Digester: Herrera

SAMPIAN vs. INDAR

December 21, 2009

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Nature: Administrative Case

Doctrine: The automatic release of the IRA from the national treasury does not prevent the proper court from deferring or suspending the release
thereof to particular local officials when there is a legal question presented in the court pertaining to the rights of the parties to receive the IRA or to
the propriety of the issuance of a TRO or a preliminary injunction while such rights are still being determined.

Petitioners: Hadji Amer R. Sampiano, incumbent Mayor, and the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of
Balabagan, Lanao del Sur

Respondents: Judge Cader P. Indar of Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Malabang, Lanao del Sur

FACTS:

1. Sampiano filed before the Commission on Elections (Comelec) a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction/TRO against his rival mayoralty candidate, his uncle Ogka, and the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur
composed of Vadria Pungginagina and Zenaida Mante.

2. Comelec issued the several orders/ First, ot authorized the vice-mayor to temporarily assume the duties and responsibilities as mayor due to the
double proclamation of Sampiano and Ogka for the position of mayor. Then, it ordered that status quo be maintained at the time of the issuance of
the said Order. Then, it clarified previous Orders, Sampiano was ordered to act, perform and discharge the duties, functions and responsibilities as
mayor to prevent paralysis to public service pending determination and final resolution of the controversy involving the mayorship of the
Municipality of Balabagan.

3. Ogka filed an Urgent MR. He also informed in writing, the Chief Legal Counsel of PNB, Atty. Alvin C. Go, and asked him not to release the IRA
(Internal Revenue Allotment which is the share of the local government unit in national internal revenue taxes) for the Municipality of Balabagan,
Lanao del Sur until the controversy involving the mayorship of the said municipality now pending with the Comelec shall have been finally
resolved. However, the IRA was still released pursuant to a COMELEC order.

4. Ogka filed a special civil action for Prohibition and Injunction with TRO and Preliminary Injunction. On the same day, respondent Judge issued
an Order setting the hearing of the petition on October 14, 2004. He likewise directed, pending resolution of the said petition, the PNB-Marawi
(represented by Disomangcop and Go) to hold or defer the release of the IRA for the Municipality of Balabagan unless ordered otherwise by the
court

5. Sampiano prodded Judge to lift said Order so as not to deprive the officials and employees of the Municipality of Balabagan from receiving their
hard earned salaries, but respondent Judge did not heed the said request

6. Petitioners filed administrative case charging said judge with gross and wanton ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority, manifest
partiality and serious acts of impropriety in connection with the Injunction

7. OCA recommendation: Guilty of ignorance of the law for violating Section 5 of Rule 58, Revised Rules on Civil Procedure and that he be
imposed a penalty of FINE in the sum of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) pesos.

SAMPIAN et. al INDAR SUPREME COURT

WON respondent Judge Indar is guilty Did not commit any Respondent Judge failed to comply with the
judge is guilty of of gross and wanton administrative lapses provisions of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court
gross and wanton ignorance of the law, in issuing October 11, 2004 Order, a preliminary
ignorance of the law, grave abuse of
injunction order. However, petitioner failed to prove
grave abuse of authority, manifest
authority, manifest partiality and serious that Respondent Judge acted with bad faith.
partiality and acts of impropriety for
serious acts of the reasons set forth
impropriety. below:
1. Court has no 1. Court assumed jurisdiction 1. The RTC has jurisdiction over complaint for
jurisdiction over the over [SCA] No. 12-173 as it is a injunction pursuant to Section 21 of BP 129. (The
action. COMELEC is petition for prohibition and complaint was not treated as an application or
vested under the injunction and not an
enforcement of election law action).
Constitution with the enforcement of election laws.
enforcement of election
SEC 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. - Regional
laws.
Trial Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction:

(1) in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition,

mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction
which may be enforced in any part of their respective
regions; xxx

2. The October 11, 2004 2. Considering the urgency of 2. Order was not in contravention of Section 286 of the
Order is a SUPER the petition and before granting LGC on the automatic release of the share of the local
ORDER. It was not only the prayer for the issuance of the
issued ex-parte but also TRO, he immediately issued an government unit.
it directed the PNB- order on October 11, 2004,
Marawi to hold or defer which defer or hold the release - automatic release of the IRA under Section 286
the release of the IRA is a mandate to the national government through the
of the Internal Revenue
until ordered otherwise Department of Budget and Management to effect
by [the] court. Allotment (IRA) pending
resolution of the petition by the automatic release of the said funds from the treasury
court and thereafter set the directly to the local government unit, free from any
hearing of the petition on holdbacks or liens imposed by the national government.
October 14, 2004. October 11,
- this automatic release of the IRA from the
2004 order DID NOT FREEZE
national treasury does not prevent the proper court from
the IRA but merely HELD or
deferring or suspending the release thereof to particular
DEFERRED its release to any
local officials when there is a legal question presented in
person including petitioner
the court pertaining to the rights of the parties to receive
Sumulong Sampiano Ogka (who
the IRA or to the propriety of the issuance of a TRO or a
is the complainants uncle), a
preliminary injunction while such rights are still being
party to the election case who
determined.
also holds [a] COMELEC
proclamation as duly elected
mayor of Balabagan.

3. TRO is like a writ of 3. Judge was also cautious in his 3. Section 5, Rule 58 expressly prohibits the grant of
preliminary injunction. In actions to avert the already preliminary injunction without hearing and prior notice
both instances, prior growing tension between the to the party or person sought to be enjoined. However,
notice and hearing are warring families newly aroused courts are authorized to issue ex parte a TRO effective
required. by the result of the May 10, 2004 only for seventy-two (72) hours if it should appear
election. Hence, he has to relax from the facts shown by affidavits or by the verified
- TRO has a limited life the application of the rules and petition that great or irreparable injury would result to
of twenty (20) days harmonize it with the the applicant before the matter could be heard on
while a writ of temperament of the protagonists notice.
preliminary injunction is who are Maranaos belonging to
effective only during the the same family clan. Within the aforesaid period of time, the Court should
pendency of the case conduct a summary hearing to determine if a TRO shall be
and only after posting issued. The TRO, however, shall be effective only for a
the required injunction period of twenty (20) days from notice to the party or
bond. person sought to be enjoined. During the 20-day period,
the judge must conduct a hearing to consider the propriety
 of issuing a preliminary injunction. At the end of such
period, the TRO automatically terminates without need of
any judicial declaration to that effect, leaving the court no
discretion to extend the same.

- In this case, the TRO issued ex parte was

effective for eleven (11) days from October 11, 2004 until
October 22, 2004 in violation of the Rules. Only a TRO
issued after a summary hearing can last for a period of
twenty days.

4. Order was issued in 4. The provision on the 4. Sampiano adduced no evidence to prove that the
violation of Section 286 automatic release of IRA is not a issuance of the October 11, 2004 Order was motivated
of the Local shield or immunity to the by bad faith. Since there is no showing that respondent
Government Code authority of the courts to Judge was motivated by bad faith or ill motives in
(LGC), which provides interfere, interrupt or suspend its rendering the assailed Order, and this is his first offense,
for the automatic release when there is a legal we sustain the penalty recommended by the OCA to be
release of the share of question presented before it in imposed on respondent Judge for violating Section 5, Rule
the local government order to determine the rights of 58 of the Rules of Court.
unit from the national the parties concerned.
government.

Dispositive Portion: A penalty of a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) is imposed on respondent Judge for violation of the Rules of Court.
 Digest by: Arnel Abeleda

CASE TITLE: De Villa v City of Bacolod

Date of Case: September 16, 2008

PETITIONERS: Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Domingo Rio, Lt. Col. Miguel Coronal, and P/Maj. Nicolas Torres

RESPONDENTS: City of Bacolod and Lt. Col. Herman S. Plotea

NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari of the RTC decision (Note: no appeal was made to the Office of the President(OP), thus
the SC notes there was failure to exhaust admin remedies)

DOCTRINE: The local executives have general and operational supervision over local police units, but no power of administrative supervision
or control over them; hence, absence of recommendation from the local chief executive does not invalidate the replacement of a Station
Commander made by the INP Director General. At best, the participation of the local chief executive is recommendatory but the power to relieve or
reassign a city INP Station Commander is lodged with the INP Director General under existing laws.

FACTS:

1. On September 1987, Lt. Gen. Renato de Villa, then Director General of the Integrated National Police (INP), relieved Lt. Col. Herman S.
Plotea as Bacolod City INP Station Commander allegedly because of the worsening peace and order and insurgency situation in Bacolod
City, and assigned him to the PC Provincial Headquarters in Bacolod City.
2. The city of Bacolod filed with the RTC of Bacolod a complaint for declaratory relief and/or injunction with prayer for issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction to declare the relief of Plotea as invalid and illegal.
3. The complaint was later amended to implead Plotea as an unwilling co-plaintiff (defendant)
4. Plotea filed an answer with crossclaim praying for dismissal of the complaint against him but asked for reinstatement with full backwages
and without loss of seniority rights.
5. SolGen files a motion to dismiss. After hearing on the MTD, case was submitted for resolution.
6. RTC: ifo of City of Bacolod. Plotea was summarily replaced without observance of due process, violative of Executive Order 1012 as
amended by Executive Order 1027 and the 1987 Constitution requiring as an essential condition for relief a prior recommendation of, or
consultation with the local chief executive(i.e., the City Mayor of Bacolod).
7. Thus, this appeal.
8. Note: City of Bacolod had a change of heart during the pendency of the case in the SC. After several extensions, it filed its one (1) page
comment praying for the dismissal of the petition as moot and academic, the City was satisfied with the performance of the new station
commander Lt. Col. Nicolas Torres
PETITIONERS CONTENTION: RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: SUPREME COURT:

The INP Chief has the power to The replacement, transfer or The petition is granted (regardless whether the City had a
replace, transfer or reassign local reassignment of the Chief of Police change of heart).
Chiefs of Police even without the may only be done upon approval of
approval of the local chief executive. the local chief executive. Under Sec 7 of PD 765, the INP (now PNP) is subject to the
command and general supervision of the President of the
Executive Orders 1012 and 1027 did Executive Orders 1012 and 1027 Philippines and shall function directly under the Department of
not remove administrative supervision effectively removed administrative National Defense.
and control over police units from the supervision and control over local
INP chief, what is given to local police units from the INP chief in favor Power of Control - power of an officer to alter or modify or
executives over local police units is of local executives. nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer has done in the
general and, at most, operational performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
supervision and direction. former for that of the latter

Power of Supervision - power of supervision means the power

of a superior officer to see to it that subordinates perform their
functions according to law.

a). General Supervision. It is the power to see to it that the

units or elements of the Integrated National Police perform their
duties properly according to existing laws and the rules,
regulations and policies.

b). Operational Supervision and Direction. It is the power to

see to it that the units or elements of the Integrated National
Police perform their duties properly according to existing laws
and the rules, regulations and policies promulgated by
competent authority, and the power to employ or deploy such
units or elements.

Administrative supervision and control is not the same as

general or operational supervision, and direction; but the
RTC ruling appears to interchange the two (2) things.
 The local executives have general and operational
supervision over local police units, but no power of
administrative supervision or control over them; hence,
absence of recommendation from the local chief executive
does not invalidate the replacement of a Station Commander
made by the INP Director General.

At best, the participation of the local chief executive is

recommendatory but the power to relieve or reassign a city
INP Station Commander is lodged with the INP Director
General under existing laws.

Section 4 of Executive Order Section 4 of Executive Order ON SEC. 4, EO 1027

1027 which is relied upon by the 1027 applies. It refers to ordinary
Bacolod RTC states: policemen AND officers. a) Sec. 4 speaks only of recommendation;
b) It applies to rand-and file policemen and officers; and
SEC. 4. Once the reassignments c) even if the section were to apply to police officers only,
the situation contemplated in the section does not exist
herein required are in place, no
in the case at bar for Plotea has been re-assigned to
further reassignment or detail of the PC Provincial Headquarters also in Bacolod City.
policemen outside their respective
towns or cities of residence shall be
made without the approval of the OBITER: EO 1040 directly placed the National Police
Municipal or City Mayor concerned. Commission under the Office of the President. The Commission
No appointment of new policemen in exercises administrative control and supervision over all units
any municipality or city shall be made, of the INP force throughout the country. Questions therefore of
except upon the recommendation of propriety of a transfer or relief of policemen have to be
the Municipal or City Mayor therein. threshed out before said body whose decisions are
The new appointees shall, as a appealable to the office of the President (which did not
general rule, be residents of the city happen in this case).
or municipality to where they are
assigned or stationed.

SolGen argues that Sec. 4 only

applies to ordinary policemen and
NOT police officers, therefore it does
not apply in this case.

Dispositive Portion: Petition is GRANTED. The challenged RTC decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
 Digester: Annie Ballesteros

CASE TITLE: ROLANDO E. SISON vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Date of Case: March 9, 2010

DOCTRINE: No regular members of the Committee on Awards may sit in a dual capacity. Where any of the regular members is the requisitioning
party, a special member from the Sanggunian is required. The prohibition is meant to check or prevent conflict of interest as well as to protect the
use of the procurement process and the public funds for irregular or unlawful purchases.

Ponente: J. Corona

Petitioner: Rolando E. Sison

Respondent: People of the Philippines

FACTS:

Rolando E. Sison was municipal mayor of Calintaan, Occidental Mindoro, a fourth-class municipality, from 1992 to 1995.

In 1994, state auditor Elsa E. Pajayon conducted a post-audit investigation which revealed that during petitioners incumbency, no public bidding
was done for the purchase of a Toyota Land Cruiser, 119 bags of Fortune cement, an electric generator set, certain construction materials, two
Desert Dueller tires, and a computer and its accessories.

In 1998, petitioner was indicted before the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. He admitted that no public bidding was conducted for the purchases which were done through personal canvass. Sison was found
guilty as charged. Sison appealed to the SC alleging that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue Petitioners Contention Respondents Contention Supreme Court Holding

Whether Sison complied with No public bidding could be conducted There was no public bidding Petitioner failed to establish that
the requirements of public because all the dealers of the items done for the purchases. his purchases fall under the
bidding or its exception/s were based in Manila. It was useless There were irregularities in exception/s to the public bidding
(personal canvass) to invite bidders since nobody would the documents supporting the (See Ratio below)
bid anyway. acquisitions.

RATIO:

RA 7160 provides that, "acquisitions of supplies by local government units shall be through competitive bidding." By way of exception, no bidding
is required in the following instances: (1) personal canvass of responsible merchants; xxx
Limitations on this mode of procurement is provided in Sec. 367 of RA 7160. Procurement through Personal Canvass. Upon approval by the
Committee on Awards, procurement of supplies may be affected after personal canvass of at least three (3) responsible suppliers in the locality by
a committee of three (3) composed of the local general services officer or the municipal or barangay treasurer, as the case may be, the local
accountant, and the head of office or department for whose use the supplies are being procured. The award shall be decided by the Committee on
Awards.

Purchases shall not exceed the amounts specified for all items in any one (1) month for each local government unit: Fourth Class (Municipality)
and below Twenty thousand pesos (P20, 000.00).

Section 364. The Committee on Awards.There shall be in every province, city or municipality a Committee on Awards to decide the winning bids
and questions of awards on procurement and disposal of property. The Committee on Awards shall be composed of the local chief executive as
chairman, the local treasurer, the local accountant, the local budget officer, the local general services officer, and the head of office or department
for whose use the supplies are being procured, as members. In case a head of office or department would sit in a dual capacity a member of the
sanggunian elected from among its members shall sit as a member. The Committee on Awards at the barangay level shall be the Sangguniang
Barangay. No national official shall sit as member of the Committee on Awards.

The Sandiganbayan found that, in the purchase of Toyota Land Cruiser, the personal canvass was effected solely by petitioner, without the
participation of the municipal accountant and the municipal treasurer. There was no showing that that the award was decided by the Committee on
Awards. Only an abstract of canvass supported the award, signed by petitioner and the municipal treasurer without the required signatures of the
municipal accountant and budget officer.

Where the head of the office or department requesting the requisition sits in a dual capacity, the participation of a Sanggunian member (elected
from among the members of the Sanggunian) is necessary (RA 7160). Petitioner disregarded this requirement because, in all the purchases
made, he signed in a dual capacityas chairman and member (representing the head of office for whose use the supplies were being procured).
That is strictly prohibited. None of the regular members of the Committee on Awards may sit in a dual capacity. Where any of the regular members
is the requisitioning party, a special member from the Sanggunian is required. The prohibition is meant to check or prevent conflict of interest as
well as to protect the use of the procurement process and the public funds for irregular or unlawful purchases.

The same flaws attended the procurement of the other items for which the petitioner clearly spent more than P20T - or beyond the threshold
amount per month allowed for purchases through personal canvass by fourth class municipalities.

Dispositive Portion: Petition is DENIED. Petitioner Rolando E. Sison is found guilty of seven counts of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. Costs
against petitioner.
 Digester: Trina Fernandez
CASE TITLE: YUJUICO v ATIENZA
Date of Case: October 12, 2005

DOCTRINE: The City School Board is not an entity separate and distinct from the City.

Petitioner:
Teresita Yujuicoowner of the parcel of land for which the City of Manila filed a case of eminent domain with the RTC. She is coming to court to
compel the City of Manila/City School Board of Manila to pay her just compensation for her properties which they expropriated 5 years before this
case was instituted.
Respondents:
The City School Board (CSB) of Manila and its Officers and MembersThey have not passed the resolution for the appropriation to pay Yujuico.
Manila RTC Judge Mercedes Posada-LacapAllowed CSBs Petition for Relief of Judgment

FACTS:

1. In 1995, the City Council of Manila enacted an Ordinance authorizing the City Mayor to acquire by negotiation or expropriation certain
parcels of land belonging to Yujuico for utilization as a site for the Francisco Benitez Elementary School. The Ordinance provides that an
amount not to exceed the fair market value of the land then prevailing in the area will be allocated out of the Special Education Fund (SEF)
of the City to defray the cost of the propertys acquisition.
2. In 1996, the City of Manila filed a case for eminent domain against Yujuico after failing to acquire her property through negotiations.
3. In 2000, the RTC found for the City and ordered it to pay the balance of P67,894,266.00 for the property acquired with interest at the rate
of 6% per annum.
4. The judgment became final and executory, no appeal having been interposed by either party.
5. In 2001, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment which the trial court granted. Therefore the branch sheriff served
a Notice of Garnishment on the funds of the City deposited with the Land Bank of the Philippines, to satisfy the judgment
amount
6. City filed a motion to quash the Notice of Garnishment invoking jurisprudence holding that public funds cannot be made subject to
garnishment.
7. The RTC issued an Order, recalling that during the hearing on the motion, the counsel for the City manifested that the amount
of P36,403,170.00 had been appropriated by the CSB under CSB Resolutions Nos. 613 and 623, of which P31,039,881.00 was available
for release. In line with the manifestation made by the counsel for the City, the trial court ordered the release to petitioner of the amount
of P31,039,881.00 deposited with the Land Bank, in partial payment of the just compensation in favor of petitioner.
8. Moreover, the RTC stated that upon manifestation of the counsel for the plaintiff that it is the CSB which has the authority to pass
a resolution allocating funds for the full satisfaction of the just compensation fixed, the said body was given 30 days from
receipt of the Order to pass the necessary resolution for the payments of the remaining balance due to defendant Teresita M. Yujuico.
9. Yujuicos inquiries as to whether the Resolution had been passed were left unanswered prompting her to file contempt charges against the
CSB members. The latter opposed stating that her remedy was that of Mandamus. The court dismissed the charges.
10. In 2002, Yujuico filed a Petition for Mandamus against the CSB members to compel them to pass the resolution for the
appropriation of the balance of the just compensation awarded to her in the expropriation case.
 11. The RTC granted the petition. Specifically, it ordered respondents to immediately pass a resolution appropriating the necessary amount
and the corresponding disbursement for the full and complete payment of the balance of the court-adjudged compensation still due
Yujuico.
12. The RTC cited Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals: The States power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of
fair play and justice. In the case at bar, considering that valuable property has been taken, the compensation to be paid fixed and the
municipality is in full possession and utilizing the property for the public purpose, for three (3) years, the Court finds that the municipality
has had more than reasonable time to pay full compensation.
The arguments of the herein respondents that passing the ordinance or the act of appropriating special educational fund is a
discretionary act that could not be compelled by mandamus should be thrown overboard. It must be stressed that what we have here is a
final and executory judgment, establishing a legal right for the petitioner to demand fulfillment which on the other hand became an
imperative duty on the part of the respondent to perform the act required.
13. The RTC denied the MR and without an appeal, the Decision became final and executory in 2003 and the petitioners Motion for
Execution was granted.
14. The CSB members filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment, citing excusable negligence, which the court granted. This had the effect of
giving due course to respondents appeal despite the fact that the decision of the trial court had already attained finality.

*Note Procedural Issues: Yujuico appealed via Rule 45 but the SC decided to rule on the case in the interest of justice and treated it as a Rule 65
Certiorari.

ISSUE 1 PETITIONERS RESPONDENTS Supreme Court

(Relevant Procedural CONTENTION: CONTENTION:
Issue) The SC Resolution dated 8 August 2005 already debunked these
Yujuico failed to arguments:
WON the failure of No discussion implead the CSB or its
Petitioner to implead new members before This Court is of the view that a substitution of
the new CSB the trial court. The the original respondents by the members of the CSB
members would former members of the who replaced them is warranted. The phrase or
render any decision CSB could no longer such time as may be granted by the Court in Sec. 17,
on this matter be compelled to act Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure denotes
ineffective. according to the that the Court before whom the motion for substitution
orders of the Court is filed may grant a period longer than thirty (30) days
since they no longer for the purpose. In any event, technical rules on
have the capacity to substitution of a party should not be so narrowly
do so. On the other construed as to prevent this Court from taking
hand, the new cognizance of a case and deciding it on the merits.
members cannot be Moreover, petitioner did make an attempt to implead
directed to comply the new members of the CSB by making the CSB itself
with the Courts a respondent before this Court. There is also no
judgment either; they showing that the new members of the CSB have
have never been deviated from the stand of their predecessors-in-
 impleaded in the case; interest; hence, there is a substantial need for
thus, the Court never continuing or maintaining petitioners action against
acquired jurisdiction them.
over their persons.
The proper substitutions of some party respondents have already taken
place in this case as further ordered in the above Resolution.

