driving was difficult and required careful attention to edges and possible slides in this very hilly terrain. The trucks, which had moved into China over the Ledo Road, had been heavily used and were not in the best condition: there were frequent breakdowns. Fortunately, the mechanic traveling with us was able to adapt to all sorts of requirements with minimal resources. He was the type of man who, in the vast support infrastructure of the US Army, kept the whole thing running. As a result, despite breakdowns, we got through from Kunming to Xi'an—a distance of a thousand miles—in about 14 days, which was a real accomplishment. I believe that our convoy of about 12 trucks was the first to make this difficult trip.

We passed through a great variety of terrain. The area north of Kunming was very poor. It seemed that much of it was not arable, which would account for what seemed to be an absence of a local populace—but the trucks had only to stop a moment for people to emerge, as though from cracks in the earth.

Even 70 years ago, China, including these areas at the periphery of the great Tibetan upland, was heavily populated. It was desolate, but there were fields in production or being prepared for crops wherever there was a bit of level land and access to water. It was inhospitable to farming but a great variety of crops were grown there nonetheless. Some of the fields were so small that a plow could not operate, leaving the grub hoe as the key tool. Throughout, human labor was intensively utilized, supplemented by water buffalo, donkeys, or horses.

This was a type of agriculture none of us had experienced or observed. Not long before this moment in our lives, we may have read Pearl S. Buck's *The Good Earth*—but here it was, right in front of us. Animal and human waste was collected and applied heavily. There were no outhouses here in the countryside; the fields consumed everything directly. All labor was utilized: even old men, too frail for field work, were posted to collect any droppings as animals passed through the village.

Our convoy was quite a sight. Children overwhelmed us at every stop. Still too innocent to beg, they

While there, one of the major problems for our convoy was river crossings: there were ferries, but often fording was required.

were ecstatic over any candy or chewing gum we might have for them. Within a day or so we became aware of the vastness and variety of China when even our interpreters experienced difficulty translating to-and-from the local dialects in these isolated areas, cut off from the more urban areas by hills and mountains. Our interpreters frequently tried to communicate in writing, but often enough this was useless because of the high rate of illiteracy.

Sichuan

From the northern part of Yunnan province we moved to Sichuan, which was at the time the most populated province in China. While there, one of the major problems for our convoy was river crossings: there were ferries, but often fording was required. Entering this region from the south, we encountered hills and mountains, which gradually became a landscape of deep canyons and declining elevation that culminated in the great basin that surrounds the provincial capital of Chengdu.

The approach to Chengdu was beautiful, with miles of peach trees in blossom. Land here was intensively cultivated, with terracing throughout the basin.

Chengdu was a city of at least a million people, with many refugees from occupied China. Most were poor: without resources, they relied on any day labor that came along or on public welfare handouts. Those in Chengdu who did possess resources had fled the east. Chengdu was the temporary home to a number of universities, including the University of Nanjing. Likewise, a number of missionary organizations, both educational and medical, had moved to Chengdu for safety. The fiancée of our interpreter, Frank, was also in temporary residence there.

The couple was quite westernized. Frank introduced us to the young lady—not typical in China in those days, when traditional customs still dictated behavior between the sexes. In fact, throughout our tour in China, we had almost no contact with women except on a professional basis, such as when dealing with shopkeepers and waitresses. American soldiers' not-inappropriate but casual familiarity with such members of the opposite sex was considered improper in China. But there was, of course, prostitution, which was generally found in identifiable "red light" districts, and American soldiers were duly cautioned away from them.

The travel from Chengdu to Xi'an covered terrain and climate quite different from what we had previously seen. It was cooler, and there was much more wheat, potatoes, and maize in evidence, although rice was still cultivated where terraced irrigation was available. There was more use of animal labor on the farms, with horses, donkeys, cows, and mules sometimes working together in a field. I was told that sharecropping and tenant farming were the dominant patterns of land usage, with a few controlling much; taxes were overwhelming, and one had the impression of a highly exploited land and people.

I recall how dirty the people were in this area, as there was little waste of water on bathing—and this was evident not only by appearance but by pungent body odor. This, together with the omnipresent manure for farming and the heavy use of garlic in cooking, made for a potent atmosphere.

We arrived in Xi'an late at night on the 11th of May. The last hundred miles of our trip from Chengdu to Xi'an was by railroad flatcar, since the bridges were unreliable and the road was badly washed out. This was the easy part of our trip.

Movement to Area of Operations and Training for Guerrilla Attacks

We spent three weeks in Xi'an with pleasant accommodations and good food. We did many interesting "route marches" across the countryside, which gave us a glimpse of a very different part of China. The weather was warm and dry, and the countryside, fields, houses, and villages were very different from those we had seen on the way north from Kunming.

On our treks through the countryside we passed large areas surrounded by armed guards and identified as "off limits," said to be ancient ruins. All we could see were large, earth-covered pyramids or earth mounds. On visiting Xi'an many years later to see the archeological ruins, we were told that they had only recently been systematically explored—but they were certainly not "recently" discovered.

The city of Xi'an, home to the first dynasty to unite China, retained more of the ancient walls and fortifications than others we had visited. In fact, although there were many people and dwellings outside the walls, a large part of the city was still within them, as were shops and restaurants. Our interpreters' work was easier here than in the regions farther south, since the north Chinese dialect was standard and they had learned it at home or in school.

By this time we were beginning to understand the complex political scene in China. Ours was a very tiny part of the American forces involved in the anti-Japanese struggle in China, but the problems facing us were similar to those facing American leaders and policymakers—factionalized, ill-trained leaders little inclined to following up on promises to foreigners or to fighting the Japanese.

China had been involved in the struggle against Japan for years. The unofficial war started in 1937, but the hostilities went back before that, at least to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. Throughout this period, Japan was organized, disciplined, unified, and militarily strong. The Chinese, in contrast, were disorganized, seemingly undisciplined, and militarily decentralized.

Chinese military power consisted of a conglomerate of forces answering to different leaders and held together by a patchwork of political alliances. Much of the fighting in China in the 1920s and 1930s had been civil war, directed by one warlord against another. By the thirties, the Chinese Nationalist party, the Kuomintang (KMT), was ostensibly in control of much of China.

This control, however, was shaky, and dependent on local military commanders whose cooperation could be unpredictable. Behind this political scene was a backward economy. For example, when the Japanese invaded Manchuria, they seized most of China's iron ore and much of its coal and steel production. These inchoate beginnings of a modern industrial economy were insufficient to support a modern military force.

Chinese military power consisted of a conglomerate of forces answering to different leaders and held together by a patchwork of political alliances.

China was also dominantly agricultural and its agricultural economy had to support an enormous population. Without any real industrial manufacturing capability, the Chinese had to import weapons, equipment, vehicles, and other manufactured goods. They could only pay with money earned from the sale or export of agricultural goods, of which there was virtually no surplus for trade.

Americans greatly admired the bravery and endurance of the Chinese people during this period in history. China was seen as an important, potentially powerful ally in the anti-Japanese struggle—a perception supported by the movement of large numbers of people away from the occupied areas, the emergence of a paramilitary resistance, and the obvious failure of the Japanese puppet government under Wang Jingwei to legitimate Japan's occupation of large swaths of the country.

Bitter divisions, particularly between the Nationalist and Communist leadership, as well as the very shaky nature of Chiang Kai-shek's regime, were not emphasized. One has the impression that even President Roosevelt was inclined to believe the optimistic reports about China. America was not ignorant, having been active in various ways for decades in China: trade there had gone on for more than a hundred years; educational and medical investments had been made; and Christian missionary societies of various denominations had functioned there since the 1500s, with Americans involved in missionary work there since early in the 19th century. Prominent Americans had served in China, including the Army chief of staff, George C. Marshall, who had been a military attaché in Beijing during the 1920s. Gen. Joseph S. Stilwell had been in Beijing for several years, learning the Chinese language and establishing himself as a military expert on China.

After Pearl Harbor and the US entry into the Sino-Japanese War, Stilwell became chief of staff to Chiang Kai-Shek. Stilwell had responsibility for all US lend-lease supplies and considerable training and operational duties in the Chinese army. With great faith in the possibilities of his mission, Stilwell nevertheless had little faith in Chiang Kai-Shek, and Chiang, in turn, had little confidence in Stilwell's military judgment and in the commonality of their goals.

Stilwell believed in the possibilities of building up some type of cooperative arrangement with the Communists who, by now, controlled large parts of north and northwest China. Chiang, naturally, had a strong disinclination towards this course of action.

Chiang Kai-shek, his wife Soong Mei-ling, and US Army Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell. (Image: US Army Center for Military History.)

By the time of our arrival, tensions between and among the president, Chiang Kai-shek, and Stilwell had resulted in Stilwell's being recalled; however, the American mission in China continued, focusing on mobilizing all forces in opposition to the Japanese. This was far from an easy task: the Nationalist leaders, both in Chongqing and in the smaller field units with which we were to work, were inconsistent on this point. That is, one had the impression they believed the Americans were going to win the war, vanquishing an enemy that they, the Chinese, had spent years fighting.

To be fair, the Nationalist armies had fought the Japanese with great desperation and great losses in cities such as Shanghai, Taierzhuang, and Changsha for five long years before America ever entered into the conflict. As the war dragged on, however, exhaustion had set in and, by 1944, the Nationalists appeared to be appraising developments while they conserved strength for later battles with their archenemy.

The briefings we received stressed the political complexities that would face us. The KMT reacted negatively to the suggestion that OSS teams might be able to work with the Communists, who were often in ideal positions for unconventional warfare and were experienced at it. As far as I know, the only cooperation that was permitted was assistance to the rescue operations at POW camps in Manchuria, after Japan's announcement of surrender.

The most significant American military presence in China was the 14th Air Force, built on the earlier *Flying Tiger* volunteer force that had been formed by Claire Chennault. It played an important role in deterring Japanese advance. The Air Force and the Chinese army were heavily dependent on American logistical support, which came through India—by truck, via the Ledo Road, and by "The Hump" air supply route.

There were other American forces in China, but OSS was focused on on those who might be involved in intelligence collection or in unconventional warfare operations. One of the most interesting of these was a force called the Sino-American Cooperation Organization (SACO), which was headed by an American naval officer, Adm. Milton E. Miles, and manned on the US side by naval personnel. OSS and SACO had worked closely during the Kweilin campaign of the previous year. Their work was closely aligned with that of OSS. Where else but in China could we have had an American naval contingent working a thousand miles from the sea, on guerrilla warfare operations?

The briefing we received on our planned area of operations went into some of these details. Our team, Hyena, was to be landed by plane in central Anhwei province, which was within what the Chinese command called the "10th War Area." This 10th War Area was surrounded by territory under Japanese control, but the region itself was not within Japanese military occupation. The area was cut off from land access to the Nationalist-controlled areas to the west when the Japanese seized the Pinghan Railroad in 1944, as part of Operation Ichi-Go, the largest operation conducted by the Japanese Army during the war.

The Pinghan Railroad runs from Beijing in the north, to Wuhan in central China, and the 10th War Area lies between this railroad and the Japanese occupied coastal areas to the east. There were large numbers of Nationalist soldiers in various organizational components throughout the area. The command looked well articulated on paper, but in reality it was rather amorphous. The typical soldier had little incentive to heed commands of far-off Nationalist commanders, since the Nationalists government provided little in the way of resources and the soldier's pay, if any, was in the form of near worthless, paper currency.

The purpose of Team Hyena was to arm and train a group of about 150 men. These men were to be used in small bands for attacks on Japanese holdings, particularly the Pinghan Railroad. The railway was an important means of communication and transportation for the Japanese forces in China and, by extension, their forces in Indo-China and Southeast Asia. It was under surveillance (and attack, from time to time) by the 14th Air Force, but this did not put the railway out of operation.

The railroad was one of the major military targets in China. Other military objectives included the rolling stock and Japanese garrisons nearby. The Chinese Nationalists army was theoretically poised for attacks on these objectives, but experience had shown that they had neither the resources nor the skills for such unconventional responses. The hope was that we could assist in developing such skills and in directing the Chinese forces toward their accomplishment. Another team, Team Grizzly—led by a Jedburgh veteran, Maj. Charles Carman—was landed in a nearby area. Another Jedburgh and an old friend, Frank Cole, was the radio operator with that team.

There was already an OSS Advanced Liason officer in the 10th War Area, Capt. Jack Finnegan, whom we contacted a few days later. An agreement was made for Team Grizzly to turn over some of their supplies to our team, since they received enough for 250 men (whereas we had only enough for 100). Looking to the future, we divided up the target areas, with our team designated to operate against the Pinghan Railway along a 100-mile stretch between Xinyang and Suiping in the adjacent Henan Province.

Team Hyena with local war officials. The author is on the right, second from the end. (Image: author's collection.)

The flight from Xi'an was over 500 miles. We made a successful landing at a place called Valley Field near Li Huang in western Anhwei Province. Shortly afterward, the other members of the team departed for Li Huang to meet with local commanders and make arrangements for our training location and identify the men assigned to be with us. Of course, the most valuable thing we had was our collection of supplies—weapons, ammunition, explosive material, etc. These were moved by porters from the landing field to nearby spots, some of them in temporary shelters and some in the open.

I thought it somewhat ironic that I was in charge of this collection, which was priceless in this country where weapons were so highly valued and difficult to acquire. What would I do if I were to perceive improper movement of the boxes of rifles? In fact, what would be improper movement? This was a humid country and I could be told simply that they were being moved to protect against the rain. Fortunately I saw no challenge to what I thought to be proper handling.

Still, our team was frustrated by a confusing pattern of Chinese command and responsibility, and this frustration continued throughout the time we worked with them.

We were able to set up what was to be our training base about 10 to 15 miles from Li Huang, a pleasant spot in a heavily agricultural area. Small huts were erected for us and areas were cleared for training. Most of the radio work was carried out from a nearby hill, which provided clear transmission facilities.

This was all very different from how things had worked in France.

Preparing the training base near Li Huang. Radio operations were conducted from the nearby hills. (Image: author's collection.)

There was no question that the Japanese could move into the area without very effective opposition. The previous year, with the Japanese army on the offensive in China, the danger of such a move would have been acute; it was considered unlikely, now. Their closest contingents were a considerable distance, roughly 30 to 50 miles, and were now essentially in a defensive posture.

Recognizing how quickly and forcefully the Japanese could move if they found it necessary, we sometimes felt that the Chinese were too sanguine about the security of their position: things were so open, in fact, that we just assumed Japanese intelligence on activities in the area was probably accurate. Our concern was that they might take preemptive action. Nothing happened, but might have, had the war lasted into the winter months as expected.

The first contingent of officers arrived in early July. After weeding out some of the least qualified, we began training with those who remained. It was not until 15 July that training of the enlisted men began, creating a very tight schedule in light of the planned 1 August departure date, when we would head westward toward the railroad.

During this period we concentrated on the training facilities, including preparing ranges for rifle and mortar practice, building obstacle courses, and creating exercise facilities. Our radio contact was good, but messages were minimal since we had little to say.

We used a hand generator, for which we had plenty of labor available. (There was a kerosene-powered generator available, but I did not have the transformer available to adapt this to radio needs.) In any case, we expected that we would be relying on the radio more heavily later on, once we'd advanced toward the Pinghan Railroad. After I wired our quarters, we did use the generator to supply electric light for short periods each day.

Throughout the whole period of the mission, we sent in daily weather reports by radio. These were highly desired by the Air Force and eventually reached the Navy. The weather reports followed a regular pattern, which, when combined, were used to predict weather patterns throughout north and central China. This was one area where the Communists were of assistance, but they were working on their own—not through OSS teams.

During this time, though, we did become better acquainted with our Chinese colleagues. With us was a small contingent of officers, together with service personnel, which included cooks, cleaners, and porters, etc. Over the following two months, three more Americans joined us; one was a physician, but I do not know the nature of his mission. Whatever it was, his effectiveness was greatly diminished because, ignoring the very rules he preached, he was sick most of the time!

The other two Americans, a Major Walker and a Sergeant Romney were representatives of the OSS MO (Morale Operations) which was responsible for certain aspects of propaganda, particularly "black propaganda." Black propaganda was designed to appear as if it emanated from the enemy.

Throughout this period, we were able to observe, closely and critically, the Chinese social system, which was evident in the interactions we witnessed between officers and the enlisted. On the one hand, it seemed very informal: officers wore loose clothing, with little concern about the informality of their attire (unless in a command setting). On the other hand, officers held themselves on a superior plane and treated as inferior, often harshly, the enlisted men. I once observed an officer beat a coolie with a stick: the coolie had slipped into a rice paddy alongside a narrow path, and when he did not immediately extricate himself, others were assigned to take over his load, and another officer kicked him into the paddy.

Whether this was typical or not we could not say: being foreigners, it was a glimpse of the interactions among the Chinese to which we weren't often privy. Overall, we felt we were in a pleasant setting with good food and adequate quarters.

It was, however, a hot and humid area, requiring protection against mosquitoes. There was much malaria, though I do not believe it was as bad as in the paddy areas of South China or of Southeast Asia. We took atabrine, a synthetic replacement for the traditional quinine. Few Chinese had preventive medicine of any type; rather, they relied upon their own natural immunity, which, of course, varied from one person to another. Medicine in this area was mostly traditional; some of it may have been useful, but it was contrary to our thinking, for the most part. We didn't have antibiotics yet, but we did have a handful of sulpha drugs that we kept for medical emergencies. Fortunately our team remained well.

Once our contingent got settled, they proved to be enthusiastic. They were ignorant of the weapons we had brought, but they learned fast. They were very agile—quick at gymnastics and anything related to it. Instructional assignments were divided among our team members and then among the Chinese cadre. The men responded well and seemed to enjoy the training.

Russia's entry into the war and the dropping of the atomic bomb—two developments that arose nearly simultaneously—abruptly changed these plans.

Much time was spent during this and the next month negotiating with the Chinese command over our planned operations. The first colonel commanding our contingent was unreliable and was finally replaced by another, more effective leader. It was finally agreed that we would aim to begin on 12 August, which was to be a firm date—although the definition of "firm" was difficult to determine. Our life during this time was routine, with much effort expended trying to figure out what we would need for the coming operation, and identifying, particularly, the adaptations that would be required for the coming winter months.

While winters were not as severe as they were north of the Yellow River, this area could still get cold, and we had to prepare for that. Winter clothing and adequate shelter had to be provided, and details associated with procuring and moving weapons and munitions had to be worked out. The furious battle for Okinawa and the tenacity of the Japanese in defending their homeland made it seem likely that a long winter campaign would be ahead of us.

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Surrender and Our Journey to the Capital

We heard the news of Japan's announcement of surrender the night before it was official, but this was reason enough for everyone to travel to a nearby village for celebrations. Upon confirmation the next day, our entire operation was put on standby, pending instructions from Headquarters.

I noted in my journal that the problems with surrender were tremendous: even in the late stages of the war, there were more than a million Japanese troops remaining in China, all of whom needed to be peacefully subdued and transported out of the country. From our higher-ups, we received some confusing inquiries about our team's going to Hankou, a large city and major Japanese logistics center for operations in southern China on the Yangtze River, some 200 miles to our southwest.

We learned that, apparently, the idea was to take over the Japanese counterintelligence files. But we never learned the precise nature of the mission: our Chinese colleagues immediately negated the plan, saying it was impossible. In later years, I was to learn that a very substantial Communist contingent led by Li Xiannian (who would later become president of the PRC) was operating in that area—and while this aspect of the situation was never mentioned, I

After a few days, we were dispatched for Kunming—and the end of the mission of Team Hyena.

suspect that it, too, may have been a reason for them to negate the plan.

Almost immediately, Headquarters returned with orders for us to proceed to Nanjing, which was the prewar capital, the seat of the puppet government during wartime, and a major Japanese position. We were told to collect information on Japanese atrocities in the areas en route.

One thing I found confusing at first was that all the radio traffic was now coming in clear text. It took me a short time to adjust to this since I had become so fixed on the regularity of the cipher groups. The clear text traffic was much easier to handle since there was no cipher work and mistakes could be checked immediately.

The next few days were busy with plans for our move and for handing over weapons and supplies to the Chinese Nationalists. We worked out a plan for this turnover and for our team's further movement. Our trip was partly by boat along one of the many canals flowing quietly through central China; part was on horseback, but most of our travel was on foot. It was a fascinating trip that allowed us to experience the densely populated rice paddy region of central Anhui, a poor area with little urban development and a lot of marginal farmland.

We were welcomed in the provincial capital, Hefei, and in other cities and villages along the route. Captain MacIntosh, however, found the Chinese quite uncooperative regarding atrocities: he was chagrined that they seemed to be welcoming back the puppet troops as prodigal sons. It was difficult for us to distinguish the local leaders from those who supported the puppet government.

Our trip took about two weeks, becoming ever more uncertain as we approached Nanjing. For many miles outside the city, there were Japanese or puppet soldiers posted as guards at intervals of several hundred yards at first, then decreasing to 10-yard intervals as we approached Pukou, the city on the far side of the Yangtze from Nanjing. I recall thinking how strange this was: these men, with whom we would have exchanged fire but a short time ago, were now watching and saluting as we passed. I remember thinking that one of them might get trigger happy, recalling what he had pledged to do to an American over the previous few years.



A Japanese soldier arranging a ferry ride. (Image: author's collection.)

On our arrival in Pokou, we were met by a Japanese officer who was overseeing the river crossing. He arranged a boat to take us across the river into the capital city. It seemed ironic that Japanese soldiers were posted as guards on one side of the street, while just across the same street were soldiers of the Nationalist armies who had just begun to arrive in Nanjing, ferried by American transport planes.

A handful of senior OSS officers had already arrived. We were directed to their headquarters, which was allegedly the home of the late Wang Jingwei, who had led the pro-Japanese puppet government. After a few days, we were dispatched for Kunming—and the end of the mission of Team Hyena.

While waiting, I was approached by a lieutenant from OSS counterintelligence who was about to depart for Shanghai. He asked if I would accompany him to act as a radio operator and general assistant. The colonel in charge of the OSS contingent said that I should return with our team; I believe, however, that I could have persuaded him to assign me to this task—but I decided not to. Perhaps an exciting opportunity, missed?

The opportunity aspect notwithstanding, I believe I was already showing the symptoms of malaria that would become particularly troublesome on the boat ride home. Fortunately they resolved by the time we arrived stateside.

It is pure speculation as to whether Team Hyena would have been able to do much toward its mission had the war continued. We were ready to move and reasonably prepared for a move toward the Pinghan Railway, as planned.

In retrospect, we know that the major concern of Nationalist armies at the time was not so much the Japanese enemy as the prospect of a Communist civil war in the post-war period. But that does not mean that they would not have proceeded with our mission had pressure continued. Some OSS teams did accomplish more under a variety of conditions. Some OSS special operations units had already done a lot during the 1944 period of the Japanese advance in south China which was prior to our arrival.

For me, personally, this part of my OSS service was a great experience, regardless of the military success. The chance to interact with a very different people and witness the workings of a very different civilization was a special, once-in-a-lifetime opportunity.

Aftermath

After the war, the only direct contact I had with our Chinese compatriots was by correspondence with Frank, our interpreter. We exchanged several letters from 1946 until July 1948. Frank had accompanied our team to Kunming, where we separated: the Americans headed home, and Frank planned his next steps.

After a short time in Kunming, Frank went north. I believe he went to Nanking where he found employment, first, in an agricultural college and later with the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. There, he worked in horticulture, his chosen field, but he also continued to do translation work. His letters, both handwritten and typed, demonstrated a very good command of English.

In his early letters, Frank mentioned the hardships of the country and his own difficulties, but he remained optimistic about China and his own prospects. He spoke of his marriage and sent a photo of the wedding party (left)—posed Western style.

Frank would ask about my academic work, farming, and even about my girlfriend, remembering very well the conversations we'd had in camp. As 1947 passed into 1948, though, the content and tone of Frank's letters changed. Communist forces were no longer groups of poorly armed partisans but were now a well-organized and well-armed army. They had moved from their victories in Manchuria in to North China and, by mid-1947, were poised to go south. In his letters, Frank now dwelled more on the miseries in Nanking—the violence, the hordes of refugees, the shortages of everything, and the pervasive sense of fear. He was by this time desperate to get out of China, hoping to get a fellowship or scholarship to an American university or agricultural school.

Just finishing college on the GI bill, I could offer little but compassion. His letter of July 1948 was the last I heard from Frank. I suspect he would have been treated badly by the Communists: he was an intellectual with a higher level of education than most, had worked with the Nationalist army and, most damaging of all, had served with an American team associated with the forces of the Nationalist government. Hopefully, Frank's many assets would have protected him. I suspect others among our Chinese compatriots faced similar challenges.

Professional Impact

World War II had a lasting impact on Americans serving abroad. As with others, we in OSS were quite innocent of the world at large; before the war, most of us had never been outside the United States. Foreign language competence was limited.

But we learned quickly. In my case, my view of the world vastly expanded. My comrades and I learned much about the beauty and nature of other cultures. We learned the importance of discipline, at both the group and personal levels. We learned how to train and prepare for any action. We learned about weapons—the variety, power, and limits of them. Most important of all, we learned about dealing with people: be honest, yet skeptical; friendly, but detached; forceful, yet understanding. Finally, we learned to balance risk with caution, a lesson equally applicable to both civilian and military life.

For me, an interest in China and its people and culture remained. I stayed involved with China affairs through academic study and continuous observation of the China scene throughout the many years when direct access was impossible. I worked as an intelligence officer in operations and analysis, but primarily as a training officer. My wartime experience was invaluable.

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Reflections on Readings on 9/11, Iraq WMD, and Detention and Interrogation Program

Martin Petersen

Like most historic events, a considerable mythology has grown up around that September 11th Tuesday and the controversies that followed. While not quite "ancient history" for much of the IC workforce, it is still a poorly understood history.

It is still like yesterday for those of us who were there in Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Headquarters in Langley, Virginia: The small morning meeting in the Directors' Conference Room; the door opening from the inner corridor; the head of the Security Detail of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) entering to say an airplane had just hit the World Trade Center. My first thought was probably like that of the others in the room: "Please dear God, make this an accident," but we all suspected the worst, and soon our fears were confirmed.

