Using Robots for Analysis

Bitter Memories: The Fall of Saigon, April 1975

From the Archive:
The Intelligence Role in Counterinsurgency

Book Reviews

World War II Special Ops in Crete

Half-Life: The Divided Life of Bruno Montecorvo
The Great War of Our Time
Chinese Industrial Espionage
Spies, Patriots, and Traitors
*The Fighting Group against Inhumanity*
All the Old Knives

Defence Intelligence and the Cold War
John McCone as DCI
Death in the Congo
Surveillance and Spies in the Civil War

Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf

Mission	The mission of *Studies in Intelligence* is to stimulate within the Intelligence Community the constructive discussion of important issues of the day, to expand knowledge of lessons learned from past experiences, to increase understanding of the history of the profession, and to provide readers with considered reviews of public media concerning intelligence.
	The journal is administered by the Center for the Study of Intelligence, which includes the CIA's History Staff, CIA's Lessons Learned Program, and the CIA Museum. CSI also provides the curator of the CIA's Historical Intelligence Collection of Literature. In addition, it houses the Emerging Trends Program, which seeks to identify the impact of future trends on the work of US intelligence.

Contributions	*Studies in Intelligence* welcomes articles, book reviews, and other communications. Hardcopy material or data discs (preferably in .doc or .rtf formats) may be mailed to:
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Awards	The Sherman Kent Award of $3,500 is offered annually for the most significant contribution to the literature of intelligence submitted for publication in *Studies*. The prize may be divided if two or more articles are judged to be of equal merit, or it may be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently outstanding. An additional amount is available for other prizes.
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	Unless otherwise announced from year to year, articles on any subject within the range of *Studies*' purview, as defined in its masthead, will be considered for the awards. They will be judged primarily on substantive originality and soundness, secondarily on literary qualities. Members of the Studies Editorial Board are excluded from the competition.
	The Editorial Board welcomes readers' nominations for awards.

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Contents

1. Editor's note (1 Feb 2016): Due to a production error, one page of the reprint of "The Intelligence Role in Counterinsurgency" was omitted from the printed version of this issue and its earlier digital versions. It has been inserted in the digital versions of the book and article.

Intelligence in Public Literature (cont.)

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The Case for Using Robots in Intelligence Analysis

Puong Fei Yeh

Is it possible that automation could determine the demand for intelligence analysts?

From music to cars, the trend of automation—machines substituting human labor—is quickening. An article published in the *MIT Technology Review* in 2012 posed the question, "Can creativity be automated?" The author then told the story of Music Xray[a] which possesses technology to detect potential hit songs by using algorithms that compare a song's constituent parts—tempo, rhythm, pitch—against those of historical top hits.[1] In March 2015, the e-commerce giant, Amazon, obtained US regulatory approval to begin testing its drone delivery service.[2] At the same time, Tesla Motors announced that it would roll-out autonomous driving technology.[3] Microsoft cofounder Bill Gates once commented that software substitution will ultimately affect workers ranging from drivers to waiters: "Twenty years from now, labor demand for lots of skill sets will be substantially lower, and I don't think people have that in their mental model."[4] Is it possible that automation could determine the demand for intelligence analysts?

Automated Analysis: It's everywhere

In a story heard all too often these days, my credit card company recent-ly stopped my card from being used for purchases in Kentucky that I had not made. For this action to occur, the company (or rather, its software) probably spotted purchases made several hundred miles apart and within minutes of each other. It drew the conclusion that I could not have been in two places at once, buying a TV at a WalMart in Kentucky and a coffee at Dunkin Donuts in Boston. Or maybe the software spotted a series of low value transactions that preceded the attempt to buy the TV.

Companies on Wall Street automate stock trades based on real-time analysis of news. In a span of two minutes during the early afternoon of 23 April 2013, the stock market fell 100 points before it recovered. The cause of the plunge was a fake tweet from a hacked Associated Press (AP) Twitter account claiming the White House had been attacked. The event underscored the extent to which companies analyze news in real-time to exploit market-moving news.[5] Dataminr Inc., a leading company in providing real-time social media analytics to financial institutions, analyzes hundreds of millions of tweets a day to uncover market-moving news. Last September when a journalist tweeted that Home Depot was the victim of a cyber attack, Dataminr sent out an alert to its subscribers nearly 15 minutes ahead of news wires and before Home Depot's share price declined 2 percent.[6]

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a. The company describes itself as a "song and talent filter," linking artists and composers with potential employers.

The Open Source Indicators project aims to "develop methods for continuous, automated analysis of publicly available data in order to anticipate and/or detect significant societal events..."

The Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, the Intelligence Community's (IC's) blue-skies research arm, is sponsoring the Open Source Indicators (OSI) project.[7] OSI aims to "develop methods for continuous, automated analysis of publicly available data in order to anticipate and/or detect significant societal events such as political crises, humanitarian crises, mass violence, riots, mass migrations, disease outbreaks, economic instability, resource shortages, and responses to natural disasters."[8] In early 2014, OSI claimed to have detected disease outbreaks in Latin America up to two weeks before they were reported by local media or official government authorities.[9]

The Rise of Machine Reporters

On 17 March 2014, the *Los Angeles Times* ran a nearly 150-word story that gained attention not for its content—a report of an earthquake aftershock—but for how it was written.

> *"Earthquake aftershock: 2.7 quake strikes near Westwood*
>
> March 17, 2014, By Ken Schwencke
>
> *A shallow magnitude 2.7 earthquake aftershock was reported Monday morning four miles from Westwood, according to the U.S. Geological Survey. The temblor occurred at 7:23 a.m. Pacific time at a depth of 4.3 miles.*

> *A magnitude 4.4 earthquake was reported at 6.25 a.m. and was felt over a large swath of Southern California.*
>
> *According to the USGS, the epicenter of the aftershock was five miles from Beverly Hills, six miles from Santa Monica and six miles from West Hollywood.*
>
> *In the last 10 days, there has been one earthquake of magnitude 3.0 or greater centered nearby.*
>
> *This information comes from the USGS Earthquake Notification Service and this post was created by an algorithm written by the author.* [Emphasis added]*"[10]

Although the *Los Angeles Times* printed Schwenke's name in the byline, the actual author was the program he designed, Quakebot.

From writing corporate earnings reports to sports stories, natural-language generation—the process of machines generating narratives based on data—is taking hold.[11] Participants in a 2014 study could not tell whether a recap of a football game was written by a human or machine.[12] Yahoo's partnership with North Carolina-based Automated Insight enables millions of team owners in Yahoo Fantasy Football to receive automated status updates on their team's performance, including automated trash talk.[13,14]

In 2014, AP, partnering with Automated Insights, automated the writing of corporate earnings reports. In March, the AP announced plans to expand the use of the automation technology to cover college sports.[15] Commenting on the technology's impact, the AP noted automation allowed the production of 10 times as many stories per quarter as its reporters could previously accomplish.[16,17]

The IC's venture capital firm, In-Q-Tel, has taken notice. In 2013, In-Q-Tel and Chicago-based Narrative Sciences announced a strategic partnership and technology development agreement to create a version of Narrative Science's automated analysis software, *Quill*, for the IC.[18] Narrative Science began its work with automated sports reports and is now generating earnings previews for *Forbes*, mutual fund performance reports for financial institutions, and investment research reports.[19] The first paragraphs of a March 2015 report for Forbes.com illustrates the power of Quill.

> *Wall Street is optimistic about Barnes & Noble, which is slated to report its third quarter results on Tuesday, March 10, 2015. Analysts project a profit of $1.19 a share, a rise from 86 cents per share a year ago.*
>
> *The consensus estimate remains unchanged over the past month, but it has increased from three months ago when it was $1.10. Analysts are projecting earnings of 28 cents per share for the fiscal year. Analysts look for revenue to decrease 5% year-over-year to $1.90 billion for the quarter, after being $2 billion a year ago. For the year,*

revenue is projected to come in at $6.05 billion.

Written narrative is important because it is the primary way information and insights are communicated to most people. As one writer noted, "just as words cannot really turn into pictures, pictures cannot replace words in terms of their ability to convey clear, (mostly) unambiguous information."[20]

That the adoption of automated journalism is occurring during the Big Data era is not a coincidence. A 2012 study sponsored by information technology provider EMC and market research and analysis firm IDC concluded that 23 percent of the information in the "digital universe" was potentially useful if tagged and analyzed, but right now only 3 percent of that digital data is tagged and even less (under 1 percent) is analyzed.[21]

Today's computing technology and advances in information storage mean volumes of past and real-time data being created at high velocity are now exploitable.[22] With increased amounts of data for analysis, there is increased demand for people and machines to make sense of *and* act on that data. The "global economy is beginning to operate truly in real-time, with constant streams of data showing where consumers are shopping, ships are traveling, energy and money are flowing," according to the Mckinsey Global Institute.[23]

Where companies like Automated Insights and Narrative Science fit into the Big Data landscape is that their technology, which is scalable, can analyze complex and high volumes of data and autonomously translate those insights into plain English.

> **Today's computing technology and advances in information storage mean volumes of past and real-time data being created at high velocity are now exploitable.**

According to Narrative Science CEO Stuart Frankel, "imagine the amount of time and money companies are spending taking data, trying to get a couple of interesting things out of that data, and then putting it into PowerPoint or Word. It takes an extraordinary amount of effort."[24]

Robots in Intelligence

In spite of the numbers of agencies (17) that comprise the IC, analytical writing across the community follows a general formula and style. Some even view intelligence writing as somewhat mechanistic or borderline robotic. Many analysts use templates, which have specific guidance on how to structure an intelligence story according to the topic. Whether you are a puzzle solver—those who try to connect the proverbial dots—or a mystery framer—those who focus on "political and societal questions related to people, such as regional issues, national intent, or group intentions and plans"—the written narrative remains the principal means of delivering analysis to their audiences.[25]

Typically within the first paragraph, analysts describe a new development and give their bottom-line take on the development. The remaining paragraphs address reasons for the development and the last paragraph or paragraphs provide implications and outlook or suggest opportunities to capitalize or manage the risk of the development. Often below each paragraph are bulleted points that provide "evidence" or supporting analytical reasoning.

The deliverable or the intelligence product can take many forms, ranging from PowerPoint slides to reports running several pages in length. Topics covered range from political and economic issues to terrorism and weapons development. The underlying narrative formula, however, for these stories is the same. Start with a development—nefarious guy in country X is preparing to do bad things in country Y—and explain to the intended audience the cause and significance of this development.

