

Studies in Intelligence

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
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Prepublication Review Boards
Books Reviewed in 2016

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- The Pivot*
- Spying Through a Glass Darkly*
- The Angel*
- Spies in the Congo*
- The Bletchley Girls*
- Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf*

Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf



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Capt. Gordon I Peterson, USN (Ret.), and David C. Taylor for "A Shield and a Sword—Intelligence Support to Communications with US POWs in Vietnam," *Studies* 60, no. 1 (March, 2016).

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James Burridge and John Kavanagh for their review of the movie "Bridge of Spies," *Studies* 60 no. 2 (June 2016).

Rebecca H. for "Protecting Government Equities: The Right to Write in the Information Age: A Look at Prepublication Review Boards," *Studies* 60, no. 4 (December 2016).



Another View of an Episode in “Why Bad Things Happen to Good Analysts” by Jack Davis

Brian F. McCauley

The September 2016 issue of *Studies in Intelligence* (vol 60, no. 3) contained a reprint of a chapter the late CIA analyst and teacher Jack Davis had written in the book *Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners’ Perspectives* (2nd Edition) edited by Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce (Georgetown University Press, 2014). The chapter, “Why Bad Things Happen to Good Analysts,” contains an anecdote (p. 125 in the book and p. 17 of the unclassified issue of *Studies*) Jack used to illustrate the “paradox of expertise”—the argument that experts are prone, in their areas of expertise, to be blind to major changes that are evident to non-experts.

Jack attributed the anecdote to a senior CIA analyst who made a presentation in 1990 at Jack’s seminar on intelligence successes and failures. The analyst claimed that an Oval Office briefing on “why the Berlin Wall was not likely to come down any time soon” had taken place on 9 November 1989—the day the wall actually did begin to come down—and was interrupted by a staff member who urged the president to turn on the television to watch the beginning of the Wall’s demise.

I was present at the meeting the senior analyst described, but it neither took place on the 9th nor was the briefing meant solely to discuss the future of the Berlin Wall. More importantly, the analyst left out an important part of the story that runs counter to the “paradox of expertise” argument.^a

Here’s the context. I was assistant national intelligence officer (NIO) for the USSR at the time. On the morning of 8 November 1989, word came to the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and CIA that President George H. W. Bush wanted a briefing that afternoon on the tumultuous events occurring in East Europe. The briefing was to help prepare

the president for his first meeting as president with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Malta in early December. A notation of the briefing and a redacted list of participants is contained in the president’s diary for that day.^b

Director of Central Intelligence William Webster and Director of European Analysis John McLaughlin led the briefing team. During the briefing, which lasted a little more than an hour, senior analyst Brian Quigley spoke to events inside East Germany, and I briefed on the Soviet view of things. I was a CIA careerist, but I was representing the NIC. My first account as a CIA analyst was covering Soviet policy toward East Europe (1978–81). The DI’s Office of Soviet Analysis (SOVA) at the last minute sent a senior manager, who had no formal role in the briefing. After reading Jack’s article in 2014 and again in preparing this letter, I rechecked my recollection of what happened that day with Brian, who added some details.

For both of us, this was the most memorable day in our careers at CIA. That’s not to say we have every detail exactly right, but these have been our recollections from the moment we walked out of the White House that day. They are not events we are trying to recall for the first time after almost three decades.

After we completed our formal briefings, the president asked two questions. The first was “What about the Wall”? Brian responded emphatically that it was “history.” He recalls that, after gasping to himself that he gave such a flip answer to the president, he explained that any wall one can go around (East Germans were escaping via Hungary) had ceased to serve its purpose. The president then asked whether, if that were the case, Gorbachev would

a. When I read his chapter, I had tried to point this out to Jack via internal e-mail, but my note apparently never reached him.

b. “The Daily Diary of President George Bush,” November 8, 1989, page 6 and Appendix C. Available at http://web2.millercenter.org/ghb/documents/presidential_papers/ghb_diary_series/1989/ghb_1989_11.pdf

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step in to prevent the Wall from coming down. The SOVA manager—a seasoned analyst of the Soviet military—answered first and said Gorbachev would not allow the Wall to fall, citing the critical importance of East Germany to Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, the many thousands of Soviet forces stationed there, and the legacy of Nazi invasion of the USSR. So, Jack’s source got this partly right: a CIA officer did tell the president that Gorbachev would not let the Wall come down.

But the story did not end there. I immediately interjected that I could not agree with that judgment. I cited Gorbachev’s record in withdrawing Soviet troops from Afghanistan the year before, allowing free elections to proceed in Poland in the summer of 1989—elections that toppled communist rule and resulted in a Solidarity-led government—and his clear and public display of disdain for East German leader Erich Honecker while in East Berlin only a month earlier (after which Honecker was removed). I said I would not be surprised at all if Gorbachev did NOT step in to prevent the Wall from coming down.

Four years ago, following my retirement from CIA, I talked with Ambassador James Dobbins, who in November 1989 was the principal deputy assistant secretary for European and Canadian Affairs. I mentioned that I had briefed the president a few times, including the day before

the Wall fell. He said he, too, had been in the Oval Office that day as one of State Department’s representatives—I had forgotten. To my surprise, he then brought up the story of the disagreement in front of the president. Although he did not recall me personally as one of the briefers, he said he remembered the disagreement because he had sided with the view that Gorbachev would allow the Wall to come down.

In sum, the president heard arguments that day from an expert on East German politics that the Wall was “history,” from an expert on Soviet foreign policy that Gorbachev would not prevent it from falling, and from an expert on the Soviet military that he would prevent it. I agree that there is such a thing as a “paradox of expertise,” but this episode could be cited as an example of the value of expertise. And even the military analyst’s argument, while off the mark on Gorbachev’s reaction, may have factored into the president’s decision to avoid triumphalism in reacting to the debacle the Soviets suffered when the wall opened and more East European communist regimes crumbled. When the wall came down the day after the briefing, the president publicly was as cool as a cucumber, perhaps because that Oval Office discussion had provided forewarning as well as a context for the implications—for both the United States and the Soviet Union—of such a momentous event.



“How good is your batting average?” Early IC Efforts To Assess the Accuracy of Estimates

Jim Marchio

“Few things are asked the estimator more often than ‘How good is your batting average?’ No question could be more legitimate—and none could be harder to answer.”

Sherman Kent was never more blunt or accurate than when he observed in his memoir-history of the Office of National Estimates (ONE): “Few things are asked the estimator more often than ‘How good is your batting average?’ No question could be more legitimate—and none could be harder to answer.”^a This article explores one of the Intelligence Community’s (IC) earliest efforts to assess the accuracy of its estimative judgments. Led by Kent and his deputy, Abbot E. Smith, the IC systematically examined the judgments contained in more than 200 estimates between 1955 and 1962, sharing its findings with IC members in a series of “validity studies.” The factors driving the effort, the challenges encountered in executing it, and the findings contained in the validity studies all are of value today as the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and other members of the IC attempt to answer the same question involving the accuracy of their analysis.^a

This IC “experiment” conducted six decades ago reminds us how difficult it is to determine “batting averages” as well as the importance of doing so, especially if the IC is to learn from its errors and improve its estimative accuracy.

a. The author acknowledges the valuable comments of John Botzenhart on an early draft of this article.

Origins of the Initiative

Exploring ways to improve the quality and, in turn, the accuracy of the intelligence analysis given to US leaders began with the origins of the IC. However, the perceived intelligence failure associated with the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in 1950 spurred new efforts.² In 1952, a production program for national intelligence estimates was initiated. This program provided “for a reexamination of existing estimates on critical areas or problems as well as the production of new estimates designed to improve the coverage of important topics.” The program continued and expanded the practice of producing “postmortems,” assessments designed “to reveal deficiencies in the preparation of selected estimates and to stimulate corrective action.”^b The

b. The term “postmortem” has been used in different ways in the IC’s history. Initially, it was used to denote a product that identified shortcomings in collection and analytic research on an issue on which an estimate had been completed. As Sherman Kent noted: “In the early 1950s we initiated an exercise—collateral to the main task of the ONE—which, however laudable, became a major pain in the neck. This was the *ex post facto* examination of important estimates with an idea of identifying the most significant gaps in our knowledge. Almost from the start it was called a “postmortem.” See “The Making of an NIE,” *Sherman Kent and the Board of Estimates: Collected Essays* (Center for the Study of Intelligence), 25.

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The failure of post-mortems to address the validity of judgments in estimates likely prompted a new initiative to do so.

National Security Council (NSC) report describing the effort noted that “the experience of past months in this procedure, particularly as applied in the case of estimates on the Far East, indicates that the results are beneficial.”³

The number of postmortems completed by the Office of National Estimates increased each year.⁴ By the end of 1954 well over 50 post-mortems had been completed on National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs).⁵ For each NIE or SNIE, postmortems identified “areas in which intelligence information is inadequate due either to gaps in collection or in research and analysis.” A November 1954 report summarizing postmortem production on NIEs published between January and June of that year stated: “The most important intelligence deficiency in the Soviet Bloc is one of collection . . . in most other areas . . . the overall coverage is good. . . . The problem here is largely one of research and analysis rather than collection.”⁶ However, no attempt was made in the post-mortems to “deal with the validity of substantive judgments made in the estimates.”⁷

Validity Studies

The failure of postmortems to address the validity of judgments in estimates likely prompted a new initiative to do so. Following a discussion of the “Postmortem of NIE Production” at a 26 April 1955 meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee

(IAC), the chairman proposed that a new procedure be adopted to provide for two kinds of reviews subsequent to the completion of an estimate.^a The first type would be “an immediate postmortem on each estimate to record the intelligence deficiencies encountered by the estimators in its preparation” and would be “prepared by the interagency group that wrote the estimate.” The second would be a “review of each estimate after the lapse of an appropriate interval (usually within six months to a year) to study the validity of the estimate, i.e., how good the estimate was in the light of subsequent developments.” The proposed initiative was approved and procedures for “validity studies” were drafted over the next few months.⁸

The new IAC postproduction review procedures for NIEs and SNIEs were advanced for review and approval in September 1955. Beyond clarifying and codifying postmortem actions, the draft document established “validation” procedures. “Whenever an estimate is revised,” it noted, “the contributing agencies will be requested to submit a critique of the previous estimate together with their regular contribution. These critiques will be consolidated by the Board of National Estimates and coordinated with the IAC representatives.” Validation studies also could be “undertaken at any time upon the

a. The Intelligence Advisory Committee, later renamed the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), was the predecessor of today’s National Intelligence Board. It was composed of the heads of IC agencies.

initiative of the Board of National Estimates or at the request of any one of the IAC agencies.” This clause was added to address instances in which estimates were revised only infrequently.⁹

Over the next seven years, nearly 150 validity studies were completed and submitted to the IAC. As planned, the studies examined most of the NIEs and SNIEs published during these years. Four validity studies were produced in 1955. This number jumped to 26 in 1956 and peaked at 28 in 1957. For the remaining years of the program, an average of 16 validity studies were completed annually.

The span of issues and geographic regions covered in the NIEs and SNIEs and, in turn, the validity studies was wide-ranging. Although the greatest number focused on the Soviet Union, its satellites, their military capabilities, and potential courses of action, multiple NIEs and SNIEs addressed the outlook for political stability and economic prospects in nearly every region in the world. Intelligence assessments on the key international crises of the period—Hungary, Suez, and Taiwan—also were assessed for their validity.¹⁰

Two special validity studies also were completed in the latter years of the program. These examined multiple estimates involving military, political, and economic issues on one country over an 8-to-10-year time period. One, identified as the first of its kind, was intended to be a “validity study of all National Intelligence Estimates [more than 80] concerning the USSR which were produced by the machinery [Office of National Estimates] as presently constitut-

ed, from its beginning late in 1950 through 1957.”¹¹ The other, completed in 1961, reviewed all the estimates produced on India in the preceding decade.¹²

What Was Their Batting Average?

Most validity studies produced for the IAC contained a one-to-two-page summary of findings. These findings did not contain numbers or percentages to reflect how many judgments were assessed to be valid or inaccurate. Moreover, the methodology used to determine whether a judgment was valid or inaccurate is unclear. My archival research to date in declassified sources has yet to uncover a standardized approach or universal criteria used by IAC members or the ONE to make such assessments. However, it likely involved, per the 1955 guidance, evaluating the judgments “in the light of subsequent developments.”

Validity studies generally conveyed their findings in general terms, with assessments falling into one of three categories:

- Judgments were or remain valid
- Judgments were flawed or inaccurate
- Unable to determine validity at this time.

Some variation in how evaluations were conveyed was evident in each category. For instance, a number of studies noted “judgments remain valid but are in need of updating” in light of recent developments.¹³ In other cases, judgments were assessed as “partially correct,” “partly

Most validity studies produced for the IAC contained a one-to-two page summary of findings. These findings did not contain numbers or percentages to reflect how many judgments were assessed to be valid or inaccurate.

in error,” or caveated in some way to reflect estimative successes or shortcomings.¹⁴ The validity study completed on NIE 13-58, *Communist China*, was indicative of such an approach when it reported to the United States Intelligence Board that “as of mid-1959, most of its judgments for the period through 1962 appear to be still valid except for the predictions of economic growth, which now seem clearly to have been too conservative.”¹⁵

On Target

The majority of validity studies concluded that their primary conclusions and estimates had proved to be “valid,” “generally accurate,” “substantially correct,” or had been borne out by developments during the period of estimate.¹⁶ As noted in

the 1958 validity study examining national estimates on the USSR, “There were hundreds of judgments in these papers, and by far the greater number of them were sound.”¹⁷

Even in cases where individual judgments missed the mark, the key findings of the estimate were often considered valid. The validity study of NIE 11-6-56 (*Capabilities and Trends of Soviet Science and Technology*) observed, “It should be remarked, however, that these are specific developments of a kind which intelligence does not expect to predict, and failure to do so in no way affected the validity of the main estimates in this paper.”¹⁸

Individual validity studies occasionally described factors that contributed to their accuracy. For example, the validity study on NIE 27-1-56 (*Probable Developments in*

Validity Studies of NIE 91-56: The Outlook for Argentina, published 17 July 1956; and SNIE 91-57: The Outlook for Argentina, published 12 November 1957

1. NIE 91-56 correctly assessed the character of the provisional government of General Aramburu and its intent to transfer power to an elected civilian government. Moreover, it pointed out that the Radical Party was the strongest contender in a national election, although it did not foresee the split in this party.

2. SNIE 91-57 re-estimated the prospects for a return to an elected government on schedule in May 1958 contained in NIE 91-56, and changed the estimate from “slightly better than even” to “even.” In view of the orderly manner in which the elections were conducted and the President inaugurated, this estimate appears to have been over-cautious.

An illustrative summary page of an IAC Validity Study. Originally classified Secret; approved for release August 2006.

Validity studies in some instances delved into greater detail into the sources underlying estimative errors.

Spain) noted that it had proved to be “substantially correct” and that “in some particulars it anticipated trends still developing at this moment, such as the continuing of labor unrest.” This forward-looking focus may also have contributed to the NIE correctly calculating that “Franco could retain power, and that oppositionist forces, although increasing in restlessness, would probably remain weak.”¹⁹ In the case of an NIE on Burma, the validity study praised the estimate for emphasizing “the dangers inherent in the situation” while avoiding going “overboard.” The validity study also cited the NIE for its treatment of Burma’s actions and identification of key drivers in the short as well as long run.²⁰

Off the Mark

Validity studies, to their credit, were just as quick to acknowledge and identify how specific judgments or assessments were off the mark as well as the reasons why. In fact, the greatest amount of time and effort in validity studies was spent in exploring where and how assessments went awry.

The estimative shortcomings identified in validity studies often involved errors of emphasis (overly cautious, underestimated, or overly emphasized) or omission (the failure to foresee or anticipate certain developments, identify key factors or drivers). The validity study on a 1954 NIE addressing probable developments in Argentina, for example, concluded, “It overestimated Peron’s ability, through the policy of moder-

ation followed after 1952, to repair army loyalty shaken by the activities of Eva Peron prior to her death in July of that year. NIE 91-54 also failed to give adequate weight to the intentions and political determinations of the Argentine armed forces, especially the navy.”²¹ A 1958 validity study on the estimate *Sino-Soviet Foreign Economic Policies and Their Probable Effects in Underdeveloped Areas* identified similar shortcomings: “We now believe that NIE 100-57 overestimated the extent to which competing internal demands would restrict expansion of the Bloc foreign economic program. Moreover, it did not foresee the number of opportunities which would develop in the Free World.”²²

Validity studies in some instances delved into the sources underlying estimative errors. For example, an August 1957 validity study of NIE 71.2-56, *Outlook for Algeria*, concluded the NIE “has proved incorrect in its most important estimate: that there was a somewhat better than even chance for an Algerian settlement within a 12 month period.” It then went on to identify the main causes for the miscalculation:

- a) *An overestimate of France’s willingness to face the realities of the Algerian situation,*
- b) *A failure to estimate the Mollet government’s adoption of an increasingly rightist policy toward Algeria, and*
- c) *The unforeseen armed intervention at Suez and the subsequent intensely nationalistic French reaction.*²³

Can’t Tell

The validity studies produced between 1955 and 1962 also highlighted the challenges in assessing accuracy. In some cases, it was the insufficient passage of time or the long-range nature of the issue. For example, the 1957 validity study on NIE 100-5-55, *Implications of Growing Nuclear Capabilities for the Communist Bloc and the Free World*, published in June 1955, concluded: “Many of its judgments involved long-term attitudinal trends which cannot yet be measured or checked with any preciseness and with contingent situations that have not yet arisen.”²⁴ Similar comments were advanced regarding SNIE 12-3-56, *Probable Developments in Soviet-Satellite Relations*: “Insufficient time has passed to permit an assessment of the validity of this estimate.”²⁵

In other instances it was the lack of data or a rapidly changing environment that prevented an assessment. As the validity study addressing NIEs on Soviet guided missile capabilities concluded, “The amount of evidence obtained has been meager. It tends to strengthen the previous estimates, but does not permit an evaluation of their validity.”²⁶ In a similar vein, the study *Probable Developments in Argentina* noted, “conclusion as to the validity of our estimate that any successor government to Peron would probably follow the same general internal and external policies must be reserved pending political stabilization in Argentina.”²⁷ Thus it is not surprising that the USSR validity study reminded readers: “The words ‘right, correct, accurate,’ and so on, when applied to our estimates, must still be taken in a provisional sense.

Only in a comparatively small number of instances can we be perfectly sure that we were ‘right.’”²⁸

The possibility that US actions initiated in response to intelligence provided was another factor identified as affecting and complicating decisions on the accuracy of NIE and SNIE judgments. The validity study of NIE 93-55, for instance, pointed out that “partly as a result of army influence in the present regime and partly because of the US decision to provide substantial economic assistance to Brazil, a moderate political course, rather than further evolution to the left, as suggested in [the] NIE, has thus far prevailed.”²⁹ Likewise, the lengthy validity study on Indian assessments observed that “predictions may have been good when they were made, but the event forecast did not occur because of a sharp change in US policy made after—or perhaps even because of—an NIE.”³⁰

In hindsight, those assessing the accuracy of their estimates in validity studies believed performance depended in part on the subject area. Sherman Kent observed: “We did find ourselves in a number of significant good and bad estimates, especially in those matters which involved quantifiable things like estimated growth in GNP, probable dates of initial operational capability of a new weapons system, etc. We were a lot less successful in our evaluations of our estimates of less tangible things.”³¹

Reflections on the Record

Several of the longer validity studies were noteworthy for their

Several of the longer validity studies were noteworthy for their efforts to step back and consider the accuracy of estimates produced over extended periods.

attempts to garner lessons learned by stepping back and considering the accuracy of estimates produced over extended periods. Both the 1958 USSR and 1961 India validity studies did so, identifying the most serious estimative errors, greatest successes, and factors contributing to each in order to improve future analysis.

The USSR validity study was particularly forthcoming and valuable in addressing what its author considered “three truly serious” errors:

1. *We wholly failed to foresee, and for a long time we even failed adequately to recognize and describe, the changes in the character and conduct of Soviet policy—especially foreign policy—that occurred after the death of Stalin.*
2. *We failed to foresee the upheavals in the European Satellites that occurred late in 1956 or even to hint that such upheavals were possible.*
3. *We failed to foresee Soviet intervention in the Middle East in late 1955.*³²

The author then went on to explore what he considered the root cause of these errors, observing, “One phenomenon strikes me quite forcibly—it is the degree to which our most important wrong estimates, all of which were in the political field, arose out of resistance to the idea that change and development would occur in the Soviet Bloc.”³³ Although the author ultimately concluded that he did not discern “per-

sistent or recurring tendencies which have led us into error on repeated occasions and which are susceptible to correction,” he reiterated the need to address “our disinclination to foresee or to recognize change.”³⁴

Certainly the estimative shortcomings identified in the other 156 validity studies completed during this period corroborate to a degree Abbot Smith’s observations. In many cases the judgments deemed inaccurate were attributed to a failure to address and properly assess the strength of nationalism and popular unrest, two key drivers of change during the late 1950s and early 1960s.

Beyond the USSR and Indian efforts, the IAC validity studies also spurred other detailed assessments of IC analytic processes and estimates. A 1963 exchange in *Studies in Intelligence* over intelligence estimates on China’s economy is one such example. The initial piece, billed as a “postmortem,” presented “lessons derived from analysis of errors past” and explored how and why Western intelligence had been “so awry” in its estimates of communist China’s economic strength. A rebuttal published several months later specifically noted procedures institutionalized in “validity studies” and asserted that “if the purpose of the postmortem is to learn the lessons of experience, the record should be read straight.” The rebuttal went on to address at length the supposed errors and the analytic tradecraft used in estimative process.³⁵

Although the exact date the IAC ended its validity studies program is unclear, it was probably late in 1962.

End of an Era

Although the exact date the IAC ended its validity studies program is unclear, it was probably late in 1962. The last validity study I have discovered was completed in June 1962,³⁶ and there is no mention of such studies in an ONE activities report for first half of 1961.³⁷ It is likely validation studies were done on an ad hoc basis thereafter.³⁸

A memo laying out the specific reasons for the discontinuation of the validity studies has yet to be declassified. Sherman Kent later wrote, “We in ONE were dismayed at our failure to do a more convincing job of the validity studies and much relieved when the IAC let the enterprise peter out.”^a However, Smith almost certainly explained the rationale for ending the effort in a 1969 article “On the Accuracy of National Estimates,” which was originally classified Secret and published in 1969 in *Studies in Intelligence*.^{b,39} Smith laid out multiple reasons in the article why a “complete, objective, and statistical tally would not be worth doing.”⁴⁰ He divided these reasons into two categories. The first involved the difficulty of checking accuracy; the

second concerned the value of the results from these efforts.