It is now 16 years since 9/11, one of "those dates" when everyone in the United States knows where they were and what they were doing. For a significant portion of today's Intelligence Community (IC) workforce, that place was school. Those under 35 now were probably in college, at most, and if under 30, high school or middle school. Like most historic events, a considerable mythology has grown up around that September Tuesday and the controversies that followed. While not quite "ancient history" for much of the IC workforce, it is still a poorly understood history.

Few will have read the *9/11 Commission Report*, the *Robb-Silberman Report* on the IC estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or the deeply flawed *Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program*. (Hereafter the *SSCI Report*.) Having served more than 35 years as an intelligence professional, I—and many others—believe the *9/11 Commission* and the *Robb-Silberman Reports* are generally solid, but the *SSCI Report* —sometimes referred to as the "torture report"—is a travesty, fatally flawed by errors of fact, unsupportable findings and conclusions, and serious flaws in analytical tradecraft.

It also fails to adequately capture the context of the times. Indeed, very, very few—including the sons and daughters of serving CIA officers at the time—will have an appreciation for the difficulty of the decisions that had to be made at that time, the complexity of the politics, the degree of the public's fear—and the fear CIA officers themselves felt knowing how little we really knew—and the deep sense of personal responsibility we all carried. I recall sitting in the Director's Conference Room as the 9/11 Commission was hammering the CIA and turning to the director of Public Affairs and asking rhetorically, "Who will tell our story? So much of this is just off." I thought—feared—it might take 25 to 30 years or more for a more complex appreciation of events

Adding to the Record		
Issue	**Document of Record**	**Additional Material**
9/11: The run up and the aftermath	*Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States* (9/11 Commission) (Government Printing Office, 2004)	*At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA,* by George Tenet with Bill Harlow (Harper Collins, 2007)
		Preventing Surprise Attack: Intelligence Reform in the Wake of 9/11, by Richard A. Posner (Rowman and Littlefield, 2005)
		First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror, by Gary C. Schroen (Presidio Press, 2005)
Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction	*Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Robb Silberman Commission), unclassified version (Government Printing Office, 2005)	*Comprehensive Report of the DCI's Special Advisor on Iraq WMD, 30 September 2004* (Duelfer Report) (Government Printing Office, 2005); available digitally at https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/
		"The Iraq WMD Intelligence Failure: What Everyone Knows is Wrong," Chapter 3 in *Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War,* by Robert L. Jervis (Cornell University Press, 2011)
Interrogation and Detention	*Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program* (525-page "Findings and Conclusions and Executive Summary" together with "Foreword" by Chairman Diane Feinstein and "Additional and Minority Views" [Declassified], available at https://web.archive.org/web/20141209165504/http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/study2014/sscistudy1.pdf)	*Rebuttal: The CIA Responds to the Senate Intelligence Committee's Study of Its Detention and Interrogation Program*, edited by Bill Harlow (Naval Institute Press, 2015)
		"The Torture Blame Game: The Botched Senate Report on the CIA's Misdeeds," by Robert L. Jervis in *Foreign Affairs,* May/June 2015
		Hard Measures: How Aggressive CIA Actions After 9/11 Saved American Lives, by Jose A. Rodriguez, Jr. with Bill Harlow (Threshold, 2012)
		Company Man: Thirty Years of Controversy and Crisis in the CIA, by John Rizzo (Scribner, 2014)
		Michael Morell interview with Charlie Rose, 14 December 2014 at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FdITBCKtVDc
		Playing to the Edge: American Intelligence in the Age of Terror, by Michael V. Hayden (Penguin Press, 2016)

to come out and that I would not be around to see it.

Wrong. Increasingly the memoirs of serving CIA officers are becoming part of the public record. There is now an impressive library of books and articles that should be read in conjunction with the "official record." Importantly, not all are by CIA officers; two of the best are by an outstanding academic (Robert L. Jervis) and one by and a noted jurist (Richard A. Posner).

There is now an impressive library of books and articles that should be read in conjunction with the "official record." Importantly, not all are by CIA officers.

Why should officers new to CIA and the IC dwell in the past? *Because they are the future leaders, and they need to understand the past if they are going to lead the IC into the future: What went right? What went wrong? Where are the traps? What are the pressures like? And how are the politics played? Those who do not know where the IC and CIA have been, cannot know how we got to where we are.*

What follows is discussion of readings I recommend (see table on preceding page) because the material provides additional perspective and adds to the official records on 9/11, Iraq WMD, and the CIA's detention and interrogation program.

September 11, 2001

The 9/11 Commission Report on Causes and Remedies

Two phrases that everyone, including me, associates with the *9/11 Commission Report* do not, in fact, appear in the report: "intelligence failure" and "a failure to connect the dots." The report says clearly that there were missed opportunities, especially the failure to watchlist two of the hijackers, but even in this case, the report states that it is unlikely that watchlisting by itself would have prevented the attacks. (354–55) (Hereafter, numbers in parentheses following book or publication references denote the page on which the cite appears.) The only reference to "connecting the dots" is in the context of the need for greater integration of analysis, without which "it is not possible to 'connect the dots.'" (408) The report makes clear that 9/11 is a case in which failure had many fathers, and in the end, no one looked good. The report does an excellent job of laying out the history of al Qa'ida, Bin Ladin, and the road to 9/11, and intelligence officers new to the subject—or unfamiliar with the history—will find chapters two through seven particularly beneficial.[a]

There were three root causes for 9/11, according to the commission. The first was a lack of sufficient resources. Intelligence was particularly hard hit by the "peace dividend" following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Intelligence budgets were cut between 1990 and 1996, and were essentially flat between 1996 and 2000. (93) CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO) hit rock bottom in 1995, when only 25 Career Trainees became case officers. (90)[b] Foiling the Millennium Plot used up all of the Counterterrorism Center's current year funds for 2000.[c]

The second factor was the lack of a sense of urgency in the US government, including Congress, regarding terrorism—Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet aside. Countering terrorism was a second or third priority, and the US government reaction is understandable, despite Tenet's repeated warnings in 2000 and 2001. Al Qa'ida had killed fewer than 50 Americans at that point, and the threat was seen to lie overseas. The press was no better. The *New York Times* in April 1999 had debunked the idea that Bin Ladin was a terrorist threat.[d] As threat reporting rose through the spring of 2001, precautions were taken overseas, but, the report states, "domestic agencies never mobilized in response to the threat." (265)

Communication barriers between and within agencies was the third root cause, according to the commission. The FBI and the CIA to this day

a. These chapters are: "2—The Foundation of the New Terrorism;" "3—Counterterrorism Evolves;" "4—Responses to al Qaeda's Initial Assaults"; "5—Al Qaeda Aims at the American Homeland"; "6—From Threat to Threat"; and "7—The Attack Looms."

b. The Career Trainee Program is the CIA's principal mechanism for recruiting and training case officers.

c. The Millennium Plot was an al-Qa'ida plan to carry out a series of spectacular attacks, including in the United States, to greet the new century. See *The 9/11 Commission Report,* Chapter 6, "From Threat to Threat."

d. Tim Weiner, "U.S. Hard Put to Find Proof Bin Laden Directed Attacks," *New York Times*, 13 April 1999: A1; cited in *The 9/11 Commission Report,* 343. Weiner wrote: "In their war against Mr. bin Laden, American officials portray him as the world's most dangerous terrorist. But reporters for *The New York Times* and the PBS program 'Frontline,' working in cooperation, have found him to be less a commander of terrorists than an inspiration for them."

What George Tenet brings that does not come through nearly as strongly in the 9/11 Commission Report is the emotion, intense frustration, and incredible dedication of the men and women of the CIA through this period.

disagree about whether key information was shared about a terrorist meeting in Kuala Lumpur, but the CIA did fail to register with the US Department of State the names of two terrorists who became hijackers. (181–82) FBI had major sharing issues within the Bureau—between the criminal investigators and the national security sector, between the field and FBI headquarters, and between field stations.

The commission also notes that leaks, which compromised the IC's ability to collect on al Qa'ida were among the other contributing factors. The most notorious of these was a story in the *Washington Times* that NSA was able to intercept the conversations of senior al Qa'ida leaders, who immediately stopped using the form of communication they were using at the time.[a]

Although avoiding the phrase "intelligence failure," the commission found four kinds of failure: imagination, policy, capabilities, and management.[b] In short, according to the commission, analysts failed to imagine the type of attack that occurred; the policy process in two administrations failed to respond to the rising threat; while the CIA did more than anyone else, its capabilities were limited, DoD was not fully engaged, and the FBI did not have the capability to link field reporting to national priorities; and the US government as a whole failed to bring together all available information to manage transnational operations.

The commission put forward five "major" recommendations, which are directly quoted below:

- unifying strategic intelligence and operational planning against Islamist terrorists across the foreign-domestic divide with a National Counterterrorism Center;
- unifying the intelligence community with a new National Intelligence Director unifying the many participants in the counterterrorism effort and their knowledge in a network-based information-sharing system that transcends traditional governmental boundaries;
- unifying and strengthening congressional oversight to improve quality and accountability; and
- strengthening the FBI and homeland defenders. (399–400)[c]

At the Center of the Storm
by George Tenet[d]

What George Tenet brings that does not come through nearly as strongly in the *9/11 Commission Report* is the emotion, intense frustration, and incredible dedication of the men and women of the CIA through this period. He takes exception to some of the commission's findings, but in large measure his commentary on the times reinforces much of what the report had to say, especially about the failures of capabilities, policy, and management. Tenet's book also provides the vivid detail you would not expect in a bipartisan commission undertaking.

Chapters seven, eight, and nine ("The Gathering Storm"; "They're Coming Here"; "9/11") are particularly moving. The frustration and anger come through as Tenet and other CIA officers throughout 2000 and 2001 tried repeatedly to get policymakers to pay attention to their warnings. He says the 9/11 Commission missed something important about 9/11 and the CIA: "it was personal with us." (173) The CIA had thwarted attacks and lost lives in the fight against terrorism, he writes, something that our global partners in the intelligence business understood, but "the politicians, the press, and even the 9/11 Commission often failed to understand." (173)

Tenet hits the resources issue hard. He says that, by the mid-to-late 1990s, "American intelligence was in Chapter 11, and neither Congress nor the executive branch did much about it." (108) He said he aggressively sought additional funds, including writing two personal letters to President Clinton, which only succeeded in irritating the administration. Many

a. Martin Sieff, "Terrorist Is Driven by Hatred for U.S., Israel," *Washington Times*, 21 August 1998: 1, cited in *The 9/11 Commission Report*, 127.

b. See *The 9/11 Commission Report,* Chapter 11, "Foresight—and Hindsight."

c. Overall, the commission had over a dozen recommendations. See chapters 12 and 13, "What to Do? A Global Strategy" and "How to Do It? A Different Way of Organizing the Government."

d. In the spirit of full disclosure, I worked closely with George Tenet and consider him a friend. *At the Center of the Storm* is an excellent history of the CIA from 1997 to 2003, some of the most, if not the most, challenging years in the agency's history.

At the Eye of the Storm is also interesting for what it says about the nature of Washington politics, especially when the bureaucratic finger pointing starts.

in government claimed after 9/11 that they had encouraged Tenet to spend more on terrorism. "No, they didn't."(107) Tenet was heard to say more than once, "There are more FBI special agents in New York City, than there are CIA case officers around the world." By shifting resources, scrapping and scrimping, the CIA managed to quadruple the money spent on counterterrorism over the 1990s, even though the overall intelligence budget declined by 10 percent. (108)

Chapters seven through nine also chronicle the lack of response by successive administrations, Congress, and the press to the repeated warnings issued over many years about the dangers of international terrorism. Many of these warnings were public; a *National Intelligence Estimate* (NIE) on the foreign terrorist threat in the United States was done in 1995, and Tenet's annual Worldwide Threat Briefing to Congress hit terrorism hard from 1997 on.[a] Tenet says that starting in 1998 he wrote eight personal letters to Presidents Clinton and Bush warning of the terrorist threat. (122) He takes issue with the 9/11 commission finding that the Clinton administration did not fully understand the threat and reminds us that President Clinton signed a covert action Finding on Bin Ladin. (129–30) But, as Tenet points out, these were very limited findings, and the authorities he felt he needed he did not get until six days after 9/11. (109 and 154)

At the Eye of the Storm is also interesting for what it says about the nature of Washington politics, especially when the bureaucratic finger pointing starts. Washington, Tenet writes, has its own laws of physics, one of which is that "inside the Beltway . . . for every action there is an unequal and opposite overreaction." (192) When *Time* magazine ran a cover story on "The Bombshell Memo"—accusing the FBI of mishandling the Zacarias Moussaoui case and failing to act on field reporting about Arabs seeking flying lessons—the bureau went into action. (192)[b] "No organization . . . is better at defending itself than the FBI. . . . The Bureau knows that when you get slugged in *Time*, you punch back in *Newsweek."* (192) The following week *Newsweek* ran a story titled "The Hijackers We Let Escape" quoting an unnamed FBI official as saying that the CIA did not notify the FBI about the Kuala Lumpur meeting, that the FBI could have tracked the terrorists and uncovered their mission, and that it was all 'unforgiveable.'"(192)[c]

Tenet does pose a question the 9/11 Commission did not: What if? What if the two hijackers had been watchlisted properly, the FBI had searched Moussaoui's luggage, and the bureau had recognized what it had in the flight school information and shared it. . . . What if all that had been done? Would it have prevented 9/11? Tenet concludes that a 9/11 attack would have been delayed, but not prevented. Al Qa'ida would have replaced the two men, just as it had replaced another who could not get a visa. (199–200) Tenet calls the Moussaoui case another missed opportunity (like Kuala Lumpur), but in the end he concludes "larger systemic shortcomings, in resources, people, and technology". . . and the lack of a "comprehensive, layered system of domestic protection in place to compensate for the internal weaknesses" was equally important. (204–205)

***Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform in the Wake of 9/11* by Richard A. Posner**

Richard Posner, until recently, was a judge on the US Court of Appeals in Chicago. He remains a senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School. He is not a man who minces words, and he states flatly that the 9/11 Commission's narrative does not support its conclusions. (20) Specifically, he says, the commission offered a structural solution to what appears from the narrative to be a managerial problem, (9) and the most sensible response to a managerial problem is to change managers. (207) The book is far from a screed. It is a very thoughtful, carefully argued—he was a judge after all—assessment of the implications of the commission's recommendations and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). He offers a number of insightful observations on surprise attacks and the relationship between structure and performance in intelligence that analysts, managers, and future managers ought to be familiar with.

a. A selection of Tenet's statements are available at https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/pub_statements_terrorism.html.

b. The *Time* story, "How the FBI Blew the Case," ran on 3 June 2002.

c. The facts are far more complicated than the FBI provided to *Newsweek*, and Tenet discusses the controversy on pages 191–205.

Posner takes issue with the commission's determination that one of the causes of 9/11 was a lack of imagination.

In criticizing the commission report, Posner argues that "bipartisan" is not the same as "nonpartisan" and that the commission erred in insisting on a unanimous report. "The premium on unanimity . . . undermines the commission's conclusion that everybody in sight was to blame. . . . and it could not have achieved unanimity without appearing to apportion equal blame to the Clinton and Bush administrations." (7–8) It is clear from the questioning, he says, that none of the members forgot which party they belonged to. (7)

Posner also faults the commission for failing to take into account, when making its recommendations, organizational theory, the history of "czars" in the US government, and the chaos that resulted from the creation in 2002 of the Department of Homeland Security. (10) With regard to the IRTPA legislation, he believes much could have been accomplished through executive orders and that the 2004 presidential election campaign led to the speedy acceptance of the commission's recommendations—and the resulting act—without careful consideration.[a] He is particularly critical of the fact that the IRTPA appears to weaken the CIA, while "all the other components of national defense against terrorism that failed on 9/11 are to be strengthened, although many of them, notably the FBI, failed worse than the CIA did." (68)

But, this is now ancient history. What Posner has to say, however, about preventing sneak attacks and the relationship between structure and performance in intelligence organizations is very relevant to today. Posner states that "not all surprise attacks are preventable" and indeed are something of an inevitability. (42) "The analysis suggests . . . that surprise attacks cannot be reliably prevented, though some can be, others can be deterred, and the worst consequences of those that do occur can be mitigated."[b] (97) Sneak attacks are by their nature low probability, high impact events that occur only relatively rarely and are most likely to succeed when they have a low antecedent probability of success and the attacker is weak, because on both counts the victim will discount the danger. (93 and 111) Posner points out that the last successful hijacking of a US airliner anywhere in the world was in 1986.

Posner takes issue with the commission's determination that one of the causes of 9/11 was a lack of imagination. "Before (9/11), although the government knew al Qa'ida had attacked US facilities . . . and would try to again, the idea that they would do so by infiltrating operatives into this country to learn to fly commercial aircraft and then crash such aircraft into buildings, killing thousands of Americans in a space of minutes, was so grotesque and so devoid of precedent that anyone who had proposed that we take costly measures to prevent such an event would have been considered a candidate for commitment." (20)

Although he concludes that the prospect of dramatically improving the ability of an intelligence system to anticipate surprise attacks is dim, (124) Posner argues that surprise attacks share common features:

- The attacker is too weak to prevail in conventional military terms.
- The victim's perception of the attacker's weakness contributed to the failure to anticipate the attack.
- The victim lacked a deep understanding of the attacker's intentions and capabilities.
- The victim reasonably thought the principal danger was elsewhere.
- The victim interpreted warning signs to fit a preconception.
- The victim was lulled by false alarms.
- The victim was in a state of denial concerning those forms of attack hardest to defend against.
- Intelligence officers were reluctant to challenge the opinions of superiors.
- Warnings to local commanders lacked clarity and credibility. (85)

The judge concludes by stating, "Among the common features of successful surprise attacks that I have listed, the structure of the victim's intelligence system is not salient." (86)

Which brings us to Posner's views on the relationship between organization and performance in intelligence systems. His basic position can be nicely summed up as "One ought to distrust organizational solutions to management problems." (41) The creation of the Director of National

a. See especially Chapter Two, "The Congressional Response."

b. Pages 87–97 contain a lengthy discussion of the mathematics of sneak attacks.

Intelligence position was supposed to solve several problems, including information sharing, warning challenges, and management of the Intelligence Community.

Posner is skeptical on all counts, which he discusses in some detail.[a] The DNI system turned out to be far less centralized than many (including Posner) imagined at the time the IRTPA became law. So Posner's fears, which did not come to pass, are better seen as warnings—warnings that greater centralization could lengthen the time it takes information to move through the system and could reduce competitive analysis. (43)

As for information sharing, Posner argues that the greater problem may be sharing information *within* agencies and points to the FBI in particular. (153) He notes that Israel's Agranat Commission, which looked into the 1973 Yom Kippur War surprise, came to the opposite conclusion from that of the 9/11 Commission—that Israel should move to less centralization and more pluralism. (156 and 82–85) His bottom line: "The startling implication is that the performance of a nation's intelligence system is probably, within a broad range, insensitive to how it is organized . . . history seems not to vindicate one over the other [centralization over pluralism] . . . *no (his emphasis)* known organizational form seems able to cope with the problems of information and incentives as grave as those that beset the intelligence function." (157)

There are no heroes in the Iraq WMD story, and failure is the only word to describe it.

***First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan* by Gary Schroen**

Perhaps because it was so long ago and perhaps because so much has happened since, it is easy to forget how quickly and effectively CIA moved immediately after 9/11. Tenet describes the policy process in his book,[b] but Gary Schroen, who led Team JAWBREAKER into Northern Afghanistan, paints a riveting picture of the action on the ground from the day after 9/11 to mid-November 2001, when CIA working with the US Special Forces, Afghan allies, and the US Air Force drove the Taliban from power and al Qa'ida into the hills. Of course, this did not keep some in Congress and the press from speaking about a "risk averse CIA." *First In* gives lie to that canard—as do the 117 Stars on CIA's Memorial Wall—and this book is a powerful reminder of just how dedicated, capable, and brave the men and women of the CIA and the IC are.

I will give the last word on 9/11 to DCI George Tenet. It is from his prepared statement to the above-mentioned congressional Joint Inquiry Committee on 17 October 2002:

> *It may be comforting on occasion to think that if we could find the one process that went wrong, then we could remedy that failing and return to the sense of safety we enjoyed prior to 9/11. The reality is that we were vulnerable to suicide terrorist attacks and we remain vulnerable to them today. That is not a pleasant fact for Americans to live with, but it is the case. There are no easy fixes. We will continue to look incisively at our own processes and to listen to others in an ongoing effort to do our jobs better. But we must be honest with ourselves and with the public about the world in which live.*[c]

Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction

There are no heroes in the Iraq WMD story, and failure is the only word to describe it. Moreover, it was a failure that was largely CIA's, although there were plenty of other participants, and CIA was not alone in its beliefs. All IC officers—especially analysts and managers of analysis—need to be familiar with the works that will be considered in this section. All look at why the IC—and the international community—were so wrong about Iraq's putative WMD capabilities, and while there is some agreement among the three, two point to a fundamentally different cause from that of the third—failure to understand an adversary—which I believe is *the* enduring intelligence challenge. The third report goes beyond the reasons for the Iraq WMD failure and examines the eternal tensions between those who produce intelligence and those who use intelligence to make decisions.

a. See especially Chapter 5, "The Principles of Organization."

b. See Tenet, Chapter 12 "Into the Sanctuary."

c. https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2002/dci_testimony_10172002.html.

The fundamental problem with the analysis of Iraq's WMD capabilities, according to the* Duelfer Report, *was not that it was a problem in S&T analysis, but that it was a problem in political analysis.

Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction

The Robb-Silberman[a] Commission, as it was popularly known, was created in February 2004 by President Bush to look not only into the Iraq issue, but also at the capability of the IC to address WMD and related threats. The commission on its own broadened its mandate to include a look at the structure of US intelligence. Congress passed the IRTPA, which created the DNI, while the commission was still working.[b]

According to the Robb-Silberman Commission, the Iraq WMD failure was "in large measure the result of analytical shortcomings" (3) and poor tradecraft in particular. (408) In the words of the report, "far and away the most damaging tradecraft weakness we observed was the failure of analysts to conclude—when appropriate—there was not enough information available to make a defensible judgment." (408) Compounding this was the "river of intelligence . . . over long periods" that flowed to the president and others that was "more alarmist and less nuanced than the NIE."[c] (14) It "left an impression of many collaborating reports where in fact there were very few sources." (14) The report, like the 9/11 Commission, also faults the analytic community for a lack of imagination. (13) Collection takes its blows, too: the WMD failure was also a collection failure on the part of CIA, DIA, NSA, and NGA, according to the report, and analysts cannot analyze information they do not have. (3, 9)

The commission's answer is more integration and greater centralization. The powers of the new DNI are too limited; the position requires more budget authority and more control of Defense Intelligence. (18) Strong mission managers are part of the answer, as they should play a powerful role in driving collection and encouraging competitive analysis. (387)

With specific regard to analysis, the commission recommended, among other things:[d]

- putting more emphasis on strategic intelligence (and, by implication, less on current intelligence);
- making analysis more transparent, in part by using more detailed sourcing statements;
- making greater use of red teams, devil's advocates, and outside experts, especially in the areas of science and technology;
- investing in technologies for advanced search and knowledge extraction; and
- requiring continual training and establishing IC-wide standards.

The report and the recommendations are what you would expect from a commission made up of lawyers, politicians, and bureaucrats—and I do not mean that disparagingly. The answer for such a group is always heavily weighted toward structure, procedure, training, and tools. But this solution does not get to what the Duelfer Report concluded was the real problem.

Comprehensive Report of the DCI's Special Advisor on Iraq WMD (*Duelfer Report*)[e]

The fundamental problem with the analysis of Iraq's WMD capabilities was not that it was a problem in science and technology (S&T) analysis, but that it was a problem in political analysis—in understanding the adversary. I confess I am as guilty as the rest. I was no longer in CIA's Directorate of Intelligence (now the

a. Laurence Silberman was (and still is) a senior judge of the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. He had served as deputy attorney general under Presidents Nixon and Ford. Charles Robb is as former Democratic senator from Virginia.

b. The IRTPA was signed on 17 December 2004; the Rob-Silberman commission delivered its report on 31 March 2005.

c. The NIE, *Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction*, October 2002, was mandated by Congress in the run up to US invasion of Iraq in March 2003. A redacted and released version can be found at http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB129/nie.pdf.

d. These are scattered throughout the report but most are dealt with in detail in Chapter 8, "Analysis."

e. The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) was a postwar, multinational fact-finding mission under the leadership of CIA and DIA. It was initially led by David Kay, who resigned and was replaced by Charles Duelfer. Duelfer and a member of his team wrote about the effort in a *Studies in Intelligence* article published in 2005 (Vol. 49, No. 2 [June]): "Finding the Truth: The Iraq Survey Group and the Search for WMD." A redacted form of the article was released in 2015. It is most easily found at: http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB520-the-Pentagons-Spies/EBB-PS37.pdf.

Directorate of Analysis) during the period the NIE on Iraq WMD was done, but if I had been in the room when the president questioned the strength of the case against Iraq and George Tenet allegedly said "slam dunk," I would have said "Amen."

According to Duelfer, what was not factored into the analysis was the personality of Saddam and how the regime worked.[a] This was true not just of the CIA and the IC, but of the international community as well, including those in the Middle East, who one would think would have known Saddam and his regime the best. According to Duelfer, three things drove Saddam's behavior and made him *act* like he had ongoing WMD programs and stocks of chemical and biological weapons:

- He believed chemical weapons had saved Iraq in the Iraq-Iran War, and Iran was a continuing threat.
- He believed US concern about WMD during the first Gulf War had kept the US forces from pushing all the way up to Baghdad after it crossed into Iraq in 1991.
- He believed the fear of WMD would keep the United States and an international coalition from enforcing UN resolutions against him. (8)[b]

If Duelfer points to the analytic challenge, Robert Jervis examines it in depth. And, like Posner, Jervis does not mince words. The various Iraq postmortems are "almost as flawed as the original estimates,"and bad outcomes are not always explained by bad processes.

