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US Navy: An Early Advocate of Central Intelligence***

***Edging in From the Cold: The Past and Present State of Chinese
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Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf

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The Evolution of Intelligence Reform, 2002–2004

Philip Zelikow

Large organizational change in the United States occurs in evolutions, not revolutions.

“
**The basic issues were:
How much centralized
managerial authority was
required? Where should
this authority be located
in the government?**
”

Preliminary accounts explaining how and why major organizational reform of the US intelligence establishment finally occurred after 9/11 have appeared. So far, none has been satisfactory, although I believe Michael Allen (currently the staff director of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and former senior National Security Council (NSC) official) is preparing a good one. There are some gaps in published knowledge that I can help fill.

Before I provide my view of the events that led directly to the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of December 2004, I wish to offer a perspective on the basic choices that were to be made with intelligence reorganization. Because the legislation itself involved so many points of detail, fundamental issues can be obscured. The basic issues were: How much centralized managerial authority was required? Where should this authority be located in the government?

A starting point was the struggle between CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia, and the Pentagon. This long-running tug-of-war was complicated by 9/11 and the increased salience of domestic intelligence that followed. Then the issue was

complicated again by the Iraq War controversy and arguments about analytical quality and detachment. All three of these concerns influenced the law that emerged at the end of 2004.

Apart from the broader reorganization of the Intelligence Community (IC), another significant reform was the establishment of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). This innovation has been important in counterterrorism (CT) work. It has also spurred some attention as a novel way of organizing other joint work, federal and intergovernmental. The NCTC model is also getting some notice from folks puzzling over how to organize cybersecurity work.

Historical Context

Why should anyone care about “intelligence reform?”

The organization of the IC is an arcane topic to people not close to it. And it can be numbing to plenty of insiders too. Intelligence is one of the largest enterprises of the US government. The National Intelligence Program is currently funded at \$55 billion a year.¹ As a part of the discretionary portion of the federal budget, this scale—if it were a cabinet department—would be the fourth largest in the government,

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On one side of the most important fault line were the advocates for the primacy (to answer all those “who” questions posed above) of “civilian,” “strategic,” or “national” intelligence.

behind only Defense, Health and Human Services, and Education. The National Intelligence Program is thus a good deal larger than, say, the Department of Homeland Security, or the Department of State and the various international affairs programs, or the Departments of Interior, Justice, Energy, Transportation, and so on.^a

Since the early 1950s the US government has set up an almost incomprehensibly vast number of activities to “watch” what is going on around the world. The world is a big place. So the government makes many kinds of choices about how to direct its attention. Distill them to their essence and a lot of the arguments about intelligence reorganization just boil down to this: Who will decide what channels to watch?²

Hundreds of thousands of people will be recruited, trained in particular ways, and deployed to certain units and places to answer someone’s questions. Very expensive machines will be designed, procured, and operated to do the same. All of this effort is designed to see and hear people or other items of interest. Of interest to *whom*? *Who* decides?

The Early Organizations

There is good material on the creation of the CIA, especially in the relevant volumes of the *Foreign*

Relations of the United States series specifically on this topic (1945–1950, 1950–1955). Solid surveys of the whole history of intelligence reform efforts are the two monographs published by CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence: one by Michael Warner and J. Kenneth McDonald and another by Douglas Garthoff.³

Despite the significance of the 1947 and 1949 legislation, the modern CIA really came into being after the tremendous intelligence shocks of the Korean War. Before the Korean War the CIA was a shell, mainly used to collate State and military reports. The character of the North Korean attack was itself a shock, a kind of intelligence-policy failure. Perhaps most shocking were the misjudgments about Chinese moves during October and November 1950.

From November 1950 onward, the country began preparing in earnest for World War III. Truman appointed a new director of central intelligence right after the Korean War began: Walter Bedell “Beetle” Smith. Smith had been Eisenhower’s chief of staff during World War II. The CIA was transformed. NSA was created in 1952. The term “intelligence community” first came into use that year. Resources flowing into every aspect of intelligence work massively increased. Building on skeletal frameworks created in

the 1940s, much of the recognizable national security state we have today took shape in the 1950s and early 1960s. By 1960 the major fault lines in the sprawling new intelligence establishment had appeared. These same fault lines would be evident for the next 40 years and vestiges of them remain today.

On one side of the most important fault line were the advocates for the primacy (to answer all those “who” questions posed above) of “civilian,” “strategic,” or “national” intelligence. These broad perspectives were identified with the CIA—with “Langley.” The State Department’s earlier role in providing “civilian,” “strategic,” and “national” intelligence was eclipsed, though it did not disappear.

On the other side of the basic fault line were advocates for the primacy of “defense” or “military” intelligence. These wartime perspectives were identified with the Department of Defense and the armed services—with “the Pentagon.” If the main business of the government was to prepare for war, the needs of the potential warfighters had to drive the system.

From the mid-1950s onward the public battles over intelligence organization were often paralleled by debates in a more secret realm, centered on what is now called the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB). This board was long known as the PFIAB. In 2008 the “F” for “Foreign” was removed from its

^a The DHS budget, for instance, is in the neighborhood of \$40 billion. One could categorize additional federal spending as “homeland security” spending and push that number toward \$70 billion. But one could respond by similarly calling out the IC “reserves” and including the Military Intelligence Program in that budget figure, which would then push the intelligence total toward \$80 billion.

The National Intelligence Program budget is lower than that of the Department of Veterans Affairs, but a large part of the VA’s spending is not discretionary. All numbers are derived from figures published by the White House.

title. Though there is evidence about its work, the board's work has been little noted by historians, even CIA's historians.^a

The board had come to prescient conclusions about the basic problems of IC management by the end of the 1950s. At an NSC meeting on 5 January 1961 to discuss PFIAB's ideas and other proposals to consolidate intelligence management within DoD, the notetaker recorded the following illustrative exchange, worth quoting at length:

The President [Eisenhower] believed that the Services should collect battlefield intelligence but did not see the necessity for strategic intelligence in the Services. He wondered what intelligence officers in the Services could do to get information from the center of the USSR and correlate it with intelligence on the rest of the world.

He said when he supported the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947, he did it on the basis that the function of strategic intelligence should be in CIA and that duplication should be eliminated. [JCS Chairman] General [Lyman] Lemnitzer felt that the acquisition of technical intelligence, e.g., information about enemy nuclear submarines, required officials who know nuclear submarines.... The President believed that

the information referred to by General Lemnitzer was battlefield intelligence, whereas the discovery of the shipyards where nuclear submarines are being constructed was the business of CIA. He did not see why four intelligence services should attempt to find out where the submarines were made. He believed it was the function of CIA to acquire strategic intelligence.⁴

Eisenhower's PFIAB had a similar view. But it also thought that, if the job was properly conceived, it was too big to be given to the CIA director. The board put it this way:

We believe that the situation would be bettered substantially if the DCI would divest himself voluntarily of many of the functions he currently performs in his capacity as Head of CIA and by assigning such duties elsewhere within CIA. To accomplish this purpose we again recommend that he be provided with a Chief of Staff or Executive Director to act for him, together with the Deputy Director, in the management of the CIA, thereby relieving him to perform the even more important duty of coordinating, integrating and directing all U.S. foreign intelligence activities.

After a reasonable trial period, if this course of action does not accomplish its intended goal, serious consideration should be given to complete separation of the DCI from the CIA.⁵

The Kennedy administration did not act on this particular set of recommendations. Instead it did pursue the parallel project, long under way, to consolidate some of the intelligence work being performed in the Pentagon. So JFK's administration established another major institution within DoD, a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

Four Models of IC Management

For the next 40 years, the running argument posed roughly *four* models for solving the problem of intelligence community management, deciding which questions to answer and how to answer them.

- **Pentagon-centered.** DoD should have direct budget and personnel control over most of the intelligence establishment. Defense concerns were the main concerns. The rest was niche collection (human agents) or analysis no one else, like State, wanted to do or cared to do well.
- **Langley-centered.** The director of the CIA should also have, as director of central intelligence, direct budget and personnel control over most of the intelligence establishment, including the major "national" agencies involved in technical intelligence collection.

^a Eisenhower created the board toward the end of his first term in office. He created it after first having used an ad hoc group, headed by Air Force Gen. James Doolittle, to report to him on CIA covert operations and other matters. Doolittle would later be a member of the regular board, whose first chair was MIT President James Killian.

Noticing the rapidly growing size of the IC, with its new programs for technical intelligence collection, the Nixon administration's budget office prepared a landmark report

Or, if that was too much for one man, the DCI could devolve some of his CIA management to a deputy. But the DCI would remain based at Langley, intimately connected to and identified with the CIA.

- ***White House–centered, driving an interagency committee system.***

The weak version of this idea would be a White House chair of a committee of agency heads. The strong version (“driving”) would have Congress appropriate the money to the White House official, who could then better enforce the decisions.

- ***A separate “director of national intelligence” to run the conglomerate.*** In this option the power center would be separate from Langley, separate from the Pentagon, yet not clogging up the White House.

In the decades before 9/11 the US government essentially chose option 1—*Pentagon-centered*.

Since the director of the CIA was still a focal point for the leadership of “intelligence” in the eyes of the president, the Congress, and the public—a focal point for issues of covert action, espionage, and daily analysis—my characterization of this long period as “Pentagon-centered” may seem odd. But in describing it this way I am describing the objects of attention, the resource flows, and daily management of the whole enterprise. From a budget point of view, before 9/11 the resources devoted to intelligence

usually coursed through three major budget programs. Two of these, crudely accounting for about half the resources, were entirely run by the DoD. The other program, which included the national technical agencies, was mainly (except for the CIA) implemented through DoD.

And the money for all the budget programs, even for CIA, was appropriated by the defense subcommittee of the appropriations committees in the House and Senate. This was supposedly done to hide the budget programs from public view, though it meant that defense appropriators had the final say on who would get what.

CIA had to fight to gain even elemental roles in core Cold War work, like analysis of the Soviet military threat. This bureaucratic place was attained slowly and painfully, mainly in the 1960s. The CIA gained this key role partly because of niche work the Agency had begun doing in the 1950s on the Soviet economy, which no one else had wanted to do well, and because it had pioneered some of the critical early forms of overhead intelligence collection and analysis of the collected imagery. The Cuban missile crisis had provided a rather compelling example.

It is hard to calculate the objective results of the Pentagon-centered system in dollar terms. But if someone with relevant clearances attempted to analyze resource allocation of the entire intelligence effort between “defense” and “other civilian” purposes, my very rough guess is that the analyst would find that a large

majority of the spending was allocated to “defense” purposes and questions. If I had to make a ballpark estimate, I would conjecture that during the Cold War the “defense” proportion of the intelligence effort was at least 85 percent and that today, more than 20 years after the Cold War’s end, it is still at least 75 percent. These are just straw estimates to provoke reflection: perhaps others who are more informed can venture better ones.

Noticing the rapidly growing size of the IC, with its new programs for technical intelligence collection, the Nixon administration’s budget office prepared a landmark report, known for the name of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) official who took the lead in writing it—James Schlesinger. Schlesinger’s March 1971 report floated the idea of creating a “director of national intelligence” (DNI) to oversee the burgeoning enterprise.

As in 1961, two recurrent concerns animated this reform proposal. One was substantive: a Pentagon-centered approach tended to be more parochial, less objective



James Schlesinger, as deputy director of Office of Management, floated the idea of creating a director of national intelligence in 1971. Photo © Bettmann/Corbis.

(about the Soviet threat or the Vietnam War, for example) than a broader and more detached perspective on current events centered in Langley, informed by daily interactions with the White House. The other was managerial: overall Community management needed to be stronger, and the Pentagon—the military—could not run, should not run, the whole national show.

On the question of how much more centralized authority to add to the status quo, the Schlesinger Report articulated the option of going all the way, with most intelligence funds appropriated to the DNI office. Since that DNI would be in Langley, the disadvantages flowed from that—like the danger that the CIA director would be overwhelmed by the additional work—and Defense resistance. The other option for change was a stronger DCI who would be a “*de facto* manager of most resources even though they are not appropriated to him.”⁶

This DCI option was also meant to be Langley-centered but in this vision Schlesinger hoped that the DCI would no longer manage the CIA and its covert operations. Someone else would run the CIA while the DCI devoted “most of his attention to substantive intelligence matters, the tasking of collectors, and community resource management issues as they relate to his production activities.”⁷

Schlesinger’s third option was a “coordinator,” perhaps centered in the White House, leaving the status quo structure in place. This, he

The outcome of the Schlesinger report and follow-on work were amalgams that strengthened the DCI role of the CIA director...

feared, might just add friction without enough management gain.

The outcome of the Schlesinger report and follow-on work were amalgams that strengthened the DCI role of the CIA director, while encouraging more consolidation of defense intelligence management within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Schlesinger would go on to serve briefly as a DCI, and also as a secretary of defense.

The full DNI idea remained only that. The intelligence enterprise remained Pentagon-centered. As debates continued, they were fought over incremental struggles to give the DCI/DCIA at Langley more scope to set the Community’s agenda and enforce this guidance.

With the end of the Cold War and cuts in budgets, the 1990s reopened a period of ferment about intelligence reform.⁸ Critiques nudging away from the traditional Pentagon-centered approach gained strength.

The Aspin-Brown Commission (1995–96)—probably the most significant of these critiques—proposed the separation of the DCI from a deputy who would handle “day-to-day” management of the CIA.⁸ But the DCI would still be at Langley and might still direct CIA too. The IC21 study (1996) of the House intelligence committee pointed in the same direction.⁹

Aspin-Brown declined to quarrel over the key DoD powers. Its report promised not “to alter the fundamen-



Six former DCI’s in May 1995 appeared before the House Select Intelligence Committee, whose report in 1996 proposed separation of the DCI from CIA’s management, among other major recommendations. Photo © GettyImages

⁶ There is a lesson here for 2012. It is never as hard to manage an organization whose budget is going up and up as it is to manage an organization whose budget is going down and down. The last 10 years have been up and up. Now, about the *next* 10 years?

tal relationship between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense.” The report actually supported various changes to *strengthen* Defense’s control over aspects of national collection, like the creation of a national imagery agency that would move some of this collection control out of CIA into DoD. These odd compromises then flowed into 1997 legislation, which, when the dust settled, had done little to change the fundamental balance of power in driving the focus of intelligence attention and the allocation of resources.

One legacy of all this work, though, was that many of the “inside” participants in the intelligence reform debates of 2002–2004 had been involved in this earlier set of arguments and had thus internalized some of the issues. That was true in my case.

Members of Clinton’s PFIAB weighed in on these issues. While those recommendations remained private, the same people were also serving “on the surface” on relevant public commissions and task forces. For example, Warren Rudman was vice-chair of the Aspin-Brown Commission and cochaired Clinton’s PFIAB. Zoe Baird and Anthony Harrington were on Aspin-Brown and Clinton’s PFIAB. Stephen Friedman was on Aspin-Brown and later on Bush’s PIAB, chairing the board in Bush’s second term.

Brent Scowcroft and NSPD-5

As one of its first presidential directives, the new George W. Bush administration in 2001 ordered a

stock-taking study of the organization of the Intelligence Community. The presidential directive was formally signed on 9 May 2001.

The National Security Presidential Directive-5 (NSPD-5) study had an “inside” component that Tenet gave to Joan Dempsey, who was his deputy for community management. There had been a lot of inside work to strengthen Tenet’s community management capabilities during the previous few years, work detailed in the Tenet chapter in Douglas Garthoff’s monograph. Garthoff’s chapter indicates the limited results of all the churning resulting from earlier commissions—one chaired by David Jeremiah and another by Donald Rumsfeld in 1998—and includes an astonishingly prescient warning given to Tenet by a group of insiders advising him in late 1998 that some sort of catastrophic systemic failure was probably coming as a result of the mess.^a 10

Brent Scowcroft directed the “outside” component of the study. He was chosen, per the directive, by Rice and Tenet. Jeremiah joined Scowcroft, helping to chair the NSPD-5 external team. Scowcroft and Jeremiah (who had been across the table from each other frequently during the administration of George H. W. Bush) were very much on the same wavelength. Scowcroft’s memory of these issues extended back to the time of Schlesinger’s original 1971 study.

Both the external (Scowcroft-Jeremiah) and internal (Dempsey) NSPD-5 studies had a single staff,


headed by Kevin Scheid and Howard Schue. At the study group’s first meeting, in July 2001, Scowcroft surprised some of those present by saying he thought the number one threat facing the US government was terrorism. And at the last pre-9/11 meeting of the study group, Rice met with them. Asked by Scowcroft what she thought she was missing from the Intelligence Community, a staff member present recalls Rice’s replying that “she didn’t know whose responsibility it is, but I’m not getting much about the Muslim youth who don’t feel they have a voice in their own future.” That meeting was on 6 September.¹¹

The internal study group effectively quit work after 9/11, preoccupied by more urgent concerns. Rice asked the external group to keep going. The group completed a working paper by the early 2002. I read it at the time.

Though both Scowcroft and Jeremiah were retired flag officers with significant Pentagon service, they endorsed a DNI-style approach greatly strengthening the authority of the DCI. It would be Langley-centered, but the stronger DCI would be separated from the job of running CIA. Scowcroft’s views were not too different from those Eisenhower had articulated in 1961.

This NSPD-5 external report was never really finalized, even for formal submission to DCI Tenet. Its influence came through Scowcroft and Jeremiah’s briefing their group’s findings to top officials throughout the Bush administration. They met

^a The passage read: “The findings of both the Rumsfeld and the Jeremiah panels were discussed at a senior intelligence leadership conference hosted by the DCI on 11 September 1998. One conclusion the participants reached was that “*failure to improve operations management, resource allocation, and other key issues within the community, including making substantial and sweeping changes in the way the nation collects, analyzes, and produces intelligence, ‘will likely result in a catastrophic systemic intelligence failure.’*” (emphasis in the original task force report.)



individually with Vice President Cheney, who had long taken a deep interest in intelligence matters. But to Cheney these ideas, coming so close to 9/11 and in the midst of the post-9/11 frenzy, seemed like “re-arranging the deck chairs [on the Titanic].”^a Defense Secretary Rumsfeld objected strongly. Brent Scowcroft remembers telling him, “Don, you know that if our positions were reversed you would be making this same suggestion to me.”

Sometime early in 2002, Scowcroft and Jeremiah recall briefing the report to the full Bush NSC, absent Bush himself. I do not know how others viewed it but feel sure it at

least made an impression on Bush’s national security advisor, Condi Rice.

The NSPD-5 work produced no visible result. Then the battle over intelligence reform shifted to two new fronts, both spurred by the aftermath of 9/11. Bush’s newly appointed PFIAB was assembled. It started work in November 2001. Scowcroft was the chair. Jeremiah was appointed to the board. I was also a member.

The other front was in Congress. That was the Joint Inquiry (JI) into 9/11 by the House and Senate intelligence committees.

A Formative Year—2002

The congressional Joint Inquiry (JI) was conducted only by the intelligence committees. Therefore it naturally enough focused principally on the IC’s work. This mattered, because such a review naturally set up and reinforced a public presumption that the IC’s performance was *at the center* of the 9/11 story. It is hard to overstate how significant that framing of the issue was during 2002, when the 9/11 narrative was taking shape among an intensely curious public.

The Joint Inquiry did not look much at policy. It had little access to relevant policy documents. It was

^a These are not Cheney’s own words; this is the way Jeremiah characterized Cheney’s reaction in a recent discussion with me about it.

So intelligence reform was being pushed on the agenda by arguments about 9/11.

not even able to get to the bottom of the arguments about the covert action issues. Nor was the inquiry able to delve too deeply into al Qaeda or the origins of the attack from the point of view of the enemy. Nor did it get into the details of what happened on the morning of 9/11, untangling the confused and erroneous accounts that the Air Force and Federal Aviation Administration had initially publicized (and continued to publicize through 2003). But in 2002 the inquiry was where the streetlight

was shining. So that is where people started looking for keys.

The Joint Inquiry first aired most of the principal controversies about 9/11 within the intelligence field. These included the Kuala Lumpur story (where future hijackers were tracked, then the trail lost, in January 2000); problems in following up on leads during 2001 once the Kuala Lumpur material was reinvestigated; the Moussaoui flub (the failure to follow up adequately after Moussaoui's capture in Minnesota), and the "Phoenix" memo

(alerting to possible flight school activity by potential hijackers, though I think this episode is exaggerated a bit by hindsight). The JI was not able to pursue some of the leads it uncovered, some fruitful some not, to firmly evidenced conclusions. The 9/11 Commission was later able to stand on the shoulders of the JI's original work and excellent work done by a CIA analytic team as well as the very thorough FBI "PENTTBOM" investigation—the shorthand name of FBI's investigation of 9/11.



Porter Goss and Richard Shelby, chairs, respectively, of the House and Senate intelligence committees, confer before opening on 18 September 2002 of the Congressional Joint Inquiry into the events of 9/11. Photo © AFP/Getty

The Domestic Intelligence Dimension

So intelligence reform was being pushed on the agenda by arguments about 9/11. But it was also being pushed on the agenda by emergence of a new dimension: the problem of domestic intelligence.

This problem was apparent before, as the old Cold War version of this story (Hoover versus the world) faded from memory and a new version, peppered by bureaucratic quarrels between CIA and the FBI, took its place. Before 9/11 the problem was noticed mainly by insiders. Of course 9/11 changed all that. And by the spring of 2002 President Bush had also decided to create a new homeland security department. That would mean another addition to the intelligence enterprise.

So the 2002 version of intelligence reform was no longer being fought just on the old trench lines between Langley and the Pentagon. The domestic intelligence aspect had to be taken seriously; the historical canyon in the US government dividing foreign from domestic intelligence had to be bridged.

The PFIAB was charged with reevaluating the intelligence organization issues.³ ¹² The board fairly quickly decided to endorse the main lines of the Scowcroft-Jeremiah group's work on overall intelligence organization, while noting that some different model for work on counterterrorism intelligence would be needed, a model it would call a national counterterrorism center.

³ In her memoir, explaining the Bush administration's decision to endorse a DNI approach in August–September 2004, Condi Rice points to the 9/11 Commission and to the concerns that prompted creation earlier that year of the Silberman-Robb Commission. She also spotlights the role of the Scowcroft-chaired PFIAB. The PFIAB work she is alluding to was done in 2002, not in 2004. She, Scowcroft, and Jeremiah have confirmed this to me.

I became a principal drafter for the board's work on this topic, which produced an interim report to President Bush in June 2002. I think this June 2002 PFIAB report mainly emphasized a recapitulation of the Scowcroft-Jeremiah group's broad ideas, and it may have briefly introduced the NCTC concept.

At this stage, broad proposals to reorganize the IC were not considered actionable. Everyone was only just catching their breath from what had been an incredibly hectic period. Rice was working with me and others to finalize a new overarching statement of national security policy.¹³

Also, in the summer of 2002 the contemplation of major political and military moves against Iraq was gathering momentum. The very top officials at the CIA and the White House were involved in closely held decisions on how they would treat and question high-value enemy captives. The legislative battle over creation of the new homeland security department was beginning. And the Joint Inquiry was also consuming its share of the time of top officials, among the jillions of usual items in the in-box.

President Bush's team was still urgently interested in how best to organize counterterrorism intelligence work. So the next phase of the PFIAB's work focused on that. I held the pen on that for a subgroup of the board that included Steve Friedman, Arnold Kanter, and—I think—Jim Langdon.

Meanwhile, Scowcroft—with permission from Rice—had been briefing congressional leaders and staff about the NSPD-5 work. In October

The main emphasis of the PFIAB paper was to develop the proposal for a national counterterrorism center and discuss the past, present, and future of the foreign-domestic divide in intelligence work.

2002 Rumsfeld sent a memo to his trusted aide Steve Cambone, cc'ing Paul Wolfowitz and Rich Haver, warning that the Joint Inquiry committee chairs (Bob Graham and Porter Goss) appeared to be warming to "the Scowcroft model" to move intelligence authority to the DCI. Rumsfeld wanted to head this off. Just as they argued that the DCI needed to be accountable for intelligence performance, Rumsfeld argued that DoD and the military were responsible for winning wars and thus had to have control over the intelligence it might need to do that.¹⁴

In an odd comment Rumsfeld added: "Also, if you will recall, in Condi's draft of the presidential decision memo on intelligence, it stated that the powers of the DCI would be strengthened, but we had to remove that point. I assume it was taken out. I never went back to the National Security Strategy, but that is where it was." I do not understand this comment. I have not seen or heard of the draft decision memo he mentions and I don't understand his reference to the National Security Strategy document, which did not address such process issues.

The PFIAB study for President Bush was finalized in November 2002. We had talked to a number of relevant officials throughout the federal government and at state and local levels, from New York City to Los Angeles. My draft for our group (20 single-spaced pages) developed the idea of a national counterterrorism center.

This NCTC idea had multiple origins. I had first broached a version of this idea, as a "national terrorism intelligence center," (along with Ashton Carter and John Deutch) in work published in 1998 on the emerging danger of "catastrophic terrorism."¹⁵ During 2002, in addition to my regular duties at the University of Virginia, I was directing a task force for the Markle Foundation, cochaired by Clinton PFIAB member Zoe Baird and Bush PFIAB member James Barksdale, on applying the new capabilities of information technology to national security. I was also directing the Aspen Strategy Group in 2002, a program of the Aspen Institute that held major conferences showing the need for better integration of available information on homeland security and bioterror concerns. The Scowcroft-Jeremiah external work had also called for a national counterterrorism center, with one of the external panel's members, Jamie Gorelick, prodding for more integration of better domestic intelligence.

The main emphasis of the PFIAB paper was to develop the proposal for a national counterterrorism center and discuss the past, present, and future of the foreign-domestic divide in intelligence work. There is no need here to detail how our group sorted through the various relationships between the proposed national center and the roles of the CIA, FBI, DoD (and its new homeland-oriented Northern Command), DHS, and state and local entities in the intelligence effort.

Amid all the particular issues, what stood out was the emphasis both Rice and Hadley placed—with support from others—on integrating intelligence, on a fusion of information available to all.

We thought this new entity should not be the captive of any single agency. Its head should be appointed by the president. But, administratively, we inclined toward placing the proposed center in CIA rather than in DHS. Remember, there was no freestanding ODNI back then, nor was one envisioned.

At this time we focused the proposed center on pooling information and analysis. But we also wanted a stronger focal point for national decisions about collection, warning, and combined operations.

National Organization

My PFIAB subgroup also returned to the larger issues of coordinating the entire intelligence community. Here my draft proposed a version of option 3, *White House-centered*, driving an interagency committee system.

This idea was a sort of fusion of Schlesinger's option of setting up a powerful White House "coordinator" with his idea of a DCI separated from being head of the CIA. We did not advocate a "DNI," however, who would receive the intelligence appropriation. Instead the White House-based DCI would manage a strong "executive committee for intelligence management," harkening back to precedents in the old US Intelligence Board.

A top White House appointee would chair the proposed executive committee. The office of the DCI

would move to his office, in the Executive Office of the President. The various Community management offices would also migrate to the EOP. The committee would extend across both foreign and domestic intelligence. We did not want domestic intelligence managed from either Langley or the Pentagon, and we did not think the American people would want that either.

This approach was also strongly influenced by British experience in managing a system that I thought produced relatively high value in relation to money spent. This system was centrally managed yet drew heavily on career professionals. Our draft explained it this way:

In contrast to the head of the CIA, who may have executive and policymaking responsibilities—especially in the global war on terror—the DCI's role would be strengthened in some ways yet more circumscribed in others. He or she would no longer have his departmental powers and duties. But he or she would help the President manage the intelligence support and national integration of analysis for the policy process. This would be more similar to the roles played in the British system both by the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee and by the cabinet secretary who serves as the Prime Minister's intelligence and security coordinator.

The DCI would thus eventually lose the connotation of being an official concerned purely with foreign intelligence. That office could therefore help the President manage the fuller and more complex integration of the broader intelligence community structure, domestic and foreign, that he needs.

Within days after this draft was completed, Kanter and I were invited to join a White House meeting on 11 November 2002, cochaired by Andy Card and Condi Rice, on the counterterrorism intelligence issues, especially in connection with legislation for the new Homeland Security Department. The meeting also included Attorney General John Ashcroft, DCI George Tenet, FBI Director Bob Mueller, Tom Ridge, Richard Falkenrath, John Brennan, Steve Hadley, Steve Abbot (Tom Ridge's deputy), and a couple of others.

Amid all the particular issues, what stood out was the emphasis both Rice and Hadley placed—with support from others—on integrating intelligence, on a fusion of information available to all. Rice said she was generally skeptical of new structures, but this sort of integration needed to happen at every stage of the process. Hadley warned that the establishment of the DHS and other innovations was creating "new seams." Rice and Hadley both stressed how essential it was to do whatever was needed, however hard it might be.

At one point Ashcroft noted that for the last 14 months the president himself had been the person who

brought everyone together to pool information and action. Rice agreed, describing that as a management method relying too much on “brute strength” to integrate the work and the action. The president did not need to see all of the information. Some new institution might help the next president too. Ashcroft was sympathetic but said that maybe only that constant interaction with and pressure from the president would produce the desired fusion.

Reflecting on this meeting, additional information, and input and debate among the full board, the PFIAB report was revised and finalized. Entitled “National Intelligence and Transnational Terrorism,” the 24-page, single-spaced report went to Rice and the president in late November or early December 2002. The recommendation for the NCTC was fleshed out. The report included a detailed review of the past and present condition of domestic intelligence work in the United States.¹⁶ It identified four main challenges:

- a “domestic versus foreign” challenge
- a “domestic intelligence” challenge
- an “intelligence management” challenge
- a “people” challenge in leveraging scarce high-quality analytical resources.

The majority of the report concentrated on the proposed NCTC innovation. It suggested that, for reasons of administrative expediency, the new NCTC should be housed in the CIA but be a separate entity within the IC budget. The NCTC could thus build on the existing CIA Counter-

[PFIAB] recommended a “Director of National Intelligence with real authority...to provide higher-level management of national collection systems, allocate resources to meet changing priorities within or beyond the U.S. and foster community-wide innovation and better R&D

terrorism Center (CTC). In other words, “a CIA foundation for an autonomous *national* center, headed by a Director who is appointed by the President” and with its own budget program.

This final PFIAB report returned to the issue of broader intelligence reform. Influenced by Scowcroft and other board colleagues, PFIAB went back to full support for a DNI. Specifically, it recommended a “Director of National Intelligence with real authority over the CIA, the NCTC, NSA, NIMA [National Imagery and Mapping Agency], and the NRO [National Reconnaissance Office] in order to provide higher-level management of national collection systems, allocate resources to meet changing priorities within or beyond the US, and foster community-wide innovation and better R&D [an urgent priority in the intelligence and information war against transnational terrorism].”

The DNI’s authorities were explained: greater personnel authority over the leadership of the national agencies; the relevant budget programs for national agencies would be appropriated to the DNI, not the secretary of defense (thus requiring declassification of the budget top line); reprogramming authority within and among the national intelligence agencies; and other powers.

But where to put the DNI? My draft had suggested a White

House-centered approach. Scowcroft did not like that. Recalling his Tower Board days (investigating the Iran-Contra affair during the Reagan administration) Scowcroft was uneasy about putting this organization in the Executive Office of the President. But the board liked the proposed intelligence committee system and it could not reach a consensus on where else to put the DNI. So the report proposed the substance of the DNI’s authority and was simply silent about whether the empowered DNI would be White House-centered or Langley-centered.

The PFIAB report recognized the ambition of its proposals. “They would alter the respective roles that the DCI and the Secretary of Defense currently play in managing key elements of the intelligence community. They would require statutory changes.” But the report also warned:

If you [the president] conclude that the DNI should not have budgetary, personnel, and related authorities over the national intelligence agencies, such far-reaching changes are not advisable; then we would withdraw our recommendation to create a DNI and separate that job from the head of the CIA. It would be better to leave the DCI as a dual-hatted head of the CIA rather than put a

bureaucratically impotent official in charge of these vital intelligence functions.

At practically the same time the PFIAB report was being delivered privately to the president, the Congress provided its public report. In December 2002 the Joint Inquiry issued a report that strongly indicted the management of the IC before 9/11. In fact, mainly because of its narrower focus, the Joint Inquiry report goes into more detail about management failings of the IC than the 9/11 Commission report later did.

The *number-one* recommendation of the Joint Inquiry was the creation of a DNI. Its recommended DNI would be a separate cabinet-level official, nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate, with strong power over IC personnel and resources.

But the Joint Inquiry's DNI was more like the original 1947 version of the secretary of defense job. The 1947 National Security Act had a secretary of defense with an office, but no department. It said the secretary would coordinate a "National Military Establishment"—a term much like our current phrase "Intelligence Community." The service departments (Army, Navy, Air Force) would remain separate with their own secretaries. The first secretary of defense who took on the job under these difficult conditions killed himself.

Of course, James Forrestal's illness had other causes beyond bureaucratic stress. But Congress and the president did go back to the drawing boards and create the Department of Defense we know

today between 1949 and 1958, with the modern version of the Joint Chiefs of Staff enacted in 1986 along lines George Marshall had longed for back in 1946. Large organizational change in the United States occurs in evolutions, not revolutions.