Smith identified the sheer number of estimates contained in NIEs and SNIEs as one factor hindering an evaluation of accuracy, noting in his article that approximately 25,000 judgments would need to be assessed.⁴¹ Beyond the number, Smith pointed to the difficulty of evaluating restricted or conditional judgments (if/then); judgments contained in less prominent locations, e.g., subordinate clauses or in the middle of an estimate; and judgments caveated with “estimative formulations” (probably, unlikely, etc.).⁴²

Smith also stressed the importance, and the difficulty, of determining the impact of the context surrounding judgments. “The validity of such papers,” Smith noted, “depends only partly upon the accuracy of each particular statement in them. It must also be judged by the impact and tone of the document as a whole.”⁴³ Finally, Smith cited the lack of data in many cases to check or verify judgments as well as the challenges in ascertaining what impact US actions (action/reaction) may have had on the accuracy of an estimate.⁴⁴

Even when possible, Smith questioned the value of the results derived from such accuracy assessments. In some cases, he asserted, the results were dubious because of changes in the environment, context, or even the methodology used in generating the estimate. Another element was that not all judgments were of the same importance. Many of them were “simply too easy” and thus a “batting average, if it were arrived

at, would be worth about as much as the batting average of a major league team playing against a scrub outfit in a sandlot.”⁴⁵ In sum, Smith argued “a complete, objective, statistical audit of the validity of NIE’s is impossible, and even if it were possible it would provide no just verdict on how ‘good’ these papers have been.”⁴⁶

Although Abbot Smith’s 1969 article certainly provides the most comprehensive discussion of challenges in assessing accuracy, many of same arguments are found years earlier in validity studies done on the USSR and India.⁴⁷ Foreshadowing what he would write a decade later, Smith began the 1958 Top Secret USSR validity study with this observation:

*In theory the making of a validity study should be a simple matter—get out the old papers, read them, and note whether the estimates turned out to be true or false. In practice it is not that simple. Indeed it is so much more complicated and difficult that it has proved in many respects to be impossible, and this study has turned out quite differently from what its author had hoped it would.*⁴⁸

Smith went on to identify in the validity study’s introduction the same challenges in assessing accuracy that he surfaced in the *Studies in Intelligence* article.⁴⁹ Interestingly, while the authorship of the May 1961 validity study on India is unknown at this time, the report’s discussion of the obstacles encountered in attempting to evaluate the accuracy of 10 years of NIEs on India mirrored the 1958 conclusions of the USSR validity study. Like the earlier work, the Indian validity study stressed the

a. Kent agreed with Smith’s assessment of the challenges involved in evaluating accuracy. He quoted extensively from Smith’s 1969 article in his memoir/history of NIEs and the ONE, concluding: “I join Mr. Smith in his regrets that we can do no better for the outsider in search of a box score.” (“The Making of an NIE,” 35.)

b. Abbot Smith worked with Sherman Kent as his deputy for 14 years (1953–67) in the Office of National Estimates.

multiple factors that made determining an estimate's accuracy difficult and undermined—to a degree—the value of the findings.⁵⁰

Intermittent Efforts To Assess Accuracy in the Years Since

Despite the IAC's experience with validity studies and Smith's pessimistic 1969 article, efforts to ascertain the IC's "batting average" persisted. In 1972, an in-depth study was conducted at the request of the Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms to examine the most important NIEs and SNIEs produced in 1967, with the idea that the passage of time would aid in assessing accuracy. The study, similar in many ways to the special validity studies completed on the USSR and India over a decade earlier, looked at the estimative record for multiple topics ranging from Vietnam and Soviet military forces to China, Latin America, and Africa.⁵³

Like these earlier validity studies, "1967's Estimative Record – Five Years Later" was frank in acknowledging the shortcomings and strengths of estimates produced during that year. Although the report did not include overall accuracy numbers for the estimative judgments advanced, it did provide this general assessment:

Broad general judgments about future capabilities and courses of action have generally held up well; such judgments are based on a broad range of considerations, not often subject to change through the appearance of specific new data. Judgments about specific capabilities

Postmortems: Similar Fate, Later Reincarnation

The IC produced "postmortems" addressing collection and analytic gaps during and after the IAC's validity studies program ceased. However, like the validity studies, the postmortem program was scaled back. USIB guidelines approved in June 1964 directed that rather than being published with each estimate, postmortems should be produced

*selectively; that is, when intelligence gaps or deficiencies are encountered which are sufficiently serious to affect the quality and completeness of national intelligence on important topics.*⁵¹

An IC postmortem program was reincarnated a decade later. Yet this effort was different in focus and purpose from its predecessor. In some ways the program combined elements of earlier postmortems that focused on collection shortcomings with the emphasis on analytic judgments found in validity studies. The end result was an assessment of the IC's overall performance on an issue or in response to a crisis.⁵²

*existing in 1967 have also stood the test of time; they usually had hard evidence to support them, but sometimes did not. Predictions of specific future capabilities and force levels are a more chancy business; estimates in this category were sometimes right on the mark, but sometimes wide of it.*⁵⁴

The study ended with a section that delved into broader analytic issues, including the value of the exercise itself and the challenges in evaluating accuracy:

If it is not fair to judge an estimate by success or failure in predictions of discrete events, it is certainly legitimate to ask whether it identified and interpreted the major forces at work in a situation. If it failed to do this, it is a poor job by any standards. A review of 1967 does not turn up any serious deficiencies on this score.^{a, 55}

a. "1967's Estimative Record—Five Years Later" also may have been written by Abbot Smith. The challenges identified in assess-

Later in the decade another exercise was conducted to determine the accuracy of judgments in national-level estimates. Although the full details of the effort have yet to be declassified, a larger report addressing the overall quality of national intelligence estimates described the difficulty in determining the accuracy of judgments contained in political estimates, noting that for one year a running box score was kept on the forecasting ability of these estimates. The result proved "futile," with 50 percent of the events never resolved. Moreover, in a substantial number of the remaining 50 percent, predicted outcomes happened "but not quite in the way described in the estimates" or involved tautological judgments such as "the sun will rise tomorrow."⁵⁶ Other efforts during the 1970s to identify and assess the "track record" of national intelligence estimates took a more holistic approach, eschewing percentages of right and

ing accuracy as well as the language used is very similar to that employed in the 1958 USSR and 1961 Indian validity studies.

wrong for general conclusions about the community's performance.⁵⁷

Accuracy continued to be considered during the 1980s as part of a larger effort to evaluate the quality of finished intelligence. Helene Boatner, chief of CIA's Product Evaluation Staff, acknowledged in a 1984 *Studies in Intelligence* article that in judging the quality of analysis, a number of factors had to be considered:

Accuracy (on both facts and judgments) is one key ingredient. . . . How right or how wrong we can expect to be varies a lot by topic. . . . The accuracy of our assessments also depends on whether relationships between the facts we have and the ones we lack are fixed (physics), generally predictable within some range (economics), or highly irregular (politics). The more human decisions affect the relations between the known and unknown facts, the harder it is for an analyst to assess the present, to say nothing of predicting the future.⁵⁸

Boatner concluded her discussion by singling out some of the same challenges in assessing accuracy identified by Smith and previous validity studies including the "problem of action and reaction," specifically citing the issue of the accuracy of estimates of Soviet strategic weapons deployments over time. While acknowledging that mistakes had been made, she opined that the political impact of intelligence judgments "may well have had a major impact on weapons trends," with the "missile gap" controversy of the late 1950s leading to a major US defense buildup that spurred the Soviets to re-

spond by accelerating and expanding programs already under way.⁵⁹

The Post-IRTPA Environment

The passage of the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) and the findings of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Commission gave renewed impetus to evaluation of the quality of intelligence analysis and to efforts to improve its accuracy. Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203 (Analytic Standards), signed by the Director of National Intelligence in 2007, included accuracy as its eighth tradecraft standard. ICD 203 directed analysts to "apply expertise and logic to make the most accurate judgments and assessments possible" while acknowledging "accuracy is sometimes difficult to establish and can only be evaluated retrospectively if necessary information is collected and available."⁶⁰ Other IC attempts to evaluate the accuracy of their estimates have occurred since 2004. As former CIA Acting Director Michael Morell recently noted: "One of things that most people don't know is that the Agency actually tracks how well its judgments stand up over time. And the numbers look like fielding percentages in baseball, not batting averages."⁶¹

Lessons for Today

The need for accuracy in the intelligence assessments provided to our nation's leaders certainly has not declined in recent years. As then-CIA Director Michael Hayden remarked in 2006, "With regard to analysis, it's

real simple; it's just 'getting it right' more often." The 2011 Arab Spring, the rise and success of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Russian actions in the Ukraine and Syria as well as the terrorist attacks in Europe and in the US homeland in 2015 and 2016 all reinforce Hayden's comments.⁶²

The continuing requirement for accurate intelligence has spawned new efforts from outside and within the IC to determine its "batting average." The research of multiple scholars suggests that many of the challenges associated with assessing accuracy Abbot Smith identified in 1969 can be overcome or at least mitigated, producing an outcome beneficial to IC consumers and analysts.^a Within the IC, the ODNI has devoted more resources in the last three years to assess accuracy. This effort, unlike

a. Recent studies calling for and highlighting the feasibility of assessing accuracy include: Jeffrey A. Friedman and Richard Zeckhauser, "Why Assessing Estimative Accuracy is Feasible and Desirable," *Intelligence & National Security*, 28 November 2014, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.980534>; Welton Chang, "Getting It Right: Assessing the Intelligence Community's Analytic Performance," *American Intelligence Journal*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (December 2012): 99–108; David R. Mandel and Alan Barnes, "Accuracy of forecasts in strategic intelligence," *PNAS Early Edition*, www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1406138111; David R. Mandel, "How good are strategic intelligence forecasts?" 25 Sep 2014, <http://policyoptions.irpp.org/2014/09/25/how-good-are-strategic-intelligence-forecasts/>; Philip E. Tetlock and Barbara A. Mellers, "Structuring Accountability Systems in Organizations: Key Tradeoffs and Crucial Unknowns," in *Intelligence Analysis: Behavioral and Social Scientific Foundations* (National Research Council, The National Academies Press, 2011), 249–70.

past ad hoc examinations, represents a systematic evaluation of the accuracy of the key judgments contained in the products it evaluates as part of its annual tradecraft review mandated by the IRTPA.⁶³

What lessons then does the IC's experience nearly six decades ago in attempting to assess the accuracy of its estimates offer for us today? What insights do the hundred-plus validity studies provide into determining the IC's "batting average" and the value of doing so?

These studies, much like Smith's 1969 article, remind us of the obstacles the IC will face as it tries to do more in determining the IC's and individual analyst's batting averages. Many of the same challenges that complicated or prevented the completion of these validity studies—lack of data, imprecise estimative language, conditional judgments, and action-reaction scenarios—have not disappeared with the passage of time. Moreover, some of the challenges identified in the validity studies have become more acute in recent years with the emergence of "big data" and methodological changes that have accompanied the digital revolution. These changes tend to complicate any analysis of the track record that seeks to use common yardsticks for reviewing estimates over a period of years. The same is true for changes in intelligence collection and analytic capabilities.

These validity studies also offer valuable cautions as to what renewed efforts to assess accuracy should avoid or, conversely, incorporate. One caution, just as relevant today as it was in 1958, is to concentrate accuracy assessments on key judg-

These studies highlight how critical it is to go beyond just determining and comparing batting averages and examine the reasons why judgments were off the mark or on target.

ments. In essence, it is not the overall batting average that matters most but the IC's average—to use another baseball analogy—with "runners in scoring position." Another is to avoid focusing solely on individual judgments. It is important to keep the context of the entire assessment in mind.

A 1980 report on national intelligence estimates captured this issue with alacrity:

*Postmortems of estimates whose original purpose was to undertake some kind of prediction do not help the policymaker. Such an evaluation will show only that the predicted event did or did not happen. Most policymakers already have some chosen objective in mind. What they most want to know from the estimate are the elements in the situation which would make the desired outcome more probable.*⁶⁴

A third caution involves the issues or topics evaluated and the credibility of the results. Accuracy evaluations for some areas are more illuminating and calibrated than others. As highlighted in these historical studies, there was generally a better correlation between accuracy and more quantitative analysis than with political assessments.⁶⁵ The same was true for estimates with shorter time frames (two to three years) vice three to 10 years in the future.⁶⁶

Finally, these studies highlight how critical it is to go beyond just

determining and comparing batting averages and examine the reasons judgments were off the mark or on target. The review of judgments for validity forced analysts and their managers to reexamine assumptions and conduct essentially an analytic line review—both tradecraft best practices by today's standards. The same is true of the step-back assessments conducted in the USSR and India validity studies and the *Studies in Intelligence* exchange over Chinese economic estimates. Indeed, as noted earlier, only by doing so will it be possible to identify "persistent or recurring tendencies which have led us into error on repeated occasions and which are susceptible to correction."

There is little doubt that the IC should continue its efforts to assess accuracy, including piloting approaches now being used in prediction markets and elsewhere. At the same time, the community must remember that the most important aspect of assessing accuracy goes beyond the numbers. Abbot Smith, not surprisingly, summed it up best: "A validity study should be a vehicle of improvement, not merely of congratulation and abuse."⁶⁷ It is critical that the IC not forget this valuable lesson as it attempts again to answer the batting average question Sherman Kent and his colleagues were asked more than 60 years ago.



ENDNOTES

1. Donald P. Steury (ed.), "The Law and Custom of the National Intelligence Estimate" in *Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates: Collected Essays*, Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI), 1994), 100; available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/sherman-kent-and-the-board-of-national-estimates-collected-essays/toc.html>.
2. For discussion of the impetus to IC reform efforts in the wake of the Korean War, see Michael Warner, J. Kenneth McDonald, *US Intelligence Community Reform Studies Since 1947* (CSI, April 2005), iii.
3. *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community* (Government Printing Office, 2007), 410–11.
4. "List of NIE Studies," undated. This document can be found via the CIA Records Search Tool (CREST). CREST is available at <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/crest-25-year-program-archive>. However, many documents are not available on-line and must be viewed at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) II in College Park, Maryland. Documents located in the CREST database are henceforth referenced by their Agency Action Identifier, followed by the box, folder, and document number: CIA-RDP85S00362R000600010001-3. Also see "Contents," no date, CIA-RDP85S00362R000500030001-2 for a listing of three NIEs on which postmortems were done in 1952, all of which tied into Asia and China-related topics.
5. "Contents," 173–80, and 187–98.
6. *Ibid.*, 188.
7. *Ibid.*, 3 May 1955, 173.
8. Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), Minutes of 26 April 1955 Meeting, CIA-RDP85S00362R000200060029-2.
9. "Contents," 140–43.
10. For crisis validity studies, see SNIE 12-3-56: *Probable Developments in Soviet-Satellite Relations*, SNIE 36.7-56: *Outlook for Syrian Situation*, NIE 36.1-55: *The Outlook for Egyptian Stability and Foreign Policy*, NIE 92: *Israel and Other Important Estimates on Israel in Estimates Prepared Since April 1956*; NIE 100-4-55: *Communist Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to the Offshore Islands and Taiwan* in "List of Validity Studies," 21–22, 43–44, 47–48, 81–82, & 123–24.
11. *A Study of National Intelligence Estimates on the USSR, 1950–57*, CIA-RDP79R00971A000300050001-8.
12. *Validity Study of the National Intelligence Estimates on India, 1951–60*, 31 May 1961, CIA-RDP79R00904A000700030026-6; and "Memo on Validity Study of NIEs on India, 1951–1960," 19 June 1961, CIA-RDP79R00904A000700030025-7.
13. "List of NIE Studies," 12, 92, 150.
14. *Ibid.*, see p.18 for an example of partially correct judgment: "Moreover, it points out that the Radical Party was the strongest contender in a national election, although it did not foresee the split in this party." Also see 52, 155, and Validity Study of NIE 24-56, 6 November 1958, CIA-RDP82M00097R000600020046-4.
15. *Validity Study of NIE 13-58*, 29 July 1959, CIA-RDP82M00097R000600020033-8.
16. For an example, see *Validity Study of NIE 32-56*, 2 October 1958, CIA-DP82M00097R000600020048-2.
17. *A Study of National Intelligence Estimates on the USSR, 1950–57*, 25; *Validity Study of the National Intelligence Estimates on India, 1951–60*, 31 May 1961, 18: "Judged as objectively as is possible, it would appear that the intelligence community's record in estimative developments in India during the last decade is a good one."
18. *Validity Study of NIE 11-6-56*, 19 August 1959, CIA-RDP82M00097R000600020030-1.
19. "List of NIE Studies," 20–21.
20. *Validity Study of NIE 61-56*, 18 April 1960, CIA-RDP82M00097R000600020022-0. For other examples, see "List of NIE Studies," 30, 48: "SNIE 36.7-56 was produced during the Suez crisis last fall as a short-term paper. The estimate proved to be accurate in all major respects and most of its judgments are still valid today."
21. "List of NIE Studies," 109.
22. *Ibid.*, 16. For other examples of overestimating and anticipation errors see 22, 31, 40, 52, 76, 88, and 103.
23. *Validity Study on NIE 71.2-56: Outlook for Algeria*, "List of NIE Studies," 57–58, 13 Aug 1957.
24. "List of NIE Studies," 55–56.
25. *Ibid.*, 81–82.
26. *Ibid.*, 159; also see 156–60 addressing NIE 11-6-54: *Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field*, 5 Oct 1954 and its supplement NIE 11-12-55, *Soviet Guided Missile Capabilities and Probable Programs*, 20 Dec 1955.
27. *Ibid.*, 109.
28. *A Study of National Intelligence Estimates on the USSR, 1950–57*, 23.
29. NIE 93-55: *Probable Developments in Brazil*, 15 Mar 1955, in "List of NIE Studies," 90, 8 Jan 1957; see also NIE 70: *Conditions and Trends in Latin America Affecting US Security*, 12 Dec 1952, 147.
30. *Validity Study of the National Intelligence Estimates on India, 1951–60*, 1–2; also *A Study of National Intelligence Estimates on the USSR, 1950–57*, and *1967's Estimative Record—Five Years Later*, 16 August 1972, CIA-RDP79R00967A001500040010-1, 4.
31. Steury, *Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates*, 27.
32. *A Study of National Intelligence Estimates on the USSR, 1950–57*, 20–21.

33. Ibid., 25.
34. Ibid., 131–32.
35. “Post Mortem: The Chinese Economy,” *Studies in Intelligence* 7, no.1 (1963): Approved for Public Release: 2014/07/29 C061830; and Edward L. Allen, “Chinese Growth Estimates Revisited: A Critique,” *Studies in Intelligence* 7, no.2 (Spring, 1963), 1–12, CIA Historical Review Program Release as Sanitized, 18 September 1995. Also see *Validity Study of NIE 13-58*, 29 July 1959, CIA-RDP82M00097R000600020033-8 and *Validity Study of Economic Sections of NIE 13-60*, 26 April 1961, CIA-RDP-82M00097R000600020005-9.
36. *Validity Study of NIEs 51–60*, 53–59, and 36.2–60, 1 June 1962, CIA-RDP82M00097R000600020001-3.
37. “Principal Activities of the Office of National Estimates in Last Half Year,” 24 October 1961, CIA-RDP80B01676R003400010001-5.
38. Memorandum from the Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence Programs Evaluation (Bross) to Director of Central Intelligence Rayborn, 20 January 1966: “The Board of National Estimates reviews National Intelligence Estimates from time to time to ascertain retrospectively the validity of these estimates. These ‘Postmortems’ identify gaps which appear to have existed in the information available during the formulation of particular estimates.” *FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations* (GPO, 2004) available at <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v33/d242>.
39. See “Abbot Emerson Smith,” *Studies in Intelligence* 27 (Winter 1983), Approved for Release 2014/07/29 C00619199.
40. Abbot E. Smith, “On the Accuracy of National Intelligence Estimates,” *Studies in Intelligence* 13, no.4, (1969) CIA-RDP-P79R00971A000400030001-9, 26.
41. Ibid., 25.
42. Ibid., 26.
43. Ibid., 29.
44. Ibid., 26–27.
45. Ibid., 26.
46. Ibid., 30.
47. *A Study of National Intelligence Estimates on the USSR, 1950–57; Validity Study of the National Intelligence Estimates on India*, 31 May 1961.
48. *A Study of National Intelligence Estimates on the USSR, 1950–57*, 1.
49. Ibid., 1–5.
50. *Validity Study of the National Intelligence Estimates on India, 1951–60*.
51. “USIB Action on Post-Mortems to National Intelligence Estimates,” 24 August 1965, CIA-RDP82R00129R000100010015-3.
52. Richard W. Shryock, “The Intelligence Community Post-Mortem Program, 1973–1975,” *Studies in Intelligence* 21, no.1 (Fall 1977), CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010015-5.
53. *1967’s Estimative Record—Five Years Later*, 16 August 1972.
54. Ibid., 7–8.
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56. *Seminar on National Intelligence Estimates*, 26 February 1980, CIA-RDP81B00493R000100020010-0, p.12.
57. “The Track Record in Strategic Estimating: An Evaluation of the Strategic National Intelligence Estimates, 1966–1975,” in CIA’s *Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947–1991*; see also “DCI Backup Briefing Note,” 11 July 1979, NIE Track Record, CIA-RDP-86B00269R001100150001-2.
58. Helene L. Boatner, “The Evaluation of Intelligence,” *Studies in Intelligence* 28, no.2 (Summer 1984), 67.
59. Ibid., 70.
60. <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD%202003%20Analytic%20Standards.pdf>.
61. “The Cipher Brief,” *Washington Post*, 14 December 2016, <https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/exclusive/fmr-cia-acting-dir-michael-morell-political-equivalent-911-1091>.
62. Transcript of General Hayden’s Interview with WTOP’s J.J. Green, 30 November 2006. <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/press-release-archive-2006/pr11302006.htm>.
63. IRTPA, Section 1019.
64. *Seminar on National Intelligence Estimates*, 26 February 1980, 12.
65. Ibid., “This is not to say that postmortems of political estimates are useless. There are lessons to be learned from hindsight. One study analyzed existing estimates up to the 1960s. Predictions dealing with more quantitative analysis, such as technology or gross weapons capabilities, proved to be adequate. But the threat of political reality in the more general estimates also proved to be surprisingly good: 75–80% right for the world as a whole.” (12); Boatner makes the same point in her article.
66. *1967’s Estimative Record—Five Years Later*, 16 August 1972.
67. *A Study of National Intelligence Estimates on the USSR, 1950–57*, 131.



The “Right to Write” in the Information Age: A Look at Prepublication Review Boards

Rebecca H.

Secrecy agreements that establish legally-enforceable expectations intended to protect classified information have been in use for decades.

Editor’s Note: This article is an excerpt from the manuscript the author submitted in June 2016 to the faculty of the National Intelligence University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence.

Background

Since the attacks of 11 September 2001, an unprecedented number of retired Intelligence Community (IC) officers have published memoirs and works about their experiences over the past 15 years, in effect building a veritable cottage industry.^a

Some publications, such as *The Secret Book of CIA Humor* (Pelican, 2004) by a former member of the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Public Affairs office, Ed Mickolus, provide humorous insight. *Hard Measures: How Aggressive CIA Actions After 9/11 Saved American Lives* (Simon & Schuster, 2012) by former National Clandestine Service director Jose A. Rodriguez, Jr., discusses highly controversial subjects. The number of intelligence-based stories written by “insiders” concerns many IC officers who believe writing about

their experiences goes against CIA norms—the protection of sources and methods—and is contrary to the secrecy agreement and oath to protect national security that officers must affirm and sign prior to entering on duty.

This concern was especially visible at the National Intelligence University in September 2012, when former ambassador Henry Crumpton visited the university to discuss his book, *The Art of Intelligence* (Penguin Press, 2012) and his intelligence career. His talk, while fascinating, provoked the question, “How is it that he can write about these experiences?”

