Rise to World Power, 1867-1913

1900 U.S. Campaign Poster Historians have characterized the 31 years after the Civil War as the least active period in American foreign relations, but it was to be the last such period in U.S. history. The Spanish-American War of 1898 brought enormous change in its wake, and American diplomats were forced to adapt an antiquated foreign affairs establishment to the exercise of world leadership.

The World in the mid-19th Century

After the Civil War, Americans took advantage of the stable international balance of power to continue the dynamic process of westward expansion and building a strong and powerful economy. There were few changes in nation’s basic foreign policies; the overarching principles of isolation and neutrality generally remained firmly entrenched. Secretary of State Walter Gresham In 1894, Secretary of State Walter Q. Gresham of Illinois reaffirmed Washington’s “great rule of conduct” in commenting on what he deemed a questionable departure from the policy of “no entangling alliances”—an agreement with Germany and Great Britain to share control of the Samoan Islands. “Every nation, and especially every strong nation, must sometimes be conscious of an impulse to rush into difficulties that do not concern it, except in a highly imaginary way,” he noted.

The continuing national focus on domestic issues does much to explain why, despite its numerous flaws, the conduct of foreign relations continued unchanged. As late as 1894, an observer noted that the public was “less familiar with the duties of our diplomatic and consular agents than any other branch of the public service.” In a sense, this was logical, because diplomatic work was carried out overseas, where it could not be observed.

For most of the period, diplomacy remained mired in the past. The biographer of Secretary of State John Hay later described the Department in 1898 when Hay became Secretary as “an antiquated feeble organization, enslaved by precedents and routine inherited from another century, remote from the public gaze and indifferent to it. The typewriter was viewed as a necessary evil and the telephone was an instrument of last resort.”

Political Interference and Corruption

Xenophobic Americans regularly condemned their representatives abroad as subversive, and some cast doubt upon the need for any contact whatsoever with the Old World and its representatives. President Ulysses S. Grant In 1885, for example, Senator William E. Robinson of New York insisted “…this diplomatic service is working our ruin by creating a desire for foreign customs and foreign follies. The disease is imported by our returning diplomats and by the foreign ambassadors sent here by monarchs and despots to corrupt and destroy our American ideals.” The Senator's solution was to quarantine entering diplomats “as we quarantine foreign rags through fear of cholera.”

Another familiar pattern transcended the Civil War—meddlesome political interference with the Department of State and a tendency to see its overseas posts as rewards for loyalty not talent. In 1869, for example, President Ulysses S. Grant made Elihu B. Washburne, a friend from Galena, Illinois, the Secretary of State for 12 days so that he could enjoy the prestige of the position when he took up his responsibilities as Minister to France. Washburne's successor, Hamilton Fish of New York, found that he could not resist political pressure and administer the Department efficiently without strong presidential support. When General Orville Babcock, another of Grant's friends, tried to interfere, Fish bluntly informed the President that he could not tolerate such activities. If the President showed lack of confidence in him, he wrote, “or when the influence of the head of the Department in the administration of its affairs, or the formation of its policy, is overshadowed by others, a sensible or sensitive man will appreciate that the time for his retirement has arrived.”

Problems in the Consular Service

Because the consular service expanded so rapidly during this period, incoming presidential administrations found ample overseas rewards for their friends and supporters. Even artists and writers, such as James Fennimore Cooper, Nathaniel Hawthorne, William Dean Howells, Bret Harte, and Thomas Nast used their political connections to secure lucrative overseas posts. Some hoped for an improvement in their finances, while others were attracted by free time to pursue their writing or a desire for adventure.

Despite strenuous efforts to correct them, abuses in the Consular Service persisted into the late 19th century. In 1872, DeB. Randolph Keim, a representative of the Department of the Treasury, headed an extensive investigation of the Consular Service. He uncovered many irregularities, among them collection of illegal fees, improper exercise of judicial powers, fraudulent accounting, faulty administration of estates left by Americans who died abroad, and issuance of illegal passports. Keim thought that the most important feature of his investigation was the “ingenuity displayed by consular officers, since the Act of 1856 particularly, in defrauding the Government and grasping gains from various outside sources besides.”