ISSUE 2 PETITIONERS RESPONDENTS Supreme Court

CONTENTION: CONTENTION:
CSB should pay. (1) The law does not make the CSB an
WON it is the CSB No discussion CSB has a personality entity independent from the City of Manila.
that should pay for separate and distinct (2)The particular circumstances of this case coupled with
the amounts due to from the City such that the rule that an act performed by counsel within the scope of a
Yujuico it should not be made general or implied authority is regarded as an act of the
to pay for the Citys client, render the City and, through it, respondents in estoppel.
obligations.

(1) Local Government Code of 1991, the law providing for the
creation of school boards states:

Section 98. Creation, Composition and

Compensation.-

(a) There shall be established in every province, city

or municipality a provincial, city, or municipal school
board, respectively.

(b) The composition of local school boards shall be as

follows:
...
(2) The city school board shall be composed of
the city mayor and the city superintendent of
schools as co-chairmen; the chairman of the
education committee of the sangguniang
panlungsod, the city treasurer, the
representative of the pederasyon ng mga
sangguniang kabataan in the sangguniang
panlungsod, the duly elected president of the
city federation of parents-teachers
 associations, the duly elected representative of
the non-academic personnel of public schools
in the city, as members;
...
Section 101. Compensation and
Remuneration.-
The co-chairmen and members of the provincial, city or
municipal school board shall perform their duties as
such without compensation or remuneration. Members
thereof who are not government officials or employees
shall be entitled to traveling expenses and allowances
chargeable against the funds of the local school board
concerned, subject to existing accounting and auditing
rules and regulations.

The fact that the highest ranking official of an LGU is

designated as co-chairman of the school board negates the
claim in this case that the CSB has a personality separate and
distinct from the City. The other fact that government officials in
the school board do not receive any compensation or
remuneration while NGO representatives merely receive
allowances underscores the absurdity of respondents
argument all the more. Indeed, such would not be the situation
if the school board has a personality separate and distinct from
the LGU.

(2) The Office of the City Legal Officer (OCLO), represented the
City in the expropriation case and now, all except one of the
individual respondents in the case at bar. The following are
manifestations which were relied upon by the lower court in
issuing the order on the motion to quash the Notice of
Garnishment over the funds of the City:
The Motion to Quash Notice of Garnishment was
heard by this court this morning and Atty. Joseph Aquino
appeared for the City and Atty. Federico Alday, for
Yujuico. Atty. Aquino manifested that the amount
P36,403,170.00 had been appropriated by the CSB
under CSB Resolution Nos. 613 and 623 for this
purpose.
 Upon manifestation of the counsel for the
City that it is the City School Board which has the
authority to pass a resolution allocating funds for
the full satisfaction of the just compensation fixed,
the said body is hereby given 30 days from receipt of
this Order to pass the necessary resolution for the
payments of the remaining balance due to Yujuico.

The manifestation was made by the same counsel now

claiming that it is actually the City which should be made liable for the
payment of its own obligations. This, after it trotted out the CSB as the
entity with authority to pass a resolution that would satisfy the obligation
it had vigorously pursued.

Petitioner and the courts acted in accordance with the Citys

own manifestations by running after the CSB. At this point, respondents
and the OCLO can no longer turn around and toss the obligation back
to the City. After all, it was the legal counsel of both the City and
respondents who made a big production out of showing that the liability
incurred by the City will be borne by the CSB.
ISSUE 2 PETITIONERS RESPONDENTS Supreme Court
CONTENTION: CONTENTION:
WON the enactment Yes, mandamus lies. The question of has already been settled
of an ordinance to The members of the in Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals:
satisfy the CSB cannot be Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason,
appropriation of a directed to decide a to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the
final money judgment discretionary function claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the
rendered against an in the specific manner enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and
LGU may be the court desires the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds.
compelled by
mandamus Mandamus is a remedy available to a property owner when a
money judgment is rendered in its favor and against a municipality or
city, as in this case. Moreover, the very ordinance authorizing the
expropriation of petitioners property categorically states that the
payment of the expropriated property will be defrayed from the SEF.

The legality of the provisions of the ordinance is presumed. The

source of the amount necessary to acquire petitioners property having
in fact been specified by the City Council of Manila, the passage of the
resolution for the allocation and disbursement thereof is indeed a
 ministerial duty of the CSB.

Furthermore, respondents had argued in the petition for

contempt filed against them by Yujuico that her failure to invoke the
proper remedy of mandamus should not be a ground to penalize them
with contempt. In their haste to have the contempt petition dismissed,
respondents consistently contended that what petitioner should have
filed was a case for mandamus to compel passage of the
corresponding resolution of the CSB if she wanted immediate payment.
Having relied on these representations of respondents and having filed
the action they adverted to, petitioner cannot now be sent by
respondents on another wild goose chase to obtain ultimate recovery of
what she is legally entitled to.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order of the trial court dated 25 June 2004, granting respondents Petition for Relief from
Judgment is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and its Decision dated 9 October 2002, ordering respondents to immediately pass a resolution for the
payment of the balance of the court-adjudged compensation due petitioner, is REINSTATED.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Court of Appeals for its information and guidance in relation to CA-G.R. No. 86692 entitled
Teresita M. Yujuico v. Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., et al.
 Digester: Lacas

CARPIO V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET. AL GR No. 96409

1992 Feb 14, Petition for declaration of unconstitutionality with TRO

Doctrine: Placing the PNP under the DILG does not constitute and encroachment on the power of the President. In fact, the police,
as a civilian force, is placed under the executive power and control of the President.
Powers exercised by local officials over the PNP are merely in the nature of delegates to the NAPOLCOM.
Petitioner: Antonio Carpio
(citizen, taxpayer, and member of the Philippines Bar sworn to defend the Constitution)
Respondent: The Executive Secretary, Secretary of Local Governments, Secretary of National Defense and National Treasurer
Facts:
1. Congress passed RA 6975 which established the PNP under a reorganized DILG. It was approved by Pres. Cory Aquino and published.
2. Petitioner seeks to declare the said Act unconstitutional.
3. (Trivia) Brief history of Phil police force and Art. XVI, sec. 6 of Constitution
a. Commonwealth period: Philippines Constabulary (PC) of Phil Ground Force (PGF, now AFP). Even if PC was part of PGF,
administrative, supervisory and directional control was under the Dept of Interior. After war, it became National Police under Dept
of National Defense.
b. Integration Act of 1975: created Integrated National Police (INP) under Office of the President, with PC as nucleus and local police
forces as civilian component. National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) exercised administrative control and supervision, while
local executives exercised operational supervision and direction. Under command of PC (military component), civil component of
INP was eroded and gave rise to inequities since the military had more benefits. Multiplicity in governance of PC-INP resulted in
inefficiency.
c. 1986 Constitutional Commission: Accdg to Commissioner Teodulo Natividad, modern police organization is removed from the
military and allows civilian police to blossom into a full profession by removing military from key positions. Hence, the one police
force, national in scope, and civilian in character provision (Art XVI, Sec. 6 of 1987 Constitution).
Issue: WON RA 6975 Petitioner: YES! Respondent (OSG): NO! Supreme Court: NO!
is unconstitutional?
1. RA 6975 emasculated 1. There is no usurpation of the 1. As a fundamentally accepted principle in
NAPOLCOM by limiting its power of control of the Constitutional Law, the President has
power to administrative NAPOLCOM under Section 51 control of all executive departments,
control over PNP, thus because under this very same bureaus, and offices. This presidential
control remained with DILG provision, it is clear that the power of control means "the power of [the
Sec under whom both the local executives are only acting President] to alter or modify or nullify or set
NAPOLCOM and PNP were as representatives of the aside what a subordinate officer had done
placed. NAPOLCOM. As such in the performance of his duties and to
deputies, they are answerable substitute the judgment of the former with
2. In manifest derogation of the
to the NAPOLCOM for their that of the latter."
power of control of the
actions in the exercise of their
NAPOLCOM over the PNP, a. Corollary rule to the control powers of
functions under that section.
RA 6975 vested the power to the President, is the "Doctrine of
Thus, unless countermanded
choose the PNP Provincial Qualified Political Agency". As the
by the NAPOLCOM, their acts
Director and the Chiefs of President cannot be expected to
are valid and binding as acts of
Police in the Governors and exercise his control powers all at the
the NAPOLCOM.
Mayors, respectively; the same time and in person, he will have to
power of "operational delegate some of them to his Cabinet
supervision and control" over members. Under this doctrine, "the acts
police units in city and of the Secretaries of such departments,
municipal mayors; in the Civil performed and promulgated in the
Service Commission, regular course of business, unless
participation in appointments disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
to the positions of Senior Executive presumptively the acts of the
Superintendent to Deputy Chief Executive."
Director-General as well as
b. The circumstance that the NAPOLCOM
the administration of
and the PNP are placed under the
qualifying entrance
reorganized Department of Interior and
examinations; disciplinary
Local Government is merely an
powers over PNP members
administrative realignment that would
in the "People's Law
bolster a system of coordination and
Enforcement Boards" and in
cooperation among the citizenry, local
city and municipal mayors.
executives and the integrated law
3. Section 12 of the said Act enforcement agencies and public safety
constitutes an "encroachment agencies created under the assailed Act
 upon, interference with, and c. Such organizational set-up does not
an abdication by the detract from the mandate of the
President of, executive Constitution that the national police
control and commander-in- force shall be administered and
chief powers." controlled by a national police
commission as at any rate, and in fact,
4. The creation of a "Special
the Act in question adequately provides
Oversight Committee" under
for administration and control at the
Section 84 of the Act,
commission level.
especially the inclusion
therein of some legislators as 2. The Constitutional Commission intended
members is an that the day-to-day functions of police work
"unconstitutional like crime, investigation, crime prevention
encroachment upon and a activities, traffic control, etc., would be
diminution of, the President's under the operational control of the local
power of control over all executives as it would not be advisable to
executive departments, give full control of the police to the local
bureaus and offices." executives because, previously, this gave
rise to warlordism, bossism, and
sanctuaries for vices and abuses.
HOWEVER, this does not mean that the
Act went beyond the bounds of the
Constitution's intent.
a. Under the provisions, full control
remains with the NAPOLCOM.
b. Agrees with the OSG. In fact, the local
officials, as NAPOLCOM
representatives, will choose the officers
concerned from a list of eligibles (those
who meet the general qualifications for
appointment to the PNP) to be
recommended by PNP officials. The
same is true with respect to the
contention on the operational
supervision and control exercised by the
local officials.
c. As regards the assertion involving the
 Civil Service Commission, suffice it to
say that the questioned provisions
precisely underscore the civilian
character of the national police force,
and will undoubtedly professionalize the
same.
d. The grant of disciplinary powers over
PNP members to the "People's Law
Enforcement Boards" (or the PLEB) and
city and municipal mayors is also not in
derogation of the commission's power of
control over the PNP. The Commission
exercises appellate jurisdiction, thru the
regional appellate boards, over
decisions of both the PLEB and the said
mayors. Furthermore, it is the
Commission which shall issue the
implementing guidelines and procedures
to be adopted by the PLEB for in the
conduct of its hearings, and it may
assign NAPOLCOM hearing officers to
act as legal consultants of the PLEBs.
The establishment of PLEBs in every
city, and municipality would all the more
help professionalize the police force.
3. Looking into the deliberations of the
ConCom, it thus becomes all too apparent
then that the provision herein assailed
precisely gives muscle to and enforces the
proposition that the national police force
does not fall under the Commander-in-
Chief powers of the President. This is
necessarily so since the police force, not
being integrated with the military, is not a
part of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
As a civilian agency of the government, it
properly comes within, and is subject to, the
 exercise by the President of the power of
executive control.
a. It does not constitute abdication of
commander-in-chief powers. It simply
provides for the transition period or
process during which the national police
would gradually assume the civilian
function of safeguarding the internal
security of the State. Under this
instance, the President, to repeat,
abdicates nothing of his war powers. It
would bear to here state, in reiteration of
the preponderant view, that the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, is
not a member of the Armed Forces. He
remains a civilian whose duties under
the Commander-in-Chief provision
"represent only a part of the organic
duties imposed upon him. All his other
functions are clearly civil in nature." His
position as a civilian Commander-in-
Chief is consistent with, and a testament
to, the constitutional principle that
"civilian authority is, at all times,
supreme over the military."
4. No interference with Presidents power if
control. The Special Oversight Committee
is simply an ad hoc or transitory body,
established and tasked solely with planning
and overseeing the immediate "transfer,
merger and/or absorption" into the
Department of the Interior and Local
Governments of the "involved agencies"
and once this is carried out, its functions as
well as the committee itself would cease
altogether. As an ad hoc body, its creation
and the functions it exercises, decidedly do
 not constitute an encroachment and in
diminution of the power of control which
properly belongs to the President. What is
more, no executive department, bureau or
office is placed under the control or
authority, of the committee.
5. Lastly, Article XVI, Section 6, merely
mandates the statutory creation of a
national police commission that will
administer and control the national police
force to be established thereunder. This
commission is not in the same category as
the independent Constitutional
Commissions of Article IX and the other
constitutionally created independent Office,
namely, the Commission on Human Rights.
The three Constitutional Commissions (Civil
Service, Audit, Elections) and the additional
commission created by the Constitution
(Human Rights) are all independent of the
Executive; but the National Police
Commission is not. In fact, it was stressed
during the CONCOM deliberations that this
commission would be under the President,
and hence may be controlled by the
President, thru his or her alter ego, the
Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government.

Dispositive: Petition dismissed for lack of merit.

 Digester: John Michael Vida

CASE TITLE: SPO1 LEONITO ACUZAR vs. APRONIANO JOROLAN and HON. EDUARDO A. APRESA, PEOPLES LAW ENFORCEMENT
BOARD (PLEB) Chairman, New Corella, Davao del Norte
Date of Case: April 7, 2010

DOCTRINE: Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) -

Petitioner:
SPO1 Leonito Acuzar
Respondents:
Aproniano Jorolan
Hon. Eduardo Apresa, PLEB Chairman, Davao del Norte

FACTS:

On May 2, 2000, respondent Aproniano Jorolan filed Administrative Case No. 2000-01 against petitioner Acuzar before the PLEB charging
Acuzar of Grave Misconduct for allegedly having an illicit relationship with Jorolans minor daughter. Subsequently, the respondent also filed a
criminal case against petitioner before the MTC of New Corella for violation of RA 7610 (Section 5, Article III 1). Acuzar, in response, vehemently
denied the accusations against him in a Counter-Affidavit. In support of his denial, Acuzar attached the affidavit of Rigma A. Jorolan, who denied
having any relationship with the petitioner or having kissed him despite knowing him to be a married person.

On July 24, 2000, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings before the PLEB pending resolution of the criminal case filed before the
regular court. The PLEB denied his motion for lack of merit and a hearing of the case was conducted. After due proceedings, the PLEB issued a
decision holding Acuzar guilty of grave misconduct, punishable by immediate dismissal.

The PLEB subsequently denied Acuzars subsequent motion for reconsideration. Immediately upon receipt of the decision, Acuzar filed a Petition
for Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order with the RTC of Tagum City.

Petitioner alleged that the decision was issued without giving him an opportunity to be heard. He likewise averred that the PLEB acted without
jurisdiction in proceeding with the case without the petitioner having been first convicted in the criminal case before the regular court. He pointed
out that under the PLEB Rules of Procedure, prior conviction was required before the Board may act on the administrative case considering that
the charge was actually for violation of law, although denominated as one (1) for grave misconduct.

On September 16, 2000, petitioner was ordered dismissed from the PNP by the Chief Regional Directorial Staff of the PNP, Police Regional Office
11, effective September 7, 2000.

1
The RTC later rendered a Decision annulling the Decision of the PLEB, as it was stated that Acuzar was not given his day in Court. The Board
could have scheduled the hearing for reception of Acuzars evidence and his failure to appear will be considered as a waiver to present his
evidence. It was only then that the decision could have been rendered.

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTCs decision, stating that certiorari was not the proper remedy and that the petitioner should have appealed the
decision of the PLEB to the regional appellate board of the PNP before resorting to certiorari before the RTC.
Issue 1: PETITIONERS RESPONDENTS SUPREME COURT:
CONTENTION: CONTENTION:
WON Acuzars NO. SC agrees with CA decision.
resort to certiorari NO, certiorari was YES, certiorari was an
was NOT appropriate because his inappropriate remedy First, the Court disagrees with Acuzars contention that his offense
warranted due to case falls under the because appeal was was that of violation of law as he was indeed charged with grave
the availability of exceptions to the rule on available and the issues misconduct for engaging in an illicit affair with respondents minor
the remedy of exhaustion of raised were not pure daughter, he being a married man, and not for violation of law, as
appeal from the administrative remedies, questions of law but were petitioner would like to convince this Court.
decision of the the decision being questions of law and fact.
PLEB. patently illegal. Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful
The existence and conduct, motivated by premeditated, obstinate or intentional
Furthermore, he maintains availability of the right of purpose. On the other hand, violation of law presupposes final
that a conviction should appeal proscribes resort conviction in court of any crime or offense penalized under the
have been obtained first in to certiorari because one Revised Penal Code or any special law or ordinance.
the criminal case for child (1) of the requirements for
abuse against him before its availment is the The settled rule is that criminal and administrative cases are
the PLEB can acquire absence of the remedy of separate and distinct from each other. In criminal cases, proof
jurisdiction over his appeal or any other plain, beyond reasonable doubt is needed whereas in administrative
administrative case. This speedy or adequate proceedings, only substantial evidence is required. As such,
was because, although remedy. administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal
the case filed before the proceedings. And the PLEB, being the administrative disciplinary
PLEB was captioned as Acuzar should have body tasked to hear complaints against erring members of the
Grave Misconduct, the appealed the decision of PNP, has jurisdiction over the case.
offense charged was the PLEB to the regional
actually for Violation of appellate board of the Second, Section 43 (e) of RA 6975 is explicit in stating that:
Law, which requires prior PNP before resorting to
conviction before a certiorari before the court. a decision involving demotion or dismissal from the service
hearing on the may be appealed by either party with the regional appellate
administrative case can Also, while it is true that board within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the decision.
proceed. there are instances where
the extraordinary remedy Since appeal was available, filing a petition for certiorari was not
Therefore, the PLEB of certiorari may be apt. The existence and availability of the right of appeal are
should have awaited the resorted to despite the antithetical to the availment of the special civil action of certiorari.
 resolution of the criminal availability of an appeal, The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires
case before conducting a Acuzar failed to that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court,
hearing on the demonstrate any ground it is a precondition that he should have availed of the means of
administrative charge to warrant immediate administrative processes afforded to him. If a remedy is available
against him. resort to it. within the administrative machinery of the administrative agency,
then this alternative should first be utilized before resort can be
He also maintains that the made to the courts. This is to enable such body to review and
Boards decision was correct any mistakes without the intervention of the court.
reached without giving
him an opportunity to be Third, contrary to Acuzars claim that he has not been afforded all
heard and his right to due the opportunity to present his side, the SC found that Acuzar was
process was violated. given the opportunity to be heard in the proceedings before the
PLEB. He was notified of the complaint against him and in fact, he
had submitted his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his
witnesses. He also attended the hearings together with his
counsel and even asked for several postponements.

Acuzar had more than enough opportunity to present his side and
adduce evidence in support of his defense, and therefore Acuzar
cannot claim now that he had been denied of due process.

Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or

through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process.
The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy.
In other words, it is not legally objectionable for being violative of
due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based
solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence
submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the
place of direct testimony.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 23, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77110 is hereby
AFFIRMED.
 Digester: Ivan

CASE TITLE: Ignacio v Banate, Jr.

Date of Case: August 31, 1987

DOCTRINE:
The appointee to a Sangguniang Panlungsod who sits there as a representative of the barangays must meet the qualifications required
by law for the position. An unqualified person cannot be appointed a member even in an acting capacity.

