

Program Protection Implementation Considerations

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Ensuring Confidence in Defense Systems



• Threat:

 Nation-state, terrorist, criminal, or rogue developer who gain control of systems through supply chain opportunities, exploit vulnerabilities remotely, and/or degrade system behavior

• Vulnerabilities:


- All systems, networks, and applications
- Intentionally implanted logic
- Unintentional vulnerabilities maliciously exploited (e.g., poor quality or fragile code)


• Consequences:


- Loss of critical data and technology
- System corruption
- Loss of confidence in critical warfighting capability; mission impact


Today's acquisition environment drives the increased emphasis

Networked systems Software-intensive Prime Integrator, hundreds of suppliers Advanced technology and critical components











Program Protection Integrated into Policy





Interim DoDI 5000.02 Operation of the Defense Acquisition System

- Regulatory requirement for Program Protection Plan at Milestones A, B, C and FRP/FDD



DoDI 5200.39 Critical Program Information (CPI) Protection Within the DoD

 Assigns responsibility for Counterintelligence, Security, and System Engineering support for the identification and protection of CPI

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DoDI 5200.44 Protection of Mission Critical Functions to Achieve Trusted Systems and Networks

 Establishes policy and responsibilities to minimize the risk that warfighting capability will be impaired due to vulnerabilities in system design or subversion of mission critical functions or components (including software, microelectronics)



DoDI 4140.67 DoD Counterfeit Prevention Policy

 Establishes policy and assigns responsibility to prevent the introduction of counterfeit material at any level of the DoD supply chain



DoDI 8500.01 Cybersecurity

Establishes a DoD cybersecurity program to protect and defend DoD information and information technology

 - Update in process



DFARS Clause 252.204-7012: Safeguarding Unclassified Controlled Technical Information*



• Published November 18, 2013

- Clause affects all new contracts that contain, or will contain unclassified controlled technical information
- Includes flow down to all subcontracts
- Purpose: Establish minimum requirements for DoD unclassified controlled technical information on contractor information systems
 - Requires contractors implement minimum set of information security controls
 - 51 information security controls from NIST SP 800-53, Revision 4
 - Combination of Technical, Process, Awareness, and Training measures
 - Requires contractors report cyber incident and compromises
 - Requires contractor actions to support DoD damage assessment as needed

Incident Reporting

- Reporting includes:
 - DoD contracts and subcontractor information affected by a cyber incident or compromise
 - DoD programs, platforms, or systems involved
 - Description of DoD technical information compromised
- Reported information does not include signatures or other threat actor indicators

• Procedures, Guidance, and Information (PGI) in development

*http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/dfars/html/current/204_73.htm





- Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) is being updated to reflect Interim DoDI 5000.02 content
 - Program Protection, Chapter 13, incorporates DAG Chapter 4 (Systems Engineering) framework, DoDI 5200.44, DoDI 8500.01, and advancements in methodology
 - Reorganization: Aligns with Systems Engineering framework to increase integration of Program Protection activities into DoD systems engineering
 - Focus on overarching processes:
 - Processes and security specialties written for PMs and systems engineers to better understand how to incorporate program protection into programs
 - Detailed guidance is transitioning to white papers that will be available on the DASD(SE) website; facilitates domain unique tailoring

• DoD 5200.39 Manual

Development effort kicked off April 2014

Defense Acquisition University

- Initiated discussions with DAU to begin building curriculum
- Plans to develop a 100-level course and a 200-level course for PMs and SEs



DASD(SE) Program Protection Website



- DASD(SE) has added a Program Protection and System Security Engineering initiatives page to its website
- Contains the latest available policy, guidance, professional papers/presentations, and acquisition regulations for SSE
 - Guidance available will continue to grow as more techniques for implementing PP/SSE are developed
 - Contains links to relevant Industry collaboration initiatives, including the NDIA SSE Committee

Recently added guidance

- Program Protection Plan Evaluation Criteria, Version 1.1
- Suggested Language to Incorporate System Security Engineering for Trusted Systems and Networks into Department of Defense Requests for Proposals
- Software Assurance Countermeasures in Program Protection Planning


PP/SSE Initiative page is available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/initiatives/init_pp-sse.html

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PPP Development and Updates






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CPI Protection Throughout the Life Cycle





Balance CPI exposure — threat — consequence of loss

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Critical Program Information (CPI) Analysis Process



	Determine:	Consider:	
Determine CPI	The advanced technologies to be protected	 Intelligence on foreign capabilities Information that will derive the capability requiring protection 	
Assess CPI	The level of protection required based on the assessed CPI risk.	CPI criticalitySystem exposureThreat(s)	
Protect CPI	The required protections / countermeasures.	Anti-TamperExportability FeaturesSecurity	
Monitor CPI	The CPI that no longer requires protection. The new technologies requiring protection.	CPI compromise and lossTechnological advantageEmerging technologies	
MDD Materiel Solution Risk		Operations & Support	

Identify and protect CPI concurrently throughout the acquisition lifecycle. Iterate these steps prior to development or update of the PPP for each phase.