Story templates and data—both of which are in abundance in the IC—are essential for natural-language generation. To date, the technology's rise to prominence is its capacity to autonomously analyze and generate stories based on quantitatively-rich data. Statistical data that can be compared across time and against other like data is particularly well-suited for natural-language generation. This is why the technology's most well-known applications center on sports and financial-related topics.

To summarize a football game, for instance, one would want to know the key play or set of plays that led to the outcome. Was it time of possession or yards or total offensive yards gained that swung the game towards the final outcome? Using data from sports analytics platforms that provide continual updated odds of winning given a certain play, down and distance, and remaining time, natural-language generation can be used to automate this type of analysis.[26] The platform

Stories that center on quantitative data (e.g., measurements) are probably most suitable for natural language generation.

would then compare the game against a broader context. How unique was this outcome in the current season? How about compared to the past 10 seasons? The last step involves translating the analysis into the written narrative.[27, 28]

One also can tailor the narrative to suit different readers. Suppose you're a fan of the losing team, would you really want to read a recap of how the opposing team put up four touchdowns and 400 yards, breaking multiple records in the process? In fact, Big Ten conference officials approached NarrativeScience about writing stories that were less embarrassing for the losing team. When NarrativeScience covered little league games, its platform left out dropped fly balls to soften the blow to parents' egos.[29]

In the IC, the data that underpins analytical assessments are derived from across the "INTs" (i.e., human, signals, imagery, and measurement and signatures intelligence). The data can be qualitative or quantitative in nature. Qualitative data can come from the interpretation of person-to-person conversations or documentary information. Quantitative data can take the form of technical signatures or characteristics of a specific target. Imagery data can have both quantitative and qualitative aspects. Single or multiple sources of intelligence can be used to directly or indirectly support analytic reasoning. The evidence underlying analysis is messy and contradictory.

Possibilities and Challenges in Automating Analysis

What intelligence stories might natural-language generation write? Stories that center on quantitative data (e.g., measurements) are probably most suitable for natural-language generation. Measurement and signature intelligence gleaned from tests of an adversary's new ballistic missile, for example, would seem like a good fit. The data acquired during a test could include information on the composition of the exhaust or distinctive radar signatures and emissions or trajectories and distances from launch to impact. With such information from a current test together with data from previous tests or tests involving different missiles, comparisons can be made against current and historical data and patterns. One could structure a story on the significance of the most recent test or just focus on a discrete aspect of the test itself, for example, the composition of the missile exhaust.

The following is a hypothetical example of the possibilities of natural-language generation based on a declassified intelligence report about a 1980 Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile test.[30]

Title: Missile Launch Preparations are underway involving Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

Bottom Line: Recent construction of tracking equipment facilities and activities at a missile production plant suggest launch preparations are underway.

Summary: In late November 1979, construction of two, new facilities to house launch alignment equipment occurred at the Shuangchengzi Surface-to-Surface Missile Complex. These facilities were larger than the old facilities, suggesting that the larger facilities house new types of alignment equipment. During the same month, activities observed at the Shanghai/Minhang Missile Production Plant were consistent with the transport of intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Shanghai/Minhang production plan is associated with CSL-2 space launch vehicles.

The parts of the above story that are quantitative are the dimensions of the launch alignment facilities and signatures associated with the transport of missiles at a previously identified missile production plant. From this collection of data, a computer searches for insight asking analytical questions of the sort an analyst might ask.

- What missiles are associated with the missile production plant?

- With regard to physical dimensions, how is the new launch alignment complex different from the old complex?

- What is the significance of the missile transport activities?

- What is the significance of both occurrences—construction of new facilities and missile transport activities—occurring in the same time frame?

- Have these occurrences coincided before and if so what occurred afterwards?

Typical capabilities embedded in natural-language generation technology include regression analysis, time series modeling, and other statistical approaches. Translating these analytic insights into a narrative involves the computer understanding the style and structure of analytical products. For the hypothetical title, "Missile Launch Preparations are Underway involving Intercontinental Ballistic Missile," the computer needs to generate a headline that communicates the message of the report within a specified word limit. Similarly, for the bottom line, the computer needs to communicate the gist of the story while avoiding technical jargon that only specialists would understand. With automation, however, different narratives could be generated from the same data to suit different audiences. A policymaker's analytical needs are different from those of a Chinese ballistic missile analyst.

A more challenging task for natural-language generation is creating stories based on qualitative information, although some qualitative data is more conducive to measurement than others. Measuring sentiment through analysis of social media probably is an easier task for natural-language generation than figuring out an adversary's plans and intentions based on fragmentary reporting from multiple intelligence sources.

The United Nations-sponsored Global Pulse Initiative, in 2012, successfully predicted an increase in the price of foodstuffs in Indonesia several weeks ahead of government indices by measuring popular senti-ment through Twitter.[31] Now imagine a natural-language generated story on the same topic that says, "based on the increasing intensity of popular discontent regarding foodstuff prices over the past three months, inflation probably has increased between X and Y percent. Compared with the past five years, the current estimated level of inflation represents a new high. The last time the inflation reached new levels, riots occurred in Jakarta and other major population centers. . ."

Producing assessments on a government's intent and plans are a greater challenge for natural-language generation since the underlying data is mostly unmeasurable. The intelligence reporting that analysts use to produce these types of assessments could span lengthy periods of time, consist of information from multiple sources across topics as diverse as domestic politics and defense industries. They also involve intuition.

For example, determining a country's threshold for initiating a military offensive over a territorial dispute may require information on the capabilities of its military forces (current and projected), dynamics of senior political-military decision-making, and similar information on other internal and external actors. Assessing military force capability, alone, require judgments about forces' readiness, structure, and sophistication of military equipment and personnel capabilities and will. Of these, sophistication of equipment may be most measurable. Now imag-ine some of the information on the aforementioned factors is missing or fragmentary. In the financial services industry—a data rich environment for measurement—natural-language generation still has "trouble processing the qualitative information central to most analysts' jobs."[32]

A question separate from whether natural-language generation can effectively process qualitative information is which can tell a better story, humans or computers? In comparing two Disney corporate earnings reports—reports that natural-language generation currently process—*Slate* columnist Will Oremus noted, "[a] good story about Disney requires a journalist who already has a conception of what the company is about and why it's important in the wider scheme of things. . . . [the] piece also draws on [Ryan Nakashima's] understanding of the big abstract questions looming over 21st-century business management. Are big content brand acquisitions, in general, worth the money?"[33] For some kinds of story-telling, processing power, alone, may be insufficient, and therefore some automated intelligence stories do require a human touch.[34]

Rebalancing Analytic Resources

As is widely known, one of the big challenges confronting the IC is the ever increasing volume of data that requires timely analysis and the speed with which data is created and distributed. Adding another layer to these challenges is the IC's requirement to maintain a watch over nearly

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> *A question separate from whether natural language generation can effectively process qualitative information is which can tell a better story, humans or computers?*

> *Why not let robots help in analysis and writing and free up human analysts to engage in the exhaustive research and creative efforts necessary to confront the dangers we face now and will face in the future?*

the entire globe. US policymakers and the public expect the IC to be capable of providing warning in any part of the world where events may affect US national security and interests.[35] This often results in a situation in which a handful of countries (China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia) and topics (terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) attract the most collection and analytical resources while remaining countries and topics attract much less.

Automation could help the community address the imbalance by permitting it to realign resources differently. For example, if analysis of developments like missile tests or changes of military force dispositions were automated and quickly communicated with little human involvement delivery of intelligence reports on these developments could be completed and disseminated much more quickly as time on analysis, drafting, editing, and reviewing would be reduced.

In the case of AP, automating news reports on corporate earnings resulted in "far fewer errors" than appeared in manually written reports.[36] More importantly, automation allowed organizations to shift resources to their greatest need. For the AP, automation allowed it to "focus more reporters on higher-end enterprise stories *that break news that no one else has* [emphasis added]."

Ken Schwencke, the journalist and developer of *Los Angeles Times'* Quakebot, said, "it [natural-language generation] saves people a lot of time, and for certain types of stories, it gets the information out there in usually about as good a way as anybody else would. The way I see it is it doesn't eliminate anybody's job as much as it makes everybody's job more interesting."[37]

Another potential benefit may be that IC producers of analysis may be able to more effectively tailor their products for different—and possibly a wider range of—consumers. Today, analysts tend to be focused on the needs—both in content and style—of specific audiences. Demands from multiple consumers compete for the time and attention of analysts and their managers. Consequently, prioritization will lead to some customer's needs being unmet, imperfectly met, or ignored. Natural-language article generation can help cover some of those gaps. During the football season, Yahoo Fantasy Football delivers personalized stories to millions of its users on their teams' status. The goal of Automated Insights CEO Robbie Allen is to deliver tailored analysis on a massive scale— "[i]nstead of one story with a million page view[s], we'll have a million stories with one page view each.[38]

Earlier this year, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee about the landscape of threats facing the United States.[39] Declaring that the new normal is "unpredictable instability," he provided a grim picture of our world and the uncertainty in predicting how threats will unfold. As the same time, the IC faces increased demand for intelligence during a time of constrained budgets.

Why not let robots help in analysis and writing and free up human analysts to engage in the exhaustive research and creative efforts necessary to confront the dangers we face now and will face in the future?

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Bitter Memories: The Fall of Saigon, April 1975

Tom Glenn

> **I listened to anything I could hear to keep track of what was happening. It was April 1975. I was in Saigon waiting for the North Vietnamese to attack.**

Day la nhung tin tuc cua Tieng Noi Hué Ky phat thanh tu thu do Hoa Thinh Don.

("Here is the news from the Voice of America, broadcast from the capital, Washington.") That's what I heard every day—the Voice of America in Vietnamese. I listened to the BBC, I listened to the American Radio Service, I listened to anything I could hear to keep track of what was happening. It was April 1975. I was in Saigon waiting for the North Vietnamese to attack.

As a speaker of Chinese, French, and Vietnamese, I'd been operating in Vietnam under cover on and off for 13 years. My job was signals intelligence (SIGINT), the intercept and exploitation of the communications of the invading North Vietnamese. I was an employee of the National Security Agency, but my connection with NSA was classified; my name was redacted from unclassified NSA documents. Now, after 40 years, my work has been declassified, and I can tell the story of what happened.