Recourse to the DNI idea in the aftermath of 9/11 could be explained by pointing to fresh symptoms of old problems. The Joint Inquiry laid out a powerful case relating IC management challenges to the inability to move resources or develop an adequate interagency intelligence program once the al Qaeda menace had been fully recognized as a priority. Thus the argument could be made that 9/11 added yet one more compelling count to an old indictment and old need. A former senior Defense Department official told the Silberman-Robb Commission that the Intelligence Community was "not so much poorly managed as unmanaged." The commission commented, "After a comprehensive study of the Community, we can't disagree."¹⁷

Yet the historian is compelled to add that the DNI idea had the value of also being a preexisting solution. The seed had been planted decades earlier. The usual pattern in the United States in responding to strategic surprises, Ernest May wrote in 2002, is that

Having diagnosed the surprise as our own fault, we have usually then set about with great energy putting in place programs and institutions that, it is supposed, would have prevented the surprise or at least made conditions much better had they only been in place beforehand. The focus has been on preventing exactly the surprise or disaster that just occurred. Inevitably, however, most of the actions taken early on have been ones conceived earlier, often for quite different purposes. The history of American response to emergencies is replete with evidence for the proposition that Washington teems with solutions in search of problems.¹⁸

This was true for the creation of several of the major institutions created in the 1940s and 1950s, like the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of Special Services. It was true again.



9/11 Commission Chairman Kean (l), Vice Chairman Hamilton (r), and author discussing testimony on 13 April 2004. Photo © Ron Sachs/CNP/Corbis

Though certainly aware of the domestic intelligence problem, and critical of the FBI, the Joint Inquiry did not focus as sharply on the domestic-foreign divide or detail ways to bridge it. It did not recommend the creation of an NCTC.

The Bush administration considered both the internal PFIAB report and the public Joint Inquiry report. President Bush quietly decided to concentrate on the PFIAB idea for an NCTC and put off the rest.

The entity Bush announced in his State of the Union message in January 2003 would instead be called the “Terrorist Threat Integration Center” (TTIC). Rather than enlarging and building on the existing CIA CTC, as the PFIAB had recommended, TTIC would be set up roughly alongside it, competing with it for scarce experts. This would be the source of much trouble. Tenet’s chief of staff, John Brennan, became TTIC’s first director.¹⁹

Part II: The 9/11 Commission and Beyond

In January 2003 I was appointed executive director of the newly created 9/11 Commission. The commission was an independent, small, short-lived federal agency, a creature neither of Congress nor the president.

In some accounts I have read or heard, associated with Paul Pillar and Mark Lowenthal, CIA folks recall my visiting them soon after my appointment in January 2003 and telling them, in effect, that some sort of DNI was coming. The inference then was that this was my personal agenda, that my bias was promptly reported to Tenet, and that I then did

From the start the commission included advocates for the DNI approach.

much to steer the commission to what these individuals regard as a tragic destination.

When I first heard these accounts of my supposed fixed agenda, they puzzled me. As indicated above, my own views on the right organizational setup were more complicated and had not initially included a DNI. But I had an open mind and knew how much momentum had built up for some sort of DNI idea. What they may have heard was my assessment of that political environment, which they may have interpreted as my own preference. Whatever my own preferences, I believe my assessment of the climate was accurate.

From the start the commission included advocates for the DNI approach. On the commission itself, no one was more vocal on this point than Tim Roemer, who had served on the Joint Inquiry (as a minority member of the House intelligence committee). Bob Kerrey had been following the issues closely from his post on the Senate intelligence committee and supported some sort of DNI. So did Jamie Gorelick, who had been a member of the Scowcroft-Jeremiah NSPD-5 external study group. Commission vice-chair Lee Hamilton, a former chair of the House intelligence committee, was also sympathetic to a DNI idea, but neither he nor his longtime staffer, Chris Kojm (who became my deputy), had firmly committed themselves to a particular form of it.

Within the staff, I had selected Kevin Scheid to lead the team working on IC management issues. As

mentioned earlier, Scheid, along with Schue, had been head of the NSPD-5 study staff in 2001 and then had returned to the DCI’s Community Management Staff. Lorry Fenner was one of the staffers on Scheid’s team; she too had also served on the NSPD-5 effort. Also on Scheid’s team was Gordon Lederman, who had written a pioneering study of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation of 1986 that had strengthened the JCS.²⁰

Scheid’s staff team converged by 2004 in favor of a general reorganization, a DNI model (I will use DNI where sometimes the original sources use the slightly altered term “NID”—for national intelligence director). The DNI they envisaged was the stronger form of this model, akin to Schlesinger’s original DNI option in 1971—an official who would receive the intelligence appropriation. They envisioned the establishment of a National Intelligence Authority headed by a Senate-confirmed DNI. The National Intelligence Authority would receive Intelligence Community funds through an amended, dedicated congressional appropriations process.^a

Earlier I mentioned that in 2002 a fresh issue, the problem of domestic intelligence, had moved to the center of attention in any debate about intelligence reform. By the beginning of 2004 yet another large issue was in play: the intelligence failure over weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

The US government had expected to find a substantial, clandestine WMD program with advanced work

The 9/11 Commission did not discuss the Iraqi WMD intelligence issues at all. But there are echoes of that debate in the views of the commission's staff, and some commissioners.

on biological and possibly nuclear weapons. By the end of 2003 it had found little beyond a program in a coma, waiting for some future revival. Since these findings seemed starkly at odds with the way the Iraqi situation had been understood since 1997, and especially in the run-up to war in 2002–2003, this shock produced recriminations.

The recriminations took two basic narrative forms. One narrative traced the problem to serious flaws in the Intelligence Community, aggravated by the way policymakers had used the available estimates. A second narrative traced the problem to policymaker distortion and manipulation (“politicization”) of available intelligence, aggravated by some problems in the analysis.

The Bush White House believed the first narrative. Critics of the Bush White House liked the second.²¹ Whichever one the reader prefers, the shadow of the Iraqi failure and widespread belief in the first narrative had a major impact on the shape of intelligence reform debates in 2004.

The 9/11 Commission did not discuss the Iraqi WMD intelligence issues at all. But there are echoes of that debate in the views of the commission's staff, and some commis-

sioners, that a new DNI should be a coordinator of analysis not unduly influenced by any one agency, more detached, and more of a professional analyst. So Scheid's staff team recommended, for instance, that the DNI should be assisted by a nonpartisan chief of national intelligence, analogous to the JCS chairman. This person would be the lead PDB briefer and substantive intelligence adviser to the president.

The commission issued its report in July 2004. Its critique of the pre-9/11 situation had four parts, leading with a critique of US government policy. The policy argument only indirectly involved the Intelligence Community. The report also criticized the IC's failure to apply its own best practices for “warning of attack,” long-honed during the Cold War, to the al Qa'ida menace. And the report also renewed and reinforced critiques of general management (weak reallocation of resources to new priorities) and operational management (e.g., the Kuala Lumpur case management) that had already been surfaced in the report of the congressional Joint Inquiry.

Both staff and some commissioners pressed the Commission to recommend the establishment of a DNI. In early June 2004, synthesizing input from across the staff along

with my own views, I prepared an outline, “Summary of Possible Policy Recommendations,” for review by the commissioners. In the proposed recommendations on organization of the government, I led with the NCTC idea, along lines similar to the 2002 PFIAB report (which commissioners had never seen). I added the proposal for an NCTC role in the planning of joint counterterrorism operations that spanned multiple agencies.

Further down, my proposed version of the reorganization did not go all out for the DNI. Instead I suggested that recommendations to “restructure the Intelligence Community to create joint mission centers, give the Director of Central Intelligence more authority, and create a Chairman of National Intelligence to oversee stronger analysis.” The commissioners pressed for a DNI. Yet they did not want to go as far as Scheid's team had suggested. They leaned more toward the weaker version of this idea that the Joint Inquiry had suggested—the DNI with his own office but overseeing still-autonomous agencies nestled in their own departments.

At this point a particular commissioner—John Lehman—played an important role. Lehman, a secretary of the navy in the Reagan administration, was a friend of Rumsfeld. He had occasional informal conversations about the commission's work with Rumsfeld and with Rumsfeld's

^a By June 2004 the team (with Lederman holding the pen) prepared a well-footnoted draft “Chapter 13: Restructuring U.S. Intelligence for 21st Century Threats;” and a subsequent, more extensively footnoted 47-page draft “Chapter 13: Reforming U.S. Intelligence to Meet the Jihadist Threat.” All of this material, which should be in the 9/11 Commission archives, then informed my draft of the relevant subsection in Chapter 13 of the Commission's final report. Another useful internal staff study, with contributions from another staff team headed by Douglas MacEachin (a former CIA deputy director for intelligence) that had studied al Qa'ida and the intelligence work done on the organization, was entitled “Improving Assessment and Warning.” It, too, found the Intelligence Community lacking: “the PDB [President's Daily Brief] was weak, the TWG [Threat Warning Group formerly of the CIA's CTC] met quarterly, and the NIE [National Intelligence Estimate] was non-existent,” 14 May 2004.

longtime aide and newly created undersecretary of defense for intelligence (USD-I), Steve Cambone.

A longtime critic of some of the CIA's work, Lehman was opposed to a Langley-centered DNI. He had roughed out a brief draft of how a DNI could work. He had consulted with me about his draft and, more importantly, he had marked up his draft in consultation with Cambone over at DoD. Lehman believed he had made headway in getting a private understanding with DoD leadership on a DNI proposal they might support. This would partly be achieved by putting the job in the White House, and thus embedded in DoD's chain of command.

In this construct, the DNI's powers would be strong. He would be a top official in the Executive Office of the President with substantial budget authorities. He would have a small staff, not to exceed 500 people. In Lehman's paper, the intelligence enterprise would be consolidated into foreign intelligence (CIA lead), defense intelligence (DoD), and homeland intelligence (DHS/FBI). All the military or defense intelligence agencies, to include NSA, would be placed under the USD-I. Cambone, or his successor at Defense, would then report both to the secretary of defense *and* to the DNI (NID).

Though he did not know it, Lehman's approach converged with ideas I had developed in my 2002 PFIAB work. As in that work, Lehman also stressed a much stronger White House-centered committee system to manage the intelligence enterprise, to be chaired by the White House-based DNI. The president would settle unresolved issues.

The final 9/11 Commission Report included the recommendation for a DNI (called a National Intelligence Director).

In this approach there would be no large new agency or department. Instead intelligence management would be an enlarged and powerful White House staff operation, managing a committee system to set priorities and—empowered to receive the national intelligence appropriation—able to allocate resources across all the divides.

The final 9/11 Commission Report included the recommendation for a DNI (called a National Intelligence Director). My draft of that section synthesized all the suggestions I've mentioned, very much including Lehman's. That draft language was then reviewed and approved by the commissioners with little further debate. All understood the great difficulty of getting such recommendations moving power away from DoD enacted into law, especially while the country was at war. Lehman had an informed hope that Rumsfeld's DoD would find this proposal agreeable.

Another key aspect of the Commission's recommendations was the call to declassify the top line of the National Intelligence Program budget. This was of course about much more than mere openness. Such a declassification was the key to unlock the concealment of the intelligence budget inside the Pentagon budget and, with it, control by the defense appropriations subcommittee and the Pentagon. With that declassification, our proposed reform of Congress was possible, adding budget control to the general oversight authority of the intelligence committees.

Immediately after the commission issued its report, and after the lead testimony of Chairman Tom Kean and Vice Chairman Hamilton, I testified to the Senate along with my deputy, Chris Kojm, about the NCTC and DNI recommendations.

In that testimony I explained that if Congress moved the DNI out of the White House there would be complications with using any existing agency. The most important feature of the new office was that it oversaw both foreign *and* domestic intelligence. That was not an appropriate role either for the CIA or for DoD. If a new agency was created (which is what happened), then, I testified, "Such an option would require authorities at least as strong as those we have proposed, or else it would create a bureaucratic 'fifth wheel' that would make the present situation even worse." And, wherever it landed, I thought the DNI needed to have a relatively small staff.

The commission's NCTC proposal had various features to pool information and analysis. The most significant advance between my conception of the NCTC in the PFIAB report of 2002 and my conception of it in the commission report of 2004 came from thinking harder and learning more about the additional problem of orchestrating joint operations across agencies and across the foreign-domestic divide.

For a long time the military services had faced a narrower, though larger-scale, version of the problem of how best to orchestrate combined operations. While I was then on the NSC staff, I had seen the post-Gold-

As the 9/11 Commission completed its work, the Bush administration went into high gear in developing its own ideas about reorganization of the Intelligence Community.

water-Nichols J-3 office of the Joint Staff work well during the Gulf War of 1990–91. I thought the theory behind the organization was sound. I thought similar theories were at work in the design of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and I reflected some more on its experience after spending some time at JSOC headquarters at Fort Bragg in the course of my commission work.

The experience of Britain's Security Service (MI-5) also influenced the NCTC model. MI-5 is actually a relatively small agency that—bridging foreign and domestic work in counterterrorism—gains much of its strength from pooling expertise and orchestrating relevant activities of other executive agencies, like police forces and the Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6).



On 2 August 2004, President Bush told a Rose Garden press conference that his administration endorsed establishment of a DNI. Photo © Downing/Reuters/Corbis

The operational planning side of the NCTC was later accused of being too operational and was watered down. This was a bit of a straw-man argument. The real complaint came from musicians who just didn't want to play in an orchestra. So they were not interested in letting anyone orchestrate combined operations.

Both in the report and in my testimony I made the analogy to the Joint Staff's J-3 model explicit. In drafting the language I used in the Commission report I had even looked to the way DoD manuals described the J-3's role. Thus, as I testified, "The NCTC would not break the formal chain of command for executive agencies, just as the Joint Staff today is not part of the formal chain of command between the president, the secretary of defense, and combatant commanders."

As proposed, the NCTC would prepare just the kind of plan that should have been developed during the fateful January 2000 Kuala Lumpur episode. That was a failure in case management, which I also sometimes compared to the absence in the clinical-case-management world of an "attending physician" to coordinate the care and drugs administered to a hospital patient among various specialists. In the Kuala Lumpur case an appropriate management plan would, at a minimum, have involved orchestrating actions by CIA (in multiple

stations), by NSA, by the FBI, by State, and by immigration officials at US ports of entry. If agencies didn't like the proposed plan then they could take their disagreement to the usual NSC process.

Turning Proposals into a Law

As the 9/11 Commission completed its work, the Bush administration went into high gear in developing its own ideas about reorganization of the Intelligence Community. President Bush quickly decided, and announced on 2 August 2004, that the status quo was not satisfactory and that he would endorse some form of DNI.

A series of internal debates about the appropriate form of a national intelligence director culminated in a meeting of administration principals on 18 August 2004. The next day, Rice sent out a memo inviting final comments on three major options that would go to the president. One option was the purest form of the DNI approach, yanking the national collection agencies out of DoD and placing them under the new director. The then-directors of NSA (Michael Hayden) and NIMA (James Clapper) had been open to such a radical move and were dressed down for it by Rumsfeld (ironic to them, since normally they hardly ever even met with the secretary of defense).

The White House rejection of this more radical organizational move was important. To Bush, Cheney, and Rice such a move seemed too disruptive in time of war. It is worth remembering that August 2004 happened to be a period of intense military crisis in Iraq, one of the most violent periods of the entire war.

The subsequent congressional battle in the autumn of 2004 was a fierce one, mainly in the House.

Another fateful initial decision by Bush was to reject the recommendation for declassifying the National Intelligence Program budget's top line. He may have just accepted the "sound bite" version of the critique, about exposing US intelligence programs. In my view, this argument does not stand up to even a few minutes of serious analysis. But it sounds good. By accepting it, Bush compromised—perhaps unknowingly—his ability to unlock defense control over the collection agencies and their budgets in any proposal he put forward. And the administration declined to include provisions for congressional reform in its proposed legislation.

The Bush administration did look at setting up either a separate DNI office or putting the job in the White House. And Rice also boiled down for the president two options for DNI budget authority. One was direct appropriation to the DNI. The other was retention of the status quo, modified to strengthen DNI control over the content of the national budget program. Her options paper argued that the current DCI (this was shortly after Tenet's resignation) had "never fully exercised" even his existing authorities. "The guidance and approval process is largely passive; the DCI has not engaged in agency-by-agency deliberations to define the content of budgets or enforce compliance with national policy goals and requirements."²² Thus the administration's views in August 2004 were not very far from the 9/11 Commission's ideas.

The White House-centered option ran into a buzz saw on Capitol Hill, and even the 9/11 Commission's former leaders (like Lee Hamilton) soon publicly backed away from it. Why?

The shadow of Iraq was a major factor. On the Democratic side, believing that White House politicization had just produced a terrible tragedy, a White House-based DNI seemed out of the question.

So the White House settled on legislation proposing a new DNI office with significant authorities and budget powers. The battleground became draft legislation being prepared in September 2004 for the president's approval. Rumsfeld fought hard, writing repeatedly to the president, arguing against dilution of his budget control over the national intelligence agencies. Bush did not agree. He effectively rejected Rumsfeld's pleas. Handicapped by the decisions mentioned above, especially on declassification of the top-line budget, the administration's draft bill nonetheless gave the DNI as strong powers as it could with those handicaps.

The administration's bill was watered down again, at the very end of the process, by the so-called chain-of-command language (drafted by David Addington in Vice President Cheney's office) to mollify Rumsfeld. This language, not easily understandable to nonexperts, said that nothing in the proposal would compromise existing authorities of the cabinet secretaries. This last-minute insertion created an embedded contradiction—some would later call it a "poison pill"—that Congress would have to sort out.

Congress then fused the administration's preferred approach with the weaker DNI approach that had ear-

lier been favored by the Joint Inquiry. So, for example, the CIA would not be placed under the direct authority and control of the new DNI. The Congress then made other changes that further blurred the DNI's budget authority and the operational planning responsibilities of the new NCTC.

Thus the 9/11 Commission recommendation had provided important political momentum to the push for a DNI. But the actual form this took in the legislation owed more to these other influences in both the administration and on Capitol Hill.

The subsequent congressional battle in the autumn of 2004 was a fierce one, mainly in the House. I had been involved in successful legislative follow-up on the report of an earlier bipartisan commission I had directed on reform of the federal election system after the election of 2000, best known as the Carter-Ford Commission for the former presidents who co-chaired it. The 2001 recommendations of the Carter-Ford Commission had been enacted in a pathbreaking 2002 act. In that case our principal allies had been in the House (Steny Hoyer and Roy Blunt) and principal problems were in the Senate. This time the principal allies were in the Senate (Susan Collins, Joe Lieberman, and John McCain) and principal problems were in the House.²³

Republicans controlled the House and the majority of the Republican caucus opposed the reforms. The odds of passage were not good. Shortly before the November 2004 election, the forces were stalemated

Eight years later, enough time has passed to do a fair appraisal of the intelligence reforms of 2004.

in conference. The fulcrum of power rested with the centrist House Speaker, Denny Hastert, and his chief of staff, Scott Palmer. Hastert and Palmer believed, and persuaded me, that the 9/11 Commission's political capital was at its height before the election. After the election, odds of passage would dissipate. And there was no chance of passage, they judged, unless the former commission and its congressional allies gave way on some of the key budget issues.

I therefore sent a message on October 23 urging commissioners and our congressional allies to accept what we could then get. I argued to them that once the smoke of battle had cleared there would still be a landmark change that would be improved upon in time. I still believe the substantive and political assessment was correct. But my message, and the Hastert/Palmer strategy behind it, failed completely. Instead of persuading folks to compromise, my message—seized on by the House Republican opponents—infuriated former allies like Susan Collins and Jane Harman, who dug in.

The election came and went. Bush was reelected. The bill was still stuck. The 9/11 Commission's political capital remained strong, but had passed its peak. The proponents could not squeeze out further significant substantive concessions, just a few token nuances here and there. The real issue was whether they could now get any bill at all, even of the quality on the table in October.

The bill was at death's door. What rescued it in November 2004 was

the reinvigorated and personal support thrown behind it by President Bush himself. The victorious president had some more political capital, at least with his fellow Republicans, for a while. He made passage of this bill his number-one legislative priority for the lame-duck Congress. With that boost, the bill barely made it through to be signed into law on 5 December.²⁴

Good Enough?

Eight years later, enough time has passed to do a fair appraisal of the intelligence reforms of 2004. So many people have preconceived opinions about them that it is useful to specify criteria for judgment.

First, did the reforms improve management of the overall Intelligence Community? For example, have the “back office” functions of the Community been consolidated or harmonized? Can the DNI move hundreds of millions of dollars from one priority to another, in fairly short order? Can the DNI achieve synergies and pare redundancies?

Readers will likely have more informed opinions on any of these questions than I do. My impression is that the answers to these questions tend to sound like yes, but not as much as was hoped. Perhaps the most effective DNI among the first four, aided during his years by a quite interested and supportive White House and PIAB, was probably Adm. Michael McConnell. He scored gains on all the above-mentioned standards. He thinks, though, that the DNI's authorities need a major boost.

Meanwhile the “White House-centered” option has not died. Instead it has mutated—under John Brennan's leadership—into a different form.

The Obama administration has declassified the intelligence budget's top line. At last. And the sky did not fall. But that declassification has not yet been converted into meaningful structural reform, principally in Congress.

Second, did the reforms bridge the fault line that had long separated the management of foreign and domestic intelligence? Fundamentally, I think the answer here is yes. There are plenty of particular faults, but “national” intelligence is now for real.

Third, did the reforms improve the integration and professionalism of major analytical assessments? Here the answer again is yes, but less because of the legislation and more from the way it has been implemented. DNI James Clapper has, for instance, de facto created a kind of “chairman” of national intelligence analysis in his deputy for intelligence integration, Robert Cardillo (a DIA veteran), who plays an important and valued part in regular briefings for the White House.

Fourth, has the NCTC turned out to be an important innovation? I believe it has. Aided by several years of steady leadership from Michael Leiter, it has straddled the foreign-domestic and the federal-local divide. It set a Washington standard for a massive “fusion center” in a war that had already shown the benefits coming from ad hoc fusion centers set up to solve problems in the field.

It still amazes me a bit that any significant “intelligence reform” was adopted at all. The emerging legislation ended up being opposed by DoD and its very powerful allies on the Hill. It was quietly opposed by many at the CIA, since the proposal was not Langley-centered. The administration had stoutly opposed the creation of the 9/11 Commission and had

repeatedly tangled with it. So an alliance there was hardly to be expected.

Few people now yearn to go back to the good old pre-9/11 status quo ante. Yet many find the current setup suboptimal. Major institutional change in the US government is invariably a negotiated product. Its results are usually deeply unsatisfying to those who led the charge for

change. James Madison had profoundly mixed feelings in 1787 about the compromised Constitution that he had done so much to create.

So an eternal question lingers: At what point does an unsatisfactory compromise become too unsatisfactory? The best may be the enemy of the good. But when is good enough?



Endnotes

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10. Garthoff, 273.
11. The meeting may have been on 7 September. I have not double-checked this against Rice’s archived calendar.
12. Condoleezza Rice, *No Higher Honor* (New York: Crown, 2011), 264–65.
13. See Zelikow, “U.S. Strategic Planning in 2001–2002,” in Melvyn Leffler and Jeffrey Legro, eds., *In Uncertain Times: American Foreign Policy After the Berlin Wall and 9/11* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 96–116.
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17. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, *Report to the President*, 31 March 2005, 314.
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19. The Silberman-Robb Commission provides details on these troubles and Brennan's early difficulties. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities, 288–91.
20. Gordon Lederman, *Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1999).
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23. Since several former commissioners, Kojm, and I all were working with Congress and the administration on the legislation, e-mailing updates to each other on a daily basis since the commission had dissolved, the records of these exchanges provide a close-up view of the legislative battle during the last third of 2004. These records are preserved at Indiana University in the Lee H. Hamilton, *9/11 Public Discourse Project Papers, 2003–2007, Series: Working Documents, 2004–2006*, boxes for August 2004 to December 2004.
24. For a view of the legislative process, as seen from the Senate, see Deborah Barger, "The Passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004: An Intelligence Officer's Perspective," in *Studies in Intelligence* 53, No. 3 (September 2009). (For Official Use Only).



Captain John A. Gade, US Navy: An Early Advocate of Central Intelligence

Patrick Devenny

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Gade’s most notable entry in the annals of US intelligence was his recommendation, made in 1929, to establish a national intelligence organization to coordinate intelligence activities and provide analysis.
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Only the most dedicated pursuers of intelligence trivia will have heard of Captain John Allyne Gade, US Navy. Born in 1875, Gade worked as a naval attaché, author, architect, and financier until his death in 1955. His most notable entry in the annals of US intelligence was his prescient recommendation, made in 1929, to establish a national intelligence organization to coordinate intelligence activities and provide analysis of international developments. In the estimation of the late CIA historian Thomas F. Troy, who first discovered Gade’s work, “[Gade] laid out in 1929, ahead of his time, the idea of a central intelligence agency.”¹ Authored at a time when America’s intelligence capacity was poorly resourced and viewed suspiciously by many, the Gade proposal was deemed unrealistic and promptly shelved. Decades later, it became prophetic.

It would be easy to characterize the proposal and its author as inconsequential curiosities with minimal impact. Such a view, however, ignores the extraordinary biography of Captain Gade, whose experiences as a naval intelligence officer in Europe during World War I transformed him into a determined and early advocate of intelligence reform. Additionally, Gade’s tour as a State Department officer on the

front lines of the Russian Revolution led him to argue for an escalated campaign of covert action targeting the Soviet Union, a view fashionable at the dawn of the Cold War but unusual in 1919. Finally, as an attaché in Europe during the 1930s, Gade observed the expansion of totalitarianism and sought to improve the intelligence structures of Europe’s democracies before the outbreak of World War II. Gade’s lengthy and diverse intelligence career along and his visionary ideas on US intelligence provide several lessons for those now serving in the profession and justify a more detailed look at Gade’s life.



Capt. John A. Gade, USN. Courtesy of Oslo Military Society.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

The war and its mobilization of new communication and surveillance technologies had ushered in a revolution in military intelligence.

Trial by Fire: John Gade, WW I, and HUMINT

Born in Massachusetts to an American mother and a Norwegian diplomat father, Gade had an extraordinarily worldly childhood that did much to prepare him for a career in intelligence. The young Gade spent most of his childhood in a self-described "fairy tale," surrounded by the natural splendor of Norway. Educated in France and Germany, he studied alongside Europe's elite, gaining exposure to their practices and customs and mastering several of their languages. Gade wrote in his memoir that when he returned to the United States to take Harvard's admissions test, he found that for all his gains in Europe, his grasp of English had slipped and was inferior to that of Chinese exchange students there.² Gade quickly reacquainted himself with his native country, however, and graduated in 1896 with a degree in architecture and worked in New York City for the next 14 years.³

As war raged across Europe, the 41-year-old Gade grew increasingly dissatisfied with his uninvolved life as an architect and looked for a way to serve his country. In 1916 he joined the Commission for Relief in Belgium (CRB), an American aid organization headed by future president Herbert Hoover. Returning to Europe with the organization, Gade worked to forge relationships with Belgian leaders and to channel food aid to Belgian citizens, who had been living under German occupation since 1914. It was not long before Gade became involved in

other activities—which he deemed as "mischief" in his memoirs—that fell well outside of his aid-worker portfolio. The first of these involved helping an agent of the Belgian secret service, a Belgian countess, whom he smuggled aboard a CRB aid barge headed to neutral Holland to save her from being arrested by German authorities.

His first foray into clandestine activity successful, Gade sought in 1917 to make it his profession. The war and its mobilization of new communication and surveillance technologies had ushered in a revolution in military intelligence. In the words of historian David Kahn, "for the first time...intelligence was timely, voluminous, and trustworthy. And so for the first time, it could regularly help win battles."⁴

However, as European militaries pioneered new techniques, the meager intelligence components of the US government remained woefully unprepared. As one military historian of the era wrote, "US military intelligence was also totally incapable of handling the challenges of modern warfare. Most of the state-of-the-art intelligence processes...did not exist within the American army."⁵ In 1917, the US Army's newly formed Military Intelligence Section, headed by intelligence pioneer Ralph Van Deman (then a major), had only four employees and lacked access to basic intelligence information.⁶ America's entry into the war brought about rapid expansion, but poor interagency coordination and information sharing would hinder US

intelligence efforts for the duration of the war.⁷

Among those overseeing the expansion was the director of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), Captain Roger Welles. Welles—whose agency in 1916 consisted of just 16 officers and clerks—was looking for attachés with foreign experience and relied on a network of associates, including Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt, to identify suitable candidates.^{8,9} Aided by this distant association with Roosevelt and his Harvard pedigree, Gade was commissioned a lieutenant in 1917 and, after a short period of training, was sent to Oslo as the assistant naval attaché to Norway and Sweden. During this first posting, Gade relied primarily on his family network for intelligence. A year later, he was promoted to attaché in neutral Denmark, an important battleground in the intelligence war between the Allied and Central Powers.

It was in Copenhagen that Gade would be fully initiated into the intense world of wartime espionage. The intelligence agencies of the warring powers were active throughout the country. These included Britain's relatively young Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), which ran several Denmark-based sources with access to Germany's naval movements.¹⁰

Gade's European background gave him important advantages. On his arrival in Denmark, he used his native-accented Norwegian to establish rapport with merchant mariners who traversed the strategically important North Sea lanes. Gade successfully recruited several as sources, his pitches strengthened

with gifts of scotch, a rare commodity only procured through special arrangement with the Scottish distiller Mr. Dewar himself.

German intelligence made its own attempts to recruit the Norwegian seafarers; when informed of these overtures, Gade—in concert with British intelligence—encouraged several to accept German offers; he then used the mariners to feed spurious information to their German handlers.¹¹

Gade's work with the British and exposure to their collection activities impressed upon him the amateurish nature of his—and his country's—espionage efforts and led him to forge close relationships with his Allied counterparts. Gade remarked years later: "I found it humiliating to realize what a greenhorn I was in comparison with my two [British and French] experienced colleagues." It fell upon Gade's fellow attachés to inform the American novice that German intelligence had placed him under surveillance. He responded by staying at a hotel known to be a hotbed for German activity, and he happily discovered that the false documents he was carrying were stolen and copied by German agents.

In 1918, Gade made several recruitments that granted the Allies greater understanding of Germany's military and diplomatic activity in Northern Europe. Perhaps his most important recruitment targeted Germany's U-boat fleet, which was inflicting significant casualties on Allied convoys. Here again, Gade's European learning benefited his nation's intelligence. Lunching privately with a family friend who

Gade's work with the British and exposure to their collection activities impressed upon him the amateurish nature of his—and his country's—espionage efforts.

commanded the Danish Coast Guard, Gade inquired innocently if the service tracked all ships that came through their territorial waters, including U-boats. The admiral, mindful of his nation's neutrality, was tight-lipped and attempted to change the subject, but Gade pressed the matter, revealing that he would be recalled to the United States if he were unable to collect the information. The meal ended with a handshake, which Gade described as "a second longer than was necessary."

The following afternoon, a messenger delivered a slip of paper describing the path of *U-73* through Danish waters. Gade also established relationships with senior Danish military and intelligence officers, who rewarded his friendship with useful bits of information and even private meetings with the Danish royal family.¹² Among his close allies was the chief of Danish military intelligence, who provided Gade with a wealth of information concerning sensitive German activities in the country and whose wife, conveniently for Gade, was Norwegian.¹³

Collaboration with the British also exposed Gade to underhanded tactics regularly applied in the intelligence war. Observing a British officer grant a handsome reward to a source whose information he deemed unimportant, Gade objected, only to be told the bills were counterfeit. Such duplicity probably prepared Gade for his most complex—and sordid—collection effort. In the spring of 1918, Gade was

ordered to procure the codes used by the German legation in Denmark. Drawing up a dossier on the legation's counselor, Gade determined the man's one weakness was "a pretty woman." He recommended to his superiors that they procure the services of a woman who met certain linguistic and physical requirements. This, Gade wrote in his memoir, led to a sharp rebuke from the secretary of the Navy himself, who indignantly denied his less than wholesome request.

Shortly after receiving the secretary's note, Gade received a direct message from ONI's New York office—probably authored by Spencer Fayette Eddy, a Harvard classmate of Gade's¹⁴—recommending he speak to a young German-American nurse who was traveling to Europe to care for her sickly father. Meeting surreptitiously with the nurse in a Norwegian hotel, Gade determined she was willing to render any service, including sacrificing her chastity, for her adopted country. Directed against Copenhagen's German diplomatic community, it was not long before the beautiful amateur secured an appointment as the counselor's secretary and, according to Gade, delivered the codes, which were forwarded to Herbert Yardley's famed cryptologic unit, MI8, in Van Deman's growing Military Intelligence Section.

However, several weeks after the nurse's appointment, the lovestruck counselor caught her copying new codes. He threatened her with arrest

After the "Great War"

but didn't confine her. She contacted Gade, who, with the help of a friendly Danish naval officer and a Danish agent, smuggled her out of the legation in a large suitcase. Then, using a local yachting race as cover, Gade and the nurse successfully made for Sweden.