Some Diplomatic Accomplishments

Despite the atmosphere of corruption surrounding diplomacy, some members of the foreign services developed special competence and achieved distinguished careers. Prominent among them was Eugene Schuyler, who first served as consul in Moscow in 1867 and later held other posts in Europe, before ending his service as the American representative in Cairo in 1890. Another was William Lindsay Scruggs, who served as Minister to Colombia in 1873 and Minister to Venezuela in 1889. George P. Marsh served the United States for 33 years as Minister to Turkey (1849-53), special emissary in Athens and Tehran (1850s), and Minister to Italy (1861). He died in Rome in 1882. Two diplomats who developed impressive reputations as regional specialists—Henry White in Europe and William W. Rockhill in East Asia—began careers that extended well into the 20th century.

Despite the general lethargy characterizing foreign policy during this period, several Secretaries of State were proactive. James G. Blaine of Maine, for example, had long been interested in the development of more cordial relations and the expansion of trade with the American republics. In 1889, he inaugurated the modern Pan American movement with the convocation of an inter-American conference in Washington.

Perhaps the most notable development was the elevation of the Monroe Doctrine into an unquestioned article of faith in American foreign policy. In 1895, Secretary of State Richard Olney asserted that as a result of the Monroe Doctrine, “To-day the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition.” Why was this so? Because, Olney stated, in addition to all other grounds, “its infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all other powers.”

Departmental Organization—and Reorganization

The limited importance assigned to foreign relations after the Civil War was reflected in the modest growth of the Department of State and the foreign services. In 1880, the Department had only 80 employees compared with 42 in 1860, and the total actually dropped to 76 in 1890. In the period 1860-1890, the number of diplomatic missions increased by only eight to 41, while the number of consulates grew from 282 to 323. Diplomats numbered 45 in 1860 and 63 in 1890. The Consular Service expanded much more rapidly, employing 1,042 people in 1890 compared with 236 in 1860. Expenditures on domestic and foreign operations rose from $1.3 million in 1860 to only $1.8 million in 1890.

Secretary of State Hamilton Fish

In the early 1870s, Secretary of State Hamilton Fish reorganized the Department, expanding the existing “bureau” system, in place since the 1830s. To cope with the growth in overseas missions and consulates, Fish established two diplomatic bureaus and two consular bureaus with geographic responsibilities. The First Diplomatic Bureau and the First Consular Bureau, dealt with the major European nations, China, and Japan. The second pair of bureaus managed communications with the rest of the world—Latin America, the Mediterranean region, Russia, Hawaii, Japan, and Liberia. Several other bureaus were created or underwent name changes—the Law Bureau, Bureaus of Accounts, Bureau of Indexes and Archives, the Statistical Bureau, Bureau of Pardons and Commissions, the Passport Bureau, and the Domestic Records Bureau. Congress also passed legislation in 1874 that authorized a Third Assistant Secretary as well as a private secretary to the Secretary of State. There would be no further reorganization until 1909.

In 1875 the Department of State moved into an imposing new home—the State, War, and Navy Building located at 17th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., adjacent to the White House.

The Practice of Diplomacy

From the earliest days of the Republic, a U.S. envoy overseas was known as “minister” since an “ambassador” traditionally was the representative of a king. But in 1893, the United States bowed to the now-common diplomatic practice and upgraded its envoys to the most important foreign nations to the rank of ambassador. Embassies were established in Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy after those nations conferred ambassadorial rank on their representatives in Washington. The elevation of ministers to ambassadors and legations to embassies was a gradual process and continued until the late 1960s when all U.S. chiefs of mission finally held the rank of ambassador.

1898: The Birth of a Superpower

The global equilibrium, which had allowed the United States to grow and prosper in virtual isolation since 1815 was gone forever as the result of a short but shattering war. In 1898, U.S. domestic support for the independence of Cuba enmeshed the United States in a struggle with Spain over the fate of the island nation. The decision to aid the Cuban resistance was a major departure from the traditional American practice of liberal nationalism, and the results of that decision had far-reaching consequences. The 1898 Treaty of Paris ending the war gave Cuba its independence and also ceded important Spanish possessions to the United States—notably Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and the small island of Guam. The United States was suddenly a colonial power with overseas dependencies.