My final stint in 'Nam was in 1974 and 1975. As the head of the covert NSA operation in Saigon, I had two missions: to keep the US ambassador, Graham Martin, abreast of signals intelligence on the North Vietnamese, and to assist the government of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) in its own signals intelligence effort. Our suite of offices was in what had been the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) building, by that time named the Defense Attaché Office or DAO building. The edifice was so huge we called it "Pentagon East." It was located on the military side of Tan Son Nhat airport on the northern edge of Saigon in a compound that housed other buildings, several parking lots, tennis courts, and incinerators. That's where I was when the North Vietnamese attacked us.

Meanwhile, my wife, our four children, and I lived in an elegant villa on Le van Duyet Street in the residential section of Saigon, near the presidential palace. That's where they were when a disgruntled South Vietnamese pilot bombed the palace not long before the city fell.

The author with his daughter, Susan, in Saigon during his first tour in 1963. Photo © author.

SOUTH VIETNAM

THE FINAL DAYS

ELEVATION IN METERS

0   200   500   1000   OVER

0   20   40   60   80

SCALE OF MILES

16

- ▶ Communist advances, March 1975
- ▶ Communist advances, April-May 1975

Note: There are two major monsoon seasons in South Vietnam. Generally, it rains heavily from May to September southwest of a line Tuy Duc-Di Linh and from November to March north of that line. In the "dry" season, many areas that were swampy in the monsoon turn to dust. Wet and dry seasons vary considerably in both time and intensity from area to area.

Map courtesy of the United States Military Academy History Department (http://www.westpoint.edu/history/SitePages/Our%20Atlases.aspx)

Beginning of the End

For me, the story of the fall of Saigon begins in January, 1975, with the North Vietnamese army's conquest of Phuoc Long Province, some 60 miles north of Saigon. SIGINT revealed that infiltration of men and matériel from North Vietnam had spiked since the autumn of 1974, always an indication that an offensive was coming, and other intelligence indicators of a forthcoming attempt to take Phuoc Long were unmistakable. Nevertheless, the surprise communist victory was an unparalleled blow; it was the first time during the entire war that the North Vietnamese had captured and held a whole province, including the provincial capital.

As I learned later, North Vietnam was testing American resolve: would we Americans keep our solemn pledge to counterstrike if the North Vietnamese violated the cease fire signed in Paris in 1973? The seizure of Phuoc Long was a gross violation. We did nothing.

With a shift in the pit of my stomach, I went over our own evacuation strategy and assured myself that each of my men in the field—at Can Tho in the south, Pleiku in the highlands, and Da Nang in the north—was covered in the escape plans of the State Department consuls in those areas. I confirmed that I could reach each of our reps by both phone *and* radio if things went to pieces suddenly.

By the end of February, it was clear that the focus of the next North Vietnamese campaign was to be in the northern half of the country, the highlands and I Corps. Communist units in both areas were on the move.

> **With a shift in the pit of my stomach, I went over our own evacuation strategy and assured myself that each of my men in the field . . . was covered in the escape plans of the State Department consuls in those areas.**

On 9 March, I flew north with my counterpart, a South Vietnamese general, on his C-47 to Phu Bai, near Hué in the far north; to Pleiku in the central highlands; and thence to Ban Me Thuot in the southern reach of the highlands. Our purpose was to visit units under the general's command to prepare them for the coming onslaught. In Pleiku, during a courtesy call with the commander of II Corps, Major General Pham Van Phu, things turned sour. The general I was traveling with and the II Corps intelligence staff chief tried to persuade General Phu that Ban Me Thuot would be the first target of the communist campaign in the highlands. Intercept of North Vietnamese communications made that clear. The II Corps commander was unpersuaded. He doubted the communists were preparing to strike, and if they were, II Corps headquarters would be the logical focus of the offensive. After all, he was the most important man in the highlands, and he was at II Corps headquarters in Pleiku.

My counterpart cut short our trip, and we flew directly, that afternoon, to Ban Me Thuot. The first barrages against Ban Me Thuot had been launched that morning. Not long after we landed, while the general was inspecting his troops, I watched a battle erupt in the valley to the west of the ridge where the airstrip was located. We took off for Saigon just as the runway came under fire.

Ban Me Thuot fell within days, and South Vietnamese President Nguyen van Thieu ordered the evac-uation of the highlands, starting on 15 March. The result was mass chaos as the military and the civilian population panicked and fled. All major roads to the coast were by then under the control of the North Vietnamese; fleeing military and civilians clogged the only open road, Route 7B, a secondary bypass, barely more than a trail in places, while the North Vietnamese repeatedly attacked them.

Route 7B came to be called "The Trail of Blood and Tears." Something like 18,000 South Vietnamese troops were killed or captured; losses among civilians were over 100,000. The highlands fell within the week.

Almost at once, I Corps, the northern five provinces of South Vietnam, crumbled. Eighty thousand refugees jammed the roads and ports, vainly trying to escape the communists.

With the northern half of the country now captured, communist forces moved south toward Saigon. I knew capitulation was imminent.

To reduce the number of in-country people I was responsible for, I considered sending out some personnel, including my secretary, on the first OPERATION BABYLIFT flight on 4 April. The project, launched by President Ford, was an effort to save as many orphans (mostly Amerasian) as possible because we knew how vicious the North Vietnamese would be to the half-American, half-Vietnamese children. The adults on board the aircraft, all volunteers, would act as caretakers for the children. By the

But Ambassador Martin refused to consider evacuations. . . . he genuinely believed that the prospect of the communist flag flying over Saigon was unthinkable.

grace of God, I decided against sending any of my people on the flight. The C-5A Galaxy transport, the largest plane I've ever seen, was filled with orphans en route to California. It crashed shortly after takeoff, killing 138. Among them were 78 children and 35 DAO folks. Each of us knew somebody who died in the crash. Miraculously, 170 passengers survived, which did not hinder the project's continuation. BABYLIFT would eventually bring some 3,000 children to the United States.

The day after the C-5A disaster, I took my wife to lunch at the American Officers' Club to break the news to her that she and our four children must leave the country immediately. She was incredulous. Just that morning she'd gone to a coffee at the

South Vietnamese soldiers standing guard at the site of the crash of the US C-5A transport on 4 April 1975.
Photo © Bettman/CORBIS.

embassy. Officials in attendance had advised the gathering to disregard news reports; we were all safe and had nothing to fear. Unpersuaded by my urging, she finally agreed to go on three conditions: she could choose the flight date, she and the children could tour the world on the way back to the states, and she could have a new Buick station wagon as soon as she got home.

I disguised my family's departure to look like a vacation in Bangkok (the ambassador forbade evacuations—more about that later) and got tickets for them to fly out on 9 April. On the 8th, a renegade South Vietnamese air force pilot bombed the presidential palace, close to our house. My wife was now convinced, but because of the 24-hour curfew imposed by the South Vietnamese government in the wake of the air strike, I had to pull rank to drive my family through the multiple roadblocks in Saigon to the airport at Tan Son Nhat. But at last, I got them all on a plane headed for Bangkok. My relief to have them safe cemented my determination for what I had to do next.

Unsure how long I'd be able to get through the mobs of refugees swarming Saigon, I moved to my office at Tan Son Nhut and stayed there 24 hours a day, sleeping on a cot between the two flags next to my desk—the stars and stripes and the flag of the Republic of Vietnam—a .38 revolver under my pillow.

On 17 April, I was in my office, which was now doubled as my bedroom and stoveless kitchen, read-

ing the latest messages and reports before I burn-bagged them when one of my comms guys came in with a news dispatch—he wanted me to see it right away: Phnom Penh, the capital of Cambodia, had fallen to the Khmer Rouge, the Cambodian communists. Within days we were reading grisly descriptions of the beheadings of Cambodian officials. I learned what terror tasted like.

Getting Everybody Out

Since the middle of March, my principal concern had been seeing to it that none of my people was killed or wounded in the forthcoming attack. I had 43 American men working for me and I was responsible for the safety of their 22 dependents, wives and children, living in Saigon. My men in Da Nang, Can Tho, and Pleiku all managed to reach Saigon after hair-raising escapes and were working in our Tan Son Nhat office. I wanted to get all my people out *now*.

But Ambassador Martin refused to consider evacuations. On the one hand, he wished to avoid doing anything that might stampede the South Vietnamese; on the other, he genuinely believed that the prospect of the communist flag flying over Saigon was unthinkable.

I was stymied.

My state-side boss, General Lew Allen, the director of NSA, ordered me to close down the operation and get everyone out before somebody got killed, but the ambassador wouldn't hear of it. I made him a proposition: if he would let my people go, I would stay in Saigon until the end with a skeleton staff to assure

> *I turned my full attention to persuading the ambassador that the remaining Americans and the Vietnamese who had worked with us had to leave Saigon before we were captured or killed.*

that the flow of SIGINT reports for him from NSA would continue. He turned me down.

So I cheated. I sent employees and their families out any way I could think of. Some I had to order out—they were unwilling to leave me behind. Some went on trumped-up early home leave, some on contrived vacations. Others I sent out on phony business travel. One day toward the end, I bought a guy a ticket with my own money and, with no authorization and no orders, I put him on a Pan Am flight to the United States. It was the last Pan Am flight from Saigon.

I knew I'd have to stay until the end. The ambassador wouldn't allow me to go, but, more important, I had to be sure all my subordinates and their families escaped. Besides, some 2,700 South Vietnamese military personnel had worked with NSA for years. I was determined to do everything possible to get them out of the country before the North Vietnamese took Saigon. I knew how cruel the North Vietnamese would be to them if they could get their hands on them.

Since I couldn't leave, I asked for two volunteers to stay with me. I needed a communicator and a communications maintenance technician to keep comms open to the United States. Some men pleaded that they owed it to their wives and children not to risk their lives. I found that eminently reasonable. Then two brave men stepped forward: Bob Hartley, a communicator, and Gary Hickman, a maintenance man. I warned them of the danger and told them that they'd have to keep the equipment going through unforeseen emergencies that might include

electrical outages and shelling. They understood.

Even today I admire—no, *love*—those two men for their raw courage. They risked their lives because I asked them to.

On 21 April, Xuan Loc, 40 miles northeast of us, fell, ending a heroic defense by the South Vietnamese 18th Infantry Division. Communist forces encircled us.

I instructed my comms center to reduce to the minimum the number of copies it made of each new incoming message. We bagged documents as soon as we read them and burned them in the incinerator in the DAO parking lot. I turned my full attention to persuading the ambassador that the remaining Americans and the Vietnamese who had worked with us had to leave Saigon before we were captured or killed. To my undying regret, I failed.