By war's end, Gade could count himself among an extremely small number of Americans who had become intimately familiar with the intelligence tradecraft and processes of the Allied and German services. This knowledge would serve as the foundation for his critique of US intelligence and his prescriptions for its reform. Although he had little formal intelligence training, Gade deftly utilized his own cultural skills and contacts in the intelligence organizations of the countries in which he served to advance US intelligence efforts in Northern Europe. For his efforts he was awarded the Navy Cross, his citation praising his recruitment of sources "most valuable to the Commander of Naval Forces operating in European waters and to the Naval Information Division of the British Admiralty."¹⁵ Perhaps concerned that the United States would forget the hard-fought

lessons of the intelligence war in Europe, Gade recommended that Washington bolster its intelligence network in Northern Europe by establishing a covert information bureau, maintaining a roster of Danish intermediaries, and using cultural organizations as conduits for press stories favorable to American interests. These recommendations were ignored.¹⁶

Our Man in the Baltics: Gade and the Communist Threat

The armistice of November 1918 gave Gade only a short respite from his official duties. Just weeks after the guns fell silent, he was sent on behalf of the State Department to Finland and the newly independent Baltic republics. The tour brought him into direct conflict with agents of international communism. Like his views on intelligence, Gade's insights into the danger posed by Moscow and his advocacy for an aggressive Western response would prove prescient.

Gade's first exposure to communism had occurred in 1917, when an informant—a Danish police officer—told him of ongoing meetings

between German officials and exiled Russians. In his memoirs, Gade admits he felt the information was irrelevant and fell outside of his collection requirements. Unbeknownst to Gade at the time, Bolshevik agents had established at least two front companies in Copenhagen to serve as cover for their activities and maintained contact with the German ambassador,¹⁷ and others were watching closely. During a wartime visit to London, Gade met with the legendary head of British naval intelligence, Admiral William Hall, who abruptly asked, "What mischief are Trotsky and the Germans in Copenhagen up to?"

In Finland, Gade met with government officials who had recently crushed their own communist rebellion and were eyeing events in neighboring Russia with concern. The situation was far less stable in Estonia, where numerous White (anticommunist) armies, their Western Allies, and ethnic German forces staged offensives against increasingly powerful Bolshevik forces. In a detailed after action report written in early 1919, Gade urged the West to support Estonia's fight against the Bolsheviks, characterizing the coun-



Above, Gade in Navy bridge coat, meeting in April 1919 with Estonian troops near Narva, Estonia, not far from the Russian border. About seven months later he became US commissioner to the Baltic States. Image on the right shows him arriving with this staff in Narva in November.³⁴

try as a valuable bulwark against communism: "[It] is unquestionably worthy of assistance in various forms. It has fought its own hard fight against Bolshevism with courage and persistency. It feels it has fought it for the rest of the World as for itself...it is hindering Bolshevism from spreading through its harbors to Scandinavia."¹⁸

Gade's work in the Baltics would by the end of 1919 earn him a more permanent appointment as US Commissioner to the Baltic States. Arriving in Latvia that November, Commissioner Gade was instructed by Secretary of State Robert Lansing to simply "observe conditions."¹⁹ Gade's assignment came as the Wilson administration pursued what historian David Foglesong has described as an "undeclared war against Bolshevism" involving the covert support of White forces.²⁰

By now an ardent anticommunist, Gade was a more than willing participant in the effort, regularly urging his superiors to provide needed foodstuffs to White forces in support of their operations against the Red Army.²¹ Through regular visits to the front and consultations with Allied and Russian generals, Gade determined by the end of 1919 that anticommunist forces were near collapse, and he provided Lansing with a lengthy catalog of their shortcomings.^{22,23} Although US aid failed to reverse the fortunes of anti-communist forces in the Baltics, Gade was decorated by White generals for his efforts, which included arranging passports and transportation for their units.²⁴

Although ostensibly a diplomat, Gade would later describe his work in Riga as "principally intelligence

Although ostensibly a diplomat, Gade would later describe his work in Riga as "principally intelligence service."

service."²⁵ Using skills honed during the Great War, Gade conducted numerous espionage operations that brought insights into the nature of the emerging Bolshevik state. Gade's private papers contain detailed descriptions of the Soviet Army and Navy provided by Latvian sources and a lengthy proposal for a new Bolshevik internal security apparatus, somehow procured from Soviet representatives in Estonia.²⁶ In December 1919, he debriefed—using intelligence requirements he most likely drafted—a Lithuanian citizen who had lived in Moscow and offered extensive information on conditions in the new Soviet state.²⁷ Reports of discontent within the Red Army were sourced to Gade's reading of captured Russian mail. For his assessments of the Red Army, Gade relied on observations made during his tours of the front, writing, "I have talked to dozens of them [Red Army officers] in the front lines, immediately after their capture."^{28,29}

Gade's presence did not go unnoticed in Moscow. In order to address the concerns of Russia's flailing provisional government that the United States was supporting "separatist trends" among the Baltic nations, the State Department briefed the Russian ambassador in Washington on Gade's mission. The coded Russian cables describing the discussions were intercepted by a Bolshevik agent and were triumphantly read aloud by Lenin in a speech in February 1920.³⁰

At the same time as he was describing the consolidation of Soviet power inside Russia, Gade

also reported on the expansion of the Soviets' international operations. In March 1919, several foreign communists, along with leading Soviet government officials, attended the first meeting of the Communist International (Comintern), a coordinating body charged with exporting the revolution.³¹ Later that year, Gade observed from his post in Latvia the Comintern's intensifying propaganda operations and the travel of their agents through the Baltics and into Europe and North America. A detailed letter from Gade to Lansing in December 1919, sourced to "a friendly intelligence officer," listed the names of prominent Comintern agents in Europe and their suspected Bolshevik couriers.³² Additionally, an undated line-and-block chart detailing the structure of Soviet espionage and covert action elements included in the US legation's records evidences a growing interest in the threat of communist subversion.³³

In an effort to combat what he later deemed "the attempts of the Soviet Government to strike at American institutions," Gade relied on the methods that had served him well during wartime, including the establishment of ties with local police forces to enable him to identify suspected communists applying for passports.³⁵ In a March 1920 cable to the State Department, Gade profiled "Muller," who held a partially forged Hungarian passport and had been attempting to enter the US before he was captured and executed by Latvian intelligence. On his person, "Muller" carried letters, purportedly from Comintern chief Grig-

In 1921, Gade, alarmed by what he perceived as a growing sympathy among Americans for the Soviet government, wrote "The Truth About Soviet Russia" for the New York Times.

ori Zinovieff, containing general guidance to American communists. Gade was able to review the letters firsthand, he claimed, "owing to [his] confidential relations with secret and military intelligence services."³⁶ The captured material and Gade's reports were later referenced by a Senate subcommittee examining Comintern propaganda.³⁷

In a similar instance described in Gade's memoirs, Latvian intelligence tipped him off to the arrest of an unnamed English-speaking communist who had intended to travel to the United States following a stay in Russia. Gade's private notes indicate the figure possibly was Patrick Quinlan, an Irish-American labor leader Gade suspected of conspiring with the Comintern.³⁸ Gade questioned the prisoner concerning the names of other communist agents in the United States and offered him safe passage if he agreed to provide information. Before Gade could get answers, however, the individual was exchanged for prominent Latvians held by the Bolsheviks.

Upon his return to the United States in May 1920, Gade continued to study the Soviet issue and authored at least one assessment on Soviet policy for senior State Department officials.³⁹ Although his official correspondence conveys his growing concern about the spread of communism, Gade reserved his most forceful commentary for several articles he authored for American publications in 1920 and 1921. These pieces illustrated his advanced understanding of the Soviet government, the danger it posed to West-

ern democracy, and the risks of American inaction. The first article, "Inside Red Russia," appeared in July 1920 and presented a powerful condemnation of Leninist economic policies, decrying their "absolute failure...to accomplish anything whatever of a constructive nature."⁴⁰ Gade substantiated his assessment of communism as an international threat in a later article, "Notes from Secret Papers," in which he detailed how Soviet front organizations had aided communist revolutionaries in postwar Germany, and vividly described their structure and tactics.⁴¹

In 1920, anxious to be reunited with a family he had hardly seen in four years, Gade resigned his State Department position and joined a Wall Street firm, although the move did not mark the end of his public service. When he left government service, Gade could count himself as one of the few American officials who had observed the rise of Soviet communism so intimately. His cogent assessment of the threat and his advocacy of an unconventional response were ahead of their time, and his call in 1920 for escalated economic and covert warfare against the Soviet state to counter its expansionist designs presages the seminal American foreign policy documents of the early Cold War.

In 1921, Gade, alarmed by what he perceived as a growing sympathy among Americans for the Soviet government, wrote "The Truth About Soviet Russia" for the *New York Times*. It was a lengthy article that methodically refuted the claims

of Soviet sympathizers and relied on Gade's firsthand experiences, official US documents, and his analysis of communist publications. "This is Bolshevism. We need not go to its opponents to know the system; the Bolsheviks publish it clearly and boldly." Gade went on to catalog the Soviets' excesses and assess their internationalist designs.⁴² Another article, which he published in the *North American Review*, concluded that the Soviet government had cemented its gains and was now immune to Western military encroachment. In the article, Gade wrote, "those of us who believe Bolshevism to be a world peril must fight it with other than military means."⁴³

Advocate of a "National Intelligence Service"

He was fully engaged in the world of international finance by the mid 1920s, but Gade had not abandoned his intense interest in intelligence. Relying on his own experiences, as well as his discussions with US military intelligence officials, Gade developed several concepts remarkable in their similarity to those that later influenced the formation of the OSS and the CIA. Gade's interest in intelligence reform can first be glimpsed in a 1926 letter to the Director of ONI, in which he expressed his concern over the weak state of US intelligence and suggested using reserve officers and US nationals living overseas.⁴⁴ Three years later, while dining in New York with two military intelligence officers, Gade called for the creation of a "national intelligence service" that would serve as the "hub of the wheel" for a US intelligence community and would operate under the direction of the executive

branch. Noting that Gade “appeared very sanely in earnest in connection with the ideas prescribed,” his dinner guest passed the idea to his superior, Colonel Stanley H. Ford, assistant chief of staff for the Army’s Military Intelligence Division (MID).

Meeting the officers again four days later, Gade gave them a typed, seven-page proposal that identified several weaknesses of the US intelligence system and prescribed radical reforms, chief among them the creation of the “national intelligence service” he had mentioned earlier. US intelligence services, Gade charged, suffered from “a lack of organization,” had no “clearing house” for the analysis of information, and often pursued their respective activities with little coordination or unity of effort. While recognizing the shortage of funds and the antagonism of Congress, Gade suggested that the creation of a central intelligence group was of the utmost importance. The proposed agency would enjoy access to all US intelligence streams, enabling it to quickly piece together high-value intelligence and facilitate its dissemination: “Information immediately can be sifted and passed out and assumes its true value, and with this is forthwith retransmitted by the center office to the office where it is most urgently needed.”

Operating as an independent department within the executive branch, the agency would help prevent duplication of effort, boost information sharing, and more efficiently utilize the various elements of America’s intelligence system. This agency would also be responsible for providing assessments to the president and improve information

Days later, Gade gave them a typed, seven-page proposal that identified several weaknesses of the US intelligence system and prescribed radical reforms, chief among them the creation of the “national intelligence service.”

sharing among federal agencies and state and local police forces. For guidance, Gade recommended that US officials study the operations of European agencies. He praised the British in particular, and perhaps excessively, for their sophistication and expertise. The US should streamline intelligence efforts during peacetime rather than wait until the next conflict, as “the possession or dissemination of information in peace often hinders the most dangerous of misunderstandings.”⁴⁵

Gade’s promotion of greater centralization, coordination, and improved analytical and operational capabilities may seem quaint to the modern reader exposed to decades of similar intelligence reform efforts. However, Gade’s sophisticated proposal, penned during an era when America’s understanding of intelligence bureaucracy was rudimentary, is remarkable; it would be more than a decade until Gen. William Donovan would pen a letter to then President Roosevelt advocating reforms nearly identical to those Gade had envisioned. In 1944, looking beyond WW II, Donovan suggested “the establishment of a central authority reporting directly to you [the president] with responsibility to frame intelligence objectives and to collect and coordinate the intelligence material required by the Executive Branch.”⁴⁶

Unfortunately, it is difficult to envision a more inopportune era in American history for Gade’s proposal. The administration of newly

elected President Hoover was uninterested in maturing US intelligence capabilities, and the nation’s already limited intelligence capacity would continue to atrophy throughout the late 1920s. Indicative of this trend, Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson in May 1929 deemed American codebreaking efforts as “highly unethical” and closed down Yardley’s “black chamber.”⁴⁷

In the case of Gade’s proposal, Colonel Ford passed the idea to a subordinate who penned a scathing review—suggesting that Gade underestimated the costs of creating a national agency and was overly influenced by “story books”—and concluded, “I see nothing to be gained and many difficulties to be overcome.” Ford agreed and had Gade’s work filed away.⁴⁸ Gade’s former organization, ONI, was similarly dismissive. According to Thomas Troy, “[the proposal] failed, because the intelligence chiefs said no, and their negative reflected their unwillingness to be coordinated.”⁴⁹

Although his proposal was disregarded, Gade continued his work in intelligence. In 1933, a Harvard classmate was appointed US ambassador to the Netherlands and asked him to serve as naval attaché to both the Netherlands and Belgium. Over the next nine years, Gade worked in several European capitals. In Belgium, he renewed his practice of establishing strong information-sharing relationships with host-country services—“liaison partners” in today’s parlance—and worked with

Gade's worst fears were realized in May 1940, when, from the American embassy in Brussels, he watched regiments of German troops march through the capital

both the British military attaché and the Belgian secret police. He made friends with local newspaper reporters and collected information on suspected communist agents who passed through the port of Antwerp. Gade also provided guidance to Dutch naval officers seeking to establish their country's naval intelligence service, a positive development in light of shared US-Dutch concerns over Japanese aggression in the South Pacific.

Gade's European postings also allowed him to report on the escalation of tensions throughout the continent and to observe firsthand its descent into war. Traveling to Portugal in 1934, he documented the intensifying diplomatic and intelligence war between the UK and Germany as both sides sought to increase their influence over the Salazar regime. Crossing the Spanish border in civilian clothing, Gade witnessed the siege of Madrid and sought intelligence on the German Luftwaffe's "Condor Legion," which was supporting the army of General Ferdinand Franco and refining tactics it would later employ with devastating effect across Europe. Later, during his conversations with Belgian political leaders, Gade recorded growing alarm among European governments concerning the unchecked expansion of German power.⁵⁰

Gade's work with European intelligence services throughout the 1930s and the deteriorating political climate across the continent reinforced his conviction that the United States

and its allies needed to bolster their intelligence capabilities. Acting again as an impassioned advocate for intelligence, Gade in 1938 authored a letter to the king of Belgium, recommending the country establish a secret intelligence network that could conduct operations in the event of a German invasion. He posed the rhetorical question, "What are Belgium's first and most crying needs in case war breaks out?"—and then answered, "one of the vital ones [is] the organization of a skeleton secret or intelligence service within the country itself." Gade later claimed the idea had been reviewed by Belgian leaders but was only truly considered on the eve of the German invasion, far too late.

Gade's worst fears were realized in May 1940, when, from the American embassy in Brussels, he watched regiments of German troops march through the capital. He was by then 65 and left the country several months later. His memoir concludes with his exit: "And so the great adventure was over. Some of us were returning to report for the last time. Younger, better men were to replace us."

Conclusion

Although his government career was now completely over, Gade did not fade into inactivity. He went on to earn a Ph.D at Columbia University and authored several books on European history. Nor did Gade abandon his advocacy of strong American intelligence; he wrote in

1942 on the need for ONI to identify promising young officers—specifically those with language capabilities and cultural knowledge—and to offer them special training and service opportunities. In 1951, he wrote to Allen Dulles and recommended a graduate student and WWII veteran for consideration by "the Intelligence Service." Dulles replied, addressing him as "John" and asking that the young man in question pay him a visit.⁵¹

Gade measured his role in history, prefacing his autobiography with his "feeling that the narrative of the events in which [he] played a modest part might have a good deal of general human interest." His effect on intelligence history is indeed modest; he engineered no revolutionary reform or spectacular victory. However, no individual, whatever his credentials, could have had much impact on American intelligence in the interwar period; only World War II and the Soviet threat could help realize the reforms he broached in the 1920s. Gade should be appreciated for his foresight and his successes as an intelligence officer rather than the fate of his proposals. With sparse training and no experience, he operated efficiently by recognizing his and his country's weaknesses and overcoming them through a mixture of skill and adaptation. He then used these hard-fought lessons to pressure American leaders to ensure that the shortcomings he observed would not be felt again.

Finally, Gade's life as portrayed in his memoirs and cables conveys lessons relevant to intelligence practitioners today, particularly regarding the

importance of native language skills and deep cultural knowledge among collectors. Ironically, Gade's foreign background and associations would have complicated his participation in American intelligence if modern security standards had been applied. These connections and skills, however,

Gade's life conveys lessons relevant to intelligence practitioners today, particularly regarding the importance of native language skills and deep cultural knowledge among collectors.

allowed Gade to effectively recruit sources and interact with European elites. His aggressive courting of local security and military figures and his establishment of positive information

sharing relationships with Allied intelligence figures further benefited his mission, highlighting the usefulness of effective liaison relationships in conflict environments.



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The Past and Present State of Chinese Intelligence Historiography

Dr. David Ian Chambers

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There is a much neglected orphan in the western scholarly backyard: the evolution of China’s intelligence and security services and the role they played in enabling the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to win and secure national power in the 20th century.
”

Introduction

During the past three decades, great progress has been made in mapping and exploring the role of intelligence in international statecraft and war. The contribution of security services to the maintenance of state power has also attracted a great deal of productive scholarly attention.

As far as western intelligence and security services are concerned, the scale of the “missing dimension” identified by Christopher Andrew and David Dilks in 1984 has shrunk significantly.¹ Benefiting from various “open government” and freedom of information initiatives in the 1980s and 1990s, professional historians have produced a plethora of studies about individual agencies and their senior personnel, specific operations, and the interface between intelligence and states in times of war and peace.

Traditional official reticence or silence about past operations has been replaced by the production of official and authorized histories; in several countries, former intelligence officers are free to publish memoirs provided they do not prejudice current intelligence sources and methods.²

The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe has spawned an upsurge in studies of the security

agencies that once underpinned dictatorship, while a selective opening of intelligence archives in the former Soviet Union has led to the production of official and semiofficial studies of past KGB and GRU operations by Russian writers, as well as high-grade analyses by foreign historians of the use of intelligence and counterintelligence in the USSR’s war against Nazi Germany.³

Where once undergraduate and postgraduate courses in intelligence history were rare on the university campus and their reading lists were short, there is now no shortage of courses or material on which to base teaching and research.

Despite these advances, there is a much neglected orphan in the western scholarly backyard: the evolution of China’s intelligence and security services and the role they played in enabling the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to win and secure national power in the 20th century. Though there is no shortage of publications focusing on the current threat China’s intelligence services present to western interests, non-Chinese studies of the history of those services and its reflection in current operational norms and practice are rare indeed. The very few that do exist were written mainly by journalists 20 to 30 years ago and have been criti-

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

A largely unnoticed relaxation has provided a rich data stream for scholars seeking to develop insights into the CCP's pre-1949 intelligence wars and intelligence operations it directed against perceived internal and external enemies.

cized for their defective methodologies and uncritical reliance on a handful of seemingly sensational but deeply flawed sources emanating from both sides of the Taiwan Strait.⁴ This is hardly surprising given the enduring power of the near total blackout on public discussion of intelligence issues that the CCP imposed after the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949; an adequate platform for western scholarly studies of Chinese intelligence history simply did not exist.

However, just as more relaxed official attitudes towards intelligence research and publication have fueled the growth in historical studies of western services, and as China has pursued a path of radical economic "reform and opening up" over the past three decades, a parallel but largely unnoticed relaxation has provided a rich data stream for scholars seeking to develop insights into the CCP's pre-1949 intelligence wars and the subsequent intelligence operations it directed against perceived internal and external enemies. Based on interviews with PRC intelligence historians and veterans, as well as documentary research, this article's aim is to account for the underdevelopment of public intelligence history in China during and immediately beyond the Mao Zedong era, to examine the reasons for the relaxation that began in the 1980s, and to introduce the types of intelligence history now being produced, as well as the constraints that affect their use as a scholarly resource.

From "Liberation" to Destruction

Within weeks of the establishment of the PRC in October 1949, the CCP Politburo formally approved a Central Committee *Resolution on Intelligence Work*, which stated that intelligence had played a major role in the Party's achievement of national victory in its extended war with the Kuomintang.⁵ However, just as the secrets of ULTRA and the Double-Cross Operation in World War II remained highly classified in the United Kingdom until the 1970s, the successes of the CCP's wartime intelligence operations were withheld from public view and the scrutiny of historians in China.

Nowhere was there scholarly discussion of the role of intelligence in preserving the CCP from near extinction in the late 1920s and early 1930s; the major contribution intelligence made to the Red Army's successful breakout from the Jiangxi Soviet that began the Long March in 1934; the acquisition of predictive intelligence in 1941 about Nazi Germany's invasion of the USSR and Japan's thrust into the Pacific; the paranoid counter-espionage campaign in communist base areas in 1943 for which CCP Chairman Mao Zedong was later obliged to apologize before his peers; or the comprehensive intelligence penetration of the Kuomintang's political and military establishment between 1945 and 1949.

The Chinese press of the early 1950s did carry countless emotive reports about the neutralization of dastardly espionage and subversion

plots by the CIA, SIS, and others, but there was no public discussion of the resource constraints under which the Chinese intelligence services labored when setting operational priorities during and beyond the Korean War. Nor was there any overt indication of a protracted and divisive debate within the Chinese intelligence community about optimum counterintelligence strategy and tactics to be employed against the CCP's old and new enemies.

In this, the behavior of Chinese policymakers was no different from that of their western counterparts. The judgment of the leaders of the intelligence services and their political masters was that secrecy was an absolute value and that there should be no disclosures about past operations lest they prejudice wartime sources and methods—which were still valued and in play—or the commitment of those fighting on the "hidden front" to defend the new regime. Equally, open discussion of security and intelligence dilemmas was considered likely only to provide comfort to China's perceived enemies.

Thus although intelligence chief Li Kenong encouraged the gathering of archival material and preparation of intelligence case histories in the 1950s, such material was for in-house use only.⁶ In society at large, trained and politically correct historians were in short supply, their primary duty being to compile macrohistories of the Chinese revolution for use in universities, schools, work units, and CCP branches as part of a nationwide political resocialization program.

The aim of such history was less to establish and explore facts than to inculcate and reinforce loyalty to the

CCP by presenting an idealized past dominated by the infallible wisdom of Mao, the heroic role of the Red Army and “the masses” in the Chinese revolution, and the sagacious leadership of the CCP throughout the civil and Sino-Japanese wars.⁷ Provision of detailed public intelligence history was not a priority.

Concepts of necessary secrecy and the need to concentrate scarce scholarly resources on “big picture” history aside, a further reason for the nondevelopment of public intelligence history was the willful distortion of China’s intelligence past by the Chinese communist purge process. This tendency first emerged during cadre screening and counter-espionage campaigns, launched by the CCP in 1943 to neutralize hostile spies within the Party and the base areas it controlled. During the campaigns, virtually every cadre who had operated underground in Kuomintang- or Japanese-held areas became vulnerable to suspicions they might have been recruited by the enemy to penetrate the CCP. Intelligence cadres who had oper-

The aim of such history was less to establish and explore facts than to inculcate and reinforce loyalty to the CCP.

ated as case officers or deep penetrations of Kuomintang and Japanese establishments were particularly exposed: to support their operations, many had publicly adopted at best neutral and at worst stridently pro-Kuomintang or pro-Japanese cover identities. Operating separately from local underground CCP branches, they had worked for a single superior cadre fully aware of their circumstances and intelligence product, but the use of aliases and the shifting fortunes of war (deaths, reassignments, enemy successes against CCP networks, and policies requiring the destruction of sensitive documents) often broke those connections and thus the ability of those under suspicion to defend themselves.⁸

With war in progress, it was hardly surprising that few resources were allocated for the preparation of non-didactic histories of past operations or the maintenance of archives that might provide objective answers to

questions about the loyalty of individual intelligence cadres. As anecdotally-based accusations and counteraccusations about past case-work flew back and forth at the height of the 1943 campaigns, hundreds of intelligence and security cadres were targeted for interrogation in Yan’an and other CCP base area headquarters about their possibly dubious links with the Kuomintang and Japanese.

The application of relay interrogation, sleep deprivation, physical torture, and peer pressure techniques produced countless false confessions, including, bizarrely, some from schoolchildren who admitted that they were enemy secret agents. Fortunately for the CCP, these excesses were recognized relatively quickly, and the vast majority of those accused of treachery were officially cleared by the time the Seventh CCP Congress met in spring 1945.⁹

Nonetheless, although intelligence operations in the field continued—it would have been impractical to withdraw cadres operating under deep cover in denied areas for questioning at headquarters—the suspicions of some accusers and the vulnerability of the accused to absent or distorted history lingered and led to a series of high-profile purges of the intelligence and security apparatus in the first five years of the PRC.

- Chen Bo (a.k.a. Bo Lu), once lionized by Mao as the “Sherlock Holmes of Yan’an” for his able counterespionage investigation work, was dismissed from his post



Li Kenong, the People's Republic of China's most senior intelligence official from 1949 until his death in 1962.



Li's intelligence career began in the late 1920s, when he penetrated the Kuomintang Investigation Section in Shanghai, working as a wireless operator dealing with classified traffic. In 1946 he was appointed head of the CCP's Social Department (Shehui Bu), the Party's combined intelligence and counterespionage organ. (Above right: The Social Department office in Beijing in 1949.)

These purges had all been triggered by professional disagreements about counterintelligence policy and fundamental differences of approach.

as director of the Guangdong Public Security Department in 1950, accused of having been an SIS and Kuomintang agent, and imprisoned for more than 20 years.¹⁰

- Yang Fan, who had collated the intelligence reporting that did much to facilitate the relatively peaceful takeover of Shanghai in May 1949 and who later ran the city's counterintelligence operations with considerable flair, was removed as director of the Shanghai Public Security Bureau (PSB) in 1951 and imprisoned in 1955 for being a Kuomintang agent. He was not released from custody until 1978.¹¹
- Pan Hannian, a former deputy chief of the CCP's intelligence service who had run operations against the Kuomintang in the dark days of the early 1930s and later against the Japanese in World War II, was arrested in 1955. He was charged with having been a spy for the Kuomintang and Japan, and he died in custody in 1977. He was the headline victim of an intelligence purge in which 800–1,000 cadres received compulsory job transfers, demotions, or lengthy prison sentences, some committing suicide to avoid interrogation.¹²

These purges had all been triggered by professional disagreements about counterintelligence policy and fundamental differences of approach between those with solid, hands-on experience with wartime intelligence in denied areas, and others who had either sat out most of the

civil and Sino-Japanese wars at intelligence headquarters in Yan'an or concentrated on security rather than intelligence gathering. As the disagreements escalated into purges, the grave reservations of senior judicial officials about the evidential basis of the cases against Chen, Yang, Pan, and their colleagues were suppressed, and Li Kenong found there was little he could do to protect the intelligence apparatus from the damage the purges were causing to reputations and operations.¹³

The essential problem was that the purges had been initiated or endorsed by Mao and executed slavishly by a minister of public security with limited pre-1949 experience with intelligence work. Mao's formal position, quasi-god-like status, and constructed reputation for infallibility were such that no one was willing or able to challenge his assessments, either directly on the basis of limited archival records, or indirectly by the writing of accurate formal intelligence history. The task of those mining archives was less to produce objective history or to fairly assess the merits of accusations against individual purge targets than to extract material that supported the Chairman's views or perceptions of them. In short, by the mid-1950s, intelligence archives and history—still out of the public gaze—had become weapons and mediums of purges rather than vehicles of truth and scholarly resources.

The political abuse of intelligence history reached unprecedented

heights during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76). Virtually every senior cadre who fell was accused of being a “renegade and traitor,” particularly if their pre-1949 careers had involved contact with Kuomintang, Japanese, or collaborationist officials. Intelligence and security cadres were particularly vulnerable to charges that they consorted with the enemy when acting as case officers, penetrations, or runners of double-agent cases that had involved passing genuine intelligence to the other side.

Chaos mounted, and in March 1967, the Investigation Department of the CCP Central Committee (ID/CCP, then China's civilian intelligence service) was placed under military control. It was absorbed by the military intelligence service two years later. ID/CCP secretary-general and de facto chief, Zou Dapeng committed suicide with his wife (herself a senior intelligence cadre) in April 1967 rather than face the kind of interrogation he had endured during the 1943 counterespionage campaign about his participation in operations in northeast China.¹⁴

Ironically, the history-based assault against the ID/CCP's leadership was led by Kang Sheng, who had headed the Party's intelligence and security apparatus between 1939 and 1946, only to be relieved of that command and stripped of other key posts once Mao and his senior colleagues realized the damage Kang had done to party unity with his overzealous direction of the 1943 campaigns.¹⁵

In Shanghai—a key center of the CCP's wartime intelligence offensive against the Kuomintang and Japanese and a major attack base for operations against western targets after 1949—over 1,000 PSB cadres

were placed in custody and 147 murdered during investigations of their past conduct. The principal allegations against them were that they had conspired to conceal key issues and protect the guilty during the earlier Yang Fan and Pan Hannian purges or that they had abused their access to pre-1949 police archives to assemble a “black intelligence dossier” on the conduct of Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, during her time in Kuomintang custody in 1934. Perhaps most bizarrely, it was claimed that history proved the PSB cadres were guilty of subverting Shanghai’s post-1949 counterespionage defenses in the interests of the so-called “Japanese Special Service Clique,” the “Collaborationist Police Bureau Underground Party,” the “Soviet Revisionist Special Service Group,” and/or the “Shielding the Hidden US-Chiang Kai-shek Organization Group.”

Once again, distortion of the slim historical record and the retrospective imposition of current political values onto past intelligence conduct was the order of the day. Intelligence archives and the few in-house histories that had been researched and written after 1949 were ransacked for evidence to “prove” ahistorical allegations of past treachery against those already condemned and to identify their former associates. Politically embarrassing material about the leaders of the Cultural Revolution was destroyed.¹⁶

Hesitation, Rehabilitation, Hesitation Again

Between Mao’s death in September 1976 and a critical meeting of

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the CCP elite in late 1978, Chinese intelligence history remained in limbo, a reflection of the fact that there were much greater issues on the CCP Politburo agenda. Contrary to tabloid histories of Chinese politics in this period, there was no life and death struggle for the future of China between neo-Maoists led by Mao’s successor, Hua Guofeng, and pragmatic reformers led by Deng Xiaoping. It was agreed that the Cultural Revolution had been a bad thing, originating from Mao’s misperceptions of his colleagues’ intentions and developing into an all-out civil war with dire political, economic, and social consequences.

However, the fact that the bulk of the CCP membership had joined the party or risen in it by demonstrating fealty to Cultural Revolution policies argued against its immediate official negation. Instead, during 1976–78, the CCP leadership developed an uncomfortable rationale whereby some principles of the Cultural Revolution were defended and said to be of continuing relevance, while its negative features were attributed exclusively to the “Gang of Four” and their followers.^a

Mao’s infallibility was left publicly unquestioned for the time being for fear that to do otherwise might delegitimize the CCP; his position was protected by the claim that he had recognized the errors of the Cultural Revolution, criticized the “Gang of Four,” and would have

completed his moves against them had illness and death not intervened.¹⁷ Thus Mao’s involvement in the intelligence purges of the 1950s and the consequent attacks on senior intelligence cadres during the Cultural Revolution were left uncriticized, at least for the time being. Not surprisingly, the rehabilitation of intelligence purge victims proceeded at an extremely slow pace.

However, that situation changed significantly after unforeseen developments at a CCP leadership conference convened in late 1978 to address pressing economic policy issues. In the present context, the most significant intervention at the conference was that of Chen Yun, head of the CCP’s intelligence and security service from 1931 to 1933. A senior CCP Politburo member prior to the Cultural Revolution, Chen had earlier been discreetly exploiting his unquestionably high revolutionary status to improve the living conditions of former intelligence comrades and their dependents who had suffered during the Cultural Revolution.

Following the lead of others who had intervened to set aside the conference’s economic agenda in favor of discussing political issues, Chen dramatically called for the ashes of former Minister of Defense Peng Dehuai to be reinterred with honor in Beijing’s hallowed Babaoshan Revolutionaries’ Cemetery. Chen also demanded that the “extremely

^a Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, and the Shanghai CCP officials Wang Hongwen, Yao Wenyuan, and Zhang Chunqiao.

Chinese intelligence historiography thus became inextricably bound up with the complex process of rehabilitating cadres who had been purged in earlier years.

grave” errors of Kang Sheng during the Cultural Revolution be criticized.