Secrecy agreements that establish legally enforceable expectations intended to protect classified information have been in use for decades: the US National Archives holds versions of CIA secrecy agreements within the CREST database^b that date back to the early 1950s. Records from the collection of renowned cryptologist William F. Friedman (1891–1969) provide evidence that secrecy oaths

a. For an early, post-2001 discussion of this topic, see John Hollister Hedley reviews of three CIA memoirs in *Studies in Intelligence* 49, no. 3 (September 2005), 79.

b. CREST is the acronym for the CIA Records Search Tool, a database of declassified intelligence documents. CREST cannot be accessed online but visitors to the National Archives, Archives II Library in College Park, Maryland, can search the database in room 3000 at that location. It is expected to be available on cia.gov in 2017.

The views, opinions, and findings should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government.

A new outlook on publications occurred in the late 1990s, when Tony Mendez and Gary Schroen were encouraged by CIA senior management to write [their memoirs].

had been in place earlier still; Army Security Agency personnel had to sign them as early as 1947.

The use of secrecy agreements throughout the executive branch began with the signing of Executive Order (EO) 11905, on 19 February 1976. The order, “United States Foreign Intelligence Activities,” required all executive branch employees with “access to information containing sources and methods of intelligence to sign an agreement that they will not disclose that information to persons not authorized to receive it.”

In addition to that enjoiner, the order directed the development of programs to protect intelligence sources and methods. It was this element of the order that led to the establishment of prepublication review boards within the executive branch.

Without a dependable prepublication review procedure, no intelligence agency or responsible government official could be assured that an employee privy to sensitive information might not conclude on his own—innocently or otherwise—that it should be disclosed to the world.¹

This sentiment, articulated in the Supreme Court’s decision in *Snepp v. United States* in 1980 stands in contrast to the view of CIA Deputy Director of Plans (now Operations) Frank Wisner (1951–59)—and shared by many IC officers—that

... persons having the deepest and most legitimate insights into intelligence matters are most scrupulous in their trusteeship of such knowledge and ... the penchant for sensational revelations is the near monopoly of the charlatans and pretenders who scavenge along the flanks of the intelligence enterprise.²

The number of individuals who actually write memoirs is quite small compared to the number of government and contract employees who have, at some point in their lives, had access to classified material. One early memoirist, a “scavenger,” was Herbert O. Yardley with his book, *The American Black Chamber* (1931). Others who chose to write included Roger Hall, a member of the OSS who wrote *You’re Stepping on My Cloak and Dagger* (W. W. Norton & Co., 1957) in the 1950s, a humorous account of his experiences, and Allen Dulles, a retired DCI who authored *The Craft of Intelligence* (Harper & Row) in 1963.

The works of Victor Marchetti, Frank Snepp, and Philip Agee in the 1970s shocked the IC, much as Yardley’s book in the 1930s had done. Here were “insiders” writing about sensitive subjects. Marchetti’s works prompted the creation of a formal prepublication review process. Snepp attempted to work around the review process, resulting in the first imposition of a constructive trust^a around

a. A constructive trust arises by operation of law whenever the circumstances are such

a book’s profits. Agee’s works led to an act of Congress that criminalized revelation of the identities of undercover personnel. Between the 1970s and 1990s, the majority of works for the public were written by former senior officials, such as directors of central intelligence Stansfield Turner and William Colby.

A new outlook on publications emerged in the late 1990s, when Tony Mendez and Gary Schroen were encouraged by CIA senior management to write, respectively, *The Master of Disguise: My Secret Life in the CIA* (William Morrow, 1999) and *First In: An Insider’s Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan* (Presidio Press, 2005).³ Between these books, in 2002, appeared senior operations officer Dewey Clarridge’s memoir, *A Spy for all Seasons: My Life in CIA* (Scribner, 2002). The publication of these books opened a new chapter in the intelligence genre and spawned today’s cottage industry in intelligence memoirs.

Early Steps in Protection of Secrets

William Friedman tried hard during his days in the Army Signal Corps and NSA to curtail the publication of any sensitive information. His aversion to publishing sensitive material is evident in his personal papers and the disgust of Herbert Yardley that is revealed in them. Friedman’s

that it would be unconscionable for the owner of the property . . . to assert his own beneficial interest in the property and deny the beneficial interest of another. Source: Scott Atkins, *Equity and Trusts* (Routledge, 2013).

papers also chronicle his involvement in drafting anti-publishing legislation during the 1940s, which appears to have been motivated by his hearing some of his own subordinates at the Army Signal Corps proclaim that their experiences would “make a great book!”⁴

The legislation that ultimately passed Congress during this period would penalize only those who revealed classified information to the public: we know it as 18 US Code Section 798. Much later, in the mid-1960s, a group of lawyers at CIA began to consider alternate ways to prevent the disclosure of sensitive information by current or former employees.^a

From the 1950s through the mid-1970s, the CIA Office of Security usually reviewed manuscripts intended for nonofficial publication, in association with the Office of General Counsel and other appropriate agency components; however, the Marchetti case revealed the need to

a. In reality, it is practically impossible to prevent the disclosure of sensitive information if someone is intent on doing it. The threat or reality of imprisonment or fines, as discussed in the nondisclosure or secrecy agreements, will not deter all individuals. Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden in this century, Ana Montez or Robert Hanssen in the 1980s and 1990s, and Philip Agee in the 1970s all demonstrate that it is not hard to get information out of government control. The more difficult task is for an individual who has the trust of the US government to write about an intelligence related topic and follow the rules to publish an unclassified work for a nonofficial audience. Of course, this is not impossible by any means, evidenced by the intelligence genre cottage industry that has grown exponentially since 2000. This is where review boards come in.

United States v. Marchetti was a groundbreaking case that reinforced the strength of the secrecy agreement contract and set precedents that remain in place today.

establish a more systematic review process at CIA.

Victor Marchetti forced the CIA’s hand in 1972, when it was discovered—before publication—that he was writing about topics considered quite sensitive. *United States v. Marchetti* was a groundbreaking case that reinforced the strength of the secrecy agreement contract and set precedents that remain in place today. To strengthen the government’s position, President Gerald Ford in 1976 allowed for the formal creation of prepublication review boards across the executive branch by issuing Executive Order 11905. EO 11905 also made secrecy agreements mandatory, so that signatories would be duly informed of the new prepublication review requirement.

Growing Burden, Growing Criticism

Since 1976, the CIA’s Publications Review Board (PRB) has been reorganized several times in order to accommodate changing trends. One notable change was the decision to review the works of current—as well as past—employees. (Originally, the PRB reviewed only the works of former employees, leaving the review of works written by current employees to their immediate supervisors. However, the PRB assumed responsibility for reviewing the writings of both current and former employees after the appearance of Michael Scheuer’s *Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War On Terror* (Brassey’s,

2004) presumably because of the burden the effort placed on managers to determine what was classified and what was not.^{5,6})

Between 1977 and 1980, the number of PRB reviews grew from 42 to 148 works.⁷ From 1980 to 2003, the CIA’s PRB reviewed between 200 and 400 manuscripts per year. In 2010, more than 1,800 manuscripts were reviewed. For 2011, the board anticipated the review of more than 2,500 manuscripts.⁸ By contrast, the FBI’s review board evaluated 69 works in 2000, 167 works in 2008, and 223 works in 2013.⁹

Participation on a prepublication review board is often thankless work, although it should perhaps be seen as a rewarding opportunity to assist in the protection of national security and to assure that peers—past and present—uphold the secrecy agreements they signed.

However, the work is not only thankless, but subject to intense criticism for a range of perceived faults ranging from slowness, inaccuracy, opaqueness to being overly political and playing to favorites or just overreaching the writ of review boards.

The difficulties faced by these boards became apparent early on. The first manuscript from Victor Marchetti (578 pages in length) was reviewed by an ad hoc board of high-ranking CIA officers. The book had more than 300 redactions made during its first review; Marchetti contested many of them in court. By the end of legal negotiations, the number of redactions was reduced to 168.

Directors Tenet, Hayden, and Panetta favored far looser restrictions [on what could be published], which facilitated the publication of a significantly larger number of manuscripts.

The removed sections ranged from a couple of words to entire paragraphs.

However, perceptions of favoritism in the treatment of some authors have challenged the credibility of the process. When a former CIA director incurs no apparent repercussions from going to print prior to full PRB review, the reputation of the PRB suffers. “If he doesn’t follow the specific protocols, then why should there be any expectation for anybody underneath him to do so?” said Mark Zaid, a Washington lawyer who has handled more than a dozen cases involving authors and the CIA’s review board.¹⁰

Indeed, in the CIA memorandum “Inspection Report of the Office of Public Affairs, Chapter V,” about the Publications Review Board from then-inspector general Charles Briggs to CIA’s deputy director in 1981, employees were already expressing concerns over whether the PRB acted fairly toward critical texts and whether the board was acting impartially toward former senior officers.¹¹

In his 2016 book *Company Confessions*, Christopher Moran wrote that

being someone who speaks out against the Agency is a brutal experience. The official backlash against the individuals . . . was such a ferocious orgy of overkill that they were left devastated. . . . Marchetti was thrust into a psychological and financial tailspin that left him a shadow of his former self; Agee

*was, quite literally, cast into the wilderness. The sad moral of their story was: publish at your peril.*¹²

A former member of CIA’s PRB wrote in the September 2011 *Studies of Intelligence* article “Myths and Realities: CIA Prepublication Review in the Information Age”:

*As a longtime DI manager, the frenetic activity of dealing with middle-of-the-night breaking events now seems quaintly bucolic compared with my daily navigation of the often confusing rules and guidelines dealing with the CIA’s prepublication review process.*¹³

For example, under CIA director Porter Goss, the board tended to err on the side of allowing very little to be published by CIA authors. By contrast, directors Tenet, Hayden, and Panetta favored far looser restrictions, which facilitated the publication of a significantly larger number of manuscripts.¹⁴

The Absence of Digital Archive of Decisions

Authors who have worked with the PRB have the perception that there is no complete digital, searchable archive of previously reviewed and cleared publications, a situation which is described as a source

of frustration.^a Authors who have submitted works in the past, for example, published authors Hank Crumpton, Robert Wallace, and Bill Harlow, have gone back to the board some time later with the same material and found the previously-cleared writing redacted.¹⁵ Even after seeing the previous text in the context of the previous publication, the PRB has been firm in redacting some previously-cleared verbiage. Unsurprising, then, that some individuals find the PRB daunting, frustrating, cumbersome, and capricious.

CIA inspector general reports about the PRB process mirror some of these concerns. In addition to concerns about lack of transparency, unfairness, heavy handedness, the difficulty of disputing decisions, an overarching concern has been the absence of a comprehensive database containing previously-cleared manuscripts, a shortcoming that has prevented the PRB from comparing newer writings against older writings. The CIA inspector general (IG) report from May 2009 identified a number of problems caused by the absence of such a searchable database.

The 2009 report was not the first time that inadequacies have been identified in the PRB’s ability to conduct its duties efficiently. In the 1981 inspector general report cited earlier, the author noted that PRB members expressed concern over the difficulty of keeping track of intelligence-related information in the public domain.¹⁹

a. The PRB maintains detailed files of all cases they review. But conversion of these files to digital forms for easy searching has been a challenge.

Failure to develop a comprehensive readily-searchable institutional memory of material officially released to the public hastens the day when the CIA will be embarrassed (and probably sued) because it denies an author the right to publish material that has officially been made publicly available.²⁰

The Problem of Leaks

Further confounding the process is the problem of leaks, which many IC writers may believe can be cited

In 2005, Congressman Peter Hoekstra said in a speech to the Heritage Foundation, “It has become all too common—almost second nature—for people in Washington to leak information.

in their own work. Leaked information is not automatically unclassified by the originating organization. As a result, because information that was leaked is not always identified as such, writers will be confronted with a problem if they draw, intentionally or unintentionally, on leaked information. The lack of a current database of officially released material makes it difficult for both writers and

reviewers to recognize leaked material in a document.

Making it worse is that leaks themselves happen for a variety of reasons. There are official leaks, as noted by Gary Ross in his 2011 book, *Who Watches the Watchman*:

In 1987, the Tower Commission that investigated the Iran-Contra Affair made the same point more succinctly: “Selective leaking has evolved to the point that it is a principal means of waging bureaucratic warfare and a primary tool in the process of policy formulation and development in Washington.”²¹

In 2005, Congressman Peter Hoekstra said in a speech to the Heritage Foundation, “It has become all too common—almost second nature—for people in Washington to leak information. Policymakers may leak for any number of reasons, such as to bring attention to a good news story or discredit policies with which they disagree. They may also leak information to gauge public interest in a new policy or issue. But some seemingly leak just because they can.”²²

The ratio of material that might possibly be leaked to the number of proven and punished leakers makes the likelihood of being jailed for leaking, as author David Pozen notes, “statistically very low.”²³ Another issue is a “longstanding organizational culture that treats leaking classified information to the media as nearly risk-free, which suggests

Unauthorized Disclosure and the Arm of the Law

Over the past 10 years, the US government has become more inclined to follow through in pursuing indictments against contract or staff employees for unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

The mechanism for the criminal punishment of unauthorized disclosure is that the agency that believes its information has been mishandled makes an official complaint to the Department of Justice, which then decides, first, whether to investigate and, second, whether the results of the investigation warrant indictment.

It should be noted that Lawrence Franklin, a former Department of Defense official, was indicted in May 2009 and subsequently convicted for leaking information to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. Before Franklin’s indictment, the only two modern-era indictments had been Daniel Ellsberg in June 1971 (case dismissed) and Samuel Morison in October 1984 (convicted, then pardoned by presidential decree.)

In 2009, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair asked the Department of Justice for a report on the number of leak cases brought between 2005 and 2009.¹⁶ The report found that 153 referrals from agencies resulted in 24 investigations by the FBI—and no indictments.¹⁷ Subsequently, DOJ is reported to have issued eight indictments (the last against Edward Snowden).¹⁸

Newspaper accounts have differed on the number of indictments made during the Obama administration, perhaps because some tally only indicted government officials while others count total indictments (several of those indicted were contractors, not government employees). The most accurate information available suggests there have been eight indictments since 2010: Thomas Drake, April 2010 (guilty of lesser charges, not espionage); Shamai Leibowitz, May 2010 (convicted); Chelsea Manning, May 2010 (convicted); Stephen Jin Woo Kim, August 2010 (convicted); Jeffrey Sterling, December 2010 (convicted); John Kiriakou, January 2012 (convicted, but not of espionage); James Hiteberger, January 2012 (case pending); and Edward Snowden, June 2013 (case pending). Some accounts suggest further indictments are also being prepared.

Enthusiastic authors hoping to use information obtained from official or unofficial leaks in their books are walking into a minefield.

that the behavior is acceptable.²⁴ Enforcement of anti-leaking laws, as haphazard as it has been, has focused almost entirely on the leakers, while the recipients of the leaks—typically journalists—are left untouched.²⁵ Courts have also taken a dim view of attempts to block publication of leaked material.²⁶

On the other hand, courts have consistently upheld CIA efforts to block publication by individuals who are “in privity” with the agency by virtue of having signed a secrecy agreement that obliges them to seek prepublication permission for manuscripts. This has enabled the CIA to temporarily stop publication of books by former employees in order for the PRB to gain access to the manuscript. However, the secrecy agreement has applied only to attempts by CIA-affiliated authors to publish their own works; it has not been ruled to constitute grounds for enjoining publication by third parties.²⁷

Enthusiastic authors hoping to use information obtained from official or unofficial leaks in their books are walking into a minefield. One of the problems with publicly available information is the possibility that the information is still considered classified by the originating agency or department. Up until about 2014, CIA neither affirmed nor denied involvement in the Predator program, while Hank Crumpton’s 2012 book discussed the Predator program in detail. Ambassador Crumpton’s book clearly states the book was reviewed by the CIA’s PRB, but once published, many in the IC thought the

inclusion of the Predator account in the book was at least curious, given the agency’s continued refusal to confirm its existence. This situation is not limited to CIA. In an atmosphere like this, an Intelligence Community person using classified terms but quoting them from reports in the media would presumably strongly challenge the probable redactions.

A Broken Process?

In a *Washington Post* op-ed dated 27 December 2015, Jack Goldsmith and Oona A. Hathaway lamented, “The government’s prepublication review process is broken.”²⁸ They state in their opening paragraph:

*We both learned the hard way that public service in jobs related to national security carries the risk that, for the rest of our lives, the government will insist that we allow it to review virtually everything we write related to our time in government before it can be published. We are not alone. Hundreds of thousands of former government employees who have had access to classified information cannot publish without permission. This system results in pervasive and unjustifiable harms to freedom of speech.*²⁹

The secrecy or non-disclosure agreement signed by both of these individuals prior to their being allowed to access classified information clearly specifies a prepublication review requirement. Furthermore, any other

nondisclosure agreement they may have signed subsequently—indeed, at any point in their careers—carries the same verbiage. Secrecy agreements are legal contracts upheld by the US Supreme Court and enforceable by the executive branch. These agreements clearly state that information must be reviewed by a prepublication review board prior to publishing.

Goldsmith and Hathaway continue:

In the 35 years since Snepp, however, the review system has grown unreasonable . . . the number of classified documents, and of people with access to them, has grown exponentially. The result today is a mess of overbroad and inconsistent regulations that apply to all living people with pre-clearance contracts going back decades . . . the system is racked with pathologies . . . The review process sometimes takes longer than the specified review periods, leaving authors in limbo. And vague criteria give reviewers enormous discretion over what the public can see . . .

It is time for change. The executive branch should develop clear, uniform criteria for publication review. Only writings that might reasonably contain or be derived from classified information should be subject to the process, and inspection for classified information should be the only basis for review. When an agency blocks publication, it should give clear reasons and permit swift appeals. And it should establish binding

deadlines for completion—ideally no longer than 30 days. If the executive branch needs more resources to implement these reforms, Congress should provide them.

The government must be able to keep its secrets, but First Amendment values also matter. The president and Congress should find a better way to balance the two.³⁰

Goldsmith and Hathaway do touch on some very important aspects of prepublication review, however. The resources devoted to review efforts appear to be minimal for the formal teams. Staff members may not even be full time, and review boards may have a hard time maintaining the staff that is allocated for the function whether “enough” for the task or not. Depending on the status of the writer, and the institution, the primary reviewer may still end up being a current supervisor. That supervisor may have any number of other mission-critical tasks to do in addition to reviewing this work, which probably should not be carried home in case some sensitive item is discovered in the work—thus creating a security violation. Additionally, no formal training exists to instruct supervisors on how to evaluate documents under review (other than resumes) according to board standards.

The process can be even more burdensome if a manuscript requires review by other IC entities. This always happens when a manuscript contains information that reviewers believe involves information and source and methods managed in other community components. For example, in 2013, the FBI received

The process can be even more burdensome if a manuscript requires review by other IC entities.

for prepublication review 16 works from other agencies or departments. The requirement to coordinate review with other IC elements can easily lead to failure to meet the 30-day review deadline established in the Marchetti case. At the very least, the Supreme Court decision in Marchetti and its 30-day “rule” did not address timing in cases where the manuscript needs to be reviewed by a second or third IC partner.

Certainly, reviews of some works can be especially taxing. When former DCI George Tenet submitted his manuscript of *At the Center of the Storm*, the CIA PRB convened a special committee just for his work. That group required about a year to evaluate his manuscript. Soon after the evaluation was completed in 2006, the PRB underwent the most recent of its reorganizations in reaction to the changing volume of material and the identified need to have a relatively stable permanent staff.³¹

With the increasing volume of book manuscripts, the reality of similarly long delays (or longer) for other authors increases the likelihood authors will attempt to buck the system, publishing without review and leaving themselves to the mercy of the courts. Alternatively, they may become more inclined to ditch their projects altogether. An author taking this last route most likely would characterize the decision as a de facto form of government prohibition (through the PRB) of the publication of their work.

A similar opinion is that of Robert Wallace, former director of the Office of Technical Service at CIA. He

believes that individuals who have successfully worked with a PRB multiple times should be allowed some sort of an expedited process through the PRB. He believes that these “frequent fliers” should be trusted not to put classified information into new works presented to the PRB.³²

All individuals within the IC assume a great deal of responsibility when they sign a secrecy agreement. They are entrusted to keep thousands of “secrets” and only occasionally have to face anyone to “prove” their worthiness for the opportunity to protect these items so important for the national security.^a The burden for writing an unclassified work is always on the writer. It is the PRB’s job to verify that the work does not contain classified information.³³

The Question of “Appropriateness”

While the discussion about “classified” versus “unclassified” can be intense, a potential bigger hornet’s nest is the issue of an additional normative standard to which current CIA employees and contractors must adhere—that of “appropriateness.” While this standard has been applicable for years, the subject was treated at length, in two pages, in the aforementioned 2011 *Studies in Intelligence* article.^b The officer reminded

a. Issues around overclassification *do* exist.

b. Former PRB chairman John Hedley addressed this topic, although in less detail, in his article on the review process in 1997. See “Reviewing the Work of CIA Authors:

readers of the provision by including the following excerpt from the CIA prepublication regulation:

For current employees and contractors, in addition to the prohibition on revealing classified information, the Agency is also legally authorized to deny permission to publish any official or nonofficial materials on matters set forth (earlier in the regulation) that could:

(a) reasonably be expected to impair the author's performance of his or her job duties,

(b) interfere with the authorized functions of the CIA, or

(c) have an adverse effect on the foreign relations or security of the United States.³⁴

One would presume that a conversation with a current employee about how an item he or she authored could affect foreign relations or security, or interfere with the agency's functions, would lead to an agreed-upon conclusion that such disclosures are not acceptable. For example, national policy is for policymakers to discuss and determine; analysts provide in-

formation to help policymakers come to conclusions, but they themselves should never appear to advocate any particular policy direction. Another example is the case of someone who might be identified on social media as a current CIA employee, who could be viewed as expressing "CIA policy." Items (b) and (c) seem reasonable enough on their face.^a

What makes the appropriateness provision difficult is that it more often requires subjective judgment and a longer view of the potential implications of what is published in the literature of intelligence. Accordingly, it is often subject to negotiation.

In Sum

Prepublication review boards are a necessary function within the executive branch, a fact the majority of Intelligence Community writers almost certainly recognize and accept. Prepublication review boards, in effect, legitimize the needs of writers by providing them the means for complying with regulations and agreements and protecting sources,

a. Of course, resignation—admittedly drastic—is one option for circumventing the appropriateness provision.

methods, and US interests as they exercise their rights as American citizens.

But, given the state of current information technology, writers would be reasonable to wonder why these advances have not been mobilized to improve and speed up review processes. In this respect, the Goldsmith and Hathaway call for change is not unreasonable. Among the possibilities are applying more up-to-date archival tools and data analytics, adopting Bob Wallace's trusted "frequent flier" notion, and improving staffing.

Investment in the means to improve and speed up the review process would yield valuable returns by reducing tension in the process (and the likelihood someone will circumvent the system), which would result in published works with the potential to foster a greater understanding of the functions of intelligence in the United States and the challenges it faces in serving US national security.

And unless Congress creates laws to restrict the unclassified writings of Intelligence Community officers, the future will likely see many more works from current and former IC officers sent to PRBs for review. The need for change can only become more urgent.



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Intelligence in Public Media

The Field of Fight: How We Can Win The Global War Against Radical Islam and Its Allies

Lt. Gen. Michael T. Flynn with Michael Ledeen (St. Martin's Press, 2016), 180 pp., notes, suggested reading, index.

The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in Asia

Kurt Campbell (Twelve—Hachette Book Group, 2016), 349 pp., notes, bibliography, index.