The Last Week

On 22 April, the US Defense Intelligence Agency estimated that the Republic of Vietnam wouldn't last more than a week. It was comforting to see that the Department of Defense and the Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) harbored no delusions about what was happening in Vietnam, but the ambassador was not in their chain of command. He reported to the secretary of state and the president. Unless they overruled him, he still had the power to keep us

all in Saigon. He convinced them no evacuation was necessary.

Despite the Ambassador's refusal to call for an evacuation, outgoing commercial airlines were choked with passengers, and US Air Force C-130 and C-141 transports daily carted hundreds of Vietnamese and Americans out of the country. The embassy made a point of explaining that their departure was not an evacuation. It was a reduction in force to free up resources to help the Republic of Vietnam.

I didn't know how much longer I'd be able to get out and about—the crowds in the streets were becoming larger and more menacing. Some of the men, in ragged Republic of Vietnam military uniforms, were armed. I knew the danger, but several trips were crucial. I told my Vietnamese driver, who usually ferried me around town, to use his US pass to drive his family onto the military side of Tan Son Nhat in the black sedan assigned to me, a Ford Galaxy with diplomatic plates and American flags, and escape while they still could. Then I took over the sedan. Armed with my .38, I drove it rather than my small Japanese car, foolishly believing that the impressive official vehicle would ward off the massed refugees.

I had it exactly backwards.

The sedan attracted the most desperate of those seeking evacuation. I was mobbed once, but when I bared my teeth and leveled the .38, the crowd pulled back just enough for me to make my way through.

The ambassador put his arm around my shoulder and guided me to the door. "Young man, when you're older, you'll understand these things better." He showed me out.

One trek was to help a Vietnamese family related to our house servants to get into the airbase at Tan Son Nhat so that they could find a way out of the country via a departing US military aircraft. Because South Vietnamese guards at the gates would allow no one to pass without official identification, the family members hid in the trunk and on the floor by the back seat of the sedan, covered with blankets. The guard admitted me without incident. The family managed to get on a C-130 and fly to Guam. Much later, they contacted me in the states to thank me.

I risked another trip to check on a South Vietnamese officer I worked with. I wanted to be sure he and his troops knew where to go when the evacuation order was given, something I couldn't discuss on an unsecured phone line. Always a model of Asian politeness, he invited me in and served me tea. He told me that his wife, who worked for USAID, had been offered the opportunity to leave the country with her family. That included him. But he wouldn't go because he was unwilling to abandon his troops—no evacuation order had been issued—and she wouldn't leave without him. Alarmed, I asked him what he would do if he was still in Saigon when communist tanks rolled through the streets. He told me he couldn't live under the communists. "I will shoot my three children, then I will shoot my wife, then I will shoot myself."

He didn't escape at the end, and I have no doubt that he carried out

his plan; many other South Vietnamese officers did precisely what he described.

That left one more requisite foray. I got through the hordes to the embassy and pleaded with the ambassador to evacuate everybody as soon as possible, citing signals intelligence evidence that an assault was imminent. I repeated what I had already reported to him, that Saigon was surrounded by 16 to 18 North Vietnamese divisions, poised to strike. Communist troops less than two kilometers north of my office at the airport were awaiting the command to attack.

The ambassador put his arm around my shoulder and guided me to the door. "Young man, when you're older, you'll understand these things better." He showed me out.

Frantic, I went down the hall to the office of the CIA chief of station, Tom Polgar. He laughed at my frenzy and showed me a cable to Washington the ambassador had released that morning. It stated that the signals intelligence evidence of a forthcoming assault could be disregarded. It was all due to the communists' skillful use of "communications deception." Stunned, I asked Tom what evidence he had of communications deception. He waved my question away and bet me a bottle of champagne, chateau and vintage of my choice, that he and I would both still be in Saigon a year hence, still at our desks, still doing business as usual.

Even though I ran into him months later in the United States, he never made good on that bet.

I finally understood what was going on. The embassy was a victim of what sociologists now call *groupthink syndrome*—firm ideology, immune to fact, shared by all members of a coterie. The ambassador, and therefore his subordinates, could not countenance the prospect of a communist South Vietnam and therefore dismissed evidence of the coming disaster. Graham Martin later told Congress he had been advised by the Hungarian member of the International Commission of Control and Supervision, the ICCS, that the North Vietnamese had no intention of conquering Saigon; they wished to form a coalition government with "patriotic forces in the south"—this from a representative of a communist government allied to North Vietnam. *And the ambassador believed him* in the face of overwhelming signals intelligence that the attack was at hand.

On 24 April, the wire services, which we monitored, reported a speech that President Ford had given the previous day at Tulane. He referred to Vietnam as "a war that is finished." My cynicism overcame my dread. If the war was finished, what was I, a civilian signals intelligence officer and potential prisoner of singular value to the communists—in short, a spy—doing in a combat zone with nothing better than a .38 revolver to defend myself against 18 North Vietnamese divisions?

During the night of 26 April, I was trying unsuccessfully to sleep when a blast threw me from my cot and slammed me to the floor. I ran to the comms center. The guys looked

Marines in mufti! *I knew all the Marines in country, and I didn't recognize any of these guys. What the hell was going on?*

dazed but everything was working and nobody was hurt. A bulletin arrived within minutes telling us that North Vietnamese sappers had blown up the ammo dump at Bien Hoa, just north of us. That meant, among other things, that panic in the streets would ramp up a couple of notches.

I started doing regular physical recons of the DAO building. Sometimes I took out a load of burn bags to the incinerator in the parking lot and burned them; other times I just wandered around. I wanted to be sure I knew beforehand if the North Vietnamese were going to breach the perimeter fence. As I walked the halls and crisscrossed the compound, I saw brawny, young American men with skinhead haircuts who had appeared out of nowhere. They were dressed in tank tops or tee-shirts, shorts, and tennis shoes. When two or three walked together, they fell into step, as if marching.

Marines in mufti! I knew all the Marines in country, and I didn't recognize any of these guys. What the hell was going on?

I found out that night. I was trying to grab a little sleep in my office. The door chime sounded. I grasped my .38 and went to the door. Through the peep hole I saw a middle-aged, red-haired American man in a neon Hawaiian shirt and shorts. He gave me a flat-handed wave and a silly grin. It was Colonel Al Gray, a Marine officer I'd worked with over the years in Vietnam. I'd never before seen Al out of uniform—I didn't think he owned any civies—and I knew he made it an iron-clad rule never to spend more than 24 hours in Saigon—his work was with his troops in the field and he disliked bureaucracy. I lowered

the .38 and opened the door. "Hi," he said. "Can I come in?"

In my office, I told him everything I knew about the military situation, but he knew more than I did. What he didn't know in detail was what was going on with the friendlies. I told him about the unruly, desperate crowds jamming the streets and now 10 to 15 people deep outside the perimeter fence of our compound and my worry that the fence might not hold. He explained to me that he'd been named the ground security officer—the man in charge—for the evacuation of Saigon once it was ordered.

But the ambassador was doing everything he could to throw roadblocks in Al's way. He wouldn't allow Al's Marines to dress in uniform, fly their own helicopters into the country, or stay overnight. So Al and his troops, in civilian clothes, had to fly in and out each day from the 7th Fleet, cruising in the South China Sea, via Air America slicks, the little Hueys, the UH-1 choppers that could only carry eight to 14 people.

It didn't matter. Ambassador or no ambassador, the Marines had landed. They'd be ready for the evacuation the instant it was ordered.

During my next daylight recon of the compound, I saw 55-gallon drums arrayed along the perimeter fence. I asked one of the buzz cuts why they were there. He said the drums were filled with combustible material, probably gasoline, and wired: if the North Vietnamese penetrated the pe-

rimeter, the barrels would be detonated to wipe them out.

Another tour of the parking lot took me into a surreal world. Marines and civilians were cramming cars, my small white sedan among them, onto the side of the building by driving them into one another so that they formed a compacted mass. That done, the drivers turned their attention to the half-dozen cars still in the parking lot, large black sedans (including mine) and one jeep. These they used as ramming devices, crushing the heap of cars more tightly together. Then they turned the now-mangled sedans on the tennis courts. Again and again, they backed their vehicles to the perimeter and burned rubber to smash into the poles holding the fence around the courts until they tore out of the pavement. Next they used the cars as battering rams, flattening the nets and court fencing against the building. Lastly, they ground the vehicles they were driving into the jumble of mashed automobiles. The area between the fence and the wall of the building was now clear.

It dawned on me what was going on. The small Air America slicks had been able to get into and out of the compound one at a time, without hitting parked cars or the tennis courts, but the much larger Marine CH-53s—each could carry 55 troops loaded for combat—needed more unobstructed space, especially if two or three were in the compound at the same time. One more obstacle to our escape had been removed.

US civilians boarding a Marine Corps CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopter for flight to waiting ships of the 7th Fleet in mid April 1975. Photo © Dirck Halstead/Getty Images.

Last Days

By 27 April we were, by dint of lying and deception, finally down to just the three of us, my two communicators, Bob and Gary, and I. None of us had slept through the night for longer than we could remember, and our diet was bar snacks we'd scrounged from a hotel before the mobs surrounding us made it impossible to get out. I found out that Vienna sausages were edible cold, straight from the can, and that mustard on pickle relish, if eaten in quantity, could stave off serious hunger. Granted, I developed bowel problems, but my guess was that it was due less to the food than to stress. Coffee we had aplenty—Bob and Gary had seen to that—and I'd made sure I wouldn't run out of cigarettes. From then on it was lots of coffee, chain smoking, almost nothing to eat, and no sleep.

We locked all the rooms in the office suite except the comms center, and I moved my cot and my .38 in there. Bob and Gary and I established a regimen: one guy took a two-hour rest break while the other two worked.

Then a series of messages I'll never forget flowed in. They asked me to get children out of the country. The requests were from American men who had fathered kids in Vietnam and wanted to save them. I shuddered to think what might happen to Amerasian youngsters when the communists took over. But it was too late. I had no vehicle and couldn't even get out of the compound—surrounded by panicky crowds, anxious for escape—much less to the addresses the children's fathers gave me. To this day, I don't know how the senders managed to get messages to me.