Analysts were also fooled because they were looking for a pattern and a strategy where there was none. According to Duelfer, Saddam was making it up as he went along—entirely tactically, but with a long-term goal: getting the UN sanctions lifted. Duelfer believed Saddam had no real plan or strategy other than wearing down the resolve of the international community. (3–5)

I have long thought that Iraq WMD was more the rationalization than the reason for the Second Gulf War, and the fact that large stockpiles were not found has fixed in the public mind the perception that there was no threat. The *Duelfer Report* is a powerful corrective. The ISG found that Saddam had destroyed his existing stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons after his son-in-law, Husayn Kamil, defected in the summer of 1991. But Saddam worked to sustain the capacity, especially the intellectual capital required, to restart the programs once the UN sanctions were lifted. (9)

The report concludes that Saddam probably had a capability to produce large quantities of sulfur mustard within three to six months at the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom (March 2003) and could have reestablished the biological weapons (BW) program in a few weeks. Moreover, the Iraqi Intelligence Service maintained a network of covert labs in which it developed poisons and did research on chemical and biological weapons.[c] When David Kay testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in January 2004, he said,

> *Based on the intelligence that existed, I think it reasonable to reach the conclusion that Iraq posed an imminent threat. Now that you know reality on the ground as opposed to what you estimated before, you may reach a different conclusion—although I must say I actually think what we learned during the inspection made Iraq a more dangerous place, potentially, than in fact, we thought it was before the war.*[d]

***Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War* by Robert Jervis**

If Duelfer points to the analytic challenge, Robert Jervis examines it in depth. And, like Posner, Jervis does not mince words. The various Iraq postmortems are "almost as flawed as the original estimates," and bad outcomes are not always explained by bad processes. (123–124) Like Posner, he believes that "fixing the intelligence machinery" will not necessarily fix the problem.

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a. See especially the Transmittal Letter to the Duelfer Report, dated 23 September 2004. The page numbers refer to the GPO printed version of the 1,000-page report. A digital, html (unpaginated) version is available at https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/transmittal.html.

b. It was not just the IC that miscalculated. Saddam failed to understand that 9/11 changed the US equation. See page 12.

c. For specifics, see https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/ for links to portions of the report dealing with each type of weapon.

d. See http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/kaytestimony.pdf, 2.

Jervis points out that many intelligence failures are, in fact, "bilateral" in that one state is taken by surprise because it is unable to anticipate the other's intelligence failure.

Robert Jervis is a uniquely qualified commentator.[a] He is the Chair of the CIA's Historical Review Panel, possesses full clearances, and is one of the authors of the landmark internal CIA report on what went wrong with CIA analysis on Iran in the 1970s. When I was deputy executive director, I asked him to look into the CIA's analytic work on Iraq. Chapter Three of *Why Intelligence Fails*—"The Iraq WMD Intelligence Failure: What Everyone Knows is Wrong"—is the unclassified version of that study.[b]

Jervis reviews the various explanations given for the failure, finding some valid (too much certainty, failure to consider alternatives, etc.) and some just wrong (excessive consensus, politicization, etc.), but in every case the explanation ignored the context. (126–36) For instance, with regard to alternatives, Jervis points out that even opponents of the war did not offer alternatives, and if someone had, it was unlikely to have been seen as credible. (128) "The fundamental reason for the WMD failure in Iraq was that the inferences were very plausible, much more so than the alternative." (146)

The causes of failure lie elsewhere, according to Jervis. Insufficient attention was paid to Husayn Kamil's claim that the stockpiles had been destroyed and the programs were morbid. (137) The analytic community "overlearned" the lessons of 1991, when, after the First Gulf War, it was revealed that Saddam's WMD programs were much further along than previously thought. (138) Saddam's denial and deception efforts were treated as proof of concealment rather than a hypothesis to be tested. (139) And, HUMINT was weak and misleading, and analysts did not have enough insight into the sources. (140)

But Jervis points to three deeper factors. The first is a failure "to sufficiently integrate technical and political analysis . . . questions of Iraqi WMD capabilities were not treated in the context of Saddam's political system, fears, and intentions." (145) Second, analysts assumed foreign actors were rational. Confusion and improvisation are hard to understand and Saddam's strategy was incoherent. (146) "Third, and central to the Iraq case, empathy is difficult when the other's beliefs and behavior are strange and self-defeating." (146) Jervis points out that many intelligence failures are, in fact, "bilateral" in that one state is taken by surprise because it is unable to anticipate the other's intelligence failure. He quotes Sherman Kent on the Cuban Missile Crisis: "We missed the Soviet decision to put missiles into Cuba because we could not believe Khrushchev would make such a mistake." (1)

Jervis does not excuse himself from the same conclusion everyone everywhere made.

> *In this case, even if there had been no errors in tradecraft, I believe the analysts would* <u>*and should*</u> [Jervis emphasis] *have judged that Saddam seemed to be actively pursuing all kinds of WMD and probably had some on hand. The assessment should have been expressed with much less certainty, the limitations on direct evidence should have been stressed, and the grounds for reaching the conclusion should have been explicated. But while it would be comforting to believe that better analysis would have led to a fundamentally different conclusion, I do not think this is the case.*(149)

Jervis concludes by stating that intelligence is inherently fallible and that the most important function of intelligence is to raise questions. (178, 181) Analysis can be best improved by a good product evaluation program, stronger middle management, more attention to social science methods, more rigorous peer review, and deep country expertise to include culture and language. (187–195)

Detention and Interrogation

The 9/11 Commission and the Robb-Silberman Commission were bipartisan and went about their work in a professional manner. This was

a. Jervis was the chair of the DCI Historical Review Panel when I was deputy executive director. Professor Jervis is the Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics at Columbia University.

b. *Why Intelligence Fails* is the best book I have ever read on intelligence analysis and should be required reading for all analysts and managers of analysis. In addition to the unclassified version of the Iraq study, the book includes the unclassified version of the Iran study and the best chapter I have seen on the limits of intelligence and the natural tension between intelligence producers and policymakers.

not the case—on either score, in my view—with the *Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program*. Initiated by a 14-1 vote in March 2009, the study led to a 6,700-page classified report that was approved in December 2012 by a 9-6 vote (all seven Democratic members, one Republican, and one Independent voted in approval).[a] The contention and controversy that would surround the study and the report resembled the period of the mid-1970s when alledged CIA abuses of its authorities were investigated by two congressional committees.

In my view, the report reads like an indictment, a document a prosecutor would prepare to gain a grand jury decision to go to trial—the facts still in dispute and having to be proven in court. Committee staff members took five years and, according to a CIA estimate cited in the minority response to the report's passage, cost CIA $40 million dollars to help locate, review, and sanitize the documentation required to produce the report and its 20 conclusions (all of them disputed in CIA's official rebuttal). Moreover, as the Committee Chairman Dianne Feinstein pointed out, the report contained no specific recommendations.[b] Former CIA Director Michael Hayden likened the process to a personal experience:

> *When I was a military attaché in Bulgaria during the Cold War, I once got into a heated discussion with a Bulgarian political officer. Frustrated by some of the things he had been telling me, I simply asked what "truth" meant to him. He quickly responded, "Truth is what serves the party." That's a pretty good description of what we have here . . . and why.*[c]

In my view, the report reads like an indictment . . . the facts still in dispute and having to be proven in court.

Rebuttal: The CIA Responds to the Senate Intelligence Committee's Study of Its Detention and Interrogation Program, **edited by Bill Harlow**

Particularly frustrating to me and many others is how quickly and completely the *SSCI Report* has been embraced and accepted as truth. Particularly troubling is acceptance of the idea that the CIA program was carried out without the express knowledge and approval of senior administration AND congressional figures. *Rebuttal* is a collection of essays and documents that attempts to correct the distortions in the *SSCI Report*. It includes short essays by former directors George Tenet, Porter Goss, and Hayden; deputy directors John McLaughlin and Michael Morell; and former senior CIA and FBI officers, John Rizzo, Jose Rodriguez, and Phillip Mudd. It also includes the unclassified CIA rebuttal as well as the "Minority Views of Vice Chairman Chambliss, Senators Burr, Risch, Coats, Rubio, and Coburn."[d]

In more than 100 pages the "Minority Views" contains a much more detailed and thorough critique of the *SSCI Report* than the official and relatively brief unclassified CIA rebuttal.[e] It faults the report on two broad grounds: flawed process and problematic analysis. On process, the "Minority Views" notes that the majority did not interview witnesses; did not do basic factchecking; did not provide sufficient time for the Republican minority to review the report before the vote; and ignored the CIA's response, which identified a number of factual errors. (187) The

a. Senators Angus King and Susan Collins, both from Maine, voted to release the report, which would also include their personal perspectives on its findings. (The report actually included the personal views of six senators and three sets of collective minority views.) In her "views," Collins offered the following reason for voting to release the report: "My vote to declassify this report does not signal my endorsement of all of its conclusions or its methodology. I do believe, however, that the Executive Summary, and Additional and Minority Views, and the CIA's rebuttal should be made public with appropriate redactions so the American public can reach their own conclusions about the conduct of this program. In my judgment, the 'enhanced interrogation techniques' led, in some instances, to inhumane and brutal treatment of certain individuals held by the United States government."

b. *SSCI Report*, 554 and 4, respectively.

c. Michael V. Hayden, "Analysis: Flawed, Politicized . . . and Rejected" in *Rebuttal: The CIA Responds to the Senate Intelligence Committee's Study of Its Detention and Interrogation Program*, 13.

d. *Rebuttal* labels its chapter on one of the minority additions to the *SSCI Report* "The Minority Report," although its authors noted in their introduction that "These views should not be treated as an independent report based upon a separate investigation, but rather our evaluation and critique of the Study's problematic analysis, factual findings, and conclusions."

e. See "CIA Fact Sheet Regarding the SSCI Study on the Former Detention and Interrogation Program" at https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/2014-press-releases-statements/cia-fact-sheet-ssci-study-on-detention-interrogation-program.html

"Minority Views" does not take issue with two of the report's conclusions—that the EITs were brutal and the conditions of confinement were harsh.

"Minority Views" also states that the the *SSCI Report* violates several basic tenets of intelligence analysis: it lacked context and objectivity; showed evidence of politicization; lacked timeliness; did not make use of available sources; and displayed a poor standard of analytic tradecraft. (187–190)

"Minority Views" also takes sharp and direct exception to eight of the 20 conclusions of the *SSCI Report*; the CIA rebuttal takes issue with all of them.[a] Specifically, "Minority Views" disagrees with the report's conclusion that the enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs) were not effective; that justification of the EITs rested on inaccurate claims of effectiveness; that CIA impeded oversight by Congress, the White House, and the NSC; that CIA misled the Department of Justice and impeded its own inspector general; and CIA released classified information on EITs to the media. (191–213) The "Minority Views" does a particularly good job of refuting specific contentions of the majority. In a detailed analysis that lasts almost 90 pages, "Minority Views" first states the "Study Claim" and then presents the "Fact."(191–213)

"Minority Views" does not take issue with two of the report's conclusions—that the EITs were brutal and the conditions of confinement were harsh. It also does not directly dispute some others, including that the CIA was not prepared to operate detention facilities and that the program was flawed, especially in the beginning, but it adds context. "Minority Views" did not directly address a handful of the conclusions, but commented on most of them.[b]

One impression that some in Congress have tried hard to create is that the Hill was kept in the dark about the RDI program and the EITs. It is a claim CIA rejected in its official comments on the report. The factsheet available on CIA's public website offered the following summary, directly quoted:

•Within the limits on access established by the White House, CIA made a good faith effort to keep Congressional oversight committee leaders fully briefed on the program.

•CIA also facilitated multiple reviews by its own Inspector General (IG), whose reports allowed Agency leaders to address a number of the same shortcomings noted in the SSCI report.

•Despite some flaws in CIA's representations of effectiveness, the overall nature and value of the program, including the manner in which interrogations were carried out and the IG's findings about the program's shortcomings, were accurately portrayed to CIA's Executive and Legislative Branch overseers, as well as the Justice Department.[c]

And, of course, Congress funded the program. When the abuse of prisoners by US Army soldiers in Abu Ghraib was exposed in April 2004 and knowledge of the CIA detention program became public, congressional attitudes hardened against the program.

Two retired senior Agency officers and a former director and deputy director have written books or given lengthy interviews on their involvement with the RDI program, their interactions with the Bush and Obama administrations, and Congress. ***Company Man: Thirty Years of Controversy and Crisis in the CIA*** **by John Rizzo**, who served many years in the Office of the General Consul and as acting general consul, covers in detail the history of the RDI program and EITs, especially in chapters one and 11–16. Rizzo chronicles CIA frustrations in dealing with both the Department of Justice and the Hill as it sought legal guidance on the program and worked hard to make sure that everything was done legally and briefed properly. He also discusses problems with the program and how CIA made sure any and all incidents were reported to the IG and the Department of Justice for investigation. ***Hard Measures: How Aggressive***

a. For a detailed comparison of differences see a multipart blog posting on the Brookings Institution's Lawfareblog at https://www.lawfareblog.com/findings-conclusions-and-areas-dispute-between-ssci-report-minority-and-cia-part-1. The site contains extended discussion of the issues surrounding detention and interrogation, including a defense of her report by Senator Feinstein.

b. https://www.lawfareblog.com/findings-conclusions-and-areas-dispute-between-ssci-report-minority-and-cia-part-1.

c. http://www.cia.gov/library/reports/CIAs_June2013_Response_to_the_SSCI_Study_on_the_Former_Detention_and_Interrogation_Program.pdf and http://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/2014-press-releases-statements/cia-fact-sheet-ssci-study-on-detention-interrogation-program.html

CIA Actions After 9/11 Saved American Lives **by Jose Rodriguez** covers some of the same ground, but focuses on Rodriguez's time in the Counterterrorism Center and as director of operations. The book is particularly good on the "torture tapes" issue and relations with the Hill.[a]

Former director Michael Hayden in his book ***Playing to the Edge*** details at length his interaction with the congressional oversight committees and his struggles with the Obama administration over the release of documents on the RDI program.(227–32, 354–58, and 395–402) He has nothing but praise for former Director Panetta and very little praise for former Attorney General Eric Holder. The president, he says "seemed to want to have it both ways" and in Hayden's judgment, "came out looking inconsistent to people on both sides of the issue." (395) Hayden writes with humor and a decided edge, and in doing so skewers opponents and turns the memorable phrase. He sees the *SSCI Report* as "a missed opportunity to deliver a serious and balanced study of an important public policy question" and that the Agency and the country would benefit from a "more balanced study . . . and a corresponding set of recommendations." (402)

Former deputy director "***Michael Morell in an Extended Interview with Charlie Rose"*** makes many of the same points, but without the edge that characterizes Hayden's book. Morell is dispassionate and analytic—just what we would expect of a career analyst—and therefore more effective than Hayden. Morell is especially helpful in providing the CIA context and the atmospherics surrounding these issues.

Hayden sees the SSCI Report as "a missed opportunity to deliver a serious and balanced study of an important public policy question."

I am going to give Robert Jervis the last word on the *SSCI Report*. He did a review essay in the May/June 2015 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, **"The Torture Blame Game The Botched Senate Report on the CIA's Misdeeds."** He sees the *SSCI Report* as a missed opportunity to address some very complex and profound issues:

> *The CIA's interrogation program raised a host of moral questions as well, which the Senate reports and the CIA rebuttal ignore . . . . both the Democratic majority report and the Republican dissent take easy ways out. By claiming torture was ineffective, the Democratic report encourages a sense of indignation and implies the interrogation program was morally indefensible. The Republican dissent, for its part, contents itself with claiming that the torture did produce useful information but avoids an accounting of its moral and political costs, suggesting that such concerns have no place in counterterrorism policies.*
>
> *All the documents suffer from a shortcoming . . . a failure (or refusal) to acknowledge the existence of tradeoffs between competing values . . . both spare their beholders from confronting the possibility that the CIA tortured people, acted immorally, and also saved lives.*
>
> *Such difficult questions require a national conversation. Unfortunately, the Senate Intelligence Community forfeited its chance to lay the foundations for one. Indeed, the majority report suggests that little further thought is needed, clearing almost all involved. According to the Democrats on the Committee, the American people, Congress, the Department of Justice, and even the President himself were either kept in the dark by the CIA or deceived by it into needlessly allowing torture to continue. The majority report's authors seem to want Americans to accept these findings, condemn the CIA, and simply vow to never permit torture to recur.*
>
> *If the authors of the majority report believe their efforts have made the outcome less likely, they are mistaken. In the end, a less political report might have had more influence.*

. . . so what? Other than the benefit of having a deeper understanding of three controversies that in large measure define the CIA for the past 15 years? I think 9/11, Iraq WMD, and RDI hold important lessons for all intelligence officers, but especially analysts and managers of analysis, who increasingly are not former analysts themselves.

a. Some early interrogations of captured al Qa'ida operatives were taped, in part so there would be an accurate record of what was learned and to make sure the guidelines were not exceeded. Rodriguez ordered the destruction of the tapes because they showed the faces of CIA officers who were doing the interrogation, and he feared that if the tapes became public, the lives of these officers and their families would be at risk.

With regard to empathy, if our mission at its core is to make judgments about an adversary, then I think we must be able to answer eight questions about the adversary's system and key leaders(s), institutions, and groups.

If Robert Jervis is correct—as I think he is—that the most important function of intelligence is to raise questions, then the three episodes teach us that we must know what questions to ask. After 45 years doing and thinking about intelligence, I have to offer my list of 11 questions—eight relating to empathy and three to confidence—that I hope every analyst and manager will ponder every time. To these I would add an keen appreciation of the environment in which we practice our craft today.

With regard to empathy, if our mission at its core is to make judgments about an adversary, then I think we must be able to answer eight questions about the adversary's system and key leaders(s), institutions, and groups. We must also be able to answer questions about our confidence in our judgments.

With regard to the ***system*** he lives in or the organization he belongs to:

- *How does one get to the top of that system?*
- *What is the preferred method of exercising power and making decisions?*
- *What are the acceptable and unacceptable uses of power in that system or institution?*

With regard to the ***individual, institution,*** or ***group***:

- *What is his/their assessment of the situation?*
- *How does he/they see their options?*
- *What is his/their tolerance for risk?*
- *What does he/they believe about US intentions, capabilities, and* especially *will?*
- *What is his/their definition of an acceptable outcome?*

If we cannot answer these questions, then how can we make good judgments about the other side? I believe we cannot, and, in fact, we really do not understand what we are attempting to analyze.

With regard to ***confidence*** and ***expressing confidence***, I have come to believe the Intelligence Community is going about it backwards. If you had asked me when I was a callow youth how confident I am in judgments, I would have answered: "I have looked at all the evidence, thought about it, presented it accurately with appropriate caveats. I am pretty confident in my judgments and furthermore I have taken care in expressing them with the appropriate level of confidence." I am considerably older now, and with regard to confidence, I would encourage analysts—and especially managers and reviewers of analysis—to ask these three questions:

- *Where am I most vulnerable to error?* The question will invite a different and more thoughtful answer than, "How confident am I?"
- *What am I not seeing that I should be seeing if my analytic line is correct?*
- And if we ever find ourselves thinking it makes no sense for the adversary to be doing something, we should ask, "*Under what circumstances might it make sense for them to do that?*"

With regard to the environment in which we practice our craft . . . well, 9/11, Iraq WMD, and the controversies around RDI and EIT have had one indisputable impact. Intelligence, and especially intelligence analysis, is much more the topic of partisan politics these days, and that is not going to change. Objectivity and refraining from policy prescription have been and must always be our core values. We in the Intelligence Community also need to realize that we are the only ones in the foreign-policy decisionmaking process playing by those rules, and that makes us targets as well as helpmates. And, this is yet another reason why tradecraft must be strong and our knowledge of the past—and its lessons—forever in our minds.

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A Review of *Enhanced Interrogation: Inside the Minds and Motives of the Islamic Terrorists Who Are Trying to Destroy America*

James E. Mitchell, with Bill Harlow (Crown Forum, 2016), 309 pp.

Erik Jens

Now, James Mitchell . . . has produced his own memoir of his participation in the CIA's post-9/11 interrogation program.

Note to readers-1 Dec 2018: On 26 July 2018, the Editorial Board received a submission from Dr. James E. Mitchell objecting to this review of his book. Dr. Mitchell's elaboration of his concerns about the review written by National Intelligence University Professor Erik Jens included assertions that the review was "based on false assumptions and flawed logic" and "misconceptions." It also suggested the review had the "imprimatur of the CIA"—which, as an independent journal within the Intelligence Community, Studies does not. See disclaimer below. Dr. Mitchell further requested that a reference be included to his book's website, EnhancedInterrogation.com.

When the Editorial Board chose to publish this review, its members felt, and still feel, that Professor Jens' submission met the Board's standards for publication, though not all necessarily agreed with his conclusions. As it has not been common practice for *Studies* to publish responses to reviews authors may consider unfavorable—and while at the same time understanding the strong feelings surrounding this subject—the Editorial Board elected not to depart from its practice but decided instead to append this note to the digital versions of the review and to the full December 2018 issue to make readers aware of Dr. Mitchell's critique and permit them to visit his website and draw their own conclusions.

Introduction

Former CIA contract psychologists James Mitchell and John "Bruce" Jessen are well-known to anyone familiar with the history of CIA's post-9/11 experiment with enhanced interrogation techniques. The accounts of numerous ex-intelligence officials and journalists have portrayed Mitchell as obsessed with repurposing various survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) torments to induce "learned helplessness" as a necessary prelude to the interrogations of hardened terrorists. Mitchell and Jessen figure in many such accounts as opportunists who allegedly violated their ethical duties as psychologists, then got rich at taxpayer expense assessing the very interrogation program they had designed.

So run the depictions in popular culture of Mitchell and Jessen's roles in designing and helping to execute the CIA's detention and interrogation program. Now, James Mitchell, who until after the December 2014 release of a portion of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee's report on the program was—much to his frustration—barred under his CIA nondisclosure agreement from publicly commenting on his work as an agency contractor, has produced his own memoir of his participation in the CIA's post-9/11 interrogation program.[a] The December 2016 publication of *Enhanced Interrogation* seemed timed to reach the potential jury pool for the then-pending lawsuit by three former CIA detainees against Mitchell and Jessen.[b] That lawsuit, to the surprise of some legal observers, remained alive until an out-of-court settlement was reached on 16 August 2017 despite expectations that the government, as it has with most previous detainee lawsuits, would

a. Mitchell wrote this book with the assistance of former CIA spokesperson Bill Harlow, who has done similar service for a number of ex-CIA memoirists, including CIA Director George Tenet (*At the Center of the Storm,* HarperCollins, 2007); counterterrorism chief Jose Rodriguez (*Hard Measures*, Threshold Editions, 2012); and former Deputy Director of CIA Michael Morell (*The Great War of Our Time,* Twelve, 2015). Harlow also edited a volume of essays and government documents titled *Rebuttal: The CIA Responds to the Senate Intelligence Committee's Study of its Detention and Interrogation Program* (Naval Institute Press, 2015).

b. The case was Suleiman Abdullah Salim, Mohamad Ahmed Ben Soud, and Obaid Ullah (as personal representative of Gul Rahman) v. James Elmer Mitchell and John "Bruce" Jessen, filed 13 October 2015 in US District Court, for the Eastern District of Washington.

Mitchell's account encompasses not only the legalistic and often highly politicized headquarters environment but the messy realities of field operations.

invoke the state secrets privilege to quash the litigation.[a]

Mitchell relates the origins and progress of his and Jessen's involvement with CIA's nascent interrogation program by way of their experiences as psychologists supporting the Joint Forces Recovery Agency's (JPRA) SERE training program. He stoutly defends their work as CIA contractors supporting interrogation operations, casting his critics—especially Senator Dianne Feinstein, his fulminations against whom are a recurring theme throughout the book—as willfully, spitefully "cherry-picking" evidence to unfairly portray him and his partner as, in his words, "two greedy contractors who lacked the necessary skills and experience" to design or run the enhanced interrogation program. (277)[b]

Mitchell's book is notable in several respects. Some are positive: His account vividly depicts the interrogation program as he designed, experienced, and helped execute it, including extended interrogations of some of the most notorious al-Qaeda detainees ever captured. His account encompasses not only the legalistic and often highly politicized headquarters environment but the messy realities of field operations. This distinguishes his book from the many memoirs written either by field operators railing against allegedly unresponsive or clueless headquarters personnel and offices or by senior officials who might have visited field sites, if at all, as part of VIP delegations, announced in advance and thoroughly anticipated by their hosts.

But *Enhanced Interrogation*, while an informative and interesting read, suffers from Mitchell's tendency to whitewash his own involvement in designing and executing CIA's interrogation program. More problematic is his tendency to ascribe terrorist sympathies to those who question his ethics and practices as an architect of the program. It especially suffers from his occasional flatly wrong statements, which combine to undermine his generally valid argument. Many observers and reporters have indeed unfairly demonized Mitchell and Jessen for doing what their country had asked—in fact, formally contracted—them to accomplish during a difficult and dangerous time.

The full title of Mitchell's book certainly implies the need for extreme measures in response to the "Islamic terrorists trying to destroy America." But this title looks more like a marketing tactic than an actual description of the content. Mitchell does devote two chapters to his personal interrogations of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and his assessments of KSM's psyche, world view, and motivations. That KSM proves to be wily, vainglorious, fanatically religious, and by most Western standards thoroughly evil will come as no surprise to anyone with even general familiarity with al-Qaeda and its leadership.

But the majority of *Enhanced Interrogation* focuses on just that: the CIA's use of SERE techniques to question high-value terrorist detainees, as first designed by Mitchell (and later by Jessen as well), based on their experience as psychologists with SERE programs. (Jessen, as detailed below, had separately pitched SERE approaches to Department of Defense elements prior to formally becoming a CIA contractor with Mitchell.) This book's real raison d'etre is defense of the CIA enhanced interrogation program generally, and Mitchell's participation specifically.

Whether the enhanced interrogation techniques the two allegedly designed were critical in eliciting useful intelligence, or whether there were operational or ethical reasons to stick to less controversial, time-tested methods, is beyond the scope of this review. Smart, dedicated patriots continue to argue both sides of this issue, and Mitchell's defense of enhanced interrogation techniques is unlikely to convert anyone at this point.

Ultimately, Mitchell makes a strong case that he has been mistreated in the press and unfairly convicted in the court of public opinion. But his book's misleading descriptions of his participation in CIA interrogation operations, combined with selective use of facts and flat-out misstatements all call his overall account into question. Moreover, his repeated diatribes against Senator Feinstein, the Democrats, and a mendacious press are as dogmatic and ideological as anything in the Senate reports he castigates.