Reviewed by Jason U. Manosevitz

Presidential election years often breed several national security-related books. These works can give insight into the substantive security issues at stake and help intelligence professionals prepare to serve the next administration. This time in particular, two books lay out competing objectives that will feed into how the Intelligence Community (IC) prioritizes its resources in support of the next administration.

Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Michael T. Flynn's *The Field of Fight: How to Win The Global War Against Radical Islam and Its Allies*, co-written by Michael Ledeen, and Kurt Campbell's *The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in Asia*, lay out starkly contrasting strategies for dealing with counterterrorism and the rise of China, respectively. As long-serving national security professionals, Flynn and Campbell's works highlight two issues intelligence professionals will need to continue to address through collection, operations, and analysis. Each makes an impassioned case for prioritizing his area of interest and calls for whole-of-government approaches. Both fall short, however, by not articulating how the IC fits into their strategies and by failing to consider the key premises underlying their recommended courses of action and the implications.

The Field of Fight and *The Pivot* also serve to remind intelligence professionals how difficult it can be to array intelligence resources against different kinds of national security issues. *The Field of Fight* focuses on our immediate counterterrorism fight, a functional intelligence issue like counternarcotics, counterproliferation, cyber activities, and illicit finance. Such issues transcend specific states or geographic regions. In contrast, *The Pivot* addresses the implications of an emerging threat stemming from an assertive China and its effect on East Asia's security dynamics—a regional, state-based issue.

The Field of Fight demands the fight against terrorism be recast as a struggle against what Flynn calls "radical Islam." Flynn, who led the Defense Intelligence Agency from July 2012 to August 2014, castigates the Obama administration for lacking the will to fight ISIL and losing the broader initiative against terrorism. Flynn argues his unique experiences—many of which come from his combat tours in Afghanistan and Iraq, and his tours with the Joint Special Operations Command—allow him to "get in to the heads of our enemies," based on many hours he spent debriefing captured terrorists (11, 50–52). His book asserts China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Russia are in an alliance with ISIL and other terrorist groups to destroy the United States (28, 76–78).

Flynn's strategy—akin to the thinking behind the "Global War on Terrorism"—emphasizes a military solution in black and white terms. He lays out four strategic objectives: mobilizing all national power under the command of a single leader accountable to the president; killing or capturing terrorists wherever they are; compelling state and non-state supporters of terrorists to end their activities; and waging an ideological war against radical Islam. (117–118) Embedded in these objectives are sub-points that include building up the capabilities of states that are unable to aid the United States with its strategy; cutting or curtailing US diplomatic, economic, and military ties with states that fail to follow international norms and international law; and improving the use of social media tools, like Facebook and Twitter, to repudiate terrorist doctrine. (121–122)

The Field of Fight offers little perspective on US policy in the Middle East or against counterterrorism, covering only about the last 15 years of the United States's decades-long history of engagement there. It argues ISIL presents a severe ideological challenge to democracy, but

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

offers no data to support this assertion. Flynn also fails to back up the assertion that China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Russia are colluding to destroy the United States or to show how this alliance is operationalized. A review of the imperatives of US national security interests in the Middle East, a discussion of the breadth and drivers of Islamic terrorism, and consideration of why fighting terrorism in the Middle East, Africa or Europe should be the United States' paramount national security concern would have strengthened his argument.

Flynn's view that the counterterrorism fight will be a protracted, multigenerational struggle is shared across a wide spectrum of observers. In contrast to Flynn's approach, many argue the problem is one the United States should seek to manage rather than solve, in part because ISIL has lost some territory in the last several months.^a *The Field of Fight* offers little insight into how the current counterterrorism fight relates to other national security issues, the costs and benefits of pursuing the strategy it advocates, or alternative approaches to its proposals.

The Field of Fight is the kind of work that Campbell would see as "drown(ing) out reasoned arguments for a more balanced understanding of America's national interests." (2) Campbell asserts in *The Pivot* that the Asia-Pacific region "exerts an undeniable and inescapable gravitational pull" (5) and he puts forth an argument for a "necessary course correction for American diplomacy, commercial engagement, and military innovation during a time of unrelenting and largely unrewarding conflict." (2) Campbell reviews the impetus, challenges, and interpretations of the policy he himself largely crafted in 2009, under then-Secretary of State Clinton. From this angle, the book is a valuable resource for anyone interested in United States-Asia relations because it recounts major diplomatic, economic, and military changes in US policy toward the region under the Obama administration, placing these in the context of the last 230 years of United States-Asia interaction. *The Pivot* offers a range of useful statistical data about the region's key demographic, economic, environmental, political, and security issues to support its claims.

Campbell, who served as assistant secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs from 2009 to 2013 and has held several civil servant positions at the Pentagon—including deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asia and the Pacific—puts his years of experience on Asia to good use. *The Pivot* does not provide a chronological narrative, but reviews eight historical themes in United States-Asia ties: geographic distance, cultural differences, economic relations, the role of missionaries in early relations, military conflict, Asia as a "second tier" issue for US diplomacy, lack of consistent US regional focus, and efforts to promote democracy. (82–83) With this context, Campbell portrays Asia today as at a decisive inflection point where the region "is being pulled in two contradictory directions toward two contrasting futures—a promising one consistent with American objectives, and a more perilous one at odds with US interests and intents." (153)

Campbell details a 10-point strategy designed to enable the United States to shape Asia's path forward. The first step, similar to *The Field of Fight*'s proposal, is for the president to articulate a whole-of-government approach and to mobilize the American public to support the focus on Asia. The remaining objectives are to strengthen ties to existing US allies Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore; to shape China's rise by placing it within a larger Asia policy framework; to increase ties with partners Taiwan and New Zealand, while cultivating relations with India, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Pacific Island states; to expand free trade agreements, bolstering regional institutions and organizations; to overhaul US military capabilities deployed to the region; to promote democratic values; to support educational and cultural exchanges; and to collaborate with European states to shape Asia's direction. (198–200)

The Pivot indirectly points to China as the United States's main rival in the region. Campbell offers several points for each aspect of his strategy, which in a broad sense combines bilateral alliances and partnerships and multinational institutions with economic, political, and military threads woven throughout. Campbell uses a separate chapter to address challenges to this grand strategic plan, such as a fractured US policy community, defense spending shortfalls, public fatigue with foreign entanglements, and continuing Middle East troubles. *The Pivot* fails to address, however, the tension inherent in Campbell's strategy that simultaneously seeks to preserve

a. John McLaughlin, "ISIS Is Hurt but Its End Is Not In Sight," *The CipherBrief.com*, 28 July 2016; Kimberly Dozeier, "US Officials Are No Longer Talking About 'Defeating' ISIS," *The Daily Beast*, 1 August, 2016.

the status quo, challenge China's rise, and bolster US ties to the region. *The Pivot* also does not address two key questions embedded in its strategic intent. The first is whether US engagement in another Asian war is an option as the United States pursues its policy goals. The second is whether China's continued rise is inevitable, which is the central assumption underpinning Campbell's logic. Finally, *The Pivot's* analysis would have benefitted from some attention to crisis planning—such as unplanned conflict in the East China or South China seas or a rapid collapse of North Korea.^a

Surprisingly, neither *The Field of Fight* nor *The Pivot* offers a vision for how the IC fits into the whole-of-government approach both propose. Intelligence collection, analysis, and operations can help achieve policy goals, but intelligence is no guarantee of policy success.^b The IC

a. For example, see David C. Gompert, Astrid Cevallos, and Cristina L. Garfola, *War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable* (Rand Corporation, 2016).

b. See George Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA* (HarperCollins, 2007); Richard Helms, *A Look over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency* (Random House, 2003); and James Igoe Walsh, *The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing* (Columbia University Press, 2010).

provides an additional conduit through which to pursue diplomacy and operations and provides policy support through collection and analysis. *The Field of Fight* disparages the intelligence bureaucracy and offers little about how IC resources should be used against terrorists. *The Pivot* is mostly silent on the role intelligence cooperation, analysis, or operations play in its proposed strategy. This is unexpected, given Campbell's years in government and exposure to and knowledge of US intelligence capabilities.

Evaluating relative threats and developing strategies for countering them is inherently difficult. Understanding the divergent viewpoints in *The Field of Fight* and *The Pivot* aids the kind of strategic thinking that could shape how national intelligence resources are used. Both books offer intelligence officers and national security professionals the opportunity to scrutinize hidden assumptions within key national security goals and to think hard about the kinds of intelligence support policymakers need. At the same time, whatever foreign policy goals the United States seeks to accomplish, the IC also needs to lean forward and plan for crises that emerge beyond policy plans.



Spying Through a Glass Darkly: American Espionage Against the Soviet Union, 1945–1946

David Alvarez and Eduard Mark (University of Kansas Press, 2016), 344 pp., notes, bibliography, index.

Reviewed by John Ehrman

It seems to be common knowledge that the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was abolished only weeks after the end of World War II and that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was established in the fall of 1947. The story of US espionage operations during the two years in between is a virtual black hole, however, barely mentioned in histories of intelligence. To fill this gap, and especially to understand how human intelligence (HUMINT) reporting informed policymaking during the critical early days of the Cold War, is the goal of intelligence historians David Alvarez's and Eduard Mark's new history, *Spying Through a Glass Darkly*. The result is an interesting and informative book—if at times slow going—that helps flesh out our understanding of US intelligence collection at the dawn of the Cold War.

For the United States, the end of World War II brought a rush to demobilize. This meant not only scaling back the US military machine and returning millions of draftees to their civilian lives but, as Alvarez and Mark show, also dismantling the global intelligence apparatus that had been built during the war. When the OSS was abolished in September 1945, the War Department took in the former service's espionage function, now renamed the Strategic Services Unit (SSU), and operated it until October 1946. (In October 1946, the SSU became the Office of Special Operations, within the Central Intelligence Group.) For the first half of that year, as Alvarez and Mark document in detail, the SSU spent much of its time simply trying to sort out its structure and missions under the difficult bureaucratic circumstances of declining resources and interagency rivalries.

At the start of their account, Alvarez and Mark describe how unexpected developments drove the SSU's collection priorities in directions few had foreseen. Immediately after the German surrender, the major intelligence target was not the Soviet Union, which many in Washington—including such high-ranking intelligence officials as OSS Director William Donovan—believed would remain if not a US ally then at least not an active threat. Instead,

HUMINT operations concentrated on guarding against resurgent fascism in Germany and Italy, rounding up Nazis and war criminals, and collecting on other allies, such as the French. Only gradually, as Soviet overt actions and the first reporting on Moscow's covert moves made it clear that Stalin was consolidating his control over Soviet-occupied lands and violating his agreements regarding the postwar order, did the focus of collection shift toward the Soviet Union.

Spying Through a Glass Darkly is at its best in describing the development of the resulting espionage operations. After reviewing the ascent of the Soviets to the top of the collection priorities, Alvarez and Mark shift to a geographic approach and describe operations in Germany, Austria, Eastern Europe, and then France and Italy. In each, the broad story was the same: a period immediately after the end of the war during which HUMINT capabilities largely collapsed, followed by a time of confusion and incompetence as inexperienced officers—or, in Germany, officers corrupted and distracted by black marketing—tried to undertake operations with only minimal guidance from Washington, and, with painful lessons learned and more competent officers starting to distinguish themselves, the start of effective operations against the Russians. Separately, as Alvarez and Mark further detail, the SSU relied heavily on close liaison relations with European services for much of the reporting it passed to Washington.

Filling in the details of these operations allows Alvarez and Mark to tell some good spy stories. Some are cautionary tales of inexperienced or naïve US intelligence officers falling into classic traps. Reprising the Trust operation of the 1920s, for example, in Germany the Soviets sent agents to the SSU who claimed to represent resistance networks in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself, and thus were able to deceive the Americans with bogus reporting and also gradually uncover US networks. Other cases brought important successes, however. One of the first involved Leo Skrzypczynski, a member of the

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wartime communist espionage rings in Germany who was arrested and survived a concentration camp and became a high-level economic planning official in the Soviet zone. By the spring of 1946, he had become disillusioned with the Soviets and began passing information to the SSU, providing an “excellent window on industrial and economic conditions and policies” in Eastern Germany. (102)

Alvarez and Marks also provide a nuanced and overall positive view of James Angleton’s operations in Italy, where he worked closely with the Italian services while at the same time recruiting assets within them to ensure that he did not become dependent on Rome’s views. Angleton, moreover, directed operations in Albania, Hungary, and Yugoslavia that resulted in recruitments that, while small in number, brought good information. His work, Alvarez and Mark conclude, was “probably the equal of any American intelligence station in early postwar Europe.” (267)

Alvarez and Mark tell their story in a well-organized and detailed package that reflects extensive archival research. They are careful, too, not to go beyond their documents, noting when materials remain classified and therefore prevent them from telling a complete story. The only serious weak point of the book is that it could have been more carefully edited. Alvarez and Mark have an un-

fortunate tendency toward page-long paragraphs in which the reader can at times become lost, and their recitations of the litany of the SSU’s administrative and resource woes occasionally become repetitive. These are minor issues, however, that detract only a little from the overall high quality of the work.

Alvarez and Mark conclude that, given the constraints under which the SSU operated, it “performed fairly well” in that it provided customers with “timely and accurate information . . . not available from other sources.” (274) This is certainly a supportable judgment, given the wealth of detail upon which Alvarez and Mark base it. Still, the SSU’s problems and foul-ups leave the reader wondering if this conclusion might be a tad too generous, especially when its performance in Europe is compared to the unit’s operations in Asia.^a A more accurate conclusion might be that the SSU, in its year of operations, gained important experience that did much to lay the foundations for greater US intelligence successes later on.

a. For an example of SSU’s work in Asia, see William J. Rust, “Operation Iceberg—Transitioning into CIA: The Strategic Services Unit in Indonesia” in *Studies in Intelligence* 60, no. 1 (March 2016), available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-60-no-1/operation-iceberg.html>.



The Angel: The Egyptian Spy Who Saved Israel

Uri Bar-Joseph (HarperCollins, 2016), 384 pp., cast of characters, notes, bibliography, index.

Reviewed by Thomas G. Coffey

The first thing that jumps out about *The Angel* is the surprisingly short “Cast of Characters” section, given the book covers a major Middle Eastern war and its chief protagonists. It all makes sense, however, if your subject is a sensitive spy, whose reports were strictly disseminated and whose identity was a closely-guarded secret. The hush-hush nature of this spy’s life meant author Uri Bar-Joseph had his work cut out for him in order to penetrate this need-to-know world and get at the truth. Bar-Joseph does so in a superb fashion, arguing methodically and convincingly that this individual was an authentic spy for the Israelis—not a double agent for the Egyptians—and that his intelligence “saved” Israel from being overrun on two fronts during the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War.

Bar-Joseph spends much of the book addressing whether “the Angel” was genuine. After all, Ashraf Marwan (a.k.a. “the Angel”) was the son-in-law of Egyptian President Gamal Nasser and a close adviser to President Sadat. Marwan started in 1970 as a “walk-in,” offering Egypt’s order-of-battle to Mossad officers in London. A skeptic could not be blamed for thinking there was something too good to be true about Marwan, but the author makes a good case that sometimes intelligence services get lucky.

Marwan had a number of motives to spy for Israel, among them the desire for revenge and a need for money. First, Nasser disliked Marwan and tried to stop his daughter from marrying the ne’er-do-well. Marwan was assigned to work in the president’s office but in a sidelined capacity where he could be watched. Not surprisingly, Marwan resented this second class status. Marwan also had a taste for good things that the corruption in high Egyptian office would normally afford him. Not so with Nasser, who was adamant about maintaining a spare life-style so his family would be beyond reproach.

To explain why Marwan continued to spy after Nasser died and during the period he worked for Sadat (who looked the other way when it came to corruption), Bar-Jo-

seph raises complicated and less than convincing motives, including Marwan’s desire to be aligned with a winner after the resounding Israeli victory in the 1967 Six Day War and his need to influence events. It may simply have been that Marwan had a problem with authority. Despite all Sadat had done for him (including being designated a key interlocutor with Libya and Saudi Arabia, in a show of Sadat’s appreciation for Marwan’s loyalty in helping to quash an attempted takeover of the government), Marwan was perceived by his Mossad handlers as harboring disdain for the Egyptian leader.

Beyond motive, Bar-Joseph stresses three other reasons Marwan was not a double agent. First, he argues the Egyptians were not any good at these operations, and that only the Soviets and British had the knack for them. Of course, Egypt has long been under the influence of the British and then the Soviets, making it entirely possible the Mukhabarat picked up a thing or two about running these agents. On stronger ground, Bar-Joseph notes it would have been risky for such a high level and connected Egyptian official to be involved in such an operation: if discovered and subsequently imprisoned, Marwan would have a lot to tell the Israelis about Egyptian policy and its top officials.

Most persuasively, Bar-Joseph argues the nature of the intelligence Marwan gave the Israelis was simply too destructive of Egyptian interests. From the start, the Angel gave Israel not “seed corn”—intelligence that was true but of marginal consequence—but highly damaging, order-of-battle information. As the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War would eventually show, Marwan provided accurate intelligence about how the Egyptian military would conduct itself and the signs to watch for in its battle preparations a year before the attack, giving Israel plenty of time to ready its defenses.

Of the possibility that Marwan instead was a double agent—namely that his intelligence about the upcoming start of the Yom Kippur War was late, flawed, and of little practical use—Bar-Joseph offers a convincing defense.

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Marwan was not in Egypt when Sadat gave the general order to attack in three days, and thus was unaware of the order. When he discovered through an acquaintance that Egyptian airliners were to be rerouted to Libya, Marwan knew from his understanding of the battle plans that war was imminent, and he immediately contacted his Mossad handlers. He gave an incorrect start time (dusk) for the invasion, but that was only because he did not know Sadat had made a compromise with Syrian President Hafez Assad, who wanted to start the attack at dawn, agreeing upon a militarily-unsound 2:00 p.m., broad daylight, commencement of hostilities. Even this eleventh-hour warning allowed some mobilization and call-up of reserves four hours before the fighting, enough time for Israeli defense forces to prevent a takeover of the Golan Heights.

The Angel is more than a detective story seeking to uncover the truth surrounding Marwan. It is equally a case study, filled with telling details about the traps and snags that confronted the Israeli intelligence and policymaking communities. Some of these details will sound familiar to students of intelligence history:

- Israeli military analysts fully expected Egypt to only wage a war that was winnable and aimed at retaking the entire Sinai Peninsula. Marwan himself cemented this thinking, providing the Israelis with order-of-battle plans, dubbed “the Concept,” that noted Egypt would not strike across the Suez Canal and try to retake the Sinai Peninsula without first neutralizing Israeli’s command of the skies. When Marwan later reported, accurately, that Sadat had changed his mind, instead choosing to fight a limited war without the need for sophisticated jet fighters and SCUD missiles, Israeli military intelligence officers refused to believe him.
- Israel had other sources on Egypt, but Marwan was the most highly-placed. Mossad chief Zamir and Israeli Military Intelligence chief Zeira limited distribution of Marwan’s reports to Prime Minister Golda Meir’s inner circle; for intelligence analysts, the reports were broken down, without identifying the source, into separate issue areas and distributed. This procedure helped protect the source but also undercut analysts’ ability to understand the credibility and weight of the intelligence.
- “Crying wolf” was a major concern, given the huge cost of mobilization to counter threats on many

fronts. When Marwan gave precise—but ultimately incorrect—warning about an Egyptian attack in the spring of 1973, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan stopped putting much stock in these reports.

- Divisions in the intelligence ranks contributed to Israel’s being less prepared to halt a Sinai crossing than a Syrian takeover of the Golan Heights. After Prime Minister Meir gave mobilization orders, having received Marwan’s convincing intelligence about an imminent attack, the director of military intelligence told the military commander in the Sinai that he still didn’t believe Sadat would fight a limited war. As a result, this commander did not take the orders seriously; however, his counterpart in the north did—and took action. This saved Israel from having to begin a major and bloody campaign to retake the Golan Heights, and freed up forces to counterattack in the Sinai desert, where Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal and made major inroads into the Sinai Peninsula.

Bar-Joseph says the CIA did receive some of Marwan’s reporting, but it went in a way that made it very difficult to identify the source. Some of the reporting was handed personally to Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms. Such intelligence sharing had its uses. Meir showed President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that Marwan had obtained minutes of a meeting between Sadat and Soviet leader Leonard Brezhnev. She reported to the Mossad chief that this act of sharing deeply impressed both Nixon and Kissinger and that the president became willing to sell Israel additional F-4 Phantoms.

The Yom Kippur War came as a surprise to the US Intelligence Community, where analysts shared the consensus Israeli Military Intelligence view that a major Egyptian attack was unlikely in 1973. However, US analysts did at least entertain the possibility that Sadat had adopted the more limited war aims about which Marwan had warned the Israelis. In the wake of the heightened Egyptian military preparations and false alarm of a spring attack, analysts in a May 1973 estimate—the most prescient piece of intelligence analysis before the war—spelled out the factors bearing on an Egyptian decision to invade:

Sadat’s new campaign of threats to renew hostilities . . . are consistent both with preparations to fight Israel and with political/psychological efforts

to stimulate diplomatic activity . . . If Sadat is once again disappointed, the temptation to resort to military action in order to force the US hand might prove irresistible...Sadat himself could be trapped by building an atmosphere of crisis to the point where failure to act militarily would seem to him more dangerous to his own hold on power than attacking and taking the consequences.^a

Still, like their Israeli counterparts, US analysts as late as October could not shake the compelling logic of Egypt's only fighting a winnable war, which they were in no position to launch. Up to the time of the attack, analysts recognized Egypt and Syria military moves as looking "very ominous" but "the whole thrust of President Sadat's activities since last spring has been in the direction of bringing moral, political, and economic forces to bear on Israel in tacit acknowledgment of Arab unreadiness for war."^b Only two days before the attack, analysts continued to believe "an outbreak of hostilities remains unlikely for the immediate future."^c

A postmortem ordered by Director William Colby poured it on a bit thick: "A thorough search of the material issued prior to 6 October has failed to turn up any official statement from any office or committee responsible

a. United States Intelligence Community, *NIE 30-73: Possible Egyptian-Israeli Hostilities—Determinants and Implications*, 17 May 1973 (Approved for Release: 4 September 2012).

b. Harold P. Ford, "William E. Colby as Director of Central Intelligence, 1973–1976," in *President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War*, (CIA Historical Collections Division, CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, The Richard Nixon Foundation, and The Richard Nixon Presidential Library & Museum, 30 January 2013), 17. Available online at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/international-relations/arab-israeli-war/nixon-arab-israeli-war.pdf>.

c. DCI memorandum—prepared by the Intelligence Community Staff, "The Performance of the Intelligence Community before the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973: A Preliminary Post-Mortem Report," 20 December 1973, 2.

for producing finished, analytical intelligence which contributed anything resembling a warning, qua warning. . . . There was an intelligence failure . . . the principal conclusions concerning the imminence of hostilities reached and reiterated by those responsible for intelligence analysis were—quite simply, obviously, and starkly—wrong."^d The intelligence failure badly undercut Colby's start as director, and he instituted some policy changes to get things back on track. He set in motion initiatives that led ultimately to the creation of a special assistant to the director for strategic warning. To challenge orthodox thinking on some issues, he created a devil's advocacy system in the production of finished intelligence. He overhauled the watch system to include more analysts and experienced officers. Lastly, he created Alert Memoranda to provide more timely warning for high level policymakers.