Partly to stay awake, I maintained my schedule of recon runs, checking out the parking lot and the perimeter. I got chummy with the snuffs at the gate closest to the building exit I used. Unlike most of the Marines, these guys were willing to fill me in on any new scuttlebutt. Among other things, they told me that people outside the fence were tossing babies into the compound, hoping they'd survive and escape the communists. Most of the infants didn't make it over the top of the fence—it was something like two stories high with barbed wire and an outward tilt at the top to prevent scalers. That had to mean many of the babies fell to the ground and were killed.

Not long before sunset on 28 April, I made a head run. The mammoth Pentagon East was in shambles. Light bulbs were burned out, trash and broken furniture littered the halls, and the latrines were filthy and smelled disgusting. I came across men on stepladders running cables through the ceiling. They told me they were wiring the building for complete destruction. "Last man out lights the fuse and runs like hell," they joked.

I went into the men's room. I was standing at the urinal when the wall in front of me lunged toward me as if to swat me down, then slapped back into place. The sound of repeated explosions deafened me and nearly knocked me off my feet. Instead of sensibly taking cover, I left the men's room and went to the closest exit at the end of a hall, unbolted it, and stepped into the shallow area between the western wall of the building and the security fence, a space of maybe eight to 10 feet, now piled high with sandbags.

The first thing I noticed was that the throngs of refugees had dispersed—no one was clamoring outside the barrier—presumably frightened away by the explosions. My ears picked up the whine of turbojets. I shaded my eyes from the setting

sun and spotted five A-37 Dragonfly fighters circling above the Tan Son Nhat runways. They dove, dropped bombs, and pulled up. The resulting concussions sent me tumbling, but I was on my feet and running before the planes went into their next approach. Back in the office, I found out shortly that renegade pilots who had defected to the communists were bombing Tan Son Nhat.

That was the beginning. We were bombarded throughout the night and much of the following day, first rockets, later, beginning around 0430 hours local on 29 April, artillery. One C-130 on the runway next to us was hit before it could airlift out refugees; two others took off empty. Fixed-wing airlifts were at an end. Rounds landed inside the DAO compound; the general's quarters next door were destroyed. Worst of all, two of the Marines I had been talking to were killed. Their names were McMahon and Judge. They were the last American fighting men killed on the ground in Vietnam.

One image I'll never forget: sometime during the night I was on my cot taking my two-hour rest break when the next bombardments started. I sat straight up and watched the room lurch. Bob was typing a message at a machine that rose a foot in the air, then slammed back into place. He never stopped typing.

Just after that, we got word that FREQUENT WIND PHASE IV had been declared. That was the code name for the evacuation. It had finally been ordered.

We gave up trying to rest. The air in the comms center, the only room we were still using, was faintly misty and smelled of smoke, as if a

We were bombarded throughout the night and much of the following day.... One C-130 on the runway next to us was hit before it could airlift out refugees; two others took off empty. Fixed-wing airlifts were at an end.

gasoline fire was raging nearby. After daylight, I got a call from the Vietnamese officer I'd visited a few days before. He wanted to know where his boss, the general, was. He'd tried to telephone the general but got no answer. I dialed the general's number with the same result. I found out much later that the general had somehow made it from his office to the embassy and got over the wall. He was evacuated safely while his men stayed at their posts awaiting orders from him. They were still there when the North Vietnamese arrived.

Next I telephoned the embassy. "The evacuation is on. *Get us out of here!*"

The lady I talked to was polite, even gracious. She explained to me, as one does to child, that the embassy could do nothing for us—we were too far away, and, although I probably didn't know it, the people in the streets were rioting. Of course I knew it; I could see them. I uttered an unprintable curse. She responded, "You're welcome."

I tracked down Al Gray and asked if he could fit us in with his guys. He reassured me he would.

We got word that armed South Vietnamese air force officers had forced their way into the building and were on the loose, demanding evacuation at gun point. Offices were to be emptied and locked. We were to proceed at once to the evacuation staging area, an office the Marines had secured. We sent our last message announcing we were closing

down. It was a personal message from me to my boss at NSA, General Allen:

1. HAVE JUST RECEIVED WORD TO EVACUATE. AM NOW DESTROYING REMAINING CLASSIFIED MATERIAL. WILL CEASE TRANSMISSIONS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THIS MESSAGE.

2. WE'RE TIRED BUT OTHERWISE ALL RIGHT. LOOKS LIKE THE BATTLE FOR SAIGON IS ON FOR REAL.

3. FROM GLENN: I COMMEND TO YOU MY PEOPLE WHO DESERVE THE BEST NSA CAN GIVE THEM FOR WHAT THEY HAVE BEEN THROUGH BUT ESPECIALLY FOR WHAT THEY HAVE ACHIEVED.

Even though the message was from me to General Allen, I still began the third paragraph with the words "FROM GLENN." I wanted to be sure he knew it was me speaking.

We destroyed out comms gear and crypto and locked the door as we left for the staging area.

The remaining events of 29 April are confused in my memory—I was in such bad shape I was starting to hallucinate. I know that, as the shelling continued, I begged Al Gray to get my two communicators out as soon as possible. I couldn't tolerate the idea that, after all they'd done, they might be hurt, captured, or killed. Sometime in the afternoon, when finally they went out on a whirlybird, my work was done.

The sea, between and among the ships of the 7th Fleet and to the western horizon as far as I could see, was filled with boats—sampans, junks, fishing vessels, commercial craft, tugs, even what looked like large rowboats, each overloaded with Vietnamese waving and calling to the ships.

I recall being locked in a room alone and told to wait until I was called for, trying to stay awake in my chair as the building pitched from artillery hits. I didn't want to board a chopper until I got confirmation that my communicators were safe aboard a ship of the 7th Fleet. And I wanted to get to a telephone to confirm that our Vietnamese counterparts were being evacuated. As far as I knew, they were still at their posts awaiting orders. But there was no telephone in the room, and I couldn't leave because the South Vietnamese air force officers were still on the prowl.

The next thing I remember is being outside.

It was getting dark, and rain was pelting the helicopters in the compound. I protested to Al Gray that I wanted to wait for confirmation that my two communicators were safe, but he ordered me, in unrepeatable language, to get myself on the chopper *now*. I climbed aboard, carrying with me the two flags that had hung in my office—the US stars and stripes and the gold-and-orange national flag of the defunct Republic of Vietnam.

The bird, for some reason, was not a CH-53 but a small Air America slick. As soon as we were airborne, I saw tracers coming at us. We took so many slugs in the fuselage that I thought we were going down, but we made it. All over the city, fires were burning. Once we were "feet wet"— over water—the pilot dropped

us abruptly to an altitude that scared me, just above the water's surface, and my stomach struggled to keep up. It was, he explained to me later, to avoid surface-to-air missiles. All I remember of the flight after that is darkness.

I was conscious when we approached the *USS Oklahoma City*, flagship of the 7th Fleet. The pilot circled four or five times before coming down very slowly on the ship's small, floodlit helopad. He told me subsequently that he, a civilian employee of Air America, had never before landed on a ship.

As we got out of the slick into the lashing rain, flashbulbs went off and someone took my .38. Sailors immediately tipped our Huey over the side and dumped it into the sea. I faintly remember some kind of processing, answering questions and filling out forms, but I was only half there. The next thing I recall clearly is shivering—I was very cold. I was in berth, a sort of canvas hammock, in a room lit only by a red bulb on the bulkhead. I could hear the ship's engine, low and far away, and men above, below, and on all sides of me were sleeping.

I discovered I could walk and found my way to the head where, still shivering, I brushed my teeth, shaved, and showered for the first time in weeks. Somebody directed me to the wardroom where I ate a breakfast and a half, surrounded by the scruffiest mix of Vietnamese and Americans I

had ever seen. Their clothes were torn and filthy. The men were unshaven, the women disheveled. In the midst was a distinguished older gentleman in a ruined suit, but his tie was still knotted at the throat.

When I'd eaten my fill and went on deck, it was daylight—I must have slept a long time. South Vietnamese helicopters flew close to the ship, cut their engines, and dropped into the water. The pilots were rescued and brought aboard as the choppers sank to the bottom.

The sea, between and among the ships of the 7th Fleet and to the western horizon as far as I could see, was filled with boats—sampans, junks, fishing vessels, commercial craft, tugs, even what looked like large rowboats, each overloaded with Vietnamese waving and calling to the ships.

Someone found out I spoke Vietnamese and asked me to broadcast a message on a common frequency tell-

The author with Gen. Al Gray, USMC. Undated photo © author.

ing those in the boats that the ships of the 7th Fleet were already jammed to the rafters and couldn't take any more on board. Numb to the implications of what I was saying, I repeated the message four or five times before my voice gave way from coughing and I had to quit. Only later did I understand that many of those boats were so far from shore that they couldn't make it back. Many didn't make it back. The people on them perished at sea.

After circling for days, we finally set sail for Subic Bay in the Philippines. Once there, I booked a flight for Hawaii because I knew I'd be required to brief CINCPAC and his staff about what had happened in Saigon.

When I arrived in Honolulu, still carrying my two flags, an NSA official met me at the airport. Rather than congratulating me for getting out alive or asking if I was all right, he took one look at me and said, "You can't be seen around here looking like *that*." I was still in the clothes I'd been evacuated in and hadn't shaved for days. I knew I'd lost weight and my face was a map of lines. He assigned a subordinate to gussy me up. That guy took me to a barber and a good men's clothing store to get a decent suit to brief the brass at Pearl Harbor.

That briefing didn't go well. I couldn't talk. I was coughing constantly. I couldn't focus my eyes. I was sweating and felt like I was running a fever. When I sat down, I passed out.

I finally admitted to myself that I was suffering from more than exhaustion. For days, as the ships of the 7th Fleet circled, I'd done nothing

> *Any sensible person would have gone to a doctor immediately. But I didn't. I can't tell you how much I yearned to go home. Dressed in my new suit and tie, I booked the earliest flight possible for Baltimore.*

but sleep. Despite that, I was getting worse. Any sensible person would have gone to a doctor immediately. But I didn't. I can't tell you how much I yearned to go home. Dressed in my new suit and tie, I booked the earliest flight possible for Baltimore. During the stopover between flights in San Francisco, I tried to find a doctor. But a physician's strike was in progress, and no doctor would see me. I flew on to Baltimore. The day after I landed, I found a doctor who diagnosed me with "pneumonia due to sleep deprivation, muscle fatigue, and poor diet." He relished adding that heavy smokers are more susceptible to pneumonia than "normal people."