Chen’s intervention was highly significant on two counts. First, it amounted to a criticism of Mao’s behavior preceding the Cultural Revolution (the Chairman had ordered Peng Dehuai dismissed in 1959), and second, it was Kang who had launched the Cultural Revolution attack on the operational records and loyalty of the ID/CCP leadership. It followed from Chen’s remarks that official intelligence history was no longer to be set in Maoist stone: if the Chairman had made a grave error in his treatment of Peng, he and his acolytes might have been equally wrong in their assessments of senior intelligence and security cadres purged before the Cultural Revolution, as Peng had been. Similarly, if Kang Sheng’s Cultural Revolution critique of ID/CCP’s leaders such as Zou Dapeng was incorrect, it followed that the official narrative of pre- and post-1949 intelligence history generated during the Cultural Revolution was in urgent need of revision.¹⁸

Chinese intelligence historiography thus became inextricably bound up with the complex process of rehabilitating cadres who had been purged in earlier years. In some instances, the initiative for rehabilitation came from above, as individual senior CCP leaders placed cases for fallen intelligence heroes onto official agendas. Chen Yun, after a careful personal examination of the historical basis for Pan Hannian’s purge in 1955, submitted a written request to the Politburo Standing


Committee in 1981 to have the case reviewed.¹⁹

In other instances, relatives of the fallen submitted petitions to individual CCP leaders and Central Committee organs. Many of these petitions were for individuals who were either dead or languishing in labor camps; the extended personal lobbying and petitioning of senior Party officials by Yang Fan’s wife to enlist support for his release from a Hubei labor camp is a classic example.²⁰

Former intelligence cadres who had been rusticated to the provinces after enduring imprisonment in jails or labor camps journeyed to Beijing to seek the support of colleagues who had survived the Cultural Revolution and attained high office. Thus, Hua Kezhi, a key operative in the

CCP’s wartime South China intelligence station, petitioned former ID/CCP deputy chief Lian Guan and Liao Chengzhi (a Central Committee member soon to join the CCP Politburo), both of whom had been aware of his role in operations based in Hong Kong and Shanghai during the 1940s. Similarly, Yun Yiqun, a journalist who had spied for the CCP inside the Japanese and collaborationist establishment in wartime Shanghai, used old press connections to win an audience with Politburo member Hu Yaobang to present his case for rehabilitation.²¹

Decisions to rehabilitate fallen intelligence cadres were not made simply on the basis of high-level recommendations or party fiat. Instead, each appeal was subject to a “cold-case” review, involving extensive trawling through archival material and interviews with surviving colleagues to establish whether or not the original purge was supported by the available historical evidence. The findings were then



Babaoshan Revolutionaries’ Cemetery in Beijing.

considered at a senior level by the intelligence and security agencies, and by the CCP Central Committee Organization (i.e., personnel) Department and its provincial branches before recommendations for rehabilitation were submitted to the relevant superior CCP body.²²

Some rehabilitations took place relatively quickly—Yan Baohang, a major wartime penetration agent who died in prison in 1968, was formally rehabilitated in January 1978, and the deceased Zou Dapeng was cleared of all charges in February 1979. However, for the majority of purged intelligence cadres, the rehabilitation process was long and occasionally contentious.

The first to benefit from rehabilitation were those who had survived the Chinese gulag after their purges in the Cultural Revolution; the cases of those who had been purged earlier or were dead were assigned a lower priority since scarce investigative resources were as much in demand to investigate those responsible for the excesses of the Cultural Revolution as the brutal treatment of its victims. The cases of those whose purges had been based on a specific directive from Mao or interpretation of his indirect musings (e.g., Pan Hannian and Yang Fan) could not be addressed properly (or safely) until the CCP Central Committee passed a resolution in June 1981 publicly acknowledging that the Chairman had made several profound errors of judgment in the years after 1949. Turf battles between different components of the CCP machine complicated access to historic archives for the case reviewers.

As rehabilitations began to gather momentum in the early 1980s, they

Countless solemn memorial meetings honored the dead. Herein lay the roots of the emergence of public intelligence history in the PRC.

culminated in the reappearance of once-purged intelligence cadres in their former units or alternative pre-retirement comfort posts. Countless solemn memorial meetings honored the dead. Herein lay the roots of the emergence of public intelligence history in the PRC. The intermediate products of the rehabilitation process for the living and the dead alike were nonpublic circular documents rescinding earlier Party and court verdicts. For the dead, formal memorial ceremony eulogies delivered by senior Party or state cadres were duly reported in the press. Circulars and eulogies were closely based on the historical record as established during the case review process, and it was these, together with memoirs by past associates of the deceased, which constituted the initial raw material for public intelligence history in the 1980s.

In parallel, intelligence history was beginning to acquire a solid research and vetting infrastructure. A Party History Research Office (*Dangshi Yanjiu Shi*) directly subordinate to the CCP Central Committee was established to set priorities for scholarly research in universities, the Academy of Social Science, and the elite Party School system, working through the Party History Research Society (*Dangshi Yanjiu Hui*) which held its inaugural meeting in mid-1980. Discussions began about improving researchers' access to archives held by the intelligence and security services, leading to some case files being transferred to relatively open-access civilian provincial-level archives.

In 1983, the Ministry of State Security (MSS) was established and assumed the functions of the ID/CCP—as well as the counterespionage functions of the Ministry of Public Security. The MSS set up a small headquarters group to stimulate the production of public and classified intelligence histories. This group eventually became the MSS's Intelligence History Research Division (*Qingbao Shi Yanjiu Chu*), publishing material under its own name and playing a custodial and prepublication vetting role comparable with that of CIA's Historical Collections Division and the Publications Review Board.

Intelligence history publications in the 1980s were mainly cradle-to-gravestone biographical studies of deceased intelligence cadres. Dominant themes in the prefaces of such works were China's moral obligation to honor the contribution of fallen intelligence heroes to the success of the communist revolution; the country's need to atone for their physical suffering during the Cultural Revolution; and/or the detailing of their experience as an inspiration to those following in their professional footsteps.

So far, so predictable, but an additional motive behind the MSS's initial support for intelligence publications was the hope that intelligence history would help the new ministry establish its reputation with post-Mao leaders who had relatively little direct personal experience with intelligence work, thus improving the chances of the MSS gaining access to diplomatic cover slots

All publications about intelligence were to be subject to strict Party leadership (i.e., censorship) to prevent unauthorized disclosure of details regarding organization, personnel, sources, and methods.

abroad and enjoying decent treatment in annual and quinquennial manpower-allocation and budget-setting exercises. More broadly, it was anticipated that public intelligence history and associated discussion of intelligence and security issues would help raise awareness of espionage and subversion threats to the PRC and provide a sympathetic operational environment for those professionally responsible for countering them.^a

However, public intelligence history was almost stillborn. In July 1980, veteran journalist Mu Xin published a short book about the activities of Chen Geng during his time as director of CCP Special Service Section (SSS) intelligence and counterintelligence operations in Shanghai between 1928 and 1931. Based on interviews with Chen (who had died in 1961) and his surviving colleagues, the book was classified for “internal circulation” (*neibu faxing*), i.e., for PRC readers only. Over 73,000 copies of the book were printed (a relatively large print-run for the times). Readers were provided a sober and detail-rich account of the operations Chen had led against hostile security agencies and of the SSS’s bloody reprisals against CCP defectors and key Kuomintang security personnel, all brought to a shuddering halt when SSS chief Gu Shunzhang defected to the Kuomintang in April 1931.²³

Though Mu Xin’s book proved to be hugely popular with its readership, reactions in the upper levels of the CCP and intelligence services were mixed. For some, public intelligence history was an indispensable moral and political component of the rehabilitation process, which honored the deceased and fallen and served the interests of the services. Others took a contrary view, arguing as their predecessors had in the early 1950s, that public intelligence history should not be encouraged lest it expose sources and methods still in use.

In the short term, this contradiction was resolved by classified circulars issued by the Central Committee General Office and Propaganda Department in 1982. These stated that although intelligence work had been an integral component of the Chinese revolution and was a worthy subject for historical research, all publications about it were to be subject to strict Party leadership (i.e., censorship) to prevent unauthorized disclosure of details regarding organization, personnel, sources, and methods. “Inappropriate” leaks in the past had produced “unhealthy” consequences at home and abroad.²⁴

As a result, later publications rich in detail were given a higher classification or were edited to remove any discussion of sources and methods deemed to have contemporary operational relevance. Access to intelligence archives was to be controlled

as before: possible if researchers were past or serving members of the intelligence community, but difficult to negotiate for academics who were not. Soon afterwards, Chinese People’s University Professor Hu Hua, the then doyen of CCP academic historians, commented in a major Party history journal that:

*Some secret Party incidents cannot be written about for the time being... we can avoid these issues and not write about them [but] pushing them to one side certainly doesn’t mean that the facts do not exist—it just means that they can’t be written down for the time being. For example, at present we can only refer in vague terms to the individuals who took part in the struggles of the SSS and to the secrets of the underground struggle—but we can’t serve it up on a plate or write it all down. Perhaps some of these affairs can be written about by the next generation.*²⁵

Creating Public Intelligence History: the Example of Pan Hannian

The production of intelligence history thus proceeded to edge in from the cold, subject to the limits set out in the Central Committee circulars. The posthumous, post-rehabilitation reconstruction of Pan Hannian’s reputation provides a classic example of the process. After an 18-month investigation of the case, a classified CCP Central Committee Notice

^a The latter factor was the explicit *raison d’être* for launching the MSS’s monthly house-journal *Guojia Anquan Tongxun* [State Security Bulletin].

was issued in August 1982 that set out and reassessed the three major charges on which Pan had been found guilty at a secret trial in 1963, eight years after Mao had ordered his detention.

Examination of contemporary documents and telegrams had proved that rather than being recruited by the Kuomintang and subsequently betraying the CCP during secret united front negotiations in Moscow and Nanjing in 1936, he had adhered throughout to the CCP's negotiating position. Second, during the Sino-Japanese War, he had met frequently with a senior Japanese intelligence officer and collaborationist officials, but these meetings had been approved in advance by CCP headquarters, had been reported fully by Pan and had produced well-received, strategically important intelligence.

Thirdly, Pan had overseen postwar counterintelligence operations in Shanghai that had deployed pre-1949 defectors from the Kuomintang as double agents, and he had directed deception operations with



Pan Hannian, ca. 1950s.

By the end of the 1980s, Pan had been the subject of two unrestricted book-length biographies.

captured Kuomintang agent radios to identify enemy intelligence requirements, incoming personnel, and modus operandi. These operations had required the provision of genuine intelligence to the enemy, but none of it had directly assisted the Kuomintang's damaging aerial bombing raids against Shanghai in the early 1950s, and many hostile espionage and subversion circuits had been broken.

Pan had erred by waiting until 1955 to report an unscheduled 1943 meeting with collaborationist government chief Wang Jingwei, but that had been a mistake rather than an act of treason. It followed that Pan's detention in 1955, his trial on espionage charges in 1963, and the barbaric treatment he had suffered in prison and labor camp had been completely unjustified: Pan had been a hero of the underground intelligence war of the Chinese revolution, not one of its biggest traitors.²⁶

Like similar rehabilitation documents, the notice was classified for distribution exclusively within the CCP down to the level of county Party branches. For those intent on ensuring Pan's place in CCP intelligence history, the next step was to convert the classified text into public history. The first move was made by Politburo member Chen Yun, who directed one of Pan's former intelligence colleagues to write a memorial article that was published in November 1982 in the national Party organ *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily]. In the next month, a restricted Shanghai journal published a Pan photo-feature and no fewer than 17 articles by his former

colleagues. Such was the demand for copies that a second print-run was commissioned in January 1983. Even that proved inadequate to meet public demand, prompting the publication of two unrestricted collections of articles about Pan in 1984 and 1985.²⁷

By the end of the 1980s, Pan had been the subject of two unrestricted book-length biographies: one written by a veteran associate from the pre-1949 Shanghai underground,²⁸ the other the product of four years of research by a young postgraduate whose interest had been piqued by the August 1982 Central Committee Notice. As a junior civilian cadre, he had been unable to access official intelligence archives, but—backed by senior members of a Shanghai CCP Committee group working on the post-rehabilitation welfare of those once jailed for being members of the alleged “Pan Hannian Counter-Revolutionary Clique”—he was able to interview several of Pan's relatives and former intelligence colleagues.²⁹

In the final shot of the opening salvo of intelligence history publications about Pan, in 1991 the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) published a qualitatively superior biography by an MPS cadre with formal access to intelligence archives. For the first time, accounts of past operations were presented in fine detail. No attempt was made to conceal the fact that intelligence-led assassination operations were as much a feature of the CCP intelligence service's early years as the gathering of secret information about Kuomintang political and mil-

By the time the centenary of Pan's birth in 2006, he had been the subject of almost 20 book-length studies, countless articles, and a TV serial dramatization of his life.

itary intentions. The targeting, recruitment, and running of human sources was presented not in simplistic terms but as a complex process often involving necessary contact with those whose profiles were anything but pro-CCP.

Fair regard was given to the difficulties of intelligence cadres operating alone in the field, and descriptions of operations were linked explicitly to the CCP's intelligence requirements and to the product that had flowed from them. Most significantly, the book addressed, albeit obliquely, the role of senior CCP officials from Mao downwards who had criticized Pan's leadership of intelligence operations and his occasionally undisciplined responses to political issues of the day.³⁰

Nonetheless, the door to public intelligence history was only partly open: rather than being available for open sale to Chinese and foreign readers alike, the book was classified for distribution to political-legal cadres only and printed in limited numbers. After four years of serial plagiarism, edited, unrestricted versions of the book and its intelligence chapters were published separately in 1996, and, by the time the centenary of Pan's birth was commemorated in 2006, he had been the subject of almost 20 book-length studies, countless articles, and a TV serial dramatization of his life.

As statues in Pan's honor were unveiled in Shanghai and his home county, and schools were renamed in his memory, all that was lacking was

the production of a Felix Dzerzhinsky/Richard Sorge-style postage stamp to celebrate his contribution to CCP intelligence. And as Pan's rehabilitation and record became public, so the rehabilitation of his former intelligence colleagues and the agents he had run followed, sparking a secondary wave of public historical studies of their careers and those of other intelligence giants who had fought on the "hidden front."³¹

Intelligence Histories, 21st Century-Style

Intelligence history sells well in China. Most weekly TV schedules include at least one documentary or racy drama on the subject, and popular interest has sparked a deluge of "noodle-stall" accounts comparable to the wave of ill-sourced "airport-bookstall" versions of US and UK intelligence history—written by journalists and parahistorians—that emerged in the 1970s and shows no signs of abating.³²

These and the often sensationalist blogs of Chinese cyberspace offer little to serious scholars (Chinese or western), who can turn more confidently and easily to a wide range of scholarly books, journals, and institutional websites for biographies, memoirs, operational case studies, reference aids, and reproductions of archival documents that have emerged over the last 30 years. Recent suggestions that China has never contributed to the literature of intelligence and that "there is no tradition of retirees publishing their memoirs, of senior officers recalling

their triumphs...or of government agencies declassifying documents and making archival material available to historians" are patently incorrect.³³

As indicated above, the products of rigorous research and the recording of oral intelligence history are protected by a formal system intended to ensure that sources and methods are shielded and that publications conform with official assessments of past and current political norms. At the lowest level, publications are classified for open sale to all or for sale only to PRC nationals. Above that level, publications are restricted for circulation only to those working in the political-legal occupational sector (*xitong*), a low-level classification very roughly equivalent to those held by people working inside the Beltway or the Westminster Village.

At the next highest level, publications are available only to employees of the agency concerned and to favored historians. In this category, books and periodicals sometimes appear without colophons and are over stamped with markings indicating that they must be kept in safe custody at all times and not be copied, passed to others, or cited in unrestricted publications. Fortunately, open distribution publications far outnumber the other varieties.³⁴

Most obviously, there is much in current PRC intelligence history for students of the dynamics of the Chinese revolution, the early years of the PRC, and the ways in which intelligence practice reflected and contributed to the differences within the CCP leadership about how to

achieve regime goals. In addition, Chinese intelligence historians have thrown much fresh light on hitherto vague or unknown aspects of international intelligence history. Examples abound.

- It is now possible to chart Richard Sorge's recruitment and deployment of Chinese nationals during his Shanghai posting, thanks to a memoir by his principal Chinese assistant.
- The obscure circumstances of the arrest of the GRU's Maxim Rivosh (a.k.a. Joseph Walden) in 1935 and the damage that resulted are now explained.
- A significant addition to the history of World War II has emerged in biographical studies of Pan Hannian and Yan Baohang, a Chongqing-based penetration agent, who together obtained predictive human intelligence about BARBAROSSA and Japan's Pacific intentions; the information was passed to the Kremlin, prompting a letter of thanks at the time and posthumous awards to Yan and members of his network by Russia's ambassador to China in 1995.
- Histories of the so-called US "intelligence failure" that preceded the attack on Pearl Harbor must now incorporate findings that the Kuomintang SIGINT effort had decrypted enciphered Japanese messages indicating the likelihood of the attack and that those details were passed to the United States by the Nationalist defense attaché in Washington on Chiang Kai-shek's direct orders. Furthermore, it seems possible that a CCP penetration in the Kuomintang

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SIGINT unit passed the Japanese take onward for transmission via CCP headquarters to the Kremlin.³⁵

- Histories of CCP underground and intelligence activities in the postwar years suggest that the US Military Advisory Group was penetrated by no less than seven locally-engaged staff who were secret CCP members (a profile reminiscent of that of the infamous Larry Wu-tai Chin).
- The liaison between US Ambassador John Leighton Stuart and the CCP during the abortive postwar CCP-Kuomintang mediation effort was not merely one of his former Yanjing University students—he was also a CCP intelligence cadre who had worked for the GRU in China for 15 years.
- A biography of a former Shanghai PSB deputy bureau chief provides much collateral for overt contemporary reporting about the Hugh Redmond case and the neutralization of External Survey Detachment 44, CIA, SIS, and Kuomintang intelligence case-work in early 1950s China, providing names of hostile agents and case officers, and describing how they were detected and the product of their interrogations.

Nonetheless, there are problems for producers and readers alike in current PRC intelligence history practice. PRC intelligence historians of any worth find themselves plagiarized in print or their findings

extracted without attribution on Internet sites. Sometimes, as indicated above, they are unable to cite the source documents for their findings, and when the product of their research is pirated and represented as original, it can easily be misread as substantiation by readers new to the field. The Chinese legal system offers little protection against plagiarism, and intelligence historians who challenge official Party verdicts have been threatened with legal action for defamation by the descendants of their subjects.

Another problem arises from the operational codes of wartime intelligence work and the oral origins of much recently published intelligence history. The reporting delivered by intelligence cadres working in the wartime field often existed only in oral form until it was relatively high up the communications chain to headquarters. Clandestine radio facilities destroyed tasking documents and intelligence reports once they had been received or transmitted. As discussed above, the collection of archival material and, especially, oral history was disrupted severely by the intelligence purges of the 1950s and the Cultural Revolution.

Consequently, much of the raw material of CCP intelligence history generated in the last three decades is in the form of transcripts of oral reminiscences by veteran intelligence cadres. Inescapably, they are elderly men and women, sometimes with faded or distorted memories. Some were held in solitary confine-

The pride of some intelligence veterans in recounting their experiences and at last receiving recognition is manifest in many memoirs, but others have refused to confide anything.

ment, especially during the Cultural Revolution, for so long that they lost the power of speech. Others could not recognize even their immediate families or had developed various psychoses from which recovery was incomplete.

The pride of some intelligence veterans in recounting their experiences and at last receiving recognition is manifest in many memoirs, but others have refused to confide anything about their past work to historians or even close family members on the grounds that what was once secret should always remain so. Some have declined to meet MSS or MPS researchers because they want nothing more to do with a system that treated them so badly. And it goes without saying that some have an agenda of self-justification or aggrandizement. Thus, as Philip Davies argued in 2000, no single source, orally-based or not, should be considered definitive: triangulation is as necessary a component of intelligence research and reading in the Chinese context as in any other.³⁶

An additional problem, familiar to historians of western or Warsaw Pact intelligence and security services, is the difficulty of gaining access to official intelligence archives. Compared to the sheer volume of archival material now available in the United States, PRC intelligence archives are relatively small, for the historical reasons considered above. Recent works demonstrate that established professors and postgraduate students working in academia

have more difficulty gaining archival access than do cadre historians employed by “the relevant departments” (*youguan bumen*), i.e., the intelligence services themselves.³⁷

Like their western counterparts, the Chinese intelligence services are able to invoke legislation to defend nondisclosure—specifically, the 2010 PRC Protection of State Secrets Law and the State Archives Law of 1996. The latter provides that archives involving “security or vital interests” or other “unsuitable” topics are exempt from a general provision that makes PRC archives accessible after 30 years. In this way, historic “sources and methods” still considered to be relevant are protected in the same way as in the West.³⁸

The control system is imperfect, however, and some archives, particularly those related to domestic security operations, have been discovered and put to excellent analytical use by foreign scholars.³⁹ And Chinese scholars do benefit from relatively free access to reproductions by the MSS and MPS of historic archive material, collections of veterans’ memoirs, and draft histories that are judged not yet fit for open circulation or purchase by the man in the street (or by the foreign researcher). Thus, while the MSS’s monthly *Guojia Anquan Tongxun* [State Security Bulletin] carried little historical material prior to its recent closure, both the MPS and MSS have produced solid serial collections and draft histories of great value to researchers, their efforts

replicated at the provincial level by organs of both ministries.⁴⁰

High office provides no exemption from constraints in public intelligence history writing. In a recent example, former Minister of Public Security Liu Fuzhi published a memoir in 2010 containing a great deal of hitherto unknown detail about security/counterespionage operations during the years of revolution prior to 1949, his activities as a senior MPS cadre in subsequent years, and his treatment in custody during the Cultural Revolution. However, Liu’s memoir makes no mention of the purges that rocked the security elite in the 1950s or of his role in drafting policy papers which, once approved by the CCP Politburo, led to the creation of the MSS almost 30 years ago.⁴¹

Detailed discussions of the CCP’s intelligence failures and the undoubted success of the Kuomintang intelligence and security services in penetrating the CCP are extremely hard to find. Much is made of the treachery of those (such as Gu Shunzhang) who willingly allowed themselves to be debriefed after being captured by the Kuomintang, or who defected to join the Kuomintang. Absent, however, are accounts of defections in-place by CCP intelligence cadres or details of the Kuomintang’s successful counterintelligence operations against the CCP and its intelligence services, even though it beggars belief that the Kuomintang was no less energetic in its efforts than the CCP, if not as successful.

Ultimately, the most intrusive and powerful constraints on public intelligence history in China relate to cur-

rent political sensitivities. Historians may not, under any circumstances, challenge the principle that CCP leadership was a necessary condition for the intelligence successes of the past. Nor may they address the issues about Chinese intelligence methods raised by western studies of the (now relatively dated) Larry Chin and Bernard Boursicot cases, let alone cases that have not yet moved from current affairs to researchable history. Indeed, apart from some limited coverage of PRC intelligence operations in Taiwan and Hong Kong in the 1950s, there is virtually nothing to be found in openly accessible material about PRC intelligence operations outside China since 1949.^{a 42}

Some publications are driven explicitly by CCP leadership concerns about the ideological state of China's youth. Thus, a collection of biographies of heroes of the pre-1949 Shanghai underground was published in December 1989, with the hortatory aim of providing "patriotic education" material in the wake of the "counterrevolutionary turmoil" that had taken place in Tiananmen Square earlier in the year. Similarly, a study of Pan Hannian's intelligence career was published in 1996 after a senior CCP leader had decried the tendency of China's consumerist youth to identify more with the gangsters and riff-raff of China's pre-1949 past than with revolutionary intelligence heroes such as Pan.⁴³

Firm political ground rules also apply to discussion of former intelligence cadres currently esteemed or excoriated in official CCP historiog-

Ultimately, the most intrusive and powerful constraints on public intelligence history in China relate to current political sensitivities.

raphy. For example, it is perfectly proper (and accurate) to chronicle party saint Zhou Enlai's major role in the foundation of the CCP's intelligence services and his direction of their activity on many occasions during his working life. However, official accounts do not discuss his failures in judgment during the period immediately prior to SSS chief Gu Shunzhang's defection in 1931, or his explicit endorsement of the false charges against Pan Hannian and Yang Fan at a national public security conference in February 1971.

Historiography surrounding Kang Sheng—an SSS section chief from 1931 to 1933 and intelligence/security service director from 1939 to 1946—illustrates the converse case. Expelled posthumously from the CCP in 1980 for his persecution of cadres during the Cultural Revolution, he may currently only be described as something approaching the devil incarnate for his conduct in the Cultural Revolution and the 1943 counterespionage campaign. Though memoir material and histories have added several others to the list of those responsible for past persecutions of intelligence cadres, seldom indeed is there discussion of Kang's close relationship with Mao, analysis of Kang's seemingly exemplary conduct as a co-organizer of assassinations in the early 1930s, or his subsequent role directing the creation and operations of the CCP's intelligence apparatus during the Sino-Japanese War.⁴⁴

Institutional pride and a determination not to besmirch the reputation of deceased heroes also apparently account for the treatment of ex-Minister of Public Security Luo Ruiqing and other senior MPS officials in recently published intelligence histories. In Luo's case, since his 1978 death, he has entered the pantheon of CCP heroes, rightly acknowledged as one of the Cultural Revolution's principal elite victims (a failed suicide attempt in 1966 left him crippled for life). Serving as PLA chief of general staff at the time of his death, Luo is remembered as having supported Deng Xiaoping's return to office in 1977, for backing subsequent proposals for military reforms, and for lending critical PLA media support to the 1978 campaign to establish the principle that CCP policies should be formulated according to facts rather than dogma.

However, neither in a hagiographic MPS-published biography, nor in a substantial work published by one of China's major biographical publishing houses is there any mention of Luo Ruiqing's active role as Minister of Public Security in purging Chen Bo, Yang Fan, and Pan Hannian. They, too, have been rehabilitated and declared heroes of the intelligence wars but are apparently considered of lesser status, their fates an embarrassment to the Luo legacy.⁴⁵

Similar ahistorical airbrushing is evident in the treatment of Xu Jian-

^a Note the similarity between PRC and UK practice: the official history of SIS by Keith Jeffery published in 2010 to mark the service's centenary has a cut-off date of 1949.

Certainly, the volume and quality of publications now available to Chinese-reading Western researchers demands attention and can no longer be overlooked.

guo and Huang Chibo, appointed in 1952–53 on Mao's orders to serve as director and deputy director, respectively, of the Shanghai PSB and to eradicate the damage done to the bureau's counterintelligence program by an allegedly malevolent Yang Fan, working on behalf of the Kuomintang. Both Xu and Huang are now honored as intelligence and security heroes who suffered in the Cultural Revolution, and while the contemporary record leaves no doubt that both were vociferous critics of Yang's counterintelligence operations, that record is omitted from their official biographies.⁴⁶

Conclusion

At present, there is no comprehensive scholarly history of the Chinese communist intelligence services available, either in Chinese or in English. Chinese intelligence historians freely admit that they still have some way to go before they are able to complete microstudies of particular pre-1949 operations and write individual biographies that would allow CCP intelligence history to be incorporated accurately into histories of CCP leadership decision-making. However, work is well underway on building intelligence into the bigger picture of CCP urban underground work (and the military campaigns of the revolutionary years) and setting it into a theoretical framework.⁴⁷



Inevitably, some historic intelligence research material remains classified (particularly that related to post-1949 operations), but current Chinese practice is more congruent with that of western states, following the derestriction of the 1980s and 1990s rather than the “closed doorism” that prevailed in China during and immediately after the Mao era. Certainly, the volume and quality of publications now available to Chinese-reading western researchers demands attention and can no longer be overlooked. There are pitfalls in the recently constructed past, but they are not unavoidable. Perhaps, then, this history is now less of an orphan in the backyard than a colleague, long lost through no fault of his own, ready to join the international intelligence history community?

Endnotes

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5. “Zhong Gong Zhongyang Guanyu Qingbao Gongzuo De Jueding” [CCP Central Committee Resolution on Intelligence Work], 16 November 1949, a document still classified over 60 years since its promulgation.
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The Analytic Challenge of Understanding Chinese Intelligence Services

Peter Mattis

“
Clear understanding of Chinese intelligence serves more than the CI mission.
”

Introduction

Scholars of intelligence and comparative politics have tended to overlook intelligence services as bureaucratic organizations and as components of government information-processing systems. As a consequence, conventionally trained analysts and most journalists tend to overlook the role of intelligence and security services in extending and maintaining state power and international policy goals.

In the case of China, the intense focus of writers on the ups and downs of US-Chinese relations seldom leads to efforts to more deeply understand China and the sources of its government's behavior, and, in particular, the effects that Chinese intelligence services might have on that behavior. Even when journalists and other commentators address the seemingly monthly appearance of new details of Chinese human and technical espionage, analysts tend to focus on each incident as a bellwether of the US-Chinese relationship or as a straightforward counterintelligence (CI) issue.

Protecting the integrity of US intelligence and policy processes is

an important task for the US Intelligence Community, but clear understanding of Chinese intelligence serves more than the CI mission. At the core, analysis of Beijing's intelligence institutions is about trying to understand systematically how the Chinese government uses information to inform its policy formulation, guidance to diplomats and security officials, and the execution of its policies.

Just as importantly, China's civilian intelligence and security agencies are empowered to arrest and to operate inside and outside China. The distinction between intelligence and internal security policy is minimal, institutionally speaking. This makes these services not just part of a policy staff process but an integral tool for the preservation of the power of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).^{a 1} Yet, very little is known about the organizations themselves and their importance to China and its future.²

The Analytical Questions

The Chinese intelligence services (CIS) present three distinct analytic challenges critical to understanding

^a Beijing has consistently identified this goal as a “core interest” of China, indicating a willingness to use force if necessary.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

As Chinese foreign interests widen, Beijing increasingly will call upon the intelligence services.

the future of China and US-Chinese relations.

The CIS and Domestic Political Activists

First, insights into China's political future require analysis of the competition between domestic political activists and the security services. A decade ago, China's security state appeared to be eroding as modern communications technology swept across the country. Today, domestic intelligence agencies have adapted to the Internet and mobile communications and are capable of following electronic breadcrumbs left behind as people move through China's "informatized" (*xinxihua*) society. Whether the current regime stays in power or a political movement generates enough momentum for political reform will depend on how effectively China's internal security forces perform their work.

Evolution of Chinese Intelligence

The second issue to be watched is the evolution of the Chinese intelligence community, particularly on the civilian side. Internally oriented security services tend to reinforce the leadership's worst fears about potential adversaries, the United States in particular,³ and China's civilian intelligence organizations both focus on internal security.

The degree to which Beijing resolves the issues of overlapping jurisdictions—or, at least, insulates the foreign intelligence function from internal security—will help determine the tone and relative objectivity of foreign intelligence products reaching the leadership. As

Chinese foreign interests widen, Beijing increasingly will call upon the intelligence services to provide inputs to assessments of the intentions of states capable of harming China's interests abroad.

Information Processing Systems

The final challenge is evaluation of the Chinese intelligence community's information processing systems. The civilian ministries include national, provincial, and local elements, which operate under competing horizontal and vertical lines of authority. The military intelligence services under the General Staff Department compose China's only all-source intelligence capability, but the mechanics of intelligence fusion in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) are opaque.

How these agencies collect, process, and disseminate intelligence affects Chinese behavior, and, with the rise of cyberspace issues, the volumes of information are potentially staggering and difficult to manage. Knowing how this system works is a prerequisite to ensuring US leaders can be certain US statements and acts are interpreted as they were intended.

In this essay I will outline a research agenda on the Chinese intelligence services built around these three challenges, and I will suggest some of the factors that should underpin future analysis.



Fundamentals of Chinese Approaches

Before addressing the analytic questions, I will briefly address some misunderstandings of the nature of Chinese intelligence operations. Many, perhaps most, US observers of Chinese intelligence have argued that the Chinese think about and collect intelligence in ways fundamentally different from Western or even Russian intelligence.

In large measure this perception stems from Chinese attempts to acquire, legally and otherwise, Western technology information to support Chinese modernization and economic priorities. These efforts have been equated with Chinese intelligence collection and have been labeled the "mosaic" or "grains of sand" approach. Chinese intelligence, it has been argued in this context, has four basic tenets:

- Chinese intelligence focuses on ethnic Chinese as sources;
- It relies on amateur collectors rather than professional intelligence officers;
- It does not use intelligence tradecraft familiar to Western services;
- It pursues high volumes of low-grade (if not entirely unclassified) information.⁴

This view falls down on both conceptual and empirical grounds. Conceptually, both US and Chinese analysts describe intelligence in similar terms—a specialized form of knowledge for reducing uncertainty during decision making. Empirically, the cases linked to the Chinese intelligence services—not

Chinese writings on intelligence bear remarkable similarity to familiar US definitions of intelligence functions and goals.

simply the illegal activities of Chinese nationals or companies—demonstrate that professional Chinese intelligence officers use familiar tradecraft in formalized intelligence relationships with their sources. Additionally, cases are not limited to ethnic-Chinese whatever their nationality.^{a 5}

Chinese Doctrine

Chinese writings on intelligence bear remarkable similarity to familiar US definitions of intelligence functions and goals. Sun Tzu taught that “foreknowledge” (*xianzhi*) allowed commanders to outmaneuver opponents. More modern definitions range from “activating [catalytic] knowledge” (*jihuo zhi-shi*) to information to protect national security, domestic stability, or corporate interests in a competitive environment.⁶

Chinese military scholars today frame intelligence as a distinct subset of knowledge, defined by its relevance to decision makers and a competitive environment. Specifically, intelligence is transmittable (*chuandi xing*) and is knowledge that satisfactorily (*manzu xing*) resolves a specific decision-making problem.⁷

Empirically, Chinese intelligence officers consistently have demonstrated the use of widely practiced professional tradecraft, having successfully exploited for political and military intelligence purposes agents

with vulnerabilities familiar to anyone who follows the subject. The use of such tradecraft goes back to the most famous early known cases, Larry Wu-Tai Chin and Bernard Boursicot (M. Butterfly). The former began in the 1940s and latter in the 1960s.