OT&E

Sustainment

Disposal

Reduction

Analysis

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- DASD/SE PPP Website contains a document with potential SOW and Section L SSE language
- SOW example

The contractor shall plan for and implement countermeasures that mitigate the risk of foreign intelligence or foreign influence, technology exploitation, supply chain and battlefield threats, and vulnerabilities that result in Level I and Level II protection failures of the system;

• Section L example

The offeror, as part of its technical proposal, shall describe the use of its system security engineering (SSE) process in specifying and designing a system that is protected against external threats and against hardware and software vulnerabilities.

• DFARS Clause 252.204-7012: Safeguarding Unclassified Controlled Technical Information is also being included in contracts, subcontracts and solicitations





SSE performance metrics are needed to assess the health of the system security implementation

- Needs to align with SE and PM performance metrics
- Provide a common set of SSE metrics to measure progress
- NDIA Study that kick-offs at the breakout sessions will focus on SSE metrics



Supply Chain Attack Framework and Attack Patterns



- OSD sponsored effort to investigate supply chain attacks and develop a framework for defining supply chain attack
- White paper available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/initiatives/ init_pp-sse.html
- Need industry and government input to enhance the database
- Send feedback to glenda.n.turner.ctr.@mail.mil

* The information on slides 12-16 taken from: Miller, John F, *Supply Chain Attack Framework and Attack Patterns*, MTR 140021, Dec 2013. Case number 13-3315. Used with permission, The MITRE Corporation.

Supply Chain Attack Framework and Attack Patterns

Abstract

This White Paper brings together various sources of information into a supply chain attack framework and a catalog of specific supply chain attack patterns of malicious insertion of hardware (HW), software (SW), firmware (FW), and system information/data.

The framework and catalog were compiled to assist acquisition programs in understanding the nature and potential extent of supply chain attacks. The attack patterns cover a broadscope, but can be filtered and structured into views to help programs in their consideration of specific types of supply chain attacks. The most recent and configuration managed version of this document will reside on the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering Web Site at <u>http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/initiatives/init_pp-ss.html</u>es a reference to system security engineering (SSE) practitioners.

1. Background and Motivation

Although SSE has traditionally been viewed as a specialty engineering area, it has become increasingly evident that implementing SSE to address emergent adversarial threats must be tightly integrated within a systems engineering (SE) approach. Yet, the security risks for large, complex systems are neither fully understood nor adequately addressed by the systems engineers responsible for system specification, design, implementation, and integration. To address this situation, DASD SE has engaged in a number of efforts to as use trusted systems and networks (TSN), including the development of an SSE methodology (Baldwin et al. 2012; Popick and Reed 2013) that is built upon standard SE processes (e.g., trequirements definition and risk management).

This SSE methodology provides a defined set of activities and analyses to be carried out by a multidisciplinary team led by systems engineers in order to identify and protect mission-critical system components. Successful implementation, however, depends on the availability of adequate data and procedures to carry out the defined activities; e.g., threat analysis and vulnerability assessment. Ongoing efforts by engineers and security professionals within several sub-disciplines of system security address threats, vulnerabilities, and attacks at various levels. Building on these sources, DASD SE has sponsored efforts to examine the supply chain and software development lifecycle contexts of threat activity (Reed 2012) and to develop associated attack vector understanding (Miller 2013).

The general nature of the threat is malicious exploitation of vulnerabilities in fielded systems. In addition to <u>cyber attacks</u> initiated during system operation, emergent, more complex threat actor involvement can occur early in and throughout the acquisition lifecycle. By inserting malicious software and counterfeit components during system design and development and across the supply chain, adversaries can gain system control for later remote exploitation or plant "time bombs" that will degrade or alter system performance at later time, either preset or event-



Supply Chain Attacks and Countermeasures – Catalog Attributes



Attack Catalog

- Attack ID (unique ID number)
- Attack Point (supply chain location or linkage)
- Phase Targeted (acquisition lifecycle phase)
- Attack Type (malicious insertion of SW, HW, etc.)
- Attack Act (the "what")
- Attack Vector (the "how")
- Attack Origin (the "who")
- Attack Goal (the "why")
- Attack Impact (consequence if successful)
- References (sources of information)
- Threat (adversarial event directed at supply chain)
- Vulnerabilities (exploitable weaknesses)
- Applicable Countermeasures (mapped IDs)