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a. Ellen Nakashima and Julie Tate, "Architects of CIA interrogation program settle lawsuit brought on behalf of brutalized detainees," *Washington Post*, 18 August 2017.

b. Editor's note: Numbers in parentheses in this review are references to the page or pages in Mitchell's book on which cited quotes or assertions appear. All other cites will appear in footnotes.

Mitchell describes himself as tormented by the question of whether or not the application of his psychological and SERE training and experience to help design a coercive interrogation program was appropriate.

Events Covered

James Mitchell and Bruce Jessen first came to the attention of the CIA's Counterterrorism Center with their December 2001 analysis of the just-discovered "Manchester Manual," an al-Qaeda training document that included instructions on resisting common interrogation approaches. The main narrative of *Enhanced Interrogation* begins soon afterward, when Mitchell signed on with CIA as a contract psychologist assigned to apply his experience in SERE training to assess the resistance postures of detainees. Soon afterward, he and Jessen, would become instrumental in designing a set of coercive techniques to help extract intelligence from high-value al-Qaeda detainees.

Mitchell and Jessen would go on to help interrogate al-Qaeda leaders Abu Zubaydah, USS *Cole* bombing mastermind Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, and, most notably, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Initially they used a menu of coercive techniques of their own design based on their SERE background. Eventually, they functioned under the terms of CIA's formally approved program. Mitchell describes himself as tormented by the question of whether or not the application of his psychological and SERE training and experience to help design a coercive interrogation program was appropriate. In the end, he tells us, he overcame his misgivings on the grounds that a) CIA had "already decided to get rough" and Mitchell could at least mitigate and channel that rough treatment into a safe, defensible, and effective program, and b) the need to protect the United States trumped "the interests of a handful of Islamic terrorists." (47–49)

The book goes on to detail Mitchell's experiences with a range of Langley and White House officials and with CIA officers at various "black sites." He includes vivid re-creations of his conversations—coercive and otherwise—with high-value detainees. Mitchell recounts his increasing frustration with what he sees as politicized, ill-informed decisions concerning the program made by high officials. He bitterly describes what he calls a straightforward persecution of the CIA and its unthanked intelligence operators around the globe in an extended "witch hunt" led by Senator Feinstein and her myrmidons, cheered on by the media industry.

Mitchell's Memoir Compared to Others Covering Similar Ground

The point of assessing Mitchell's version of history is not to tarnish his and Jessen's reputations or those of the many CIA and other intelligence officials and national leaders who made hard decisions during a time of national crisis and in response to unfamiliar threats and adversaries. Mitchell has his version of how the enhanced interrogation program played out. Many other memoirists and countless intelligence officers involved in the program—almost all of whom have written no books—have their own. No one, or almost no one, appears to have deliberately lied in print. Even Mitchell's misstatements in *Enhanced Interrogation*—and there are some big ones, which will be examined—are (mostly) defensible, albeit in the most narrowly technical sense (as when dubious assertions are cited merely to "a report").

While some journalists such as Jane Mayer have been heavily criticized within the Intelligence Community for alleged "liberal bias" in their reporting, at least Mayer, in her history of the CIA's interrogation program *The Dark Side*, cites all her sources in a detailed bibliography.[a] Mitchell's book—like many other memoirs of former interrogators and intelligence officials—would be far more credible had he likewise cited any sources beyond his vague allusions to "reports" or "sources."

Having added to the bookshelf of writings by former interrogators, Mitchell echoes the observations of a number who have pointed out how interrogation work can, over time, degauss the moral compasses of those who do it. For example, Chris Mackey's *The Interrogators: Inside the Secret War Against Al Qaeda* (Little, Brown, 2004) and Tony Lagouranis's *Fear Up Harsh: An Army Interrogator's Dark Journey Through Iraq* (Caliber, 2007) both detail the tendency of even trained and dedicated military interrogators, in the absence of strong leadership, to go beyond approved questioning methods until brutality becomes the rule rather than the exception.

a. Jane Mayer, *The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned Into a War on American Ideals* (Doubleday, 2008).

A comparison of his account with . . . Ali Soufan regarding their experiences in interrogating Abu Zubaydah in 2002 illustrates the highly subjective nature of personal memoirs.

A former CIA interrogator, Glenn Carle, in *The Interrogator: An Education* (Nation, 2004), does not allege the kinds of brutal or illegal behavior witnessed by the Army memoirists above, but his book does discuss the disconnect between CIA Headquarters and the field regarding interrogation operations. All of these accounts "from the field" illustrate the principle—familiar to anyone with military or bureaucratic experience—that rules promulgated from headquarters may, in the absence of strong oversight and complicated by the secrecy inherent in most interrogation operations, be honored more in the breach than in the observance. Occasional interpersonal drama aside, then, Mitchell's depiction of his time working with CIA interrogation teams generally matches previous accounts by his colleagues and other CIA officials.

In fairness, Mitchell has written a memoir of his own experiences and perceptions, not an academic paper or a *New York Times* exposé. A comparison of his account with that of ex-FBI agent and interrogator Ali Soufan regarding their experiences in interrogating Abu Zubaydah in 2002 illustrates the highly subjective nature of personal memoirs. Here are two well-educated, dedicated interrogators, each wanting to do only the right thing and each apparently convinced of the nobility of his cause. In his own interrogation memoir *The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War Against al Qaeda* (W.W. Norton, 2011), Soufan describes Mitchell (using the pseudonym "Boris") as utterly, arrogantly convinced of the rightness of his plan to force Abu Zubaydah to see his interrogator (i.e., Mitchell) as a "god" who would exercise absolute control through forced nudity, constant loud noise in his cell, and, especially, sleep deprivation. Soufan depicts Mitchell as unused to having his expertise questioned, ignorant of the cultural backgrounds of detainees, and enjoying the chance to "experiment" on the detainees in ultimately counterproductive and damaging ways.[a]

For his part, Mitchell paints Soufan as marginally competent, self-righteous about his virtuous FBI versus the sadistic CIA, and short-tempered (including an episode in which Soufan allegedly physically threatened Mitchell and later apologized). (37) While the weight of anecdote favors Soufan's version of events, whose account is more objectively "accurate" cannot be determined at this point. Certainly both men seem sincere in their mutual professional disdain.

The use of temperature manipulation (exposing detainees to extreme cold in their cells) is recounted differently by these two as well. Mitchell says the cells were chilly only because the guards were heavily dressed in black uniforms and masks and would otherwise overheat. There was no intent to make detainees uncomfortable, he claims. (286) Soufan, on the other hand, describes cell temperatures clearly intended to keep the detainees freezing and miserable. He recounts his resulting confrontations with Mitchell, who he was convinced was experimenting with temperature manipulation in defiance of local policy.[b]

"Learned Helplessness"

Media accounts of Mitchell's work with the CIA often highlight his alleged single-minded pursuit of inducing "learned helplessness" as a necessary precondition for effective interrogation. Indeed, this phrase has become a sort of shorthand for Mitchell and Jessen's mission statement as CIA contractors. It appears in almost every account of their work as something they—especially Mitchell—constantly, even aggressively, emphasized as a critical element of breaking the will of detainees to resist questioning.[c]

Yet *Enhanced Interrogation* contains not a single mention of learned helplessness (although Mitchell does cite, in passing, a fellow psychologist as an expert on "learned optimism.") One might infer from this omission Mitchell's acute awareness of the negative publicity associated with the term "learned helplessness" and his determination to erase from popular

a. Soufan, *Black Banners,* chapters 21–22.

b. Ibid., 409.

c. For discussion of Mitchell as an aggressive booster of "learned helplessness," see Jane Mayer, *The Dark Side*, 164; Soufan, chapter 21; John Rizzo, *Company Man* (Scribner, 2014), 269; and *Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture* (Melville House, 2014) (hereafter, *SSCI Report*), 30.

memory his promotion of the theory as applied to interrogation.

A related point is that in his May 2017 deposition for the pending lawsuit by former CIA detainees against himself and Jessen, Mitchell flatly denied having ever used the term in connection with interrogation. He stated, rather, that CIA officers often misused the term "learned helplessness" in documents because they did not understand the distinction between helplessness to induce cooperation—as is utilized in SERE—and "learned helplessness," which would inhibit cooperation."[a] Yet Mitchell himself had included "learned helplessness" in his list of techniques in his "pitch memo" to CIA in early 2003 and cited it elsewhere as well as a tool in his toolkit.[b]

This is an early clue that Mitchell may have written *Enhanced Interrogation*, as the saying goes in intelligence reporting, "to influence as well as inform." From the first chapter, Mitchell seems to downplay his own hands-on role within the various interrogation teams he worked with. For example, where multiple other memoirs depict Mitchell as aggressive and overbearing in his insistence on applying his own theories to break detainees' resistance, he tells us that he merely provided his "observations" in post-interrogation "hot washes," the better to prepare the team for the next day's session. (23) In fairness, however, one of Mitchell's most vocal critics in this respect is the aforementioned critic of Mitchell's techniques, Ali Soufan.

Rewriting History: Omissions, Evasions, and Whoppers

Mitchell sometimes glosses over his specific actions as part of agency interrogation teams. For example, he states that "after transfer to the black site Abu Zubaydah *was subjected* to sleep deprivation, nudity, loud noise, and dietary manipulation, which produced intelligence of threats against the United States [italics added]." (28) Mitchell thus completely erases himself from active design and execution of these techniques, whereas multiple other accounts show him as an insistent, driving force for the entire concept of coercively questioning Zubaydah. Such blurring of his actual role in interrogation operations casts an early shadow over his book's reliability.[c] Mitchell, here and elsewhere, goes well beyond mere papering over his active design of, and participation in, operations he would have the reader believe he merely witnessed.

Nothing is more damaging to the overall credibility of *Enhanced Interrogation* than the pair of "whoppers"—hardly too strong a word in this case—that Mitchell, and his co-author have seen fit to insert into their book.

The first misstatement relates to the 2002 death in CIA custody of Gul Rahman.[d] In late 2002, Mitchell and Jessen were interrogating USS *Cole* bombing mastermind Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri at an undisclosed facility where terror suspect Gul Rahman was also being held. During a break from questioning al-Nashiri and briefly talking with Gul Rahman, Mitchell recalls noticing that he looked "just not right" and asking a medic to see to Rahman's abraded wrists and ankles (the medic refused). A few days later, Gul Rahman was found dead.

Mitchell's explanation for Rahman's death, in full: "Reports say he died of exposure after he had been mistreated by the indigenous guards." (90) This is an absurd, provably false statement, contradicting—among many other sources—CIA's own, exhaustive investigation of Rahman's death, which highlights the local guard force's professionalism and specifies that they never physically mistreated detainees at the site where Rahman was held. The same CIA report quotes an extended description by Jessen of a CIA team executing a "rough takedown," which involved running a hooded Rahman up and down a corridor while slapping and "forcefully" punching him—in order to, in Jessen's words, "give them [sic] something to think about."[e] The

a. Salim v. Mitchell, "Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts," quoting Mitchell's statement, paragraph 57 (deposition taken May 22, 2017). https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/salim-v-mitchell-defendants-statement-undisputed-facts (accessed 23 May 2017).

b. James Mitchell, "Qualifications to Provide Special Mission Interrogation Consultation," memorandum to CIA dated 1 February 2003, 3. Available in case materials for Salim v. Mitchell.

c. See footnote c on preceding page for a list of accounts of Mitchell's proactive role in the interrogation program.

d. Rahman's family joined in the ACLU suit against Mitchell and Jessen.

e. Memorandum, "Death Investigation – Gul Rahman," CIA investigative report, issued 28 January 2003, approved for release 30 September 2016, #c06555318), A24-23, https://www.thetorturedatabase.org/files/foia_subsite/pdfs/cia_production_c06555318_death_investigation-_gul_rahman.pdf (accessed May 12, 2017).

The point here is not to impugn the professional competence and regard for law of CIA or its deployed officers working in difficult conditions, facing dangerous adversaries with often ambiguous or nonexistent legal guidance or support.

report goes on to state that a junior, newly deployed CIA officer ordered Rahman chained, naked from the waist down, to the floor of his cell, where he was found frozen to death the next day.[a] One wonders how Mitchell, or his co-writer Bill Harlow, could claim with a straight face that Rahman just happened to die of "exposure," somehow, and pin it all on "the locals."

Mitchell's Self-absolution of the Events at Abu Ghraib

An even more egregiously false claim—one difficult to chalk up to honest error—is Mitchell's assertion—in a passage apparently intended to absolve CIA generally and himself personally from any moral responsibility for the Abu Ghraib scandal—that "DoD investigations proved that the CIA was not involved in Abu Ghraib."(233) This claim is simply false, and one wonders that Mitchell would make such an easily disproved claim—and that his co-author, who ought to be an expert on this issue, having previously co-authored four books addressing the CIA's operations around the globe, let it survive.

In fact, multiple DoD investigations have laid out in detail CIA's extensive interrogation operation at Abu Ghraib, which led to "a loss of accountability, abuse, reduced interagency cooperation, and an unhealthy mystique that further poisoned the atmosphere at Abu Ghraib."[b] Of special note were CIA interrogators, described in these reports as "set[ting] physical and mental conditions for favorable interrogations" of detainees, echoing—by chance or otherwise—the approach advocated by Mitchell and Jessen starting a year or so earlier.[c]

Not only multiple civilian reporters such as Jane Mayer (*The Dark Side*) and Tara McKelvey (*Monstering: Inside America's Policy of Secret Interrogations and Torture in the Terror War*), but several DoD investigations have stated clearly that CIA was a major player in interrogations, detentions, and related mistreatment at Abu Ghraib. To quote only one such source, Maj. Gen. George Fay's report:

> *The CIA conducted unilateral and joint interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib* [which] *contributed to a loss of accountability and abuse. . . . Local CIA officers convinced military leaders that they should be allowed to operate outside the established local rules and procedures. CIA detainees in Abu Ghraib, known locally as "Ghost Detainees," were not accounted for in the detention system.* [Following this statement in the Fay report's executive summary, the report goes on to detail, at length, CIA activities at Abu Ghraib in 2003–2004.][d]

The point here is not to impugn the professional competence and regard for law of CIA or its deployed officers working in difficult conditions, facing dangerous adversaries with often ambiguous or nonexistent legal guidance or support. But the admirable work of the many should not, in a democracy enshrining the rule of law, excuse the misdeeds of the few. One of these misdeeds, and perhaps the most notorious low point of the Abu Ghraib scandal, was the accidental death by asphyxiation of Manadel al-Jamadi at the hands of CIA personnel, widely reported in media accounts as well as several government reports.[e] For James

a. Death investigation—Rahman, A24-4; "CIA Comments on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report on the Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Program," issued 27 June 2013, approved for release 8 December 2014, 42, https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/CIAs_June2013_Response_to_the_SSCI_Study_on_ the_Former_Detention_and_Interrogation_Program.pdf (accessed 12 May 2017).

b. Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, report issued 23 August 2004, 53, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nationi/documents/fay_report_8-25-04.pdf (accessed 19 May 2017).

c. Ibid., 18.

d. AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, MG George R. Fay, Investigating Officer, declassified Department of the Army report, published 23 August 2004, http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf (accessed 12 May 2017), 9. The report contains multiple detailed descriptions of CIA personnel and activities conducting interrogation and related activities at Abu Ghraib in 2003–2004.

e. "Final Autopsy Report No. ME 03-504," Armed Forces Institute of Pathology report dated 9 January 2004, https://thetor-

A reasonable argument could be made . . . that the propagation . . . of coercive techniques . . . intended to induce "learned helplessness" . . . and the use of all those same techniques by both DoD and CIA personnel a year later at Abu Ghraib share a causal link.

Mitchell to simply state that none of this ever happened, defies belief and raises serious questions about his book's overall credibility.

Mitchell cites media reports "suggesting erroneously that we bore some responsibility for Abu Ghraib. We didn't. I had never been to Iraq, and neither had Bruce." (234) a Mitchell may well be blameless for anything that happened at Abu Ghraib, but his presentation of the facts, too artful by half, disguises a fairly strong counterargument.

Mitchell cites the Senate Armed Services Committee's November 2008 report as evidence that "the military" had contacted the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency—which runs all DoD SERE training—for advice on using SERE methods in interrogation, back in December 2001—months before Mitchell was summoned to Langley in April 2002 to begin applying SERE techniques in Abu Zubaydah's interrogation. This, argues Mitchell, proves that he and Jessen could not have influenced the military's use of enhanced interrogation techniques. (258)

But that same SASC report also details how, in December 2001, Jessen co-authored with Mitchell their paper on al-Qaeda's "Manchester Manual."[b] Jessen then sent that paper in February 2002 to JPRA leadership.[c] The JPRA commander, in turn, sent Jessen's paper to Joint Forces Command, along with his suggestion that JPRA send a team to Guantanamo Bay to "provide instruction on basic and advanced techniques and methods" related to countering resistance. From there, as the SASC report details, word quickly got around various combatant commands that JPRA was available to "assist" interrogation efforts. Meanwhile, Jessen, as early as February 2002, helped the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) create a two-week, "ad hoc 'crash' course on interrogation."[d] By August 2002, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had authorized a set of enhanced questioning techniques largely mirroring those developed by Mitchell and Jessen for the CIA. The Abu Ghraib scandal broke roughly a year later, in summer 2003.

Perhaps the content of Jessen's February 2002, SERE-derived interrogation course for the DIA, and his offers of interrogation advice and assistance to other DoD elements, played no part in the emergence of SERE questioning methods at Abu Ghraib a year later.[e] And maybe Mitchell and Jessen's work, in the spring of 2002, designing a CIA interrogation program based on the same ideas Jessen had endorsed in his memo to a DoD element a few months earlier was indeed totally unrelated to the emergence at Abu Ghraib of those same methods a year later, reportedly at the direction of CIA personnel.

True, Mitchell and Jessen never set foot in Abu Ghraib. But their specific approach toward "setting the conditions for interrogation" through forced nudity and other humiliations was clearly in evidence among those unnamed CIA and military intelligence officers whose instructions to the enlisted military reservists at Abu Ghraib helped create the whole sorry episode.

A reasonable argument could be made (though this is not the place to make it) that the propagation throughout CIA's interrogation "community" of coercive techniques (nudity, sleep deprivation, loud music and other noise) intended to induce "learned helplessness" as a prelude to questioning and the use of all those same techniques by both DoD and CIA personnel a year later at Abu Ghraib share a causal link. Given the above timelines, and given also the fact that physical absence is not necessarily a defense to accountability

turedatabase.org/files/foia_subsite/pdfs/dod003212_0.pdf (accessed 12 June 2017).

a. Here, as elsewhere, Mitchell's vague allusion to "reports" make it impossible to assess the reliability of his claim.

b. A partial translation of the manual is available on the Justice Department web site. See https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2002/10/08/manual-part1_1.pdf.

c. "Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody," Report of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, issued 20 November 2008, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Detainee-Report-Final_April-22-2009.pdf (accessed 13 June 2017), 6.

d. SASC report, 20 November 2008, 8.

e. "Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody," (accessed 13 June 2017), 6.

The value of Mitchell's account of the CIA's program lies in its insights into the perennial tensions between Headquarters policies and doctrines and the realities of field operations.

(former Brigadier General Karpinski's demotion to colonel in the wake of Abu Ghraib being a prominent example), Mitchell is far too glib in excusing himself from any role in setting the conditions that led to Abu Ghraib.

Like the debate about whether torture "works" in interrogation, the question of Mitchell and Jessen's moral responsibility for the use of SERE questioning methods in terrorist (suspected and actual) interrogations may be ultimately unanswerable. In the national security environment of 2002–2003, it could just as likely have been a case of "cometh the hour, cometh the man." Had Mitchell not gotten that call from CIA in April 2002, some other reputed "interrogation expert" willing to advise on "what really works" in questioning America's enemies, might well have been contacted instead. Would the interrogation program really have proceeded so differently?

Mitchell often comes across as a genuinely sympathetic figure in his own book, willing to engage with the ethical as well as practical issues inherent in counterterrorism interrogations. But his book too often tests the reader's sympathy in careless, often slanted, and occasionally simply false history of the agency's interrogation program.

Mitchell's Memoir as Contribution to the Interrogation Debate

Much of Mitchell's history of these interrogations is aimed at proving his point that rough questioning was critical in producing intelligence that stopped future attacks, and ultimately in locating Osama bin Laden. He also describes his experiences at a number of secret detention facilities, at least one of which he vividly paints as run by CIA officers with little regard for training or discipline and with no use at all for "fucking lawyers." (115)

Mitchell's perspective here is valuable, in that too many otherwise excellent and informative memoirs by senior CIA officials lay out the legal and operational rules at Headquarters, hammered out between CIA, other IC agencies, and the White House—but have little to say about real-life compliance with those rules at remote, often secret locations. For example, Mitchell quotes a deployed CIA officer (he is, perhaps deliberately, unclear whether it was the chief interrogator or the local chief of station) as willing to lie to Langley about "communications" being down, in order to prevent Mitchell from reporting illegal treatment of detainees on the scene. (118)

Furthermore, Mitchell describes the "flagrant disregard of both Justice Department approvals and headquarters guidance" displayed by both the chief of station and the chief interrogator at one of the secret detention sites. (116) He recounts the latter officer's attempt to frame him for mishandling information, based on Mitchell having couriered an agency-owned laptop between locations at the request of a CIA chief of base. (108)

Mitchell's account of over-the-top, sadistic, and incompetent interrogations conducted by field officers seems calculated to help take the onus off himself, who presents himself as the sole reasonable man at a secret detention site run by vengeful, undisciplined cowboys. Yet Mitchell is careful to avoid sweeping accusations, emphasizing that the misbehavior he observed was limited to his secret location "down the rabbit hole . . . [and] out of character for the carefully controlled program I knew [CIA counterterrorism chief] Jose Rodriguez and the leadership at CIA had in place." (116)

The value of Mitchell's account of the CIA's program lies in its insights—intended or not—into the perennial tensions between Headquarters policies and doctrines and the realities of field operations. Senior CIA officials have written memoirs of their time at Headquarters, punctuated by occasional visits to the field, but they rarely address whether a pre-announced VIP delegation is likely to witness or hear about the poor, if not illegal, behavior Mitchell ascribes to certain CIA officers. Conversely, many field-interrogators-turned-memoirists, mostly military but including the occasional CIA veteran, have retailed their war stories into often compelling and well-written chronicles in which "headquarters" stands for a range of vices—bureaucratic cowardice or cluelessness, or legal opinions that are seen as impeding or precluding effective action in the field.

Why Didn't the SSCI Talk to Mitchell?

Mitchell repeatedly dwells on the SSCI's allegedly arbitrary "refusal" in its 2014 investigation of the CIA interrogation program to interview him or any of the other CIA officers and contractors involved in the program. (308) He appears to attribute this almost solely to Senator Feinstein's personal malevolence, disregard for the truth, and determination to slander the CIA, and he blames her directly for the eventual leaking, by unnamed Senate staffers, of his and Bruce Jessen's names to the media.

The intelligence committee's failure to interview CIA officials has indeed come in for heavy criticism. But Mitchell elides the critical fact that he, like many participants in the enhanced interrogation program, was the subject of a Department of Justice investigation even while the Senate was preparing its report.[a] That fact complicated the issue of testifying to Congress and suggests a reason for Mitchell's not being invited to testify that is far more plausible than claims of personal spite on Senator Feinstein's part.

No CIA officer or contractor with any sense of self-preservation—or a competent lawyer—would discuss with Senate investigators his or her role in the enhanced interrogation program while they were being investigated by the Department of Justice and while any statements to Congress could be used against them in the event of criminal prosecution. Mitchell acknowledges the existence of the Justice investigation, but never in connection with his several diatribes against Feinstein and the SSCI process. In keeping several chapters between his complaint about not being allowed to testify and the fact of the contemporaneous Justice investigation, he leaves the impression that only political malice or incompetence could explain the lack of invitations to testify.

Many other CIA veterans share this complaint. For example, Jose Rodriguez, in his May 2017 deposition for the pending detainees' lawsuit against Mitchell, called the Senate report "an errant, one-sided assault on the CIA's EIT program that reaches numerous unsupportable and baffling conclusions."[b] While James Mitchell and others involved with the program may now angrily claim that they ought to have been interviewed, it seems disingenuous to pretend they would have freely provided their version of events to the SSCI without regard to their own legal exposure in an ongoing criminal investigation.

In fairness, as former acting director of CIA John McLaughlin has noted, the Senate committee declined to interview anyone at all, including a number of CIA high officials and field officers, who had been involved in the program but were *not* the subjects of any Justice investigations.[c] But McLaughlin's fair criticism of the Senate committee's stated reason for not conducting interviews is not relevant to Mitchell—who *was*, in fact, under Justice scrutiny and therefore was not, on reasonable legal grounds, a candidate for interviews.

Mitchell's "Enemies List"

In another example of Mitchell's personal animus swamping his objectivity, he accuses former Attorney General Eric Holder of "stacking the Justice Department with al-Qaeda's lawyers and looking for any excuse to file criminal charges against the men and women of CIA who had been keeping Americans safe, including me." (270) His sole evidence, apparently, is that nine (out of well over a hundred) Justice lawyers had done legal work defending terror suspects and that they therefore must love terrorists and so must their boss.

Even apart from the fact that a number of those nine lawyers had worked on habeas corpus and other basic rights issues related to detainees—as opposed to actually trying to gain their release—Mitchell's argument here is simply silly. His claim resurrects 2010's "shoddy and dangerous" accusations by fringe conservatives that Guantanamo defense lawyers were *per se* bad Americans, who ought to be professionally ostracized—accusations strongly refuted by both Obama and Bush officials as a "shameful . . . undermin[ing of] the justice system."[d]

As for Mitchell's general characterization of Holder as "out to get" the CIA workforce, Holder made it clear in mid-2009 that Justice

a. *SSCI Report*, xii.

b. Deposition of Jose Rodriguez, 22 May 2017, https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/salim-v-mitchell-declaration-jose-rodriguez (accessed 23 May 2017).

c. John McLaughlin, "The Senate Majority Report on Interrogation: An Opportunity Lost," in Harlow, *Rebuttal*, 19.

d. Ari Shapiro, "'Al-Qaeda 7' Controversy: Detainees and Politics," *National Public Radio* website, published 11 March 2010, accessed 12 June 2017.