Petitioner: ROBERTO IGNACIO

Respondent: LEONCIO BANATE, JR., HON. AQUILINO PIMENTEL, in his capacity as Minister of Local Governments and Community
Development and the CITY TREASURER OF ROXAS CITY

FACTS:
On May 17, 1982: Ignacio was elected as Brgy Capt of Brgy Tanza, Roxas City for a 6 year term.
Subsequently Ignacio was elected as Pres of the Katipunang Panlungsod ng mga Brgy (KPB) in Roxas City, pursuant to then Local
Government Code.
In 1982, by virtue of his being the KPB Pres, he was appointed a member of the Sangg Panlungsod of Roxas City by Pres. Marcos.
On May 9, 1986, Minister of Local Government Pimentel designated Banate, Jr. as member of the Sangg Panlu of Roxas City, repacing
Ignacio.
Ignacio now comes to Court questioning Banate, Jr.s appointment

ISSUE PETITIONERS RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: SUPREME COURT:

CONTENTION:
WON Banate, Under BP Blg. 337 LGC, the terms of We find the petition to be meritorious. It is true
Jr.s appointment Banate is not qualified to office of local government officials that Minister Pimentel, as cabinet member, is
to replace Ignacio replace Ignacio as commenced on the first Monday of the alter ego of the President in appointing a
is valid Ignacios membership in March 1980 and ended on March 28, public officer. His authority to designate or
the Sangg Panlu is 1986. The period was extended to appoint local officials in an acting capacity has
governed by Sec 173, BP June 30, 1986 by the Omnibus been upheld by this Court.
337 which requires that Election Code of 1985). The appointee to a Sangguniang Panlungsod
the officer is the duly The petitioner, as an appointive local who sits there as a representative of the
elected Pres of the KPB in government official who assumed barangays must meet the qualifications
order to be appointed as office under the 1973 Constitution, is required by law for the position. An unqualified
officer in the Sangg Panlu covered by the provisions of Section person cannot be appointed a member even in
Banates appointment is 2, Article III of Proclamation No. 3 an acting capacity.
invalid as Sec 173, BP 337 issued by President Corazon C. It must be noted that the petitioner is an
requires that it is the Pres Aquino, which provides that: elected barangay captain of Barangay Tanza,
who should appoint and "All elective and appointive officials Roxas City. As barangay captain, he was
not the Minister of Local and employees under the 1973 subsequently elected President of the
 Government. Constitution shall continue in office Association of Barangay Councils of Roxas
until otherwise provided by City. It was by reason of his being the president
proclamation or executive order or of the Association of Barangay Councils of
upon the designation or appointment Roxas City that the President of the Philippines
and qualification of their successors, appointed him as member of the Sangguniang
if such is made within a period of one Panlungsod. This was pursuant to Section 3,
year from February 25, 1986." paragraph 1 of BP Blg. 51
Under Section 2, Article III of Respondent not being a barangay Captain and
Proclamation No. 3, dated March 25, never having been elected president of the
1986, issued by President Aquino, association of barangay councils, cannot be
otherwise known as the Provisional appointed a member of the sangguniang
Constitution, the power to delegate panlungsod. He lacks the eligibility and
or appoint officers-in-charge in qualification required by law.
replacement of local government Section 2, Article III of the Provisional
officials by then Minister Aquilino Constitution of 1986, Proclamation No. 3 of
Pimentel, Jr., as alter ego of the President Corazon C. Aquino provides:
President of the Philippines, has "All elective and appointive officials and
been upheld by this Court in several employees under the 1973 Constitution shall
cases. continue in office until otherwise provided by
proclamation or executive order or upon the
designation or appointment and qualification of
their successors, if such is made within a
period of one year from February 25, 1986."
The petitioner, as one who was appointed
under the 1973 Constitution continues in office
until the appointment and qualification of his
successor. Since the appointment of his
successor, respondent Banate, is not valid, the
tenure of petitioner Ignacio could not be
terminated on that basis alone.

Dispositive Portion:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The appointment/designation of private respondent Banate as
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Roxas representing the Katipunang Panlungsod Ng Mga Barangay is DECLARED NULL
and VOID. Petitioner ROBERTO IGNACIO is ordered REINSTATED as member of said Sangguniang Panlungsod.
 Digester: Madarang
GALAROSA vs. VALENCIA
11 November 1993 / J. Davide

DOCTRINE: ABC presidents may continue to serve as ex-officio members of the sangguniang bayan because of the hold-over doctrine, which
states that unless holding over is expressly or impliedly prohibited, the incumbent may continue to hold over until someone else is elected and
qualified to assume the office.

Petitioner: Raul Galarosa, incumbent President of ABC Sorsogon

Respondent: Hon. Valencia (Presiding Judge of RTC Sorsogon), Sangguniang Bayan of Sorsogon and Rodolfo Salay (incumbent barangay
captain of Brgy. Gimaloto, and aspirant for the position of ABC Sorsogon President)

FACTS:
In 1992, Lasay filed in the RTC Sorsogon a petition for declaratory relief against the Sangguniang Bayan of Sorsogon (SBS), seeking to clarify
the proper interpretation of Sec. 494 of the LGC, and to settle the issue of whether or not the incumbent ABC President can continue holding
office despite the termination of the term of office of the SBS members on 30 June 1992.
In its Answer, SBS asked for the dismissal of the petition because Lasay had no legal right to file the petition. He was merely an aspirant to the
position of ABC President, not the holder thereof.
RTC Decision: Galarosa had no right or legal basis to continue in office as ex-officio member of the present SBS. Since the term of the
sanggunian concerned expired on 30 June 1992, it stands to follow that the ex officio membership of the liga (or ABC) president in the said
sanggunian, by express mandate of law, likewise ended on the said date.

Issue Petitioners Contention Respondents Contention Supreme Court

WON Galarosa can Yes. No. Yes.
continue to serve as a Pursuant to DILG The term of office of Although the ABC presidents' term of office as members of the
member of the SB Memorandum Circular Galarosa as an ex officio sangguniang bayan has expired, they could serve in a hold-
beyond 30 June No. 92-38 dated 29 member of the SBS is over capacity.
1992, the date when June 1992, Sec. 494 coterminous with that of the
the term of office of LGC was reconciled said SBS which expired on Generally, the term of office of the ABC presidents as ex-officio
the elective members with Article 210 (d)(3), 30 June 1992; hence there members of the Sangguniang Bayan is coterminous with the
of the SB of Sorsogon Rule XXIX of the LGC was a need for the new term of the said Sanggunian.
expired IRR which provides that election of an ABC
incumbent ABC representative. There is no law which prohibits ABC presidents from holding
presidents shall over as members of the sangguniang bayan. On the contrary,
continue to serve as ex the IRR of the LGC (prepared and issued by the Oversight
officio members of their Committee upon specific mandate of Sec. 533 LGC) expressly
respective sanggunians recognizes and grants that hold-over authority to ABC
unless sooner removed presidents (Art. 210 pars. d and f).
for cause or the new The purpose of the hold-over is to prevent the hiatus in the
officers shall have been government pending the time when the successor may be
 elected and qualified. chosen and inducted into office. Sec. 494 could not have been
intended to allow a gap in the representation of the barangays,
through the presidents of the ABC, in the sanggunian.

Note on liga ng mga barangay or Association of Barangay Councils (ABC)

Sec. 494 LGC provides for the ex officio membership in the respective sanggunians of the duly elected presidents of the liga at the
municipality, city, and provincial levels, including the component cities and municipalities of Metro Manila. The liga referred to therein is the liga
ng mga barangay. Every barangay is represented in the liga ng mga barangay by the punong barangay, or in his absence or incapacity, by a
sanggunian member duly elected for the purpose among its members. The principal aim of the liga ng mga barangay is to promote the
development of barangays and secure the general welfare of their inhabitants.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the decision of the respondent Judge in the
RTC of Sorsogon. Costs against Lasay.
 Digester: Mendoza

SB of Barangay Don Mariano Marcos v. Punong Barangay Severino Martinez

March 3, 2008

CHICO-NAZARIO

R45 Petition for review on certiorari against the orders of Bayombong, Nueva Ecija RTC imposing upon Severino Martinez, the administrative
penalty of removal from office.

DOCTRINE: A Sangguniang Bayan is not empowered to remove an elective local official from office. Sec. 60 of the LGC conferred upon the
courts the power to remove elective local officials from office.

Petitioner: THE SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF BARANGAY DON MARIANO MARCOS, MUNICIPALITY OF BAYOMBONG PROVINCE
OF NUEVA VISCAYA represented by BARANGAY KAGAWAD JOSE CENEN SANTOS, MARIO BACUD, WALTER
FRANCISCO, ROSITA SEBASTIAN, LAURETA CABAUATAN, CECILIA ALINDAYU and MELY SIMANGAN

Respondent: PUNONG BARANGAY SEVERINO MARTINEZ

FACTS:

1. Petitioner Sangguniang Barangay charged respondent Punong Barangay Martinez with Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office and Violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act through the filing of a verified complaint before the Sangguniang Bayan.
2. Martinez was placed under preventive suspension. Eventually, the Sangguniang Bayan rendered its Decision which imposed upon
Martinez the penalty of removal from office.
3. Martinez filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for TRO and Preliminary Injunction before the RTC, questioning the validity of the
Sangguniang Bayan decision.
4. The RTC issued an order declaring the decision void.
5. Sangguniang Barangay now comes before the SC, seeking the reversal of the RTC order.

ISSUE PETITIONER RESPONDENT SUPREME COURT

The pivotal YES. NO. NO.

issue in this
case is Administrative Under the law, a Sangguniang Bayan is not vested with the power to remove an elective local
whether or cases involving official from office.
not the elective
Sanggunian barangay
g Bayan officials may be
may remove filed with, heard 1. The pertinent legal provisions and cases decided by the SC firmly establish that the
an elective and decided by Sangguniang Bayan is not empowered to remove Martinez, an elective local official, from
office.
local official the 2. Sec. 60 of the LGC conferred upon the courts the power to remove elective local officials
from office. Sangguniang from office.
Panlungsod or 3. The legislative intent to confine to the courts (RTC, Sandiganbayan, appellate courts)
Sangguniang jurisdiction over cases involving removal of elective local officials was evident in the
Bayan deliberation of the Senate on the LGC.
concerned, 4. Salalima v Guingona, Jr. (1996): The power to remove elected officials is exclusively
vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of Sec. 60 of
which can,
the LGC. The SC in this case invalidated Art. 125, Rule XIX of the IRR of the LGC,
thereafter, which provided that the disciplining authority has the power to remove elective officials.
impose a Only the courts have this power.
penalty of 5. Pablico v Villapando (2002): It is beyond cavil that the power to remove erring elective
removal from local officials from service is lodged exclusively with the courts. The peoples will must
office. The not be put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority.
courts are 6. The rule which confers to the proper courts the power to remove an elective local official
from office is intended as a check against any capriciousness or partisan activity by the
merely tasked
disciplining authority. Vesting the local legislative body with the power to decide whether
with issuing the or not a local chief executive may be removed from office, and only relegating to the
order of courts a mandatory duty to implement the decision, would still not free the resolution of
removal, after the case from the capriciousness or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Thus, the
the petitioners interpretation would defeat the clear intent of the law.
Sangguniang 7. Moreover, such an arrangement clearly demotes the courts to nothing more than an
Panlungsod or implementing arm of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, or Sangguniang Bayan. This would
be an unmistakable breach of the doctrine on separation of powers, thus placing the
Sangguniang
courts under the orders of the legislative bodies of local governments.
Bayan finds 8. Congress clearly meant that the removal of an elective local official be done only after a
that a penalty trial before the appropriate court, where court rules of procedure and evidence can
of removal is ensure impartiality and fairness and protect against political maneuverings.
warranted.

(The proper procedure for imposing the penalty of removal from office)

9. If the acts allegedly committed by the barangay official are of a grave nature and, if found
guilty, would merit the penalty of removal from office, the case should be filed with the
regional trial court. Once the court assumes jurisdiction, it retains jurisdiction over the
case even if it would be subsequently apparent during the trial that a penalty less than
 removal from office is appropriate. On the other hand, the most extreme penalty that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the erring elective
barangay official is suspension; if it deems that the removal of the official from service is
warranted, then it can resolve that the proper charges be filed in court.

DISPOSITIVE: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Bayombong RTC in Special Civil
Action No. 6727 is AFFIRMED.
 Digester: Ansis V. Pornillos
CASE TITLE: AMORA, JR. vs. COMELEC
Date of Case: January 25, 2011

DOCTRINE: Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to stand in the way of the true will of the
electorate. Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice
of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.

Petitioner: Sergio G. Amora, Jr. - the incumbent Mayor of Candijay and had been twice elected to the post, in the years 2004 and 2007.
Respondent: Arnielo S. Olandria - one of the mayoralty candidates of the Nationalist Peoples Coalition (NPC) in the same municipality.

FACTS:

On March 5, 2010, Olandria filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification against Amora. Olandria alleged that Amoras COC was not
properly sworn contrary to the requirements of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Olandria pointed out
that, in executing his COC, Amora merely presented his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) to the notary public, Atty. Oriculo Granada (Atty.
Granada), instead of presenting competent evidence of his identity. Consequently, Amoras COC had no force and effect and should be considered
as not file

Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified Amora from running for Mayor of Candijay, Bohol. Amora (petitioner) filed
an MR.

Meanwhile, on May 10, 2010, national and local elections were held. Amora obtained 8,688 votes, equivalent to 58.94% of the total votes cast,
compared to Olaivars 6,053 votes, equivalent to only 41.06% thereof. Subsequently, the Muncipal Board of Canvassers of Candijay, Bohol,
proclaimed Amora as the winner for the position of Municipal Mayor of Candijay, Bohol.

A week thereafter, or on May 17, 2010, in another turn of events, the COMELEC en banc denied Amoras motion for reconsideration and affirmed
the resolution of the COMELEC (Second Division). Hence this appeal.

Issue 1 PETITIONERS RESPONDENTS Supreme Court:

CONTENTION:2 CONTENTION:

W/N it is proper to Olandrias claim does Amoras COC was not Ruled in favor of Mayor Amora. Grave abuse of discretion on
disqualify a candidate not constitute a proper properly sworn contrary the part of Comelec.

2
Personal attacks of petitioner against complainant ;)
(1) Olaivar, his opponent in the mayoralty post, and likewise a member of the NPC, is purportedly a fraternity brother and close associate of Nicodemo T. Ferrer
(Commissioner Ferrer), one of the commissioners of the COMELEC who disqualified him; and
(2) Olaivar served as Consultant for the COMELEC, assigned to the Office of Commissioner Ferrer.
who, in executing his ground for the to the requirements of
Certificate of Candidacy cancellation of the COC; the Omnibus Election Olandria petition is not based on any of the grounds for
(COC), merely Code (OEC) and the disqualification as enumerated in the foregoing statutory
presented to the Notary The COC is valid and 2004 Rules on Notarial provisions. Nowhere in Sec. 68 of Omnibus Election Code 3 or
Public his Community effective because he Practice. Sec. 40 of LGC4 did it specify that a defective notarization is a
Tax Certificate. (Amora) is personally ground for the disqualification of a candidate.
known to the notary Amora merely
public, Atty. Granada, presented his Moreover, competent evidence of identity is not required in
before whom he took Community Tax cases where the affiant is personally known to the Notary Public
his oath in filing the Certificate (CTC) to the (Sec. 2 of 2004 Notarial Rules)5, which is the case herein. The
document; notary public, Atty. records reveal that petitioner submitted to this Commission a
Oriculo Granada (Atty. sworn affidavit executed by Notary Public Oriculo A. Granada
Atty. Granada is, in fact, Granada), instead of (Granada), who notarized petitioners COC, affirming in his
a close acquaintance presenting competent affidavit that he personally knows petitioner.
since they have been evidence of his identity.
members of the League Consequently, Amoras The purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather than

3
SEC. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found
by the Commission of having: (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d)
solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86, and 261, paragraphs
d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his
status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the elections laws.

4
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment,
within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the
effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

5
Sec. 2. Affirmation or Oath. The term "Affirmation" or "Oath" refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and
(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the contents of the instrument or document.
 of Muncipal Mayors, COC had no force and frustrate, the will of the voters. The people of Candijay, Bohol
Bohol Chapter, for effect and should be has already exercised their right to suffrage on May 10, 2010
several years; and considered as not filed where [petitioner] was one of the candidates for municipal
mayor. To disqualify [petitioner] at this late stage simply due to
Ultimately, he (Amora) an overly strict reading of the 2004 Notarial Rules will effectively
sufficiently complied deprive the people who voted for him their rights to vote.
with the requirement
that the COC be under Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases
oath. should not be made to stand in the way of the true will of
the electorate. Laws governing election contests must be
liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in
the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere
technical objections.

Obiter:6
OEM Section Petition Effect
Sec. 68 Petition for disqualification merely prohibited to continue as a candidate

Sec. 78 Petition to deny due course to or Certificate is cancelled/denied due course and would not treated as a
cancel a CoC candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC

Thus, in Miranda v. Abaya, this Court made the distinction that a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can validly be substituted under
Section 77 of the OEC because he/she remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled
under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he/she is never considered a candidate.

Dispositive Portion:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 10-046 (DC) dated April 29, 2010 and May
17, 2010, respectively, are ANULLED and SET ASIDE.

6
Court distinguished between the two since respondent filed for a petition for disqualification but based on Sec. 78. However, respondent never filed for the
cancellation of his opponents CoC but used Sec. 78 as his petitions basis, thus Court did not apply the effects of Sec. 78. (This part is only my opinion).
 Digester: Geronimo

VALLES V. COMELEC
2000 August 09
Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court
The mere fact that a person is a holder of a foreign passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an
effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against his/her claim of Filipino citizenship.
The phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160, Section 40(d) and in RA 7854, Section 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance.
Persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.
For candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. A declaration in the COC that one is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will
support and defend the Constitution and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto, which is under oath, operates as an effective
renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Petitioner: Cirilo R. Valles
Position not mentioned; he questioned the qualification of Rosalind to run as governor
Respondents: COMELEC
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez
She ran for governor; her citizenship was questioned
Facts:
1. Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born in Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte,
and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. At the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines.
2. In 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen.
3. She continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but also as candidate. She served as Provincial Board Member
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental.
4. In the 1992, 1995 and 1998 elections, she ran for governor. Her candidacy was questioned in the three elections on the ground that she is
an Australian citizen.
5. The COMELEC dismissed all three petitions for disqualification.
6. The third petitioner, Cirilo Valles, filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Petitioner:
1. Lopez had renounced her Filipino citizenship based on the admitted facts:
a. In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration as an Australian national and was issued Alien
Certificate of Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988
b. On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR)
c. She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988
1. On COMELECs finding that Lopez had renounced her Australian citizenship and had her Australian passport cancelled, the said acts did
not automatically restore her status as a Filipino citizen. For her to reacquire Philippine citizenship, she must comply with the mandatory
requirements for repatriation under Republic Act 8171.
2. Coupled with her alleged renunciation of Australian citizenship, she has effectively become a stateless person and as such, is disqualified
to run for a public office in the Philippines.
3. Even on the assumption that Lopez had dual citizenship, still, she is disqualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental, citing Section 40 of
RA 7160.
4. When citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is generally not
considered res judicata in any subsequent proceeding challenging the same, citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of
Immigration.
Respondents:
1. Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a public office because:
a. Her father is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine
Constitution
b. She was married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473
c. She renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia
and her Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as certified to by the Australian Embassy in Manila
d. There are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066 (two previous cases filed against her), declaring
her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the elective position of Davao Oriental governor
Issue: WON Lopez is disqualified to run for local elective office for being an Australian citizen?
Held: No. Lopez is a Filipino citizen, hence, she is qualified to run for governor.
SC:
 1. The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. A child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents
regardless of the place of his/her birth. Lopez was born to Telesforo Ybasco who, based on the organic acts 7 existing at that time, is
considered a Filipino citizen8.
2. The mere fact that Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an
effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the
loss of citizenship, the same must be express.
a. Aznar vs. COMELEC: an application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an express renunciation or
repudiation of ones citizenship
b. Mercado vs. Manzano : the application for an alien certificate of registration and the holding of a foreign passport are mere acts of
assertion of foreign citizenship before it is effectively renounced.
c. At the most, private respondent had dual citizenship - she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.
3. Under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in another country has not been included as a ground for
losing ones Philippine citizenship.
4. Mercado vs. Manzano: dual citizenship as used in the Local Government Code pertains to dual allegiance.
5. The fact that Lopez had dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify her from running for a public office. It was ruled that for
candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their COC, to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship.
6. On January 15, 1992, Lopez executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian passport of private
respondent was cancelled, as certified to by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in Manila.
7. The principle of res judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs.
Republic, an exception to this general rule was recognized. Res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship if all of the following are
present: 1) a persons citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party; 2) the Solicitor General or
his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof, and 3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Dispositive: Petition DISMISSED. CA Resolutions AFFIRMED.

7
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Jones Law
8
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens
Digester: Cagahastian

Moreno v. COMELEC

August 10, 2006

Disqualification

Person convicted by final judgment but placed on probation without serving sentence is not disqualified from running in a local elective
office (1) the suspension of service also suspends the accessory penalties i.e. disqualification (2) Probation Law (S.16) is an exception
to the LGC (S. 40a) a convict on probation is restored to all his civil rights.

Note: Designation of petitioner and respondent is based on the original complaint, and not on this petition for review.

Petitioner: Moreno was disqualified by Comelec upon the petition by private respondent Mejes

Respondent: Comelec disqualified Moreno upon petition by private respondent Mejes

Facts:

1. Mejes filed petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong Barangay in 2002 elections in Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar.
2. The ground cited for the disqualification of Moreno was his conviction for arbitrary detention. He was convicted by final judgment but
placed on probation instead of serving sentence. Later, trial court discharged Moreno's probation.
3. Comelec 1st division disqualifies Moreno.
4. Comelec en banc affirms the disqualification.

Petitioner Respondents SC

He was already given probation, thus no cause Mejes says that Moreno was convicted by final Moreno is qualified to run.
of action. judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention
and was sentenced to imprisonment for (4 mos
one day to 2 years 4 months) by RTC
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following
Catbalogan Samar, which also carries the
persons are disqualified from running for any
accessory penalty of disqualification.
elective local position:
 (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for
an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence; [Emphasis supplied.]

xxxxx

Baclayon v. Mutia imposition of sentence of Comelec says that S. 40(a) of LGC provides Baclayon v. Mutia Probation not sentence but
punishment, as well as accessory penalties, that those convicted by final judgment of a suspension of imposition of sentence. Thus,
was thereby suspended when Moreno was crime involving moral turpitude for an offense accessory penalties including perpetual special
placed on probation instead of serving his punishable by 1 year or more of imprisonment, disqualification were similarly suspended.
sentence. w/in 2 years after serving sentece, are Moreno wasn't even disqualified because of
disqualified from running for any elective local the suspension of the imposition of the
position. Probation merely suspended sentence.
execution of sentence but did not affect his
disqualification from running for an elective
local office.

S.16 of Probation Law of 1976 final Trial court discharged Moreno's probation.
discharge of probation granted by RTC to Applying S.16 of Probation law, Moreno is
Moreno restores to him all civil rights lost. restored to all his civil rights. Even if we don't
Thus, he may vote and be voted for. apply S.40(a) of LGC to the letter, still Moreno
will be qualified because of S.16.

