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18 March 1951

[Redacted]

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SUMMARY

GENERAL

[Redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

FAR EAST

2. Major Chinese Communist forces still in Wonsan area (page 3).

[Redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

4. Chinese Communists assuming direction of guerrilla operations in Burma (page 5).

EASTERN EUROPE

5. Polish partisans attack Soviet installations and personnel (page 5).


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3.3(h)(2)


GENERAL



FAR EAST

2. Major Chinese Communist forces still in Wonsan area:

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[initials]



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
3.3(h)(2)



3.3(h)(2)

Comment: The Chinese Communist 9th Army Group, representing the largest uncommitted Chinese reserve force known to be in Korea, was identified in the Wonsan area early in February. Subsequent reports indicated that elements of this Army Group were moving south into central Korea to positions north of the 38th Parallel. The continued presence of major Chinese Communist units on defensive missions in the Wonsan area precludes their immediate use as reinforcements in the front lines.

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4. Chinese Communists assuming direction of guerrilla operations in Burma:

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

the Chinese Communists have trained and equipped 600 Burmese Communists and 300 Kachin

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followers of the rebel leader Naw Seng. [Redacted] these forces are to be infiltrated into Burma where they will conduct widespread guerrilla warfare against the Burmese Government under the direction of Chu Chia-pi, "famed" Communist guerrilla leader in Yunnan. The Embassy comments that Chu is ideally suited for such an assignment and that this method of Chinese intervention will be most difficult for the Burmese Government to combat.

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: Information has been steadily accumulating from numerous sources indicating Chinese Communist preparations for limited intervention in Burma. Burmese forces are largely committed against insurgents in lower Burma and few reinforcements could be spared for operations in the north. Chinese aid to Burmese Communists would instill new spirit in the latter's currently disorganized insurrection and develop it into a serious threat to the existence of the moderate Burmese Government.

EASTERN EUROPE

5. Polish partisans attack Soviet installations and personnel:

3.3(h)(2)

[Redacted]

Comment: During the past two years, Polish security forces have been hunting down resistance bands operating in the heavily forested area of eastern Poland. For the most part, these

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bands have directed their resistance activities against minor Polish Communist officials, farm cooperative organizations and telephone lines of the Polish Internal Security Police. An attack against an important Soviet communications line is a more sophisticated form of resistance.

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