Similar techniques have been applied in more recent cases—Gregg Bergersen, Chi Mak, James Fonden, and Tai-Shen Kuo. These revolved around a single Chinese intelligence officer, and possibly a second.⁸ Each of these sources was paid for sensitive information and all were aware of an intelligence relationship.

Consequences of the Conventional View

Misapprehension of Chinese intelligence practices has consequences. Most basically, the “mosaic” or “grains of sand” concepts fail to guide the organization, prioritization, and execution of CI efforts against Chinese national and corporate intelligence threats because the concepts do not differentiate between the varied Chinese collectors and their motivations as well as their varied signatures and risks to the United States:

- **The “mosaic” concept does not help clarify what aspects of Chinese information and tech-**

nology collection are important, whether the collection is linked to Chinese intelligence services or not. If “Chinese intelligence” includes everything from the intelligence services to a corporation to a criminal entrepreneur, then the term becomes almost meaningless.^b

- A belief that the Chinese rely on amateur operatives risks leading CI professionals to dismiss or be inattentive to the threat posed by China’s professional services.⁹
- **When economic espionage with no connection to the Chinese intelligence services is interpreted as “Chinese intelligence,” less attention will be paid to what those organizations actually do. The Chinese intelligence services and the Chinese defense industries are distinct entities, although they may sometimes work for mutual benefit.**
- **The “grains of sand” concept focuses analytic attention on the CI risk individuals pose rather than on government intelligence services.**

Still, it should be borne in mind that while the evidence shows that Chinese and US intelligence con-

^a The Chinese intelligence services have balanced finding targets with access and sources able to travel back-and-forth to China. That many of these individuals were ethnically Chinese is a function more of opportunity than intent, because China-based case officers have run most known Chinese operations. Moreover, many of Beijing’s intelligence targets are, in fact, ethnically Chinese, such as Taiwan and overseas dissident groups—where foreigners are targeted, the results are cases like Boursicot’s and Glenn Shriver’s.

^b After the Congressional investigation into the Chinese espionage scandals of the 1990s, the committee tried to warn future analysts to be clear in their distinctions. The Cox Committee’s final report admonished that “those unfamiliar with Chinese intelligence practices often conclude that, because intelligence services conduct clandestine operations, all clandestine operations are directed by intelligence agencies. In the case of [China], this is not always the rule.”

What Beijing really appears to be aiming for is creation of the capacity to create a panoptic state.

cepts and methods may not be too far apart, intelligence organizations operate in the service of national policy. The needs and priorities of decision makers guide the activities of intelligence services and their operations.

Beijing and Washington are engaged in dramatically different competitions that need active intelligence support. For example, counterterrorism in both countries focuses on noticeably different problems. US intelligence agencies primarily are concerned with terrorists abroad and their efforts to go operational within the United States.

China, by contrast, confronts domestic terrorists that apparently have relatively fewer foreign links. The operational challenges related to collecting intelligence on these essentially different terrorist threats produce different kinds of intelligence activity. Observers should be careful not to go too far in describing the similarities between the two systems, especially given the differing cultures and ways of thinking.¹⁰

The Challenges

Thinking of China's intelligence services as bureaucratic organizations raises questions of what functions they serve as part of the state's administrative apparatus and how well they perform those functions. Below, I will outline what I believe are the three principal analytic challenges to understanding the Chinese intelligence services and their relationship to the future of China and US-Chinese relations.

1. Assessing China's Internal Security Apparatus

Informed assessments of the capabilities and performance of China's internal security system may not have direct payoffs in terms of immediate US policy goals, but they are key elements in evaluations of China's stability—in turn a key factor in a number of US strategic interests in Asia. Analysis of China's internal security forces is the first step toward a net assessment of the competition between China's political reformers and its governing apparatus. While the United States may not wish to influence this contest directly, US policymakers should be aware of its progress and the viability of Chinese opposition.

For at least the past 15 years, China has appeared precariously unstable; various sources have noted mounting unrest—now well over 100,000 “mass incidents” per year.¹¹ Reports and photographs of violent demonstrations in various places have given rise to analysis that “Beijing's control over the coercive system, as well as that system's capacity to maintain social control, appears to be slipping.”¹²

Since that assertion was published in 2001, Beijing has reinvigorated its coercive apparatus. As the Chinese citizenry gained access to the Internet and mobile communications, the authorities have increased their investment in internal security. According to press reports, State Council budget figures for 2010 and 2011—even if not broken out by agency—show that the expenditures on internal security systems have

outpaced the cost of China's dramatic military modernization, coming in at \$95 billion compared to \$92 billion in 2010 and up to \$111 billion for 2012.¹³

Following several years of local-level experimentation with intelligence-led policing, State Councillor and Minister of Public Security (MPS) Meng Jianzhu announced the nation-wide adoption of “public security informatization” (*gong'an xinxihua*) at an MPS conference in 2008. “Public security informatization” refers to the process of integrating information more closely into police operations, including both domestic intelligence gathering and information management components.

On the former, the MPS directs its officers to focus on collecting information about potential social disturbances. The most well-known example of the latter is the Golden Shield project, which is primarily about linking a variety of national- and local-level databases with personal information collected from hotels, phone companies, and other businesses that require true-name registration. This data then can be aggregated and used to generate tasking for police stations automatically when a person-of-interest turns up in that jurisdiction.¹⁴

What Beijing really appears to be aiming for is creation of the capacity to create a panoptic state, a capacity that goes beyond what normally is thought of as domestic intelligence. In the CCP's leading journal, China's senior leader responsible for security and stability, Zhou Yongkang, laid out the desired “social management system” (*shehui guanli tixi*), which he said would include integrating MPS

intelligence with public opinion monitoring and propaganda to shape people's decision making about appropriate actions in the public sphere.¹⁵

Since the publication of Zhou's article, the MPS has launched two new efforts to change the level of its public engagement. On 27 September 2011, the MPS formally approved a nationwide policy for public security elements' use of microblogs to spread a ministry perspective and inform Chinese citizens about safety concerns.¹⁶ In December 2011, the MPS also pushed police officers out of their stations as part of a campaign to win over the hearts and minds of the Chinese people—and to monitor public opinion.¹⁷

The idea of information control has deep roots in Chinese strategic thought and may provide insight into how Beijing is acting on its domestic ambitions. Beginning with Sun Tzu, Chinese strategists have envisioned a seamless web of counterespionage, information collection, agent provocateurs, and propagandists—what Sun Tzu called the “divine skein.”¹⁸

Intelligence as information to support decision making is only one part of the overarching idea of achieving information superiority. For example, modern PLA strategists divided strategic information operations into multiple categories including manipulation of adversary decision making, intelligence and offensive counterintelligence, and efforts to erode or destroy an opponent's sensors, both human and technical.¹⁹

The question is whether these ideas permeate internal security and

The idea of information control has deep roots in Chinese strategic thought.

how far the MPS and MSS go in attempting to draw out potential dissidents—not just identifying already active subversive elements.²⁰

The MPS rejuvenation fits within a broader strategy of localizing grievances while preserving the legitimacy of the central government in Beijing.²¹ The visible signs that this strategy is working include examples of protestors in Guangdong Province, who, despite their problem with corrupt local officials, still appealed to Beijing.²²

The potential ability to track millions of people and register their communications would support this strategy by making it easier to follow activists and malcontents wherever they go, physically and virtually. People like the lawyers Chen Guangcheng and Gao Zhisheng, artist Ai Weiwei, and authors Chen Wei, Yu Jie, and Liu Xiaobo are dangerous because they draw attention to systemwide grievances and directly challenge the CCP's role in perpetuating official abuse.²³

The final question about the MPS and related security offices is what is their degree of political influence. Do the internal security forces merely execute policy or are they intimately involved in its creation—and, consequently, in CCP policymaking and strategy formulation? Little open-source material—other than published career information and public leadership functions—help in analyzing this question.

The largely unchronicled rise of the MPS during the past decade sug-

gests Meng and his predecessor Zhou Yongkang are largely responsible for reforming the MPS and raising the profile of “social management” and “preserving stability.”

Yet despite the growing importance of the CCP's efforts to monitor and shape an increasingly contentious Chinese society,²⁴ nowhere can be found a public profile of either of these two men that analyzes their impact on policy or the organizations they oversee.

2. Evolution of the Chinese Intelligence Community

While analysts of Chinese intelligence activities often invoke China's long history of espionage, the Chinese intelligence community as currently constituted is less than 30 years old. While culture matters, institutions are affected by much more—including incentives, leadership attention, and measurements of performance. Assessments of developing bureaucratic and political relationships may be difficult, even impossible, using only open-source material, but clearer understanding of them will help US intelligence and policymakers understand the conflicting interests that will shape the Chinese intelligence apparatus and its contribution to Chinese policymaking, especially as Beijing's interests abroad grow and create new bureaucratic space and possibly greater influence for the intelligence service most able to respond to leadership needs.

Since its creation in 1983, the Ministry of State Security (MSS) has

Recent developments suggest Beijing may be placing more emphasis on the MSS and other intelligence services to develop more capable foreign intelligence capabilities.

fought to carve out its operational and policy space from the Ministry of Public Security. When Beijing created the MSS, it fused the remnants of the CCP's Investigation Department with the intelligence- and counterintelligence-related components of the MPS.

The first minister of state security had been a senior vice minister of public security. Thus, the MSS lacked a distinct identity, drawing as it did from several organizations that were still in the process of reconsti-

tuting from the chaos of the Cultural Revolution (1966–76).²⁵

Recent developments suggest Beijing may be placing more emphasis on the MSS and other intelligence services to develop stronger foreign intelligence capabilities. The first sign was the selection of Geng Huichang as the new MSS chief in a ministerial shakeup in August 2007. Geng became the first minister with a foreign affairs, rather than internal security, background. He reportedly served as a professor at the MSS-affiliated Beijing International Relations Institute and as a scholar, and later director, at the MSS think tank, the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations.²⁶

A second sign is the emergence since 2008 of PRC intelligence operations conducted entirely outside of China. Until then, no exposed Chinese espionage case occurred without operational activity inside China—that is, no operation occurred without a physical connection to China. The Swedish first identified the new approach in 2008, when they uncovered Chinese intelligence officers in the Chinese embassy in Stockholm who had recruited a Uyghur émigré to spy on fellow émigrés in Europe and beyond. The Germans may have identified the second, alleging the existence of a spy ring run by a Chinese intelligence officer out of the Chinese consulate in Munich in 2009. Last year a case involved the Taiwan Army's director of telecommunications and electronic information, who was recruited in Bangkok.²⁷

Understanding is also needed of the role of military intelligence (especially 2PLA) in any competition for shares of the state budget and for influence within the central leadership. Chinese military modernization, especially the PLA's development of precision-guided weaponry, has created a new need for timely tactical intelligence—targeting and data guidance, as well as information to guide bomb damage assessments, for example.²⁸ While 2PLA has been known as “China's CIA,”²⁹ the military's need for more intelligence support would have created pressure for 2PLA to focus more on military requirements rather than national policymakers.³⁰

Chinese policymakers—with the exception of two civilian members of the Central Military Commission—can exercise little direct influence over the PLA. Thus the PLA's intelligence needs could lead it to monopolize intelligence resources or underinvest in capabilities that might otherwise go to meet the requirements of the central leadership. If PLA intelligence resources become more internally directed, as suggested by senior personnel appointments,³¹ then Beijing may lose an alternative to the internally oriented civilian security and intelligence apparatus.

A second factor to be understood is the degree to which bureaucratic inertia and the influence of the internal security elements of the Chinese intelligence and security apparatus affect developments. The civilian organizations, the MPS and MSS, report to the political-legal system (*zhengfa xitong*) overseen by Zhou Yongkang, who also sits on Politburo Standing Committee. His portfolio emphasizes preserving internal stability (*weihu wending gongzuo*)

Chinese Intelligence and Security Services^a

Civilian

Ministry of State Security (MSS)
Counterespionage and Counterintelligence; Foreign Intelligence; Domestic Intelligence

Ministry of Public Security (MPS)
National Police; Domestic Intelligence;

Military

Second Department of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department (2PLA)
Foreign Intelligence; Defense Attaché System; Imagery Intelligence; Tactical Reconnaissance

Third Department of the PLA General Staff Department (3PLA)

Signals Intelligence

^a Other major intelligence and security departments not specifically discussed in this essay include the Fourth Department of the PLA General Staff Department (4PLA); the Liaison Office of the PLA General Political Department; the intelligence departments of the PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, and Second Artillery; and the State Secrecy Bureau.

and, according to the Hong Kong press, Zhou does not sit on any of the foreign policymaking bodies, such as the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG).³² The minister of state security only gained an FALSG seat in 1998.³³

Both civilian ministries also have substantial portions—probably the majority—of their personnel in provincial departments or local bureaus, which report to the provincial and local party committees in addition to their home ministries. Foreign affairs however are not handled at the subnational level, encouraging these local MPS and MSS units to focus on provincial, rather than national, concerns like internal stability.

3. Understanding the Chinese Intelligence Processing System

If US policymakers hope to shape the way China exercises its growing influence in the world,³⁴ they will require clear understanding of how Chinese intelligence interprets official US statements and intelligence about the United States its services collect and evaluate. Will information the United States purposefully transmits reach China's senior civilian and military decision makers? How it is interpreted will depend on the biases and underlying assumptions about the United States that each of the services have, subjects we know little about. Without answers to such questions the risk will be high that US statements and actions will be misinterpreted.

In part the answers to such questions lie in understanding the ideo-

It is highly likely that whatever reaches the top will have been influenced by local procedures and biases.

logical and political prisms through which Chinese officials at multiple levels view the United States. In part the answers lie in the institutional frameworks through which intelligence about the United States flows and the ways in which the Chinese manage intelligence derived from the new digital world of large data.

Institutional Frameworks

China, like the United States, has separate civilian and military organizations, but it also has components of national security and intelligence distributed throughout provincial and, in some cases, lower levels. This is true both for civilian ministries, which have provincial and lower level bureaus, and for PLA intelligence organizations. An excellent military example is the Third Department of the PLA's General Staff Department (3PLA). The 3PLA—responsible for signals intelligence, computer network reconnaissance (cyber), and technical countermeasures—has offices and technical reconnaissance bureaus in each of China's seven military regions and several major cities,³⁵ and it is likely that the Chinese services have their own training and procurement units in these areas. If so, it follows that regional differences in performance and equipment will exist throughout the PLA's intelligence organizations.³⁶

With multiple levels between the sources of intelligence and China's leadership, it is highly likely that whatever reaches the top will have

been influenced by local procedures and biases.³⁷ Understanding how each of China's intelligence organizations processes reports, identifies important issues, and validates information will be key to understanding how Chinese perceptions are shaped.^a ³⁸ Even if understanding these processes does not provide the insights British signals intelligence did into German intentions, it forms the beginnings of serious assessment and awareness.

A related question is to what extent are institutional and procedural biases reflected in the public writings of Chinese intelligence-affiliated analysts. Examples are the works of analysts at the military intelligence-run China Institute of International and Strategic Studies and the MSS-run China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations.³⁹ Are their writings useful in understanding how PLA and MSS intelligence analysts filter and interpret world events and foreign intentions?

Large Data Processing

The reported scale of China's hacking activities suggests terabytes of data may be finding their way to Chinese intelligence organizations.⁴⁰ What happens to the data there remains unknown. The intricacy of China's civilian and military security and intelligence organizations and the variety of services they are presumed to provide to a multitude of government organizations make it

^a Students of deception basically come to the same conclusions about what makes deception—influencing an adversary to make disadvantageous decisions by denying or supplying information—function well. Would-be deceivers need time, control over their own information, channels through which pass information, and the ability to monitor the adversary's thinking and behavior.

Ferretting out of internal, generally secret, processes may seem irrelevant to national policy or the daily diplomatic and commercial relations, but it is no less important for analysts and policymakers to understand.

difficult, if not impossible, to examine solely through open sources.

Key questions include how will the Chinese take on the challenge of processing vast amounts of data that human beings, even in the large numbers Chinese intelligence presumably could recruit, are unable to process. The challenge goes well beyond simple translation problems or conversion of data into searchable formats by organizations with different bureaucratic practices and jargon. How exploitation of such data adds value to Chinese leaders and policymakers is yet another question—one which Western services have probably not even begun to address, let alone resolve.

Conclusion

China's intelligence services have long been underanalyzed as major bureaucratic organizations and components of state power. This may have mattered relatively little during China's inward-looking and underdeveloped years. Today, its leaders are significant players on the world stage, and understanding how and what they learn about the world and how they formulate their policy choices is more important than ever.

Given the complex choices the Chinese face, it is likely that their intelligence services will play an even greater role than they have in the past.⁴¹

The intelligence and intelligence analysis challenges the Chinese face will look familiar to many US analysts:

- **Determining sources of energy and maintaining the security of delivery routes.**
- **Protecting Chinese officials and citizens working abroad.**
- **Preserving markets for Chinese goods and defense of key supply chains, among many others.**

All of these interests will put pressure on the intelligence services to be more active abroad against a wide variety of targets, both official and not. How intelligence performs missions in support of these and other goals will also serve as indicators of Chinese national policy, and possibly in some cases as indicators of independent policymaking in the services.



At the same time, understanding Chinese intelligence remains crucial to understanding the state of China's internal stability, although this topic cannot be watched solely from an intelligence perspective—the pace of economic development, indications of the PLA's loyalty to the CCP, and signs of the party's cohesion are other keys.

Recent Western misconceptions about Chinese intelligence operations and insufficient scholarly attention to intelligence organizations have limited awareness of how these institutions actually function, but, as China's influence grows and domestic unrest continues, failure to remedy these deficiencies will be to the detriment of the United States and others with similar policy perspectives.

Finally, open-source researchers are likely only to be able to establish the broad contours and systemic pressures under which Chinese intelligence operates. They may also be able to offer the questions in need of research. But much of that research involves the ferreting out of internal, generally secret, processes. That work may seem irrelevant to broad national policy or the daily blow-by-blow of diplomatic and commercial relations, but it is no less important for analysts and policymakers to understand.

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A Strategy Framework for the Intelligence Analyst

Steven M. Stigall

“
It behooves intelligence officers to know the strategic context of policymakers—the cognitive and national security framework they consciously (or instinctively) use to make policy.
”

Since joining CIA in 1985, I've had my share of “out of body” sojourns outside of the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence, my home component. These rotational jobs are critical for analysts, or any intelligence officer, to develop new perspectives. After 15 years in the trenches of what is now the Analysis Group of the CIA's Information Operations Center—interrupted by deployments in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom during 2002 and 2003—I had the opportunity to spend the past three years on the faculty of the National War College (NWC), part of the National Defense University at Ft. McNair in downtown Washington, DC.

While there I taught or attended the core courses at NWC and ran electives I created on intelligence, cyber strategy issues, and even WW I strategy. I should note here that “teachers” at NWC are called “Faculty Seminar Leaders” (FSLs). Their jobs are to leverage the combined insights and expertise of classes of a dozen senior military and civilian officers into thoughtful, informed discussions about national security topics. FSLs don't lecture as much as they listen.

This experience greatly expanded my horizons beyond the Intelligence Community (and military) and demonstrated how analysts must understand the broader context in

which senior policymakers work. As intelligence officers, we obviously must be keenly aware of the foreign issues we assess and the context of the intelligence we provide to policymakers. It also behooves us to know the strategic context of policymakers themselves—the cognitive and national security framework they consciously (or simply instinctively) use to make policy.

The National War College was formed right after WW II. Dwight Eisenhower and George C. Marshall both believed that the war had shown the critical need for the US military to plan and operate jointly. They thought the country needed a national-level war college with a more strategic focus than that provided by the individual armed services. While we take “jointness” for granted today, in the late 1940s this was a bold change in how the United States made and executed national military strategy. George F. Kennan wrote his famous “Sources of Soviet Conduct” at the National War College, which publicly outlined the basic architecture of Cold War containment strategy towards the USSR. Colin Powell and the current chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen. Martin Dempsey, are among its graduates. And CIA's own dean of intelligence analysis, Sherman Kent, served on its faculty.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

It would be useful for the intelligence analyst to know with reasonable granularity what the US agenda is—the ends, ways, and means—to a given actor, region, or issue.

NWC's goal is to develop national security strategists—leaders whose thinking and perspectives today go beyond joint, or interservice planning and operations, who think strategically and globally about US security. It emphasizes interagency or “whole of government” approaches to national strategy. NWC cultivates military officers and civilians to understand better all the instruments of national power, beyond the military, including diplomatic, economic, and intelligence. Students there also learn how factors such as chance, time, culture, and unchanging human nature can affect strategy and impact policy.

The student body is a rich mixture of about 230 senior US military, typically O-6 (colonels and navy captains) and GS15-level civilian interagency officers. Since the 1990s this mix each year has included several CIA students and a CIA faculty representative. In addition, each year over 30 foreign military officers join NWC for its nine month academic year of instruction. NWC students

are invariably “Type A” leaders, professional problem solvers who until this point in their careers have been heavily focused on operations within their fields and services. They are accustomed to “fixing things” and to running at least mid-size organizations—some considerably larger than units in the Intelligence Community.

Until this point in their careers, however, they have not often paused to think strategically and in the long-term about the US role in the world, US power, and other actors on the world stage with whom the United States must contend. Of course, this component is familiar ground for the intelligence analyst, and this is where CIA arguably provides the most value in decisionmaking.

With this as background, I've tried in the following to distill three years as the CIA faculty representative to the National War College into what one may simplistically call an “intelligence analyst's strategy framework.” The relevance of this for

intelligence officers is that some (hopefully most) of the items on this list at one time or another run through the minds of senior leaders who use our products. For the Intelligence Community's burgeoning cadre of newer analysts, I hope this will be useful framework to allow intelligence analysts to step out of their usual perspectives on intelligence.

1. “Ends, ways, and means” must be commensurate with strategy.

This is actually the first “big lesson” the National War College tries to inculcate in students. The “ends” are just that, the goals or intended strategic outcomes. The “ways” are how one implements strategy, how one executes plans. The “means” are the various instruments of hard and soft national power used to do it.

Hard power equates to overt pressure and may or may not involve the threat or actual use of military force. Soft power is more difficult to quantify. Just as Dark Matter is said to account for most of the mass in the universe, so too does soft power, in defiance of empirical metrics, account for most of what we think of as “international relations.”

If any one of these “means” is insufficient, the strategy will struggle. Note that in this formula “ends” actually come first. Before engaging any strategy, before making any plans, or thinking about resources, one must know clearly what the goal is. If one cannot clearly articulate this to the first 10 people one encounters in a shopping mall or baseball game, that person needs to go back to the drawing board and figure out what exactly he or she is trying to achieve strategically.



The National War College was established in 1946. Its earliest faculty included George F. Kennan and Sherman Kent, both strategic thinkers. (Photo: Roosevelt Hall ca. 1933. Library of Congress Digital Collection)

The intelligence officer's job is not to second-guess policymakers, nor judge whether they have adequately balanced ends, ways, and means. Nor of course does the intelligence officer provide policy recommendations. That said, it would be useful for the intelligence analyst to know with reasonable granularity what the US agenda is—the ends, ways, and means—to a given actor, region, or issue.

For example, the so-called “Powell Doctrine”—applied during the liberation of Kuwait from Iraq in 1991—called for the use of overwhelming force to subdue an enemy. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld did not embrace the doctrine for Iraq in 2003. No military analyst of that period would have worked in ignorance of the US order of battle, much diminished from that deployed in 1991, nor of the forces and objectives in Iraq with which the US force still had to contend.

2. Know the domestic context of an adversary or subject.

This is arguably the first order of business for the intelligence analyst—to put into context our subject and the domestic developments that surround it. But what is “context”? Simply put, for our purposes, context is the broad framework within which a foreign decisionmaker acts or an event or process occurs. Context is temporal and spatial. It may be a very immediate, contemporary phenomenon. It may extend no further back than yesterday and no further into the future than tomorrow. For other actors, context extends back decades or even centuries. It may refer only to a small group of actors and variables that feed a late-breaking situation. It may be tempo-

rally narrow but regionally, politically, socially, and economically broad. The strategist must know as much about these contexts as possible, and that's where intelligence officers come in.

The Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people may see as a natural process that nation's reemergence onto the world stage after their “century of humiliation,” while the United States and its neighbors react with alarm. Chinese forays into the South China Sea and beyond may have as much a domestic political context and function as an external geostrategic one.

A direct corollary of the importance of knowing a foreign actor's domestic context is that history matters. Americans may bemoan US impatience and ignorance of history. Some cultures however are prisoners of theirs. Senior policymakers and intelligence officers do not need PhDs in history, nor is history deterministic. But since those we serve make history, we must all appreciate history's role in decisionmaking, ours and our adversary's. When the West offers “carrot and stick” incentives to suspend nuclear research, Iranians retort that such an approach may be suitable for a donkey but not for a civilization that built Persepolis two millennia before the idea of a Europe even existed.

3. Never assume an adversary is a unitary, let alone rational, actor.

We should not make “Teheran” or “Iran” subjects of sentences explaining behavior or acts unless we specifically want to imply that Iran acts, or even thinks, as a unitary actor. There are powerful domestic political reasons for various factions in

Tehran to pursue nuclear research in addition to reasons related to external security.

Any organization of human beings will produce factions, and all but the most totalitarian ones must take into account the desires and reactions of these factions within their own society. Precisely because factions are susceptible to subjective drivers, we cannot expect these groups to behave entirely rationally or predictably. Thus, we must not expect such regimes always to act in their own long, or even short-term, interest, at least as we would calculate them. Conversely, we cannot expect them to have finely-tuned diplomatic or other antennae to detect and accurately interpret signals the US government may be attempting to send.

This rule also has a corollary: ***Tribalism, custom, and fear trump facts, reason, and logic most of the time.*** Political economy, for example, basically teaches that leaders make decisions and states act as they do because it is in their economic self-interest to do so. In this view, history—and the actions of current leaders—consists of a series of essentially rational decisions, conceived through careful calculation, and executed with an accountant's regard for political and economic margins, losses, and profit. The reality is that political economy is invariably a factor but not a driver in foreign decisionmaking. Most of the time, being culturally Chinese, Russian, or Iranian will be relatively more important factors in the decisions those states make and actions they take than what their economic or even security ledger sheets might suggest.

Time has eager servants. These are chance and imponderables and fog and friction.

4. Time is on no one's side for long.

Time has eager servants. These are chance and imponderables and fog and friction. Always be prepared for the services they render. Fog and friction were terms coined by military theorist Carl von Clausewitz. He wrote that war was marked by fog and friction—the opaqueness of the battlefield and the resistance of the enemy to our actions. So too are fog and friction rife in any intelligence-related dilemma. In the end, history and pundits will not judge a strategist on how well his plan succeeded but on how well he adapted it to the inevitable change that time and chance played upon his strategy. Even if time seems to work to one's advantage, random events will cause strategy to stumble. Time reveals in technical and human glitches, some as empirical as the weather or as subjective as emotion.

In intelligence, this touches upon the issue of predictive analysis. We struggle mightily to provide timely information to senior decisionmakers. We may excel at providing snapshots of ground truth unavailable from other sources, as well as its context. But that ground truth can be intensely sensitive to small changes over time and will change dramatically. Thus, we are probably on firmer ground when we identify dynamic forces and discreet actors and events that can cause a situation to deviate from a norm (or at least its current trajectory) than we are when we predict what an “end state” will be at a given point in the future.

Finally, the role of time in our analytic efforts also is related to the old

adage about “secrets” and “mysteries.” Our adversaries have secrets that we as intelligence officers attempt to steal or learn. The future however is unknown not only to us but to our adversaries as well. It is a mystery in the classic sense of the word, meaning it is largely unknowable. In this context time levels playing fields: all states and actors, no matter how rich or powerful, weak or unstable, are fairly ignorant of the future.

5. Always identify, and periodically recheck, assumptions.

Again this is familiar territory for the intelligence analyst. But intelligence professionals are not the only players in the security world who need to do this. A saying at the National War College is, “If your assumptions are wrong, nothing else will be right.” It's acceptable to have assumptions, but as any good intelligence analyst knows, they must be identified early on. Especially important is identification of “linchpin” assumptions, which, if wrong, render moot everything else thought to follow from them.

One must also periodically recheck assumptions because, time, again, will play its role in any action or process. Time, even by itself, alters what strategists in the Soviet Union used to call the “correlation of forces”—the complex balance sheets of power between states and actors. Put simply, over time, situations will change and past assumptions may become irrelevant.

Senior policymakers and intelligence professionals are probably

more averse than most to use of the word “inevitable.” It is a word heavily laden with assumptions. No war or armed clash for example is inevitable, though certainly conflict, competition, and even chaos may often be the rule rather than the exception for some regions. World War I was not inevitable, no more than is a future clash with China. But the approaching centennial of the outbreak of WW I reminds the analyst and strategist that 1914 is what happens when all pre-war assumptions are proven wrong—and there is no Plan B.

6. Have a Plan B, but remember, strategy trumps plans.

Strategy is what leaders or organizations are trying to do and where they want to go; plans are maps for getting there. Plans are not an end in themselves but means to ends. If strategy is flawed, and so problematic that it actually works against an organization's best long-term interests, then all the planning staffs in the Pentagon or around Washington's Beltway won't help.

As is often said in the military, “No plan survives first contact with the enemy.” Nonetheless, military staffs are meticulous planners, but good leaders are prepared to throw their plans out or significantly revise them at any moment. The challenge is to know when Plan A as originally conceived can no longer succeed and to be ready to adapt it when necessary.

Nor is hope a strategy. This is a lesson from Thucydides and his *History of the Peloponnesian Wars*, a foundational text at the war college. In the famous Melian Dialog, the Melians placed their survival on the hope that Sparta would rescue them or that something else would sud-

denly intervene in their favor to spare them from Athens' ruthless ultimatum. One cannot commit national power in a way that the outcome hinges on hope alone. Intelligence officers, by the way, are the enemy of hope, because it is their job to dispel the mystery and ignorance that can lead a strategist to rely on hope rather than on facts and critical assessment.

Intelligence officers invariably spend their days (and nights) providing policymakers with bad news. This may give the intelligence officer a reputation for being unduly pessimistic (recall former CIA Director and Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who said that when he saw flowers he wondered for whose funeral they were gathered).

7. Thucydides was right: States go to war for only three reasons: fear, honor, or because (their leaders believe) it is in their interest to do so.

This maxim of war has pretty much stood the test of 23 centuries. Countries go to war because a foreign actor has made their leaders or people afraid, or because they are afraid not to go to war. They go to war because it would be shameful not to go to war. Or they go to war because they decide that at that moment it is simply in their best interest to do so.

Of crucial importance is the realization that the character of war constantly changes but its nature never has. War is about hurting and killing people and damaging and destroying property. That is its eternal nature. How we defend ourselves from other tribes—usually driven by technical and economic factors—is in constant change. That is its character. For this reason alone we should

Advances in weapons technologies and in military and societal organization and governance do not spread evenly through time and space; asymmetries emerge, plateau, or even dead-end.

refrain from casual references to war, such as “war on poverty,” “war on drugs,” or “cyber war.” This most basic of concepts is not a trivial academic exercise. Intelligence officers must recognize that at this moment a significant debate stirs in the US military about the proper way to defeat a guerilla insurgency—whether one “wins” this kind of war by the traditional, kinetic means of killing insurgents or by eliminating the socioeconomic conditions that spawn and grow them.

There is a corollary to this rule: No state has ever started a war in anticipation of a long struggle of attrition. States that start wars invariably assume the war will be a short one. The only exception to this may be when a state decides to sponsor a guerilla campaign against an enemy. These struggles by definition are protracted conflicts.

Finally, just as war's character changes, so too does its utility to states and other actors. Advances in weapons technologies and in military and societal organization and governance do not spread evenly through time and space; asymmetries emerge, plateau, or even dead-end (again, time is the final arbiter here). War may favor one actor in one generation and another in the next. Its innate violence however, derived from human nature, does not change.

8. Whatever one's strategy or plans may be, adversaries get to vote on them—and sometimes he votes before the planned move is finished.