Nature of probation mere privilege, an act of

clemency or grace. Probationers a distinct
class of offenders NOT covered by
 disqualification.

Against COMELEC argument LGC 40(a) Probation law exception to LGC.

only applies to those who have served their
sentence and not to probationers since the
latter do not serve their adjudged sentence.
On pardon - it would be far better to err in
Thus: Probation law exception to LGC.
favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in
complex but little understood legalisms. - J.
Panganiban in Frivaldo v. COMELEC

And even if disqualified, his subsequent

election as Punong Barangay constitutes an
implied pardon of his previous misconduct

Dispositive: Granted in favor of Moreno.

 Digester: RUIZ

EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ vs. COMELEC, BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ

July 24, 1996

Doctrine:
A fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being
charged, flee to avoid prosecution. Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has
already been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed.

Parties: Petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez and private respondent Bienvenido O. Marquez Jr. were protagonists for the gubernatorial post
of Quezon Province in the May 1992 & 1995 elections.

Facts:
Rodriguez (petitioner) won against Marquez (respondent) for the gubernatorial position in the 1992 elections.
Marquez filed a petition for quo waranto before COMELEC. The ground was that Rodriguez was a fugitive from justice, a ground for
disqualification/ineligibility under Section 40(e) of the LGC. According to Marquez, there were pending charges, filed on November 12,
1985 in the US against Rodriguez, for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal property.
Marquez petition: COMELEC dismissed the QW petition. Marquez filed a certiorari case before the SC (Marquez petition). In the
Marquez petition, the SC defined a fugitive from justice as not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those
who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. The SC did not rule on whether or not the Rodriguez was a fugitive from justice but it
remanded the case to COMELEC to decide on this issue.
In the 1995 elections, Rodriguez and Marquez were again rivals for the gubernatorial position. Marquez filed a petition for disqualification
before the COMELEC on the ground that Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice. During the filing of the disqualification case, the MARQUEZ
petition was still pending in the SC.
The COMELEC consolidated the QW petition [NB: At this point, SC had already remanded the Marquez decision to COMELEC] and the
disqualification case.
o COMELEC Consolidated Resolution: The COMELEC found Rodriguez to be a "fugitive from justice" based on 1. an authenticated
copy of the November 12, 1995 warrant of arrest issued by the Los Angeles Municipal Court against Rodriguez and 2. an
authenticated copy of the felony complaint. He is therefore disqualified from running for governor and his certificate of candidacy is
set aside.
Rodriguez won the 1995 elections.
COMELEC suspended the proclamation of Rodriguez. The COMELEC Consolidated Resolution and the resolution suspending his
proclamation gave rise to the instant petition for certiorari.
The COMELEC filed a report, in compliance with the order of the court, entitled xxx COMMISSION'S EVALUATION": Rodriguez is NOT a
"fugitive from justice" as defined in the main opinion of the MARQUEZ Decision, thus making a 180-degree turnaround from its finding in
the Consolidated Resolution.

Petitioners arguments:
For Issue 1:
NB: The arguments of Rodriguez were not expressly mentioned in the SC decision. The following are his arguments in the other proceedings:

MR in the Marquez petition: In the MR, Rodriguez attached a certification from the Commission on Immigration showing that he (Rodriguez) left
the US on June 25, 1985 roughly five (5) months prior to the institution of the criminal complaint filed against him before the Los Angeles court.
The Court however denied this MR.

Answer in the COMELEC proceedings in the Consolidated QW and disqualification cases: Long before the felony complaint was allegedly
filed, Rodriguez was already in the Philippines and he did not know of the filing of the same nor was he aware that he was being proceeded
against criminally.

Respondents arguments:
For Issue 1:

NB: The COMELEC flip-flopped in the proceedings. The COMELEC initially declared Rodriguez as a fugitive from justice in the Consolidated
Resolution. It then changed its position in the xxx Commissions Evaluation.

Consolidated Resolution position: FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE

Rodriguezs allegation in the Answer was not even fortified with any attached document to show when he left the United States and when
he returned to this country, facts upon which the conclusion of absence of knowledge about the criminal complaint may be derived
The fact of arrest of respondent's wife on November 6, 1985 in the United States by the Fraud Bureau investigators in an apartment paid
for respondent in that country can hardly rebut whatever presumption of knowledge there is against the respondent.

Commissions Evaluation: NOT A FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE

Intent to evade is a material element of the MARQUEZ Decision definition. Such intent to evade is absent in Rodriguez' case because
evidence has established that Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines (June 25, 1985) long before the criminal charge was instituted in the
Los Angeles Court (November 12, 1985).

For Issue 2:
The definition of the term 'fugitive from justice' contemplates other instances not explicitly mentioned in the main opinion in the Marquez
petition.
From the rulings in King v. Noe and Hughes v. Pflanz, the objective facts sufficient to constitute flight from justice are: (a) a person
committed a 'crime' or has been charged for the commission thereof; and (b) thereafter, leaves the jurisdiction of the court where said
crime was committed or his usual place of abode.
Filing of charges prior to flight is not always an antecedent requirement to label one a 'fugitive from justice. Mere commission of a 'crime'
without charges having been filed for the same and flight subsequent thereto sufficiently meet the definition.
Attention is directed at the use of the word 'crime' which is not employed to connote guilt or conviction for the commission thereof.
Justice Davide's separate opinion in the Marquez decision: The disqualification for being a fugitive does not involve the issue of the
presumption of innocence, the reason for disqualification being that a person 'was not brought within the jurisdiction of the court because
he had successfully evaded arrest; or if he was brought within the jurisdiction of the court and was tried and convicted, he has successfully
evaded service of sentence because he had jumped bail or escaped. The disqualification then is based on his flight from justice.
 King v. US: It is not necessary that the party should have left the state or the judicial district where the crime is alleged to have been
committed, after an indictment found, or for the purpose of avoiding an anticipated prosecution, but that, having committed a crime within a
state or district, he has left and is found in another jurisdiction.
Therefore, it appears that the mere fact there are pending charges in the US and that petitioner Rodriguez is in the Philippines
make him a fugitive from justice.

Issue 1:
Whether Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice (No)

Held/Ratio:
Definition in Marquez decision: Includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being
charged, flee to avoid prosecution.
The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. And
obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already
instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.
Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines from the US on June 25, 1985, as per certifications issued by the Bureau of Immigrations dated April
27 and June 26 of 1995, which arrival preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of
the issuance on even date of the arrest warrant by that same foreign court, by almost five (5) months.
It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there
was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant much less conviction to speak of yet at such time.
The SC quoted pertinent portions from the COMELECs decision:

o A voluminous copy of an investigation report on the alleged crimes committed, which led to the filing of the charges, was offered
for admission to show the intent of Rodriguez to evade the law. However, investigations of this nature, no matter how extensive or
prolonged, are shrouded with utmost secrecy to afford law enforcers the advantage of surprise and effect the arrest of those who
would be charged. The conclusion that it was impossible for Rodriguez not to have known of said investigation of such magnitude
is misleading.
o That it was 17 days after Rodriguez' departure that charges against him were filed cannot overturn the presumption of good faith
in his favor. In fact, the evidence of petitioner Rodriguez sufficiently proves that his compulsion to return to the Philippines was due
to his desire to join and participate vigorously in the political campaigns against former President Ferdinand E. Marcos. After the
EDSA Revolution, Rodriguez served as OIC-Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Quezon in 1986. He was
elected governor in 1988, 1992 and 1995.
o Having established petitioner's lack of knowledge of the charges to be filed against him at the time he left the United States, it
becomes immaterial under such construction to determine the exact time when he was made aware thereof. When, in good faith,
a person leaves the territory of a state not his own, homeward bound, and learns subsequently of charges filed against him
while in the relative peace and service of his own country, the fact that he does not subject himself to the jurisdiction of the former
state does not qualify him outright as a fugitive from justice.
o The criminal process of the United States extends only within its territorial jurisdiction. That petitioner has already left said country
when the latter sought to subject him to its criminal process is hardly petitioner's fault. In the absence of an intent to evade the
 laws of the United States, petitioner had every right to depart therefrom at the precise time that he did and to return to the
Philippines.
o Clearly, a person who is aware of the imminent filing of charges against him or of the same already filed in connection with acts he
committed in the jurisdiction of a particular state, is under an obligation not to flee said place of commission.
o However, as in petitioner's case, his departure from the United States may not place him under a similar obligation. His
subsequent knowledge while in the Philippines and non-submission to the jurisdiction of the former country does not operate to
label petitioner automatically a fugitive from justice. As he was a public officer appointed and elected immediately after his return
to the country, petitioner Rodriguez had every reason to devote utmost priority to the service of his office.

Issue 2:
Whether one becomes a "fugitive from justice" by the mere fact that he leaves the jurisdiction where a charge is pending against him, regardless of
whether or not the charge has already been filed at the time of his flight (No)

Held/Ratio:
The "law of the case" doctrine forbids the Court to craft an expanded re-definition of "fugitive from justice" (which is at variance with the
MARQUEZ Decision)

People v. Pinuila: Whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same
case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was
predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
The same parties (Rodriguez and Marquez) and issue (whether or not Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice") are involved in the Marquez
Decision and the instant petition. The Marquez Decision was an appeal from Marquezs QW petition before the COMELEC. The instant
petition is also an appeal from the QW petition although the COMELEC resolved the latter jointly with the disqualification case.
Therefore, what was irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule in the Marquez Decision must govern the instant petition. And
we specifically refer to the concept of "fugitive from justice" as defined in the main opinion in the MARQUEZ Decision which highlights the
significance of an intent to evade but which Marquez and the COMELEC, with their proposed expanded definition, seem to trivialize.

Dissenting opinion: J. Vitug

Congress must have intended for the ordinary connotation of the phrase fugitive from justice to prevail. It might be understood as
referring to one who, having committed or being accused of having committed a crime in one jurisdiction, cannot be found therein or is
absent for any reason from that jurisdiction that thereby forestalls criminal justice from taking its due course.
 (M. Espinal)
Mercado v. Manzano/1990

Doctrine: The phrase dual citizenship in R.A. 7160 and R.A. 7854 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons
with mere dual citizenship do not fall under the disqualification. By declaring in the certificate of candidacy that a person is a Filipino citizen, that
he will defend and support the constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto, that person (as far as the laws of this
country are concerned) has effectively repudiated his other citizenship.

Petitioner: Ernesto Mercado

Respondent: Eduardo Manzano
(Both are candidates to the Vice-Mayoralty post in Makati during the 1998 elections.)

FACTS:
Manzano was born in San Francisco, California to Filipino parents. Under the principle of jus soli, he is deemed to be a US citizen while being
likewise a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of his Filipino parentage.
In the May, 1998 elections, Mercado, Manzano and Gabriel Daza ran for the contested post where Manzano emerged as winner. His
proclamation was, however, suspended because of a petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril.
COMELECs 2nd Division granted the petition and ordered the cancellation of Manzanos CoC on the ground that he was a dual citizen and thus
disqualified from running for any elective local position pursuant to the LGC. COMELEC en banc, however, reversed and ruled in favor of
Manzano. Accordingly, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Manzano as Vice Mayor of the city of Makati.
The present case is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare Manzano disqualified to
hold the said office.

ISSUE PETITIONER RESPONDENT SUPREME COURT

Right to bring suit Petitioner has a right to intervene Mercado has no right to intervene At the time Mercado sought to
because he has no legal interest intervene, there had been no
in the matter in litigation nor does proclamation yet, thus, he still had
he have an interest to protect, he an interest in ousting Manzano
being a defeated candidate who from the electoral race. Moreover,
cannot be proclaimed Makatis Mercados right as intervenor is
Vice Mayor even if Manzano be provided by the Electoral Reform
ultimately disqualified Law of 1987 which allows
intervention in proceedings for
disqualification even after election
as long as no final judgment has
as yet been rendered.
Dual citizenship as a ground for Sec. 40 of LGC specifically Manzano had registered as a Dual citizenship is different from
disqualification commands in explicit terms the voter and voted in the elections of dual allegiance. While dual
 ineligibility of persons possessing 1992, 1995 and 1998, effectively citizenship is involuntary, dual
dual citizenship to hold elective renouncing his US citizenship. allegiance is the result of an
office. Such provision is individuals volition. What the law
incorporated in the Charter of the frowns upon is dual allegiance
City of Makati. which is inimical to citizenship.
Merely taking part in Philippine By filing a CoC when he ran for
elections (1992, 1995, 1998) is not the present post, Manzano
sufficient evidence of renunciation effectively elected Philippine
of Manzanos US citizenship and, citizenship and renounced his
in any case, the alleged American citizenship.
renunciation was made when he [CoC bears the following
was already 37y/o rendering the declarations: I am a Filipino
same ineffective, as it should have citizen....I will support and defend
been made when Manzano the Constitution of the Philippines
reached the age of majority. and will maintain true faith ad
Moreover, Manzano holds an allegiance thereto...] With such
American passport and is declaration, Manzano has, as far
registered in the Bureau of as the laws of this country are
Immigration and Deportation as an concerned, effectively repudiated
American citizen. his American citizenship. Such
oath of allegiance, when
considered with the fact that he
has spent his youth and
adulthood, received his education,
practiced his profession as artist
and taken part in past elections in
this country, leaves no doubt of his
election of Philippine citizenship.
Further, no law requires that
election of Philippine citizenship
be made upon majority age.

Dispositive: Petition for certiorari is dismissed.

 Digester: Puguon

Case Title: ABELLA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ADELINA Y. LARRAZABAL

Petitioners: Benjamin Abella (second highest number of votes but not proclaimed as governor by COMELEC after Larrazabals
disqualification)

Respondents: COMELEC and Adelina Larrazabal (obtained highest number of votes for position of Leyte Governor, proclaimed governor, but
later disqualified by COMELEC for lacking both residence and registration qualifications)

Facts:

Abella Official candidate of Liberal party for position of provincial governor of Leyte

Emeterio V. Larrazabal - the original candidate of the Lakas ng Bansa-PDP-Laban who was disqualified by the Commission on Elections on
January 18, 1988, for lack of residence qualification.

Respondent Adelina Larrazabal wife of Emeterio. On January 31, 1988, the day before the election, she filed her own certificate of candidacy in
substitution of her husband.

Silvestre dela Cruz with Abella as intervenor filed a petition with the COMELEC to disqualify Adelina Larrazabal from running as governor. She
allegedly misrepresented her residence in her certificate of candidacy as Kananga, Leyte, when in fact she was a resident of Ormoc City.

Silvestre T. de la Cruz raised two issues: Larrazabal's lack of legal residence in the province of Leyte and her not being a registered voter in the
province, as required by Title II, Chapter I, Section 42, B.P. Blg. 337, in relation to Article X, Section 12 of the Constitution, to wit:

Sec. 42. Qualification. (1) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-three years of age on election
day, a qualified voter registered as such in the barangay, municipality, city or province where he proposes to be elected, a resident therein
for at least one year at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy, and able to read and write English, Pilipino, or any other local
language or dialect.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for
provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain
no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.
The COMELEC held that Larrazabal (who was already proclaimed as governor) was disqualified. Leopoldo Petilla, elected vice-governor was then
proclaimed as Governor. Abella, who gathered the second highest votes in the said area, filed this petition to take his oath as governor.

Petitioner: (Larrazabal) Respondents Arguments:

Supreme Court

On the issue of Residence On the issue of Residence ISSUE #1: WON the petitioner was qualified to run as
governor? (Does the prohibition to vote likewise prohibit
Larazabal claims that the ruling of From 1975 to the present, the the voters to run for provincial offices)
COMELEC based on the provisions of the petitioner has established her
Family code that she lacks the required residence at Ormoc City and not
residence to qualify her to run for the at Kananga, Leyte. The petitioner
position of governor of Leyte is incorrect. purportedly changed her No.
She states that in the Election Law, the residence by registering at
matter of determination of RESIDENCE is Kananga, Leyte one year before
more on the principle of INTENTION, the the election for her to qualify to
animus revertendi rather than anything run for the position of governor of Section 12, Article X of the Constitution provides that aside
else." She believes that as long as she had the province of Leyte which in from highly-urbanized cities, component cities whose
the ANIMUS REVERTENDI, which is effect strenghtens the fact that charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial
evidenced by her continuous and she considers herself already a elective officials are independent of the province. The
continuous acts of returning to Kananga in resident of Ormoc City. same provision mentions other component cities within a
the course of the years, although she had Furhtermore, the petitioner failed province whose charters do not provide a similar prohibition.
physically resided at Ormoc City, her to present evidence to show that
physical transfer of residence to Ormoc City she resided at Kananga, Leyte,
would not neccessarily erase or remove her separate from her husband
residence in Kananga. residing at Ormoc City." Therefore, component cities such as Ormoc City whose
charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial
elective officials should be treated as highly urbanized cities
which are outside the supervisory power of the province to
which they are geographically attached. In effect, the
Alternative Argument
independece from the province also provides the prohibition
or mandate directed to their registered voters not to vote and
The fact that she is a registered voter in
be voted for the provincial elective offices. The same
Ormoc is no impediment to her candidacy
principle is applied in the resolution in G.R. No. 80716
for the position of governor of the province
of Leyte. entitled Peralta v. The Commission on Elections, et al. dated
December 10, 1987, where Olongapo City is classified as a
highly urbanized city
Section 12, Article X of the
Constitution provides:
Independent of the constitutional provision, Section 89 of
Cities that are highly urbanized, as Republic Act 179, prohibits registered voters of Ormoc City
determined by law, and component from voting and being voted for elective offices in the
cities whose charters prohibit their province of Leyte. Therefore the court is in agreement with
voters from voting for provincial the COMELEC en banc that "the phrase 'shall not be
elective officials, shall be qualified and entitled to vote in the election of the provincial
independent of the province. The governor and the members of the provincial board of the
voters of component cities within a Province of Leyte' connotes two prohibitions one, from
province, whose charters contain no running for and the second, from voting for any provincial
such prohibition, shall not be elective official."
deprived of their right to vote for
elective provincial officials.

Section 89 of Republic Act No. 179

creating the City of Ormoc provides:

Election of provincial governor and

members of the Provincial Board of
the members of the Provincial
Board of the Province of Leyte
The qualified voters of Ormoc City
shall not be qualified and entitled to
vote in the election of the provincial
governor and the members of the
provincial board of the Province of
Leyte.

Relating therefore, section 89 of R.A. 179 to

section 12, Article X of the Constitution one
can conclude that while Ormoc City was
organized and was not yet a highly-
urbanized city but is was still considered
independent of the province of Leyte to
which it is geographically attached sue to
the fact that its charter prohibits its voters
from voting for the provincial elective
officials.

And even if a Component City whose

charter prohibits its voters from participating
in the elections for provincial office, is
indeed independent of the province, its
independence is still not that of a highly
urbanized city;

rather it is limited to the administrative

supervision aspect, and it should not lead
one to the conclusion that said voters are
also prohibited from running for the
provincial offices."
ISSUE #2: WON the candidate who got the second
highest vote may be proclaimed as governor when the
candidate for such position was disqualified?

No. According to the Supreme Court, the fact remains that

Larrazabal was considered as a bona fide candidate in the
local elections of February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte
even if it is true that the first petition was to deny due course
to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and that it was
filed before Larrazabal could be proclaimed. Larrazabal was
voted for and obtained the highest number of votes with the
belief that she was a qualified candidate for the position of
governor. In effect Abella lost in the election and was
repudiated by the electorate.

It has been observed that those who recieve the highest

number of votes cast in the election would fill the position
and that no one can be declared elected and no measure
can be declared carried unless it is through a majority or
plurality of the legal votes cast in an election. Furthermore,
that the candidate that obtained the second highest number
of votes is not necessarily declared as the winner of the
elective office.

Therefore, the Court does not find any reason to reverse and
set aside the questioned decision and resolution of the
COMELEC. The COMELEC has not acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion.
 Digester: Flores
CASE TITLE: FRIVALDO v. COMELEC
Date of Case: June 28, 1996

DOCTRINE: LGC expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino
or any other local language or dialect; (b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or
mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election
day.
Under Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation.
Citizenship should be reckoned from the date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of
candidacy. Furthermore, Frivaldos repatriation retroacted to the date of the filing of his application therefor, because PD 725 is curative and
remedial in nature.

PETITIONER: Juan G. Frivaldo (candidate for the Office of Governor in the May 8, 1995 elections)
RESPONDENT: COMELEC and Raul R. Lee (another candidate for the Office of Governor in the May 8, 1995 elections)

FACTS:
Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. Lee, another candidate, filed with the
COMELEC a petition to disqualify Frivaldo from seeking/holding any public office/position on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen.
2nd Division of COMELEC: Granted petition.

Frivaldo filed an MR which remained unacted upon until after the elections so his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections.
COMELEC en banc: affirmed Resolution of 2nd Division of COMELEC.

The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of election returns and a Certificate of Votes was issued showing the votes obtained
by the candidates for the position of Governor: Antonio Escudero, Jr. 51,060; Juan G. Frivaldo, 73,440; Raul R. Lee, 53,304; Isagani P. Ocampo,
1,925.

Lee filed a petition praying for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.
COMELEC en banc (dated June 21, 1995 but promulgated June 29, 1995): Directed the Provincial Board of Canvassers to reconvene for the
purpose of proclaiming Lee as the winning candidate.
Accordingly, at 8:30pm of June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.

Frivaldo filed with the COMELEC a petition praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He
alleged that at 2pm on June 30, 1995, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippine after his petition for repatriation under PD 725,
which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization (SCN) in September 1994, had been granted. He received the June 21, 1995 Order of
the COMELEC at 5:30pm on June 30, 1995, hence, there was no more legal impediment to his proclamation as governor. In the alternative, the
Vice Governor, not Lee, should occupy said position of governor.
1st Division of COMELEC: Frivaldo, having garnered the highest number of votes, and having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on
June 30, 1995 Is qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon.

Both Frivaldo and Lee filed a petition with the SC (consolidated).