While self-serving in many respects,* Enhanced Interrogation *constitutes useful testimony from one of the last major players in CIA's post-9/11 enhanced interrogation experiment.

would not prosecute any CIA officers who had acted in good faith under then-approved interrogation guidelines.[a] Those who had accidentally killed detainees and others who had acted outside the approved limits on coercive interrogation were put on notice that they might be held to account. In the end, no one was. Holder dropped all detainee investigations in 2012.[b]

Mitchell is harshly critical of the media, which he accuses of gleefully trampling the truth in its quest for profits, and especially of "los[ing] all reason when they get the torture bug." Some of his examples seem valid—for instance, the tendency of any allegation or appearance of sexual abuse to get disproportionate media attention. Others are less defensible. For example, Mitchell cites widespread press skepticism about the officially reported mass suicides at Guantanamo Bay in 2006 as proof of a "lurid" press obsession with assuming the very worst of the US government. But skepticism about the official account of the reported 2006 suicides at Guantanamo was widespread across a range of major media outlets, a result largely of the government's ambiguous or arguably implausible explanations for the deaths.

In support of his thesis that the media routinely lies about him, Mitchell quotes a "press account" that on the night of the suicides, "shrieks and wailings were heard coming out of [a Guantanamo facility] and one *James Elmer Mitchell* was seen entering it [italics in original]." (289) But this quote, for which Mitchell provides no source, appears to exist nowhere on the Internet—except in the online version of Mitchell's own book. This "press account" thus appears to be either fabricated or appeared only in some media outlet so desperately obscure as to not even have a Web presence. Either way, it does not help support Mitchell's claim that the press is out to get him.

Another dubious claim is Mitchell's account of a "female journalist" telling him outright that she intended to lie about him in print in order to get at "a larger truth." As a previous reviewer of *Enhanced Interrogation* has pointed out, this anecdote does not ring true: why would any reputable reporter tell an interview subject she intended to lie about him, a firing offense in most news organizations?[c] Wouldn't his next phone call be to her editor, and wouldn't she know that?

Conclusion

For all its problematic aspects, *Enhanced Interrogation* is well worth reading for the CIA interrogation history "completist." While self-serving in many respects, it constitutes useful testimony from one of the last major players in CIA's post-9/11 enhanced interrogation experiment who had not yet penned their own account of the program. And Mitchell's account, intentionally or not, serves as a dramatic reminder of how ethically problematic measures, undertaken in extremis in the wake of 9/11 and subsequent attacks, can take on lives of their own, making life difficult not only for those (of course) subjected to those measures, but to those who must defend their use long after the sense of crisis has passed.

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a. "Attorney General Eric Holder Regarding a Preliminary Review into the Interrogation of Certain Detainees," public statement dated 24 August 2009, US Department of Justice website, https//www.justice.gov (accessed 12 June 2017).

b. "Statement of Attorney General Eric Holder on Closure of Investigation into the Interrogation of Certain Detainees," public statement dated 30 August 30, US Department of Justice website, https//www.justice.gov (accessed 12 June 2017).

c. Steve Hirsch, "Review of *Enhanced Interrogation* by James Mitchell," published 17 March 2017, https///www.thecipherbrief.com (accessed 12 June 2017).

Annotated Bibliography of Previous Interrogation-related Memoirs

The following are some of the more illuminating and/or influential books about the CIA interrogation program.

Glenn L. Carle, *The Interrogator: An Education* (Nation, 2004). A former CIA clandestine officer and interrogator's account of his personal experiences in CIA, focusing on his extended interrogation of a single detainee and his gradual loss of faith in his superiors' willingness and ability to reliably assess detainees and related conditions in the field.

Bill Harlow, ed., *Rebuttal: The CIA Responds to the Senate Intelligence Committee's Study of Its Detention and Interrogation Program* (Naval Institute Press, 2015). Mr. Harlow, a former CIA spokesman and a frequent co-author of CIA memoirs, has gathered a number of short essays (about 40 pages' worth) by former CIA officials criticizing the Senate report and filled out the book with about 300 pages of government documents: the CIA's formal response to the Senate report, and the Senate Intelligence Committee's minority report.

Tony Lagouranis and Allen Mikaelian, *Fear Up Harsh: An Army Interrogator's Dark Journey Through Iraq* (Caliber, 2007). Lagouranis, a former Army interrogator, details his interrogation training followed by deployment to Iraq, where he unsparingly depicts his and his colleagues' gradual departure from adherence to approved interrogation methods. His detailed accounts of how he deployed a range of psychological methods per his training, the pitfalls associated with various approaches, and the frustrations of trying to "break" detainees to elicit usable intelligence make his account one of the best overall depictions of day-to-day interrogation in a military deployed environment.

Chris Mackey and Greg Miller, *The Interrogators: Inside the Secret War Against Al Qaeda* (Little, Brown, 2004). Mackey, a former senior enlisted Army interrogator, covers much of the same ground as Lagouranis, albeit his account focuses less on bad behavior and more on deployed military culture, as well as individual interrogators and their interrelationships. Less sensational than *Fear Up Harsh*, *The Interrogators* may be more useful for the reader interested in the intersection of interrogation work and enlisted military culture.

Jane Mayer, *The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned Into a War on American Ideals* (Doubleday, 2008). Mayer's book, while widely praised as an authoritative chronicle of the interrogation program, has also come under fire for its alleged "liberal bias." Without rendering a verdict on that issue, it is worth noting that her book—unlike any of the many "I was there" memoirs of the CIA interrogation program—is impeccably cited, with detailed endnotes, bibliography, and an afterword detailing Mayer's research methods.

Tara McKelvey, *Monstering: Inside America's Policy of Secret Interrogations and Torture in the Terror War* (Avalon, 2007). McKelvey's book focuses on the Abu Ghraib scandal, treating it as a microcosm of the United States' flawed approach to the war on terror. Her clear (and understandable) outrage over the episode is tempered in her account by meticulous citations for her facts and allegations. It would be hard to find a more thorough account of the origins, execution, and aftermath of what passed for interrogation policy (or even basic leadership) at Abu Ghraib.

Jose A. Rodriguez, Jr., with Bill Harlow, *Hard Measures: How Aggressive CIA Actions After 9/11 Saved American Lives* (Threshold Editions, 2012). Former CIA counterterrorism chief Rodriguez, in this tough-minded account of his experience with the interrogation program, does not conceal his support for enhanced methods as an ugly but indispensable component of the program. He recalls the CIA's pre-9/11 "Deutch rules," perceived by the workforce as limiting HUMINT recruitments to politically palatable candidates, as a typical symptom—repeated after 9/11 in the aftermath of the interrogation program—of clueless leaders undercutting good intelligence practice in a misguided quest for political approval. He shares with James Mitchell a withering contempt for the Senate intelligence committee's 2014 report on the program. While the Rodriguez and Mitchell accounts are often redundant (a result of covering much of the same ground and possibly of Harlow's co-authorship of both memoirs), Rodriquez's no-nonsense, unapologetic defense of the CIA program will appeal to many.

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Two Books on Special Operations Forces:
Oppose Any Foe: The Rise of America's Special Operations Forces

Mark Moyar (Basic Books, 2017), 402 pp., notes, index.

Special Forces: A Unique National Asset

Mark D. Boyatt (Outskirts Press, 2016), 548 pp.

Reviewed by J. R. Seeger

As we enter the 16th year of combat initiated by the attack on the homeland on September 11, 2001, US Special Operations Forces (SOF) remain central to the way the US government prosecutes its undeclared war against terrorist networks. However, the definition of the SOF roles and responsibilities has become far less clear to policymakers over the past few decades and, to some degree, to commanders and operators inside SOF. From a doctrine standpoint, *Joint Publication 3-05—Special Operations* identifies 12 separate missions for the various units inside the US military that fall into the SOF category: direct action, hostage rescue, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, unconventional warfare, military information support operations (MISO, or psychological operations), security force assistance, foreign internal defense, humanitarian assistance operations, and civil affairs operations. Some of these are clearly identified as core missions for specific units, such as the Army's MISO and Civil Affairs units. The remaining 10 missions are the responsibility of the full complement of US Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps USSOCOM units.

For policymakers and intelligence professionals determined to understand how these unspecified missions are divided among the SOF units of the four services, Mark Moyar's book *Oppose Any Foe* serves as an excellent primer on the history of US special operations and the strategic decisionmaking involved in using SOF units. For intelligence professionals who have or will work with Special Forces teams, Mark Boyatt's book *Special Forces: A Unique National Asset* is equally important. Boyatt's book is focused on only one of the USSOCOM units, and he describes in detail what Special Forces teams and their higher commands are designed and trained to accomplish.

Moyar's work begins with special operations in World War II, works through Cold War SOF operations, and ends with a discussion of the use of SOF in President Barack Obama's final term. The 11 chapters are arranged along a timeline, so readers can visualize the development of US SOF over 75 years. At the end of each chapter, Moyar summarizes the key points and offers his own views on events, people, and political context, and includes commentary on the successes and failures of the units involved. While not polemical, Moyar voices strong views on the interrelationship between policymakers and the operators who have to execute policies.

In *Oppose Any Foe*, he expands on themes first published in *National Review* and the *New York Times*. Moyar sees US SOF as a brilliant tactical tool available to the president, the US national security apparatus, and senior combatant commanders. But he cautions against using this brilliant tool to solve every problem, arguing that US SOF have in the past been overused as a strategic solution for national security challenges—where other tools might have been more effective, or incurred far lower risk to the SOF operators themselves.

Moyar offers valuable historical insight into what he calls the four enduring challenges of the entire complement of US SOF:

- the involvement of political leaders who lacked understanding of the Special Operations Forces they were creating and employing;
- the flexibility of special operations and the forces that conducted them—and how that flexibility can lead to overuse;
- disputation over the value of Special Operations Forces, which tends to focus on whether SOF is worth the cost to the larger military force; and
- the intense rivalry between Special Operations Forces and regular forces.

In the prologue to his book, Moyar concludes,

> *These four challenges serve as the backbone of this chronicle of US special operations forces. The seventy-five year rise of special operations forces from humble origins in World War II to the present-day behemoth is, at bottom, a coming-of-age story . . .* (xviii)

> *This history provides the familiarization required to avoid the errors to which the historically deprived are especially prone, such as relying excessively on one's own intellect, leaping at the first historical analogy to rear its head, and grasping at facile theories drawn from dubious historical interpretations or abstract reasoning.* (xx)

These errors often result in tragic loss of life for SOF operators. Moyar shows how, in both the successes and failures, tactical operations were directly affected by policy decisions in both major command headquarters and Washington.

While not stated explicitly in the text, it seems clear that Moyar sees all US special operations units as morphing into direct action units subordinate to the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), or succumbing to less well-funded and less well-trained versions of themselves. He suggests that both US civilian and military leadership need to become more fluent in the specific capabilities of USSOCOM units, if direct action and hostage rescue are to be their primary missions.

As with any general history book, *Oppose Any Foe* skips over certain bits of history that might be important to subject matter experts. Beginning with his discussion of World War II special operations, Moyar focuses almost exclusively on the US Army and Marine units that were designed to conduct "commando" style operations, a focus which effectively curtails any discussion of the contributions of specific individuals or of the US Army Air Force special operations units that supported these units. Similar omissions occur in other chapters; for example, the broader subject of Special Forces in Afghanistan in 2001 is largely subordinated to JSOC's "man-hunting" capability, and Moyar fails to address the importance of OSS and CIA paramilitary and intelligence operations in partnership with US SOF. Instead, Moyar focuses attention on points of friction between SOF and OSS/CIA units. None of these omissions calls into question the value of the book, but pointing the reader to alternative perspectives within the scholarly canon would have added nuance to Moyar's overall position.

While *Oppose Any Foe* is mostly about strategic and doctrinal issues related to the history of US SOF, Mark Boyatt's book *Special Forces: A Unique National Asset* concerns itself with the tactical history of US SOF. Boyatt, a retired senior Special Forces officer, has a clear perspective on the mission of US Army Special Forces (SF). He acknowledges the same 12 USSOCOM critical areas of special operations, but argues that Special Forces is a unique national asset primarily because it is the only part of the special operations community that is designed to conduct unconventional warfare. He points to the origins of SF and to the design of modern SF training to support the primacy of unconventional warfare in the SF mission. No other organization in the US military, he notes, has the same level of commitment to language and cultural training; none has the same doctrinal bias toward training—training that extends to equipping and, if necessary, leading indigenous fighters in battling US adversaries:

> *Special Forces is the only U.S. entity that is selected, assessed, organized, trained, and equipped to conduct unconventional warfare. The core uniqueness of SF is "through, with, and by." This is the core purpose of Special Forces . . . Anything SF does "unilaterally," the conventional forces can do. The same is true of SOF in general. It's just a matter of degree and resourcing; for example, given resources, time, priority and focus, any combat unit can do unilateral direct action (DA). The SOF who have the direct action mission as a priority are certainly more adept with finesse and surgical precision at this mission than Special Forces.* (53)

Just as Moyar's book serves as a primer for the national security community on the history of special operations, Boyatt's book is a primer on the selection, assessment, and training of the Special Forces professional. For intelligence professionals who do not have a military background, Boyatt's book is essential reading for understanding US SF as an organization; the structure of SF teams; and the training and personality of both SF individuals and teams, together with their shared history and culture. Boyatt's book includes 350 pages of appendices, with everything from case studies to OSS manuals that support his argument; these make it possible for readers to gain a more complete understanding—with ample documentation—of points he raises throughout the book.

The Moyar and Boyatt books are by no means the only works that discuss strategic and tactical use of US special operations. Moyar's book is somewhat similar to Thomas Henrickson's *Eyes, Ears, and Daggers* (Hoover Institution Press, 2016) in its focus on strategic issues. Boyatt's is somewhat similar to Alfred Paddock's *US Army Special Warfare: Its Origins* (University Press of Kansas, revised edition, 2002), though Boyatt's is more current. Tactically speaking, James Stejskal's *Special Forces Berlin: Clandestine Cold War Operations of the US Army's Elite, 1956–1990* (Casemate, 2017) is a superior case study on the execution of a Cold War era NATO strategic plan.

What do all of these books have in common? They all argue for a more thoughtful assessment by policymakers on the use of Special Operations Forces and a larger strategic vision that includes SOF, conventional military forces, and civilian agencies and departments. They also argue for a clearer delineation of roles and responsibilities among the various special operations units inside USSOCOM. Each of these authors offers a deep historical context that traces the roots of special operations back to World War II, when strategic thinkers considered special operations a distraction, at best.

Both these books take the discussion forward 75 years—to the present, when USSOCOM units are most likely troops in combat operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. That context helps explain some of the institutional tensions that still exist among SOF, the conventional military, and the intelligence and diplomatic communities. Finally, all of these books point to the criticality of collaboration and cooperation—especially between SOF and the CIA. As we continue to face the "long war" against terrorist networks and ongoing tensions with strategic adversaries—in the shadow of political wrangling and budget battles in Washington—these are discussions that must take place both inside the policy community and with those military and civilian leaders who will carry out policy.

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A Single Spy

William Christie (Minotaur, 2017), 391 pp.

Reviewed by John Ehrman

"A single spy in the right place and at the right moment may change the course of history," says a Soviet spy master midway through *A Single Spy*, and who are we to argue? William Christie's espionage thriller revolves around this observation, using historical events to provide a foundation for his story as well as for the larger points he wants to make. Whether he succeeds or not depends on how the reader chooses to approach the book.

A Single Spy is the story of a young Soviet, Aleksi Smirnov. Left alone in the rural upheavals of collectivization and dumped into a Soviet state orphanage, he escapes and lives by his wits until caught by the NKVD in 1936. Given the choice of signing up to train as a spy or be executed, Aleksi agrees to work for Soviet intelligence. As soon as his training is finished, he is dispatched to Nazi Germany, taking on the identity of a dead ethnic German boy he had known on his collective farm (and whose family had taught Aleksi German). Living with the boy's uncle, a well-connected diplomat, Aleksi eventually becomes an officer in the German army and is picked up by the Abwehr.

From there the plot rolls on, becoming ever more improbable. Aleksi uncovers the plans for the German invasion of Russia and warns Moscow months in advance, only to be told to stop reporting British provocations. Disgusted, he takes an Abwehr assignment to Iran, which ends with a narrow escape and return to Berlin. With Germany's fortunes in decline, Aleksi then takes on an assignment from the Gestapo to return to Tehran and . . . well, no sense spoiling the fun.

If nothing else, Christie has mastered the craft of giving modern-day thriller readers what they want. Chapters average about six pages, which keeps the story moving and does not burden the reader with character development or convincing atmospherics. Violence comes along at regular intervals to keep things lively, as does some laughably bad sex. Historical characters—Admiral Canaris, Walter Schellenberg—have cameos, to lend an air of verisimilitude, though they sound more like the cardboard Nazis of 1960s television shows than anything else.[a] This is hardly great literature, and Robert Harris and Philip Kerr both do much better with genuine Nazis, but *A Single Spy* is perfectly acceptable vacation entertainment.

Christie would have done well to be content with writing a fast-paced spy novel. At some point, however, he decided to use his story to make a statement about the nature of the Nazi and Soviet regimes—that both, staffed by opportunistic thugs, existed solely to crush the people they ruled and, therefore, that there was little difference between them. Christie is absolutely right about this, as anyone with a passing familiarity with 20th century history will know, but in his telling, the point seems a bit flat.

Two reasons account for this. First, Christie simply is not steeped enough in Aleksi's world to give a convincing portrait of what his character had to endure. His research is enough for a light thriller, but is not up to the task of recreating the grim world of Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany. Second, Christie just isn't that strong a prose stylist. His writing is admirably concise and direct—the better to keep the tale moving—but at the cost of omitting the details that give the reader a sense that he is immersed in another world. Christie's ambitions call for the experiences of an Arthur Koestler or the writing of an Eric Ambler, but he just isn't up to it.

Christie has written a pleasant bit of escapism and, on that level, *A Single Spy* succeeds. Anyone who hopes it will fulfill the author's ambition to provide more than that, however, will be disappointed.

a. Aleksi's NKVD handler is named Grigory Petrovich Yakushev; in real life, an Aleksandr Yakushev was an OGPU officer who worked against Russian monarchist exiles in Paris.

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Sons and Soldiers: The Untold Story of the Jews Who Escaped the Nazis and Returned with the US Army to Fight Hitler

Bruce Henderson (Harper Collins, 2017), 423 pp., notes, *dramatis personae*, appendix, bibliography, index.

Reviewed by David A. Foy

Of the millions of American men who fought in Germany during World War II to defeat Hitler's Festung Europa, only a minority were of Jewish extraction, and only a miniscule number of those were of German birth. Bruce Henderson's latest book, *Sons and Soldiers*, focuses on this sometimes overlooked minority, who came to the United States in the 1930s to escape Nazism and preserve their family names. Despite their limited numbers, they would make a disproportional contribution to the US war effort in general—and the intelligence war in particular.

In mid-1942, early in the US involvement in World War II, the US Army began to recruit and train these select individuals by means of an eight-week-long training session at a newly-constructed, $5 million hush-hush facility in rural Maryland known as Ft. Ritchie. Here these ethnic German Jews (who spoke German and often other European languages, as well) were trained as translators or interrogators. Experts in the fine art of eliciting critical intelligence information from their captured former countrymen, they were then assigned to frontline Army units in Europe. In return for their service, the recruits—known ever since as the Ritchie Boys—were frequently promoted rapidly and placed on the fast-track for US citizenship. The fact that these men had been recruited into military intelligence was a closely guarded secret for many years—as was the training they experienced at Ft. Ritchie, where in the early days the locals besieged authorities with panicked phone calls about men in German uniforms and vehicles spotted in the area.

The first few chapters of *Sons and Soldiers* focus on the family life and coming of age of approximately a half-dozen of the Ritchie Boys who, by various means, were spirited out of Nazi Germany before they could be consigned to internment or concentration camps and purposely forgotten or eliminated. The key to fleeing the Third Reich proved to be the correct combination of timing, refugee quotas, daring and determination, and, often, Jewish refugee organizations that helped the Ritchie Boys find relatives in the United States who could sponsor their young charges. The "luck and pluck" demonstrated by these young boys and men and their families, together with their determination to survive the horrors of Nazi Germany, would serve them well during their military training and their wartime service. Some of their stories are highlighted in the book, including those of Martin Selling, who survived Dachau to become a Ritchie Boy; Werner Angress, whose ticket out of Nazi Germany proved to be his answering an Army newspaper ad seeking foreign-language capable soldiers to apply to the Military Intelligence (MI) Training Center (no one referred to it openly as Ft. Ritchie at the time) as translators; and Victor Brombert, whose French-language capabilities led to his being promoted to master sergeant at the tender age of 19, after only five months in the Army. Though the Ritchie Boys were constrained by strict orders not to divulge their MI assignment, that restriction was made up for, at least in part, by the operational independence they enjoyed as members of an elite club. A letter from Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, which instructed military commanders to fully cooperate with the Ritchie Boys in the pursuit of their critical duties, attests to their privileged status.

Although the stand-up of the Ritchie Boys occurred early in the war, the identification, recruitment, and extensive training required took time. Thus, it was not until the D-Day assault and the campaigns that followed that the interrogators and translators were able to demonstrate their considerable value. Farmed out to different units in combat, the Ritchie Boys focused on satisfying the largely tactical, short-term information needs of those units in contact with the enemy by immediately interrogating newly-captured German soldiers who were dealing with the shock of surrender, or those who had been in the MP-guarded POW cages for only a brief time. Thus, some Ritchie Boys found themselves attached to the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, and others to various armored and infantry divisions—including the ill-fated 106th Infantry Division that would bear the brunt of the German surprise offensive during the Battle of the Bulge.

As the author points out repeatedly with specific examples, the Ritchie Boys were able to elicit critical tactical information from German POWs that contributed to US battlefield victories and resulted in the saving of US lives. For example, 82nd Airborne Division member Werner Angress persuaded a POW to provide a map of a recently planted German minefield, an intelligence coup the veracity of which was proven by Angress's ensuring that the POW first went through the minefield. Another Ritchie Boy, Martin Selling, enlisted the help of a captured German medic to sketch a map of German positions that was then provided to the US regimental commander, who used the information to decimate the medic's former unit; for that critical piece of intelligence, the commander nominated Selling for a commission. Still another Ritchie Boy, Stephan Lewy, elicited from a surrendered German general officer tactical information that was used to destroy the infantry division he had commanded.

The Ritchie Boys continued their contributions to the war effort not only in the breakout following the Normandy invasion but also in the hard fighting in Holland and in the Hürtgen Forest. In Holland, Manny Steinfeld was part of a three-man order-of-battle team with the mission of providing intelligence support for the entire 82nd Airborne Division. During the Germans' December 1944 Battle of the Bulge offensive in the Hürtgen Forest, 28th Infantry Division assignee Victor Brombert argued that US assessments of the low morale and determination of the German Army were grossly underestimated: the 30,000 casualties the US Army suffered as a result of its encounter with the 25 German infantry and armored divisions (comprising 500,000 troops and equipped with 600 tanks) served as tragic confirmation of his assessment.

As US forces swept into Germany, most of the Ritchie Boys remained with their assigned units, operations discussed in a chapter Henderson appropriately titles, "Return to Deutschland." As the German defeat became more imminent, some of the Ritchie Boys found themselves focusing on strategic-level intelligence collection—for example, Guy Stern was among 24 German-speaking interrogators assigned to the US First Army, a force of 300,000 men. As Stern moved among the internees in the POW cage, guarded by 500 MPs, he queried them about the German railroad system and German use of chemical warfare, among other topics. When faced with Nazi fanatics or those who were simply uncooperative, Stern adopted the persona of brutal Russian interrogator "Commissar Krukov," to whom Stern threatened to turn over tight-lipped German captives. The threat of handing them over to the hated and dreaded Russians prompted most POWs to answer Stern's questions fully and accurately.

While the interrogators and translators were trained and ready to deal with their captive former countrymen, they were not prepared for what they found in the concentration and extermination camps in Germany. Ritchie Boy Capt. Herbert Gottschalk was the first of the interrogators to encounter the horrors of Buchenwald, which the nearby US 6th Armored Division did not even realize was there until a group of German captives was attacked and beaten by men in striped clothing—Jewish and other inmates from the camp. A colleague of Gottschalk arrived the next day, and Guy Stern three days later. When the men began interrogating former camp guards, officials, and nearby townspeople, they were stunned to hear repeated claims of ignorance and failure to take responsibility for what had occurred close to them over the preceding months and years. When they were not dealing with the mentally and psychologically taxing extermination camps, some of the Ritchie Boys were enlisted to help in other ways—Manny Steinfeld, for example, translated the one-paragraph surrender document into German when the 21st Army capitulated to Maj. Gen. James Gavin, commander of the 82nd Airborne Division.

Only in the last month or so of the European War did the Ritchie Boys gradually learn the fate of two of their own. On 7 April 1945, German captain Curt Bruns was tried for the deaths of Ritchie Boys Kurt R. Jacobs and Murray Zappler, who had been separated after their capture on 16 December 1944 and questioned by Bruns. When Bruns learned that Jacobs and Zappler were German Jews and had, earlier that same day, interrogated German troops in German, he announced to his men, "Juden haben kein Recht, in Deutschland zu legen." (the Jews have no right to live in Germany) (280) He then conferred with one of his NCOs, who gathered other German soldiers who—despite Jacobs's plea that he and Zappler be treated according to the Geneva Conventions, as they had treated the Germans they'd interrogated earlier that day—marched the two captives into a field and executed them with a volley of rifle fire. Bruns was found guilty and himself executed by firing squad on 14 June 1945, in the same uniform he had worn the day Jacobs and Zappler were killed—all the time protesting his innocence.

In the immediate postwar period, the Ritchie Boys remained with their assigned units but still found useful work—Stephan Lewy, for example, volunteered to round up Nazi Party members in Aschaffenberg. Although the work soon became impracticable and the program was ended in 1948, it afforded Lewy and his fellow interrogators and translators the opportunity to witness and intervene in the inevitable "street meets" between SS/Gestapo members and their victims. On one occasion, Lewy and a fellow GI were walking down the street when a woman ran up to them, screaming, "Verhafte Ihn! Verhafte diesen Mann!". (Arrest that man!) (356) Military policemen did so, only to later discover their captive was a sadistic physician who had worked at one of the extermination camps. The other activity of some of the Ritchie Boys during this interregnum between war and peace was trying to find family members and learn their fates. Although some found surviving relatives, others learned of their deaths from abuse, disease, or gassing.