It is acceptable for intelligence officers to inform policymakers of the likely reactions of foreign actors to US initiatives or to identify leverage points for US policymakers. But we must remember that foreign actions may also be attempts to seize the initiative in a situation and not simply reactions to US initiatives.

Because of time, the game is not always sequential and orderly, especially when an adversary acts to seize the initiative. Thus, those who carry out strategy and plans—and the intelligence officers who support them—must be wary of straight-line, linear thinking. Parts A, B, then C, and so on of a plan are not always executed sequentially. Rather, adversaries will often carry out their efforts in parallel with other actions in both time and space.

In either case, a strategist does not act in a vacuum. Nor should the intelligence officer. The other side is always in play. In an intelligence context an adversary will always try and keep his secrets from us and attempt to deceive us. He will do this passively, through denial and deception activities, and actively, through offensive counterintelligence operations.

9. Embrace complexity, uncertainty, and unpredictability.

These three factors cannot be eliminated but they can be harnessed, remembering they apply to all sides

A strategist does not act in a vacuum. Nor should the intelligence officer.

in a conflict. Complexity means the issues leaders grapple with will repel simplistic, inflexible solutions or approaches. Uncertainty paradoxically demands an actor to be decisive, to act on information or situational awareness that is imperfect or just “good enough.”

The relationship here between a senior decisionmaker and the intelligence officer is clear. Intelligence officers by definition can only provide imprecise and usually time-sensitive information to support a decision that is often designed simply to produce the fewest possible (and known) bad side effects. This is the classic definition of a dilemma: a situation in which all the options are bad in some way or another.

The danger is that uncertainty can become an excuse for inaction or delay. Unpredictability reminds us that the future is unknowable, uncontrollable, but not necessarily beyond our influence. Combined, these factors require a strategist to develop flexible and adaptive thinking and behavior. It is in this context that intelligence officers should prepare, and the policymakers use, intelligence.

Another corollary emerges: the Law of Unintended Consequences. Because of a situation’s complexity (or regardless of its apparent simplicity), no matter what intelligence tells a policymaker or what he decides, unforeseen outcomes and effects will result. This is perhaps the only instance in which the intelligence analyst should use the word “inevitable.”

Uncertainty, like time, can level the playing field between adversaries. If “X” is an unintended result of “A,” then we must ask, “unintended by whom?” It may have been equally unanticipated by both sides in a conflict.

10. Finally, it is more important to understand the question than to hasten to produce an answer.

Bureaucracies are adept at producing answers that wander in search of a question. Thus, one of the most valuable assets a strategist and intelligence officer can have is the ability and time to listen, observe, and assess. Whatever strategic issue the policymaker struggles with, no matter how perilous or mundane, he must always know the key strategy and security issues at stake. The challenge of course is that during crises, or even in the ordinary press of time, senior actors may not be as thoughtful as they are simply forced to be reactive.

Thus, for the intelligence analyst identification and understanding of the key questions that drive an issue are organic to getting right those strategic “ends” mentioned earlier. The sad truth is that if a senior policymaker doesn’t ask the right question, the answer won’t matter. Put differently, before intelligence officers give a policymaker an answer, they must be certain they are addressing the right question. Remembering this, intelligence officers may have (somewhat) more time than the policymaker to frame an issue in its proper context, to identify the key questions in play, and assess the implications of actions.

Sometimes we can address this on a tactical, even simplistic level by

making certain that as taskings come down to us through the hierarchy, the original intent of the policymaker isn’t lost in bureaucratic translations. This can be as simple as getting as close as possible to the original question the policymaker asked. But no matter how pressed for time, the intelligence officer must always pause and consider why a particular question was asked, what its context was, and most challenging of all, anticipate what the next question will be once an answer has been provided.

In conclusion, this article makes passing references to “rules,” “laws,” and “corollaries.” These word choices are of course a literary convention; nothing is assured in strategy and intelligence except for uncertainty. Typical National War College students, especially those in uniform, enter that institution having spent almost 20 years learning to identify and minimize uncertainty. They know what the fog of war is and have been promoted to senior ranks by acting decisively. They know that uncertainty and hesitation can cost lives, equipment, and missions. At the war college, they are suddenly thrust into a full-time learning regimen in which they are encouraged to expect, even embrace, uncertainty. It is an uncomfortable environment for them, some of whom will rise to multistar flag rank and lead their services.

It is in this context that I’ve offered this strategy framework for intelligence analysts. It is to remind us how senior decisionmakers (ideally) develop US national security strategy—and how our murky, uncertain world of intelligence analysis is often for them an alien environment.



Science and Technology: Origins of a Directorate

Donald E. Welzenbach

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Although the Directorate of Science and Technology was not formally established until 5 August 1963, recommendations for its creation were made almost nine years earlier, and the Directorate of Research had been created in February 1962. The suggestion that a science and technology entity was needed arose from a little-known, yet highly influential effort called the Technological Capabilities Panel (TCP), authorized by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in July 1954. The directorate's eventual formation came as a result of pressure brought to bear by another entity, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), which traces its origins to this same 1954 period. And it was the same two men in the TCP and the PFIAB who wanted such a directorate: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) President James R. Killian, Jr., and Polaroid Corporation President Edwin H. (Din) Land.

. . .

The TCP endeavor grew out of a 15 March 1953 report by the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM). This panel, which included in its membership MIT's Killian and Polaroid's Land, warned newly elected President Eisenhower about US vulnerability to surprise attack. Both Land and Killian had been associated with Air Force advisory groups since World War II. During the war, Killian, as assistant to MIT President Karl T. Compton, oversaw the administration of the nation's largest scientific endeavor, Radiation Laboratory (RadLab). At its peak, RadLab was substantially larger than the Manhattan Project. It brought together more than 20 percent of the nation's physicists and employed more than 4,000 persons. RadLab scientists refined a British invention known as radio detection and ranging, or radar, designed a 10-cm radar small enough to put aboard aircraft, developed a precision gun-laying radar, and designed a long-range navigational system known as LORAN.

During President Eisenhower's first year in office he worried about this nation's vulnerability, especially in the light of the paucity of hard intelligence about Soviet capabilities and intentions. Reinforcing his concern were the predictions of several 1950 NSC and CIA estimates that recommended the United States should be prepared to wage a global war in 1954, the so-called "year of maximum danger." Foremost among the President's concerns was the size and disposition of the Soviet Union's fleet of intercontinental BISON bombers.

To many US political and military leaders, the Soviet Union in the early 1950s appeared to be moving inexorably toward a position of parity with the United States. First, the USSR detonated an atomic device in the late summer

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

of 1949, nearly three years sooner than US experts predicted it could. Then, only four years later, in August 1953—a scant nine months after the United States did—the Soviet Union also succeeded in detonating a hydrogen device manufactured from lithium deuteride, a more advanced technology than the heavy-water method used by US scientists. Only two months before this Soviet nuclear success, an uprising in Berlin to protest the Soviet occupation was promptly crushed by Soviet troops. Even in the United Nations the Soviet bloc seemed bent on causing dissension and unrest between Western Europe and the United States and between the developed and undeveloped nations.

President Eisenhower became greatly concerned with the possibility that the Soviet Union might attempt a surprise attack against the United States after a US military attache sighted a new Soviet intercontinental bomber at Rameenskoye, south of Moscow, in mid-1953. This was the Myecheslav-4 BISON, the Soviet counterpart of the US B-52 which was only then going into production. Pictures of the BISON taken at the Moscow air show in 1954 had an enormous impact on the US intelligence community. Unlike the BULL and several other Soviet postwar aircraft, the BISON was not a “derivative” of US or British designs, but represented a “native” Soviet designing capability which surprised US intelligence experts.

In early 1954, Trevor Gardner, Air Force Secretary Harold Talbott's special assistant for research and development, learned of President Eisenhower's anxiety over the possibility of surprise attack. Gardner thought the nation's scholars could be of some help in this matter and went to see Dr. Lee DuBridge, chairman of the ODM's Science Advisory Committee (SAC), to urge him to have a group of experts meet with the President on the matter of surprise attack.¹ DuBridge arranged a plenary meeting of his group with the President on 27 March 1954 at which Eisenhower told the assembled scholars about the discovery of the Soviet BISON bombers and of his concern lest they be used in a surprise attack on the United States. Stressing the high priority he gave to reducing the risk of military surprise, the President challenged the scientists to advise him on this problem.

The President's challenge led SAC Chairman DuBridge * to ask MIT's Killian to convene a subcommittee of SAC members, many of whom lived and taught in the Boston area, to examine the feasibility of conducting a scientific assessment of the nation's defenses. Killian held this meeting at MIT on 15 April 1954. The subcommittee recommended that a task force be recruited, but stressed that it needed the expressed endorsement of the President. If approved, the task force would undertake studies in three areas of national security: Project One, offensive capabilities; Project Two, continental defense; and Project Three, intelligence, with supporting studies in communications and technical manpower.

¹ Michael R. Beschloss, *Mayday*, (New York, Harper & Row) 1986, pp. 73-74.

* DuBridge, who headed MIT's RadLab during World War II, later became science adviser to President Richard M. Nixon.

“Direct a Study”

On 26 July 1954, President Eisenhower authorized Killian to enlist such a panel of experts and to direct a study of the country's technological capabilities “to meet some of its current problems.”² Eisenhower had a great deal of confidence in Killian. Prior to his election as President, it should be recalled, Eisenhower was president of Columbia University. During his tenure there, Eisenhower came to know and respect Killian, a fellow college president who was elected to head the prestigious MIT when he was only 45 years old.

During July and August 1954, Killian organized 42 of the nation's leading scientists into the three special project areas and an additional communications working group. The various TCP groups, working under the aegis of the National Security Council, began meeting on 13 September 1954. For the next 20 weeks, until 4 February 1955, the members of the various panels met on 307 separate occasions for briefings, field trips, conferences, and discussions with every major unit of the US defense and intelligence establishments. They were made privy to all of the nation's defense and intelligence secrets as well as to the status of all on-going programs before they began drafting their final report.

The Project One group, charged with investigating US offensive capabilities, was headed by Marshall G. Holloway of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. This 10-man panel included Ruben F. Mettler from the staff of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (R&D) who later cofounded Space Technology Laboratories (STL) which subsequently became a part of the TRW Corporation.

Project Two, which investigated the nation's defensive capabilities, was headed by Leland J. Haworth of Brookhaven National Laboratory. This 12-man panel included Herbert (Pete) Scoville, Jr., then of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project who later became CIA's Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence and its first Deputy Director for Research; and Brockway McMillan, then of Bell Telephone Laboratories and later the second Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.

Project Three, whose task was to investigate the nation's intelligence capabilities, was headed by Polaroid's Din Land. It was the smallest of the three groups with only six members. In addition to Land, they were: Harvard's James G. Baker, the nation's leading designer of aerial lenses; Nobel physicist Edward M. Purcell; Joseph W. Kennedy of Washington University, St. Louis, a renowned chemist responsible for isolating plutonium; John W. Tukey of Princeton University and Bell Telephone Laboratories; and Allen Latham, Jr., of Arthur D. Little Inc., an engineer and former treasurer of Polaroid Corporation.³

The formal TCP report was published on 14 February 1955. This 190-page document, titled: *Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack*, had a momentous

² J.R. Killian, Jr., *Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower—A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology*, Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1977, p. 68.

³ *Technical Capabilities Panel Report, Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack*, 14 Feb 55, Top Secret—Restricted Data. The entire report was downgraded to Secret on 18 June 1973. Then, in 1975, more than three-quarters of the report was declassified and it has since been cited by a number of scholars writing on the topic of nuclear strategy and defense.

impact on the US Government during the next two decades. The TCP recommendations were responsible for great changes in the US defense and intelligence communities. At the outset, the *TCP Report* noted: "We obtain little significant information from classical covert operations inside Russia We cannot hope to circumvent these elaborate (Soviet security) measures in an easy way. But we can use the ultimate in science and technology to improve our intelligence take."⁴

The importance that President Eisenhower attached to this report was apparent in the issuance, on the very day of its publication, of National Security Council (NSC) action No. 1355, requiring all executive departments and agencies of the government to comment on the TCP recommendations by 6 June 1955. DCI Dulles assigned overall coordination for this effort within CIA to his new assistant, Richard M. Bissell, Jr., who, along with the DDCI, Lieutenant General Charles P. Cabell, USAF, assigned action to suitable Agency officers for each paragraph on which the Agency had to comment.⁵

The TCP intelligence panel saw the need for "a research program producing a stream of new intelligence tools and techniques." It felt that existing groups within the intelligence community were too small and too heavily burdened with specific requirements in support of field operations. The Project Three panel found such efforts "not appropriate for broad, fundamental, and imaginative research in intelligence techniques," and went on to propose "a new laboratory facility where broad fundamental research in intelligence can be conducted."⁶

CIA, in responding to specific TCP recommendation C 3, which urged "adoption of a vigorous program for the extensive use, in many intelligence procedures, of the most advanced knowledge in science and technology," stated that it had "created a permanent Advisory Board, composed largely of former members of the Technological Capabilities Panel, to advise the Director and to supplement existing activities."⁷ In subsequent years, this advisory unit, known officially as CIA's Scientific Advisory Board, came to be referred to as the "Land Panel," because Land chaired it for almost a decade. Its membership included the six men on the Project Three panel plus Jim Killian and Jerome B. Wiesner, professor of electrical engineering at MIT and Killian's successor as MIT president. Administratively, the Land Panel was attached to the DCI's Special Assistant for Planning and Coordination, Dick Bissell.⁸

The Land Panel was destined to exert great influence on the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, especially in the field of overhead collection, but in other fields as well.

⁴ *TCP Report*, p. 188.

⁵ Memo from AD/SI Chadwell to AD/C1 dated 1 Apr 55.

⁶ *TCP Report*, p. 145.

⁷ *Comments on the Report to the President by the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee*, NSC 5522, 8 Jun 55, Annex C, Tab A, p. A51.

⁸ CIA Notice 1-110-6 of 12 May 55, HS/HC-435.

Roots of PFIAB

While the TCP effort was being organized, a four-man Special Study Group, authorized by President Eisenhower and chaired by General James H. Doolittle (USA, Ret.), completed its investigation of CIA's clandestine operations being carried out by the Directorate of Plans, forerunner of the Directorate of Operations. Doolittle was concurrently deputy director of Killian's TCP endeavor. Doolittle's Special Study Group report, issued on 30 September 1954, recommended that a committee of civilians be appointed to oversee the CIA. No action was taken on this matter until more than a year later, on 15 November 1955, when DCI Dulles resurrected the suggestion in a letter to President Eisenhower.

For several years, Montana Senator Mike Mansfield had introduced resolutions calling for a joint congressional "watchdog" committee for the CIA. Because the Doolittle report made a similar suggestion, the Mansfield resolution picked up senatorial support and, by the end of the 1955 legislative session, it looked as though such a resolution might win Senate approval. It was DCI Dulles' idea to forestall such a possibility by having the President appoint a civilian committee before the Congress reconvened early in 1956. President Eisenhower, who was also "concerned about the state of management within the Agency,"⁹ agreed with Dulles' suggestion and, by Executive Order 10656, effective 13 January 1956, established the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA).

That Eisenhower looked upon the PBCFIA entity as something more than just a *pro forma* panel can be seen from an entry in his diary concerning his first conference with the board on 24 January 1956: "Each (member) will be required to take an oath to reveal nothing to any nonauthorized person of any information he may gain while on this task. The charter of the board I intend to be very broad."¹⁰

The original 10-member PBCFIA included three of the four members of the Doolittle panel and its first chairman was Killian. By this time, Killian had gained an enormous amount of respect from President Eisenhower for his ability as a "presiding officer" who could draw people together and get constructive solutions to problems. The President was "quite confident that Killian could get the PBCFIA going and get it aligned to what he (Eisenhower) really wanted it to be."¹¹ The PBCFIA, and its successor, PFIAB, was to act as an oversight board for the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and other intelligence units for the next 20 years.*

The Land Panel

When Killian set out to appoint the TCP panels he first approached Bruce S. Old, a vice president of Arthur D. Little, Inc., to head Project Three. Killian placed such importance on the TCP effort that he expected panel chairmen to

⁹ General A.J. Goodpaster interview, 6 Jul 83.

¹⁰ Robert H. Ferrell, ed., *The Eisenhower Diaries*, New York, W.W. Norton & Co., 1981, p. 312.

¹¹ Goodpaster interview.

* President Carter abolished the PFIAB in 1977. President Reagan reinstated it in 1981.

spend full time at the task. Arthur D. Little was reluctant to release Old for the several months it would take to do the study. Because Killian was anxious to get on with the effort, he told Old to forget about his offer, and instead contacted his close friend, Land.¹²

Land had to make a major decision about his career. When Killian asked him to head the Project Three panel, Land, the millionaire inventor of the polarizing filter and the instant camera, had just turned 45. He was on a leave of absence from Polaroid and was living in Hollywood, California, advising Alfred Hitchcock on the technology of making three-dimensional movies. Land's choice was to give up his current interest in cinema's third dimension and return east to Polaroid and the TCP appointment.¹³

Unlike Killian, Land did not believe in large committees. Following his rule that any committee of which he was a part must fit into a taxicab, Land limited his group to five plus himself. The five he chose included four eminent scholars and an engineer.

In mid-August 1954, Land and Harvard's Jim Baker traveled to Washington to prepare for the Project Three study and arrange for briefings by the various intelligence organizations. As these briefings progressed, the panel members, according to Land, became more and more distressed at the poor state of the nation's intelligence resources. "We would go in and interview generals and admirals in charge of intelligence and come away worried. Here we were, five or six young men, asking questions that these high-ranking officers couldn't answer." Land added that Project Three members were also not overly impressed with the Central Intelligence Agency.¹⁴

At the end of August 1954 Land got around to conferring with DCI Dulles' special assistant, Dick Bissell, who came away from the meeting without any definite ideas as to why Land had contacted him.¹⁵ Project Three panel members, it should be recalled, were not very happy with the status of US intelligence agencies at the time. But, Killian had confidence in Bissell. A special relationship existed between Killian and Bissell going back to 1942. In that year, Killian, the executive assistant to MIT President Karl Compton, headed a panel that recruited this brilliant young economist from Yale in order to strengthen MIT's Economics Department. Since that time, Killian held Bissell in high esteem.¹⁶

Meanwhile, Killian was in Washington arranging for the many trips and briefings to be given the members of the three major TCP panels. On 14 and 15 September, Killian and General Doolittle, the TCP's deputy director, reviewed these plans. On 24 September, Killian lunched with Air Force Secretary Talbott to discuss the study.¹⁷

¹² Interview with James R. Killian, Jr., 2 Nov 84.

¹³ Interview with Edwin H. Land, 20 Sep 84.

¹⁴ Land interview.

¹⁵ Interview with Richard M. Bissell, Jr., 8 Nov 84.

¹⁶ Killian interview.

¹⁷ Data obtained from J.R. Killian's appointments calendar.

Land's was not a typical committee; it had a power base that lent considerable weight to any suggestions it might make. The panel had been directly commissioned by President Eisenhower to examine the activities of the nation's intelligence community and to recommend changes. Having participated in a number of Air Force-sponsored studies since 1951, several panel members had definite ideas on how to improve intelligence collection, and, more importantly, they had in Killian a direct line to the White House.

It was Land's Project Three panel that pushed the idea of building a high-flying aircraft to obtain photographs of the Soviet Union. The conclusive action came in late October 1954 when Land and Killian "met with Eisenhower to discuss various TCP recommendations that the President, concerned about leaks, had considered too highly classified to include in our TCP presentation to the National Security Council."¹⁸ Indeed, the *TCP Report* included the following footnote:

In order to keep this report out of a more restricted classification, the Panel has prepared for highly restricted circulation two other reports on intelligence embodying recommendations and conclusions for transmittal directly to appropriate offices of the government.¹⁹

One of these "two other reports" was the proposal to build the U-2 aircraft. The other was a proposal to develop a missile-firing submarine that resulted in the construction of the Polaris-class of submarines.²⁰ Killian describes his and Land's meeting with President Eisenhower thusly:

Land described the U-2 system using an unarmed U-2 plane and recommended that its development be undertaken. After listening to our proposal and asking many hard questions, Eisenhower approved the development of the U-2 system, but he stipulated that it should be handled in an unconventional way so that it would not become entangled in the bureaucracy of the Defense Department or troubled by rivalries among the services. Consequently, a special management arrangement was devised that made it possible for the advisory group of scientists and engineers constantly to appraise and guide the development program and to permit quick decisions to be made. The project was made the responsibility of the CIA, Richard Bissell was to be in charge of the project, and Trevor Gardner provided full Air Force support.²¹

Land's version of the meeting with Eisenhower is more succinct: "We told the President we were confident this aircraft could and would find and photograph the Soviet Union's BISON bomber fleet."²²

Concerning the uniqueness of this proposal, Killian remarked that Eisenhower's "readiness to receive a proposal of this kind and to act upon it on

¹⁸ Killian, *Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower*, p. 82.

¹⁹ *TCP Report*, 1954, p. 27.

²⁰ Killian interview.

²¹ Killian, *Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower*, p. 82.

²² Land interview.

the recommendation of a group of scientists external to the government was an omen of great importance for the future relationship of the scientific community to him. It was also an illustration of his responsiveness to innovative ideas.”²³ Both Land and particularly Killian remained closely associated with the Eisenhower White House for the remainder of his presidency.

Channel for Scientific Guidance

Killian, first as chairman and later as a member, served on the PBCFIA throughout the second Eisenhower administration. In early 1961, President John F. Kennedy asked Killian to again chair this panel, by then renamed the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), and he also made Land a member. Land remained a PFIAB member until the end of the Ford administration.

After the Soviet success in launching two earth satellites in the fall of 1957 there was even greater demand for scientific guidance to President Eisenhower as well as to many Cabinet-level executives. The main channel for this advice was Killian. After consulting with White House Chief of Staff Sherman Adams, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization Gordon Gray, and Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert Cutler, President Eisenhower decided to reorganize and upgrade ODM's Science Advisory Committee. He wanted it to be directly responsible to the President, located in the Executive Office of the President, and chaired by a Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology who would be his scientific adviser, would regularly attend National Security Council meetings, and have an office and staff near the NSC quarters in the Executive Office Building. According to Cutler, “our first, and only, choice for this new position was Dr. James R. Killian, whose effective conduct of the earlier Technological Capabilities Panel study had won everyone's confidence.”²⁴

Thus, on 7 November 1957, President Eisenhower named Killian the first Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, a position he held until July 1959 when he turned it over to a hand-picked successor, Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky, a professor of chemistry at Harvard, the designer of the implosion device for the second atomic bomb, and an original member of CIA's Boston Scientific Advisory Panel.

During Killian's tenure, he met almost daily with Eisenhower and became one of the President's five most trusted advisers of this period. Owing to his increased workload as presidential science adviser and his position as a paid government employee, Killian relinquished the PBCFIA chairmanship in early 1958 but remained a member of the board.

On 1 December 1957, President Eisenhower completed his reorganization plan by co-opting ODM's Science Advisory Committee and making it the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) with Killian its chairman. This “interlocking” aspect of Killian's service to the President as both scientific adviser and chairman of PSAC as well as a member of the PBCFIA gave the

²³ *Sputnik, Op. Cit.*, p. 82.

²⁴ Robert Cutler, *No Time for Rest*, Atlantic, Little, Brown, Boston, 1965, p. 352.

scholar unusual influence within the Eisenhower White House. Killian's acceptance and effectiveness as special assistant "were greatly facilitated by a remarkable letter written by President Eisenhower to Cabinet officers, White House staff, and all members of the National Security Council, which stated his wish that" Killian and all members of PSAC "have access to all documents and other material, however sensitive, that we might need for our work and which indicated further that the science adviser and PSAC would be available to be of help to these other officers at the top level of government." In addition, Eisenhower invited Killian "to be present at NSC and Cabinet meetings and sessions of lesser policymaking bodies."²⁵ These actions by President Eisenhower brought the scholars inside the White House and gave their recommendations the cloak of highest authority. The suggestions of Killian, as science adviser, and the reports of the various PSAC committees, over which he presided, came to be considered by many defense and intelligence units as White House edicts. Changes in programs were often effected without resort to presidential directives. A quarter century later, Killian, in his book *The Education of a College President, A Memoir*, referred to this era as one of "creative integrations and interdisciplinary congeniality among a variety of research fields." In a postscript, Killian discusses this influence:

. . . Those individuals who served on the Technological Capabilities Panel, on the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, and on PSAC provided this creative integration of which I speak. For example, the fact that William Baker, Edwin Land, and I were engaged concurrently in several of these groups made it possible to achieve an extraordinary synthesis of minds and ideas to aid the President in achieving his goals in shaping our defense and intelligence programs and policies. The fact that a number of us, including Baker, Land, Zacharias, Wiesner, Beckler, Kistiakowsky, and many others, worked together with interdisciplinary congeniality made possible the success of such achievements as the Polaris, the acceleration of our intercontinental ballistic missile program, the U-2, new techniques of undersea warfare, and spectacular advancement in our reconnaissance capabilities. Coupled with this concert of minds was the fact that the results generated could be brought directly to the President for his consideration. My ready access to President Eisenhower made it possible for me promptly to bring to him, and to open opportunities for others to bring to him, new and important technologies, concepts, and analyses that added to the strength of our nation.²⁶

Examples of the influence the PSAC scientists wielded can be seen in the creation in early 1958 of the position of Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), the establishment of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), and also of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Killian and PSAC urged the Eisenhower administration to create NASA in order that there be a means for implementing a civilian space program. Indeed, it was PSAC's idea that NASA should be comprised of the National

²⁵ James R. Killian, Jr., *The Education of a College President, A Memoir*, Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press, 1985, pp. 331-32.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 455.

Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) and Werner von Braun's Redstone Arsenal team of missile experts from the US Army's Ballistic Missile Agency.²⁷

A Note of Discord

During the years 1955 to mid-1959, things went swimmingly for Dick Bissell's small and highly secret Development Projects Staff. This select group of engineers and managers was doing the things which the Land Panel believed needed to be done to use technology for the collection of intelligence. However, a note of discord crept into Bissell's relations with Land and Killian after he assumed the duties of Deputy Director for Plans in late January 1959. Both Land and Killian looked upon science and technology almost as a religion, something sacred to be kept from contamination by those who would misuse it for unwholesome ends. Into this category fit the covert operations and "dirty tricks" of Dick Bissell's Directorate of Plans. It rankled Land that Bissell had taken the Development Projects unit with him into the Directorate of Plans in early 1959. Land was greatly upset when he learned that Bissell had involved one of Land's favorite projects, the U-2, in the Bay of Pigs fiasco.²⁸

In November 1961, Allen Dulles announced his retirement and President John F. Kennedy named West Coast millionaire and former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission John A. McCone to be his successor. In one of McCone's first meetings with President Kennedy's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the new DCI learned of that body's concern that the Agency's scientific and technical efforts might be inhibited by continued association with the Directorate of Plans. Both PFIAB chairman Killian and board member Land explained to the new DCI their strongly held belief that the scientific and technical part of the Agency should be a separate entity and not a part of the Plans Directorate.

Following this session, McCone set up a three-man working group to review the organizational structure and activities of CIA. This group was chaired by CIA Inspector General Lyman B. Kirkpatrick and included PFIAB Secretary J. Patrick Coyne and General Cortlandt V.R. Schuyler (USA-Ret.), an adviser on the staff of New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller. One of the working group's major concerns was the proposal for establishing a new directorate for research and development. All deputy directors were asked to comment on the idea. DDP Bissell adamantly opposed the proposal. His reply included his arguments for keeping such efforts under the aegis of his directorate.²⁹

At a 22 January 1962 PFIAB meeting, DCI McCone told Chairman Killian he intended to create a new position of deputy director for technical collection under whom all of CIA's scientific activities would be consolidated. Meanwhile, Bissell's opposition to PFIAB pressures for stripping the Development Projects Division from his directorate, when added to the fallout from the Bay of Pigs fiasco, resulted in his losing the favor of his two strongest supporters, Killian and Land. Dick Bissell resigned on 17 February 1962.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 335.

²⁸ Land, Killian interviews.

²⁹ R.M. Bissell memorandum to DCI McCone, Subject: "Technical Intelligence Collection," 10 Jan 62, Secret.

Bissell's departure confronted DCI McCone with the problem of finding a manager for three, large, nearly-billion dollar projects—the remains of the U-2 program, a photosatellite effort, and a project to build a superfast reconnaissance plane—which Bissell had headed for more than seven years.

Killian and Land, who were almost singlehandedly responsible for CIA's involvement in the three major technical collection efforts, were anxious that action be taken swiftly, following Bissell's departure, in order that none of these reconnaissance programs suffer for lack of management direction. Thus, they again urged McCone to consolidate these and all other technical and scientific endeavors in a new directorate unconnected with covert activities.³⁰

On 14 February 1962, shortly before Bissell's departure, McCone approved the issuance of Headquarters Notice 1-8 announcing the appointment of Richard M. Helms to succeed Bissell as Deputy Director for Plans and indicating that a Deputy Director for Research and Development would be created at some future date.

Two days later, Headquarters Notice 1-9 established the position of Deputy Director for Research (DDR), effective 19 February 1962. The notice said that certain of the activities of DDP's Development Projects Division would also be transferred to the DDR, along with other activities in research and development. And two months later, HN 1-15, effective 15 April 1962, transferred the "Special Projects Branch" and supporting elements of the Development Projects Division to the DDR and stated that additional activities might be transferred at a later date. The first DDR was Dr. Herbert (Pete) Scoville, Jr., who was moved up from his job as Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence (ADSI).

This piecemeal publication of a major organizational change was indicative of the foot-dragging attitude in many Agency quarters toward moving ahead with DCI McCone's plan to consolidate all scientific and research efforts in one directorate. By 30 July 1962, when the terms of reference of the DDR were published in HN 1-23, McCone had been forced to compromise on the scope of the new directorate since neither the DDI's Office of Scientific Intelligence nor the DDP's Technical Services Division could be pried from those two directorates. Ray S. Cline, who replaced Robert Amory as DDI on 23 April 1962, refused to give up OSI to the new directorate because he saw this as "weakening CIA's analytical voice."³¹ Richard Helms, the new DDP, felt just as strongly about TSD and several of his directorate's aircraft operations. As of 1 August 1962, the DDR consisted of three offices: the Office of Special Activities (OSA) which was primarily the Special Projects Branch of the Development Projects Division; the Office of ELINT (OEL), comprised of a small part of the Directorate of Support's Office of Communications and an even smaller contingent from the Directorate of Intelligence's Office of Scientific Intelligence; and the Office of Research and Development (ORD) made up of several former members of the Directorate of Plans' Technical Services Division.

Pete Scoville's writ ran long on the tasks his new directorate was supposed to accomplish and short on the manpower needed to achieve such goals. The

³⁰ Killian, Land interviews.

³¹ Ray S. Cline, *Secrets, Spies and Scholars, Blueprint of the Essential CIA*, Acropolis Books Ltd, Washington, D.C., 1976, p. 200.

Directorate of Research, as approved by DCI McCone in July 1962, never had a fighting chance. All of the scientific and engineering expertise within the Agency, aside from the few experts in the DPD/OSA group, resided in the Office of Scientific Intelligence, and that unit belonged to the DDI.

In addition, 1962 was not the best year for establishing a new directorate in the CIA. Early in the year the intelligence community was caught up in trying to learn more about a new missile installation seen in overhead photography of Tallinn in the Soviet Baltic state of Estonia. A similar, prototype installation had been photographed in early 1960 by the last successful U-2 mission during an overflight of the missile test center at Saryshagan. The satellite photography, however, was substantially poorer than the U-2 imagery and photo-interpreters could not determine whether the Tallinn missiles were intended to shoot down aircraft or missiles.

Then, late in the summer came the upsetting discovery of surface-to-air missiles in Cuba, which led eventually to the discovery of medium-range offensive missiles in the early autumn. Scoville was caught up in both of these problems. In response to the Tallinn question, he agreed to cooperate with Under Secretary of the Air Force Joseph V. Charyk in a crash project to develop a high-resolution photosatellite that could possibly obtain better imagery of the missiles.

The matter which consumed more of his time, however, concerned the warheads which the Soviets intended for the missiles being moved to Cuba. Prior to coming to work for the Agency, Scoville had been technical director of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, and his assistant, then as now, was Air Force Colonel Edward Giller. Because of this background, Scoville was considered one of the nation's leading experts on warheads and both his and Giller's expertise was needed to answer the questions being asked by high-ranking Kennedy administration officials about the real nature of the Cuban missile threat. Thus, Scoville and Giller spent a large part of the late summer and much of the autumn of 1962 organizing efforts within the intelligence community to obtain nuclear-type data from these warheads.³²

Spelling It Out

By late winter of 1963, Scoville was frustrated and fed up with trying to preserve an Agency presence on the overhead reconnaissance arena as well as provide the type of technical and scientific support expected from his unmanned directorate. Scoville's dissatisfaction came to the attention of PFIAB chairman Killian in early 1963. Neither Killian nor Land had been satisfied with the Directorate of Research concept, and in early 1963 they decided they should provide DCI McCone with more specific guidance for strengthening the Agency's technical capabilities by creating, organizing, and exploiting *new* resources of science and technology.³³ Their effort, titled "Recommendations to Intelligence Community by PFIAB," was approved by the entire Advisory Board in March 1963 and given to DCI McCone. This time they left nothing to

³² Interview with BGen. Edward B. Giller, 8 April 1986.