Lee: Special Civil Action under Rules 65 and 58 for Certiorari and Preliminary Injunction to Annul the last mentioned Resolution of the COMELEC
and the Resolution denying his MR. The judicially declared disqualification of Frivaldo was a continuing condition and rendered him ineligible to
run for, be elected and hold the Office of Governor. The alleged repatriation was neither valid nor was the effect thereof retroactive as to cure his
ineligibility.
Frivaldo (Petition to annul 3 resolutions of COMELEC): Under Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC had no jurisdiction to issue
said Resolutions because they were not renered within the period allowed by law (not later than 15 days before the election), hence, the
COMELECs Resolutions are null and void.

MAIN ISSUE:
Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? YES.
If yes, did it seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? YES.
If not, may it be given retroactive effect? YES ( see #4).
FRIVALDOS CONTENTION: LEEs CONTENTION: SUPREME COURT:
YES. NO. Frivaldos repatriation is tainted YES. Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court as a non-
1. He tried to reacquire citizenship with serious defects: citizen, it is incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired
by direct act of Congress but the 1. PD 725 had been effectively citizenship; that he possesses the qualifications prescribed under the
bill failed to materialize due to the repealed when Pres. Corazon LGC.
maneuvers of his political rivals. Aquino exercising legislative powers
Also his attempt at naturalization under the Transitory Provisions of 1. Pres. Aquinos Memorandum cannot be construed as a law
was rejected by this Court the 1987 Constitution, forbade the authorizing a repeal of PD 725 as no express repeal was made therein
because of jurisdictional, grant of citizenship by Presidential and no categorical nor implied statement that PD 725 was being
substantial and procedural Decrees or Executive Issuances, as repealed or being rendered w/o any legal effect. Neither can it be
defects. Despite his lack of the same poses a serious and regarded as a legislative enactment, for not every pronouncement of
Philippine citizenship, he was contentious issue of policy which the President under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution
overwhelmingly elected governor the present government, in the can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her lawmaking powers.
by the electorate of Sorsogon, exercise of prudence and sound At best, it could be treated as an executive policy addressed to the
with a margin of 27,000 votes in discretion, should best leave to the SCN to halt the acceptance and processing of applications for
the 1988 elections, 57,000 in judgment of the first Congress repatriation pending whatever "judgment the first Congress under the
1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over under the 1987 Constitution, adding 1987 Constitution" might make (as regards the matter of repeal).
the same opponent Lee. Twice, that in her Memorandum dated
he was judicially declared a non- March 27,1987 to the members of
Filipino and thus twice the SCN constituted for purposes of
disqualified. Now, he successfully PD 725, Pres. Aquino directed them
passed through the third and last to cease and desist from
mode of reacquiring citizenship: undertaking any and all proceedings
by repatriation under PD 725, with within their functional area of
the SolGen. He took his oath of responsibility.
allegiance at 2pm on June 30,
1995.

Lee should not have been

proclaimed as the duly-elected
governor when the Provincial
Board of Canvassers met at
8:30pm of June 30, 1995, since,
clearly, he garnered the highest
number of votes in the elections
and since that time, he already
reacquired his citizenship.
2. He filed his application for 2. Serious congenital irregularities 2. Under the circumstances mentioned by Frivaldo, it could not be said
repatriation with the Office of the flawed the repatriation proceedings. that there was indecent haste in the processing of his application.
President on August 17, 1994. Frivaldo's application therefor was
However, the SCN was filed on June 29, 1995 and was
reactivated only on June 8, 1995, approved in just one day (June 30,
when SCN started processing his 1995) which prevented a judicious
application. On June 29, 1995, he review and evaluation of the merits
filled up and resubmitted the form thereof.
that the SCN required.
3. The sudden reconstitution of the 3. According to the SolGen, there were many others who applied and
SCN was intended solely for the were considered for repatriation, a list of whom was submitted by him
personal interest of Frivaldo. to the SC, through a Manifestation filed on April 3, 1996.

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and

the presumption of legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo have not been
successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings were
speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such was
necessarily tainted. After all, the requirements of repatriation under PD
725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are they tedious and
cumbersome. In fact, it requires very little of an applicant, and even the
rules and regulations to implement the said decree were left to the
SCN to promulgate. This is not unusual since, unlike in naturalization
where an alien covets a firsttime entry into Philippine political life, in
repatriation the applicant is a former naturalborn Filipino who is merely
seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship.
 Frivaldo was a naturalborn citizen who openly and faithfully served his
country and his province prior to his naturalization in the US, which he
insists was made necessary only to escape the iron clutches of a
dictatorship he abhorred, and who, after the fall of the dictator and the
reestablishment of democratic space, wasted no time in returning to
his country of birth to offer once more his talent and services to his
people.

Any contest on the legality of Frivaldo's repatriation should have been

pursued before the SCN itself, and, failing there, in the Office of the
President, pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
4. Assuming the assailed 4. Citizenship should be reckoned from the date of proclamation, not
repatriation is valid, nevertheless it necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of
could only be effective as of 2pm of candidacy.
June 30, 1995 whereas the
citizenship qualification prescribed What was cited was merely obiter as the only issue in said case was
by the LGC "must exist on the date the validity of Frivaldos naturalization and not the effective date
of his election, if not when the thereof.
certificate of candidacy is
filed," citing Republic v. De la Rosa Sec. 39 of the LGC does not specify any particular date or time when
(1994) which held that "both the the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (at
LGC and the Constitution require least 1 year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and
that only Philippine citizens can run age (at least 23 years of age on election day). Philippine citizenship is
and be elected to Public office." an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and
the purpose of such qualification is none other than to ensure that no
alien(no person owing allegiance to another nation), shall govern our
people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. An official begins
to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and
on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin.

Since Frivaldo reassumed his citizenship on the very day the term of
office of governor began, he was therefore already qualified to be
proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and
responsibilities thereof as of said date. This is the liberal interpretation
that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications
consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. Even
from a literal construction, it should be noted that Sec. 39 of the LGC
speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS," not of
candidates. Such qualifications, unless otherwise expressly
conditioned, as in the case of age and residence, should be
possessed when the elective/ed official begins to govern.

Furthermore, Sec. 253 of the Omnibus Election Code gives any voter,
presumably including the defeated candidate, the remedy/opportunity
to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a candidate for failure
to meet the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the LGC. Quo
Warranto can be availed of within 10 days after proclamation of the
winning candidate. And since, at the very moment of Lee's
proclamation, Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen, having
taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same day,
then he should have been the candidate proclaimed as he
unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes and such oath
had already cured his previous "judiciallydeclared" alienage. Hence, at
such time, he was no longer ineligible.

To remove all doubts on the issue, the repatriation of Frivaldo

RETROACTED TO THE DATE OF THE FILING OF HIS
APPLICATION THEREFOR. This is an exception to the general rule in
the Civil Code that laws shall have no retroactive effect, because PD
725 is CURATIVE (undertakes to cure errors and irregularities, thereby
validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers,
or private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce
their intended consequences by reason of some statutory disability or
failure to comply with some technical requirement) and REMEDIAL
(relates to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new
or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the
remedy or confirmation of such rights) in nature. A reading of PD 725
immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for a
new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. It cures the defect
in the existing naturalization law, CA 63, wherein married Filipino
women are allowed to repatriate only upon the death of their
husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by
naturalization and other causes faced the difficulty of undergoing the
rigid procedures of CA 63 for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by
naturalization. A remedial statute must be so construed as to make it
effect the evident purpose for which it was enacted. If the reason of the
statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in the future,
then it will be so applied although the statute does not in terms so
 direct, unless to do so would impair some vested right or violate some
constitutional guaranty.

While PD 725 was already in effect (June 5, 1975) at the time that
Frivaldo became an American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the
law itself which is to be given retroactive effect, but even the
repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to
be deemed to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor,
Aug. 17, 1994. It was the intent of the legislative authority that the law
should apply to situations and transactions existing even before the
law came into being in order to benefit the greatest number of former
Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the
constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship. There is nothing in the
law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on the part
of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or
prejudice to anyone. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the
impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested
right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.
5. The citizenship qualification 5. If the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior
should be possessed at the time the to election consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter,
candidate/elected official registered then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification.
as a voter. Sec. 39, apart from The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the
requiring the official to be a citizen, law intended citizenship to be a qualification DISTINCT from being a
also specifies that he be a voter, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. Also, it is
"registered voter." And, under the required that the official be registered as a voter in the area or territory
law, a "voter" must be a citizen of he seeks to govern (the law states: "a registered voter in the barangay,
the Philippines. So therefore, municipality, city, or province where he intends to be elected). The
Frivaldo could not have been a LGC requires an elective official to be a registered voter. Registration
votermuch less a validly registered not the actual votingis the core of this qualification. The law's
one if he was not a citizen at the purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective
time of such registration. official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern, not
anywhere else.

Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized, and Lee has not disputed, that
he was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his registration as a
voter has been sustained as valid by judicial declaration. In fact, he
has voted in 1987, 1988, 1992 and 1995.
Issue 2: YES. The first 2 COMELEC NO. The first ruling disqualifying
Is Frivaldos judicially declared Resolutions became final and Frivaldo was rendered in
disqualification for lack of Filipino executory after 5 days, no connection with the 1988
citizenship a continuing bar to his restraining order having been elections, while the second was in
eligibility to run for, be elected to issued by the SC. Hence, before connection with the 1992
or hold the governorship of Lee was proclaimed as the elections. That he was disqualified
Sorsogon? NO. elected governor, there was for such elections is final and can
already a final and executory no longer be changed. However,
judgment disqualifying Frivaldo. as found by COMELEC, there was
Also, the SCs 2 rulings declaring no final judgment of
Frivaldo an alien have also disqualification of Frivaldo as a
become final and executory candidate in the 1995 elections.
before the 1995 elections. Decisions declaring the acquisition
or denial of citizenship cannot
govern a persons future status
with finality because a person may
subsequently reacquire or lose his
citizenship under any of the
modes recognized by law for the
purpose.
Issue 3: NO. The only possible types of YES. The Constitution has given
Did the COMELEC have proceedings that may be the COMELEC ample power to
jurisdiction over the initiatory entertained by the COMELEC exercise exclusive original
petition considering that said are a pre-proclamation case, an jurisdiction over all contests
petition is not a pre-proclamation election protest or a quo relating to the elections, returns
case, an election protest or a quo warranto case. Since Lee was and qualifications of all elective
warranto case? YES. proclaimed on June 30, 1995 and provincial officials. The SC has
Frivaldo only questioned this on invariably recognized COMELECs
July 6, 1995, beyond the 5-day authority to hear and decide
reglementary period, Frivaldos petitions for annulment of
recourse was to file an election proclamations. But such power
protest or a quo warranto action. must be done within 10 days
following the proclamation.
Frivaldos petition was filed only 6
days after Lees proclamation,
hence, COMELEC correctly
acquired jurisdiction.
Issue 4: YES. Cited Labo v. COMELEC: NO. The SCs ruling therein is
Was the proclamation of Lee, a The rule would have been qualified by the next paragraph,
runner-up in the election, valid different if the electorate fully which is appropriate in this case
and legal in light of existing aware in fact and in law of a (presents an identical situation): It
jurisprudence? Under Philippine candidate's disqualification so as has not been shown, and none
law, citizenship may be to bring such awareness within was alleged, that petitioner Labo
reacquired by direct act of the realm of notoriety, would was notoriously known as an
Congress, by naturalization or by nonetheless cast their votes in ineligible candidate, much less the
repatriation. NO. favor of the ineligible candidate. electorate as having known of
In such case, the electorate may such fact. On the contrary, Labo
be said to have waived the was even allowed by no less than
validity and efficacy of their votes the Comelec itself to be voted for
by notoriously misapplying their the office of the city mayor as its
franchise or throwing away their resolution denying due course to
votes, in which case, the eligible petitioner Labo's certificate of
candidate obtaining the next candidacy had not yet become
higher number of votes may be final.
deemed elected.
Furthermore, there is no sufficient
evidence showing that the
electorate of Sorsogon was fully
aware of Frivaldos alleged
disqualification.

If Labo has any relevance at all, it

is that the Vice-Governor and not
Lee who should be proclaimed,
since in losing the election, Lee
was obviously not the choice of
the people: The rule is that the
ineligibility of a candidate receiving
majority votes does not entitle the
eligible candidate receiving the
next highest number of votes to be
declared elected. A minority or
defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office.
Issue 5: YES. The first 2 Resolutions MOOT AND ACADEMIC. The
Did COMELEC exceed its disqualifying him for want of resolutions are deemed
jurisdiction in promulgating the citizenship should be annulled superseded by subsequent ones
assailed Resolutions? MOOT because they were rendered issued by COMELEC upholding
AND ACADEMIC. beyond the 15 day period his election. Sec. 78 is merely
prescribed by Sec. 78 of the directory as Sec. 6 of RA 6646
Omnibus Election Code. authorizes the COMELEC to try
and decide petitions for
disqualifications even after the
 elections.

Dispositive Portion: Both petitions dismissed. COMELEC Resolutions affirmed.

 Digester: Roddel Paraos
CASE TITLE: Labo v Comelec
Date of Case: July 3, 1992

DOCTRINE:
Labo was disqualified as a candidate for being an alien. His election does not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship, the
possession of which is an indispensible requirement for holding public office (Sec 39, LGC)

In the absence of any official action or approval by the proper authorities, a mere application for repatriation does not, and cannot,
amount to an automatic reacquisition of the applicant's Philippine citizenship.

Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the fundamental qualification for the contested office. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable
requirement for holding an elective office. As mandated by law: "An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines."

Frivaldo: . The qualification prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed
through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was
qualified.

Petitioner: Ramon Labo, candidate for mayor of Baguio City in the May 1992 elections
Respondent: Roberto Ortega, another candidate in the same elections, and the Court of Appeals

FACTS:
Ramon Labo filed his candidacy for mayor of Baguio , and 3 days after Ortega filed a disqualification proceedings before the Comelec on the
ground that Labo made a false representation when he stated in his certificate of candidacy that he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
When summons were issued, Labo failed to file an answer. Ortega filed a motion to declare Labo in default for failure to file his Answer. However,
the Comelec once again issued an order directing the Election Registrar of Baguio City to personally deliver the summons. A hearing was set for
reception of evidence, and Ortega presented the SC decision in Labo v Comelec (1989) declaring Labo not a citizen of the Philippines. Labo,
represented by counsel, did not present any evidence. It was only a day after such hearing that petitioner submitted his Answer claiming Filipino
citizenship.

On May 9, 1992, Comelec resolved the case in against Labo, ordering that his certificate of candidacy be denied due course and cancelled. On
the same date, Labo filed a motion to stay implementation of said resolution until after he shall have raised the matter before this Court. The next
day, Comelec issued an Order which resolved that the decision promulgated on May 9, 1992 shall become final and executor only after 5 days
from promulgation, hence Labo may still be voted upon as candidate for Mayor of Baguio City on May 11, 1992. On May 13, Comelec resolved to
suspend the proclamation of Labo in the event that he wins the elections.

Labo filed with the SC a petition for review, praying that the order of the Comelec be set aside, to declare him as a Filipino citizen, and to direct
Comelec to proceed with his proclamation. Ortega, on the other hand, filed an urgent motion for implementation of the Comelec May 9, 1992
resolution. Comelec denied this motion by Ortega because of the earlier SC case. Hence, Ortega filed a petition for mandamus.
GR No. Petitioner: Labo Respondent: SC
105111 Ortega
(Labos
petition)
WON the Petitioner faults No, the proceedings did not deny Labo adequate opportunity to present a full-dress
proceedings Comelec for the presentation of his case.
denied Labo abbreviated
adequate proceedings which Records disclose that summons were issued by respondent Comelec as early as
opportunity to denied him adequate March 27, 1992 followed by a telegram on April 1, 1992. But petitioner chose to
present a full- opportunity to present a ignore the same. Came April 15, 1992, petitioner Ortega filed a motion to declare
dress full-dress presentation petitioner Labo in default. Over-extending him (Labo) the benefit of due process,
presentation of his case. respondent Comelec, issued another order dated April 24, 1992, this time directing
of his case. the Acting City Election Registrar of Baguio to personally serve the summons. The
alleged delay in the resolution of SPA No. 92-029 can only be attributed to petitioner
Labo and no one else.

Respondent failed to adduce any evidence, and in fact he failed to file an answer.
WON Vance He cites the 1980 US No, the case does not apply.
v Terrazas case of Vance v.
case should Terrazas, wherein it Suffice it to state that petitioner has already pleaded Vance in his motion for
apply was held that in proving reconsideration in Labo v. Comelec (supra; Rollo p. 375). Having been previously
expatriation, an passed upon, the Court sees no pressing need to re-examine the same and make a
expatriating act and an lengthy dissertation thereon.
intent to relinquish
citizenship must be
proved by a
preponderance of
evidence.
WON Labo is He is a Filipino citizen. No, he is not.
a Filipino
citizen The fact remains that he has not submitted in the instant case any evidence, if there
be any, to prove his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship either before this Court or
the Comelec. On this score alone, We find no grave abuse of discretion committed
by respondent Comelec in cancelling his (Labo's) certificate of candidacy and
declaring that he is NOT a Filipino citizen pursuant to our ruling in the 1989 case of
Labo v. Comelec
WON Labo Sec 72 of the Omnibus No, Labo cannot be proclaimed the winner of the election.
can be Election Code operates
proclaimed as a legislatively Labos argument is untenable. Sec 72 of the Omnibus Election Code has already
the winner of mandated special been repealed by Sec. 6 of RA 6646: If for any reason a candidate is not
the elections repatriation proceeding declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and that it allows his and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or the
proclamation as the Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest
winning candidate and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
since the resolution thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
disqualifying him was evidence of his guilt is strong."
not yet final at the time
the election was held The provision clearly shows that Comelec can legally suspend the proclamation of
petitioner Labo, his reception of the winning number of votes notwithstanding,
specially since he failed to present any evidence before the Comelec to support his
claim of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

The SC, citing the old Labo case: "Under CA No. 63, as amended by PD No. 725,
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does the
petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these
methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization or to any statute
directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. x x x"

Labo was disqualified as a candidate for being an alien. His election does not
automatically restore his Philippine citizenship, the possession of which is an
indispensible requirement for holding public office (Sec 39, LGC)
WON Labo He has re acquired No, he has not.
has Filipino citizenship by
reacquired citing his application for To date, however, and despite favorable recommendation by the Solicitor General,
Filipino reacquisition of the Special Committee on Naturalization had yet acted upon said application for
citizenship Philippine citizenship repatriation.
filed before the Office
of the Solicitor General In the absence of any official action or approval by the proper authorities, a mere
pursuant to PD 725 application for repatriation does not, and cannot, amount to an automatic
and Letter of Instruction reacquisition of the applicant's Philippine citizenship.
No. 270.
GR No. Petitioner: Ortega Respondent: SC
105384 Labo
(Ortegas
petition)
WON the Since the SC did not Yes, the resolution has become final and executor.
Comelec issue a temporary
resolution restraining order as At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition (GR No. 105111) on May 15, 1992, the
has become regards the May 9, May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling his (Labo's) certificate of
final and 1992 resolution of candidacy had already become final and executory a day earlier, or on May 14,
executory respondent Comelec 1992, said resolution having been received by petitioner Labo on the same day it
cancelling Labo's was promulgated.
certificate of candidacy,
said resolution has Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides: "Sec. 78. Petition to deny due
already become final course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy --
and executory. xxx
"(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5) days from
receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, be final and executory unless stayed by the
Supreme Court.

Sec. 3, Rule 39 of the Comelec Rules of procedure: "Sec. 3. Decisions final after
five days. --Decisions in pre-proclamation cases and petitions to deny due course to
or cancel certificates of candidacy, to declare a candidate as nuisance candidate or
to disqualify a candidate, and to postpone or suspend elections shall become final
and executory after the lapse of five (5) days from their promulgation, unless
restrained by the Supreme Court."

One of the qualifications of an elective official is that he must be a citizen of the

Philippines. Thus, the Local Government Code provides:
Sec 39. Qualifications.(a) An elective official must be a citizen of the Philippines;

Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the fundamental qualification for the
contested office. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding
an elective office. As mandated by law: "An elective local official must be a citizen of
the Philippines."

The issue here is citizenship and/or Labo's alienage - the very essence which
strikes at the very core of petitioner Labo's qualification to assume the contested
office, he being an alien and not a Filipino citizen. The fact that he was elected by
the majority of the electorate is of no moment.

The Court, citing Frivaldo v Comelec: "x x x. The fact that he was elected by the
people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting
public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualification
prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of
the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility,
especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was
qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack
 of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must
owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and
fidelity to any other state."
WON the As a result of such No, it is the vice-mayor who will be declared Mayor in this case.
candidate finality, the candidate
with the next receiving the next The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not necessarily entitle petitioner Ortega
highest highest number of as the candidate with the next highest number of votes to proclamation as the
number of votes, Ortega, should mayor of Baguio City.
votes should be declared the Mayor
be declared of Baguio City While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the office
Mayor of city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign will.
Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of mayor
in the belief that he was then qualified to serve the people of Baguio City and his
subsequent disqualification does not make respondent Ortega the mayor-elect.

The SC, citing Abella v Comelec: What matters is that in the event a candidate for
an elected position who is voted for and who obtains the highest number of votes is
disqualified for not possessing the eligibility requirements at the time of theelection
as provided by law, the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes
for the same position cannot assume the vacated position."

The ruling above applies squarely in this case. Like Abella, Ortega lost in the
election. He was not the choice of the people of Baguio.

In the old Labo case ruled that the rule in Geronimo v Santos should be followed.
The Court said: Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those
who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office,
and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can
be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it
receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.

The rule, therefore, is the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does
not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be
declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the
office.