Henderson deserves much credit for researching and writing another little-known but significant account of World War II, which makes an interesting if heart-rending read. He is the author of more than 20 non-fiction books on a wide range of topics, including naval adventures and history, serial killers, North Pole expeditions, and Vietnam and World War II-era POWs. His writing is polished and engaging, and the depth of his research into archival sources in particular is an indication of his great curiosity and desire to tell a largely unknown and compelling story. Bonuses of *Sons and Soldiers* are the profusion of black-and-white photographs, especially from the US Army Signal Corps, which help readers better know the Ritchie Boys, and the particularly-welcome *Dramatis Personae* section at the back, where we learn what happened to them after the war. Several received doctoral degrees and spent decades in college teaching, another became a CPA, and yet another a multi-millionaire businessman. Equally appreciated is the appendix which lists all 1,985 of the German-born US soldiers who attended the eight-week military intelligence training course at Ft. Ritchie between 1942 and 1945. Buried within the book is also the contemporary message that it is important to develop rapport with POWs, and the corollary that, in the experiences of the Ritchie Boys, violent interrogation accomplishes little.

Criticisms of *Sons and Soldiers* are few—readers looking for the contribution of the interrogators and translators to the war effort will have to be patient, as the author discusses several chapters of family history before getting to Ft. Ritchie and then fighting through Europe with them.

Readers awaiting a new, significant, and compel-ling read from the never-exhausted well of World War II subjects will find *Sons and Soldiers* enjoyable and satisfying, one which ably addresses yet another aspect of the confrontation between the Jewish experience and the conflagration of World War II.

Editorial Note—May 2018: The reviewer of this book identified two errors in the original version of this review (published in September 2017 issue of Studies in Intelligence*), which was based on an uncorrected, late-state proof. The publisher, Harper Collins, corrected these errors, and they did not appear in the finished edition of the book. The author of the review and the* Studies *editorial staff were unaware they had been working with an uncorrected, advanced copy of the book. We apologize for the mistake.*

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Intelligence in Public Media

OSS Operation Black Mail: One Woman's Covert War Against the Imperial Japanese Army
Ann Todd (Naval Institute Press, 2017), 244 pp., photographs.

Reviewed by J. R. Seeger

Over the last decade, American researchers have uncovered amazing stories of heroism from declassified archival material of the "glorious amateurs" of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Books and articles on the OSS have encompassed stories of courage in the face of grave danger behind the lines in both the European theatre of Operations (ETO) and the China, Burma, India (CBI) theatre, and tales of the importance of OSS strategic analysis by some of the greatest academic minds in the United States. In *OSS Operation Black Mail*, Ann Todd provides the reader with an integrated discussion of the strategic role of the OSS in Asia, the tactical missions of the various units of OSS assigned to CBI, and the personal insights of one of the most important OSS and CIA officers, Elizabeth P. McIntosh. Any one of these aspects would make this book recommended reading for intelligence professionals; by combining all three, though, Todd has created a book that should be required reading for anyone interested in the Allied war against Japan, US intelligence operations in the 1940s, and the critical role of women in the OSS and the US intelligence community.

Discussion of OSS operations in World War II often focuses on Secret Intelligence (OSS/SI) intelligence collection operations, Special Operations (OSS/SO) work behind enemy lines to support and create resistance forces fighting the Axis, and the role of Research and Analysis (OSS/R&A) in providing strategic intelligence to the president and the Joint Chiefs.[a] But neither the intrepedity of OSS/SI and OSS/SO nor the strategic focus of OSS/R&A completely addressed what OSS commander general William Donovan considered one of the organization's primary missions: "morale operations" or "psychological warfare." Interestingly, the OSS programs focused on psychological operations against the Axis powers (under the title "Morale Operations" (OSS/MO)) are rarely explored in the available literature—except indirectly, in more general discussions of either OSS as a whole or strategic discussions of Allied "deception operations."[b] The War Report of the OSS[c] states:

> *"Black" propaganda was always an essential part of Donovan's program for psychological warfare. "Persuasion, penetration, and intimidation," Donovan felt, "are the modern counterpart of sapping and mining in the siege warfare of former days."*

Todd captures, in one simple phrase, the mission of OSS/MO:

> *". . . planting a virus of doubt and desolation that could then reverse-infect the soldiers, creating a circle of despair."* (47–48)

In both the post-war report and Todd's book, the role of "black" propaganda is defined as propaganda that must appear to be coming from among the enemy troops or originating in the Axis homelands. This was in contrast to "white" propaganda, which was associated with the US Office of War Information (OWI) and other propaganda organizations within the US Army. In Todd's estimation, it was this distinction that allowed the OSS to claim manpower resources from the US military—even when the head of Army intelligence, Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, did everything in his power to block OSS access to US Army resources.

> *Donovan persuaded the president to sign a new executive order defining OWI's propagandistic functions as strictly white and overt, which left the need for black, or covert, propaganda. JCS 155/2/D officially*

a. There are extensive lists of books that discuss these three aspects of the OSS, a sampling of which includes Thomas W. Lippman, *Arabian Knight* (Selwa Press, 2008); Judith Pearson, *The Wolves at the Door* (The Lyons Press, 2008); Susan Allen, *Classical Spies* (University of Michigan Press, 2011); and Troy Sacquety, *The OSS in Burma* (University Press of Kansas, 2013).

b. The exception is Clayton Laurie's book *The Propaganda Warriors: America's Crusade against Nazi Germany* (University Press of Kansas, 1996).

c. United States War Department Strategic Services Unit, *War Report of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services)* (Walker & Co., 1976), 211.

made OSS the military's psychological warfare agency, which meant Donovan would be supplied with military manpower for his otherwise-civilian agency. (3–4)

This was one of many brilliant moves on Donovan's part to neutralize his adversaries in Washington. Todd points out that by the time the United States was in the war, the British had already established both the Special Operations Executive (SOE), to support resistance operations in the European and Asian theatres, and the Political Warfare Executive (PWE), focused on conducting black propaganda operations in both theatres. SOE and PWE were "outsider" organizations created by the Churchill government; both were accustomed to hostility from established organizations—especially from the British military—and knew they could expect the same degree of hostility from the US establishment.[a] The PWE was a "black" propaganda organization, interested in working with neither the US Office of War Information nor the US military, then focused exclusively on "white" propaganda.

By establishing OSS's claim to black propaganda, as well as to resistance operations and strategic intelligence collection, Donovan linked his new organization to powerful allies in the United Kingdom: the Secret Intelligence Service, the SOE, and the PWE. All three British organizations had direct ties to British Prime Minister Churchill and, regardless of what internal rivalries might exist inside the US military and civilian security services, this would mean that Donovan would receive strong allied support when he went to the White House.

As Todd's narrative follows Elizabeth McIntosh through her OSS training and to assignments in Washington and on into the CBI theatre, we begin to see the role of OSS/MO and the challenges faced especially by the team responsible for black propaganda against the Japanese Imperial Army. The "Asia hands" in the academic world, State Department and the US military were convinced that Japanese troops were impervious to any type of propaganda—white or black. They saw the Imperial Japanese Army as a monolithic force in which duty and loyalty to the emperor were the single motivating factors.

The first order of business for McIntosh and her colleagues was to first reject this ethnocentric view of the Japanese and, once rejected, address how to best attack the morale of individual soldiers. From a professional intelligence officer standpoint, Todd's description of the tactics, techniques, and procedures that McIntosh and others used offers a useful guide on how to analyze a target audience and then develop messages designed to resonate with specific individuals or groups of individuals. Among the many factors that remain applicable today is Todd's description of how the OSS/MO elements in India worked with the OSS/SO elements in Burma (Detachment 101) to acquire material, deliver "payload" (false messages), and, in rare cases, measure effectiveness in the field. That partnership between what we would call today "special operations" and "covert influence" explains to a great degree the success that OSS/MO had in the CBI. Simple truisms such as this can continue to serve as mottos for future covert influence practitioners:

The key to black propaganda . . . is to do as much truth as possible, and just bend it a little at the end. Just put a little hook on it. (149)

But Todd's book is also about the people of OSS/MO, and specifically about Elizabeth McIntosh. McIntosh started as a junior member of OSS/MO and ended the war 18 months later as the OSS/MO chief for the entire CBI theatre. Todd was able to interview McIntosh several times during the course of writing the book, and the latter's roller coaster of emotions around the war and the characters involved comes through loud and clear. There are few books that cover the same ground in Asia, and very few that offer the insight Todd provides on how it feels to work to erode enemy morale as part of a larger war zone effort. (Two other books do come close to providing a sense of what this experience was like: Charles Fenn's autobiographical *At the Dragon's Gate: With the OSS in the Far East* (Naval Institute Press, 2004) and a more recent biography by Jennet Conant entitled *A Covert Affair: Julia Child and Paul Child in the OSS* (Simon & Schuster, 2011). All three works describe a team of eccentrics living in an especially eccentric world of the Far East, fighting what can only be described as a battle for the minds of the Japanese Imperial Army.

a. For additional detail on both the SOE and the PWE and their adversarial relationships with the British military establishment, see Giles Milton, *The Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare: Churchill's Mavericks—Plotting Hitler's Defeat* (Picador, 2017) and David Garnett, *The Secret History of PWE: The Political Warfare Executive, 1939–1945* (Little, Brown, 2002).

MO brought a wave of artists, journalists, and others who were deeply familiar with the languages and cultures of far-flung parts of the globe. These were creative types, professionals—many too old to enlist—eager to join the war, "over there." Each of the scholars, writers, and artists destined for Asia had, through his or her own life's work, sought to understand the cultures of that part of the world; now, that understanding would be put to use finding weaknesses, attacking unity, and, as one scholar put it, "to crack the enemy's culture up, not just crack it open." (xii)

The book closes with the sad tale of the end of the OSS and, worse, the FBI investigations of multiple OSS personnel, suspected of being communists, who were close friends of McIntosh—including that of one of her closest friends, Jane Foster. The post-war investigation is the focus of the last two chapters of the book and tells the tale of what had to appear as FBI's effort to destroy the OSS legacy.

For those interested in more about the effects of the investigations of the CBI team, Conant's book addresses what this period was like for Julia Child and husband, Paul, in chapters titled "Open Season" and "The Nightmare." Todd makes clear that McIntosh was hurt by the investigations but unlike her OSS peers, the Childs, Charles Fenn, and Jane Foster, she accepted an invitation from Allen Dulles to join the CIA in 1958 and served with distinction until 1985. After her years as a CIA officer, McIntosh worked for many years as an annuitant and historian for the Agency and authored the 1998 book *Sisterhood of Spies: The Women of the OSS* (Naval Institute Press).

McIntosh died in 2015 at the age of 100. While it is unlikely that her CIA adventures will be declassified for some years to come, Todd's book makes clear that Elizabeth McIntosh was an intelligence officer of keen insight and courage whose legacy remains part of the DNA of the modern CIA. Todd's book offers the reader excellent detail on both McIntosh, the OSS, and the structure of OSS "black propaganda" in the CBI theatre during World War II. Every page is filled with information that practitioners of the espionage trade, historians of World War II, and the common reader will want to read and re-read.

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War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Success Into Political Victory

Nadia Schadlow (Georgetown University Press, 2017), 321 pp., notes, bibliography, index.

Reviewed by Clayton Laurie

Dr. Nadia Schadlow, the current Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Strategy on the National Security Council, has written a seminal history that should be required reading for every military commander, intelligence officer, and political leader involved in military affairs or the projection of US military force abroad. Schadlow addresses "the challenge of governance operations—the military and political activities undertaken by military forces to establish and institutionalize desired political order during and following the combat phase of war." (x) "Governance operations," she maintains, "are central to strategic success in war" (272) and that when done well, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, Italy, and South Korea between 1943 and 1953, lasting strategic success has resulted. "When done poorly," or not at all, "the failure to consolidate gains resulted in protracted conflicts, increased costs, higher casualties, and the loss of public support for the effort," (272) with Afghanistan since 2001 and Iraq since 2003 serving as the most salient examples.

What to do after firing the last shot is a situation the nation has repeatedly faced, but one where there "has been a persistent reluctance, rooted in history and civil military relations, to prepare and train adequately for the political dimensions of war." (x) As Schadlow demonstrates in this well-written, readable, and thoroughly researched history, military victories obtained at great cost in lives and treasure are often squandered in disappointing post-combat outcomes as soldiers, diplomats, and politicians fail to consolidate victories into stable postwar states—in effect, winning the war and losing the peace. As seen in Iraq and Afghanistan today, decisive military conflicts ended with continuing instability and chaos, forestalling a permanent peace and undercutting—if not entirely negating—the reasons why the nation went to war in the first place. As this book makes clear, this has not always been the case, and if all concerned were aware of and learned from our history, it would never occur again.

Schadlow correctly maintains that considerations of postwar military governance should form a major portion of any war plan and receive as much attention as combat operations. Yet it has been haphazard at best, especially in the post-Cold War era, and today receives little if any attention. Schadlow emphasizes quite correctly that governance duties should always fall to the US Army as the only service "capable of decisively acquiring, holding, and stabilizing territory in sufficient scale for ample duration to provide a foundation for a transition to the reestablishment of political order." (14) Army accomplishments in World War II would prove the point. Starting in 1940, the US Army acquired, trained, equipped, clothed, fed, transported, and sustained 10 million American men and women in uniform around the globe—in and of itself a herculean effort—prior to engaging in combat defeating Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan. The knowledge, expertise, and abilities to accomplish this mission would make the Army a natural, if not sole, force capable of reconstructing these former adversary nations in the postwar period. The Army had the personnel, organizational structure, logistics, equipment, discipline, accountability, and expertise to accomplish a multitude of non-combat missions. Indeed, in its 242-year history the Army has performed hundreds, if not thousands, of *missions other than war* domestically and internationally—non-combat duties such as humanitarian relief, in education and medical fields, to firefighting, riot control, territorial governance, constabulary and law enforcement, to interventions in labor-management disputes. The fact that the Depression-era Civilian Conservation Corps and wartime Manhattan Atomic Bomb Project were under US Army administration attests to this ability for effective management. Yet leaders, civilian and military, appear ignorant of this history. Schadlow quotes former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, who, referring to Iraq and Afghanistan, "admitted that there did not appear to be a sustainable vision of how to address the practical problems of reconstruction," but then declared, "The US military was in Iraq to fight a war. They are not USAID. That's not their role." (ix, 273)

Schadlow emphasizes that Americans have traditionally displayed a denial syndrome concerning soldiers as civil rulers. First among the factors, she suggests, is age-old anti-militarism and the never-ending debate over the role of the military in a democracy dating to the Republic's founding. This raises concerns that letting soldiers govern, even if abroad, may risk a blurring of civil-military roles with soldiers thinking that what worked overseas would also work best at home, however absurd concerns of a military coup d'état are. Second, Americans have traditionally harbored anti-colonial, anti-imperialist attitudes and have a deep ambivalence about governing others—in today's parlance, anything approaching "nation building," where we foist our liberal-democratic ways, culture, and values on other nations. To most, "military government was . . . a repulsive notion, associated with imperialism, dollar diplomacy, and other aspects of our behavior we had abandoned." (17) Third, Schadlow notes the prejudice holding that rebuilding civilian societies is viewed as inherently a civilian responsibility. Finally, the traditional view of war has always emphasized "the centrality of battle and the defeat of the enemy over the achievement of broader strategic outcomes." (18)

Starting with the Mexican-American War and followed with examinations of the post US Civil War, Spanish-American War [in the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico], and the occupation of the Rhineland, Schadlow's account highlights how US Army soldiers have proven effective in establishing stable governments and societies. Throughout, the Army accomplished much with little or no guidance from diplomatic or political Washington and with little assistance beyond military funding and resources already available. The post-World War II occupation of Germany and Japan and a brief period of military government in Italy and South Korea stand as exemplars of US Army governance. The Army published its first field manual on military government in June 1940 and established a school of military government in early 1942 to train soldiers as civil administrators. In addition, the Army created a staff-level G-5 Civil Affairs organization attached to supreme headquarters staffs to exercise "military government as an instrument of American policy and as an instrument for the consolidation of political order" (95) in liberated areas even as combat continued. After hostilities, soldiers governed indirectly through surviving institutions if they still existed, or directly if institutions did not exist or were politically or ideologically compromised. The Army reconstituted governments, rewrote laws and constitutions, organized political parties, selected candidates, held elections, and pulled societies back from catastrophe. US Army government lasted just five years in West Germany, two years in Italy, and eight years in Japan, but during that time the Army restored civil, political, economic, medical, agricultural, cultural, and educational institutions so effectively that it allowed former enemies to rapidly become peaceful self-governing nations. In the process, Schadlow maintains, "through reconstruction of governments in Italy, Germany, Japan, and South Korea the Army served as a critical instrument of political change as well as a key instrument for shifting the strategic landscape to favor US interests during the Cold War." (102) Skillful military governance turned former enemies into friends, and then like-minded enduring allies.

From South Korea, Schadlow skips to the relatively successful Cold War military governance operations in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and Panama in 1989. She notes a deterioration in capabilities during this era attributed to the active US Army moving military governance duties to the Army Reserve, starting in 1951. Military governance then became a reserve specialty dominated by civilians who served part-time when needed, removed from the active combat force. In addition, in an era of limited wars, the mission then moved to the Special Forces in 1987 becoming a counterinsurgency tool, no longer associated with conventional military operations. As Schadlow notes, military governance left the active military mindset by the end of the Cold War. This forgetfulness, or lack of living institutional memory, or ignorance of the history, resulted in a neglect of planning that caught up with the United States with disastrous consequences in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Oddly and inexplicably, Schadlow skips the Vietnam War. This historian would suggest that every failure of military governance that we see today first appeared in the Republic of South Vietnam over a half century ago. The deterioration is not just a post-Cold War phenomenon as implied here. US military commanders and policymakers alike, then as now, had to deal with a weak, uncooperative, corrupt, inefficient, and divided indigenous government, a fence-riding South Vietnamese population, a poorly trained and led, ineffective indigenous military, and nationwide combat operations where territorial control was fleeting and adversaries in off-limits sanctuaries received abundant flows of outside help. US civilian and military authorities remained divided over courses of action and neither provided useful overall guidance. There was no unity of effort, central planning, or centralized control. All witnessed the grotesque proliferation of American and international civilian and military organizations in the war zone (some 60 of which we would term NGOs today—half of them American), operating according to their own goals, rules of engagement, and plans. The wholesale flight from anything that smacked of military occupation, military governance, or nation-building and the military's hesitancy to engage in such endeavors most everywhere thereafter started here, not after 9/11. It was not coincidental that President Lyndon Johnson demanded that General William Westmoreland consolidate all non-combat entities and activities into the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) organization under military guidance in 1967, first under former CIA officer Robert Komer and then under CIA's William Colby in 1968. Even then, except for the Phoenix Program, most CORDS efforts to fight "the other war" in South Vietnam proved temporarily effective at best, and stabilization efforts—the "winning hearts and minds"—came too little and too late to stave off defeat in 1975.

While Schadlow accurately describes the stultifying effect of moving civil affairs and military governance from the active Army to the reserves and Special Forces, she does not address the larger and far more important impact of the Army's transition from a conscript to an all-volunteer force. US Army personnel numbers shrank dramatically from a 1968 high of 1.6 million to a professional force of 771,000 in 1978, and 491,000 in 1997. All soldiers in the new, smaller, albeit more technically enabled and well-equipped professional force were warfighters—and had to be. Although tactical troops were the main players in all of the most successful examples of military governance that Schadlow describes, the reduction of the Army to several hundred thousand from the draft-era millions meant that fewer soldiers were available for stability operations either short- or long-term. The draftee US Army could permanently garrison 300,000 soldiers in West Germany from 1949 to 1990, for example, as the manpower could be made available—an impossible feat with today's active force of 460,000.

In spite of these omissions, Schadlow has thoroughly researched US Army records available at the National Archives, and examined the existing secondary literature, both US Army official histories and other government and academic publications—an all-too-rare occurrence for many writing history today, even among professional historians. The discursive endnotes are useful and informative, and the bibliography is extensive. The documentation and bibliography are useful guides for any soldier, policymaker, or intelligence officer who wants to learn more and what to consider, should they become involved in future war-planning.

Schadlow's final chapter entitled "Afghanistan and Iraq: Lessons Ignored" is painful to read when considering that most failures seen today were utterly avoidable if only those in charge knew their history and acted on the clear lessons of the past. Her recommendations, based on historical evidence and endorsed by this historian, number five. First, governance is not separate from war. Politicians "must accept" that the political dimension is indispensable "across the full spectrum of war" and plan accordingly—not in an ad hoc, fragmentary manner when a crisis or the unexpected arises. (273) Second, all concerned must grasp the centrality of politics to war and that "unity of command is essential to operational and strategic success." (274) Third, "although civilians formulate and drive policy, they must give the Army operational control over governance operations" (274) and recognize that even if civilian entities consider the job theirs, they always lack the personnel, scale, logistics, communications, and experience managing large institutions, especially in newly liberated areas behind the front line. Fourth, wars are not won from afar. Conventional forces are necessary to hold, build, and govern. The post-9/11 emphasis on counterterrorism—drones and Special Operations Forces—Schadlow notes, is the strategic equivalent of precision bombing in World War II—grown of the desire to win quickly, cleanly, with limited human involvement or loss. This way of war can kill individuals and degrade organizational levels but it never has, and can never have, lasting strategic effects on its own. It does not hold territory, win populations, or control resources. Finally, and as much as today's warfighter may agree with former Defense Secretary Panetta that the US Army is not USAID, the US military must have some standing capabilities and organizations that are prepared to conduct governance tasks within the active duty force and with sufficient influence to affect war planning at the outset.

As we continue to search for a solution to this nation's longest wars, and avoid future such quagmires, it is hoped that Schadlow's *War and the Art of Governance* will be a well-worn, much-read, permanent addition to the bookshelf of every US soldier, politician, and intelligence officer.

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Strategic Analysis in Support of International Policy Making: Case Studies in Achieving Analytical Relevance

Thomas Juneau, ed. (Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 256 pp., index.

Reviewed by Jason U. Manosevitz

The US Intelligence Community has long struggled with the definition of strategic analysis, the best way to do it, and its value to policymakers. As such, it would be easy to get excited about *Strategic Analysis in Support of International Policy Making: Case Studies in Achieving Analytical Relevance*, edited by Thomas Juneau, because the title promises insight on these vexing issues. Unfortunately, however, the content does not make good on the title's promise.

The challenge implicit in tackling the subject of strategic analysis is evident early on in this book. Juneau argues in the preface that the major goal of strategic analysis is "to help clients develop policies and programs that will advance the national interest" (xii) While this is certainly true for strategic analysis, such a broad statement applies to almost all intelligence analysis. Close readers may wonder why Juneau asserts that strategic analysis is different from policymaking, as well. That distinction is in the DNA of most intelligence analysts, particularly those who recall Sherman Kent's point that "intelligence is not the formulator of objectives; it is not the drafter of policy; it is not the maker of plans . . . its job is to see the doers are well informed."[a] When analysts provide "opportunity analysis," it is intended mainly to alert policymakers to pathways for achieving existing policy goals.

As a whole, the collected essays reduce strategic analysis to different analytic techniques, vice a specific kind of analytic product. Intelligence professionals should not ignore the work, however, because the collection of essays spans various academic, government, and private organizations and the analytic techniques they use or teach. The book also clearly shows the wide range of voices that compete for policymakers' attention and the opportunity to inform policy decisions.

Juneau has assembled an impressive cadre of authors for *Strategic Analysis in Support of International Policy Making: Case Studies in Achieving Analytical Relevance*, which is another reason not to overlook the work. These include Gregory F. Treverton, former National Intelligence Council chairman; Jeremy Ghez, professor of Economics and International Affairs at HEC Paris; Tom King, formerly the head of the Persian Gulf Division of the US State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR); Paul Dickson, a strategic analyst with Canada's Department of National Defense; Rex Brynen, professor of political science at McGill University; Mathew Burrows, a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and State Department official; Kamran Bokhari, formerly Stratfor's lead analyst on Middle Eastern and South Asian Affairs; and Tim Walton, an associate professor of intelligence analysis at James Madison University, among others.

In the book's lead chapter, Ghez and Treverton make the oft-heard argument that strategic analysis is designed to give policymakers a broader context, to go beyond current headlines, to make long-term forecasts, and to help policymakers consider a longer time horizon. For them, the strategic analytic product is supposed to deliver relevant and actionable analysis and tackle issues that are highly uncertain, long-term, and extremely complex. (15) The four-step approach to strategic analysis they offer, interestingly, is reminiscent of Sherman Kent's outline for basic intelligence, which emphasizes identifying analytic building blocks before going beyond what is known. Their approach starts with understanding current dynamics, identifying key assumptions, testing those assumptions, and re-examining opportunities to shape the future. (8–9) They favor horizon scanning and using historical analysis and analogies as techniques for strategic analysis, but offer little criticism of the flaws or costs and benefits of these approaches. Ghez and Treverton, like others, warn of the dangers of single point-predictions. Ghez and Treverton do not, unfortunately, address problems of macro assumptions, great uncertainty, and analytic accuracy in the kinds of stand-back, think pieces they view as strategic analysis.

a. Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (Princeton University Press, 1949).

Brynen's chapter, "Here (Very Likely) Be Dragons: The Challenges of Strategic Forecasting," offers a reminder of how uncertainty complicates the analyst's job. He argues that analytic forecasting (which is how he sees strategic analysis) is an integral part of intelligence analysis and may be arguing against Ghez and Teverton. Brynen indirectly asserts that the US Intelligence Community often gets blamed for failing to make single point predictions—highlighting failures to predict the Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. He underscores the importance of tracking forecasting accuracy, an issue gaining traction these days. He highlights how team- or crowd-forecasting (versus individual forecasting) and the use of subjective numerical probabilities improve accuracy. To support his position, Brynen draws on a key study from the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat of Canada's Privy Council Office that shows how useful subjective numerical probabilities can be for analytic coordination and argumentation.