In the end, this was an Israeli and Egyptian affair, and both governments seemed to want it to go away. The Israeli commission looking into the surprise came down hard on Military Intelligence and its director, who, decades later, defended himself to historians by blaming the surprise attack on Egypt's having a double agent who deceived the Mossad. He gave away Marwan's identity by allowing readers to "put two and two together." The Mossad decided to let it go, not wanting to indirectly confirm Marwan's identity by taking action against the officer, and in the process publicize its inability to protect its sources. Bar-Joseph is convinced that when the Mubarak government found out about Marwan's betrayal, its security officers in June 2007 forced him to jump to his death or pushed him off a balcony. Much of the Egyptian upper echelon attended Marwan's funeral, even declaring publicly, "He was a true patriot of his country." (2) Despite this attempt to keep up appearances, Bar-Joseph contends the Egyptians knew full well how far this angel had fallen.

d. *Ibid.*



Spies in the Congo: America's Atomic Mission in World War II

Susan Williams (Public Affairs, 2016), 332 pp., cast of characters, locations, abbreviations, codewords, notes, index.

Reviewed by David A. Foy

While the US effort to develop the atomic bomb, usually referred to by the umbrella term the Manhattan Project and headed by Army MG Leslie Groves, is becoming better-known to the public, certain aspects of that compelling story remain largely in the shadows—partly by design, partly by neglect. Susan Williams's *Spies in the Congo: America's Atomic Mission in World War II* shines a welcome light on one aspect of the tale—namely, the resolute US desire to control the highest-quality and quantity of uranium ore available in the world in order to ensure that the all-important ore did not reach Nazi Germany, working on its own atomic weapons program. *Spies in the Congo* focuses on the Shinkolobwe mine, source of the world's highest-purity uranium ore, located in the then-Belgian Congo and operated by the Belgian firm Union Miniere. The particular emphasis in Williams's volume, however, is on the mission given to CIA's forerunner, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and its agent operations in the Belgian Congo to keep the uranium out of the clutches of Hitler's scientists, several of whom were world-class physicists. Williams's study of a little-known OSS contribution to the US war effort was made possible in part by the 2008 release of the Official Personnel Files (OPFs) of 35,000 OSS officers, among other records—such as the collection of 8mm films shot and retained by the “lead spy.”

Throughout the course of World War II, the OSS deployed 93 agents to the continent of Africa—the one who figures most prominently in *Spies in the Congo* is Wilbur “Dock” Hogue, a Firestone engineer by training before joining the Secret Intelligence (SI) Division of OSS early in the war. Hogue, or as he was better known, TETON—a pleasant memory of his formative years in Idaho—arrived in Leopoldville, Belgian Congo (now Kinshasa, Zaire), in November 1943. He began setting up agent networks in Liberia and the Ivory Coast as a means of fulfilling his assigned mission—to spy on enemy agents and devise effective means to expand US intelligence operations in the area, collecting secret military and economic infor-

mation. His “extra” mission—and the focus of Williams's book—was to prevent enemy seizure of the uranium ore during its transit from the Shinkolobwe mine to the United States. To preserve arguably the most important secret of the war, neither Hogue nor any of his accomplices were ever told why uranium was so important, only that it was so sensitive that they were never to use the term in either oral or written communications and to use “diamond smuggling” (also a legitimate concern in Africa) as a euphemism. By the time Hogue arrived in the Congo, Groves had tasked the Army's Counterintelligence Corps (CIC, or the “Creeps,” as colleagues referred to them) with the all-important job of securing atomic intelligence secrets; the particular responsibility fell to LTC Boris Pash, a military intelligence officer whose Intelligence and Security Division personnel investigated over 1,500 cases of “loose talk” between September 1943 and December 1945.

Although President Roosevelt had approved MG William “Wild Bill” Donovan's request to send an OSS officer to Africa in November 1941, it took a while to find the right individual. Hogue had replaced several less effective predecessors, some of whom had been—oddly enough—renowned ornithologists in the United States, their bona fide occupation serving as handy cover for their operational activities, allowing them to travel throughout the area without suspicion. Dock Hogue was aided in his operations by Accra, Gold Coast station chief Doug Bonner (CRUMB), and especially by the selection of Shirley Chidsey (ANGELLA), a very capable deputy in Leopoldville. When Hogue arrived in the Belgian Congo, he was challenged by the 242 different languages spoken by the populace of 15 million, only 30,000 of whom were white; by the Belgian tendency to play both-ends-against-the-middle throughout the war; by the rampant racism in the Congo at the time; and by the hostility displayed toward OSS operations both by the State Department representatives (“festering mistrust” is the descriptor the author used) and by British Special Operations Executive (SOE)

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personnel, who by war's end had been superseded by their OSS counterparts.

By the fall of 1944, Hogue had learned that the feared scenario had occurred—some Belgian companies in the Congo—one of them Union Miniere—had sold uranium ore to the Germans. Groves had known this information since January, when OSS officer Morris “Moe” Berg, of baseball fame, had confirmed that 700 tons of uranium ore had been delivered to Duisberg, Germany, which, with the small stock of inferior ore to which the Germans had access in Czechoslovakia, might be enough to build a bomb. A subsequent, dedicated bombing raid leveled Duisberg, but the question of Belgian complicity in the German atomic bomb program was a volatile postwar topic—over 1,200 people were sentenced to death for such activities, 242 of whom were actually executed. Groves also was compelled to intervene to prevent Belgian officials from exposing the secret relationship with the Allies, and in a secret White House ceremony in 1946, President Truman awarded the Medal of Merit to Edgar Sengier, the New York-based managing director of Union Miniere, to recognize the company's contribution to the allied war effort.

As the pace of activity in the Congo accelerated, Hogue argued for more personnel and “clout” to reflect the significance of the mission, and in July 1944, the consulate in Leopoldville was elevated to a consulate general, indicative of a rising US stake in the Congo. As a result of the apparent indiscretions of a cutout, Hogue's true mission in the Congo was compromised, and he was ultimately deemed *persona non grata* and compelled to leave, turning operations over to Henry Stehli (LOCUST), who had joined the OSS team in the Congo the same month. Hogue's return to the United States in September 1944 was also impelled by three attempts on his life by German assets. At home, he wrote a report summarizing his activities in the Congo, highlighting the lack of support from the American consul general.

The nagging questions that had prompted US intelligence involvement in the Congo early on in the war were finally resolved in November 1944, when the United States learned that not only did Germany *not* have the atomic bomb but was unlikely to develop one. This welcome news came almost simultaneously from Pash's Alsos team—which interrogated Union Miniere managers from the Shinkolobwe mine—and from an OSS mission known as AZUSA; neither entity was aware of the other's

existence. Pash's personnel seized the German uranium stocks and shipped them to the United States. Meanwhile, Berg—tasked with the assassination of leading German atomic theoretician Werner Heisenberg—decided he was not a threat and aborted the mission. By this time, US authorities had already dismissed Japan as an atomic threat, although the prescient worrywart Groves was already concerned about Russian atomic bomb development efforts. The British Joint Intelligence Committee estimated it would be at least 1954 before the Soviets could conduct an atomic test, which closely paralleled CIA assessments. The fact that some 50 people privy to the secrets of the Manhattan Project—notably including Donald Maclean, second secretary at the British Embassy in Washington from 1944 to 1948 and a Soviet spy—provided program information to the Soviets was unknown at the time. At this juncture, Williams makes the important point that it was primarily the lack of uranium ore that stifled both Japanese and German development of the atomic bomb.

The author begins her final chapter by stating that the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima was constructed with uranium from the Congo—as she quotes President Truman, “We spent \$2,000,000,000 on the greatest scientific gamble in history, and we won.” (218) She then shifts focus to address the fact that several of those closest to the uranium ore—physically and occupationally—died early deaths. Dock Hogue died at age 42 of stomach cancer. His replacement in the Congo in 1944, Henry Stehli, died at age 52 of brain cancer, and Doug Bonner died at age 58. Whether or not their premature deaths were due to exposure to the radioactive uranium ore is left unanswered, as is the fate of the Congolese workers and Union Miniere managers who were constantly exposed to the threat. The only exception to the “rule” was Major Adolph Schmidt, the Accra station chief later in the war, who lived to age 96.

In the “Postscript,” the author notes that the Shinkolobwe mine remained the “best source” of US ore throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s. In the latter decade, US military and civilian authorities remained so concerned about the importance of the ore that they dispatched \$7 million worth of military supplies to bolster Belgian troops in the Congo and gifted the first nuclear reactor in Africa. The mine and its ore has remained a political and foreign policy shuttlecock in the decades since, and although it is closed now, freelance miners still dig

uranium and cobalt from the mine, exposing themselves to dangerous levels of radiation.

Spies in the Congo is a welcome addition to the genre of World War II history and the first book to tackle this important and overlooked subject. Although Groves's 1962 book *Now It Can Be Told* touches on the subject, *Spies in the Congo* is the sole definitive book on the topic. Equally important, it pays tribute to a sizable number of individuals who labored in obscurity—then and until now—and under dangerous conditions to fulfill their mission with no other explanation than that it was “important.” As the thorough bibliography attests, Ms. Williams—a senior research fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London—has mined both primary and secondary sources, with numerous references to archival collections and to NARA records. The “Cast of Characters” section and the “Locations with Changed Names” are both gifts to the reader, as are the short, easily-digestible chapters. *Spies in the Congo* is Williams's fifth book—her previous works include *Ladies*

of Influence (2000), on elite women in interwar Britain; *The People's King* (2003), on the abdication of Edward VIII; *Colour Bar* (2006), on the founding president of Botswana; and most recently, *Who Killed Hammarskjöld? The UN, the Cold War and White Supremacy in Africa* (2011). The author has published widely on Africa, decolonization, and global power shifts in the 20th century.

Flaws in the book appear few and generally minor. For example, when the author describes “the Farm” in Maryland (4) where Hogue received his initial OSS training, informed readers may be thinking of another facility besides (likely) the site of the Congressional Country Club in Bethesda, and there is no further explanation. This reader also at times found himself thinking that the book kept straying from its stated theme by turning to distracting peripheral topics such as African colonialism and racism, French politics, and even Russian attempts to acquire the uranium ore—perhaps understandable, given her background and previous works.



The Bletchley Girls—War, Secrecy, Love, and Loss: The Women of Bletchley Park Tell Their Story

Tessa Dunlop (Hodder & Stoughton, Ltd., 2015), 341 pp., photos, notes, bibliography, index.

Reviewed by David A. Foy

That the British code-breaking establishment identified with Bletchley Park (BP) has gained a popular following, complete with its own mystique and museum, alternately horrifies, intrigues, and fascinates the female veterans of the Park. British broadcaster and historian Tessa Dunlop tells their story in *The Bletchley Girls*, which focuses on 15 surviving veterans, average age 90, the majority of whom labored throughout the war in the small village of Bletchley, in Buckinghamshire. Dunlop explicitly states that her goal is to correct a warped historical picture because the “focus on code-breaking’s male hierarchy has obscured the reality of Park life.” (1) She supports that assertion by noting that by 1944, women in the BP labor force—estimated to total 8,500 to 10,000—outnumbered men nearly three to one, most of them in military auxiliary units, along with a few civilians. She also explains that she has focused on those women who were not enamored of life at the Park, those for whom the war years were a brief and sometimes trying interlude rather than the peak experience of their lives.

Dunlop begins by looking at the family backgrounds of the women who worked at the Park—generally, very young women (as young as 14) with very basic skills and few streaks of independence because, as the author notes, “little girls knew their place.” Most had only rudimentary educations—only one of the 15 highlighted in the book attended university before 1945—in large part because “No matter how bright you were, a good marriage was more important than a good education.” (34) For these young women, the encroachment of war brought the prospect of “opportunity” and “adventure,” just as it worried the older generation. What to do with Britain’s young women, faced with the most unfeminine prospect of total war, was, as Dunlop describes it, “a contentious issue” (54), though not for the women themselves, who, embarrassingly, oversubscribed the government’s quota for military auxiliary service—the goal was 25,000, but in 1939, 43,000 women volunteered. Furthermore, for many of the fairer sex, “only active service would suffice” because, after all, “heroes needed heroines.” (61)

In December 1941, Britain passed National Service Act (No. 2), which mandated wartime service for all unmarried women between the ages of 20 and 30. Whether they were linguists at “Station Y” communications intercept stations or engaged in the often menial aspects of code-breaking at BP—known to most at the time as “Station X”, to the Royal Navy as “HMS Pembroke V”—the Park’s military women were housed and paid for by the services, unlike the civilians. Within the sorority of BP women who were or sought to be in uniform, the Women’s Royal Naval Service—better-known as the “WRENS”—was the unit of choice, in part because of the spiffier uniforms and because its members operated the Bombe decoding machine and Colossus, described as the world’s first electronic computer. Of Dunlop’s 15 ladies, 10 sought to become WRENS, but only four made it.

Those women who knew the right people—personal connections were important in getting a job at BP and throughout the war—joined the initial 186 employees on a 51-acre tract of land, part of the much larger estate of stockbroker and Liberal MP Sir Herbert Leon, who had purchased it in 1882. By August 1939, it belonged to the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS), the post-World War I union of the Admiralty’s cryptography units (Room 40) and the War Office. By January 1940, BP employees had decoded the first wartime messages from the German ENIGMA cipher machine, and, not long afterwards, the brilliant but erratic cryptanalytic legend Alan Turing developed the first electronic test machine to detect the settings on the German ENIGMA code machine, the first of thousands of Bombe devices produced during the war.

Within the pages of *The Bletchley Girls*, the obsession with security runs like a steel cable—as Dunlop notes, “Above all else, Bletchley Park’s employees had to be trustworthy.” (65) The first step for women of interest to GC&CS was a mandatory interview that told them nothing of their future duties. However, the seriousness of the undertaking was reinforced not only by the signing

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of the Official Secrets Act but also by security lectures highlighted by death threats and—in the case of one BP recruit—the placing for emphasis of a revolver on the officer’s desk during the briefing. Dunlop refers to the work environment as “compartmentalized reality” (107), in which no one was exactly sure what it was they were working on. Nor were the conditions—or even the labor itself—much consolation; “dreadful” was the term often used to describe the surroundings, while the toil was “boring” or “repetitious,” performed by those who were little more than “bit parts in the conveyor belt of code-breaking.” (272) However, as the author notes, “with good friends, almost anything is tolerable” and the billeting arrangements necessitated by the war definitely broke down social barriers, presaging the future.

The first indication that the Park’s employees had that the European war was nearing its end was when the volume of ENIGMA messages began to sharply decline. The few celebrations that broke out when the German surrender became reality were quickly stifled with the frosty reminder that the war with Japan was continuing and that the Soviet Union was morphing from ally to foe. The number of employees declined to 6,000 until late July 1945, and the number of Bombe machines declined from 2,200 to 60, the rest turned into colored-wire Army scrap. In the postwar years, many of the Park’s women married—11 of the 15 in the book by 1950—and adopted lives of quiet domestic conformity, determined to take their secrets to their graves. When books on Bletchley Park began appearing in the 1970s, most BP veterans were horrified and spoke of a “betrayal”—as the author points out, even had someone wanted to “warn” them, they could not because by then no one knew who they all were. Besides, as one of the women veterans put it, “Our generation doesn’t know how to show off.” (290) By the 1970s, the Park had fallen into disrepair, the property leased by the General Post Office, with GC&CS successor the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) already ensconced in Cheltenham. In the years since, however, the Park has been resurrected, thanks to the Bletchley Park Trust, and the onsite museum welcomed 120,000 visitors in 2012.

Just as it took time for the BP ladies to adjust to peacetime, so it took them time to answer the question, “What did you do in the war, Mummy?” And if discussing their personal experiences was one thing, placing those experiences into the larger context of Bletchley Park—much

less the war—was quite another. While some have been forthcoming in recent years, others have kept quiet, especially those for whom the war years were an unpleasant memory. And, of course, fewer of them are left to tell the story with each passing day—at the time *The Bletchley Girls* was published, fewer than 10 percent of the original BP staff were still alive.

Readers who pick up *The Bletchley Girls* looking for a description of how the efforts of these women turned the tide of the war will be disappointed—as engaging as the book is, it is clearly and unapologetically a social history set against the backdrop of the war, rather than vice-versa. The reason for this focus is not only Dunlop’s expressed desire when writing this volume, but also the airtight security environment of BP, in which women in the same hut often had no idea of what each other was working on, in a larger sense, much less how it was contributing to Allied victory—and of course, they never talked about what they were doing, even amongst themselves. Readers are also advised to have a “King’s English” dictionary at hand when reading this book, as such British words and phrases as “mod-cons” (28), “frisson” (59, 227), “shtum” (100), and “gamine” (163) are likely to befuddle even well-educated American readers.^a More photos of the named women would be helpful, and, as many reviewers have noted, the jerky nature of the text, jumping from one woman’s experiences to another’s, is annoying, even though Dunlop’s chapters are organized by topic.

In several instances readers need to duck to avoid the frantic waving of the Union Jack. For instance, when Dunlop discusses the US entry into the war, stressing the changes it brought to the code-breaking endeavor, she writes, “At last the green giant juddered^b into military action,” (202) certainly an odd and snarky description of the US entry into World War II, particularly in light of Pearl Harbor. Similarly, she exhibits revisionist tendencies when, discussing the use of the atomic bomb, she strongly implies the war could have been ended another way—Japanese peace feelers to the United States via the Soviet Union—but the United States “chose not to pursue it” (255) and instead wanted a quick end to the war and to send Stalin a clear reminder of who was in charge in the post-war world.

a. “Mod-cons” means modern conveniences; “frisson” means to shudder or to thrill; “shtum” means silent or non-communicative; and “gamine” means tomboy.

b. “Juddered” means shuddered.

A quick online search for books on Bletchley Park confirms that there is no shortage of them, and on all aspects of it—Colossus, the Bombe, Alan Turing, Hut 6, COMINT and the war against the U-boats, and so on; one national book chain has 47 books available on Bletchley Park. Nor is Dunlop's the only volume that addresses the experiences of women at the Park—see also *My Secret*

Life in Hut 6: One Woman's Experience at Bletchley Park, by Mair Russell-Jones (Lion Hudson, 2014) and *The Debs of Bletchley Park* by Michael Smith (Aurum Press, Ltd., 2015). Although there are caveats for readers of *The Bletchley Girls*, the book does provide a quick and interesting read and offers a valuable vantage point into one of the great stories of World War II.



Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf

Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake

CURRENT TOPICS

Harry Potter and the Art of Spying, by Lynn Boughey and Peter Earnest

HISTORICAL

Code Warriors: NSA's Codebreakers and the Secret Intelligence War Against the Soviet Union, by Stephen Budiansky

Cyberspies: The Secret History of Surveillance, Hacking, and Digital Espionage, by Gordon Corera

Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War, by Fred Kaplan

Guy Burgess: The Spy Who Knew Everyone, by Stewart Purvis and Jeff Hulbert

Into The Lion's Mouth: The True Story of Dusko Popov: World War II Spy, Patriot, and the Real-Life Inspiration for James Bond, by Larry Loftis

The Last Goodnight: A World War II Story of Espionage, Adventure, and Betrayal, by Howard Blum

The Less You Know, The Better You Sleep: Russia's Road To Terror and Dictatorship Under Yeltsin and Putin, by David Satter

On Intelligence: The History of Espionage and the Secret World, by John Hughes-Wilson

Operation Whisper: The Capture of Soviet Spies Morris and Lona Cohen, by Barnes Carr

The Red Web: The Struggle Between Russia's Digital Dictators and The New Online Revolutionaries, by Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan

Spies In The Congo: The Race for the Ore That Built the Atomic Bomb, by Susan Williams

The Spy in Hitler's Inner Circle: Hans-Thilo Schmidt and the Intelligence Network that Decoded Enigma, by Paul Paillole

Spying Through A Glass Darkly: American Espionage against the Soviet Union, 1945–1946, by David Alvarez and Eduard Mark

Stalin's Singing Spy: The Life and Exile of Nadezhda Plevitskaya, by Pamela A. Jordan

INTELLIGENCE ABROAD

The Angel: The Egyptian Spy Who Saved Israel, by Uri Bar-Joseph

The Black Door: Spies, Secret Intelligence and British Prime Ministers, by Richard J. Aldrich and Rory Cormac

The Intelligence War in Latin America, 1914–1922, by Jamie Bisher

MEMOIR

The Secrets of My Life: Vintner, Prisoner, Soldier, Spy, by Peter M. F. Sichel



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CURRENT TOPICS

Harry Potter and the Art of Spying, by Lynn Boughey and Peter Earnest. (Wise Ink Creative Publishing, 2014) 632 pp., appendix, glossary, index.

The enormously popular Harry Potter books are not only exciting fantasy for young readers, each one is also “a complex multifaceted, superb primer on spying and spycraft.” (1) At least that is what novelist Lynn Boughey and former CIA officer Peter Earnest would have young readers believe is the payoff for reading their 600-page book. The book is divided into two parts. The first part is a chapter-by-chapter analysis of *Harry Potter and the Order of the Phoenix* with occasional references to the other Potter books. The authors highlight parts of the plot that illustrate intelligence tradecraft, from the use of open source intelligence to secret communications, to cover requirements and other aspects of tradecraft. For example, they point out the “false background created by the Dursleys to explain Harry’s presence in their home.” (10) Similarly, in chapter 9, “Life At Headquarters: Boring, Boring, Boring,” (89) the authors opine that much can be learned there. Other examples include moles in the Ministry of Magic, counterintelligence principles displayed by the character Hermione, use of “spells” to prevent discovery, and various examples of data analysis.

Part two examines the “Art of Spying in the Wizarding and Muggle Worlds” from a functional espionage point of view. The authors provide examples of agents’ or spies’ motivations and discuss recruitment and running of spies, deception, decrypted communications, and double agents—Severus Snape, the death-eater, in this case—to name a few of the topics covered. Incidents from the book are used to illustrate the points under discussion.

Harry Potter and the Art of Spying includes a glossary for those unfamiliar with intelligence terms. Presumably there is no need for a glossary describing the world of Muggles, Hogwarts students, the evil Voldemort, and the Order of the Phoenix. There is also an Appendix in which Earnest makes specific reference to various CIA corollaries with the Potter topic.

It is too soon to tell whether the authors have produced a benchmark introduction to the world of intelligence for young people. But they certainly have produced an unexpected, spirited contribution toward that end.

HISTORICAL

Code Warriors: NSA’s Codebreakers and the Secret Intelligence War Against the Soviet Union, by Stephen Budiansky. (Alfred A. Knopf, 2018) 289 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

The National Security Agency has been an object of public interest since the 1975 Church Committee Hearings that revealed its domestic surveillance program called MINARET. In 1982 James Bamford published the first of three books on NSA that covered its origins, Cold War, post-Cold War and post 9/11 activities respectively.^a In 2009, Matthew Aid’s study, *The Secret*

Sentry, (Bloomsbury, 2009) surveyed NSA’s operations from its origins to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now Stephen Budiansky has contributed another volume on NSA; although there is some topical overlap with his predecessors, *Code Warriors* concentrates on NSA’s Cold War operations against the Soviet Union.

a. James Bamford, *The Puzzle Palace: Inside the National Security Agency, America’s Most Secret Agency* (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1982); *Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security*

Agency from the Cold War through the Dawn of a New Century (Doubleday, 2001); *The Shadow Factory: The Ultra-Secret NSA from 9/11 to the Eavesdropping on America* (Doubleday, 2008).