It is therefore incorrect to argue that since a candidate has been disqualified, the
votes intended for the disqualified candidate should, in effect, be considered NULl
and void. This would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty
resides.
 The rule would have been different if the electorate, fully aware in fact and in law of
a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In
such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of
their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes,
in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may
be deemed elected.

But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been shown,
and none was alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible
candidate, much less the electorate as having known of such fact. On the contrary,
petitioner Labo was even allowed by no less than the Comelec itself in its resolution
dated May 10,1992 to be voted for the office of the city mayor.

As a consequence of petitioners ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the contested

office has occurred. This should now be filled by the vice-mayor. Sec 44 of the
LGC: "SEC. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-
Governor, Mayor and Vice-Mayor. - (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office
of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or the vice-mayor concerned shall
become the governor or mayor. x x x

Dispositive Portion WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioners both being ineligible for the Office of the City
Mayor of Baguio City and in view of the vacancy created in said office, the vice-mayor elect of said city in the May 11, 1992 elections is hereby
declared Mayor of Baguio City after proclamation by the City Board of Canvassers.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: concurring and dissenting

Since Mayor Labo never validly acquired Australian citizenship, he never lost his Philippine citizenship. His oath of allegiance to Australia was null
and void because he was not qualified to be an Australian citizen. This is clear from the certification of Australia's Embassy officials. To me, a null
and void act cannot have the positive and serious effect of stripping a Filipino of his natural-born citizenship.

Labo's taking an oath as citizen of a foreign country was based on his marriage to a citizen of that country. It turns out, however, that Labo's
marriage was bigamous and void because his Australian wife had an existing valid marriage when she tied the knot with him. Not being qualified to
become an Australian citizen, his oath of allegiance to that country was meaningless act.

I, however, concur in the Court's reiteration of the rule that it is the

vice-mayor elect who succeeds the disqualified mayor-elect and not the losing candidate for mayor. I have to be consistent with
my ponencia in Geronima v. Santos.
In deciding cases involving citizenship, I believe that the presumptions should be in favor of its retention and against its loss. We apply this
principle to cases involving civil liberties. We should also apply it to a sincere invocation of Philippine citizenship. We should not lightly strip a
person of his natural born status but should accord to him every possible interpretation consistent with the exercise of a right that was vested in
him from birth.
 Digester: Justin Batocabe

CASE TITLE: Dominador Jalosjos v COMELEC; Agapito Cardino v Dominador Jalosjos

Date of Case: October 9, 2012

DOCTRINE: A sentence of prisin mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification under Section 40 of the Local Government Code and
under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is also a material fact involving the eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code.

Petitioner: Dominador Jalosjos

Respondent: COMELEC and Agapito Cardino

FACTS:

1) Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte in the May 2010 elections. Jalosjos was running for his
third term.

2) Cardino filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to deny due course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jalosjos
asserting that Jalosjos made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy when he declared under oath that he was eligible for the
Office of Mayor. Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos had already been convicted by final judgment
for robbery and sentenced to prisin mayor but Jalosjos has yet to serve his sentence and was granted probation.

3) COMELEC First Division granted Cardinos petition and cancelled Jalosjos certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC First Division concluded
that "Jalosjos has indeed committed material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy when he declared, under oath, that he is eligible for
the office he seeks to be elected to when in fact he is not by reason of a final judgment in a criminal case, the sentence of which he has not yet
served." MR denied

Issue PETITIONERS RESPONDENTS Supreme Court

CONTENTION: CONTENTION:

WON Jalosjos is
qualified to run as COMELEC committed Jalosjos certificate of
candidate for grave abuse of compliance of The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his
Mayor of Dapitan discretion in probation was criminal conviction by final judgment is a material fact involving
City diaqualifying him to run fraudulently issued eligibility which is a proper ground for a petition under Section 78 of
as a candidate. and he has yet to the Omnibus Election Code. Jalosjos certificate of candidacy was void
serve his sentence from the start since he was not eligible to run for any public office at
there is simply no the time he filed his certificate of candidacy. Jalosjos was never a
Jalosjos relied in good basis for Jalosjos to candidate at any time, and all votes for Jalosjos were stray votes. As a
faith upon a previous claim that his civil as result of Jalosjos certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, Cardino,
COMELEC decision well as political rights as the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number
declaring him eligible have been violated. of votes for the position of Mayor.
for the same position Having been convicted
from which he is now by final judgment,
ousted
Jalosjos is disqualified A sentence of prisin mayor by final judgment is a ground for
to run for an elective disqualification under Section 40 of the Local Government Code and
position or to hold under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is also a material
public office. His fact involving the eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of
proclamation as the the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, a person can file a petition under
elected mayor in the Section 40 of the Local Government Code or under either Section 12
May 10, 2010 election or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
does not deprive the
Commission of its
authority to resolve the Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under
present petition to its Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code because this accessory
finality, and to oust him penalty is an ineligibility, which means that the convict is not eligible to
from the office he now run for public office, contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires
wrongfully holds. him to state under oath. As used in Section 74, the word "eligible"
means having the right to run for elective public office, that is, having
all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for public
office. As this Court held in Fermin v. Commission on Elections, the
false material representation may refer to "qualifications or eligibility."
One who suffers from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to
run for public office. If a person suffering from perpetual special
disqualification files a certificate of candidacy stating under oath that
"he is eligible to run for (public) office," as expressly required under
Section 74, then he clearly makes a false material representation that
 is a ground for a petition under Section 78.

A candidate for mayor during the 2010 local elections certifies under
oath four statements: (1) a statement that the candidate is a natural
born or naturalized Filipino citizen; (2) a statement that the candidate
is not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country; (3) a
statement that the candidate is eligible for the office he seeks election;
and (4) a statement of the candidates allegiance to the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines. Jalosjos knew that he was ineligible

The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos certificate of candidacy. A

void certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy can never give rise
to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes

On Cardino who assailed the COMELEC ruling that succession determined the next mayor (SC declared he was the rightful winner):

If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in
the elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a
first-placer in the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing
jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the
elections, all votes for such candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is void from the very beginning. This is the
more equitable and logical approach on the effect of the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of
candidacy void ab initio can operate to defeat one or more valid certificates of candidacy for the same position.

Jalosjos petition is DENIED

Cardinos petition is Granted
Brion dissent,

Short Version: Cardino was a defeated second placer as Jalsojos was validly qualified in the 2010 elections. Rules of Succession should
apply

I dissent from the majoritys (i) position that the present case involves a cancellation of a certificate of candidacy (CoC) rather than a case of
disqualification and (ii) conclusion that Cardino, the "second placer" in the 2010 elections for the mayoralty post of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del
Norte, should be the rightful Mayor. I submit that while Cardino intended to cancel Jalosjos CoC, his petition alleged acts constituting
disqualification as its ground. Thus, the case should be resolved under the rules of disqualification, not from the point of a cancellation of a CoC.

In the denial of due course to or cancellation of a CoC, the ground is essentially lack of eligibility under the pertinent constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office; the governing provisions are Sections 78 and 69 of the OEC.

In a disqualification case, as mentioned above, the grounds are traits, conditions, characteristics or acts of disqualification, individually applicable
to a candidate, as provided under Sections 68 and 12 of the OEC; Section 40 of LGC 1991; and Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. As
previously discussed, the grounds for disqualification are different from, and have nothing to do with, a candidates CoC although they may result
in disqualification from candidacy whose immediate effect upon finality before the elections is the same as a cancellation. If they are cited in a
petition filed before the elections, they remain as disqualification grounds and carry effects that are distinctly peculiar to disqualification.

In order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under Section 78, it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein
pertain to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate the right to run for the
elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. Although the law does not specify what would be considered as a "material
representation," the Court has interpreted this phrase in a line of decisions applying Section 78 of the Code.

xxxx

Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code refer to qualifications for elective
office. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false representation
in his certificate of candidacy are grave to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the
election laws. It could not have been the intention of the law to deprive a person of such a basic and substantive political right to be voted for a
public office upon just any innocuous mistake. [emphases ours, citation omitted]

Thus, in addition to the failure to satisfy or comply with the eligibility requirements, a material misrepresentation must be present in a cancellation
of CoC situation. The law apparently does not allow material divergence from the listed requirements to qualify for candidacy and enforces its edict
by requiring positive representation of compliance under oath. Significantly, where disqualification is involved, the mere existence of a ground
appears sufficient and a material representation assumes no relevance.
Jalosjos validly stood as a candidate in the elections of May 2010 and won, although he was subsequently disqualified. With his disqualification
while already sitting as Mayor, the winning vice-mayor, not. Cardino as a mere defeated second placer, should rightfully be seated as mayor under
Section 44 of LGC 1991 on the law on succession.

Reyes dissent

I fully agree with the COMELECs ruling that Jalosjos cannot run for any public office by reason of possession of a ground for disqualification.
However, the COMELEC laid the predicate of said conclusion on a muddled discussion of the nature of the petition filed by Cardino and the effects
of a judgment on the same on the status of candidacy.

Reyes then just reiterates the arguments of Brion with the added novel concept of the doctrine of Rejection of the Secon Placer

The doctrine of rejection of the second placer was not conceived to suit the selfish interests of losing candidates or arm them with a weapon to
retaliate against the prevailing candidates. The primordial consideration in adhering to this doctrine is not simply to protect the interest of the other
qualified candidates joining the electoral race but more than that, to safeguard the will of the people in whom the sovereignty resides. The doctrine
ensures that only the candidate who has the peoples faith and confidence will be allowed to run the machinery of the government. It is a
guarantee that the popular choice will not be compromised, even in the occasion that the prevailing candidate is eventually disqualified, by
replacing him with the next-in-rank official who was also elected to office by the authority of the electorate.
 Digester: Guangko

Mayor Barbara Ruby Talaga v. COMELEC and Alcala // Castillo v. COMELEC, Talaga and Alcala*
9 October 2012
*This is a consolidated case. For the purposes of this digest, please note which party makes the arguments.

DOCTRINE: The filing of a certificate of candidacy is a condition sine qua non in order for there to be a valid candidacy. In case of vacancy in a
position there is an order of succession provided for in the Local Government Code.

Petitioner: Barbara Ruby substituted her husband Ramon, the former mayor who had served three terms and as such was disqualified. Ramons
name was on the ballot on Election Day but Ruby won and was declared as Mayor by the City Board of Canvassers.

Castillo was the other candidate on the ballot. He lost.

Respondent: COMELEC proclaimed that the Vice Mayor was to assume the office of Mayor following the substitutes disqualification. Alcala was
the duly elected Vice Mayor; he contends that he should be the Mayor because the substitution of Barbara Ruby was invalid.

FACTS:

1. Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and Phillip Castillo (Castillo) filed their COC for the position of Mayor of Lucena City for the election on May 10
2010. Ramon was the candidate of Lakas-KAmpi-CMD.
2. Castillo filed a Petition to Deny or Cancel the COC of Ramon on the grounds that he had already served three consecutive terms. Ramon
countered and said that Sandiganbayan had preventively suspended him from office during the 2 nd and 3rd term and so the three-term limit
rule did not apply (jurisprudence: involuntary separation from office amounted to an interruption of continuity of service for purposes of the
application of the three-term limit rule.)
3. However, the SC declared in Aldovino Jr. v. COMELEC that preventive suspension was not a valid ground to avoid the effect of the three-
term limit rule. Thus Ramon was disqualified to run as Mayor. Barbara Ruby Talaga (Barbara Ruby) filed her COC in substitution of
Ramon, with Certification of Nomination and Acceptance issued by Lakas-Kampi-CMD.
4. On Election Day, Ramons name remained printed on the ballots but the votes in his favor were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his
substitute candidate. Barbara Ruby had the most votes vs. Castillo. However, it was only three days after the election that Barbara Rubys
COC was given due course by the COMELEC En Banc. Thus, the City Board of Canvassers declared her as the newly elected mayor.
5. Castillo filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation and Roderick Alcala, the duly elected Vice Mayor, sought to intervene, saying that
he should assume the post of Mayor because Rubys substitution had been invalid.
6. COMELEC 2nd Division denied the Petition and Petition in Intervention. However, COMELEC En Banc reversed and concluded that
Barbara Ruby could not have properly substituted Ramon and held that Vice Mayor Alcala was to succeed the position pursuant to Section
44 of the LGC.

Issues: PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: Supreme Court:

Validity of Substitution is valid. Substitution was SUBSITUTE IS VALID.
substitution invalid.
(Barbara Ruby:) In the event that a candidate is disqualified to run for a public office, or dies,
COMELEC En Banc (Castillo:) Barbara or withdraws his CoC before the elections, Section 77 10 of the Omnibus
did not deny due Ruby cannot Election Code provides the option of substitution.
course or cancel substitute Ramon
Ramons COC, because his CoC Nonetheless, whether the ground for substitution is death, withdrawal or
despite the had been cancelled disqualification of a candidate, Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code
declaration of and denied due unequivocally states that only an official candidate of a registered or
disqualification course; and Barbara accredited party may be substituted.
because there was Ruby could be
no finding that he considered a Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy,
had committed candidate because there can be no valid substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the
misrepresentation, the COMELEC En Omnibus Election Code.
the ground for the Banc had approved
denial of due course her substitution three Ramons CoC was cancelled in line with Section 7811 of the Omnibus
to or cancellation of days after the Election Code. To accord with the constitutional and statutory proscriptions,
his COC. Sec. 129 elections; hence the Ramon was absolutely precluded from asserting an eligibility to run as Mayor
of RA 9006 should votes case for of
be applied, based Ramon should be Lucena City for the fourth consecutive term. Resultantly, his CoC was invalid
on which the votes considered stray. and ineffectual ab initio for containing the incurable defect consisting in his
cast for Ramon false declaration of his eligibility to run. The COMELECs declaration of his
were properly disqualification had the effect of announcing that he was no candidate at all.
counted in her favor.
We stress that a non-candidate like Ramon had no right to pass on to his
substitute. In all the instances enumerated in Section 77 of the Omnibus
Election Code, the existence of a valid certificate of candidacy seasonably

9
Section 12. Substitution of candidates. In case of valid substitutions after the official ballots have been printed, the votes cast for the substituted candidates
shall be considered votes for the substitutes.

10
Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal. If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official canadidate of
a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political
party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the
political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of
the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed
with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the
country, with the Commission.

11
Grounds for cancellation of or denying due course to a COC: material misrepresentation under Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
 filed is a requisite sine qua non.
Who will assume (Castillo:) The (Alcala:) He should ALCALA to be Mayor.
the contested doctrine on the assume the post of
elective position rejection of the Mayor because After Barbara Ruby substituted Ramon, the May 10, 2010 elections
second-placer Barbara Rubys proceeded with her being regarded by the electorate of Lucena City as a
should not apply to substitution had bona fide candidate. To the electorate, she became a contender for the same
him because been invalid and position vied for by Castillo, such that she stood on the same footing as
Ramons Castillo had clearly Castillo. Such standing as a candidate negated Castillos claim of being the
disqualification lost the elections. candidate who obtained the highest number of votes, and of being
became final prior to consequently entitled to assume the office of Mayor.
the elections. The
law expressly Indeed, Castillo could not assume the office for he was only a second placer.
declares12 that a Labo, Jr. should be applied. There, the Court emphasized that the candidate
candidate obtaining the second highest number of votes for the contested office could
disqualified by final not assume the office despite the disqualification of the first placer because
judgment before an the second placer was not the choice of the sovereign will. Surely, the
election cannot be Court explained, a minority or defeated candidate could not be deemed
voted for, and votes elected to the office. There was to be no question that the second placer lost
cast for him shall in the election, was repudiated by the electorate, and could not assume the
not be counted. He vacated position. No law imposed upon and compelled the people of Lucena
is entitled to City to accept a loser to be their political leader or their representative.
assume the position
of Mayor for having The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the place of a
obtained the highest disqualified winning candidate is when two requisites concur, namely: (a) the
number of votes candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (b)
among the the electorate was fully aware in fact and in law of that candidates
remaining qualified disqualification as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but
candidates. the electorate still cast the plurality of the votes in favor of the ineligible
candidate. Under this sole exception, the electorate may be said to have
waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their
franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case the eligible candidate
with the second highest number of votes may be deemed elected. But the
exception did not apply in favor of Castillo simply because the second
element was absent. The electorate of Lucena City were not the least aware

12
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987: Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of
the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
 of the fact of Barbara Rubys ineligibility as the substitute. In fact, the
COMELEC En Banc issued the Resolution finding her substitution invalid
only on May 20, 2011, or a full year after the decisions.

On the other hand, the COMELEC En Banc properly disqualified Barbara

Ruby from assuming the position of Mayor of Lucena City. To begin with,
there was no valid candidate for her to substitute due to Ramons ineligibility.
Also, Ramon did not voluntarily withdraw his CoC before the elections in
accordance with Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code. Lastly, she was
not an additional candidate for the position of Mayor of Lucena City because
her filing of her CoC on May 4, 2010 was beyond the period fixed by law.
Indeed, she was not, in law and in fact, a candidate.

A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City thus resulted, and
such vacancy should be filled pursuant to the law on succession defined in
Section 4413 of the LGC.

*note that there are dissents by Brion, Mendoza, and Abad.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petitions in these consolidated cases; AFFIRMS the Resolution issued on May 20, 2011 by the
COMELEC EN BANC; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

13
Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the
governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor shall become the governor or mayor
 Digester: Jel Gallego
CAYAT v. COMELEC
April 24, 2007; G.R. No. 163776

DOCTRINE: Sec 6, RA 6646 or The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final
judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted.

The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer applies only if two conditions concur: (1) the decision on disqualification remained
pending on Election Day; and (2) the decision on disqualification became final only after the elections.

Petitioner: Fr. Nardo B Cayat candidate for the mayor in Buguias, Benget
Respondent: Commission on Elections
Thomas R. Palileng, Sr. Cayats opponent in the mayoralty post during the elections
Intervenor: Feliseo K. Bayacsan

FACTS:
1. Cayat and Palileng were the only candidates for the mayoralty post in Buguias, Benguet in the 10 May 2004 local elections.
5 January 2004: Cayat filed his certificate of candidacy
26 January 2004: Palileng filed a petition for disqualification against Cayat before the COMELEC on the ground of misrepresentation.
2. Palileng argues that Cayat made misrepresentation and committed acts of perjury when he declared in his COC that he was eligible for
office when he was not because in fact, he was then serving probation after being convicted for the offense of acts of lasciviousness.
3. COMELEC granted the petition based on Sec 40 of the Local Government Code. COMELECs Resolution cancelled Cayats COC due to
disqualification. Cayat filed a filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied for failure to pay the filing pay. Hencce, COMELEC Reso
became final and executory on 17 April 2004.
4. Despite this decision, Cayats name was still included in the ballot and he was later proclaimed winner on 12 May 2004; thus prompting
Palileng to file a petition for annulment of proclamation. COMELEC declared Palileng as the duly elected mayor and Bayacsan as the
duly elected vice mayor.

ISSUE: WON Palileng was validly proclaimed as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet

Petitioner/Intervenor: NO
Bayacsan argues that he should be declared as mayor because of the doctrine of rejection of second placer.
Respondent: YES

SC: YES
As to Cayat, he can no longer be proclaimed as Mayor because he was disqualified by final judgment for having been sentenced by final judgment
for an offense involving moral turpitude.

His proclamation is void because the decision disqualifying Cayat had already become final on 17 April 2004, 23 days before the election
day. There is no longer any need to ascertain whether there was actual knowledge by the voters of Cayats disqualification when they cast their
votes on election day because the law mandates that Cayats votes shall not be counted. There is no disenfranchisement of the 8,164
voters. Rather, the 8,164 voters are deemed by law to have deliberately voted for a non-candidate, and thus their votes are stray and shall not
be counted.

Sec 6, RA 664614 or The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election
cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. Provision covers two situations:

First, when the disqualification becomes final before the elections, which is the situation covered in the first sentence of Section 6. (applies to the
case herein)
Sec 6 is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall
not be counted. Hence, all votes cast in Cayats favor are stray. Cayat was never a candidate

Second, when the disqualification becomes final after the elections, which is the situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6. (applied in
Labo)

As to Bayacsan, the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer does not apply to this case.

1) The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer, which triggers the rule on succession, does not apply in the present case because Palileng is
not a second-placer but the only placer. 23 days before election day, Cayat was already disqualified by final judgment to run for Mayor in the 10
May 2004 elections. Palileng was the only candidate, the sole and only placer, second to none.

2) There are specific requirements for the application of the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer. The doctrine will apply
in Bayacsans favor, regardless of his intervention in the present case, if two conditions concur: (1) the decision
on Cayats disqualification remained pending on Election Day, 10 May 2004, resulting in the presence of two mayoralty candidates
for Buguias, Benguet in the elections; and (2) the decision on Cayats disqualification became final only after the elections.

Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC is inapplicable here. Labo and the other cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer have one
common essential condition the disqualification of the candidate had not become final before the elections. This essential condition does not
exist in the present case. Labos disqualification became final 3 days after the elections so on election day, he was still a candidate while in this
case, Cayat was disqualified by final judgment 23 days before elections so on election day, his candidacy was legally non-existent.

14
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added)
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayats petitions and Feliseo K. Bayacsans petition-in intervention.
We AFFIRM the Resolutions & Orders of the COMELEC
 Edward Dayog

Bautista v. COMELEC
October 23, 2003
J. Carpio

Petitioner Bautista ran as a candidate for Punong Barangay in Batangas. He won. The COMELEC En Banc later cancelled his certificate
of candidacy and revoked his proclamation after it ruled that he was not a registered voter at the time of the election. The SC ruled that
while the COMELEC exercised grave abused of discretion due to procedural lapses, inluding the fact that the order should have come
from a Division, not En Banc, Bautista cannot be proclaimed to the office of Punong Barangay for being ineligible. The SC also ruled
that the second-highest ranking officer, not the candidate with the second-highest number of votes, should replace Bautista.