Mapping to
Countermeasures Catalog

Countermeasures Catalog

- CM ID
- CM Name
- *CM Type*
- CM Focus
- Mitigation Approach
- CM Description
- CM Goal
- Earliest Implementation Phase
- Timeframe to Implement
- Resources Needed
- Cost to Implement
 Amount of Risk Reduction with
 - References
- Implementation Action
 - Applicable Attacks.


with Implementation Guidance

Mapping to Attack Catalog



Supply Chain Attack Vector Description Format





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Summary of Attack Patterns By Component



Critical Component Targeted for Malicious Insertion	Phase Targeted	Number of Applicable Attacks	Specific Attacks
	TD	5	A2 A6 A8 A29 A36
Hardware	EMD	13	A2 A5 A6 A7 A9 A10 A15 A22 A24 A29 A31 A33 A36
	P&D	12	A2 A5 A6 A7 A11 A15 A22 A24 A25 A29 A31 A33
	O&S	10	A5 A6 A7 A10 A15 A23 A24 A28 A34 A36
	TD	5	A13 A18 A27 A36 A38
Software	EMD	15	A1 A3 A4 A5 A13 A18 A19 A26 A27 A32 A36 A38 A39 A40 A41
	P&D	9	A3 A4 A5 A19 A26 A27 A32 A38 A39 A41
	O&S	11	A3 A4 A5 A13 A21 A35 A36 A38 A39 A40 A41
	TD	1	A29
Firmware	EMD	8	A4 A7 A10 A15 A20 A29 A33 A41
	P&D	8	A4 A7 A12 A15 A20 A29 A33 A41
	O&S	6	A4 A7 A10 A15 A20 A41
	MSA	3	A14 A16 A17
Sys	TD	4	A14 A16 A17 A18
Info/Data	EMD	3	A14 A18 A31
	P&D	3	A30 A31 A37
	O&S	2	A30 A37

By phase:	MSA	TD (now TMRR)	EMD	P&D	O&S
Attacks	3	12	28	24	22

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Example from Supply Chain Attack Database (Attack ID: A3)



Attack	Attack	Phase Targeted	Attack Type	**From: Miller, John F,
ID	Point	(Selected = Bold)	(Selected = Bold)	Supply Chain Attack
		MSA	Malicious Insertion of:	Framework and Attack
		TD	- Hardware	Patterns, MTR 140021, Dec 2013
A3	P2-P5	EMD	- Software	2013
		P&D	- Firmware	
		O&S	- Sys Info/Data	

Attack ID	Attack Act	Attack Vector	Attack Origin	Attack Goal (Selected = Bold)	Attack Impact	Reference
A3	by the insertion of malicious software into components during development or update.	tools within the	the software engineering environment.	Corruption Disclosure	function in a manner that is	Based on NIST SP 800-30; page E-4

Attack ID	Threat	Vulnerabilities
A3	tools within the development or software support environment can insert malicious software into components during development or	The development environment or software support activity environment is susceptible to an adversary inserting malicious software into components during development or update.

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- DoD has policy in place for risk-based cost benefit trade-offs to protect systems, supply chains, and software development
- DoD is emphasizing the SSE integration with systems engineering and its contribution to the system design through:
 - Integration of PPP into System Engineering technical reviews
 - Incorporation of program protection and SSE requirements and processes into engineering development contracts
 - Inclusion of system security risk assessments into overall Program assessment
- Industry is playing an important role in the DoD SSE initiative

DoD efforts are emphasizing integration of system security engineering into system engineering processes and analysis throughout the system life cycle

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


Questions?

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TSN Methodology






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Vulnerability Assessment







DoDI 5230.24 Technical Information Definition



- The term includes technical data or computer software of any kind that can be used, or adapted for use, in the design, production, manufacture, assembly, repair, overhaul, processing, engineering, development, operation, maintenance, adapting, testing, or reconstruction of goods or materiel; or any technology that advances the state of the art, or establishes a new art, in an area of significant military applicability in the United States.
 - The data may be in tangible form, such as a blueprint, photograph, plan, instruction, or an operating manual, or may be intangible, such as a technical service or oral, auditory, or visual descriptions.
 - Examples of technical data include research and engineering data, engineering drawings, and associated lists, specifications, standards, process sheets, manuals, technical reports, technical orders, catalog-item identifications, data sets, studies and analyses and related information, and computer software.