Budiansky begins with a note on the Edward Snowden revelations that “seemed to epitomize a secret agency out of control . . . raising questions about domestic surveillance policy, legality, and, morality.” While he acknowledges that Snowden “crossed the line from defensible whistle-blowing to reckless exposure of ongoing foreign intelligence operations,” (xvi–xvii) he insists that NSA has made very serious errors. *Code Warriors* argues that NSA’s post-9/11 blunders were a logical consequence of Cold War precedents.

After reviewing post-World War II Soviet espionage operations against the West, which were revealed by defectors and the VENONA decrypts, Budiansky summarizes the West’s counterintelligence reactions and various programs initiated to deal with the growing threat, particularly in the SIGINT area.^a He then describes the contentious turf battles among the military crypto-graphic elements that led in 1952 to the creation of NSA.

This is followed by a description of how the first NSA director (DIRNSA), General Ralph Canine, struggled to get the agency functioning while dealing with moles, defectors, and the transition to a digital environment. As it grew in size and importance, NSA was involved with numerous crises such as the 1962 Cuban Missile Cri-

a. The VENONA project was an effort by the US Army’s Signals Intelligence Service (later NSA) to gather and decrypt messages sent by the Soviet military intelligence agencies from 1943 to 1980.

sis; the 1968 capture of the USS Pueblo, a Navy intelligence vessel, by North Korea; the 1964 confrontation between the United States and North Vietnam known as the Gulf of Tonkin incident; and the 1972 Watergate scandal—curiously, the shelling of the SIGINT ship by Israel during the 1967 war is not mentioned. Budiansky also scrutinizes the interagency conflicts—often with CIA—that resulted from these and other operations. He is particularly concerned about the long-range impact of “the fiction that signals intelligence is not intelligence but information,” though his arguments leave many questions unanswered. Budiansky he emphasizes the consequences of excessive secrecy—a persistent theme in the book—as well as NSA’s “drive to get everything” as major weaknesses. (308–309)

Code Warriors does mention NSA’s positive contributions, including its electronic monitoring and satellite signal interception capabilities, which were impressive and increased its bureaucratic influence. But his judgment that, by the end of the Cold War, NSA’s influence “made it a system ripe for intellectual corruption” is arguable. (308)

Whether NSA’s Cold War mistakes fathered, any more than operational necessity, the post-9/11 era operations remains an interesting thesis worthy of debate. Perhaps a final judgment about this will be made in the next book about NSA.

Cyberspies: *The Secret History of Surveillance, Hacking, and Digital Espionage*, by Gordon Corera. (Pegasus Books, 2016) 448 pp., endnotes, index.

This book was published in Britain earlier this year as *Intercept: The Secret History of Computers and Spies*. (It was reviewed in *Studies in Intelligence* 60, no. 1 (March 2016): 113–114.) This edition has a new preface,

which urges public action to protect against creeping government and commercial surveillance of ordinary citizens, but it is otherwise identical to the original.

Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War, by Fred Kaplan. (Simon & Schuster, 2016) 352 pp., endnotes, index.

Slate journalist Fred Kaplan begins his book with a story about the 1983 film *War Games* in which a young hacker unwittingly accesses a supercomputer at NORAD and—thinking it is a war game—nearly starts World War III. After President Ronald Reagan viewed the movie, Kaplan reports, he asked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff whether “something like that could really happen.” Being a good bureaucrat as well as a bemused general, the chairman said he would look into it. To his great surprise, it turned out that not only were US military systems vulnerable, but that Willis Ware, a computer scientist at the RAND Corporation, had published a paper on the problem in 1967. Moreover, Ware had been an advisor on the *War Games* movie. In 1985, the administration published a classified national security decision directive (NSDD-145) titled “National Policy on Telecommunications and Automated Information Systems Security.” (2) It was the first official recognition of what has become known as cyber warfare. The National Security Agency (NSA) was appointed as the action agency.

Shortly after VADM Michael McConnell became NSA director in May 1992, he viewed the movie *Sneakers*. In the film, a comedy, the evil antagonist steals an NSA black box that can decrypt all coded messages. He makes the point that “the world is run by ones and zeroes . . . there is a war out there . . . it’s about who controls the information.” This was an “epiphany” for McConnell (32) writes Kaplan, and he soon created NSA’s Directorate of Information Warfare. *Sneakers* was written by the same screenwriters that had written *War Games*.

These anecdotes illustrate two key points stressed by Kaplan throughout the book. First, he believes the US government was lethargic in responding to the threat posed by digital means, which was already very familiar to civilian scientists and hackers. Cooperative corrective action was essential. Second, in Kaplan’s view, US adversaries are capable of and intent on doing to the United States whatever the United States can do to them in terms of cyber warfare. *Dark Territory* tells

the story of what the US government has learned about our country’s national digital capabilities and vulnerabilities and is being done to secure those systems.

Kaplan describes the seemingly constant turf battles that ensued among the key players—mainly NSA, CIA, National Security Council (NSC), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice (DOJ), and Congress—seeking to establish their roles in the rapidly changing communications security mission. In addition, he reviews the transition from traditional offensive and defensive practices using analog signals to the digital methods imposed by the Internet. He describes red team exercises that “always succeeded” in hacking classified DOD systems and in once case those of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand as well. (65–66) Experience on genuine intrusions occurred when hackers, thought to be of Middle East origin, penetrated the computers at Andrews Air Force Base near Washington, DC. Kaplan describes how a team tracked down the culprits, who turned out to be two teenage hackers near San Francisco.

Dark Territory deals in detail with the role played by NSA and each of its directors as they worked to shape the agency to meet the growing cyber threat. As examples of the offensive capabilities developed, Kaplan discusses the Stuxnet operation, which he describes as a joint-US Israeli operation that damaged Iran’s centrifuges. On the defensive side, he deals with intrusions from China and Russia and lays out the potential threats they pose to military and civilian infrastructure.

By 2009, when then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates established the Cyber Command under the director of NSA—20 nations had created cyber warfare units. Reports of multiple daily attempted intrusions from Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and Syria were routine. Two years later, the command’s mission was expanded with more authority for defending the nation’s “critical infrastructure,” though Kaplan emphasizes that there was strong resistance on that

score from industry, a persistent problem that would be further complicated by the Snowden leaks. (280)

Dark Territory lays out the problems associated with cyber security, cyber espionage, and cyber war and the

complication imposed by interaction with Congress and the cyber industry. Although he does not present a solution—because one has not yet been found—Kaplan makes a powerful case for why one is needed.

Guy Burgess: The Spy Who Knew Everyone, by Stewart Purvis and Jeff Hulbert. (Biteback Publishing, 2016) 480 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

The story of the five Cambridge students—Kim Philby, Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess, Anthony Blunt, and John Cairncross—who went on to spy for the Soviet Union from the mid-1930s to the early 1960s has been the subject of virtually continuous attention to the present day. In addition to movies, TV dramas, articles, and academic histories, each of these men has been the subject of at least one biography. In Guy Burgess’s case, more than 60 years after his defection to Moscow, two biographies have appeared in successive years. The first, by Cambridge historian Andrew Lownie,^a was reviewed in *Studies in Intelligence* 60, no. 3 (September 2016): 56–57. The second is the present work by BBC journalist Stewart Purvis and media historian Jeff Hulbert (2016). Same topic, major differences? The short answer is “no.” But Purvis and Hulbert do add some details of interest while omitting others.

Hulbert’s account of Burgess’s visit with Winston Churchill at his home suggests the BBC was reluctant to grant permission and that Burgess had to take a sick day. Lownie omits this detail. The authors of the work being reviewed here obtained a recording—thanks to a FOIA request filed with the FBI—of Burgess’s own description of the encounter, in which he is heard mimicking Churchill rather well to colleagues in New York. The authors name those present, whereas Lownie does not because the records had not yet been released.

Both books discuss Burgess’s early life and education at Dartmouth and Eton; his experiences at Cambridge University, where he became a communist; his recruitment by the NKVD (Stalin’s domestic security forces); and his foreign office and BBC service. They also include his work for MI5 and later MI6, as well as his relationship with the other Cambridge spies and the events that led to his defection to Moscow with Donald Maclean, who became a British diplomat. Both works portray Burgess as a leftwing slob with dirty fingernails and bad breath whose charm, rhetorical brilliance, and homosexuality somehow compensated for his sordid deficiencies. As the authors demonstrate, Burgess did indeed “know everybody.”

Another incident the authors describe for the first time almost unintentionally exposes Burgess and Maclean as communists after they had begun government work. When the BBC announced that Burgess would appear on a program as a “typical young Englishman,” a former Cambridge colleague, Derek Blaikie, turned communist, wrote a letter to the *Daily Worker* describing Burgess as a “renegade from the C. P.” and along with Maclean as “having gone over to the enemy.” (67) For reasons unexplained, the authors note, the letter was never published; it was intercepted by MI5 and placed in Blaikie’s file, but not Burgess’s. (68)

The books differ in describing details, however. For example, citing his BBC personnel file, Purvis and

In a final example of a detail not told elsewhere, the 2016 book states that the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Patrick Reilly, trashed his office chair when he heard the news of Burgess’s defection. These instances, as well as the inclusion of a few names not mentioned in Lownie and scarce mention of Burgess’s unhappy life in Moscow, illustrate the differences between the two biographies.

The Spy Who Knew Everyone is a well-documented account of Guy Burgess’s life before his defection.

a. Andrew Lownie, *Stalin’s Englishman: Guy Burgess, the Cold War, and the Cambridge Spy Ring* (St. Martin’s Press, 2016).

Into The Lion's Mouth: The True Story of Dusko Popov: World War II Spy, Patriot, and the Real-Life Inspiration for James Bond, by Larry Loftis. (Berkley Caliber, 2016) 384 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Dusko Popov was a double agent for MI5 during World War II. Known as TRICYCLE to the British and IVAN to the Germans, his service came to public attention in 1972 when he was mentioned in *The Doublecross System*, by Sir John Masterman. In 1974, Popov published his life story in *Spy/Counterspy: The Autobiography of Dusko Popov*. The first independent biography of Popov appeared in 2004.^a Attorney Larry Loftis has revisited the TRICYCLE story in *Into The Lion's Mouth: The True Story of Dusko Popov*.

The obvious question is, “Does the Loftis biography add important new material to Popov’s story?” It does not. Like the other books, Loftis covers Popov’s early life, how he became a double agent, his operational contributions, and his colorful personal adventures as TRICYCLE. But Loftis does present a new analysis of two incidents in Popov’s life story that are worth considering. The first has to do with the assertion in his subtitle that Popov was the “Real-Life Inspiration for James Bond,” and that “Dusko was also BOND in . . . Casino Royale” (265). Fleming’s first biographer, John Pearson, implies that Fleming himself was the likely model.^b More recently, Andrew Lycett suggests Fleming drew on characteristics from three of his wartime colleagues in creating Bond.^c Neither biographer mentions Popov. But Popov raised the issue himself when he wrote, “I am told that Ian Fleming said he based his character James Bond to some degree on me and my experiences. Could be.”^d Loftis expands on that comment with a lengthy discussion drawn from Popov’s book that says he was followed by Fleming in Lisbon, and that they were both at the same

Lisbon casino but never met. Loftis adds only speculation and no substance to Popov’s comment, “could be.”

The second incident is more significant and more controversial. In August 1941, the Germans sent Popov to the United States. He carried with him a questionnaire—in the form of a micro-dot—listing the information he was to acquire. Copies were given to MI6 and MI5; the FBI kept the original. One section of the questionnaire dealt with specific military topics regarding Pearl Harbor. Popov was tasked by his German case officer to go there himself—the FBI prevented him from doing so. According to Loftis, after reading the document Popov concluded, “The Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor.” (35)

In a chapter titled “Cover-Up,” Loftis provides a lengthy analysis arguing that FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover did not inform the president that one-third of the questionnaire was devoted to Pearl Harbor. Nor did he distribute it to other intelligence agencies. He also mentions that “According to Popov, he [Popov] reminded Hoover of the purpose of his mission and reiterated his warning of where, when, why, and by whom America was going to be attacked.” But “the director would have none of it.” (107) Loftis does not provide a specific source for this quote, but he does mention in the narrative that several authors supported Popov’s claims to varying degrees. All of them rely on Popov’s account. The one source that supports a contrary view is not cited.

In his article, “The British Assault on J. Edgar Hoover: The Tricycle Case,”^e former CIA officer Thomas F. Troy mentions several respected historians who used FBI documents to show that “Hoover had shared the questionnaire with military and naval intelligence” and Troy asserts, there was no cover-up. Troy says that there is evidence that Popov never even met Hoover.

a. Russell Miller, *Codename TRICYCLE: The True Story of the Second World War's Most Extraordinary Double Agent* (Secker and Warburg, 2004).

b. John Pearson, *The Life of Ian Fleming: Creator of James Bond* (Jonathan Cape, 1966).

c. Andrew Lycett, *Ian Fleming: A Biography* (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1995).

d. Dusko Popov, *Spy/Counterspy: the Autobiography of Dusko Popov* (Grosset & Dunlap, 1974), 150.

e. Thomas F. Troy, “The British Assault on J. Edgar Hoover: The Tricycle Case,” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-intelligence* 3, no. 2 (1989): 169–209.

In sum, Loftis's assertions regarding Popov and Bond, and of a Hoover cover-up, rely on unpersuasive speculation and weak analysis that distract from the true story

of Dusko Popov. *Into The Lion's Mouth* deserves a secure place in a dark corner of intelligence history.

The Last Goodnight: A World War II Story of Espionage, Adventure, and Betrayal, by Howard Blum. (HarperCollins, 2016) 528 pp., occasional source notes, bibliography, photos, index.

Amy Elizabeth Thorpe was born on 22 November 1910 in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Friends and family called her Betty. Her OSS codename was "Cynthia." Some even referred to her as the "American Mata Hari."^a In *The Last Goodnight* author Howard Blum, using the surname of her first husband, calls her "Betty Pack." This American spy has been the subject of two other books. *Cynthia* (Ballantine, 1977) was written by her wartime colleague, British historian H. Montgomery Hyde. Blum calls it "a slapdash work eviscerated by the Official Secrets censors . . . and based on Betty's incomplete memoirs and her cursory notes." (465) The Hyde book focused on Betty's putative exploits as an allied spy. The second book, about which Blum expresses high regards, is *Cast No Shadow*, (Pantheon, 1992) Mary Lovell's biography of Betty's extraordinary life.

The Last Goodnight, also a biography, covers the same ground as its predecessors: Betty's complicated family and personal life; her spying during the Spanish Civil War, then for MI6 in Poland, Chile, and the United States; and finally for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Blum's reason for writing another treatment of Pack's story is based on his examination of Montgomery Hyde's papers in Churchill College, Cambridge, and the "memoirs [including Pack's unpublished drafts], letters, diaries, transcribed interviews, government documents, and contemporaneous newspaper articles." His objective was "to tell the truth" rather than "write an academic history." (470–471)

The result is an interesting, if melodramatic, account of a WWII spy who seduced her targets to achieve her goals. But has Blum found the truth? Blum's self-proclaimed non-academic (470) approach makes it difficult to answer

this question. He does provide some endnotes, but not for all chapters. He assures the reader that there are "no inventions in my account . . . where quotations bracket any dialogue . . . one of the principals was the source." (471)

This methodology creates difficulties when questions of accountability arise and where the value of an operation is at issue. For example, Blum writes "that it was Betty who first reported that the Poles were able to read the Enigma traffic." (215) This is an astounding assertion not made elsewhere, and thus one immediately asks for specifics: when, to whom, and before the French learned of it? None are provided. In another case, in which Pack and her OSS colleagues stole the Vichy government ciphers from their Washington embassy, Blum writes that "arguably, the stolen ciphers' greatest importance was in the days leading up to the invasion of North Africa." (425) Arguably indeed. Lovell, among others, writes about the episode that "the only question open to discussion is whether . . . the ciphers were as useful to the British . . . as BSC (MI6 New York) claimed."^b

Beyond Blum's judgments about Betty's exploits, the relatively little new material in *The Last Goodnight* concerns details about the spy's relationships with husbands and lovers. Among the latter, Blum reports Montgomery Hyde's conclusion after a trip to Ireland with Pack, that "he could spice up the tales that Betty was telling him, and the Sunday papers would clamor for the rights . . . the spy codenamed Cynthia was money in the bank." (282). But *Cynthia* didn't sell well.

For those seeking entertainment, *The Last Goodnight* will be an enjoyable encounter. Those more concerned with the substance of intelligence operations will lament the evidence omitted by design.

a. Mary S. Lovell, *Cast No Shadow: The Life of the American Spy Who Changed the Course of World War II* (Pantheon Books, 1992), xiv.

b. Lovell, *Cast No Shadow*, 326.

The Less You Know, The Better You Sleep: Russia's Road To Terror and Dictatorship Under Yeltsin and Putin, by David Satter. (Yale University Press, 2016) 221 pp., endnotes, bibliography, index.

David Satter began working in Russia in 1976 as a correspondent for the *Financial Times*. His articles were often critical of the government and from time to time caused problems with his getting a visa, which were overcome when the State Department or his publisher threatened reciprocal action. Even after he accused the domestic security service, the FSB, of blowing up four civilian apartment buildings in 1999—killing hundreds for political reasons—he survived as an example of official tolerance until 2013. Then his visa application was rejected because “competent organs”—read FSB—“have determined your presence is undesirable.” (x) The rejection was not a total surprise. As one Moscow colleague put it, “it was amazing it took so long.” (xi) Readers of *The Less You Know, The Better You Sleep* will soon agree.

Satter is now a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a fellow at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. *The Less You Know* is a critical analysis of post-Cold War Russia and Vladimir Putin's rise to power. It is based on the author's observations and experiences, in which he asks the reader to “believe the unbelievable.” (xiii)

His first example of the “unbelievable” is treated in a chapter on the 1999 apartment bombings in Moscow, where Satter makes a case for FSB responsibility. The bombings occurred when the Yeltsin government was disintegrating, a war was raging in Chechnya, the oligarchs were acquiring greater influence, and the dire economic situation was the focus of citizens' attention. Then, after the bombings and Vladimir Putin's vows of revenge, he was elected president and life improved for many Russians. Satter didn't reach this “unbelievable” correlation on his own; he describes the contacts that convinced him the FSB played a role.

He also reviews supporting incidents such as the arrests and even disappearance of those—especially journalists—who held similar views and said so.

Although nominal stability followed Putin's election, the vicious war in Chechnya drew international criticism and Satter argues this led to two acts of terrorism. The first was the 2002 hostage siege at the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow; a second siege occurred at a school in Beslan in 2004. Both caused many deaths. Satter writes that “in both cases, there was evidence that the government had a role in instigating the original attacks” (99) and he presents his argument in detail. Here, too, he describes what happened to those who challenged the government's explanation, especially journalists.

The Less You Know goes on to portray Putin's consolidation of power, the reasons behind the annexation of the Crimea, his reaction to the turmoil in Ukraine, and Putin's response to the domestic demonstrations—powered by social media—opposing his second election to power in 2012. In support of these actions Satter reveals how the FSB manipulated the legal system and when legal action wasn't feasible, eliminated opposition figures by assassination or deportation.

Looking to Russia's future, Satter suggests “the most desirable scenario for Russia would be the removal of the Putin regime in a free and fair election. Unfortunately, there is virtually no chance that that will take place.” (170) Alternatively, he recommends a “truth commission” (173) that might succeed if it stirs the latent liberal forces to action.

The Less You Know presents a bleak portrait of Putin's Russia—an outcome that would have dire repercussions for the United States.

On Intelligence: The History of Espionage and the Secret World, by John Hughes-Wilson. (Constable, 2016) 528 pp., bibliography, index.

Retired British army colonel John Hughes-Wilson served in the infantry and the Intelligence Corps. The author of a number of books on military intelligence, he is perhaps best known for *Military Intelligence Blunders and Cover-Ups* (De Capo Press, 2004) and *The Puppet Masters: Spies, Traitors, and the Real Forces Behind World Events* (George Weidenfeld & Nicholson, Ltd., 2004). His works apply the notion of history as a critique of “what has happened” with its implicit mandate of factual accuracy.

Hughes-Wilson’s most recent contribution, *Intelligence: The History of Espionage and the Secret World* adds other criteria as well: “It is intended as an up-to-date analysis of intelligence in the recent past, and how its impact has affected great events.” He goes on to suggest that his recent book shares a common aim with Clausewitz’s book, *On War*, “To write a book that will not be forgotten after two or three years . . . [and] to lift the veil on what really happened behind the scenes in the intelligence world during some of the most well-known military events that have shaped our lives.” (xiv)

The 42 chapters in *On Intelligence* meet these objectives with mixed results. The book begins with a historical summary of intelligence from biblical times and continues to discuss the role of intelligence to the present. The balance of the book presents examples that illustrate the contribution of the principal topics: the intelligence cycle, HUMINT, SIGINT, the impact of technology, security issues, deception, failures, terrorism and the Iraq war, and cyber warfare (including the Snowden and WikiLeaks affairs), in roughly that order. Counterintelligence is included under HUMINT. The cases are presented along with a discussion of the historical context in which they occurred. The focus is on the British, US, and Russian services. Hughes-Wilson discusses their creation, organizational evolution, and their interactions with each other and with the services of a variety of other nations.

It is important, therefore, that readers have confidence in the facts presented. Alas, the facts are not always on the mark and the lack of source notes only complicates the problem. A few examples are worth noting. In his discussion of early American intelligence, Col. Hughes-Wilson identifies Benjamin Franklin as a “British agent and spy throughout” the Revolutionary War. (23) All evidence suggests otherwise. Only one source suggested the possibility and even he was not sure.^a

Turning to the American Civil War, Hughes-Wilson writes that “Lincoln’s first choice as chief of the Union intelligence service was a detective, Allan Pinkerton.” (28) Not so: Lincoln never chose a chief of intelligence and Pinkerton was selected by Major General George McClellan. Similarly, Belle Boyd—a Confederate spy during the Civil War—was not “the South’s most famous agent,” (29) though she might have been the most self-promoting. And the claim that Antietam was a Union defeat—it was Lee who went home—is at best arguable; the consensus is that it was a military draw and a logistical failure for the South. Finally, the assertion that Lee “pushed a whole corps . . . into the small town of Gettysburg to find out what was going on, just as Meade’s leading Units blundered into town” (31) rewrites the history of the battle.

With regard to the “Cambridge Five” KGB agents, Blunt was recruited in 1936, not 1934, and Maclean did not report directly to Lavrentiy Beria; he had an NKVD contact, as did the other agents. (136) Hughes-Wilson’s statement that the FBI director did not distribute the questionnaire on Pearl Harbor that MI5 double agent TRICYCLE provided is inaccurate. Hoover sent it to the War and Navy Departments where it was ignored. (250) Then there is the curiously opaque comment that “a brush pass with a rock or a tree is still a brush pass.” (72)

a. Cecil B. Currey, *Code Number 72/Ben Franklin: Patriot or Spy?* (Prentice Hall, 1972).

Col. Hughes-Wilson uses the case summaries to demonstrate how intelligence has evolved and its importance in modern society. In the end he concludes, without substantiation, that the problems fac-

ing intelligence today “will get worse not better.” (474) While *On Intelligence* is a very readable review of the subject, it should be read with caution.

O*peration Whisper: The Capture of Soviet Spies Morris and Lona Cohen*, by Barnes Carr. (ForeEdge, 2016) 338 pp., endnotes, photos, index.