Looking Back

I'd be remiss if I didn't credit Al Gray, a Marine intelligence officer who became a combat commander, with saving my life and the lives of my two communicators. I don't call him Al anymore. That stopped the day he became commandant of the Marine Corps. These days I call him "Sir." General Gray is the finest leader I have ever seen in action and a man I am privileged to know.

None of the 2,700 Vietnamese who worked with us escaped. All were killed or captured by the North

Vietnamese. Many could have been saved but for two factors: (1) The ambassador failed to call for an evacuation—by the time he was countermanded, the North Vietnamese were already in the streets of Saigon. And (2) the general in command of those 2,700 abandoned his troops. They were still awaiting his orders when the North Vietnamese attacked them.

Ambassador Graham Martin's career was effectively ended by the debacle he authored in Saigon. He retired not long after the fall of Vietnam. Bob and Gary, my two communicators, survived and went on with their careers. Bob died about six years ago, but I spoke to Gary a few months ago. He's doing fine.

And me? Besides the pneumonia, I sustained ear damage from the shelling, and I've worn hearing aids ever since. Worst of all, I suffer, even today, from a condition we didn't have a name for back then—post-traumatic

Tom Glenn reflecting on his experience in a recent presentation. Photo © author.

> **Because we were intelligence personnel—spies—torture and long incarceration would have been inevitable.... There, but for the grace of a fallen bridge, went I.**

stress injury (PTSI). It resulted not just from the fall of Saigon but from earlier experiences in the war. When I got back to the states, my marriage crumbled. The home I yearned for didn't exist, and I was afraid I was going to lose my children—my reason for staying alive. I knew I needed help, but my job was intelligence, and I had top secret codeword-plus intelligence clearances. Had I sought therapy, I would have lost my clearances, and therefore my job. I had to grit my teeth and endure the irrational rages, flashbacks, nightmares, and panic attacks. As it happens, my vocation and my need to help others saved me.

I have always been a writer, and I wrote and wrote and wrote about what had happened. That eventually led to two books, *Friendly Casualties* (2012) and *The Trion Syndrome* (2015). I found out much later that one of the most effective therapies for PTSI is writing down the searing experiences. So to some degree, I healed myself.

Instinctively, I knew I had to help others who were worse off than I was. So I volunteered to care for AIDS patients during the years of that crisis, worked with the homeless, ministered to the dying in the hospice system, and finally worked with sick and dying veterans in the VA hospital in Washington, DC. I learned that when I gave all my attention to suffering people, my unspeakable memories receded into the background.

I still have occasional nightmares, and I can't abide Fourth of July fireworks. But these days, on the whole, I'm rational.

On the positive side, for my work during the fall of Saigon, I was awarded the Civilian Meritorious Medal. It remains my most cherished possession.

And finally, as irony would have it, Bob, Gary, and I were in more danger at the end than we realized. George Veith, author of *Black April*,

told me in January, 2012, what his perusal of newly translated North Vietnamese documents has brought to light: before dawn on the morning of 29 April, as we waited at Tan Son Nhat to be evacuated, the North Vietnamese 28th Regiment was en route to attack us. But as the unit's tanks passed over the last bridge into to Saigon before dawn, the bridge collapsed. The regiment was forced to take a detour and didn't arrive at Tan Son Nhat until the morning of 30 April. By then, we were gone.

Had the regiment reached us on schedule, my communicators and I would have been at worst killed, at best taken prisoner. Because we were intelligence personnel—spies—torture and long incarceration would have been inevitable. That was the fate of a CIA employee, James Lewis, captured in mid-April when the coastal city of Phan Rang was overrun.

There, but for the grace of a fallen bridge, went I.

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The Intelligence Role in Counterinsurgency:
Proposed Planning Guide in Four Phases of "National Liberation" Wars

Walter Steinmeyer

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Proposed planning guide in four phases of "national liberation" wars.

THE INTELLIGENCE ROLE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

Walter Steinmeyer

Experience during the past decade in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Indochina, the Congo, and other such hot spots has been variegated enough to provide some ground for generalizing about the role an intelligence agency should play in the U.S. effort to combat "wars of national liberation." This is the field in which U.S. security is for some time to come, under conditions of nuclear stalemate, most likely to be challenged, as the Soviet Union, Red China, and Cuba exploit for their own purposes dissension, turmoil, and impatience for reform in Latin America, Africa, the Near East, and Southeast Asia. No set of rules can be universally applicable to all the diverse situations that now exist and will arise, but an outline of the part a civilian clandestine service should take in helping meet these challenges can at least serve as point of departure in preparing to confront a particular one of them. To suggest such an outline is the purpose of this article.

Cadre Phase

The Communist-instigated "war of liberation" begins with a period in which the local Communist party or the local residenturas of the KGB or Chinese or Cuban intelligence service are spotting, assessing, and recruiting candidates for guerrilla training and political indoctrination. When such an agent has been recruited he is sent for his training to the Soviet Union, China, or Cuba, usually via a devious clandestine route. A Peruvian traveling to the guerrilla warfare schools in Cuba, for example, may fly, using his Peruvian passport, first to Paris, where his contacts from the Cuban intelligence service meet him and give him a Cuban passport with which to travel Paris-Prague-Havana. The record in the bona fide Peruvian passport thus shows no travel to Communist countries. After three to six months' training in Cuba he reverses these steps and returns to Peru as one of the hard-core cadres charged with preparing the insurgency.

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In this phase six aspects of the clandestine service mission can be specified:

To find out what persons and procedures are used in selecting candidates for training and then to penetrate this spotting, assessment, and recruitment machinery in order to identify the cadres. This effort will include penetration of the local Communist party.

To identify and counter, using counterintelligence techniques, cadre-phase operations of the Soviet, Chinese, or Cuban intelligence residenturas.

To expose publicly what the Communists are doing and how, and to show how the people of the country can contribute to resisting them.

To seek by political-action measures to orient and motivate the host government to cooperate in clandestine operations against the cadre buildup and in preparations for combatting later phases of the insurgency. This means that the government must have or develop an effective security agency with arrest powers and counterintelligence competence, sufficiently secure for liaison with the U.S. service. Ideally this agency should maintain travel controls over all citizens going abroad.

To conduct, if necessary, political-action programs to put teeth into the country's anti-subversive laws. The government must be able to neutralize subversives not by sending them into exile but by putting them in jail.

To help the country's military or police forces establish and train a crack guerrilla-killer unit to be deployed tactically in later phases. The unit should not exceed battalion size, about 200 men; its strength should lie in the quality of its personnel, their training and leadership, and in its mobility, fire power, communications, and tactics.

Incipient Phase

When the guerrilla trainee returns to his homeland he is usually tied into the local Communist party or the Soviet, Chinese, or Cuban intelligence residentura to get funds and guidance in developing the support structure for an active guerrilla campaign. (Sometimes his support and guidance come from an adjacent country.) In this incipient phase the returned agent begins his procurement of weapons, ammunition, and safehouses and settles on a rural area for his initial operations. Within this area he picks a location for his base camp

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and begins to cultivate the sympathies of the peasantry around it within radius of a six-hour march. He will need these peasants for logistical support and tactical intelligence.

When the groundwork is completed, the agent moves in with five to ten companions. After orienting itself in its surroundings, this incipient guerrilla band begins its political indoctrination of the peasants and the terrorizing with raids and burnings of all who remain hostile. Gradually it gains new recruits, trains and equips them, and puts them into the field. When it has grown to more than 20 men and survived what initial measures the conventional military or police forces could take against it, it has matured as a guerrilla unit and completed the incipient phase.

In this phase, the U.S. service, if feasible jointly with the government's security agency, should undertake the following kinds of operations:

> Identify the guerrilla agent as he returns from training or as soon thereafter as possible. Sources may be travel-control data or penetrations of the Communist party or recruitment machinery.

> Identify rural and urban safehouses established in support of the guerrilla program. This can be done through surveillance of the returning agent, through penetrations, or through informant nets set up in likely rural areas (see below).

> Identify and block the guerrilla's channels for arms and ammunition procurement. This can generally be done by the government's customs and border patrol forces. Intelligence penetrations will help.

> Survey rural areas suitable for guerrilla bands and gather terrain intelligence, with emphasis on such things as water sources, potential ambush sites, and possible drop zones for the guerrilla-killer unit. Bear in mind that the guerrilla usually cannot operate farther than a six hours' march from his base.

> Establish highly selective informant networks in potential guerrilla areas as a source of tactical intelligence for the guerrilla-killer unit if guerrillas do begin operations there. Such a network can be handled by the police units in the area in question, or some other apparatus can be set up for this essential job.

> Mount organized, professional civic-action programs to promote loyalty to the government among the populace of potential

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guerrilla areas. Convince the people that steps are being taken to right social, economic, and political wrongs.

Begin guerrilla-killer operations as soon as intelligence indicates the presence of an incipient guerrilla band. Tactics are sustained pursuit, ambushes, destruction of the base camp, denial of water and supplies, and finally direct confrontation in a fire fight. Nothing is so effective in stopping the development of guerrilla bands as eliminating those who have just finished training and taken to the field for the first time.

Operational Phase

If the guerrilla movement is successful, in spite of all countermeasures taken during the cadre and incipient phases, in establishing several bands of twenty or more men each in some region, it has become a real threat to the country. In this operational phase, the guerrillas try to consolidate their control of the region. Though they keep the individual bands compartmented, they coordinate their activities so as to make the maximum political and tactical impact on the area. They may thus drive the government forces out of the area completely; at least they break down the government's control over it at night. Area consolidation, in turn, enables the guerrilla to expand his supply mechanism, improve his collection of tactical intelligence, and obtain new recruits for his units.

This, in essence, is the tactic Fidel Castro used so successfully when he went into the Sierra Maestra. It is also what the FALN did in Falcón state in Venezuela. The longer the guerrillas can keep operating in one area, the more likely they are to consolidate a political and operational base there and then break out to other areas. When they get to the point that they can move with some freedom at battalion level in an area, the operational phase of insurgency gives way to one of covert warfare.

During the operational phase, the U.S. clandestine service and the host government need to take the following actions:

Intensify the effort to get intelligence on the guerrillas' strength, disposition, and plans.

Step up counterintelligence operations against the guerrillas' logistic support apparatus.