Chapters by Burrows, King, Bokhari, and Frederic Charillion offer insight into the analytic techniques and approaches used by government organizations and private think tanks. For example, in the chapter on the NIC's *Global Trends* publication, Burrows sees trend analysis as synonymous with strategic analysis. Echoing some elements from crowd forecasting, he credits the NIC's thirst for diverse views as essential to the NIC's trend analysis program and joins the chorus of intelligence critics who complain about the volume of current and tactical analysis the IC produces. To his credit, Burrows sets himself apart by being honest about *Global Trends'* analysis, writing that the NIC's analysis consistently underestimated the rate of change in their assessments. (82)

King highlights a very different approach to strategic analysis that is practiced at the Department of State's INR. In contrast to the NIC's trend analysis and diverse views, INR greatly values "individual expertise and longevity" on an account. (96) King points out that INR's strategic analysis focuses on broad, long-range issues. However, he does not address how INR guards against expertise bias—an unfortunate occupational hazard confronting many who focus on specific issues for many years and leading to analytic arrogance.

Bokhari highlights the approach taken by Stratfor, a private think tank, and its formula for analysis. Bokhari relates Strafor's history and the development of its analytic methodology, which Strator argued produced strategic analysis. Like Burrows, Bokhari is intellectually honest in pointing out that the rigid methodology Strafor used missed some key events, like the Arab Spring. Nonetheless, he touts the think tank's geopolitical framework as the reason for getting many calls "right." Charillion, a professor of political science at Université d'Auvergne in France, tells the story of efforts to create a "think tank" within the French Defense Ministry. His chapter adds an interesting international bent to the problem of analysis and depicts some of the universal problems associated with developing analytic approaches.

Several chapters in *Strategic Analysis in Support of International Policy Making: Case Studies in Achieving Analytical Relevance* focus on the nexus between academia and intelligence analysis. Walton's contribution, for example, walks the reader though James Madison University's intelligence analysis program, highlighting its training on structured analytic techniques, briefing, and writing. He echoes others' points that strategic analysis involves the future, but is also quick to assert the importance of assessing vulnerabilities, risks, organizations, networks, systems, and opportunities. (41) Walton stresses that structured analytic techniques—such as Outside-in, Red Teaming, and Devil's Advocacy—are key aspects of the JMU program and emphasizes their value in producing strategic analysis. The chapter by Trine Villumsen Berling and Brooke A. Smith-Windsor, "The NATO Defense College: Navigating Between Critical Analysis, Strategic Education, and Partnerships," offers a nuanced review of the college, where focusing on substantive issues are very much in the fore.

Dickson's chapter on US operations in Afghanistan provides a substantive rather than programmatic case study, in which he reviews intelligence and operational challenges and details changes in US command structure and mission. This led to a renewed focus on qualitative analysis rather than on measures of effectiveness and enemy combatant behavioral changes. He traces an analytic unit's struggle to inform national security policymakers by using Red Teaming to offer the enemy's perspective; in so doing, he makes the case that Red Teaming is a kind of strategic analysis.

Strategic Analysis in Support of International Policy Making: Case Studies in Achieving Analytical Relevance does not advance the discussion of the definition of strategic analysis, the best way to do it, or its value to policymakers. Analytic techniques can be applied to a wide range of problems, of varying time horizons, and for a plethora of consumers, and can be used in a wide range of analytic products. As such, analytic techniques should not be confused with—or substituted for—particular analytic products, such as strategic analysis. The value of this collection of essays is the insight it provides into the many government, private, and academic organizations that are all vying for policymaker attention. The IC should not overlook the growth of information and analytic sources policymakers have at their disposal.

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Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf

Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake

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CURRENT TOPICS

Al-Qaeda's Revenge: The 2004 Madrid Train Bombings, by Fernando Reinares. (Columbia University Press, 2016) 231, endnotes, bibliography, maps, index.

Fernando Reinares is the director of the Program on Global Terrorism at the *Elcano Royal Institute* and professor of political science and security studies at the Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, both in Madrid. The focus of his research is on individual jihadists, their motivations, and the networks that link them. In *Al-Qaeda's Revenge*, he tells how those responsible for bombing commuter trains near Madrid on 11 March 2004, killing 191 people and wounding 1841, were identified as part of the global threat from al-Qa'ida's jihadist terrorism.

Immediately after the 3/11 bombings, the government blamed ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna), the Basque separatist organization in Spain. An investigation soon discredited this conclusion and blamed the attack on local radicals who had little or no connection to an outside organization. Mr. Reinares's analysis, however, disproved this result and established that the attacks were conducted by a coalition of several terror groups under al-Qa'ida's direction.

The original al-Qa'ida cell in Spain was created in 1994 (8) and it helped the 9/11 attackers in the planning phase. Most but not all of them were arrested by Spanish authorities after 9/11; the group's leader, Abu Dahdah and at least four others remained at large. (9) In the first part of *Al-Qaeda's Revenge*, Mr. Reinares shows how the remnants formed links with groups from Algeria and Morocco to create the 3/11 network. Part 2 discusses why Spain was selected, the decisionmakers—Abu Dahdah and others—involved, the connection between the 3/11 network and the al-Qa'ida command center in Pakistan, why the 3/11 bombings did not constitute a suicide attack (though some involved later martyred themselves) and the social and political consequences of the bombings.

Al-Qaeda's Revenge also describes the bombers' connections in London, Milan, Belgium, and Indonesia, as well as what happened to those who left Spain after 3/11. The intent of al-Qa'ida's global ambitions and the complexity of its worldwide structure becomes apparent as Mr. Reinares names the many participants and examines their relationships. He also discusses the intelligence exchanges between US and Spanish authorities as each worked to track the terrorists involved. (91–92)

In his foreword to *Al-Qaeda's Revenge*, former CIA officer Bruce Riedel, now with the Brookings Institution, characterizes the book as "one of the most important . . . written on the subject of radical Islamic terrorism in Europe and North America since 9/11." (xiv) Riedel gives it high marks for the depth of research, the quality of analysis, and the accuracy of its often complex results. Right on all counts.

Global Intelligence Oversight: Governing Security in the Twenty-First Century, edited by Zachary K. Goldman and Samuel J. Rascoff. (Oxford University Press, 2016) 357, footnotes, index.

Of the 15 contributors to this volume, 11 are lawyers, all are academics, and none claim any professional experience in the intelligence profession. They come from seven countries: Australia, Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Israel, Canada, and the United States. Oversight in each nation is discussed, and one contribution considers it in the "Five Eyes" context. In her preface, former Congresswoman Jane Harmon writes that "the world wants to know . . . who is watching the watchmen?" Oversight is her answer. (xiv) To illustrate that oversight works, she cites "the inspiring example" of the Senate Intelligence Committee's report on CIA interrogation techniques. (xv) She admits that "Congress can do better," suggesting that "members ask *spies* the tough questions every chance we get." (xvi, emphasis added)

Global Intelligence Oversight gives an overview of how oversight has developed and how it is currently working. Compared to the United States, "parliamentary oversight across the liberal democratic world is not as robust," (xix) the editors assert. Several contributors expand on this point. More generally, they "offer insights into the purposes intelligence oversight may serve beyond legal compliance.” (xxvi)

As might be expected from lawyers, the descriptions and recommendations concerning oversight are not always expressed in simple declarative sentences. For example, in an otherwise informative study, on “Oversight Through Five Eyes,” the author argues that “the similarity of intelligence structures and oversight across the Five Eyes states is neither coincidental nor unintentional. Rather it is the result of a phenomenon of isomorphic ‘institutional convergence’ that results in homogenization of state practices across a wide variety of contexts . . .” (38) He argues that the process of isomorphic convergence has resulted in a model that could become an “international norm for intelligence oversight.” (70)

In addition to chapters on oversight in the countries named above, other topics include global technical changes under way in government and industry, the legal aspects of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, and the challenging issues associated with oversight within the European Union. The chapter entitled “The President as Intelligence Overseer” surprises no one by concluding that “the White House ought to be an object, not a source, of intelligence oversight.” (235)

Global Intelligence Oversight does leave some issues for the future. For instance, the term oversight is never defined, which makes it difficult to identify the line between oversight and management. Likewise, there is the implicit assumption that the legislative branch of government is the proper body to conduct oversight, as opposed to an independent joint commission of experts. Finally, one may reasonably ask whether the conference from which the book emerged would have benefited from the contributions of an experienced, career intelligence officer.

Practise to Deceive: Learning Curves of Military Deception Planners, by Barton Whaley. Introduction by Denis Clift. (Naval Institute Press, 2016) 246, footnotes, bibliography, appendices, no index.

Denis Clift, president emeritus of the National Intelligence University, writes in the book’s introduction that “the most important readings” in advanced denial and deception are the writings of Barton Whaley. One of the teaching techniques Whaley employed involved practical exercises, using actual case studies. *Practise to Deceive* contains 88 of those studies with detailed analysis of their objectives and application.

The case studies are typically one to five pages in length and contain examples from Sun Tzu to the first Iraq war in 1991. They are arranged in four categories: the first three consider learning, planning, and seeking approval for specific operations from the working level; the fourth looks at these factors from an institutional point of view. Cases are presented chronologically within each topic.

For example, case #2 deals with tactical deception measures employed by Gen. Lord Roberts, when his army relieved the siege of Kimberly during the second Boer War. Whaley notes that Roberts’s intelligence officer, Lt. Col. G. F. R. Henderson, based his recommendations for deception on lessons drawn from his study of Stonewall Jackson’s operations during the US Civil War. Operation ERROR (case #15, 39–42) is concerned with deception operations in the India-Burma theater—planned and conducted by Col. Peter Fleming (Ian’s brother).

Three interesting cases (numbers 19, 52, and 53) involve British scientist R. V. Jones, including his discussion of the “Theory of Practical Joking and the Theory of Spoof,” and his contribution to defeating the Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain.

Whaley also includes two controversial cases. The first concerns “Maj. Meinertzhagen and the Haversack Legend, Palestine 1917.” Meinertzhagen was Gen. Allenby’s intelligence officer, “who plagiarized a real plan and pretended to carry it out—thereby fabricating the celebrated legend of the ‘Meinertzhagen Haversack Ruse.’”[a] (75–76)

The second and even more controversial case involves Lawrence of Arabia’s exploits, that Whaley labels “a myth.” (80) But he doesn’t stop there. “Simply put,”

a. In his published post-war diaries, Meinertzhagen claimed to have placed false war plans in a haversack that successfully deceived the Turks as to the location of the main attack into Palestine. Lockman showed that to be a false claim, but the myth has persisted. See J. N. Lockman, *Meinertzhagen’s Diary Ruse: False Entries on T. E. Lawrence* (Cornerstone Publications, 1995).

he writes, "Lawrence was a con man whose deceptions were directed more against allies than foes." (81) Curiously, one of his sources is the unreliable Meinertzhagen. Thus readers are cautioned against accepting these views without consulting the great volume of evidence to the contrary.

The more recent case studies include "General Schwarzkopf's Deception Planners, Iraq 1991" and "Jody Powell and the Iranian Rescue Mission, 1980." (245–246)

Two of four appendices examine the deception planning for Operation Barbarossa, Hitler's preparation for invading the Soviet Union. Another examines Operation Cloak, the British deception plans against the Japanese in Burma. The fourth lists other important operations—for example, Operation Bodyguard, prior to the invasion of Europe in World War II, and source material for further study.

Overall, *Practise to Deceive* is an interesting and valuable account of deception theory in practice.

Whistleblower at the CIA: An Insider's Account of the Politics of Intelligence, by Melvin A. Goodman. (City Lights Books, 2017) 421, endnotes, glossary, index.

The writings of former senior intelligence officers deserve special attention particularly when they are also teaching intelligence-related courses at prestigious institutions. *Whistleblower at the CIA* is an important example. Retired CIA senior analyst Melvin Goodman claims whistleblower status "because of [his] revelations before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence during confirmation hearings for Bob Gates [as DCI]." (9) In his final chapter, he adds, "I wish I had gone further as a whistleblower." (379) *Whistleblower at the CIA* can be seen as an attempt to fulfill that wish.

After a few words about his background and why he joined the CIA in 1968, Goodman launches a relentless and spirited attack on the Congress, the Defense Department, the State Department, the Intelligence Community—including the DNI—the media, and most of all the CIA. His concerns range from corrupt behavior to politicization in intelligence matters.

Following up on a theme of his 2008 book, *Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of The CIA* (Rowman and Littlefield), he writes in *Whistleblower*, "The CIA's decline over several decades was marked by mediocre leadership, particularly by directors such as William Casey, Robert Gates, Porter Goss, and George Tenet, who tailored intelligence to satisfy the neoconservative biases" of presidents Reagan and George W. Bush. And "Tenet and Goss, as well as Michael Hayden and John Brennan, endorsed barbaric interrogations methods, and Brennan tried to block the Senate Intelligence Committee's investigation of torture in secret prisons." (21) Later, Goodman returns to the topic of CIA directors, labeling Generals Hayden and Petraeus "unsuited to lead the CIA," adding that John Brennan "lied to the chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee," and then criticizing President Obama for "selecting CIA chiefs, considering the disappointment of Panetta, Petraeus, and Brennan." (270–271).

Other topics subjected to Goodman's hostile scrutiny include the chapter on "CIA's Double Standards and Double Dealing," a discussion on the "lack of internal oversight . . . [and] the demise of the Office of the Inspector General and the virtual disappearance of the statutory inspector general" (214); the myth that the Intelligence Community functions like a community (230); the unwillingness of the press "to adequately question and investigate government" (313); the preferential treatment given some members of the press (324–327); and the willingness of some in the media to succumb to CIA pressure. Even Steven Colbert—"(or his lawyers)"—is included. (332)

But Goodman reserves most of his bitterness for Bob Gates, to whom he gives indirect credit for his whistleblower status. This criticism of Gates is focused in Chapter Eight, where he explains how the two met in 1968 and why they drifted apart. Goodman depicts Gates as complicit in CIA's institutionalized politicization of intelligence, fueled internally by corrupt officers from the top, down—a harsh judgment, coming from an "insider" who left the agency over three decades ago.

What has been quoted above is but a small sample of the Goodman's explicit dissatisfaction with the Intelligence Community, its elements, its personnel, and its performance. The only personnel who are uniformly praised are his fellow whistleblowers, from Ellsberg to Snowden. Goodman concludes with the unsupported comment that "as long as the secret government manages to operate beyond the law and allows former officials such as Mike Morell, Jose Rodriguez, and John McLaughlin to lie about illegalities and abuse, the Agency will remain an enemy of democracy—and I will champion the path of dissent." (379)

Readers who encounter Goodman's doggedly negative opinions of the CIA and the Intelligence Community should note the absence of any contrary views.

HISTORICAL

Special: Five Books on the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) During World War II

Churchill's Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare: The Mavericks Who Plotted Hitler's Defeat, by Giles Milton. (Picador, 2017) 368, endnotes, photos, index.

SOE'S Mastermind: An Authorized Biography of Major General Sir Colin Gubbins, KCMG, DSO, MC, by Brian Lett. (Pen & Sword Ltd, 2016) 274, bibliography, photos, index.

Agent Michael Trotobas and SOE in Northern France, by Stewart Kent and Nick Nicholas. (Pen & Sword Ltd, 2015) 294, end of chapter notes, bibliography, photos, index. Foreword by Mark Seaman.

Codenamed DORSET: The Wartime Exploits of Major Colin Ogden-Smith, Commando & SOE, by Peter Jacobs. (Pen & Sword Ltd, 2014) 201, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

RAF and the SOE: Special Duty Operations in Europe During WW2, edited by John Grehan. (Frontline Books, 2017) 309, appendices, photos, no index.

Unlike the Ministry of Truth in George Orwell's *1984* and Graham Greene's *Ministry of Fear* (Viking, 1943), Giles Milton's ***Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare*** *(MUW)* referred to a real but secret organization, Britain's unconventional warfare agency during World War II, the Special Operations Executive (SOE). Since hundreds of books have been written about SOE operations, the first question that comes to mind is, "What more is there to say?" The short answer is, "Not much." *MUW* does add some new detail about the organizations that preceded SOE, how the key personnel were recruited, and more about their personal careers. The operations it describes, for example those in France, Norway, and Czechoslovakia, have all been well covered elsewhere. Regrettably, there is no mention of "der Englandspiel" ("England game"), the term used by the Germans for the operation that captured and doubled team after team of SOE agents sent to Holland—all but two of whom died. Likewise, operations in Burma and Indo-China are ignored, while the Jedburghs receive only brief mention. References to operations in Yugoslavia are oblique—though not included in the index. Even the source of the title is dubious: according to Milton, it was Churchill himself who coined the phrase "ungentlemanly warfare"—but he fails to provide adequate proof for this assertion (he cites the British National Archives Cabinet Paper Collection, but there are 785 files and volumes reposited therein, rendering his claim impossible to verify). Finally, a central thread of the book is the role played by Colin Gubbins, who became the head of SOE, but his story is more completely covered in the second book listed above.

SOE'S Mastermind: An Authorized Biography of Major General Sir Colin Gubbins, is the second and more recent biography of Gubbins (the first, Peter Wilkinson and Joan Bright Astley's *Gubbins and SOE*, was published in 1993 by Leo Cooper, Ltd.). The adjective "authorized" does not designate official sponsorship; rather, it derives from the cooperation extended to author Brian Lett by Gubbins's grandson, which included access to family papers.

Colin Gubbins was born in Tokyo in 1896, where his linguist father was serving with the Foreign Office. When World War I began, he was on vacation from Royal Military Academy Woolwich, studying German in Heidelberg. Due to be interred as an enemy alien if caught, Gubbins's escape makes interesting reading in Lett's account.

Gubbins was commissioned in 1914 into the Royal Field Artillery and served the entire war on the western front, where he was "shot, gassed, and suffer[ed] from trench fever." (42) After the war, he served with Gen. Edmund Ironside in Russia, where he learned guerrilla warfare fighting the Bolsheviks. He would go on to serve in Ireland, India, Czechoslovakia, and the War Office before and while assigned to MI(R), a predecessor unit of SOE. It was while in MI(R) that he wrote a handbook on irregular warfare that became part of SOE training. (89) After service in Norway, he returned for domestic duty, but in 1940 was seconded to SOE as director of operations and training.

SOE'S Mastermind describes how Gubbins rose to become head of SOE and the many successful operations he conducted throughout the world in this role. Curiously, however, Lett does not mention the failure of the SOE attempts to send agents to the Netherlands and how the Germans doubled all the agents dispatched (for an account of that disaster, see Nigel West, *Secret War: The Story of SOE, Britain's Wartime Sabotage Organization* (Hodder & Stoughton, 1992) and Pieter Dourlein, *Inside North Pole: A Secret Agent's Story* (William Kimber, 1953). Lett does comment on Gubbins's relationship with William Donovan and his view of the Jedburgh teams whose delayed insertion into France before D-Day led Gubbins to tell historian M.R.D. Foot that "they had been absolutely wasted by not being pushed in at once." (229)

Operations were not the only problems Gubbins had to confront: Lett describes the attacks on SOE's autonomy and its very existence by the Foreign Office and the Secret Intelligence Service. Gubbins survived only with the support of Roundell Cecil Palmer, Third Earl of Selborne, then serving as Britain's minister of Economic Warfare, and that of Winston Churchill, as Churchill moved to expand SOE operations worldwide.

In the concluding chapter of *SOE'S Mastermind*, Lett dons the robes of "professor hindsight" and raises a provocative conspiracy theory. While most authors record that SOE was abolished in January 1946 when its mission was absorbed by MI6, Lett challenges that version: "The author believes that Colin, the expert on cover resistance, ensured that, from January 1946, SOE simply went underground." (256) The key word here is "believes," as Lett offers no source; in fact, there are no source notes in the book—a major deficiency. Well written, but more entertainment than history.

The story told in ***Agent Michael Trotobas and SOE in Northern France*** takes a tack that is very different from the top-down and overview approaches of the two previous books. Here we encounter an SOE team in the field and one that has not previously received book-length treatment. In his foreword, Imperial War Museum historian Mark Seaman writes that "it is perhaps surprising that it has taken so long for a biography of Michael Trotobas, one of F Section's [a part of SOE] most daring and resourceful agents, to be written."

Major Trotobas was an atypical officer in many respects. His working class French parents decided to emigrate to America and left France for London in 1912 on their way to Southampton. At Waterloo Station, they took the wrong train and missed their ship, the *RMS Titanic,* which was embarking upon its maiden voyage. They decided to seek their fortune in England instead. Michael Trotobas was born in 1914 and lived a working class life playing rugby; boxing at school; and traveling in France, where he perfected his French. In 1933, he joined the Army and by the time World War II started, was a senior sergeant with the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in France. Wounded during the withdrawal at Dunkirk, Trotobas returned to Britain, was commissioned, and was then seconded to the SOE. After training, he was assigned to set up a resistance circuit in France. The team parachuted in during the late fall of 1941. Within weeks, nearly all had been captured and imprisoned. As one SOE officer later reported, the arrests "almost cleaned up our organization in the unoccupied zone. The opening of 1942 therefore found us without radio contact . . . except Miss Virginia Hall established in Lyon . . . and keeping more or less an open house for F Section agents." (48) (Hall was an SOE asset at that time.)

Trotobas and his colleagues did manage to escape with the help of the resistance, including Hall, and after a lengthy, convoluted series of events, reached England by the end of the year. Two months later, in early 1943 he was back in occupied France heading up the FARMER circuit that operated out of Lille, 40 miles south of Dunkirk.

The authors devote extensive attention to FARMERS's daily existence, the persistent frustrations with communications and coordinating supply drops, personnel problems, helping downed airmen escape, sabotage operations, (135) and the ever persistent threat of betrayal that limited FARMER operations. One such betrayal has a special relevance for coauthor Stewart Kent and involves two resistance members, a mother and daughter, Jeanne and Yvonne Pachy—Kent's grandmother and mother. The women were betrayed to the Gestapo and subsequently imprisoned; Trotobas organized Yvonne's escape, but Jeanne had already been sent to Ravensbruck, where she perished.

It was also a betrayal that led to Trotobas's own dramatic death on 27 November 1943. The authors relate those circumstances and their consequences during and after the war.

Agent Michael Trotobas and SOE in Northern France gives a glimpse of SOE field special operations during World War II. It is well documented and, where gaps exist, they are noted. The FARMER operations have resonance today.

Codenamed DORSET: The Wartime Exploits of Major Colin Ogden-Smith, Commando & SOE depicts another side of SOE operations in World War II. Ogden-Smith came from a well-educated, middle class British family. With his two brothers, he joined the army as war loomed in 1939. Ogden-Smith served first with the commandos and then with the Small Scale Raiding Force before joining SOE, where he became the leader (codename DORSET) of Jedburgh team FRANCIS. Author Peter Jacobs, himself a retired RAF navigator, gives Ogden-Smith's former service some attention, but concentrates on SOE and FRANCIS.

According to Jacobs, the Jedburgh team concept "was the brainchild of SOE." (91) Each team was to consist of an SOE and an OSS officer (one fluent in French), and a radioman (usually enlisted). Exceptions to this staffing arrangement occurred due to personnel availability; FRANCIS was affected by such constraints and was made up of two Brits and a Frenchman. Their mission was to serve as a link with the local resistance and the invasion forces, to coordinate supply drops, and to conduct sabotage. They were not spies and they wore their national uniforms.

Jacobs reviews the Jedburghs' training, mainly at Milton Hall, the ancestral home of the Fitzwilliam family. It was here that the other members of FRANCIS—Guy Le Borgne, the French member, and Arthur Dallow, a Brit radioman—were added to team. (105) Their particular mission was to support a Maquis cell in Brittany. On 9 July 1944, team FRANCIS, led by now Major Ogden-Smith, was dropped near the small town of Meslan, southeast of Brest, an area full of Germans. The team landed safely but miles apart, and it was four days before they were reunited. By the end of July, after only brief contact with the Maquis, Ogden-Smith was dead and the FRANCIS mission ended. Le Borgne and Dallow survived, saved by Ogden-Smith's firing on the attacking Germans while they escaped. Jacobs gives a detailed account of the battle at a farmhouse near the town of Kerbozec where the team had been hiding from the enemy. They had been betrayed to the Germans by a Belgian collaborator, his wife, and son. Le Borgne reported to London that they had been "executed on my orders . . . two days later." (169)

Codenamed DORSET is well documented with interviews, archival documents, and Ogden-Smith's personal diary. Jacobs reveals what it was like at the action-end of SOE, and reiterates that betrayal by putative allies is nothing new.

RAF and the SOE: Special Duty Operations in Europe During WW2 is a report prepared by the Air Ministry staff at the end of World War II. It provides a chronological account of how the RAF worked with SOE to supply the weapons, radios, funds, and personnel required to conduct and support operations in the European and Mediterranean theaters during World War II. It was frequently a contentious relationship, since satisfying SOE requests meant diversion of aircraft resources from their traditional RAF mission, and not-infrequent losses only complicated matters. (12) The alternative of letting SOE have its own aircraft was never seriously considered. The report tells how this mission was accomplished with help from the US Air Force, using mostly unarmed single engine aircraft operating to and from makeshift airfields at night, behind enemy lines. Converted bombers were employed to drop supplies and teams of agents. Communication with ground staff was always risky.

The overall numbers are impressive. From 1942 to 1945, "6,700 personnel of 18 different nationalities" were landed or parachuted to the resistance behind enemy lines. Some 33,000 sorties were flown, of which "22,000 were successful and nearly 11,000 were failures." (105) The report details the flights made to each nation, the relationship with the reception committees, the amount of supplies and personnel delivered or recovered, any difficulties encountered, and the reasons for failures and successes.

The difficulties often resulted from team penetration by the Gestapo. For example, the report discusses actions taken when it was discovered that the "whole SOE organization in Holland was penetrated by the Germans and had been run by the Germans for the last year." This resulted in the suspension of sorties to Holland. Suspension was also considered for flights to Poland, but for "operational flight hazards" as well as security issues. (50–51)

The concluding chapter assesses the value of the RAF support to resistance, guerrilla, and sabotage operations as expressed by the resistance movements and the allied commanders they supported. *RAF and the SOE* is the only authoritative account of air support to the SOE. The issues of planning and coordination it discusses remain relevant today.