³³ "Recommendations to Intelligence Community by PFIAB."

chance, but spelled out in great detail just what they had in mind, as can be seen in the following points:

(a) The creation of an organization for research and development which will couple research (basic science) done outside the intelligence community, both overt and covert, with development and engineering conducted within intelligence agencies, particularly the CIA. Institutional research, academic and industrial, must be joined to mission-oriented research.

(b) The installation of an administrative arrangement in the CIA whereby the whole spectrum of modern science and technology can be brought into contact with major programs and projects of the Agency. The present fragmentation and compartmentation of research and development in CIA severely inhibits this function.

(c) The clear vesting of these broadened responsibilities in the top technical official of the CIA, operating at the level of Deputy Director. Recasting and extending the CIA's present Office of Research may accomplish this. If it does not, alternative administrative arrangements must be devised. This technical official, as we conceive his responsibilities, should have reporting to him the following groups, each managed by a competent technical leader:

- (1) Technical Requirements Group
- (2) Systems Engineering Group
- (3) Development Group
- (4) Field Engineering Services Group
- (5) Behavioral Sciences Group

(d) Formation of a few special research and development groups that may be part of a natural science division, probably coordinated with the behavioral sciences group, that cross-connects various classic disciplines in ways of primary importance to intelligence missions. Thus, studies of camouflage in plant, bird, and animal systems (where it seems to be a highly developed element in survival) coupled with physical optics, radiation and spectroscopy, might reveal new methods of both disclosure and concealment. . . .

The importance of intelligence warrants a major effort to draw fully upon the most advanced science and the best scientific brains in the nation. Our scientific intelligence should be so sophisticated and advanced that it will be beyond the capabilities, if not the imagination, of our adversaries.³⁴

The very detail of these recommendations reflects the importance that Killian and Land attached to them. In effect, they were telling DCI McCone just how they wanted him to revamp the Agency's scientific and technical efforts. Indeed, before the year was out, these recommendations would be exploited to the full. McCone's initial response to these PFIAB recommendations was made through President Kennedy's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs,

³⁴ *Ibid.*

McGeorge Bundy, on 15 April 1963. Because he had taken no action in the direction suggested, McCone generalized about the progress made. His response acknowledged that he had considered including OSI and TSD in the Directorate for Research, but had suspended action in this regard. His answer included a promise to “move ahead with additional changes” that would give the DDR “expanded responsibilities.”

Before McCone had a chance to do much in this direction, Pete Scoville submitted his resignation, on 25 April 1963, to take effect on 1 June (this date was later extended to 14 June) 1963. Scoville’s letter of resignation said he had been frustrated in his attempts to merge all scientific and technological functions under the new Directorate of Research.* McCone asked the Director of the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI), Albert D. (Bud) Wheelon, to take over Scoville’s responsibilities. The brilliant but brash missile expert demurred. Wheelon told McCone he thought the Directorate of Research was a no-win situation because it did not control all of the Agency’s scientific endeavors.³⁵ Although he was McCone’s first and only choice for the position, Wheelon dragged his feet until he managed to win from McCone the concessions he sought: the inclusion of the DI’s Office of Scientific Intelligence and the DS’s Automated Data Processing Staff within the new directorate. Before the end of 1963, Wheelon’s directorate also included the Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center (FMSAC) headed by former US Army missile expert Carl E. Duckett.

When Wheelon finally agreed to accept the position, he insisted that the directorate be renamed and that PFIAB’s March 1963 recommendations be considered the new directorate’s charter document. Also, Wheelon persuaded McCone to establish a separate, higher pay scale for scientists and engineers so that he could hire experts from the private sector to work within the Agency on advanced reconnaissance projects. Thus, when Wheelon assumed control of the Directorate of Science and Technology on 5 August 1963 he became the leader of what would become one of the nation’s most productive units for employing science and technology to collect intelligence.** During the next three years, using the expanded charter and special pay scale, Wheelon fashioned what several Air Force observers have called the nation’s most powerful development and engineering establishment.³⁶ Before the end of the decade, the Agency’s youngest directorate dreamed up, engineered, built, and deployed collection systems which gave our nation a substantial intelligence advantage.

After nearly nine years of urging the use of science as the handmaiden of intelligence, Killian and Land succeeded in August 1963 in having a governmental unit created which embodied their ideas. The existence of the Directorate of Science and Technology must ultimately be considered a monument to the wisdom of Edwin H. Land and James R. Killian, Jr.

This article was originally classified SECRET. It was declassified and released in 1996.

* Scoville later became Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

³⁵ Albert D. Wheelon lecture, September 1984.

** An update: Wheelon is senior vice president of Hughes Aircraft Corporation and a member of PFIAB; he served on the commission that investigated the Challenger disaster. Duckett is president of Intech, Inc., and the magistrate of Mathews, Virginia.

³⁶ Colonels Paul E. Worthman and Frederick C.E. Oder interview, 19 August 1985.

Castro's Secrets: The CIA and Cuba's Intelligence Machine

Brian Latell. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 288 pp., index

Reviewed by Thomas Coffey

Oswald's third shot killed President Kennedy. The president had refused to let his Secret Service agents station themselves on the rear bumper of his convertible limousine. They were thus too far away to have any hope of jumping on the president in time to take the shot. If only they had known what Castro did—that Oswald had shouted months before, when refused a visa to Cuba, that he was going to “kill Kennedy for this.” Castro, who reenacted the assassination and wrongly concluded Oswald's rifle was incapable of firing that many shots in so brief a time, knew more than he told, and the question in the mind of author and former National Intelligence Officer for Latin America Brian Latell is how much more. His book, *Castro's Secrets*, is part tour de horizon of the Cuban intelligence service and part intelligence brief on the Cuban leader's culpability in the assassination of President Kennedy.

Drawing on interviews of Cuban defectors, recently declassified CIA documents, a 1978 congressional investigation, and second-hand sources, the book is fascinating at times, yet it is uneven and scattershot in its approach. The first part has a spy-versus-spy flavor, with US intelligence officers on the losing side, according to the many Cuban defectors Mr. Latell interviewed. Castro's intelligence service discovered and flipped more than four dozen of CIA's Cuban spies. Castro made the General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) his own personal entity and was well aware of seemingly every CIA agent's movements in Cuba and whatever plots the CIA hatched in Miami. And as if flipping CIA agents was not enough, Cuban intelligence would “dangle” prospective agents to CIA handlers. When the defection of a major counterintelligence officer in 1987 blew open the story, Castro rubbed it in by showing on Cuban television tapes

made of CIA case officers and then their agents at drop sights.

The DGI's impressive record was the result of expert training, good morale, and a vast amount of sympathy to the Cuban cause. Manuel Piñero, known as “Redbeard,” the first head of the DGI, learned the spy business from the Soviets, particularly that double agents were the first line of defense. The DGI recruited very young—sometimes in their teens—Cubans who were among the most supportive of the Cuban revolution. One defector described the ease with which agents were doubled this way: “When we learned a certain case officer was interested in a certain Latin American in a third country, we'd beat them to the punch.” They were true believers; 95 percent of Cuban agents were not paid, according to one defector.

Even when beaten at the game, in the author's telling, there were moments of respect for the good trade-craft of the other side. One Cuban case officer could not help but admire the professionalism of his CIA counterpart's handling of a flipped agent. And when this Cuban officer defected, one of the first people he wanted to meet was this CIA case officer.

The author's attempt to resolve some Cuban cold cases loses dramatic impact after a while, the stories ending with the same punch line: “Castro did it.” Finding closure for some of these tales at times reads like the stuff only a Cuban insider could love, fodder for a good barroom conversation among case officers.

Latell does not attempt to look at the big picture of what this spy competition meant for the interests of both countries. Castro has remained in power despite extreme US hostility to his rule. Score a big one for superb counterintelligence. Of course, this comes as little shock, given that most security states are defined

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in this article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

by a repressive and effective security apparatus with lots of agents. And while Castro and his system did survive it hardly thrived. Many of Cuba's best and brightest departed for the shores of Florida.

Castro's attempts to spread the revolution to the rest of Latin America in the 1960s, on the other hand, were unequivocal failures. The capture, with some assistance from the CIA, and killing of Che Guevara was a major setback. This failed campaign forced Castro to be more brazen in his support of rebels in Angola and Mozambique in the 1970s and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the FMLN in El Salvador during the 1980s. Arguably, Castro's biggest success on this front is Chavez's Venezuela, but this victory seems to matter little now with the Soviet military presence no longer a concern. When it did matter, CIA intelligence helped thwart a Havana-sponsored insurrection against Venezuelan President Romulo Betancourt in the 1960s.

The latter part of the book indirectly homes in on the big picture surrounding the Kennedy assassination. In it, Latell appears to be creating a testimonial against Fidel Castro as a person and as a leader and uses it to create a case for Castro's complicity in the murder of President Kennedy. This he does along the following lines:

- Castro is a murderer. The Cuban leader got his start as a thug, and murdered two of his rivals to make a name for himself while gaining control of the streets.
- Castro is an avenger. Not one to be crossed, Castro targeted high-level defectors and nearly killed one of Mr. Latell's main sources. He had more success targeting those responsible for Che Guevara's death. He also may have had a hand in the death of a non-compliant leader of the Salvadoran guerrillas.
- Castro supports assassination of foreign leaders. The DGI trained the killers of Nicaraguan strongman Anastasio Somoza when in exile, and similarly trained hit squads nearly killed Venezuelan President Betancourt and Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet while they still held office.
- Castro has a martyr complex. At the height of the Cuban missile crisis, Castro put pressure on a Soviet commander to shoot down a U-2 spy plane. He also wrote an "Armageddon letter" urging Khrushchev to initiate a first nuclear strike against the United States if Kennedy ordered an invasion of Cuba. The letter

so stunned the Soviet leader that he moved to immediately end the crisis before Castro did anything reckless. Soviet leaders never forgot this and essentially told Castro he might very well be on his own if the Reagan administration decided to invade Cuba.

- Castro is a liar. A master at giving false comfort to his perceived enemies, Castro would often lure unsuspecting officials back to Cuba only to have them jailed on trumped up charges or killed. Castro denied vehemently having any role in the murder of his gangland competitors. One of his most deceitful acts was the Mariel boatlift of more than a 100,000 Cubans to the US mainland; he painted the boatlift as a magnanimous gesture when it was actually a monstrously cynical act that included the release of more than 17,000 Cuban criminals and psychiatric patients.
- Castro is a control freak. Many of the defectors Latell interviewed swear that Castro was into the minutiae of Cuban intelligence—the DGI was his baby. That's what boosted morale and made it the elite government entity in Cuba.

Portraying Castro as a dangerous and powerful die-hard who had a vengeful streak allows the author to speculate on how this makeup fits into the murder of Kennedy. First, Castro denied knowing of Oswald even though two sources swear the Cuban leader told them he knew of Oswald's threat to kill Kennedy in early October of 1963 at the Cuban consulate in Mexico City. In the most damning charge, a defector claimed that Castro directed him to direct communications interception gear to Texas, *three hours before the assassination of Kennedy*. There is no substantiation of this claim from any other source.

Castro knew the Kennedy brothers were trying to kill him. He had "definitive," as Latell describes it, proof. Three weeks earlier a double agent, who was supposed to murder Castro and lead a military coup, got the CIA to show proof of high-level US government support for the operation: it sent a friend of Robert Kennedy, Desmond Fitzgerald, who ran Cuban operations on a day-to-day basis, to meet with the double agent. With that visit, Castro had confirmation of what he no doubt had suspected. A month and a half earlier, Castro warned in an interview with a Reuters journalist, "US leaders would be in danger if they helped in any attempt to do away with the leaders of Cuba.... [Such acts] will be answered in kind." Few

CIA analysts knew of the assassination plots, and so they ignored these comments, taking them as more bluster from the Cuban leader. On 22 November, at 12:30 p.m., Lee Harvey Oswald shot John Fitzgerald Kennedy twice. The president was declared dead within an hour.

Given what he knows, Mr. Latell absolves Castro of charges that he helped plan the assassination, but he still holds Castro “complicit” for having had a “passive but knowing” role. What galls Latell, indeed he finds it “despicable,” is that Castro from the evidence available likely knew Oswald was going to or might possibly kill the president that day and did nothing to warn Kennedy. This indictment strikes this reviewer as a moral stretch, given that Castro, as the Latell demonstrates, knew the Kennedys planned to kill him. Why would he feel obligated to provide warning? CIA sabotage and paramilitary operations were at their highest level since the Bay of Pigs and Castro had to have felt under siege, his own life and regime in danger. He owed President Kennedy nothing.

With Kennedy gone, Castro had weathered the storm. Lyndon Johnson, who sensed bad karma in the whole covert action program (“Kennedy was trying to kill Castro, but Castro got to him first”), dismantled that “damn Murder Incorporated.” Kennedy’s death paradoxically hampered attempts to get a better handle on whether Castro was involved in any plans to preemptively kill the president. Johnson wanted the issue to go away. Robert Caro’s biography of LBJ portrays Robert Kennedy as critical of the Warren Commission’s Report, believing there was more to the assassination; nevertheless LBJ wanted the case closed and never called for or initiated another investigation. Castro said all the right things about Kennedy to calm suspicions. As Mr. Latell notes, DCI John McCone kept the Warren Commission in the dark about operations targeting Castro, thus closing a major avenue of investigation while the trail might still have been hot and people’s memories still fresh. The main person in the know today is old, sick, and out of office, and he is not talking. Any further discoveries about Castro’s culpability are likely to go with him to the grave.



Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy: the Movie

Directed by Tomas Alfredson, screenplay by Bridget O'Connor and Peter Straughan, 2011

Reviewed by Michael Bradford and James Burrige

Portrayals of the profession of intelligence in popular culture matter because they influence the perceptions of the customers of intelligence, congressional overseers, and even new hires into the business. The performance and capabilities of intelligence officers are often measured against standards established by film directors and novelists, from Brian De Palma to Tom Clancy. Perhaps one of the most enduring renderings of the profession is John le Carré's *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, which, since it was published in 1974, has been adapted to television, film, and two BBC radio series. The most recent addition to this collection is the Tomas Alfredson-directed film, released last year.

This review aims to address three questions concerning this addition: How does the movie differ from the novel and the 1979 BBC miniseries? (The BBC production is such a faithful rendering of the book that in this review the two will be regarded as essentially one version of the story.) Does the film realistically portray the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS)—or any other major Western intelligence agency? Finally, is the movie likely to alter or reinforce popular perceptions of intelligence in general and CIA in particular?

In comparison with the book and miniseries, the film treats much more directly and stridently the presumed prevalence of the British class system, which provides its upper class privilege and immunity from scrutiny and judgment. In the film, Smiley and Prideaux (who suffered the most because of the mole's treachery) are aware on some level that Haydon is the culprit, but they are unable or unwilling to act on the knowledge. Haydon is the avatar of understated patriotism, the resident hero of the Circus (SIS). To suspect

him is to indict a venerated generation and the very class whose members had always formed the backbone of the Circus. The obvious comparison is to the British decision not to indict Anthony Blunt, or even to expose his treason, after his secret confession in 1964. For Smiley and his colleagues, the crime is deeply felt and debilitating, a faith-destroying shock deeper than the operational implications of Haydon's espionage on the institution.

Both treatments emphasize an SIS hope to reinvigorate a diminished relationship with US intelligence, although the means offered for doing so are cynical and involve the use of intelligence coming from the mole—intelligence purposely provided by his Soviet handlers as cover ("Witchcraft" from "Source Merlin"). Haydon described the material as follows: "It does occur to me that anyone taking this material to Washington could drive a very hard bargain in return. Indeed, if Merlin maintains the standard, I would venture to predict that we could buy anything there is to have in the American agency's shop."^a The novel and the TV series are free of the increasingly shrill anti-Americanism found in le Carré's later books. But the movie contains an illogical and gratuitous anti-American reference. When Smiley meets Karla in New Delhi around 1955, the Indians are holding him at the request of the British, in exchange for Indian access to the interrogation transcripts. Karla declines to be doubled or given a new life in England and, with no legal grounds to hold him, the British are forced to let him go. In the movie Smiley relates that "the Americans" got the Indians to torture Karla before Smiley's arrival. Why the Indians would even allow the United States access to Karla—much less pull out his fingerprints on its behalf—is left unexplained.

^a Le Carré, *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, 137.

The homosexual relationship between Haydon and Prideaux, only hinted at in the book and the miniseries, is so explicit in the movie that one gets the impression that the director was afraid viewers would miss it. In a more puzzling change, Smiley's assistant Peter Guillam is also revealed to be gay (in the book and miniseries he is resolutely heterosexual). But there's no context, no follow-up, and no apparent significance to the revelation. It's difficult not to interpret this change and the insertion of the torture issue as gestures to political correctness.

An even more inexplicable change in the movie is Haydon's acquiescence in his death at the hands of Prideaux. In the original ending, Haydon is held and debriefed at a secure facility pending an exchange with the Russians—Haydon for several of the agents he betrayed. In his meetings with Smiley he is unrepentant and stonewalls about his recruitment and his tradecraft; he hates America and remains a true believer in Marxism, subjecting Smiley to an anticapitalist diatribe. Before Haydon can be traded, Prideaux infiltrates the compound and breaks his neck. In the movie Prideaux shoots him with a rifle in broad daylight. Haydon sees Prideaux aiming the rifle but makes no attempt to duck, effectively facilitating his own murder. Both treatments make explicit that the only thing Haydon feels any guilt about is his betrayal of Prideaux, and in both versions of the interrogation he rationalizes and justifies his behavior to Smiley. To make Haydon so plagued with guilt that he accepts his death as punishment for his actions may be typically Hollywood. Not only does it oversimplify the moral nuances of le Carré's world but subverts one of the basic themes of his work—moral equivalence, the idea that the West forfeited any claim to a higher morality by engaging in the same immoral acts. It's too complex to fully address here, but it's a major departure.

Does the movie accurately depict the day-to-day life of the SIS? The upper tier of the SIS is reduced to six managers: their personalities and interactions have to stand for the accessible human factor of an obviously large and complex organization. Strategic considerations and external politics are absent from their discussions. There are few hints about the size of SIS; at one point Smiley is told that the service has a total of only 600 assets worldwide (71). It stretches credu-

lity that these six men manage worldwide operations but play operational roles in the running of the asset Merlin or the dissemination of the Witchcraft product. The analogue would be CIA's second tier—the directors of the National Clandestine Service, the Directorate of Science and Technology, and the Directorate of Intelligence—meeting an asset, servicing a safe house, and briefing the product downtown. This organizational compression works very well at moving the story along in print, but images of senior executives sneaking through the shadows themselves is a stretch for anyone who works in the federal bureaucracy, much less in the Intelligence Community. They know the prevalent—and, after all, logical—tendency to delegate assignments down through the strata of skills and expertise.

The movie's staging of the Circus offices is wonderfully effective: a claustrophobic world of crowded bullpens, ancient escalators, narrow corridors, and creaking dumbwaiters. It evoked for these graying reviewers their first experiences at CIA and NSA respectively, when paper files dominated the landscape. To exit the Circus, Smiley, and his boss, Control, weave their way through a maze of stairways, courtyards, and corridors. The editing of the film makes it seem like an hour's journey. It is consistent with Kim Philby's description of SIS Headquarters: "A dingy building, a warren of wooden partitions and frosted glass window, served by an ancient lift."^a

The final intellectual stretch readers and viewers are asked to perform in each of the versions is in accepting that a major counterintelligence (CI) investigation could be carried out without the involvement—or even the knowledge—of CI professionals. The Cabinet Office official, Oliver Lacon, turns aside Smiley's suggestion to turn the inquiry over to MI5:

The Minister won't have that. You know perfectly well how he and Alleline feel about the competition. Rightly, too, if I may say so. A lot of ex-colonial administrators ploughing through Circus papers: you might as well bring in the Army to investigate the Navy.^b

When Smiley objects to the army-navy comparison, Lacon's response is that the minister would "rather live with a damp roof than see his castle pulled

^a James Hansen, "Headquarters Habituations of the British SIS," *Studies in Intelligence* 41, no. 2 (1997): 38.

^b Le Carré, *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, 70.

down by outsiders.”^a All of these ostensible departures from reality are in the service of le Carré’s intricate and exquisite plotting, so we can readily overlook them.

Finally, how likely is the movie to influence or change public perceptions of the profession—if at all? Very little, we judge. First of all, it repeats the long-established theme of the lone wolves—Smiley and Guillam working alone, without the resources or legal authorities that come with the overt blessing of senior management. This is the model we’ve seen over and over in films and novels. The staff work that’s required to move the machinery of intelligence can’t compete with operations in terms of reader/viewer interest, and this movie simply reinforces that trend.

The film completely ignores the moral proposition so forcefully advocated by le Carré in most of his novels—that the West’s resort to immoral tactics and techniques (by governments and corporations) created a

state of moral equivalence. The film has definite heroes and villains—Smiley and Guillam and Prideaux versus the Russians, Haydon, and his dupes in the Circus. Treason is wrong, and it is duly punished—no ambiguity there. Contrast that with the end of the novel, where Smiley weighs Haydon’s motives and ends up not judging him: “Smiley shrugged it all aside, distrustful as ever of the standard shapes of human motive.”^b

The final reason the movie is unlikely to change public perceptions is its opacity. Except for intelligence professionals and le Carré aficionados, the film version is almost incomprehensible. *New York Times* film critic Terrence Rafferty wrote of le Carré that it was “as if he determined to make [his novels] movie-proof.”^c The Center for the Study of Intelligence offers a lecture to new CIA hires and others on the portrayal of CIA and the intelligence profession in popular culture. We don’t believe the film version of *Tinker, Tailor* will make the cut for inclusion in the session.



^a *Ibid.*, 71.

^b *Ibid.*, 353.

^c *New York Times*, 18 September 2011.

Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf

Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake

Current Topics

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance: Acquisitions, Policies and Defense Oversight, by Johanna A. Montgomery (ed.).

General

The Dictionary of Espionage: Spyspeak into English, by Joseph C. Goulden.

Historical

Black Ops Vietnam: The Operational History of MACVSOG, by Robert M. Gillespie.

Classical Spies: American Archaeologists with the OSS in World War II Greece, by Susan Heuck Allen.

Dealing With the Devil: Anglo-Soviet Intelligence Cooperation During the Second World War, by Dónal O'Sullivan.

Double Cross: The True Story of the D-Day Spies, by Ben Macintyre

Enemies: A History of the FBI, by Tim Weiner.

Franco's Friends: How British Intelligence Helped Bring Franco To Power In Spain, by Peter Day.

Gentleman Spymaster: How Lt. Col. Tommy 'Tar' Robertson Double-crossed the Nazis, by Geoffrey Elliott.

The Ideal Man: The Tragedy of Jim Thompson and the American Way of War, by Joshua Kurlantzick.

Joe Rochefort's War: The Odyssey of the Codebreaker Who Outwitted Yamamoto at Midway, by Elliot Carlson, with a foreword by RAdm. Donald "Mac" Showers, USN (Ret.).

Memoir

Malayan Spymaster: Memoirs of a Rubber Planter Bandit Fighter and Spy, by Boris Hembry.

Intelligence Abroad

Israel's Silent Defender: An Inside Look at Sixty Years of Israeli Intelligence, by Amos Gilboa and Ephraim Lapid (eds.).

Learning from the Secret Past: Cases in British Intelligence History, by Robert Dover and Michael S. Goodman (eds.).

Main Intelligence Outfits of Pakistan, by P.C. Joshi.

The Politics of Counterterrorism in India: Strategic Intelligence and National Security in South Asia, by Prem Mahadevan.

Stalin's Man in Canada: Fred Rose and Soviet Espionage, by David Levy.

Stasi Decorations and Memorabilia: Volume II, by Ralph Pickard, with a foreword by Ambassador Hugh Montgomery.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

Current Topics

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance: Acquisitions, Policies and Defense Oversight, by Johanna A. Montgomery (ed.). (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2011), 161 pp., endnotes, bibliography, index.

Three government-produced articles comprise the entirety of this book. Chapter 1 is a reproduction of Congressional Research Service (CRS) report # R41284, *Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Acquisition: Issues for Congress*. Chapter 2 reproduces GAO report # 11-465, *Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Actions Are Needed to Increase Integration and Efficiencies of DOD's ISR Enterprise*. Chapter 3, the longest of the contributions at 100 pages, is a verbatim copy of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Intelligence report *Counterinsurgency (COIN) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations*.

A footnote with each chapter title states that it is “an edited, reformatted and augmented version” of the original publication. That statement is accurate to the extent that an index has been added; the footnotes of the original articles are now endnotes; the table of contents has an entry for “Chapter Sources,” which merely lists the article titles plus the agencies that created them; some

of the text has been rearranged; and the book has an impressive color cover. The content of the articles, however, is unchanged. Potential readers may wish to consider two factors before purchasing this volume. First, the articles may be downloaded from the Internet at no cost. In the case of chapter 1, Montgomery provides an incorrect website. The original document for that chapter can be found on three separate sites, including the CRS homepage. All three documents, in fact, can be found with simple Google searches. Second, the cost of the hardbound edition from Amazon is \$125.00.

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General

The Dictionary of Espionage: Spyspeak into English, by Joseph C. Goulden. (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2012), 256 pp., no index.

The first edition of this dictionary appeared in 1986, when the author was contractually obligated to use a pseudonym. He chose Henry S.A. Becket.¹ Now released from this constraint, Joseph Goulden has given us a revised edition under his true name. Most of the entries concern standard tradecraft terms used in various forms of espionage by most intelligence agencies. Often-misused terms, like “double agent,” are clarified, and the distinction between “agent” and “case officer” is sharply drawn. But while many are accurate, some miss the mark. For example, the term “clandestine services” should be “clandestine service.” Others are no longer in common use—if they ever were. The word

“Company,” defined as a common reference by CIA personnel to their employer, fits this category. Still others are slang, perhaps common to journalists—“Cinicks” is defined as the CIA term for counterintelligence officers—but not part of the professional jargon. In one case, Goulden has added a brand new term, “Spookonyms.” (132) Unfortunately, there is no way to tell which he has got right: the entries are not sourced and the bibliography is out of date.

In terms of intelligence services mentioned, the scope of the book extends only to players in the Cold War era. Countries in the Middle East or South Asia are not in-

¹ Henry S. A. Becket, *The Dictionary of Espionage: Spyspeak into English* (New York: Stein and Day, 1986).

cluded. Goulden has added a number of often humorous items called “SAFE House Interludes,” which are quotations and anecdotes dealing with famous cases and people.

In short, *The Dictionary of Espionage* is a good place to start but it is not comprehensive. Such a dictionary has yet to be written.

Historical

Black Ops Vietnam: The Operational History of MACVSOG, by Robert M. Gillespie. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011), 304 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Special Operations Group (MACVSOG) was formed on 24 January 1964. For cover reasons the name was later changed to the Studies and Observations Group. For eight years, it carried out its mission to conduct covert operations in and against North Vietnam “in direct retaliation to its aggressive moves” in the South. *Black Ops Vietnam* tells the story of MACVSOG operations and why, in the end, the group failed to stop North Vietnamese aggression.

After reviewing the history of MACVSOG’s formation, military historian Robert Gillespie presents a chronological account of the organization, its various types of operations, its key personnel, its command relationships, and the persistent bureaucratic difficulties the group encountered. In retrospect, each of these factors worked more against mission accomplishment than for it. MACVSOG’s relationship with the CIA is a good example. The Agency had conducted similar missions on a smaller scale before MACVSOG took over, according to Gillespie, and was reluctant to subordinate itself to military control. (12, 35) The South Vietnamese were similarly reluctant partners, though for different reasons. And then there were the difficulties of working with MACV under Gen. William Westmoreland, who was not an advocate of Special Forces. (They did not have the reputation or the wealth of experience they enjoy today.) Gillespie describes the problems the group’s commanders encountered as a result of these challenging relationships.

Despite the difficulties, MACVSOG conducted many and varied operations in South Vietnam and Laos. Some were psychological and propaganda, but most involved intelligence collection by special maritime, airborne, and ground teams. Gillespie gives a good account of each type. In addition to describing the tactical aspects of the operations, the logistical and communications problems with which the group had to deal, and the number of intelligence reports they produced, he describes individual contributions, some involving genuine bravery. The case of SSgt. Roy Benevidez is a fine example. While serving as a “desk jockey” in a staff billet, the sergeant joined a helicopter rescue of a reconnaissance team inside Laos. While under continuous fire, he helped extract the stranded team while suffering seven bullet and 28 shrapnel wounds, as well as a bayonet injury.

Gillespie makes clear that when MACVSOG was disbanded in 1972, the magnitude and the frustrations of its comprehensive failure in Vietnam were recognized at all levels. He doesn’t alibi the failures, but he does explain that they were inherently the result of the political and military strategy imposed on forces in the country. Those who have studied counterinsurgency and served in Vietnam will see in *Black Ops Vietnam* the seeds of contemporary doctrine. It is a well-documented, well-told account of a sad time in the nation’s history, when well-conducted Special Forces operations were laying the foundations for what would become a vital part of US operations in the current conflict in South Asia.

Classical Spies: American Archaeologists with the OSS in World War II Greece, by Susan Heuck Allen. (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2011), 430 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Harvard graduate Kermit Roosevelt interrupted his PhD studies—he never completed them—to join the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) in 1941

and went on to serve in the OSS. After the war, he was assigned to edit the then top secret OSS War Report. In his introduction to the declassified edition published in

1976, he lamented that “one cannot fail to be disappointed by the very small number of names mentioned.”² This was especially true in the entry for operations in Greece, where not a single name was included.³ *Classical Spies* fills that void and adds a surprise: the OSS officers in Greece were archaeologists.

Brown University professor Susan Allen, herself a former field archaeologist, heard her first OSS war story during an “ouzo hour,” an informal get together of archaeologists on the island of Kea, in the Aegean Sea. Dig director Jack Caskey told a tale about his days in the OSS and his role in the Cicero spy case, made famous in the 1952 movie *Five Fingers*. Reminded of the story 20 years later when asked to give a lecture in Caskey’s memory, Allen decided to determine whether it was documented in OSS records. Her research not only confirmed Caskey’s account, it revealed the extent to which archaeologists had contributed to the OSS mission in Greece, a story not told until now.

The key figure in *Classical Spies* is archaeologist Roger Young, a Princeton PhD and heir to the Ballantine Ale fortune, whom Allen describes as a “coddled child of the gilded age.” (30) He was working on a dig in Greece at the start of the war in Europe. When Italy invaded Greece and most of his colleagues left for home, Young decided to stay and help the Greeks fight Mussolini. But the government didn’t want foreigners. Allen tells how Young progressed from this situation to

join the OSS, where he recruited many archaeologist colleagues—they knew the language, geography, and culture—to staff its Greek Desk in Washington and, later, Cairo.

The operational details of the OSS Greek Desk are fascinating in themselves, but they also reveal the archaeologists’ amazing ability to adapt to the requirements of intelligence operations and perform well as intelligence officers. The work was not all agent recruitment and collection. Allen describes the many turf battles that emerged with the archaeologists’ more experienced British compatriots. Equally challenging, the various Greek and Turkish political factions—monarchists, communists, fascists—often made support a real challenge. After the war, the archaeologists returned to their peacetime professions. None wrote a memoir of the experiences.

Classical Spies relies heavily on primary sources from the National Archives. Professor Allen unearthed the long lost official report of Jack Caskey that discussed Operation Honeymoon (detailed in chapter 10), his role in the Cicero case. The appendices provide an assessment of the contributions of the archaeologists, a listing of those involved, and the operations undertaken. *Classical Spies* fills a genuine gap in OSS history and is a truly invaluable contribution.

Dealing With the Devil: Anglo-Soviet Intelligence Cooperation During the Second World War, by Dónal O’Sullivan. (New York: Peter Lang, 2010), 337 pp., footnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

More than 500 books have been published about the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) since the end of WW II. Very few have mentioned the joint Anglo-Soviet operations that sent NKVD agents behind German lines. Nigel West gives a brief account in *Secret War* but does not indicate the magnitude of the relationship, since few documents had been released before the book’s publication.⁴ Using British and Russian documents released in 2008, Dónal O’Sullivan, an assistant professor at California State University, Northridge, has remedied that situation.

By the time Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, many of the NKVD and GRU networks operating in the West had been rounded up by the Germans. Others had been annihilated during the Soviet purges. Stalin wanted to reestablish contact with those agents remaining in Europe and set up viable new sources, but early in the war he didn’t have the capability to dispatch agents. Professor O’Sullivan explains how an arrangement was reached with the SOE for Soviet agents to be dropped into German-occupied territories. He also alludes to the less productive efforts at cooperation between the NKVD and the OSS.

² Kermit Roosevelt, *War Report of the O.S.S. (Office of Strategic Services)* (New York: Walker and Company, 1976), vol. 1, viii.

³ Roosevelt, *War Report*, vol. 2, 119–24.