In 1946 the US Army’s VENONA program yielded the first of many decryptions of Soviet intelligence messages sent from New York to Moscow during World War II. To the surprised analysts, these messages provided evidence of NKVD (later KGB) penetration of the Manhattan Project during the war. Because only codenames were used, the FBI was tasked with determining the true names from clues in the messages. British scientist Klaus Fuchs (REST) was one of the first to be identified. MI5 was informed and Fuchs confessed during his interrogation; his arrest and conviction made headlines. After sentencing, the FBI interviewed Fuchs about his US contacts. The NKVD was already urging agents whom Fuchs would probably implicate to leave the United States. Among those in New York, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg and David and Ruth Greenglass delayed too long. Morris and Lona Cohen didn’t. *Operation Whisper* tells what precipitated their disappearance in 1950 and how they went on serving the KGB until their deaths.

Operation Whisper answers a number of other questions about these two New Yorkers. Carr reviews their family backgrounds, education, and courtship—and how they became very dedicated communists and eventually Soviet agents. He describes how Morris became a recruiter of agents who collected military and industrial espionage intelligence in the United States and how Lona carried on his work when Morris served in the Spanish-American War. During World War II, Morris served in the US Army. During this period Lona became a courier for Ted Hall, an NKVD agent at Los Alamos, who furnished atomic secrets to the Soviets.

After Elizabeth Bentley—a US spy for the Soviet Union—defected to the FBI in 1945, the Soviets broke contact with their active agents until 1947. Then the Cohens resumed courier activities—one of their case officers was Willie Fisher (AKA: Col. Rudolf Abel)—until the hunt for atomic spies got too close and the Cohens disappeared.

Journalist Barnes Carr became interested in the Cohens’ case when he read an article about them in the *Memphis Press-Scimitar*, a paper for which he had once worked. After acquiring a copy of the Cohens’ FBI file, he scoured all the other sources he could find and began interviewing people who had known them. He soon learned that after their disappearance the Cohens had worked for the KGB in England, where they were known to MI5 as “Peter and Helen Kroger.” Under the cover of an antiquarian book business, the Krogers provided a communication link for KGB illegals. They were not, however, as Carr claims, involved “in atomic spying in England.” (x) Carr learned too that they had been arrested as part of OPERATION WHISPER, which tracked down KGB agents revealed by Polish defector Michael Goleniewski (SNIPER). Convicted in 1961, they were exchanged in 1969 and sent to Warsaw and eventually Moscow, where they retired.

Carr tells how the couple found their way to Moscow, where they were given new identities and dispatched to London. He describes how they serviced the Gordon Lonsdale espionage network for some time and how they were tracked down by MI5.

Whether they were “the urbane, jet-set couple loyal to their service” as Carr suggests, is questionable. But it may be true that “The Soviets certainly thought so.” (287) After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Morris and Lona Cohen were made Heroes of the Russian Federation, but as Carr reveals “they came to miss America and their families.” They hated being called traitors and denied they had hurt their homeland. Nevertheless, they died in Russia, 42 years after their disappearance. (289)

The Red Web: The Struggle Between Russia's Digital Dictators and The New Online Revolutionaries, by Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan. (PublicAffairs, 2015) 384 pp., endnotes, index.

During an informal discussion among some attendees of the international conference on intelligence at Greifswald University in November 2015, a Dutch academic mentioned the paradoxical website, Agentura.ru.^a Created in 2000, by two young journalists, Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, its announced purpose was to serve as a watchdog of the Russian secret services. The paradox stemmed from the site's reputation for excellent coverage and its longevity in Putin's Russia. No explanation of the paradox was forthcoming then and *The Red Web* doesn't supply one either. But it does validate the authors' reputations for remarkable journalism.

In *The Red Web*, Soldatov and Borogan begin with a story about the Marafino sharashka, a World War II prison camp for scientists in Moscow, made famous by Solzhenitsyn in *The First Circle*. They tell about the successful development of a primitive voice analysis technique applied to a voice intercept of a call made by would-be spy for the United States. They go on to argue that subsequent Soviet progress in monitoring communications was minimal in part because of Russia's "dysfunctional and broken communications system with barely a connection abroad," even in 1991. Today, however, Russia "stands in the top ranks of developing countries that are wired to the world." (x) *The Red Web* tells how the Russians achieved this status and what it means for Russia now and in the future.

In the 1980s, the Soviets liberated a copy of the UNIX operating system and began developing their own computers. By 1990 scientific labs had established an analog network. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and with help of Western businesses, the Russians went digital and cautiously joined the Internet. All along the KGB and then the FSB, Russia's state security organization, closely monitored their traffic—all of it. To meet this requirement they developed a backdoor black box called the SORM (system of operative search measures) and tried to keep it secret. The authors write

about how they learned of SORM through a leak, how they traced it to the FSB, and how it was exposed. Many were "interviewed" by the FSB about the source, the authors included, but none were imprisoned.

Public awareness of SORM and what it was supposed to do, didn't raise public concern even though it was integral to Putin's plan to gain control over the Internet and social media, which was becoming the principal means of informing the public of events free from government spin. Equally important, these new forms of communication could motivate opposition through demonstrations, as they did before and after Putin's run for the presidency in 2012. "The revolt of the wired was underway" and the resilient netizens found ways around all restrictions. (148) Putin struck back with denial-of-service attacks that brought down offending websites. E-mails with Trojan Horses that destroyed hard drives were used to exert control. After his second election, Putin sponsored legislation that allowed filtering of the Internet and blocked access to selected sites. (166) Other action against opponents included forced buy-outs of TV station, expulsion, and even assassination. (104ff)

The authors also discuss the defection of Edward Snowden, which revealed, inter alia, that most Internet traffic passed through servers in the United States. This, they write, prompted Putin to begin a program to "change the global rules of the Internet" by routing Russian traffic through servers in Russia. Putin, they observe, thought "the Americans ruled the web and it was a CIA project." (223) Putin wanted to control the Russian web and new laws toward that end were enacted.

The Red Web concludes by acknowledging that "Russian Internet freedom has been deeply curtailed" (314) through intimidation imposed by the FSB. But in the end, they foresee that the free flow of information on the web will prevail, even in Russia.

a. Sponsored by the Institute of National Remembrance, the University of Southern Denmark, and Ernst-Moritz-Arndt-Universität, Greifswald, Germany.

Spies In The Congo: The Race for the Ore That Built the Atomic Bomb, by Susan Williams. (Hurst Publishers, 2016) 320 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index. (See review by David Foy on page 67.)

On 2 August 1939, Albert Einstein signed a letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt warning that Germany might be developing an atomic bomb and suggesting that the United States do likewise. The letter also said that the best source of uranium—a critical component—was in the Belgian Congo (today the Democratic Republic of Congo). Uranium ore in the United States had only 0.03-percent uranium oxide, requiring significant costly and time-consuming enrichment; ore from the Shinkolobwe mine in the Congo had up to 75-percent uranium oxide. General Leslie Groves, head of the Manhattan Project—the US atom bomb program—directed that steps be taken to (1) acquire all the uranium ore at Shinkolobwe and (2) prevent Germany from obtaining any. He assigned that latter mission to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). *Spies In The Congo* tells how they did it.

Most books about OSS exploits expand on operations mentioned elsewhere in the literature or official reports. But Susan Williams, a senior fellow at the School of Advanced Study, University of London, explores a topic not covered previously. The *OSS War Report, Volume II*, does mention OSS operations in Africa and the Congo, where an officer codenamed TETON was assigned to prevent diamond smuggling, but there is no mention of uranium.

Spies In The Congo not only identifies TETON as Wilbur Owings Hogue—commonly called Dock—and his equally unheard-of OSS colleagues, it also reveals that diamond smuggling was a cover for their secret mission. Few of the OSS or State Department officials involved knew the official purpose of the real mission. Using US and UK archival records, Williams provides biographical sketches of Hogue and the other OSS officers participating in the operations in Africa and Washington. But the central thrust of the book is the various

operations initiated and the problems overcome along the way. These range from recruiting agents—which for an unexplained reason she labels “cut-outs,” an entirely different species—throughout the Congo. They monitored the movement of uranium from Shinkolobwe to ports of embarkation to assure the shipments were not diverted and to prevent sabotage by German agents working in the area. There were also administrative issues to be overcome, for example, dealing with the often spotty cooperation of “US Consulate General in Léopoldville, where invoices for uranium were signed and transportation arrangements made.” (160)

Williams also discusses communications problems with OSS headquarters in Washington and the links with other OSS stations and bases in neighboring countries that supported the operation. And then there is the sometimes challenging relationship with “the British Opposites”: MI6, MI5, and Special Operations Executive (SOE) elements operating in the area. With many years of experience in Africa, Williams notes that, “resentment of OSS smoldered among some members of SOE” as well as the foreign representatives. (117)

To complete the story, Williams mentions a number of important issues. These include the miners’ problems unknowingly encountered at Shinkolobwe, where they were handing the radioactive uranium. On the OSS side, she describes what happened to Hogue and his colleagues—in the field and in Washington—when they completed their missions and returned to postwar life.

Spies In The Congo is an immensely valuable contribution to OSS history that recognizes many OSS and State Department officers who never violated their oath of secrecy.

The Spy in Hitler's Inner Circle: Hans-Thilo Schmidt and the Intelligence Network that Decoded Enigma, by Paul Paillole. (Casemate Publishers, 2016) 304 pp., endnotes, appendices, glossary, no index.

The title of this book misrepresents the story it tells. Hans-Thilo Schmidt was never in Hitler's inner circle, and there was no network that decoded Enigma. That was accomplished first by the Poles and later by the British. The late Paul Paillole didn't do the translation, but he does reveal the events that led to the British and Polish successes.

Five intelligence officers are featured in the story. Three served in the Deuxième Bureau (French military intelligence): Gustave Bertrand was a cryptologist; Rodolphe Lemoine was an agent handler; and Paul Paillole was a counterintelligence officer. Marian Rejewski was a Polish cryptologist working on a team trying to decrypt Enigma messages. Hans-Thilo Schmidt, thanks to his brother, a senior Wehrmacht officer, was an official of the Forschungsamt, the German service for wiretapping, intercepting communications and decoding them. He was also a traitor who volunteered his services to the French in June 1931.

Paillole's account begins with Schmidt's decision to sell cryptographic secrets to the French to enable him to live the lifestyle that he desired—he was a philanthropist, among other not so admirable characteristics. Once Bertrand and the French were convinced he was genuine, he was assigned the codename "H. E." Those letters pronounced in French sounded like Asche in English and that is how he came to be known.

Lemoine (known as Rex) was assigned as Schmidt's case officer and Paillole describes their secret letter correspondence used to maintain contact and the clandestine meetings—often with Bertrand—in various countries where materials describing the German work on Enigma were turned over in return for substantial sums.

When the French crypto bureau was unable to decrypt Enigma, even with the material Schmidt provided, Paillole took the material to the Poles in Warsaw, who he knew to be working on the problem. The closed-mouth Poles were receptive, but initially reluctant to reveal the details of their results. Frustrated, Paillole contacted the British and gave them copies of the Asche material, but they didn't have any success, either.

Finally, as Hitler's invasion of Poland drew near, the Poles arranged a meeting with their British and French contacts to give them the substantial results of their Enigma work before the Germans could get them. Asche continued contact after the invasion but his value was now diminished and Rex had come under suspicion. When Rex was finally arrested in March 1943, he confessed all. Schmidt was arrested soon after. He took poison before the Gestapo could execute him.

Paillole completes his story with what happened to each of the characters after the war. His personal involvement with the events adds authenticity to the story of a famous spy.

Spying Through A Glass Darkly: American Espionage against the Soviet Union, 1945–1946, by David Alvarez and Eduard Mark. (University Press of Kansas, 2016) 360 pp., endnotes, bibliography, index. (See review by John Ehrman on page 61.)

After abolishing the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in October 1945, President Harry S. Truman soon realized he had created a perfect bureaucratic storm as the Army, Navy, State Department, and FBI each maneuvered to be his principal source on intelligence matters. Tru-

man's corrective was to issue an executive order on 26 January 1946 establishing the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), headed by Adm. Sidney Souers, the first director of central intelligence (DCI). As CIA's chief historian later wrote, among its other weaknesses the CIG "had

no authority to collect foreign secrets.”^a The CIG was initially an analysis-only organization staffed by former OSS analysts and dependent on other elements of the government to provide whatever information they chose to share. Although the CIG was set up only to do analysis, it soon became heavily involved in intelligence operations. *Spying Through A Glass Darkly* tells that story.

Historian David Alvarez, then working with the late Eduard Mark, who died unexpectedly in the early stages of research, begins with a review of the bureaucratic muddle that ensued with the dissolution of OSS. Truman decided to accept the Budget Bureau’s recommendation that former OSS analysts go to the State Department and “the clandestine espionage service . . . minus the paramilitary function, move to the War Department for salvage and liquidation.” The secretary of war and his assistant, John McCloy, seized on the “salvage” requirement to preserve “the clandestine operators from OSS and their records.” In their view, rather than being liquidated, these capabilities “should be protected and nurtured as a separate unit rather than simply being absorbed into the Army’s military intelligence office.” (16) That is what happened. The new unit was designated the Strategic Services Unit (SSU). Its mission was to function unofficially as the “clandestine service” of the CIG. (23) By October 1946, the second DCI, Lt. General Hoyt Vandenberg, had integrated the SSU into the CIG.

Alvarez is not the first to discuss the SSU. Former DCI Richard Helms devotes two chapters in his memoirs to the SSU, which outline some of the organizational and operational obstacles it faced.^b But as Alvarez notes, most Cold War historians have largely ignored the SSU’s role during the year of its existence. Intelligence histories have focused on Soviet espionage in the United States rather than US operations against the Soviets.

a. David Robarge, “Leadership In An Intelligence Organization: The Directors of Central Intelligence and the CIA,” in Loch K. Johnson (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence* (Oxford University Press, 2010), 486.

b. Richard Helms with William Hood, *A Look Over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency* (Random House, 2003), 64–81.

Alvarez reviews the formidable administrative and operational problems facing the SSU as it struggled to become functional. Administrative problems were caused by demobilization, budget reductions, and battles with the State Department over cover arrangements. Operational challenges resulted from lack of experience working against Soviet targets while also interrogating former Nazis, POWs, and émigrés who were potential sources. At first most intelligence on the Soviets was provided by cooperating friendly services like Great Britain, Italy, Sweden and—to a much lesser extent—France. Independent SSU operations were slow to develop and were complicated by experienced Soviet counterintelligence dangle operations^c and fabricators seeking to line their pockets. Direction from SSU headquarters in Washington was, at the outset, almost nil as the organization worked to get on its feet in the War Department. Left to their own devices, the former OSS stations in Europe initially concentrated on recruiting sources and monitoring mail and other communications in Berlin and Austria as they “gradually began to develop operations into Russian-occupied territory . . . and occasionally beyond the Soviet sector of Berlin” (100) into Poland and other East European nations.

As part of the SSU story, *Spying Through A Glass Darkly* also discusses the intelligence contributions of the military, particularly the codebreaking efforts, and the response of the State Department—not always positive—to the foreign intelligence reports SSU analysts produced.

Alvarez concludes his assessment by acknowledging that it is not possible to say with certainty what impact the SSU had on US policymakers’ foreign policy decisions during the early Cold War. He cites many primary source documents that show that the estimates produced about the Soviet political and military “behavior and capabilities . . . [were] largely accurate.” Contrary to the conventional wisdom in the United States, the Soviets were “deceptive, untrustworthy, hostile, and belligerent” adversaries. Throughout its one-year existence, the SSU, despite its growing pains, “may deserve a more

c. A “dangle” is a person sent by the intelligence agency of his or her own country who approaches an intelligence agency of another country hoping to be recruited as a spy and work as a double agent.

prominent place, not only in the history of American intelligence, but in the history of the origins of the Cold War.” (282) Not only did the SSU provide US intelligence with the capability to conduct clandestine operations, it also provided CIA with an experienced cadre of officers.

Stalin’s Singing Spy: The Life and Exile of Nadezhda Plevitskaya, by Pamela A. Jordan. (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016) 380 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

For many nations at peace, domestic political opposition is dealt with at the ballot box. In others, however, opponents are coerced, kidnapped and imprisoned, executed, or even assassinated. In the 20th century the Soviet Union, under Stalin, was the exemplar of the latter approach. *Stalin’s Singing Spy* is the story of how Stalin used his intelligence services to deal with political opposition from Russian expatriates—the so-called White Russians—living abroad and planning to overthrow the communist regime in the motherland.

Author Pamela Jordan is a Russian specialist and intelligence historian at Southern New Hampshire University. She learned of Nadezhda Plevitskaya, the relatively unknown central figure in her book, while reading the *Biographical Dictionary of the Soviet Union (1917–1988)*. Further research revealed the details of Plevitskaya’s extraordinary life told in *Stalin’s Singing Spy*.

Nadezhda Plevitskaya was a peasant girl from the rural Kursk region in prerevolutionary Russia. She possessed an unusual talent for spirited folk singing that eventually came to the attention of the Czar for whom she performed. After the revolution, she married a White Russian general, Nikolai Skoblin. They settled in Paris and joined the Russian General Military (ROVS) movement, headed by General Evgeny Miller, that planned to overthrow the communists by force. Skoblin eventually became Miller’s deputy.

The couple faced ongoing financial troubles even though Plevitskaya arranged concert tours—one to the United States. To make ends meet, they bought a farm in southern France, where they lived modestly. But like many of the émigrés, they became homesick, sensed the futility of the ROVS movement, and returned to Russia. In the early 1930s they returned to

Spying Through A Glass Darkly fills a long-standing historical gap and is an important contribution to the intelligence literature.

Paris and “acquaintances began noticing that Skoblins seemed to be living beyond their means.” (103) Some of their friends even suspected they had been recruited by Stalin’s domestic security forces, the NKVD.

The NKVD kept close tabs on the ROVS by recruiting sources within the organization who reported on their counter-revolutionary plans. The NKVD dealt with the ROVS leaders, often kidnapping them and returning them to Russia for trial and execution. General Miller’s predecessor, Gen. Alexander Kutepov, died en route. General Miller disappeared on 22 July 1937.

Professor Jordan describes the French investigation that showed Miller too had been kidnapped. She reveals that the Skoblins were indeed NKVD agents and that the general was directly involved. Miller, it was learned, had been warned by subordinates that Skoblin was an NKVD agent. Thus, as a precaution he gave a handwritten note to a colleague that explained his movements on the day of his kidnapping. It was to be opened in the event that he didn’t return from a secret meeting arranged by Skoblin of which Plevitskaya knew nothing. The note was turned over to French authorities. Skoblin quickly escaped, leaving Plevitskaya at the mercy of French justice. She was arrested, tried, convicted, and sent to prison, where she died.

Stalin’s Singing Spy is a scholarly, very detailed, thoroughly documented, yet remarkably readable account of Plevitskaya’s often exciting life that intersected Stalin’s intelligence services in the mid-1930s. Dr. Jordan has illuminated one of the dark corners of intelligence history.

INTELLIGENCE ABROAD

The Angel: The Egyptian Spy Who Saved Israel, by Uri Bar-Joseph. (HarperCollins, 2016) 372 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index. (See review by Thomas Coffey on page 61.)

On 27 June 2007, Dr. Ashraf Marwan fell to his death from the balcony of his fifth floor apartment in London. His wife, Mona Gamal Abdel Nasser, was the daughter of former president Gamal Abdel Nasser. The funeral in Cairo four days later was attended by Egypt's establishment elites. Not all the mourners shared the praise heaped on Marwan, however. Some thought him "the worst traitor in the nation's history." (3) Some Israelis later expressed the view that "Marwan duped Israel at the behest of Sadat . . . they worked it out together." (123) On 10 May 2009, *60 Minutes* ran a story that ended by asking, "Who did Marwan really betray?" (5) Uri Bar-Joseph, a former intelligence analyst and now a professor at the University of Haifa, answers that question in *The Angel*.

Bar-Joseph discusses the knowns and uncertainties about Marwan in order to enable readers to understand the personal, political, and operational aspects of the case. For example, Marwan first contacted the Israelis in the summer of 1970 from one of London's "iconic red phone booths" now museum pieces. Bar-Joseph then examines the Israelis' response as they sought to validate Marwan's bona fides and motivation. While there can never be complete certainty, the Israelis verified his position on the embassy staff, his connections in the presidential office in Cairo, and his access to valuable military and political intelligence. After lengthy interviews in a London safehouse, the Israelis judged Marwan's actions to be a complex combination of ego and greed. Bar-Joseph sees analogies with the Penkovsky case.^a (30) But was Marwan an Egyptian provocation? This crucial question was debated at Mossad headquarters, where it was decided he was worth the risk to run him. Reassured by the initial material Marwan provided,

he soon became their most valuable agent—codename ANGEL—and Bar-Joseph describes how he was handled.

By 1973, Nasser had died and Marwan was accepted by his successor, Anwar Sadat, as a trusted advisor; he often served as Sadat's personal representative to other Arab countries in confidential matters. In 1972, when Sadat announced to his military chiefs that he planned to "launch a war" against Israel, Marwan's value increased exponentially. Bar-Joseph explains how Marwan kept the Israelis informed of the Egyptian plans and how, after several postponements, he alerted them to the October Yom Kippur attack only hours before it began.

The Yom Kippur war was widely viewed afterward as an intelligence failure, but Bar-Joseph explains why it was not a total disaster. The warning had provided time to alert the reserves and to take action against Syria. Nevertheless, controversy resulted when some in the Israeli military saw the late warning as evidence that Marwan was a double agent for Egypt.

The Mossad protected Marwan during the next 10 years although rumors that he was a double agent continued within the Israeli and eventually the Egyptian military. In December 2002, Marwan was named in an Egyptian newspaper quoting an Israeli historian. (298) The leak created bureaucratic havoc in Israel and Bar-Joseph tells how he was eventually identified. Marwan vehemently denied the charge, and Bar-Joseph describes how he managed to survive until 27 June 2007, when he fell to his death in London.

The Angel concludes with a detailed analysis of why "Ashraf Marwan was no double agent at all, but rather one of the most important spies the world has seen in the last half century." (325)

a. Oleg Penkovsky, codenamed HERO, was a colonel with Soviet military intelligence during the 1950s and early 1960s who informed the United Kingdom and the United States about the Soviet emplacement of missiles in Cuba. [Wikipedia]

The Black Door: Spies, Secret Intelligence and British Prime Ministers, by Richard J. Aldrich and Rory Cormac. (HarperCollins, 2016) 624 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Whether allies or adversaries, individuals or organizations, it is essential that observers understand the political and bureaucratic relationships that shape their national security decisions. Recent histories of the principal intelligence services in the United Kingdom—MI5, MI6, and GCHQ—have contributed to this objective—from inside each service, looking up toward the prime minister’s office. *The Black Door* reverses direction and adds perspective from “behind the famous black door of 10 Downing Street,” the official residence of Britain’s prime ministers. (3)

Author historians Richard Aldrich (Warwick University) and Rory Cormac (Nottingham University) examine 39 of the 40 British prime ministers in separate chapters, beginning with Herbert Asquith who was PM when the intelligence services were officially created in 1909. (The present PM, Theresa May, assumed office after the publication date.) Their overall assessment of the relationship is that the “link between Number 10 and Britain’s intelligence agencies, as intimate as it is secret, lies at the heart of the British establishment.” (3)

But it was not always thus. The authors characterize the early prime ministers as “notably inept practitioners.” Asquith, for example, “had little interest in secret matters other than his mistress.” (4) In the early days, the authors continue, PMs were also less than security-conscious, in several cases publishing secret decryptions of intercepted foreign traffic for political gain. Of course, the nations involved promptly changed their codes. Some PMs even suspected the services of plotting against the government. (10–11)

All this changed when Winston Churchill became PM in 1940; Churchill “placed a premium on intelligence chiefs telling truth to power” (4) and his influence was felt even after he retired in 1955. But this did not mean an end to intelligence scandals and perceived plots: in fact, they reached new heights during the Cold War. The authors discuss them all and assess their im-

pact on domestic security and foreign relations, especially with the Soviet Union and the United States.