Mount psychological operations to keep the pro-government flame of resistance alive in guerrilla-controlled areas. A portion of the psychological effort should also be targeted against the

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insurgents themselves, offering them rehabilitation if they sur-
render. (Those who do should be sent to training centers for
vocational and political reorientation.)

Intensify civic-action programs in the areas adjacent to those
the guerrillas hold in order to prove to the populace in both
that sustained cooperation with the government will produce
a better and freer economic and social way of life than the
guerrillas can offer.

Step up the number and intensity of guerrilla-killer operations,
using the killer unit at maximum capacity to eliminate guer-
rilla bands in fire fights. Give victories wide publicity in all
media throughout the country.

If the guerrillas are receiving logistical support from a contiguous
country, and if their supply depots there can be identified,
mount hit-and-run commando raids against them. Whether
the commandos are drawn from the military establishment of
the country in question or brought in for the purpose from a
third country, they should use bandit cover in order to provide
for plausible denial. Nevertheless the raids, in addition to
their primary objective of destroying the depots, are intended
to call attention to the supplying nation's interference in the
affairs of its neighbor.

Establish population controls, giving priority to districts adjacent
to the guerrilla area. The key item in the control system is
an identification document issued within a limited time to all
residents of a given area. This census certification, as it were,
not only makes it more difficult for guerrillas to pass themselves
off as innocent local farmers during the daytime but provides
a point of departure for systematic counterintelligence opera-
tions.

Organize popular self-defense forces, or citizens' militia, in dis-
tricts adjacent to the guerrilla areas. Controlled by the con-
ventional military establishment and properly motivated, these
forces can contribute to containing the guerrillas through a
strategic hamlet program, creating strong points for protection
of the people and as bases for offensive operations.

Bring the conventional military forces into full play in large
sweep and encirclement operations mounted in coordination
with the guerrilla-killer unit. As the guerrillas are dispersed

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by the sweep and are heading for safe areas the guerrilla-killer force can both set up ambushes and engage in hot pursuit. With its superior training and equipment it should generally outrun and outfight the scattering guerrilla.

Covert Warfare Phase

When the insurgents get to operating in battalion strength in two or more large regions and running raids and terror into other areas in preparation for expansion, when pitched fire fights are held between them and the government's conventional troops and the latter begin to suffer heavy losses, when a guerrilla-killer force of battalion size is no longer adequate, then covert war is in full swing, exceeding the scope of a civilian agency's paramilitary capability. This means that the U.S. military establishment must begin to provide the government forces with large amounts of equipment and send out advisers to work with them at company level.

In this phase there is still, however, more than enough work for the U.S. civilian service to do:

Provide airlift capacity, usually under commercial cover, to move government forces and supplies to combat areas or to bring in mercenaries as combat troops or as advisers.

Furnish demolition technicians and other instructors for expanded training programs among the government forces.

Continue and expand intelligence collection, counterintelligence operations, psychological programs to arouse a sense of national unity and purpose, civic-action enterprises, and "bandit" raids on adjacent-country supply depots.

Conventional Warfare Phase

When the enemy decides that his strength is sufficient to confront the government forces in decisive battle, as at Dien Bien Phu, and the United States decides to intervene in this overt conventional warfare, then the U.S. manpower needed can come only from the defense establishment. At this point the civilian intelligence agency's resources in the country are put at the disposal of the U.S. military commander. At his direction they will carry out intelligence collection, counterintelligence operations, and covert psychological and political programs. Their paramilitary operations will be redirected to raids and harassments, the promotion of escape and evasion, and the development of resistance nuclei in the enemy's rear.

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Apologia

Faced with almost any concrete situation, this general statement will be found at many points inapropos. In some ways it is too incomplete, in others too inclusive. It is not meant to imply, for example, that a U.S. clandestine service should direct overt propaganda or civic action campaigns if the appropriate U.S. agencies are there to do these things. But in some times and places it must.

The outline calls for some actions that have been tried in the past in concrete situations and have failed. But it may be the situation, not the course of action, was wrong. Or maybe the actions were carried out less than perfectly.

The outline concentrates on the rural aspects of insurgency. This does not mean that urban terrorism is of little importance. But "wars of national liberation" must take and hold territory if they are to succeed, and there is established doctrine competent to deal with urban terrorism as an adjunct to insurgency.

We hope, as we said, that our generalizations may be useful as a point of departure. But if the essay even contributes to focusing thought on the problems that occasioned it, it will, despite acknowledged limitations, serve a purpose.

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Learning from World War II Special Operations

Reviewed by JR Seeger

The Ariadne Objective: The Underground War to Rescue Crete from the Nazis
Wes Davis (Crown Publishers, 2013), 329 pp., photos, map.

Abducting a General: The Kreipe Operation and SOE in Crete
Patrick Leigh Fermor (New York Review of Books, 2015), 240 pp.

Kidnap in Crete
Rick Stroud (Bloomsbury USA, 2014), 288 pp., photos, maps.

Natural Born Heroes: How a Daring Band of Misfits Mastered the Lost Secrets of Strength and Endurance
Christopher McDougall (Alfred A. Knopf, 2015), 337 pp., map.

This year, the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, is also the 70th anniversary of the end of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) of the United Kingdom and its US counterpart, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Well documented SOE and OSS activities in the Eastern Mediterranean have provided source material for dozens of books written on operations in Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, and the islands off the coast of Turkey. Here, small numbers of special operations men and women collaborated with resistance armies against Nazi occupiers with little or no hope of an eventual invasion by conventional Allied armies. The SOE and the OSS sent a mix of combat and academic specialists into this complex military and political environment with the objective of disrupting Nazi occupation, forcing the Germans to maintain large combat forces throughout the region—forces they should have transferred to more strategic locations. These operations are true adventure stories that rival any fiction written by Ian Fleming, Graham Greene, or Alistair MacLean.[a]

In the middle of this combat theater was the island of Crete, occupied by the Nazis in 1941 after a dramatic assault of the island by German airborne forces. German soldiers occupied the island until the end of the war.

The island was of strategic value to the Germans during the North African campaign due to its location south of Greece and Yugoslavia and north of Eastern Libya and Western Egypt. After the defeat of the Afrika Corps in North Africa, it remained of military importance in the Eastern Mediterranean as an airbase and port facility, preventing British forces from conducting amphibious operations in Greece or Yugoslavia. Despite the strategic value of the island to the Nazi military machine in the early stages of the war, in hindsight there appears to be no good explanation why the Germans in 1943 had over 70,000 troops on the island—or even over 10,000 troops when the Germans surrendered in Europe in May 1945. That said, the number and types of troops deployed by the Germans on Crete throughout the war is clearly correlated with the fact that, starting in 1941, the Cretan resistance, supported by a small number of SOE operators, was active across the entire island. These resistance fighters conducted regular, small-scale sabotage and ambush attacks across the island, then disappeared into the mountain range that is the spine of the 260-kilometer long island. The Nazi occupiers were never able to stop the resistance, no matter how many troops they added to the island garrison or how extreme their reprisals.

In Crete, SOE operators on the ground managed a very successful program with few resources other than their wits, periodic equipment resupply by air and sea, and the determination of the Cretan resistance forces. The story of Crete from 1941 to 1945 is worth understanding, not for the audacity of the special operations conducted

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a. For current works on OSS and SOE operations in the region, see *The Forgotten 500* (2008) by Gregory Freeman, *The Wildest Province* (2008) by Roderick Bailey, *The Rash Adventurer* (2008) by Imogen Grundon, *Shadow on the Mountain* (2010) by Marcia Kurapovna, *Classical Spies* (2011) by Susan Allen, and *First Seals* (2014) by Patrick O'Donnell.

during those four years (though they were audacious almost to a fault), but for the fact that a very small number of local resistance fighters and no more than a dozen SOE operators tied down as many as 70,000 German soldiers at a time when they were needed on the Eastern Front.

The most audacious SOE operation during the Nazi occupation of Crete was a successful capture and exfiltration of General Heinrich Kreipe in April 1944, an operation conducted by two SOE operators, Patrick Fermor and W. Stanley Moss and a dozen members of the Cretan resistance. The story was first detailed in 1950 in a memoir titled *Ill Met by Moonlight*, written by one of the two SOE operators involved, Moss. In 1955, a member of the Cretan resistance, George Psychoundakis published his memoir, *The Cretan Runner. Ill Met by Moonlight* was made into a black-and-white war movie in 1957, starring Dirk Bogarde.

Moss and another SOE operator, Xan Fielding, published additional works on their efforts in Crete in the early 1950s.[a] The next time the story was described in detail was in a history of the headquarters of Minoan archaeology built for the British archaeological team. Dilys Powell published the book *Villa Ariadne* in 1973, capturing both the history of pre-war Minoan archeology and the Cretan resistance during the war. Powell focused much greater attention in her book on the lives and fortunes of Cretan

This map, showing the location of German General Heinrich Kreipe's capture appeared in SOE operator W. Stanley Moss's book *Ill Met by Moonlight* (1950 edition, 108). Image: Wiki Commons.

civilians who had worked for the British archeologists and faced Nazi occupation, including the use of the Villa Ariadne as a Nazi headquarters. Following this publication, the story of the capture of the Nazi general was subsumed in works focusing on special operations in World War II, but otherwise generally forgotten by writers and publishers for 40 years.

In part, the story was forgotten because the operation, though daring, had little strategic impact on overall allied operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. General Kreipe was a relatively new arrival to the island. He was a traditional Wehrmacht officer who had served in World War I and in France and the USSR during the first few years of World War II. He was part of the Nazi war machine, but he was not linked to a larger cadre of trusted Nazi officers and thus was not privy to the overall strategic views of Hitler and his military leaders. Kreipe's capture was certainly a coup and there is evidence that it was successful in boosting Cretan morale as well as in undermining German soldier morale, but it had little effect on the actual balance of power on the island. The Nazis continued to occupy Crete and to violently suppress the resistance.

The Cretan resistance continued to conduct harassment operations against the German garrison until the Germans finally surrendered to British conventional forces in 1945. Though chronicled by Moss and Psychoundakis, in general the heroism of the intrepid resistance and their SOE colleagues throughout the war was forgotten as historians of the Eastern Mediterranean in the 20th century focused on the strategic challenges in the Balkans, including the subsequent Greek civil war, the rise of communist leaders in Yugoslavia and Albania, and, eventually, the part the

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a. The works discussed in this paragraph include *The Stronghold: An Account of the Four Seasons in the White Mountains of Crete*, and *Hide and Seek: The Story of a War-time Agent,* Xan Fielding (1953 and 1954, respectively); *Ill Met by Moonlight* and *A War of Shadows,* W. Stanley Moss (1950 and 1952, respectively); *The Cretan Runner*, George Psychoundakis (1955), and *The Villa Ariadne*, Dilys Powell (1973).