⁴ See for example, Nigel West, *Secret War: The Story of SOE; Britain’s Wartime Sabotage Organization* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1992), 71–72; and Thaddeus Holt, *The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War* (New York: Scribner, 2004), 309–310.

After providing considerable background on the NKVD and SOE negotiations and planning, O'Sullivan describes selected operations and the agents that participated. More than two dozen agents were involved; all were communists and all were either from the areas into which they would be inserted or had worked there before. Some acted alone, others in teams; each team had a codename. Examples include the first Soviet agent, a woman, designated Pickaxe 1. She was landed by boat in France—the French resistance was not informed—and linked up with colleagues in Paris, where she worked until arrested. She and other members of the network were executed. A Dutch father-and-son team was recruited and dropped into Holland. Neither was well qualified; they had just wanted to go home, and the Soviets needed agents. Both were caught. The father, Willy Kruyt, was one of the few agents to survive the war.

The most complicated agent arrangement involved Bhagat Ram, an Indian communist recruited by the

NKVD and then declared to the SOE—the only known example of this arrangement—with a warning that he had very likely worked for German intelligence. Peter Fleming—Ian Fleming's older brother—called him SILVER and ran him against the Germans in India. Ram's fate remains unknown.

In the end, the Soviets gained little from cooperation with Britain. Chronic mutual distrust hampered all operations. And to make matters worse, the Germans caught most of the agents. In several cases, the agents were turned against their masters as part of what the Germans called a *Funkspiel*, or radio game

Dealing With the Devil fills a historical gap in the intelligence history of WW II. Overall, the book is well documented, though O'Sullivan's judgment that the Red Orchestra was a German myth is debatable. Running agents behind enemy lines in several countries at the same time and from a distance is a difficult job, as this book makes crystal clear.

Double Cross: The True Story of the D-Day Spies, by Ben Macintyre. (London: Bloomsbury, Ltd., 2012), 417 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, maps, index.

Two previous books by British journalist Ben Macintyre, *Agent Zigzag* and *Operation Mincemeat*, were on subjects covered in other books and movies. Yet he produced very readable, informative volumes with considerable new content. He has done the same with *Double Cross*. The classic work on the topic, Masterman's *The Double-Cross System*, provides a broad view of the program.⁵ Macintyre looks in depth at the five double agents and their handlers—British and German—who contributed the most to the D-Day deception, although a number of others are mentioned.

Four of the agents in Macintyre's book have written memoirs and thus will be familiar to some: Dusko Popov (TRICYCLE), a Yugoslav patriot and would-be man of the world who volunteered with his brother to work against the Nazis; Roman Czerniawski (BRUTUS), a Polish patriot and something of a loose cannon, although a useful one; Natalia "Lily" Sergeev (TRESURE—other sources render her surname as Sergueiev), a Russian with a pet dog that nearly ex-

posed the entire operation, but her honey trap tactics with the Germans were effective; and Juan Pujol (GARBO), portrayed elsewhere as the key to success and depicted in that role here also.⁶ The book adds some new personal details about Pujol, however. Elvira Chaudoir (BRONX), although mentioned occasionally in the literature, is not well known. MI5 used her bisexuality in order to convey erroneous information to her German handler. Macintyre relates her recruitment by MI6's Claude Dansey—and his subsequent meddling in her care—before she was turned over to MI5. On the British side, overall supervision of the double agents was provided by Tar Robertson of MI5, and Macintyre explains his role fully. The German (whether Abwehr or Gestapo) handlers varied with each agent and their strengths and vulnerabilities are analyzed. Sometimes it was dumb luck that saved the deception network from exposure.

While *Double Cross* describes the daily stresses and strains imposed on the agents, it also focuses on the bu-

⁵ John C. Masterson, *The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1972).

⁶ Dusko Popov, *Spy/Counterspy* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1973); Roman Garby-Czerniawski, *The Big Network* (London: George Ronald, 1961); Lily Sergeiev, *Secret Service Rendered: An Agent in the Espionage Duel Preceding the Invasion of France* (London: William Kember, 1968); and Juan Pujol, *GARBO* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1985).

reaucratic and personal conflicts that threatened operations. Equally important, Macintyre conveys the intricacies of running double agents when the volume of false data is high, the coordination links are many, and the possibility is ever present that agents have been discovered and turned. Fortunately, the ULTRA decrypts made it possible to know the Germans' judgments on the information passed and to make adjustments when necessary.

Enemies: A History of the FBI, by Tim Weiner. (New York: Random House, 2012) 537 pp., endnotes, index.

Pulitzer prize winner, Tim Weiner, has written several books about American intelligence. *Betrayal* was about the counterespionage failure in the Aldrich Ames case.⁷ Then came *Legacy of Ashes*, which alleged serial blundering at the CIA.⁸ In *Enemies* he has applied the same scrutiny to the FBI. All three of his books have been frequently, in most cases favorably, reviewed. In her review of *Enemies*, NPR's Dina Temple-Raston, writes that the book deals with "rumors about the FBI and its dirty tricks [that] have been circulating for years" and suggests Weiner "seeks to set the record straight on everything from providing Sen. Joseph McCarthy with secret reports to...surveillance of Martin Luther King, Jr."⁹

In fact, the book provides even wider coverage, focusing on civil liberties violations from the Palmer raids in the 1920s, to the Weathermen, Watergate, Iran-Contra, and the Bureau's growing role combating counterterrorism. The emphasis on each of these topics is on bureaucratic infighting and various political, legal, and moral issues. But aside from Mr. Weiner's gloomy views of Mr. Hoover's performance, there is little new in the book, and there are some discrepancies and omissions worth noting.

Examples of the former include the story of the 1944 black-bag job in which "the FBI broke into Amtorg's New York office and stole reams of Russian-language messages and their enciphered equivalents" that were delivered to FBI special agent Bob Lamphere (155–56)

The final chapter of *Double Cross* tells what happened to the agents after the war—double agents don't always live happily ever after. Based in part on recently released MI5 documents and illustrated with pictures of key players on both sides, Macintyre's book provides a good read and fills in some operational gaps in this famous tale. Informative and very enjoyable.

as part the VENONA operation. That story was a cover. The messages were actually collected from commercial telegraph companies.¹⁰ Then there is the assertion that NKVD agent William Weisband's penetration of VENONA "paralyzed progress." (168) Not so, future decrypts were impossible since the Soviets had already stopped using duplicate pages for their one-time-pads. The statement that Allen Dulles had been "commissioned by the Pentagon to conduct a top-secret study of the shoddy state of American spying" (169) raises an eyebrow since the study is not identified or sourced. Perhaps Mr. Weiner meant the so-called Correa Report prepared by the Intelligence Survey Group established by the National Security Council, to which Dulles contributed.¹¹ Two other examples indicate the scope of the errors. First, the KGB agent FAREWELL never defected as claimed, (353) and the Czech agent, Karl Koecher, did not work for the CIA for 10 years. (354)

The omissions include many familiar and important cases. For example, there is no mention of Yuri Nosenko or Anatoli Golitsyn and the conflict that resulted from differing judgments about them at the CIA and FBI. Similarly, Jonathan Pollard, Ronald Pelton, George Trofimoff, William Bell, and James Hall escape attention. Most curious of all, the Felix Bloch case is ignored though it figured prominently in the handling of the Robert Hanssen fiasco, which is otherwise well summarized. Lastly, the successful FBI investigation of the 11 Russian illegals—Operation Ghost Stories—is not included.

⁷ *Betrayal: The Story of Aldrich Ames, An American Spy*, by Tim Weiner, David Johnston, and Neil A. Lewis. (New York: Random House, 1995)

⁸ *Legacy of Ashes: A History of the CIA*, by Tim Wiener. (New York: Random House, 2007.) It was reviewed unfavorably in *Studies in Intelligence* 51, No. 3 (September 2007).

⁹ Dina Temple-Raston, "'Enemies: A History of the FBI' by Tim Weiner," March 23, 2012, *The Washington Post*.

¹⁰ See Robert Louis Benson and Michael Warner, *VENONA: Soviet Espionage and The American Response 1939-1957* (Washington, DC: NSA and CIA, 1995), xiii.

¹¹ See Arthur B. Darling, *The Central Intelligence Agency an Instrument of Government to 1950* (University Park: The Pennsylvania University Press, 1990), 301–302.

Overall then, it is fair to say that *Enemies* is first a review of Hoover and FBI intelligence operations—although some criminal investigations are mentioned—from the organization’s inception to the present—with intense emphasis on what Weiner deems the Bureau’s persistent disregard for legality during Hoover’s tenure. This is followed by the troubled times in the post-Hoover era and the transition to counterter-

rorist operations under Director Mueller. Only a few successful operations are noted, and many known successes are overlooked entirely. Given Weiner’s selectivity, one can’t help but wonder if his next book were to be about the history of the flight, whether it would deal primarily with crashes. *Enemies* is well written, however, with good documentation and a definite point of view.

Franco’s Friends: How British Intelligence Helped Bring Franco To Power In Spain, by Peter Day. (London: Biteback Publishing, Ltd., 2011), 243 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

In his epic history of the Spanish Civil War, Burnett Bolloten wrote that Gen. Francisco Franco was in the Canary Islands when given command “of all the militarily significant units of the Spanish Army.” They were located in Morocco. “The De Havilland Dragon Rapide, piloted by Captain Cecil Bebb, that flew General Franco secretly from the Canaries to Spanish Morocco on 18 and 19 July 1936 was chartered on 8 July in Croydon, England, by Luis Bolin, the London correspondent of a Madrid monarchist daily, *ABC*.”¹² What Bolloten didn’t write, and probably didn’t know, was that the flight was made with the help of the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and carried one of its agents, Hugh Pollard, his daughter, and one of her friends. The cover story for the flight was that it was taking a group of vacationers to the Canaries. *Franco’s Friends* reveals the secret aspects of this story with all its political implications in great detail.

After dealing with the arrangements and the flight itself, author Peter Day describes Franco’s coup and the involvement of the SIS in keeping the Foreign Office informed of Franco’s progress. British support for the Spanish monarchy involved more than political and military considerations—it also surreptitiously furnished planes and other materials to Franco’s government. Economic factors were equally important as for example, the United Kingdom’s mining interests in Spain. When the Second World War began, the British worked hard to keep Franco from siding with Hitler. Day explains the complex machinations—from persuasion to bribery—undertaken to achieve that end.

Many familiar names appear in *Franco’s Friends*. They include Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, Samuel Hoare, Kim Philby, Graham Greene, Hugh Dalton (head of the SOE), and Ian Fleming, to name a few. Day has drawn on primary source documents and interviews to tell this heretofore unknown story, and he tells it well.

Gentleman Spymaster: How Lt. Col. Tommy ‘Tar’ Robertson Double-crossed the Nazis, by Geoffrey Elliott. (London: Methuen, 2011), 332 pp., end-of-chapter notes, photos, index.

“Agent” is one of the two most misused terms in media coverage of intelligence—“double agent” is the other. A recent example appeared in an article by *Washington Post* correspondent Ian Shapira subtitled “Ex-agents claim credit.”¹³ In that case, the article discussed former intelligence officers who had recruited and handled agents and wrote memoirs about the experience. Such memoirs have become a staple in recent intelligence literature. But it was not always thus, and Geoffrey Elliott’s work is about a World War II MI5 officer who declined to write about his career.

Thomas Argyll “Tar” Robertson was born in Sumatra, educated at Sandhurst, and, shortly after leaving the Army, was recruited into MI5 by its director general, Vernon Kell. He had a natural ability for counter-intelligence work, and in WW II was the original architect of the Double-Cross system that controlled all the German agents sent to spy in Britain. Elliott describes Robertson’s early days in MI5, the agent-handling techniques he developed, how he came to recommend the use of double agents for deception, and the difficulties he overcame in supervising the Double-Cross system

¹² Burnett Bolloten, *The Spanish Civil War: Revolution and Counterrevolution* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 43.

¹³ Ian Shapira, “CIA memoirs offer revelations and settle scores among spies,” *The Washington Post*, 4 June 2012.

that deceived Hitler and his generals before D-Day. To add perspective, Elliott also provides background on the principal agents and the efforts Robertson made—in some cases dealing with them himself—to maintain their cooperation. A good example is the temperamental Russian émigré Nataliya “Lily” Sergueiew (TREASURE), whose affection for her dog nearly exposed the entire double agent operation. At times, agents’ reliability became suspect, and Robertson was forced to terminate their service or, as in the case of SNOW, have them operate from prison. And then there was the case of Yugoslav volunteer Dusko Popov (TRIYCLE), who came into contact with a not too friendly FBI. Not all of Robertson’s problems had to do with agents, and Elliott tells how he interacted with MI6 and the various deception committees in Britain as well.

The Ideal Man: The Tragedy of Jim Thompson and the American Way of War, by Joshua Kurlantzick. (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2011), 264 pp., endnotes, index.

After World War II ended in Europe, Major James Harrison Wilson Thompson was assigned to Thailand by William Donovan himself. He arrived during the final weeks of the war and never went home. In 1967, over the Easter weekend, he went to visit friends in Malaysia. One afternoon he left their cottage to go for a walk alone in the jungle. Thompson was never seen again. The 2010 book *SOLVED!* claimed that his disappearance had indeed been explained.¹⁴ But alas it had not; the book only presented speculation. *The Ideal Man* does not solve the mystery, either, but in it, journalist Joshua Kurlantzick offers the best account yet published, with new details from interviews with former OSS colleagues, CIA contacts, and Thai friends.

Kurlantzick covers Thompson’s early life in an affluent family in Delaware, his education at Princeton and the University of Pennsylvania, and his subsequent career as an architect in New York. Thompson lived well and traveled often to Europe. In 1940, at the age of 34, he enlisted in the National Guard as a private to be ready for war. Fluent in French, he was commissioned after Pearl Harbor and by late 1943 had found his way into the OSS. Following service in North Africa and France, he was transferred to Asia. He reached Thailand just after the Japanese surrender and was assigned to the OSS element in the US embassy. After the demise of the OSS, Thompson served as military attaché until late

MI5 had a unique advantage in managing the system—namely, the ability to monitor German reaction to agent reports by reading their cable traffic at Bletchley Park, where the codebreakers performed their magic. Elliott explains how Robertson used this capability to deceive.

After the war, Robertson, just 39, resigned from the service and became a gentleman farmer. His only concession to discussing his wartime service was made when he cooperated with author Nigel West in writing a history of MI5. *Gentleman Spymaster* provides unusual insights to both double agent operations and the life of one of the best at the task.

1946, when he left the military and began a life in Bangkok business and politics. The postwar business atmosphere was positive, and Thompson formed what would become the very successful Thai Silk Company—still in existence—that would supply the silk for the costumes in the movie *The King and I*. Interestingly, the wife of Thompson’s OSS colleague Kenneth Landon had written *Anna and the King of Siam*, on which the movie was based.

The success of the silk company caused problems locally for Thompson, but it was his politics that were a source of concern to the Thai government. Kurlantzick dwells on this aspect of his life in detail. Thompson was a liberal, not procommunist but certainly anti-imperialist, and he eventually came into conflict with the State Department and the FBI. At one point he was put on the do-not-contact list at the US embassy, but when William Donovan became ambassador to Thailand, Thompson met with him frequently, and the two enjoyed a good personal relationship. One can only guess at the extent to which these issues contributed to his disappearance, and Kurlantzick attempts to do so.

Jim Thompson has become a legendary figure in today’s Thailand. His silk-decorated home, where he started his business, is a museum and restaurant. *The Ideal Man* is the story of a complex, patriotic idealist

¹⁴ Edward Roy De Souza, *SOLVED!: The “Mysterious” Disappearance of Jim Thompson, the Legendary Thai Silk King* (Tarentum, PA: Word Association Publishers, 2nd Edition, 2010).

who at times cooperated with the local CIA representative but opposed the Thai military governments and US policies in Asia. Moreover, his business flourished even though his partners—mostly former OSS col-

leagues—held differing political views and sometimes opposed his positions on social welfare. Still, the real Jim Thompson remains a mystery in more ways than in his disappearance.

Joe Rochefort's War: The Odyssey of the Codebreaker Who Outwitted Yamamoto at Midway, by Elliot Carlson, with a foreword by RAdm. Donald "Mac" Showers, USN (Ret.). (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011), 572 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Joseph John Rochefort was born in 1900 in Dayton, Ohio, the youngest of seven children. Although a good student, especially in math, he dropped out of high school at 17 and joined the Navy to become a pilot. But the Navy had other ideas, and that is the story told in *Joe Rochefort's War*. Author Elliot Carlson tells how this eager, opinionated, forthright, sometimes outspoken young seaman survived manpower reductions after WW I, married his high school sweetheart, obtained a commission, and went to sea. Then, by a stroke of luck or sound Navy personnel policy, he was selected in 1925 to attend an advanced cryptanalysis class in Washington, DC. He did well. Between 1932 and 1939, Rochefort learned Japanese in Japan, had sea duty on a destroyer, carriers, and a cruiser, and was assigned to Pearl Harbor, where he became commander of a new codebreaking section called Hypo.

Rochefort's abilities had gained him strong supporters in the Navy, where Naval Academy graduates dominated the leading ranks. His personality and willingness to challenge superiors also made enemies. Carlson tracks these often conflicting forces as Rochefort worked to establish a code breaking capability under austere conditions. From a personal point of view, the Hypo billet was risky. Intelligence was not career enhancing, and future promotions were not assured. Moreover, in accepting the job, Rochefort had insisted on reporting to the commander at Pearl Harbor, Adm. Husband Kimmel, thus ruffling some feathers in OP-20-G, the Navy's cryptographic headquarters in Washington. Until Hypo was established, OP-20-G had been the source of Kimmel's intelligence, a mission it was reluctant to give up. But Rochefort prevailed and made more enemies in the process.

Rochefort assembled an impressive team of codebreakers, several with more ability than he. Hypo Station focused first on the Japanese naval code, JN-25, and then on its more difficult successor, JN-25b. Although it was evident from the results that Japan was planning a major operation in 1941, Rochefort was dismayed not to have uncovered the details by 7 December. By February of 1942, however, Hypo had made significant progress, and Carlson relates how this led to the discovery that an attack on Midway was planned. Despite continuing opposition from OP-20-G, where his superiors did not agree with him, Rochefort used a clever ruse to prove the Japanese navy was about to attack Midway. Admiral Halsey was convinced, and the rest is history.

Halsey recommended Rochefort for the Distinguished Service Medal, but his Washington enemies succeeded in denying him the award. It would eventually be awarded posthumously by President Ronald Reagan. After Midway, Rochefort was summarily transferred to a shipbuilding yard in San Francisco and later to OP-20-G. He did well in both assignments and was eventually promoted to captain. After one more sea duty assignment he retired in 1947.

Joe Rochefort's War is a story of a talented, sometimes abrasive, but always effective, officer battling the bureaucracy and unjustified criticism in a tradition-bound Navy. RAdm. Donald "Mac" Showers, who worked with Rochefort in 1942, notes in his foreword to this book that it is "an account that is long overdue." (ix) Well told and well documented, Carlson's book has done a fine job.

Memoir

Malayan Spymaster: Memoirs of a Rubber Planter, Bandit Fighter and Spy, by Boris Hembry. (Singapore: Monsoon Books, 2011), 424 pp., bibliography, appendix, glossary, photos, index.

Nineteen-year-old Boris Hembry left England for Malaya in 1930 to work on a rubber plantation. He enjoyed the work, joined the local military volunteers, and married a girl from home. Then, in 1939, life was interrupted by WW II. *Malayan Spymaster* reviews his early years but is of interest here mainly because of his war-time service. When the Japanese invaded Malaya, Hembry joined a stay-behind unit and lived in the jungle until forced to escape to Java and then to India. There he joined V-Force, a British-led stay-behind reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering organization operating in the India-Burma border region. For the next two years he collected intelligence on Japanese movements from a network of agents who, it turned out, were also working for the Japanese. But V-Force paid more and had the better end of the arrangement.

Hembry's account of his experiences adds much detail about this little-known WW II intelligence unit. His service with V-Force was interrupted when he was summoned to Calcutta for unspecified duty. He soon learned he had been "recruited" by the Inter-Services

Liaison Department, the cover name for the MI6 (SIS) element in India, because of his knowledge of Malaya. After several successful clandestine missions to Sumatra and Malaya—he was delivered by submarine—Hembry was given command of the Malayan country section. He tells of the operations he planned and executed. Most had to do with tactical reconnaissance for the Army and Navy—unusual work for MI6. At the end of the war, Hembry returned to Singapore, where his unit interrogated former prisoners and then disbanded, ending his MI6 service.

Returning to his rubber estate, Hembry tried to resume life as it had been before the war, only to be interrupted by the Malayan insurgency. He again served the British and local governments in putting it down. The counterinsurgency methods Hembry describes are instructive. In 1955, Hembry and his wife returned to England and retirement. *Malayan Spymaster* reveals a different kind of intelligence experience in a little-known part of the Pacific war.

Intelligence Abroad

Israel's Silent Defender: An Inside Look at Sixty Years of Israeli Intelligence, by Amos Gilboa and Ephraim Lapid (eds.). (Springfield, NJ: Gefen Books, 2012), 385 pp., appendices, photos, no index.

The Israeli Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center (IICC) is a nonprofit institution in Tel Aviv, founded in 1985 by Meir Amit, former head of both Israeli military intelligence and the Mossad. The IICC seeks to further public knowledge of Israel's intelligence support to national security. It operates a website, high-tech library, information center, museum, and newsletter. And now it has sponsored this book on the Israeli intelligence community.

In the introduction by the current IICC chairman, Efraim Halevy, also a former director of the Mossad, readers are warned that for security reasons, many operations are not included or even mentioned. Nevertheless, the editors have assembled 36 firsthand accounts

of intelligence operations that span the 60-year history of the three principal Israeli intelligence services—the military intelligence branch of the Israeli Defense Force, often called Aman (identified here as Israeli Defense Intelligence, or IDI); the security service, called Shabak or Shin Bet (referred to in this book as Israel Security Agency, or ISA); and the foreign intelligence agency, the Mossad, whose name is the Hebrew word for "institute."

The contributions are divided into six sections. In the first, the heads of the three services describe their missions. Section two tells how and why each branch was formed. The third section deals with operations, both successful and failed. Examples of the former include

the attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981, the Entebbe rescue raid in 1976, and intelligence preparations for the Six Day War. Operation Suzanna, or the Lavon Affair, is an example of a covert action gone wrong, and its political consequence is explained.¹⁵ Section four depicts intelligence challenges in various geographic areas of the Middle East, with emphasis on terrorism and the Iranian nuclear threat. Of particular interest is the chapter on how terrorist organizations influence believers to support aggression. Section five gives a brief tutorial on principal intelligence functions and the roles of the military services. The final section, "The Dynamics of Israeli Intelligence Activity," includes a substantial article on the Mossad by Halevy.

There are also chapters on the operational demands put on the services, the relationships between decision-makers and the services, and the Revision Department.

Learning from the Secret Past: Cases in British Intelligence History, by Robert Dover and Michael S. Goodman (eds.). (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 313 pp., end-of-chapter notes, index.

Books on intelligence with contributions from practitioners and academics are generally of two types. The first is the "reader" with articles that cover a broad view of the profession. The second examines a narrower perspective. *Learning from the Secret Past* falls into this second category, and with a unique twist based on British experience. The editors preface the work by arguing that the "failure to appreciate historical lessons is a widespread problem...particularly within intelligence communities." (xi) An introduction by David Omand—a former director of Britain's GCHQ and one-time intelligence and security coordinator in the Cabinet Office—reviews the importance of considering history in analysis. Following are 11 contributions divided into four sections: "The Organization and Oversight of Intelligence," "Political Interference in Intelligence," "Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism," and "Avoiding Surprise." Each chapter in these sections is based on real-world cases, and each includes excerpts of relevant official documents.

The first chapter, by Michael Herman, a former secretary of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), deals with a January 1945 report, *The Intelligence Machine*, which made recommendations for the organization and functions of peacetime intelligence organizations. Her-

This department, also known as the Devil's Advocate Department, may be unique to the Israeli intelligence community. It analyzes current operational plans with an eye toward avoiding past mistakes. The final chapter considers problems that can result from collective thinking. The author encourages open discussion of decisions made by persons "at the top of the pyramid." (316) There are also three appendices. The first is a chronology of key events and the leaders involved, the second contains brief summaries of operations not covered elsewhere, and the third lists the heads of the intelligence services from their origins to the present. The photographs, in color and black and white, illustrate important buildings, people, and events in Israel's intelligence history. Altogether, *Israel's Silent Defender* provides a fine summary of the origins and present-day configuration of Israel's intelligence community.

man discusses the report's influence on today's intelligence community and what might have been if some of its recommendations had not been rejected. This is followed by a chapter on the Intelligence Services Act of 1994, which established a formal oversight mechanism and publicly acknowledged SIS, among other things. A section on political interference includes two chapters with examples. The section on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism has one chapter on the British experience in Malaya and two chapters on aspects of Northern Ireland. The final section has four chapters, the first of which addresses the Suez Crisis. The second examines Oleg Penkovsky's contribution to the Cuban missile crisis, whether was he "an instrument of disinformation," (250) and the importance of communicating with decisionmakers. The third chapter discusses the 1980 Nicoll Report, commissioned by the JIC, which analyzed how well the intelligence services had done in predicting foreign acts of aggression—the report, submitted 29 days before Argentina surprised the British by invading the Falklands, highlighted various "analyst traps." The final chapter, "Lessons Learned: What the History of British Intelligence Can Tell Us about the Future," reemphasizes the importance of learning from history while recognizing that lessons don't always apply directly to current situations.

¹⁵ The operation involved placement by agents of explosives in Egypt in 1954. The bombings were to be made to look like acts of violence by the Muslim Brotherhood.

This is a thoughtful, informative book that applies to the profession generally and makes a unique contribution in another way: it is the first book on British intel-

ligence that does not mention the so-called Cambridge Spies.

Main Intelligence Outfits of Pakistan, by P.C. Joshi. (New Delhi: Anmol Publications, 2008), 484 pp., bibliography, photos, no index.

P. C. Joshi is a lawyer and a former Indian civil servant who served in Pakistan for four years in the early 1990s. His book deals with the three primary Pakistani intelligence agencies—Intelligence Bureau (IB), Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and Military Intelligence (MI)—although it mentions other smaller units from time to time. It is organized in three parts preceded by a brief history on the importance of intelligence. Part I, some 50 pages, describes the IB, the security agency concerned with “collection of political intelligence inside the country” and “intelligence pertaining to crimes, espionage, and anti-national activities.” (21) Part II, nearly 400 pages, discusses the ISI organization, which Joshi says “from all accounts is decidedly a rogue agency.” (71) He finds its tentacles in all aspects of Pakistani domestic and foreign affairs, something of an invisible government. Part III, a mere 12 pages, is titled “Military Intelligence,” and it provides only cursory treatment of

the topic. Organization charts are provided only for the first two parts.

Several aspects of the book are worth keeping in mind. First, most of the book consists of articles written by others, inserted without explanatory comment. Second, its organization is disjointed, and in some cases the chapter titles don’t match the table of contents. Finally, there are legitimate reasons for asking if the author got it right—it becomes clear after he discusses Pakistan-Indian disputes, that Mr. Joshi views ISI encirclement as a genuine, continuing threat—and the answer in this case is that one cannot tell. Where there is mention of a source, it is secondary, usually an opinion piece.

Main Intelligence Outfits of Pakistan is an intriguing title but it doesn’t add much to public knowledge, and it is badly in need of editing. Use with caution.

The Politics of Counterterrorism in India: Strategic Intelligence and National Security in South Asia, by Prem Mahadevan. (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2012), 297 pp., endnotes, bibliography, appendices, index.

Author Prem Mahadevan is a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies in Zurich. In this book, which is based on his doctoral work at King’s College, London, he analyzes the role of intelligence in countering terrorism in India and concludes that “counterterrorist failures in India are caused by the poor responsiveness of decisionmakers (that is, intelligence consumers) to strategic intelligence.” (11) And he goes on to suggest that his results also apply to other nations faced with the same problem. These are bold assertions for an analyst without any hands-on experience, and one is justified in asking whether decisionmakers and intelligence officers should take him seriously. It is a help that in the foreword, Ajit Doval, the former director of India’s Intelligence Bureau (IB), makes it clear that he supports Mahadevan’s methodology and conclusions.

Mahadevan studied the work of other researchers and applied it to a model he developed. He found that “there was no demonstrable correlation between Indian counterterrorist performance and purely organizational fac-

tors that affect national intelligence agencies.” (13) Thus the key variable in these situations was personnel. With this in mind, he examined track records of the two principal Indian intelligence agencies—the IB and the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW), as related to the counterintelligence capabilities of terrorist groups. As metrics, he examines political consistency, operational capacity, and operational coordination of the main players—all of which he seems to have found lacking. These are admittedly subjective measures, and he devotes a chapter to each one, explaining the concepts and applying them to historical Indian terrorism cases. Examples include selected Sikh and Kashmiri separatist clashes and the many attacks on Mumbai.

He sums up by offering some alternatives to the current Indian approach to countering terrorism in general and Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in particular. But he is firm in his judgment that India’s counterterrorist failures are not the fault of strategic assessments, but “rather in the inability or unwillingness of consumers to follow up on them.”

The Politics of Counterterrorism in India is a very detailed conceptual analysis, supported by case studies, and backed by secondary sources. It is well worth seri-

ous attention by those concerned with the analyst-decisionmaker relationship.

Stalin's Man in Canada: Fred Rose and Soviet Espionage, by David Levy. (New York: Enigma Books, 2011), 265 pp., footnotes, photos, index.

Fishel Rosenberg, aka Fred Rose, was born in Poland in 1907. He emigrated to Canada with his family during WW I and settled in Montreal. At 18, encouraged by his older brother and enamored of the promises of communism, he joined the Young Communist League and later the Canadian Communist Party—long before the party became legal. His participation in labor activities brought him to the attention of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and in 1931 he was arrested for sedition and spent a year in prison. He was more careful after his release and gradually developed a talent for pamphlet writing and for speaking at rallies. By 1940 he had been recruited by the NKVD and had contacts with Elizabeth Bentley and Jacob Golos, who ran a network of agents that included Rose. During the WW II, Rose was elected to Parliament, the first communist to become an MP. After the war, his espionage activities were exposed by the GRU defector Igor Gouzenko and later confirmed by Bentley. The resultant investigation led to Rose's arrest in 1946, along with a number of oth-

er agents. His supporters declared the process a witch hunt, but he and several of his fellow agents were ultimately convicted. Rose spent the next five years in prison and, stripped of his Canadian citizenship, was subsequently deported. He died in Warsaw in 1983, a disillusioned believer.

In Canadian historian David Levy's depiction, Rose comes across as what Lenin called "a useful idiot." He didn't accomplish much, and Levy devotes considerable space to stories of the more productive agents who crossed his path. While this book is generally accurate, Levy's claim that NKVD illegal Gaik Ovakimyan collected "bomb material from Klaus Fuchs through Harry Gold" (52) can't be true. Ovakimyan had left the United States before Fuchs arrived. *Stalin's Man in Canada* illustrates the power of the communist ideology and the consequences that befell so many who followed Stalin to the end. It is well documented and a useful contribution to the literature of espionage.

Stasi Decorations and Memorabilia: Volume II, by Ralph Pickard, with a foreword by Ambassador Hugh Montgomery. (Lorton, VA: Frontline Historical Publishing, 2012), 350 pp., bibliography, photos, no index.

Volume 1 of *Stasi Decorations and Memorabilia*, reviewed in *Studies in Intelligence* in 2008, focused on certificates, medals and other awards presented to members of the Ministry for State Security (MfS), or Stasi, during its notorious existence.¹⁶ As Ambassador Hugh Montgomery points out in his foreword, the current volume continues where the first left off and adds new categories, with color reproductions and photographs of the various awards.

The first chapter depicts items that could not be not included in chapters 12 ("Additional DDR award documents presented to MfS personnel") and 13 ("Foreign presentations to MfS personnel") of the first volume. Succeeding chapters are devoted to Stasi units, most notably the Wachregiment F. Dzierzynski, the Free German Youth, the MfS Academy, and the Dynamo sports

clubs sponsored by the MfS. There are also chapters on miscellaneous topics, for example, the rank and structure of the MfS, birthday and anniversary documents, KGB awards given to the Stasi officers, and the use of numerous seals and ink stamps to maintain security—a practice identical to that of the KGB. A special chapter on Richard Sorge and Felix Dzierzynski memorabilia expands on the brief attention they received in volume 1. The final chapter updates and expands on decorations and memorabilia mentioned in volume 1.

Each chapter starts with introductory background information. To assure authenticity, author Ralph Pickard enlisted former Stasi officers to validate the commentary and descriptions for each item. Despite the great quantity of awards, photos, statues, and certificates in both volumes, Pickard stresses that only a portion of the

¹⁶ Hayden B. Peake, "The Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf," *Studies in Intelligence* 52, No 3 (September 2008): 52.

total has been included here. For those concerned with Stasi history and culture, the *Stasi Decorations and Memorabilia* volumes are invaluable.