Photograph of American Soliders in Puerto Rico during the Spanish-American War

This assumption of colonial responsibilities reflected not only the temporary enthusiasms of 1898 but also marked a profound change in the diplomatic posture of the United States. The foreign policies of the early 19th century had less relevance at the dawn of the 20th century because the nation had changed. The United States had almost all the attributes of a great power—it stood ahead or nearly ahead of almost all other countries in terms of population, geographic size and location on two oceans, economic resources, and military potential.

Foreign policy had to change to meet these new circumstances. President William McKinley drew attention to the new situation in the instructions he gave to the delegation of American statesmen who negotiated the Treaty of Paris. “We cannot be unmindful that without any desire or design on our part the war has brought us new duties and responsibilities which we must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation on whose growth and career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has plainly written the high command and pledge of civilization.”

Another contemporary observer, George L. Rives, extended this interpretation. “Whether we like it or not,” he wrote, “it is plain that the country is now entering into a period in its history in which it will necessarily be brought into far closer and more complex relations with all the other great Powers of the world,” an outcome that would leave established foreign policy outmoded. “We shall now and henceforth be looked upon as having cast aside our traditional attitude of isolation.”

New Policies for Latin America, Asia

U.S. policy toward Latin American policy involved a significant revision of the Monroe Doctrine. Throughout the 19th century, American diplomats used the Monroe Doctrine to warn the European powers against further colonization in the Western Hemisphere. It did not imply the right of the United States to intervene in the internal affairs of the other American republics.

President Theodore Roosevelt

In 1904, President Theodore Rooseveltchanged the Monroe Doctrine through his “Roosevelt Corollary.” Roosevelt and other prominent Americans were concerned that European creditor nations would use the unpaid debt of the Latin American states to gain political control over them. Roosevelt said that no Latin American nation adhering to “acceptable international standards of behavior” had to fear intervention by the United States. But: “Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, require intervention by some civilized nation.”

Moreover, he continued, “in the western hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.”

At the same time, the acquisition of the Philippines triggered the development of a new American policy for East Asia. As American businessmen eyed the vast potential of the Chinese market, European incursions in China threatened to cut off American access. In 1899, Secretary of State John Hay proposed that nations interested in China should “enjoy perfect equality of treatment for navigation,” that is, maintain the principle of free trade, or the “open door.” In 1900, Hay extended the open-door policy to include respect for the territorial and administrative integrity of China.

New Prestige, New Growth

These major changes in policy and the subsequent increase in U.S. international political commitments resulted in a newly invigorated Department of State. The Department was thoroughly reorganized to meet its new responsibilities and important steps were taken toward the development of professional, democratic foreign services.

In 1898, the Department employed 82 people; by 1910 the number had risen to 234. The Diplomatic Service grew modestly from 93 people in 1900 to 121 in 1910. But expansion required a considerable increase in the annual budget. The expenditures of the Department at home and overseas increased from $3.4 million in 1900 to $4.9 million in 1910. The Consular Service also experienced a significant addition to its workload. Reflecting the boom in overseas trade from $1.8 billion to $3 billion, annual fees collected almost tripled in less than 20 years.

Increased responsibility necessitated a thorough reorganization of the Department in 1909. One reformer, Assistant Secretary of State Francis M. Huntington Wilson, succeeded in increasing the number of leadership positions, so that the Department now had three Assistant Secretaries of State, a Counselor to undertake a Counselor to undertake special assignments, and a Director to administer the Consular Service.

The bureau system was expanded to organize diplomacy by distinct geographic region—Western Europe, the Near East, the Far East, and Latin America—a move that fostered improved overseas communication. Several other bureaus and divisions were created to handle other new areas of responsibility, notably a Bureau of Trade Relations and a Division of Information. Talented diplomats were brought back to Washington to staff the new geographic bureaus, adding much-needed field experience.

A New Professionalism

Although the expansion and reorganization of the Department were significant factors, the most distinctive feature of the early 20th century was a strong movement toward fully professionalized and democratic foreign services. America’s new position in the world forced the nation to recognize that amateurism in the conduct of foreign policy could be costly. One critic wrote, “As we would not put a ship into the hands of a commander ignorant of navigation, an army under the control of a general without military training, a suit at law into the hands of a counsel who never opened a law book . . . so we should not put the foreign affairs of our government into the hands of men without knowledge of the various subjects which go to make up the diplomatic science.”