Agent M: The Lives and Spies of MI5's Maxwell Knight, by Henry Hemming. (Public Affairs, 2017) 354, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Maxwell Knight was a tad eccentric. After WWI naval service he was a jazz musician, worked for a private intelligence agency, offered his services to the British fascists, and ran a pub. He would later host BBC nature broadcasts (300 for radio, 40 for TV) for young people, all the while keeping as pets mice, a baboon, a mongoose, a parrot, and a bear—a small one—in his apartment. He wrote more than 20 books on natural history, attended séances held by a spiritualist, and after two years of marriage had not consummated the relationship. (57) He also served briefly with MI6, where his unconventional methods were not appreciated. Then, in 1931, he joined the Security Service (MI5) and found a home. In *Agent M*, author Henry Hemming tells the story the man known within MI5 as "M."

Knight's eccentricities were not confined to his personal life. He was self-taught in the field of counterintelligence and security, and he trained each of his agents personally, especially well-educated young women, whose employment, other than as secretaries, was very unusual at the time. His MI5 mission to penetrate the fascists and the Communist Party produced important results, and Hemming gives several examples. One involved H. G. Pollard, whom Knight recruited to work for the *Daily Worker*—heretofore unreported, and the details of which Hemming discovered in recently released MI5 files.

The Woolwich Arsenal operation where M used his best female agent, Olga Grey, to penetrate the communist NKVD ring working there, is the best known. The principal Soviet agent, Percy Gladding, was caught, but his NKVD handlers escaped; here, Hemming adds nothing new. In the Tyler Kent case, Knight's agents developed evidence that led to the arrest and conviction of Kent, who had worked as a code clerk in the American embassy, and that of his fellow conspirator, Anna Wolkoff.

Of course the NKVD had recruited agents in MI5, and during World War II, one of Knight's agents provided clues that led to the identification of a secretary who confessed to "passing on classified information to the Party." According to Hemming, Knight's nephew told him that his uncle even suspected Anthony Blunt, but lacked the evidence to raise the issue formally, and never mentioned it to superiors. (277) Whether Knight was just commenting for history after Blunt's exposure isn't discussed.

Knight continued to run penetrations of left wing organizations after World War II, but his operations gradually diminished. He retired in 1961 and pursued his many other interests. Hemming concludes that, despite his agent handling skills, his eccentricities assured he would never advance within MI5. (280)

When Ian Fleming published his James Bond books and called the head of the service "M," there was press speculation that "M" was based on Fleming's wartime boss, Adm. John Godfrey. Hemming, however, concludes that it was "most likely a nod to Max." (294) He doesn't consider another more likely candidate—Stewart Menzies, head of MI6. Fleming never revealed who inspired his choice. Another comparison with a fictional character is true: David Cornwell (later John le Carré) was one of Knight's promising young officers and also illustrated two of Knight's books. Citing John le Carré's biographer, Adam Sisman, Hemming notes that Knight was, however, the inspiration for Jack Brotherhood in *The Perfect Spy*. (81)

There are several flaws in *Agent M* worth noting. First, the title is inaccurate, though this is not the fault of the author: Knight was no agent; he was simply a case officer who called himself "M." Second, Hemming is also prone to using too many distracting "may haves", "it is possibles", "in all likelihoods", where circumstances are unknown. Finally, not all significant details are sourced. (157) Still, *Agent M* celebrates the unique Maxwell Knight and his agents and is a story well told.

The CIA and the Congress for Cultural Freedom in the Early Cold War, by Sarah Harris. (Routledge, 2016) 193, end of chapter notes, index.

"The Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) is widely considered one of CIA's most daring and effective Cold War covert operations," wrote Michael Warner, then a CIA historian, in a 1998 article.[a] The following year, British scholar Frances Stonor Saunders took a less positive view in her book, *Who Paid The Piper* (Granta Books, 1999). She argued that secret CIA funding and manipulation of the CCF was, in the long run, a detriment to the liberal left in countering Soviet cultural propaganda, while contaminating the reputations of the authors, artists, scientists, and philosophers whose works the CCF had promoted. Joel Whitney, in his book *Finks: How the CIA Tricked the World's Best Writers* (OR Books, 2016), takes a similar position. In 2002, Pierre Grémion, while not mentioning CIA's role, wrote that he "considered the Congress as an important semi-autonomous transnational organization that contributed a great deal to the intellectual debates of the time.[b] In 2008, Hugh Wilford concluded that "the implication that the CIA exercised complete control over the recipients of their covert largesse" was inaccurate and neglected a more complex reality.[c]

The CIA and the Congress for Cultural Freedom in the Early Cold War analyzes these interpretations and complexities from a different perspective. Author Sarah Harris, a Cambridge lawyer with a PhD in international relations, focuses on the contribution of "the man who helped found the Congress, became its de facto manager, and ensured its survival," Michael Josselson. It was Josselson's personal contacts with the "intellectuals who flocked" to the CCF and his relationship with the CIA that explain the "positions the Congress took," and were the "key to the Congress's successes." (x)

Josselson had initiated several actions, the most important of which was recommending the CIA provide for a stand-alone "Congress for cultural freedom" in June 1950. The result was a conference, to be held in Berlin, that would "feature non-communist intellectuals, who would hopefully champion Western cultural and political ideals, denounce totalitarianism" and signal to the world that "a critical mass of Western intellectuals adamantly opposed the Soviet system." Covert funding was also being used by the Soviets for their already-extensive series of front organizations supporting "hundreds of prominent artists writers and scientists . . . dedicated to championing the Soviet Union as the world's best chance for world peace and its paramount defender of culture." (1) Curiously, this fact never was accepted by participants as normal.

The Berlin conference was the scene of much controversy between East Germans and the Western attendees—that included Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Hugh Trevor-Roper, Nicolas Nabokov (author Vladimir Nabokov's cousin), and Arthur Koestler—and among the attendees themselves. As Harris reveals, many of the delegates had par-

a. Michael Warner, "Origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1949–50" *Studies In Intelligence*, 38, no. 5 (1995), 89.

b. Quoted in Giles Scott-Smith, *The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress of Cultural Freedom, the CIA, and the Post War American Hegemony* (Routledge, 2002), x.

c. Hugh Wilford, *The Mighty Wurlitzer: How The CIA Played America* (Harvard University Press, 2008), 249.

ticipated in previous conferences with the same objective. The best known was sponsored by the Soviets in New York, where communists had dominated the scene. But in the end, the Berlin delegates voted to establish the CCF.

The CCF went on to sponsor more conferences, concerts, books, travel, and magazines all over the world. Its most famous magazine was the British *Encounter*, co-edited by Bertrand Russell, Stephen Spender, Nancy Mitford, and Isaiah Berlin, among others. The *Encounter* experience was typical of CCF-supported publications: it sided with the West in the Cold War, and it criticized the United States during the McCarthy era and on other policies.

But the CCF was never a smoothly running organization, and Harris examines this aspect in detail in order to show how Josselson struggled to keep it functioning. There were turf battles within elements of CIA when management changed, and disputes among editors and authors. The most significant, prolonged, and unsuccessful effort to shape CCF policy came from the American Congress of Cultural Freedom, an offshoot of the CCF, led by an ex-communist turned right-wing CIA contractor.

Harris ends her study with an account of the 1967 scandal that exposed the CIA covert funding in the midst of the Vietnam War. She quotes Josselson as he answered the question, "Does the end justify the means?" His response was that the "record of accomplishment does seem to me . . . to justify the means in this case . . . the only thing wrong in the means was the deception I was obliged to practice about the source of funds." (183)

Harris concludes that the value of the CCF is not just "a question of history, but a moral and political judgment." (184) *The CIA and the Congress for Cultural Freedom in the Early Cold War* provides a balanced and scrupulously sourced assessment of a singular period in our history.

Inventing Loreta Velasquez: Confederate Soldier Impersonator, Media Celebrity, and Con Artist, by William C. Davis. (Southern Illinois University Press, 2016) 358, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

In his bibliographic essay, "Companions of Crisis: The Spy Memoir as a Social Document," former OSS officer and CIA analyst Curtis Carroll Davis, while discussing Civil War espionage, observes that "sooner or later some of its wartime practitioners are constrained, for a variety of reasons, to tell their stories."[a] He notes 19 autobiographical narratives that appeared after the Civil War, two of which were written in the first person. The first was *Nurse and Spy in the Union Army*, by Sarah Emma Edmonds—a somewhat embellished account of a woman who posed as male soldier and spy.[b] The second, *The Women in Battle*, by Loreta Janeta Velazquez[c] "made similar claims on the part of the Confederacy.[d] It is the latter that intrigued Civil War historian William Davis.

While in his 1964 article Curtis Carroll Davis accepted *The Women in Battle* as a genuine expression of Velasquez's experiences, William Davis's thorough and scholarly review of the book identified "obvious errors and impossibilities" in her account that sent him to the archives. (1) It is from these records—mostly press accounts from interviews she frequently gave—that Davis concludes, "we may never know her real birth name, or the true name or the true number and names of all her husbands and her children." (3) Of her early life, little is known—Davis discusses the speculation to which she contributed—though court records and press stories reveal she was a teenage prostitute and minor criminal who spent time in prison under a variety of names.

A few of the episodes in *The Women in Battle* that could not be substantiated include claims that she fought

a. Curtis Carroll Davis, "Companions of Crisis: The Spy Memoir as a Social Document," *Civil War History*, 10, no. 4 (December 1964), 385–400.

b. Sarah Emma Edmonds, *Nurse and Spy in the Union: Army Comprising the Adventures and Experiences of a Woman in Hospitals, Camps, and Battle Fields* (W. S. Williams & Co. 1865).

c. Inconsistent spellings of both her given name and surname are documented in *Inventing Loreta Velasquez* (e.g., Loreta and Lauretta, and Velasquez and Velazquez).

d. Loreta Janeta Velazquez, *The Women in Battle: A Narrative of the Exploits, Adventures of Travels of Mrs. L. J. Velazquez Otherwise Known as Lt. H. T. Buford Confederate States Army,* ed. C. J. Worthington (Dustin, Gilman & Co., 1876).

with her slave, Bob, in the major battles of 1861 and 1862; her role as a blockade runner and courier; her marriage to a Confederate officer who left her a widow; and her tales of being wounded at Shiloh, where she had a chance to kill Ulysses S. Grant. (165)

It was in September 1861, writes author William Davis, that Velasquez "decided to leave the brothels behind" and become Confederate Lt. Harry Buford, though she seldom hid her femininity from her colleagues. (16) The account of her espionage while "married" to a Confederate officer occupy several chapters in the book and, absent evidence of authenticity, are the basis for much of her post-war reputation. (51ff) And, as Davis points out (probably because *The Women in Battle* is a singular account), her reputation remains positive to this day. He describes several contemporary social scientists who willingly ignore the story's false claims and see great value in it as a model for opening dialogue around gender identity issues. (245)

For those who wonder what happened to Velasquez after the war, Davis says she remained a "confidence woman . . . and pioneering female swindler" as she schemed to survive. (3) In 1911, she announced plans for a new edition of *The Women in Battle* and a book on US-Mexico relations, but neither was to be: suffering from dementia, she was admitted to St. Elizabeth's mental hospital in Washington, DC, where she died in 1923. (234)

Inventing Loreta Velasquez should relieve any doubts about the authenticity of Velasquez and her book.

LORENZ: Breaking Hitler's Top Secret Code at Bletchley Park, by Captain Jerry Roberts. (The History Press, 2017) 240, appendices, photos, index.

With the publication of *The ULTRA Secret* by F. W. Winterbotham in 1974 (Harper and Row), the British acknowledged that the cryptographers at Bletchley Park had successfully decrypted the German military signals encrypted by the Enigma machine and transmitted using Morse code, during most of World War II. The decrypted Enigma material was eventually assigned the codename ULTRA. Winterbotham notes that ULTRA messages "carried the very highest command traffic from Hitler . . . to his High Command, the Chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Staffs."[a] But the material processed through Enigma still required manual encryption and decryption.

By 1941, a new machine was in use: the Lorenz, named for the German company that manufactured it, simultaneously enciphered and transmitted the text as it was typed; likewise on the receiving end, decipherment was automatic. The Lorenz replaced the Enigma as the preferred German Geheimschreiber (secret writing) machine during the war, but Bletchley was able to break this system, too. *LORENZ* tells how they did it.

Author Jerry Roberts worked at Bletchley Park in what was called the *Testery*, named after British major Ralph Paterson Testery, who headed the team. The intercepted Lorenz traffic was initially codenamed FISH, later TUNNY. The *Testery* quickly realized this system was far more complicated than Enigma. Gradually they worked out that the Lorenz encoding machine had 12 rotors, compared to Enigma's four. Roberts's teammate, Bill Tutte, broke the system in 1942 without ever having seen the Lorenz machine itself. (72) The initial decryption work was done by hand, and Roberts devotes two chapters (Chapters 9 & 10) to explain how that was done. Later, a machine called COLOSSUS was constructed to determine the rotor settings necessary for automatic decryption, and Roberts discusses that, too. (Chapter 11)

LORENZ also has a chapter on the impact of the decrypts on World War II. Roberts credits Lorenz decrypts with alerting the Allies to the upcoming Battle of Kursk. He also comments on their contribution to D-Day preparations. This is of interest since these feats have previously been attributed to Enigma traffic. (129)

The details of the Lorenz device (and at least one variant) were declassified in 2002, and other authors have made reference to its contribution. But Jerry Roberts, the last surviving member of the *Testery* team, provides the only firsthand account of the team's work at Bletchley. He also provides biographical details of his pre- and post-war life.

LORENZ fills gaps in the history of Bletchley Park and provides material for future historians who seek to establish more precisely the contribution of codebreaking during World War II.

a. F. W. Winterbotham, *The ULTRA Secret* (Harper and Row, 1974), 24.

MacArthur's Spies: The Soldier, The Singer, and the Spymaster Who Defied the Japanese in World War II, by Peter Eisner. (Viking, 2017) 348, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

On 2 January 1942, the Japanese army occupied Manila, unopposed. Most of the American and Filipino troops surrendered and some survived the notorious Bataan death march to prison camps. But a few escaped into the hills and formed resistance units that harassed the Japanese. Several civilians remained in Manila and built a network of agents who smuggled supplies to prisoners in POW camps. Both groups collected intelligence for MacArthur.

Years later, while reading about the war in the Philippines, author Peter Eisner came across a reference to a clandestine enterprise "operated by a mysterious woman known to the POWs only as "High Pockets." (xi) Research led to the discovery of a 1947 book, *Manila Espionage* (Binfords & Mort, 1947), by Claire Phillips ("High Pockets"). The book purported to tell of her exploits as a spy for the Americans but lacked any source notes. Still, Phillips gained modest post-war celebrity and appeared on *This Is Your Life* in 1950, then a popular radio show. A film version, *I Was An American Spy*, reached theaters in 1951, introduced in the movie's prologue by Gen. Mark Clark, who stated MacArthur had recommended Phillips for the presidential Medal of Freedom. Phillips went on to publicize herself in newspaper interviews and appeared on the Chet Huntley (NBC) evening news program before she disappeared from public view.

Positive publicity notwithstanding, Eisner spotted inconsistencies in her book, plus obvious embellishments in the movie and her interviews. Curious, he went to the National Archives in search of the facts. *MacArthur's Spies* is the story of what he found.

The archive files were sparse, but in a bit of scholarly luck, Eisner found Phillips's handwritten diary of her wartime life. From this and other clues, he learned that Claire Phillips was born Clara Mabel De La Testa, just one of multiple names she would adopt—not all associated with her many marriages. Eisner traces her path to Manila, where she met and later claimed to have married Army private John Phillips, 10 years her junior, shortly before the war. Eisner found no record that she did.

Claire remained in the Manila area after the invasion and, with the help of friends, she began a double life—in more senses than one. One part involved the nightclub, called the Tsubaki, that she did, in fact, operate. It was staffed by young female entertainers who catered to Japanese officers, businessmen, local Filipino collaborators, and—unknown to the Japanese—members of the underground. Eisner tells how she and selected colleagues began intentionally acquiring useful military information from the club's Japanese patrons that was then passed to the Americans, one of whom was Corporal (later Captain) John Boone, a leader of a guerrilla unit in the mountains. Another was an US Navy officer, Charles Parsons, who lived clandestinely in Manila and maintained contact with MacArthur's headquarters in Australia. *MacArthur's Spies* tells their stories in some detail.

It was the second half of Phillips's double life that led to her nickname "High Pockets." Her putative husband was said to be in a POW camp, and with the help of the Red Cross she attempted to locate him to deliver allowable convenience items. She never found him, though, and gave the items to other prisoners; in the process, as she would later claim in her book, she would accept messages from POWs for delivery to the Army, and these she often stuffed in her brassiere, thus expanding her silhouette. The POWs dubbed her "High Pockets," and she adopted the nickname. (120) Eisner records another, less colorful version of how the nickname originated, given by one of her colleagues, but can't confirm either story. (286)

The Japanese military security service, the Kempeitai, eventually discovered Phillips's networks. She, along with her Filipino colleagues, was imprisoned in May 1944. Eisner records the appalling details of their confinement. She was released in February 1945 upon MacArthur's return.

After her return to the United States and the publication of her book, Phillips's celebrity status gradually diminished and she sued the government for the expenses she incurred in the operation of her club. Although she won the case, the amount awarded was insufficient to sustain her and she took odd jobs before lapsing into alcoholism, succumbing on 22 May 1960—"almost sixteen years after she was dragged into a dungeon by the Kempeitai." (288)

MacArthur's Spies doesn't totally set the record straight; Claire Phillips told too many variations of her life story for that. But it does establish that she was a loyal American who risked her life for her country during World War II.

A Matter of Honor: Pearl Harbor, Betrayal, Blame and a Family's Quest for Justice, by Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swan. (HarperCollins, 2016) 520, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

To most citizens in 1942, "Remember Pearl Harbor" was a patriotic slogan and a song—but not to Adm. Husband E. Kimmel, commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet, and LTG Walter C. Short, commander of the US Army, Pacific (Hawaiian Department). Blamed for "dereliction of duty," they were forced to retire at reduced ranks. They became the focus of public controversy and the objects of several investigations that sought to explain how the disaster could have happened. Courts-martial was considered but ultimately rejected because of the risk of exposing the MAGIC secret (the United States had broken Japan's diplomatic codes).

A Matter of Honor presents a chronological examination of events in Hawaii, Washington, and Japan that involved—or should have involved—Kimmel and Short from before and just after the attack to the present. They do not absolve Kimmel of responsibility, a position Kimmel himself acknowledged, but they do raise doubts about the treatment Kimmel and Short received, especially from the CNO, Admiral Stark, and question whether others should have shared in the blame—a position Kimmel held.

Some historians and journalists have long speculated on the reasons for surprise at Pearl Harbor, and conspiracy theories emerged early on. Even President Roosevelt was suspect: some claimed the president knew the attack was coming and "ordered that no timely warning be sent to those defending Pearl Harbor." (26) Others suggested "high officials in Washington knew, before the attack, that Japanese warships were steaming toward Hawaii." (26) Still others charged that British double agent Dusko Popov had warned the FBI that an attack on Pearl Harbor was coming, and that the Bureau took no action. The authors dismiss these and similar theories for lack of conclusive evidence. The book presents a long list of books and articles about these and other conspiracy theories that have been found wanting. (477)

Adm. Kimmel testified at a post-war investigation and argued he had not been provided with crucial MAGIC intelligence, such as the November 30 message that instructed the Japanese embassies to destroy their codes and files. Still, the Navy did not alter its decision and has not done so to this day.

Three generations of Kimmels have since attempted to correct the record and restore the ranks of both officers (Gen. Short died in 1949). Authors Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swan present a long list of very distinguished naval officers, who with the 10,000-member Pearl Harbor Survivors Association, petitioned the Navy Department and the president to take that action—but no avail.

A Matter of Honor does not provide a reason for the Navy's adamant opposition (which was supported by several presidents), but it does hint that if changes are made, reputations of other distinguished wartime officers would be damaged, necessitating a correction of their testimony and reassessment of their performance, and thus a revision of history. Whether that is a price too high is a decision left to the reader.

Three Minutes To Doomsday: An Agent, A Traitor, and the Worst Espionage Breach in US History, by Joe Navarro. (Scribner, 2017) 349, photos, index.

Clyde Conrad was a US Army sergeant and classified document control NCO serving in West Germany in the mid-1970s when he began selling the Top Secret war plans in his vault to the Hungarian security service. It wasn't long before CIA sources behind the Iron Curtain reported that sensitive military secrets were being delivered regularly to the Hungarians, and the Army CI element was notified. It took years to track down Conrad and assemble the evidence required to arrest him in 1988. The story of how they accomplished this is told by Col. Stuart Harrington in his book, *Traitors Among Us* (Presidio Press, 1999).

In describing some significant breakthroughs in the case, Herrington mentioned FBI agent Joe Navarro, who interviewed former Army sergeant, Rod Ramsay, who had worked for Conrad and succeeded him as Top Secret control officer when Conrad retired. Ramsay eventually provided much confirmatory evidence concerning Conrad's operations and, to everyone's surprise, added details that were until then unknown.[a] *Three Minutes To Doomsday* tells that story.

Joe Navarro was something of a maverick FBI agent serving in Florida. A Cuban émigré with a degree from Brigham Young University, he had applied to the Bureau at the suggestion of one of his professors. In 1988, he was assigned to the field office in Tampa, Florida, where he became a member of the SWAT team and a pilot who conducted aerial surveillance. On 23 August 1988, he was tasked to accompany a visiting officer from the Army's Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) while he interviewed Roderick James Ramsay about his time working for Conrad.

During the interview, Navarro noticed how Ramsay's body language suggested he knew something that bothered him, but that he was reluctant to reveal. After the INSCOM officer concluded that there wasn't much more to learn from Ramsay and returned to Washington, Navarro mentioned his concerns to his supervisor and asked for permission to follow up. His request was approved, but not without an encounter with FBI bureaucracy—the first of many throughout the case that illuminates internal turf wars, centered on credit-sensitive careerists seeking to protect prerogatives.

Three Minutes To Doomsday follows Navarro over the next 20 months as he and two gifted female special agents slowly establish an extraordinary relationship with Ramsay that capitalized on Ramsay's genius IQ, his photographic memory, and his need for an understanding friend besides his mother. Through a carefully orchestrated series of interviews, they develop such a deep bond of trust and friendship with Ramsay that he unburdens himself about his traitorous behavior without fearing arrest. At the same time, Navarro observes the legal constraints that will permit prosecution if Ramsay confesses. In the end, Ramsay gives up details Conrad had withheld, including the location of Top Secret documents in a secret house, some of which involved nuclear war plans given to the Hungarians and shared with the KGB.

Once the information Ramsay provides is verified, he is arrested. His first response to the arresting officer is, "Does Joe Navarro know about this?" (303)

The bureaucratic and psychological strain on Navarro was severe and he was forced to take sick leave before he could return to work. Curiously, before Navarro put a stop to further communication, Ramsay continued to write and call him from prison, where he was serving a 36-year sentence. An informative, instructive, and valuable counterintelligence contribution.

a. Stuart Harrington, *Traitors Among Us: Inside the Spy Catcher's World* (Presidio Press, 1999), 382–384.

War in the Desert, by T. E. Lawrence, edited by Jeremy and Nicole Wilson. (Castle Hill Press, 2016) 404, appendix, frontispiece of Lawrence, no index.

War in the Desert has an unusual history. Its author, T. E. Lawrence, was an eccentric young Oxford archeologist who was commissioned as an intelligence officer at the start of World War I. Sent to Cairo, he served in the Arab Bureau until 1916, when he was designated liaison to the Arab leader who was fomenting a revolt against Turks. Having arranged British support for the Arabs, Lawrence ended up leading the revolt that contributed to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. He returned to Britain as a colonel and a reluctant celebrity known as "Lawrence of Arabia," thanks to the stories American journalist Lowell Thomas wrote about him. After declining a knighthood, he participated in the Paris Peace Talks, then left the Army and returned to Oxford to write a book about his adventures. Before it was finished, he was tasked to become an advisor to the colonial secretary, Winston Churchill, and he served on the Foreign Office commission that created the Arab countries in the Middle East, which exist in various forms today.

By 1922, Lawrence had returned to Oxford and had finished his book, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*. Eight draft copies were printed as proofs in August 1922, and he sent copies to his literary friends Edward Garrett and George Bernard Shaw, asking for their opinions. Two weeks earlier, Lawrence—for reasons still a puzzle—had joined the RAF as an enlisted man. A short time later Lawrence received an offer to publish an abridgement for £7000.00, equivalent to more than £300,000 today. Shaw opposed any abridgement. Garrett proposed to undertake the task and Lawrence agreed, though he made multiple changes. By November 1922, *War In The Desert* was complete—160,000 words—and Lawrence contemplated leaving the service and devoting himself to other pursuits. Then in January 1923, Lawrence wrote to his publisher withdrawing the book. He gave no reason, though Shaw's opposition may have been a factor. *War in the Desert* would wait 93 years before publication.

The idea of an abridged version did not disappear when Lawrence abandoned *War in the Desert*. Encouragement from friends resulted in a 100-copy, fine press, abridged subscription edition—80,000 words fewer than the Oxford edition of *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*; in 1926, that edition sold for £30.00 (about £1500.00 today). A year later, an abridged trade edition entitled *Revolt in the Desert* was published. Despite his need for funds to augment his anticipated retirement from the RAF, Lawrence decided not to accept any royalties.

War in the Desert has now been rescued from oblivion. The first seven chapters—omitted from *Revolt in the Desert* and other abridgments—tell how he wrote his story of the Arab Revolt. The editor's introduction adds further detail about its origins and disagreements over topics; a table of contents compares the *War* chapters with those in the Oxford edition, so one can see which have been omitted. However, even if *War in the Desert* had appeared when originally planned, its publication would probably not have materially influenced subsequent critiques of Lawrence and his writings. For more on this aspect, see Jeremy Wilson's biography of Lawrence,[a] and Barton Whaley's assessment in *Practise To Deceive*.[b]

War in the Desert adds to the Lawrence lore and will be of interest to those who have followed his legendary life. Copies can be obtained from the publisher.

a. Jeremy Wilson, *Lawrence of Arabia: The Authorized Biography of T. E. Lawrence* (Atheneum, 1990).

b. Barton Whaley, *Practise To Deceive: Learning Curves of Military Deception Planners*, Case #34 (Naval Institute Press, 2016).

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