With regard to the United States, readers should question the authors’ contention that during the runup to the Suez crisis, “Miles Copeland, a CIA officer who had . . . discussed Nasser’s assassination with [PM] Eden.” They assert that Copeland claimed “Anthony Eden wanted me to shoot Nasser.” (202) Since, according to Copeland, he was serving at CIA Headquarters and traveling to the Middle East at the time, and never claimed to have been a chief of station, there is good reason to dismiss the authors’ interpretation.^a

The 1990s opened a new era in the relationship of the services with the public when John Major allowed them to adopt “an avowed legal identity” and the advent of the terrorist threat meant new missions and larger budgets. The Blair years were particularly troublesome for the nation and the intelligence services, though Number 10 “was fascinated by them.” (495) The authors discuss Blair’s tenure at length. David Cameron, “who did not share Churchill’s voracious appetite for raw intelligence,” but was never accused of applying Eden’s “model of neurotic meddling,” was nevertheless “a diligent consumer of intelligence.” (456–467) The day after assuming office, Cameron formed the National Security Council to help manage the relationship between intelligence policymaking. The authors conclude that he learned “a great deal about the power of intelligence.” (483)

While *The Black Door* is generally well documented, it does raise doubt from time to time. For example, the assertion that “in 1954, Britain received five significant defectors from the Soviet Union” is questionable. The only example mentioned is Nikolai Khokhlov, and he defected to the United States, not to MI6 as claimed. (169) In another case, their treatment of Michael Straight’s

a. Miles Copeland, *The Game Player: Confessions of the CIA’s Original Political Operative* (Aurum Press, Ltd., 1989), 196–198.

confession that he was a former KGB agent includes a description of Straight as “a distinguished American academic” who was being considered “to lead the Advisory Council on the Arts.” (In fact, Straight was never an academic and the position involved was Chairman of National Endowment for the Arts.) Moreover, their statement that “Arthur Martin, MI5’s molehunter in chief, was quickly on a plane to Washington” to debrief Straight is inaccurate; Martin was already here on another case, and was called in by the FBI. (239)

***The Intelligence War in Latin America, 1914–1922*, by Jamie Bisher.** (McFarland & Company, Publishers, 2016) 440 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos index.

If asked to identify some memorable World War I intelligence-related events, many would name Room 40 and the Zimmermann telegram, the exploits of Lawrence of Arabia, or perhaps the Black Tom sabotage in New York harbor, Reilly “Ace of Spies,” the first use of fixed-wing aerial photo-reconnaissance, and certainly Mata Hari. Jamie Bisher, however, would find this list incomplete because it only hints—e.g., the Zimmermann telegram—at operations in Latin America.

An Air Force Academy graduate who served during the Cold War, Bisher’s current hobby is researching the stacks at the National Archives for significant intelligence-related events whose story has not been told. *The Intelligence War in Latin America 1914–1922*, is a great example.

Bisher has not produced an anecdotal summary of espionage stories. This oversized, three column, extensively documented work would be over twice as long had a conventional format been used. Instead, *The Intelligence War in Latin America* reveals widespread intelligence activities of the nominally neutral Latin and Central American countries as they cooperated with Germany and Japan—a putative ally against Germany—to further their own ends at the expense of the United States.

When the war began, Germany’s long-established economic ties with Latin American nations were in

Of course the PMs do little of the actual work regarding intelligence policy and *The Black Door* discusses the sometimes contentious roles of their key subordinates, various ministers, secretaries, and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in various well known cases. The intelligence services of the United States figure prominently throughout the book, documenting a close relationship. The result is a very readable, interesting, and informative treatment of the British prime ministers’ contributions to the evolution of their intelligence community and its relationship with other nations.

jeopardy due to the British blockade of axis shipping. Bisher describes how naval intelligence units in all countries worked to monitor shipping and inform their headquarters about enemy warships. The Axis nations wanted to protect ships caught in Latin waters and destroy British ships sent to annihilate them. The “first naval battles of the war were fought off Brazilian, Argentinian, and Chilean shores.” (13)

In 1916, the British created a Black List—the United States would publish its own later—of all firms trying to do business with the Axis governments. The result was, among other reactions, “some 200 acts of sabotage within the United States” (86) supported by agents stationed in Latin America. This complicated US relations with its Latin trading partners. Bisher deals with this situation at length. Besides the key personnel involved, he describes the intelligence networks and their operations that struggled to keep the United States from supporting the Allies and the corresponding networks established by the Allies—mainly in Mexico—to counter the Axis efforts.

Bisher also mentions some heretofore unknown US intelligence officers who functioned successfully throughout the war. John Duhn—a German who emigrated to the United States and offered his services as a double agent to the Office of Naval Intelligence—is a good example. Dunn uncovered a US expatriate working for the Germans

as well as a German Admiralty codebook. (177) On the other hand, Bisher also tells of German agents sought throughout the war who managed to evade capture.

The end of the war in Europe did not mean the intelligence battles were over; some continued into the 1920s. Japan had established “a small espionage service Latin America” in early 1918 and, anticipating the future, it continued operating throughout the region and even in the United States. (249)

Likewise, German intelligence functioned into the postwar era, when economic issues prevailed.

Bisher ends his far-reaching study with a summary of what happened to the major players. Their fates were mixed. His own efforts establish that the extent and intensity of intelligence efforts in Latin America during World War I were far greater than previously reported. A fine contribution to the literature.

MEMOIR

The Secrets of My Life: Vintner, Prisoner, Soldier, Spy, by Peter M. F. Sichel. (Archway Publishing, 2016) 403 pp., bibliography, photos, index.

Peter Sichel has put pen to paper to tell how a young German-Jew grew up to serve in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the CIA before retiring to become the vintner famous for Blue Nun wine. Sichel was born to a prosperous family of vintners in Mainz Germany, on 12 September 1922. He received a traditional German education until Hitler came to power. Then he and his sister were sent to Public school in England without knowing a word of English, an experience “not for the faint of heart.” (86). By 1939, when Peter and his sister left England after five years, they joined the rest of their family in France, where their family members had gone as émigrés to escape Nazi persecution. When Hitler invaded France they became refugees in France, then illegal aliens, and after brief imprisonment began working to avoid a “free train ride” to Germany. They survived thanks to friends, the French and American branches of the family wine business, and skill dealing with slightly corrupt border officials. On 1 April 1941 they left Lisbon for New York. The week after Pearl Harbor, Peter volunteered for service in the army.

Assigned to the Medical Corps, and while waiting for orders Sichel took the Specialized Training Program exams. A few weeks later he was interviewed by two “gentlemen in civilian clothes” who clearly knew of his linguistic abilities and his life in Europe. Asked if he would be

willing to be dropped behind enemy lines, Peter quickly volunteered. His OSS career had begun. After extensive training, he was assigned to OSS headquarters in Algiers and placed in charge of “confidential funds” obtained for agents going behind enemy lines. Sichel later served in Italy and France, where his commander was William Casey. By that time he had been given a direct commission.

By the fall of 1944 the demand for German speakers increased as the US Army neared Germany. Sichel left his financial duties and began recruiting and handling German agents to go behind enemy lines. In December, DCI Richard Helms asked him to be part of the postwar OSS cadre in Berlin and he accepted. His descriptions of the postwar devastation—social and physical—in Germany are striking.

Assigned to head the “Peter Unit”—the name was a coincidence—not officially linked to OSS, Sichel describes a number of missions the unit performed. Likewise he provides vivid examples of the intelligence problems encountered interrogating POW sources and recruiting agents to work against the Soviets. After OSS was abolished, his unit became part of the Strategic Services Unit, (SSU), then the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), and finally CIA.

Sichel stayed in Berlin until 1952 and then spent four years at CIA Headquarters before moving on to Hong Kong, where he was chief of station. (236) For various personal reasons—which he mentions—Sichel resigned from CIA after his Hong Kong assignment and returned to life in the vintner business, a topic that fills the latter chapters of the book.

The Secrets of My Life describes many of the fascinating operations in which Sichel was involved in each assignment. He also includes a chapter titled “An Informed Critique” in which he expresses his views of some of the principal CIA officers with whom he served: Allen Dulles, Richard Helms, James Angleton, and Bill Harvey to name several. For those interested in what life was like in the early days of the clandestine service, Sichel has written a valuable and interesting book.



Books Reviewed in *Studies in Intelligence* 2016

Reviews can be reached at <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/index.html>.

CONTEMPORARY TOPICS

- Harry Potter and the Art of Spying***, by Lynn Boughey and Peter Earnest (60 4 [December] Bookshelf)
- Inside Jihad: How Radical Islam Works, Why It Should Terrify Us, How to Defeat It***, by Dr. Tawfik Hamid (60 3 [September] Bookshelf)
- Interrogation, Intelligence and Security: Controversial British Techniques***, by Samantha Newbery (60 3 [September] Bookshelf)
- Playing To The Edge: American Intelligence In The Age Of Terror***, by Michael V. Hayden (60 2 [June] Hayden Peake)
- 100 Deadly Skills: The SEAL Operative's Guide to Eluding Pursuers, Evading Capture and Surviving Any Dangerous Situation***, by Clint Emerson (60 2 [June] Bookshelf)
- Quantitative Intelligence Analysis: Applied Analytic Models, Simulations, and Games***, by Edward Waltz (60 3 [September] Bookshelf)
- Rebuttal: The CIA Responds to the Senate Intelligence Committee's Study of Its Detention and Interrogation Program***, edited by Bill Harlow (60 1 [March] Bookshelf)
- The Snowden Reader***, edited by David P. Fidler (60 1 [March] Bookshelf)
- When Should State Secrets Stay Secret? Accountability, Democratic Governance, and Intelligence***, by Genevieve Lester (60 3 [September] Jason U. Manosevitz)

GENERAL

- The Central Intelligence Agency: An Encyclopedia of Covert Ops, Intelligence Gathering, and Spies***, edited by Jan Goldman (60 2 [June] Bookshelf)
- Company Confessions: Revealing CIA Secrets***, by Christopher Moran (60 1 [March] Hayden Peake)
- Countdown to Zero Day: STUXNET and the Launch of the World's First Digital Weapon***, by Kim Zetter (60 1 [March] Bookshelf)
- The Ethics of Intelligence: A New Framework***, by Ross W. Bellaby (60 1 [March] Bookshelf)
- The Five Disciplines of Intelligence Collection***, edited by Mark M. Lowenthal and Robert M. Clark (60 1 [March] Bookshelf)

Following book titles and author names are the *Studies in Intelligence* issue in which the review appeared and the name of the reviewer. All bookshelf reviews are by Hayden Peake.

- Historical Dictionary of Russian and Soviet Intelligence***, by Robert W. Pringle (60 1 [March] Bookshelf)
- The Image of the Enemy—Intelligence Analysis of Adversaries Since 1945***, edited by Paul Maddrell (60 1 [March] Jason Manosevitz)
- Understanding the Department of Homeland Security***, by Don Philpott (60 2 [June] Bookshelf)
- Intelligence Studies in Britain the US: Historiography Since 1945***, edited by Christopher R. Moran and Christopher J. Murphy (60 1 [March] Bookshelf)
- Why Spy?: The Art of Intelligence***, by Brian Stewart & Samantha Newbery (60 2 [June] Bookshelf)
- Objective TROY: A Terrorist, a President, and the Rise of the Drone***, by Scott Shane (60 1 [March] Bookshelf)

HISTORICAL

- Agent Fifi and the Wartime Honeytrap Spies***, by Bernard O'Connor (60 2 [June] Bookshelf)
- Anonymous Soldiers: The Struggle for Israel, 1917–1947***, by Bruce Hoffman (60 3 [September] Bookshelf)
- Avenue of Spies: A True Story of Terror, Espionage, and One American Family's Heroic Resistance in Nazi Occupied Paris***, by Alex Kershaw (60 1 [March] Bookshelf and (60 2 [June] David A. Foy)
- Being Nixon: A Man Divided***, by Evan Thomas (60 1 [March] Thomas Coffey)
- The Billion Dollar Spy: A True Story of Cold War Espionage and Betrayal***, by David E. Hoffman (60 1 [March] Nicholas Dujmovic)
- The Bletchley Girls—War, Secrecy, Love, and Loss: The Women of Bletchley Park Tell Their Story***, by Tessa Dunlop (60 4 [December], David A. Foy)
- Church of Spies: The Pope's Secret War Against Hitler***, by Mark Riebling (60 2 [June] Bookshelf)
- Codebreakers: The Secret Intelligence Unit that Changed the Course of the First World War***, by James Wylie and Michael McKinley (60 2 [June] Bookshelf)
- Code Warriors: NSA's Codebreakers and the Secret Intelligence War Against the Soviet Union***, by Stephen Budiansky (60 4 [December], Bookshelf)
- Cyberspies: The Secret History of Surveillance, Hacking, and Digital Espionage***, by Gordon Corera (60 4 [December], Bookshelf)
- Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War***, by Fred Kaplan (60 4 [December], Bookshelf)
- Daughters of the KGB: Moscow's Secret Spies, Sleepers, and Assassins of the Cold War***, by Douglas Boyd (60 1 [March] Bookshelf)
- Destiny and Power: The American Odyssey of George Herbert Walker Bush***, by Jon Meacham (60 2 [June] Thomas Coffey)
- The Devil's Chessboard: Allen Dulles, The CIA and The Rise of America's Secret Government***, by David Talbot (60 3 [September] J. R. Seeger)

- Disciples: The World War II Missions of the CIA Directors who Fought for Wild Bill Donovan***, by Douglas Waller (60 1 [March] Nicholas Reynolds)
- Donovan's Devils: OSS Commandos Behind Enemy Lines—Europe, World War II***, by Albert Lulushi (60 2 [June] Bookshelf)
- Eisenhower's Guerrillas: The Jedburghs, the Maquis, & The Liberation of France***, by Benjamin F. Jones (60 2 [June] David A. Foy and 60 3 [September] J. R. Seeger)
- Evasion & Escape Devices Produced by MI9, MIS-X, and SOE in World War II***, by Phil Froom (60 3 [September] Bookshelf)
- F. B. Eyes: How J. Edgar Hoover's Ghostreaders Framed African American Literature***, by William J. Maxwell (60 2 [June] Bookshelf)
- Fighters in the Shadows: A New History of the French Resistance***, by Robert Gildea (60 3 [September] J. R. Seeger)
- Guy Burgess: The Spy Who Knew Everyone***, by Stewart Purvis and Jeff Hulbert (60 4 [December], Bookshelf)
- Haig's Intelligence: GHQ and the German Army, 1916–1918***, by Jim Beach (60 2 [June] Bookshelf)
- Intercept: The Secret History of Computers and Spies***, by Gordon Corera (60 1 [March] Bookshelf)
- Into The Lion's Mouth: The True Story of Dusko Popov: World War II Spy, Patriot, and the Real-Life Inspiration for James Bond***, by Larry Loftis (60 4 [December], Bookshelf)
- JFK's Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA, and the Sino-Indian War***, by Bruce Riedel (60 2 [June] Bookshelf)
- John le Carré: The Biography***, by Adam Sisman (60 3 [September] Hayden Peake)
- "Kitachosen Kikan" o soshiseyo: Nihon ni sennyushita Kankoku Himitsu Kosakutai*** [Stop the "Return to North Korea": The ROK Covert Operative Teams that Infiltrated Japan], by Shirouchi Yasunobu (60 2 [June] Stephen C. Mercado)
- The Last Goodnight: A World War II Story of Espionage, Adventure, and Betrayal***, by Howard Blum (60 4 [December], Bookshelf)
- The Less You Know, The Better You Sleep: Russia's Road To Terror and Dictatorship Under Yeltsin and Putin***, by David Satter (60 4 [December], Bookshelf)
- Looking Down the Corridors: Allied Aerial Espionage Over East Germany and Berlin 1945–1990***, by Kevin Wright and Peter Jefferies (60 3 [September] Bookshelf)
- The Man with the Golden Typewriter: Ian Fleming's James Bond Letters***, edited by Fergus Fleming (60 2 [June] Bookshelf)
- MI5 at War, 1909–1918: How MI5 Foiled the Spies of the Kaiser in the First World War***, by Chris Northcutt (60 1 [March] Bookshelf)
- Most Secret Agent of Empire: Reginald Teague-Jones, Master Spy of the Great Game***, by Taline Ter Minassian (60 1 [March] Bookshelf)
- The Nazis Next Door: How America Became a Safe Haven for Hitler's Men***, by Eric Lichtblau (60 1 [March] Bookshelf)

- Near and Distant Neighbors: A New History of Soviet Intelligence***, by Jonathan Haslam (60 1 [March] John Ehrman)
- NPIC: Seeing the Secrets and Growing the Leaders—A Cultural History of the National Photographic Interpretation Center***, by Jack O'Connor (60 1 [March] Bookshelf)
- On Intelligence: The History of Espionage and the Secret World***, by John Hughes-Wilson (60 4 [December], Bookshelf)
- One Man Against the World: The Tragedy of Richard Nixon***, by Timothy Weiner (60 1 [March] Thomas Coffey)
- Operation Thunderbolt: Flight 139 and the Raid on Entebbe Airport, the Most Audacious Hostage Rescue Mission in History***, by Saul David (60 3 [September] Bookshelf)
- Operation Whisper: The Capture of Soviet Spies Morris and Lona Cohen***, by Barnes Carr (60 4 [December], Bookshelf)
- Ortiz: To Live a Man's Life***, by Laura Homan Lacey and John W. Brunner (60 4 [December], Charles D.)
- The OSS in World War II Albania: Covert Operations and Collaboration with Communist Partisans***, by Peter Lucas (60 3 [September] Bookshelf)
- OSS: Red Group 2—A Fisherman Goes To War***, by David G. Boak (60 3 [September] Bookshelf)
- The Pentagon's Brain: An Uncensored History of DARPA, America's Top Secret Military Research Agency***, by Annie Jacobsen (60 2 [June] Bookshelf)
- The President's Book of Secrets: The Untold Story of Intelligence Briefings to America's Presidents from Kennedy to Obama***, by David Priess (60 1 [March], Jason U. Manosevitz)
- Queen of Spies: Daphne Park—Britain's Cold War Spy Master***, by Paddy Hayes (60 1 [March] Bookshelf)
- Patriotic Betrayal: The Inside Story of the CIA's Secret Campaign to Enroll American Students in the Crusade Against Communism***, by Karen M. Paget (60 2 [June] Bookshelf)
- The Red Web: The Struggle Between Russia's Digital Dictators and The New Online Revolutionaries***, by Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan (60 4 [December], Bookshelf)
- Rendezvous at the Russian Tea Rooms***, by Paul Willetts (60 2 [June] Bookshelf)
- Resident: The Espionage Odyssey of Soviet General Vasily Zarubin***, by Robert K. Baker (60 3 [September] Bookshelf)
- The Secret War Between the Wars: MI5 in the 1920s and 1930s***, by Kevin Quinlan (60 1 [March] Bookshelf)
- The Secret War: Spies, Codes and Guerillas, 1939–1945***, by Max Hastings (60 1 [March] Nigel West)
- The Shadow Man: At the Heart of the Cambridge Spy Ring***, by Geoff Andrews (60 3 [September] Bookshelf)
- Soviet Leaders and Intelligence: Assessing the American Adversary During the Cold War***, by Raymond L. Garthoff (60 3 [September] Bookshelf)
- Special Branch—A History: 1883–2006***, by Ray Wilson and Ian Adams (60 2 [June] Bookshelf)

Spies In The Congo: The Race for the Ore That Built the Atomic Bomb, by Susan Williams (60 4 [December], Bookshelf and David A. Foy)

The Spy in Hitler's Inner Circle: Hans-Thilo Schmidt and the Intelligence Network that Decoded Enigma, by Paul Paillole (60 4 [December], Bookshelf)

Spying Through A Glass Darkly: American Espionage against the Soviet Union, 1945–1946, by David Alvarez and Eduard Mark (60 4 [December], Bookshelf and John Ehrman)

Stalin's Englishman: The Lives of Guy Burgess, by Andrew Lownie (60 3 [September] Bookshelf)

Stalin's Singing Spy: The Life and Exile of Nadezhda Plevitskaya, by Pamela A. Jordan (60 4 [December], Bookshelf)

U.S. Navy Codebreakers, Linguists, and Intelligence Officers Against Japan 1910–1941, by Capt. Steven E. Maffeo, U.S.N.R., Ret.(60 3 [September] Bookshelf)

Valiant Ambition: George Washington, Benedict Arnold, and the Fate of the American Revolution, by Nathaniel Philbrick (60 3 [September] David A. Foy)

MEMOIR

A Life of Lies and Spies—Tales of a CIA Covert Ops Polygraph Interrogator, by Arthur B. Trabue (60 1 [March] Bookshelf)

More Cloak than Dagger: One Women's Career in Secret Intelligence, by Molly J. Sasson (60 3 [September] Bookshelf)

Out of the Shadows: The Life of a CSE Canadian Intelligence Officer, by Ron Lawruk (60 2 [June] Bookshelf)

The Secret Ministry of AG. & Fish: My Life in Churchill's School for Spies, by Noreen Riols (60 3 [September] Bookshelf)

Secret Revolution: Memoirs of a Spy Boss, by Niël Barnard as told to Tobie Wiese (60 3 [September] Bookshelf)

The Secrets of My Life: Vintner, Prisoner, Soldier, Spy, by Peter M. F. Sichel (60 4 [December], Bookshelf)

INTELLIGENCE ABROAD

The Angel: The Egyptian Spy Who Saved Israel, by Uri Bar-Joseph (60 4 [December], Bookshelf and Thomas Coffey)

The Black Door: Spies, Secret Intelligence and British Prime Ministers, by Richard J. Aldrich and Rory Cormac (60 4 [December], Bookshelf)

East Asian Intelligence and Organised Crime: China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Mongolia, edited by Stephan Blancke (60 3 [September] Bookshelf)

The Gatekeepers: Inside Israel's Internal Security Agency, by Dror Moreh (60 2 [June] Bookshelf)

The Intelligence War in Latin America, 1914–1922, by Jamie Bisher (60 4 [December], Bookshelf)

Labyrinth of Power, by Danny Yatom (60 3 [September] Bookshelf)

FICTION

Ghost Fleet—A Novel of the Next World War, by P.W. Singer and August Cole (60 1 [March] Darby Stratford)

FILM

Bridge of Spies, directed by Steven Spielberg (60 2 [June] James Burrige and John Kavanagh)

John le Carré's Our Kind of Traitor—the Movie, directed by Susanna White (60 3 [September] John Kavanagh)

John le Carré's The Night Manager—the Miniseries, directed by Susanne Bier (60 3 [September] John Kavanagh and James Burrige)

Sicario, directed by Denis Villeneuve (60 2 [June] James Burrige and John Kavanagh)