Petitioner: Raymundo Oca Bautista, candidate for Punong Barangay of Brgy. Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas

Respondents: 1. COMELEC; 2. Election Officer Josefina Jareno; 3. Divina Alcoreza, 1 st runner-up

FACTS:

- June 10, 2002: Bautista filed his certificate of candidacy (COC) for the July 15, 2002 barangay elections. Election Officer Jareno refused to
accept the COC because Bautista was not a registered voter in the barangay.

- Bautista filed an action for mandamus with the RTC of Batangas. The RTC held that his name should be included in the list of candidates until
the COMELEC rules otherwise. Jareno complied but referred the matter with the COMELEC Law Department.

- The COMELEC Law Department recommended the cancellation of Bautistas COC but the COMELEC En Banc failed to rule on this before the
Barangay Elections.

- Bautista won in the Barangay Elections, followed by respondent Alcoreza. He took his oath twice (once with
Rep. Ermita-Buhain and another with Mayor Apacible).

- July 23, 2002: COMELEC En Banc issued two resolutions: 1) cancelling Bautista's COC; 2) directing him to cease and desist from taking his oath
of office or from assuming his position.

- COMELEC Comm. Tancangco directed Jareno to delete Bautista's name from the list of candidates and to order the Board of Canvassers of
Lumbangan to reconvene. The Board of Canvassers proclaimed Alcoreza, having obtained the second-highest number of votes, as the Punong
Barangay.

Issue 1: Petitioner's Respondent's Supreme Court: Yes.

Contention: Yes. Contention: No.
W/N the COMELEC En Garvida v. Sales: Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code
Banc committed GAD in 1. There was no The Constitution vests governs the procedure to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
issuing the two disqualification case the COMELEC with the candidacy. Under the rules of procedure, jurisdiction over a petition to
resolutions. formally filed against power and jurisdiction to cancel a COC lies with the COMELEC sitting in a Division.
him. pass upon the
qualification of The COMELEC En Banc can only act on the case if there is a motion
2. Even assuming that candidates. for reconsideration of the decision of the Division. Thus, COMELEC
there was a case filed should have referred the case to a division for summary hearing.
against him, the
COMELEC sitting as a The proceeding on the cancellation of a COC does not involve
Division shall have administrative, but quasi-judicial (QJ) functions of the COMELEC.*
jurisdiction over it, not
COMELEC En Banc. The Constitution (Article IX-C) provides that the COMELEC En Banc
can act directly on matters falling within its administrative powers.
Meanwhile, that QJ powers of the COMELEC are subject of the
requirement that all election cases shall be decided by the COMELEC
in division.

Issue 2: Petitioner's Respondent's Supreme Court: Yes.

Contention: Yes. Contention: No.
W/N the COMELEC 1. Sandoval v. COMELEC, citing Bince, Jr. v. COMELEC: Petitioner
deprived Bautista of due There was no notice nor 1. Bautista had the cannot be deprived of his office without due process of law.
process when it issued hearing prior to the chance to be heard and
the resolutions. issuance of the two to present his side when The fact that Bautista was able to file a letter with the COMELEC En
resolutions. he filed a letter to the Banc requesting for reconsideration of the resolutions is beside the
COMELEC En Banc point.
requesting
reconsideration of the Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides for the
resolutions. twin requirements of prior notice and hearing. A summary proceeding
does not mean that the COMELEC could do away with the
2. There was no need requirements of notice and hearing.
for presentation and
evaluation of evidence 2. This reasoning fails to consider the instances where a voter may be
since the issue of excluded through inadvertence or registered with an erroneous or
whether Bautista was a misspelled name.
registered voter is easily
resolved by looking at
the COMELEC
registration records.

Issue 3: Petitioner's Respondent's Supreme Court: No.

 Contention: No. Contention: No.
W/N Bautista was a 1. Under the LGC of 1991, which took effect on Jan. 1, 1992, an
registered voter of 1. (He actually admitted elective local official must be a registered voter.** The following are the
Barangay Lumbangan in his affidavit that he requirements: 1) Filipino citizen; 2) registered voter in the barangay; 3)
when he filed his COC. was not.) resident therein for at least 1 year; 4) able to read and write Filipino or
any local language; 5) 18 years old on election day.
2. His non-registration
as a voter was due to Bautista admitted in his Aug. 24, 2002 affidavit that he failed to register
the refusal of Jareno to as a voter of the barangay because he was out of the country from
register him in January 1995 to 2001.
2002.
2. There is no evidence of this allegation. Jareno alleges that she only
met Bautista in June 2002.

From the circumstances of the case, it becomes clear that Bautista

made false representations in his COC by delcaring that he was a
registered voter. Such false representation is a ground for cancellation
of the COC under Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Issue 3: Petitioner's Respondent's Supreme Court: Yes.

Contention: No. Contention: Yes.
W/N Bautista's The electorate cannot amend or waive the qualifications prescribed by
proclamation should be The people's choice the law for elective office.
rescinded. expressed in local
elections deserves
respect.

Issue 3: Petitioner's Alcoreza's Contention: Supreme Court: No.

Contention: No. Yes.
W/N Alcoreza should be . The factual circumstances in Grego and Labo are not to be found in
proclaimed as Punong Grego v. COMELEC this case.
Barangay. and Labo v. COMELEC:
First runner-ups may be LGC provides that in case of permanent vacancy in the office of the
proclaimed as winners if Punong Barangay, the highest ranking Sangguniang Barangay
the electorate knew of member shall become the Punong Barangay.
the disqualification of
the winning candidate
and voted for him/her
anyway thereby
invalidating their votes.
 Solicitor General's
Contention: No.

PETITION DENIED. Bautista's candidacy is cancelled and his subsequent proclamation is revoked.

Obiter

*Villarosa v. COMELEC, citing Justice Antonio's concurring opinion in University of Nueva Caceres v. Martinez: The term administrative pertains
to administration, especially management, as by managing or conducting, directing or superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of
persons or things. It does not entail an opportunity to be heard. While quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc.,
or public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.

**Before the LGC, the rule is that candidates for local office need not be registered voters but only qualified electors which does not entail formal
registration in a list of voters.
 Digester: Janine Bareo

BERNARDO et al v. ABALOS et al

Dec. 5, 2001

DOCTRINE: Petitioner did not exhaust all the remedies available to them. They did not seek a reconsideration of the assailed COMELEC en banc
resolution as required by Sec 1, Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

Petitioners: Antonio Bernardo, Ernesto Domingo and Jesus Cruz

Respondents: Mayor Benjamin Abalos, Benhur Abalos, Dr. Eden Diaz, Romeo Zapanta, Arcadio De Vera and COMELEC

Facts:

Petitioners filed with the COMELEC a criminal complaint against respondents for vote buying in violation of Sec 261, paragraphs (a), (b), and
(j) of the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Sec 28 to RA 6646 and Sec 68 of the OEC.

Petitioners allege that respondent Mandaluyong City Mayor Abalos and his son Benhur, a candidate for Mayor in the May 1998 elections conspired
with the other respondents Diaz (schools division superintendent), Zapanta (Asst. Superintendent), and De Vera (president, Mandaluyong
Federation of Public School teachers). They sponsored an all-expense free transportation, food and drinks affair for the Mandaluyong public
school teachers at the Tayabas beach resort in Quezon.

- During the whole day affair (April 14, 1998), the background music loudly and repeatedly played the political jingle of Benhur to the
tune of the song Sha lala lala.
- Some participants wore shirts with the name of Benhur printed in oversized colored letters
- Mayor Abalos delivered a speech where he offered and promised the teachers and employees a hazard pay and increase in
allowances which they will get by the end of the month

The Director of the law department of COMELEC conducted a preliminary investigation and submitted his findings to the en banc recommending
the dismissal of the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. COMELEC en banc dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence to
establish a prima facie case.

Petitioners without submitting a MR, filed the petition with the SC.

Issue/Held: WON the COMELEC erred in dismissing the complaint for vote buying. -- NO
 Petitioners Respondents (COMELEC) SC

Petitioner did not exhaust all the remedies available to

them. They did not seek a reconsideration of the assailed
The offers and promises to the The complaint, being criminal in nature, must COMELEC en banc resolution as required by Sec 1,
teachers who are members of the have all its allegations supported by direct, Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Board of Election Inspectors and strong, convincing and indubitable evidence
voters were made a few weeks before and that the submitted evidence of the
the election were to induce the complainants are mere self serving
teachers and the public to vote for statements and uncorroborated audio and The purpose of the motion is to give COMELEC an
Benhur. visual recordings and a photo. The evidence opportunity to correct the error imputed to it. If the error
of Abalos et al have more probative value is immediately corrected, then it is the most expeditious
and more believable than the evidence of the and inexpensive recourse. But if COMELEC refuses to
complainants. correct, then it commits a GAD justifying recourse to a
The offers and promises of Mayor petition for certiorari.
Abalos and the enthusiastic
acceptance of said monetary
increases of allowances is a violation
of Sec 261 pars. (a), (b), and (j) of the Petitioners complaint expressly states that no supporting
Omnibus Election Code against vote affidavits were submitted by the complaining witnesses
buying and vote selling. to sustain their charge of vote buying. The absence of
such supporting affidavits shows the frailty of petitioners
complaint.

The COMELEC en banc in dismissing

the complaint, acted with apparent
grave abuse of discretion.

Dispositive Portion:

Wherefore, the instant petition is dismissed.

 RZ Zamora

BAQUIT UNDA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HADJI ACMAD DITANGONAN RANGIRIS, Respondents.
(October 18, 1990)

Doctrine: The vice-mayor, who succeeded the deceased protestee-mayor in an election protest brought against the latter after his death, is the
real party in interest and should be substituted in the pleadings as the party-protestee.

Facts:

Hadji Minandang Guiling and private respondent Hadji Acmad Ditangongan Rangiris were the rival candidates for mayor of Masiu, Lanao del Sur
in the local elections. Guiling was proclaimed winner, along with herein petitioner as the duly elected vice-mayor. Both officials duly took their oaths
of office and entered upon the performance of their duties.

Private respondent filed in the COMELEC a petition questioning the said proclamation, which was dismissed by COMELEC without prejudice to
the filing of an election contest. Subsequently, Mayor Guiling passed away and, the following day, petitioner took his oath of office as mayor and
forthwith assumed and exercised the duties of said office.

Private respondent filed an election protest against the deceased Mayor Guiling with the RTC. The summons issued to Mayor Guiling was
returned unserved since he had already been dead for over a month. Thereafter, the protest filed by private respondent was brought to the
COMELEC on certiorari. The petitioner became a party to the election protest as an intervenor with the approval of respondent
COMELEC.

Petitioner Respondent Supreme Court

Issue: W/N the RTC to proceed with the trial of the case because the death of the protestee Statutes providing for election
trial court has There is no law does not divest the court of jurisdiction over the election protest contests are to be liberally
jurisdiction which allows a construed to the end that the
over an deceased person will of the people in the choice
to be sued as a of public officers may not be
election protest
party defendant, defeated by mere technical
filed against a objections. To that end,
much less as a
protestee who protestee in an immaterial defects in pleadings
had died prior election contest; should be disregarded and
to the filing and that provided necessary and proper
thereof. YES each resulting amendments should be allowed
district will as promptly as possible.
 On the procedural aspect, it is
represent a established that amendments to
population of at pleadings may be permitted by
least 250,000. this Court even for the first time
on appeal in order to substitute
COMELEC the name of the real party in
interest, provided that such an
misapplied the
amendment would not involve a
case of Vda. de
change in the cause of action or
De Mesa, etc., et
result in undue prejudice to the
al., vs. Mencias,
adverse party.
etc., et al. which
impliedly It follows, therefore, that the
suggested that election protest filed by private
the procedure respondent can and ought to be
would be to have amended by striking out the
the case name of Hadji Minandang
dismissed Guiling, as the protestee, and
without prejudice, substituting, in his place,
to the case being petitioner Baquit S. Unda.
refiled against Vda. de De Mesa, as well as
the proper the other cases invoked and
protestee. relied upon by public
respondent, do not present the
same factual situation obtaining
in the case before us. In the
decisions cited by public
respondent, the protestees had
been duly served with summons
and died either during the
pendency of the election protest
or on appeal. However, we
cannot allow public interest to
be fettered by procedural lapses
or technicalities where the
circumstances demand and
warrant the adjudication of the
case on the merits as early as
practicable.
We can, however, for purposes
of the present case avail of the
 ruling in the Vda. de De Mesa
case to the effect that Sec 17,
Rule 3 of the ROC, on
substitution of parties, applies to
election contests to the same
extent and with the same force
and effect as it does in ordinary
civil actions.
Now, under the LGC, the vice-
mayor stands next in the line of
succession to the mayor in case
of a permanent vacancy in the
latter's position. Upon the death
of the protestee mayor in the
case at bar, petitioner, as then
incumbent vice-mayor,
succeeded by operation of law
to the vacated office and is
ordinarily entitled to occupy the
same for the unexpired term
thereof. The outcome of the
election contest necessarily and
primarily bears upon his right to
his present position and he is
the person directly concerned in
the fair and regular conduct of
the election in order that the
true will of the electorate will be
upheld. His status as a real
party in interest in the
continuation of said case cannot
thus be disputed.
The pleadings in the election
protest should properly be
amended to substitute petitioner
as the party protestee, instead
of his being merely an
intervenor therein, and that the
proceedings be thereafter
conducted accordingly.
 Digest by: Monica
Macalincag vs Chang (1992)

The Secretary of Finance has the power to preventively suspend municipal treasurers. Designation of the replacement is not a
requirement before the subject employee is deemed preventively suspended.

Petitioners:VICTOR C. MACALINCAG (Executive Director,Bureau of Local Government) and LORINDA M. CARLOS (Acting Secretary of Finance)
Respondent:ROBERTO E. CHANG (Makati Municipal Treasurer)

Facts
Lorinda Carlos (Executive Director, Bureau of Local Government) signed a formal admininstrative charge approved by petitioner Victor
Macalincag (Acting Secretary of Finance) against Makati municipal treasurer Roberto Chang for dishonesty, neglect of duty and acts
prejudicial to the best interest of the service (disbursement of funds during election, incurring overdrafts in public funds, and non-remittance of
collections to then Bureau of Treasury), based on a COA preliminary evaluation.
Oct 5, 1989 - Macalincag issued an Order of Preventive Suspension (OPS) against Chang. Macalingcag also sent a letter to the Governor of
Metro Manila Commission Finance Office seeking the implementation of the suspension and the designation of an OIC Treasurer. Said
Finance Office sent Chang the OPS via ordinary mail on October 6, 1989.
November 10, 1989 - Chang filed a petition for prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) in Makati RTC against Macalincag and
Carlos. The implementation was temporarily restrained but the court eventually denied the WPI, sustaining the power of the Secretary of
Finance to issue the OPS.
Chang filed MR, citing EO 392 ("Constituting the Metropolitan Manila Authority, providing for its powers and functions and for other
purposes."). The RTC set aside its previous decision and granted the WPI, ordering the Macalingcag and Carlos to permanently desist from
enforcing the OPS. It said that that in order that a preventive suspension will be implemented, there are two steps involved, viz: 1) service of a
copy of said order on the respondent and 2) designation of his replacement.

Issue Petitioner Respondent Supreme Court

WON Sec of Finance has The OPS is effective upon A government officer is not PD 807 (Civil Service Law) Sec 41 governs
jurisdiction to issue an receipt of Chang and not suspended until someone Preventive Suspension: The proper disciplining
Order of Preventive upon designation of an has assumed the post and authority may preventively suspend any subordinate
Suspension against the OIC to replace him. the officer subject of the officer or employee under his authority pending an
acting municipal treasurer suspension order has investigation, if the charge against such officer or
of Makati Said OPS was also ceased performing his employee involves dishonesty, oppression or
effective before EO 392 official function grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance
and thus cannot be of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the
enjoined by the said law EO 392 enjoins the respondent is guilty of charges which would
(which provides for the implementation of the warrant his removal from service
transfer of the power to OPS, because it created
suspend from the the Metropolitan Manila Under said law, designation of the replacement is
Secretary of Finance to the Authority NOT a requirement to give effect to the preventive
President) and that the suspension.
power to suspend and The power to discipline is
remove municipal officials vested solely on the But, BP Blg. 337 (LGC) Sec 156 Art 5 Ch 3 Title II
is not an incident of the person who has the power provides for the automatic assumption of the
power to appoint to appoint, in this case, the assistant municipal treasurer or next in rank officer in
President case of suspension of the municipal treasurer. Sec
233(2) is the general repealing provision of the LGC
(Sec 8, EO 392 which took (nothing in this code shall be understood to amend
effect on January 9, 1990) or repeal the pertinent provisions of all presidential
decrees and issuances relevant to Metropolitan
Manila )

The OPS then is effective upon receipt of Chang.

Such is presumed when he filed a complaint in the
trial court preventing the implementation of such
OPS.

If such was not allowed, the purpose of preventive

suspension will be rendered nugatory

Changs arguments based on EO 392 are not correct.

Prior to EO No. 392, the power to appoint the
aforesaid public officials was vested in the Provincial
Treasurers and Assessors of the Municipalities
concerned, under P.D. No. 477 and later transferred
to the Commissioner of Finance under P.D. No. 921,
but under both decrees, the power of appointment
was made subject to Civil Service Laws and the
approval of the Secretary of Finance. Thus, there is
an intent of the aforesaid legislations to follow the
Civil Service Laws.

The power to discipline is specifically vested under

Sec. 37 of PD 807 in heads of departments, agencies
and instrumentalities, provinces and chartered cities
who have original jurisdiction to investigate and
decide on matters involving disciplinary action.

The Office of the Municipal Treasurer is

unquestionably under the Department of Finance as
provided for in Sec. 3, PD 477. Hence, the Secretary
of Finance is the proper disciplining authority to issue
the preventive suspension order. More specifically
acting Secretary of Finance, Macalincag, acted within
his jurisdiction in issuing the aforesaid order.

Assuming that the power to appoint is with the

President, Acting Secretary Macalincag acted as an
alter ego of the President and therefore, it is within his
authority, as an alter ego, to preventively suspend
respondent Chang.
 Digester: Jam Marfil

CASE TITLE: Sandoval v. COMELEC

November 12, 2012, En Banc, J. Carpio

DOCTRINES:

1. After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. However, the prohibited election
refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall
election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an
immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity
of service.
2. Term limits must be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the sovereign will of the people.

*The case is comprised of three consolidated petitions for certiorari seeking the reversal of the resolutions of the COMELEC as to the recall
election for the mayor of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. Note that the preparatory recall assembly discussed in this case has already been
eliminated by RA 9244.

Petitioner for G.R. No. 154512:

Mayor Victorino Socrates of Puerto Princesa City
Respondents for G.R. No. 154512:
COMELEC, the Preparatory Recall Assembly of Puerto Princesa and other Philippine Recall Assembly officers

Petitioner for G.R. No. 154683:

Vicente Sandoval, Jr.
Respondents for G.R. No. 154683:
COMELEC

Petitioners for G.R. No. 155083-84:

Ma. Flores Adovo, Mercy Gilo, and Bienvenido Ollave, Sr.
Respondents for G.R. No. 155083-84:
COMELEC and Edward Hagedorn

FACTS:
On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of the then incumbent barangay officials of the Puerto Princesa convened into a preparatory recall
assembly at the gymnasium of Barangay San Jose from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon. The preparatory recall assembly was convened to initiate the
recall of Victorino Socrates who assumed office as Puerto Princesa's mayor on June 30, 2001. The members of the preparatory recall assembly
designated Mark Hagedorn, president of the Association of Barangay Captains, as interim chair of the preparatory recall assembly.
On the same date, the preparatory recall assembly passed a Recall Resolution which declared its loss of confidence in Socrates and called for his
recall. The preparatory recall assembly requested the COMELEC to schedule the recall election for mayor within 30 days from receipt of the Recall
Resolution. On July 16, 2002,

Socrates filed with the COMELEC a petition to nullify and deny due course to the Recall Resolution. On August 14, 2002, the COMELEC en banc
promulgated a resolution dismissing for lack of merit Socrates' petition. The COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled
the recall election on September 7, 2002.

On August 21, 2002, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution prescribing the calendar of activities and periods of certain prohibited acts
in connection with the recall election. The COMELEC fixed the campaign period from August 27, 2002 to September 5, 2002 or for a period of 10
days.

On August 23, 2002, Edward Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election. However, earlier, or on August 17, 2002,
Ma. Flores Adovo and Merly Gilo filed a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify Edward Hagedorn from running in the recall election and to
cancel his certificate of candidacy. On August 30, 2002, a certain Bienvenido Ollave, Sr. also filed a petition-in-intervention also seeking to
disqualify Hagedorn. On the same date, a certain Genaro V. Manaay filed another petition against Hagedorn alleging substantially the same facts
and involving the same issues. The petitions were all anchored on the ground that "Hagedorn is disqualified from running for a fourth
consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms immediately prior to
the instant recall election for the same post."

In a resolution promulgated on September 20, 2002, the COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election. The COMELEC also
reset the recall election from September 7, 2002 to September 24, 2002. On September 23, 2002, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of Adovo and Gilo. The COMELEC affirmed the resolution declaring Hagedorn qualified to run in
the recall election.

ISSUES AND HOLDING:

*Note: In G.R. No. 154683 (Sandoval v. COMELEC), the issue of whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in fixing a
campaign period of only 10 days has become moot. The SC Resolution of September 3, 2002 and COMELEC Resolution No. 5708 granted an
additional 15 days for the campaign period as prayed for by petitioner.