President Theodore Roosevelt President Theodore Roosevelt agreed and emphasized the need to upgrade diplomatic performance: “The trouble with our ambassadors in stations of real importance,” he told a friend, "is that they totally fail to give us real help and real information, and seem to think that the life work of an ambassador is a kind of glorified pink tea party.”

The domestic spirit of “progressivism” and an emphasis on good government fueled the demand for change in the Diplomatic and Consular Services. A truly professional foreign service meant that the practices of the past would have to end. The spoils system would have to be replaced by competitive examination and guaranteed tenure; the merit system would have to be adopted as the basis for award of pay increases and promotions, and pay and allowances would have to be adequate to the job. As President Roosevelt told a friend in 1908, “I am anxious to have it understood that it is not necessary to be a multimillionaire in order to reach the highest positions in the American diplomatic services.” Or, as Representative Frank O. Lowden of Illinois expressed it, “It ought to be possible for the lowest man in the foreign service to feel that it is within his power, if his service justifies it, to reach the highest post.”

President Grover Cleveland President Grover Cleveland anticipated the reform movement in 1895, when he issued an executive order that made appointment to most positions in the Consular Service contingent upon passing written and oral examinations. Unfortunately, the reform was short lived because the President himself selected the individuals who would take the examinations. When President McKinley took office and was determined to appoint his own consular officers, Cleveland’s executive order was ignored. Only one person out of 112 applicants failed the tests. When Elihu Root became Secretary of State, he noted, “It has evidently come to be regarded as cruel and inhuman treatment not to pass a man. In view of the character of the examination, a rejection would practically be an imputation of idiocy.”

Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft took the most serious steps toward reform. In November 1905, President Roosevelt established competitive entrance examinations and the merit promotion system for all diplomatic and consular positions except those of minister and ambassador. His Secretary of State, Elihu Root, shepherded a law through Congress that created a grade classification system for consular positions and also provided for the inspection of consular establishments every two years. However, this statute did not mention President Roosevelt’s reforms; Roosevelt remedied this omission by means of another executive order issued in June 1906.

President William Howard Taft During his Administration, President Taft set up a board of examiners to administer both oral and written examinations to prospective diplomats. He also ordered that vacancies in the higher ranks of secretaries of legations and embassies be filled only from within the career service and that for the purposes of retention and promotion, the efficiency records be maintained for every diplomatic officer and clerk in the Department. While these measures did not include ministers or ambassadors, both Roosevelt and Taft rewarded several secretaries with appointments as chiefs of mission. Taft, for instance, promoted 18 from the diplomatic service to ministerships or ambassadorships.

American missions overseas were also subject to reform. It became clear that there was a need to establish and maintain embassy and legation buildings appropriate to the nation’s new status in international affairs and business. As one reformer argued, “All men, rich and poor, cultivated or uncultivated, are impressed by appearances. Foreigners necessarily judge us by what they see of us in their own country. We pride ourselves on being the richest people on earth and declare loudly that nothing is too good for us. And yet we are content to cheapen ourselves among the nations of the earth by the shabby showing we make among them in respect to our embassies. We feel ashamed at appearing poverty-stricken in the eyes of the inhabitants of other countries and of placing ourselves commercially below third or even fourth rate powers.”

Similarly, a former attaché promoted the enhancement of U.S. facilities abroad so that “traveling Americans will no longer be mortified at the sight of the United States embassy or legation being located on a single floor in an apartment house or office building with a tin shield over the door far inferior in appearance to that of many a butcher or baker in the vicinity.” In response to the rising complaints, Congress took a step forward when it passed the Lowden Act (1911), the first legislation to provide for the purchase of buildings to house overseas missions.

Conclusion

The Spanish-American War of 1898 revealed the first cracks in the international balance of power that had governed global relations since 1815. The United States entered the 20th century as an emerging superpower—and adopted new foreign policies and professional diplomatic practices to suit its role. The revitalized Department of State had little time to prepare for the unprecedented challenges that the United States would face during the first European war in 100 years.