1. W/N the PETITIONERS CONTENTION: RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: SUPREME COURT:

COMELEC a. Petitioner Socrates argues that the a. The COMELEC, however, found a. No. This Court is bound by the
committed grave COMELEC committed grave abuse that "On various dates, in the findings of fact of the COMELEC on
abuse of of discretion in upholding the Recall month of June 2002, the matters within the competence and
discretion in Resolution despite the absence of proponents for the Recall of expertise of the COMELEC, unless
giving due course notice to 130 PRA members and incumbent City Mayor Victorino the findings are patently erroneous.
to the Recall the defective service of notice to Dennis M. Socrates sent notices In Malonzo v. COMELEC,5 which
Resolution and other PRA members. of the convening of the PRA to also dealt with alleged defective
scheduling the the members thereof pursuant to service of notice to PRA members,
recall election for b. Socrates also claims that the PRA Section 70 of the Local we ruled that "Needless to state,
mayor of Puerto members had no authority to adopt Government Code. Copies of the the issue of propriety of the notices
Princesa? the Recall Resolution on July 2, said notice are in Volumes I and II sent to the PRA members is factual
2002 because a majority of PRA entitled Notices to the preparatory in nature, and the determination of
members were seeking a new recall assembly. Likewise, Proof the same is therefore a function of
electoral mandate in the barangay of Service for each of the said the COMELEC. In the absence of
elections scheduled on July 15, notices were attached to the patent error, or serious
2002. This argument deserves Petition. Notices were likewise inconsistencies in the findings, the
scant consideration considering that posted in conspicuous places Court should not disturb the same.
when the PRA members adopted particularly at the Barangay Hall. The factual findings of the
the Recall Resolution their terms of Photos establishing the same COMELEC, based on its own
office had not yet expired. They were attached to the Petition. The assessments and duly supported by
were all de jure sangguniang proponents likewise utilized the gathered evidence, are conclusive
barangay members with no legal broadcast mass media in the upon the court, more so, in the
disqualification to participate in the dissemination of the convening of absence of a substantiated attack
recall assembly under Section 70 of the preparatory recall assembly on the validity of the same." In the
the Local Government Code. (PRA). The City Election Officer instant case, we do not find any
of Puerto Princesa City in her valid reason to hold that the
Certification dated 10 July 2002 COMELEC's findings of fact are
certified that upon a 'thorough patently erroneous.
and careful verification of the
signatures appearing in PRA b. There is no legal basis in Socrates'
Resolution 01-02, x x x the claim that respondents violated his
majority of all members of the constitutional right to information on
PRA concerned approved said matters of public concern. Socrates,
resolution.' She likewise certified admits receiving notice of the PRA
'that not a single meeting and of even sending his
member/signatory of the PRA representative and counsel who
complained or objected as to the were present during the entire PRA
veracity and authenticity of their proceedings. Proponents of the
signatures.' The Provincial recall election submitted to the
Election Supervisor of Palawan, COMELEC the Recall Resolution,
Atty. Urbano Arlando, in his minutes of the PRA proceedings,
Indorsement, stated, 'upon proper the journal of the PRA assembly,
review, all documents submitted attendance sheets, notices sent to
are found in order.' PRA members, and authenticated
master list of barangay officials in
b. No discussion. Puerto Princesa. Socrates had the
right to examine and copy all these
public records in the official custody
of the COMELEC. Socrates,
 however, does not claim that the
COMELEC denied him this right.

2. W/N Hagedorn PETITIONERS RESPONDENTS SUPREME COURT:

is qualified to run CONTENTION: CONTENTION: We hold that Hagedorn is qualified to run in the September 24, 2002 recall election
for mayor in the Hagedorn is Not discussed. for mayor of Puerto Princesa because:
recall election of disqualified 1. Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following his three consecutive
Puerto Princesa from running terms as mayor which ended on June 30, 2001;
on September 24, for a fourth 2. Hagedorn's continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily interrupted from June
2002? consecutive 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 during which time he was a private citizen;
term, having 3. Hagedorn's recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 cannot be
been elected made to retroact to June 30, 2001 to make a fourth consecutive term because
and having factually the recall term is not a fourth consecutive term; and
served as 4. Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the
mayor of the right of the electorate to choose their leaders
city for three (3)
consecutive full The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of
terms the Constitution, which states: "Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials,
immediately except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and
prior to the no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
instant recall renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
election for the interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected."
same post. This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code, which provides: "Section 43. Term of Office.
(a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in
the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which
the elective official was elected."

These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part
provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three
consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in
determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of
service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any
length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before
and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous
service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate
reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election
for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent
election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons.
First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection
after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an
involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.

What the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following
three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent
reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately after the end
of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third
consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the
third term. Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate
reelection to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office.
What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. The debates in the
Constitutional Commission evidently show that the prohibited election referred to by
the framers of the Constitution is the immediate reelection after the third term, not
any other subsequent election.

From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor
of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn was
simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity
of Hagedorn's service as mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but
because of a legal prohibition. Hagedorn's three consecutive terms ended on June
30, 2001. Hagedorn's new recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 is
not a seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive terms as mayor. One
cannot stitch together Hagedorn's previous three-terms with his new recall term to
make the recall term a fourth consecutive term because factually it is not. An
involuntary interruption occurred from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 which
broke the continuity or consecutive character of Hagedorn's service as mayor.

In Lonzanida v. Comelec,17 the Court had occasion to explain interruption of

continuity of service in this manner: Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel
the renounced term in the computation of the three-term limit; conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. x x x." In Hagedorn's case, the
nearly 15-month period he was out of office, although short of a full term of
three years, constituted an interruption in the continuity of his service as
mayor. The Constitution does not require the interruption or hiatus to be a full
term of three years. The clear intent is that interruption "for any length of time,"
as long as the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break an elective local official's
continuity of service.

In the recent case of Adormeo v. Comelec and Talaga, a unanimous Court reiterated
the rule that an interruption consisting of a portion of a term of office breaks the
continuity of service of an elective local official. We held in Adormeo that the period
an elective local official is out of office interrupts the continuity of his service and
prevents his recall term from being stitched together as a seamless continuation of
his previous two consecutive terms. In the instant case, we likewise hold that the
nearly 15 months Hagedorn was out of office interrupted his continuity of service and
prevents his recall term from being stitched together as a seamless continuation of
his previous three consecutive terms. The only difference between Adormeo and the
instant case is the time of the interruption. In Adormeo, the interruption occurred after
the first two consecutive terms. In the instant case, the interruption happened after
the first three consecutive terms. In both cases, the respondents were seeking
election for a fourth term. One who wins and serves a recall term does not serve the
full term of his predecessor but only the unexpired term. The period of time prior to
the recall term, when another elective official holds office, constitutes an interruption
in continuity of service. Clearly, Adormeo established the rule that the winner in the
recall election cannot be charged or credited with the full term of three years for
purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an elective official's terms in office.

In the same manner, Hagedorn's recall term does not retroact to include the tenure in
office of Socrates. Hagedorn can only be disqualified to run in the September 24,
2002 recall election if the recall term is made to retroact to June 30, 2001, for only
then can the recall term constitute a fourth consecutive term. But to consider
Hagedorn's recall term as a full term of three years, retroacting to June 30, 2001,
despite the fact that he won his recall term only last September 24, 2002, is to ignore
reality. This Court cannot declare as consecutive or successive terms of office which
historically and factually are not.

Worse, to make Hagedorn's recall term retroact to June 30, 2001 creates a legal
fiction that unduly curtails the freedom of the people to choose their leaders through
popular elections. The concept of term limits is in derogation of the sovereign will of
the people to elect the leaders of their own choosing. Term limits must be
construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the sovereign will of the
people. Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Art. X, 8 of the
Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were
 as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as
they were with preventing the monopolization of political power.

It should be noted, however, that an official elected in recall election serves the
unexpired term of the recalled official. This unexpired term is in itself one term for
purposes of counting the three-term limit. A local official who serves a recall term
should know that the recall term is in itself one term although less than three years.
This is the inherent limitation he takes by running and winning in the recall election.

Dispositive Portion:

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 154512, 154683 and 155083-84 are DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court
on September 24, 2002 enjoining the proclamation of the winning candidate for mayor of Puerto Princesa in the recall election of September 24,
2002 is lifted. No costs.

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion (J. Davide):

The provision on the preparatory recall assembly in Section 70 of the Local Government Code of 1991 is unconstitutional. I also respectfully
submit that private respondent Edward S. Hagedorn is disqualified from running for the position of Mayor of Puerto Princesa City in the recall
election in question.

The term of office covered by the May 2001 election is up to 30 June 2004. Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. No.
7160 are clear in what is prohibited, which is the fourth term. Nothing can be clearer from the wordings thereof: "the term of office of elective local
officials ... shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more that three consecutive terms." In short, an elective local official who has
served three consecutive terms, like Hagedorn, is disqualified from seeking re-election for the succeeding fourth term. The provision bars the
holding of four consecutive terms. The ponencia is then correct when it holds that the three-term limit bars an immediate reelection for a fourth
term. But I disagree when it rules that in the case of Hagedorn he did not seek an immediate reelection for a fourth term because he was not a
candidate for reelection in the May 2001 election. It forgets that what would have been his fourth term by virtue of the May 2001 election was for
the period from 30 June 2001 to 30 June 2004. The flaw in the ruling results from an apparent confusion between term and election, the root
cause of which is the attempt to distinguish "voluntary renunciation" of office from "involuntary severance" from office and the term of office to
which it relates.

The voluntary renunciation referred to in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160 is one that takes place at any
time during either the first, second, or third term of the three consecutive terms. This is very clear from the last clause of Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution, which reads: "shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected." The
purpose of the provision is to prevent an elective local official from voluntarily resigning from office for the purpose of circumventing the rule on the
belief that the term during which he resigned would be excluded in the counting of the three-term rule. In short, the provision excluded is intended
to impose a penalty on one who flouts the rule or make a mockery of it by the simple act of resigning. Thus, applying it in the case of Hagedorn,
even if he voluntarily resigned on his third term, he would still be barred from seeking reelection in the May 2001 election.

Hagedorn cannot likewise avail of the ruling in Adormeo vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 147927, 4 February 2002) because in that case Talaga did not
win in his second reelection bid, or for a third term, in the May 1998 elections. He won in the recall election of 12 May 2000. Hagedorn, as earlier
stated, fully served three successive terms

A declaration that Hagedorn is qualified to seek reelection in a recall election to remove the Mayor who was elected for a term for which Hagedorn
was constitutionally and statutorily disqualified to be reelected to or, to hold is to subvert the rationale of the three-consecutive-term rule and make
a mockery of it. Worse, it abets destructive endless partisan politics and unsound governance. An elective local official who is disqualified to seek
a fourth term because of the three-term limit but obsessed to hold on to power would spend the first year of the fourth term campaigning for the
recall of the incumbent in the second year of said term. This would' not be a problem If the disqualified official has a solid following and a strong
political machinery. Interestingly, in this case, as stated on page 3 of the ponencia, the President of the Association of Barangay Captains of
Puerto Princesa City is one Mark David M. Hagedorn and he was designated by the Preparatory Recall Assembly as interim Chairman.

Concurring Opinion (J. Puno):

It is my respectful submission that the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 proscribe a local official who has been thrice
consecutively elected in regular elections and has served three full terms in the same position, from running in the regular election succeeding his
third consecutive term. It is this situation that is prohibited because it makes possible service of more than three consecutive and continuous full
terms, i.e., service of a fourth consecutive full term. We cannot overstress that it is this continuousness that the ConCom feared would open the
gates to the two evils sought to be avoided: the incumbent's use of his undue advantage to put up a political dynasty and limiting the people's
choice of leaders. It is in this context of regular elections that our obiter dictum in the Lonzanida case, which petitioners harp on, should be
understood. In that case, we opined that "[a]s finally voted upon, it was agreed that an elective local government official should be barred from
running for the same post after three consecutive terms. After a hiatus of at least one term, he may again run for the same office."17 Indeed,
insofar as regular local elections are concerned, which were the elections involved in that case, there should be a hiatus of at least one full term of
three years.

On the other hand, in the case of a local official who assumes office through a recall election - whether after his first, second, or third consecutive
term- there is a break in his service caused by the election of the incumbent who was recalled. Even in the case of a local official who initially
assumes office via recall election, then wins the two succeeding regular elections and serves two full terms in the same post, he is not prohibited
from seeking another reelection and serving another full term. This is so because his service of the remainder of the incumbent's term via recall
election is not, in reality and in law, a full term continuing on to his three succeeding full terms. Local officials who assume office via recall election
serve only the unexpired portion of the incumbent's term and this service is not counted as a full term, despite the Constitutional mandate that the
term of office of elective local officials is three years. Such is the design because Art. XVIII, Secs. 2 and 5 of the Constitution also prescribe
synchronization of regular national and local elections beginning on the second Monday of May 1992,18 which is accomplished if the local official
who assumes office through recall election serves only the incumbent's unexpired term.
 Digester: Marynette M. Gravador

CASE TITLE: Montebon v. COMELEC (Federico T. Montebon and Eleanor M. Ondoy v. Commission on Election and Sesinando F. Potencioso, Jr.
Date of Case: April 8, 2008

DOCTRINE: Involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service.
The legal successor is not given any option under the law on whether to accept the vacated post or not. Only if the highest-ranking
councilor is permanently unable to succeed to the post does the law speak of alternate succession.
Succession by law to a vacated government office is characteristically not voluntary since it involves the performance of a public duty
by a government official, the non-performance of which exposes said official to possible administrative and criminal charges of
dereliction of duty and neglect in the performance of public functions.

Petitioner: Federico T. Montebon and Eleanor M. Ondoy, candidates for municipal councilor of the Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu for the May 14,
2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections.
Respondent: Commission on Election, and Sesinando F. Potencioso, Jr., also a candidates for municipal councilor of the Municipality of Tuburan,
Cebu for the same Elections

FACTS:
On April 30, 2007,Montebon, Ondoy and other candidates for municipal councilor filed a petition for disqualification against Potencioso with
the COMELEC alleging that he had been elected and served 3 consecutive terms as municipal councilor in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-
2007. Thus, he is proscribed from running for the same position in the 2007 elections as it would be his 4 th consecutive term.
In his answer, Potencioso admitted that he had been elected for 3 consecutive terms as municipal councilor. However, he claimed that the
service of his 2nd term in 2001-2004 was interrupted onJanuary 12, 2004 when he succeeded as vice mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of
Vice Mayor Petronilo L. Mendoza. Consequently, he is not disqualified from vying for the position of municipal councilor in the 2007 elections.

Issue 1 PETITIONERS CONTENTION: RESPONDENTS COMELEC 1st Division (June 2, 2007)

Potenciosos assumption of office as vice- CONTENTION:
WON Potencioso mayor in January 2004 should not be A local elective Denied the petition for disqualification.
is disqualified to considered an interruption in the service of official is not Potenciosos assumption of office as vice-
run in the 2007 his 2nd term since it was a voluntary disqualified from mayor should be considered an
elections. renunciation of his office as municipal running for the 4th interruption in the continuity of his
councilor. consecutive time to service.
According to the law, voluntary renunciation the same office if His 2nd term having been involuntarily
of the office for any length of time shall not there was an interrupted, Potencioso should thus not
be considered an interruption in the interruption in one of be disqualified to seek reelection as
continuity of service for the full term for the previous 3 terms. municipal councilor.
which the official concerned was elected.

COMELEC En Banc:
 Potenciosos assumption to the office of the vice-mayor of Tuburan in January 2004 during his 2 nd term as councilor is not a voluntary
renunciation of the latter office. It operated as an effective disruption in the full service of his 2 nd term as councilor.
In running for councilor again in the May 14, 2007 Elections, he is deemed to be running only for a 2 nd consecutive term as councilor of
Tuburan, the 1st consecutive term fully served being his 2004-2007 term.

Issue: WON Potencioso is is deemed to have fully served his 2 nd term in view of his assumption of office as vice-mayor of Tuburan on January 12,
2004.

SC15:
1987 Constitution16 bars and disqualifies local elective officials from serving more than 3 consecutive terms in the same post.
Lonzanida v. COMELEC: The 2 conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been
elected for 3 consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the 3-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at
the same time respect the peoples choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the 3 term limit. Involuntary severance from office
for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.
Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC: The term limit for elective officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in
the same elective position. For the disqualification to apply, it is not enough that the official has been elected 3 consecutive times; he must
also have served 3 consecutive terms in the same position.
Succession in local government offices is by operation of law.
Section 4417 of RA 7160 provides that if a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member
shall become vice mayor.
Potenciosos assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an involuntary severance from his office as municipal councilor,
resulting in an interruption in the service of his 2001-2004 term. It cannot be deemed to have been by reason of voluntary renunciation
because it was by operation of law.

Dispositive Portion:

. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The June 2, 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division denying the petition for

15
Sorry, there are no contentions mentioned in the SC level. SC merely disposed of the issue.
16
Section 8, Article X: The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such officials shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.
Section 43 of Local Government Code: Sec. 43. Term of Office. (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was
elected.
17
SEC. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor. (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor,
the vice governor or vice mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, the
highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice
mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein.
disqualification and the September 28, 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
 Digester: Rachel Diaz - Tacason
CASE TITLE: Mendoza v. Familara and COMELEC G.R. No. 191017
Date of Case: November 15, 2011

DOCTRINE: the three-term limit has been there all along as early as the second barangay law (RA No. 6679) after the 1987 Constitution
took effect; it was continued under the [Local Government Code] and can still be found in the current law.

Petitioner: Mendoza was a candidate for Barangay Captain of Barangay Balatasan, Oriental Mindoro in the 29 October 2007 Barangay Elections
Respondent: Senen C. Familara, a voter in the Barangay elections; COMELEC

FACTS:
Prior to the 2007 Barangay Elections, Mendoza had been elected as Barangay Captain of Barangay Balatasan for three (3) consecutive
terms, on 9 May 1994, 12 May 1997 and 15 July 2002.
Senen C. Familara (Familara) filed a Petition to Disqualify Mendoza averring that Mendoza, under Section 218 of RA No. 916419 ("An Act
Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections), is ineligible to run again for Barangay Captain of Barangay
Balatasan.
The COMELEC Assistant Regional Election Director of Region IV, Atty. Jocelyn V. Postrado, issued a Resolution recommending that
necessary action be filed against Mendoza for misrepresenting himself as a qualified candidate for the position of Barangay Captain.
Mendoza was able to forestall the implementation of the COMELEC Resolution. He won in the elections and was proclaimed the
Barangay Captain of Balatasan.
COMELEC First Division Resolution: agreed with the recommendation of the COMELEC Assistant Regional Election Director of Region IV
that Mendoza is disqualified from running as Barangay Captain of Balatasan under the three-consecutive term limit rule, and annulled the
Mendozas proclamation.
Mendoza filed a Motion to Recall Resolution, to Dismiss Case and Conduct Appropriate Investigation to Determine Criminal and
Administrative Liability before the COMELEC En Banc but the latter denied the Motion for lack of merit
Hence, the instant petition alleging GAD on the part of the COMELEC En Banc.

Issue 1: PETITIONERS RESPONDENTS Supreme Court

CONTENTION: CONTENTION:

WON the retroactive YES. NO. Citing COMELEC v. Cruz, G.R. No. 186616, 20 November 2009,
application of the three- (I think this is the relevant 605 SCRA 167.

18
Sec. 2. Term of Office. The term of office of all barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of this Act shall be three (3) years.
No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position: Provided, however, That the term of office shall be
reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.

19
Effectivity date March 19, 2002.
consecutive term limit issue, but case didnt really
imposed on barangay go into details on the xxx the three-term limit has been there all along as early as
elective officials arguments of the parties for the second barangay law (RA No. 6679) after the 1987
beginning from the 1994 this issue, especially since Constitution took effect; it was continued under the [Local
barangay elections is petitioner only blithely Government Code] and can still be found in the current law.
unconstitutional raised this issue.) (See below for Courts discussion of this)

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The COMELEC Resolutions dated 18 September
2008 and 23 December 2009 in SPA (Brgy.) 07-243 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

[Still citing COMELEC v Cruz..]

The first law that provided a term limitation for barangay officials was RA No. 6653 (1988); it imposed a two-consecutive term limit. After
only six months, Congress, under RA No. 6679 (1988), changed the two-term limit by providing for a three-consecutive term limit. This consistent
imposition of the term limit gives no hint of any equivocation in the congressional intent to provide a term limitation. Thereafter, RA No. 7160 - the
LGC - followed, bringing with it the issue of whether it provided, as originally worded, for a three-term limit for barangay officials.
Section 43 is a provision under Title II of the LGC on Elective Officials. Title II is divided into several chapters dealing with a wide range of
subject matters, all relating to local elective officials, as follows: a. Qualifications and Election (Chapter I); b. Vacancies and Succession (Chapter
II); c. Disciplinary Actions (Chapter IV) and d. Recall (Chapter V). Title II likewise contains a chapter on Local Legislation (Chapter III).
These Title II provisions are intended to apply to all local elective officials, unless the contrary is clearly provided. A contrary application is
provided with respect to the length of the term of office under Section 43(a); while it applies to all local elective officials, it does not apply to
barangay officials whose length of term is specifically provided by Section 43(c). In contrast to this clear case of an exception to a general rule, the
three-term limit under Section 43(b) does not contain any exception; it applies to all local elective officials who must perforce include barangay
officials.
An alternative perspective is to view [Section] 43(a), (b) and (c) separately from one another as independently standing and self-contained
provisions, except to the extent that they expressly relate to one another. Thus, [Section] 43(a) relates to the term of local elective officials, except
barangay officials whose term of office is separately provided under Sec. 43(c). [Section] 43(b), by its express terms, relates to all local elective
officials without any exception. Thus, the term limitation applies to all local elective officials without any exclusion or qualification.
Either perspective, both of which speak of the same resulting interpretation, is the correct legal import of Section 43 in the context in which
it is found in Title II of the LGC.
xxx
All these inevitably lead to the conclusion that the challenged proviso has been there all along and does not simply retroact the application
of the three-term limit to the barangay elections of 1994. Congress merely integrated the past statutory changes into a seamless whole by coming
up with the challenged proviso.
With this conclusion, the respondents constitutional challenge to the provisobased on retroactivitymust fail