Balkans played at the end of the Cold War and the splintering of Yugoslavia.

More recently, and in the year marking the 70th anniversary of the SOE and OSS, a number of new works have retold the story of Cretan resistance and specifically the events associated with the kidnap of General Kreipe. In the past two years, four books have revived this story. Wes Davis' book, *The Ariadne Objective* appeared in 2013 and Patrick Fermor's own memoir of the operation, *Abducting a General*, came out in the UK in 2014. (Fermor's work was published in the United States later, in 2015.) In early 2015, *Kidnap in Crete* by Rick Stroud was published in the United States after being released in the UK in 2014. Also in 2015, Christopher McDougall's work *Natural Born Heroes* was released.

While each of these works spotlights the capture of General Kreipe as a high point of resistance operations on the island, they are very different in structure, style, and the questions they address. Stroud is an accomplished military historian and his work focuses on the question, "What happened?" Davis asks similar questions, but he and Fermor attempt to answer the question, "How did it happen?" Finally McDougall (and again Davis) addresses the question, "Who made it happen?"

Davis and Stroud detail the tactics and intricacies of the SOE operations in Crete based on information derived from primary sources such as war records as well as the memoirs of all the British participants. Stroud is the best military historian of the four authors, providing the greatest amount of detail of the entire campaign. He focuses considerable attention on the German airborne assault on 20 May 1941 that was titled *Operation Mercury* and addresses the strategic significance of the invasion and the early days of combat operations before the withdrawal of all conventional British forces at the end of May. His descriptions are matched to an excellent map of the island marking German drop zones and the deployment of British forces during the Nazi occupation. Stroud then goes on to detail the creation of the Cretan resistance from the perspective of the residents themselves and from the perspective of the SOE operators. As with all of the books being reviewed, Stroud finally turns his attention to a nearly hour-by-hour description of the kidnap of General Kreipe and his exfiltration to Cairo.

While Davis's focus is less on the larger issues of the military history of the Cretan resistance, his work does answer the question of how the SOE fostered, supported, and guided the resistance. Each author focuses on one British officer who was "curator" of the resistance network during 1940–41. John Pendlebury was an archaeologist and adventurer who understood early in 1940 that the residents of Crete could serve as a resistance force once the Germans attacked. Under cover at the British consulate in Crete, he established a small intelligence and support network that survived his death during initial days of the German invasion. This network was the backbone of the SOE network that conducted operations in Crete until the end of the war. Davis explains how the network allowed the British special operators to move throughout the island—even inside the garrison headquarters of Heraklion. He also goes into detail on the background of the various SOE operators and the Cretan resistance leaders. Davis's description of the interaction among these players provides the best atmospherics of resistance operations as he describes how the resistance worked and subsequently was able to successfully kidnap of General Kreipe.

Fermor, one of the best-respected nonfiction writers of the 20th century, was famous for capturing the emotional feeling around a place or event in his work. There is some debate about when Fermor wrote this memoir and why. Fermor did not write a memoir immediately after the war but did pen a foreword to George Psychoundakis's memoir, *The Cretan Runner*, which he translated into English. Nearly 50 years later he also wrote a foreword to Grundon's biography of John Pendlebury. Fermor wrote his own version of the story of the kidnapping of General Kreipe, a year after his colleague Moss died in 1965. The book was not published until after Fermor himself died. Written from the perspective of one of the participants in the kidnapping, of all the work reviewed here Fermor provides the best understanding of what it was like to serve in the mountains with the Cretan resistance—often working entirely alone, with only periodic contact with other SOE operators. Fermor admits early in this memoir that he did not keep many of his notebooks and thus the work is in part an exercise in recalling events of two decades before. Still, Fermor's writing style and his insight into the men and women who made up the resistance provides a detailed and brilliant depiction of what it takes to work behind enemy lines for months at a time.

Natural Born Heroes also addresses what it takes to work behind lines, but where Fermor and Davis talk about the individual personalities and interactions, McDougall

focuses much more on the physical challenges the SOE operators and Cretan resistance fighters faced. McDougall weaves the story of the SOE operations in 1944 into his attempt to retrace the footsteps of the British agents, taking us through his training regimen as he prepares for this modern recreation of Moss and Fermor's escape after capturing the general. There are chapters on the physiology, exercise, and mental capacity required to handle adversity. McDougall spends as much time focusing on the science as he does on the story of what he calls the "natural born heroes" of Crete and the group of eccentrics that became the SOE operator network on the island.

While his discussions are well written and interesting, they are often far afield from the story of SOE in Crete or even McDougall's effort to trace their actual path 70 years later. In essence, McDougall's book is an essay on the members of the SOE in Crete—who they were and how they survived mentally and physically. McDougall is adept at describing the mix of military amateurs and academics that worked for the SOE in the Eastern Mediterranean and he provides a useful study of how the SOE found, trained, and managed these eccentrics. After 70 years of professional development in the CIA and the US special operations community that has defined what the intelligence or special operations professional looks like, it is also an interesting discussion of what might be missing in the US community of carefully selected and highly trained professionals.

Common to all four works is a consistent description of the SOE operators involved in this resistance movement, operators who shared traits that should be considered essential for any unconventional warfare or intelligence operator.

• First, all of the SOE personnel on the island were creative. In fact, they were so creative that at the beginning of the war the British Army did not think that most of these men could be of real use to the war effort. While as amateurs their creativity was not structured in any way consistent with Army doctrine, it proved itself in the audacious plan and intrepid execution of the kidnapping and exfiltration of General Kreipe.

• Second, with only one exception (Moss), the SOE operators in Crete were exceptional linguists. Most had been involved in archaeological excavations of one sort or another in the Eastern Mediterranean before the war and had worked for years with Greek excavation crews. Fermor was also a linguist, but his language skills were acquired during his travels in Greece before the war and his initial assignment in Greece in 1940. As with T.E. Lawrence and the Arab Revolt, their understanding of the language and the culture of Crete meant that they knew how to grow and support a resistance movement that was unique to the culture.

• Finally, the SOE operators were both physically and mentally resilient. They lived on an island when the ability to escape from the Nazis meant multi-day evasion along mountain trails with little or no food or shelter. These men were not athletes when they arrived on the island, but they were capable of withstanding long, hard movements on the mountain paths that were the home of their Cretan partners. SOE operations on the island were divided into several areas of responsibility and SOE operators covered an area of responsibility alone or, at best, with one British partner. As a result, they had to address the challenges of local rivalries alone and without counsel. Fermor is especially clear on the mental as well as the physical challenges.

Each of the books reviewed here offers a different perspective on how a small number of SOE personnel and Cretan fighters kept so many German soldiers bottled up on a very small island. OSS and SOE operations in the European and the China, Burma, and India theaters of World War II were never intended to create strategic or even operational victories. Rather, they were designed to harass the enemy, acquire intelligence, and, if appropriate, support larger strategic or operational objectives conducted by conventional forces. Crete was a perfect example of how a small number of SOE operators and a few hundred local fighters coupled with a determined population forced the Nazis to squander time, treasure, and manpower at the expense of more important battlefields. This is a perfect definition of the value of unconventional war. These four books provide the details needed to understand how this was possible.

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The Great War of Our Time: The CIA's Fight Against Terrorism from AL QA'IDA to ISIS

Michael Morell. (Twelve, 2015) 362, photos, index.

Reviewed by Hayden Peake

Following Allen Dulles's precedent, many former senior CIA officers have written memoirs of their CIA service. While several came to the agency from military and political careers, the majority had served in the clandestine service. Former agency analysts have taken up the pen less frequently. The first was Ray Cline (1981)[1] followed by Russell Smith (1989),[2] both former deputy directors of intelligence (DDI). Robert Gates, who served as DDI and director of central intelligence (DCI), joined them later, in 2006.[3] Although each covered some challenging events in the CIA's history, none stirred as much critical scrutiny as the most recent contribution, Michael Morell's *The Great War of Our Time*.

Typical of CIA memoirists, Morell includes an account of how he found his way to the CIA. He studied economics in college, planning a life in academia. Then came the unexpected suggestion of one of his professors that he consider the CIA. On a lark he applied and was accepted in 1980 as an intelligence analyst. Most of the first 16 years of his career was devoted to dues-paying assignments on East Asian economic issues. In 1996, George Tenet, then deputy director to DCI John Deutch, assigned Morell to lead an interagency study that examined whether sufficient emphasis was being given to "open source" information in economic matters as opposed to collection by clandestine sources. Morell writes that Tenet was pleased with the result, and 18 months later, when Tenet became DCI, he made Morell his executive assistant (EA). From there, his career took off.

While cautiously avoiding immodest puffery, *The Great War of Our Time* is the story of how Morell handled a series of challenging positions under six directors, each of which he discusses frankly. He also includes occasional vignettes of their impact on his family life. After serving as Tenet's EA, Morell spent a year as President George W. Bush's daily intelligence briefer and was with him on 9/11.[a] Next he was appointed deputy to the director of intelligence, and by 2009 he was deputy director of CIA itself. Throughout this period he was "obsessed by the issue of terrorism." (xii) Thus, his book is heavily devoted to the actions CIA and the Intelligence Community undertook to deal with the threat, including failures, successes, and controversies the efforts engendered.

CIA attempts to alert the president and the community to al Qa'ida threats before 9/11 are particularly interesting. Threat reports titled "Bin Laden Attacks May Be Imminent" and "Bin Laden Planning High-Profile Attacks" were read as indicators of possible deception by the vice president; the defense department, Morell writes, saw deception in all of them. (41) Then-DCI George Tenet rejected these assertions with characteristic firmness. The president, however, took the warnings seriously, writes Morell, as he did the 6 August 2001 briefing titled "Bin Laden Determined to Strike the US." But when asked for specifics, Morell had to respond that there were none. Some in the White House later wanted to tell the 9/11 Commission that Morell had told the president at the briefing "that there was no need to worry," though he had not done so. (72) The incident made clear to Morell the political sensitivities involved in the issue. Morell challenges the 9/11 Commission conclusion that the "September 11 attacks resulted in part, from a failure of imagination," (59) and he explains his objections in some detail.

After a year as the presidential briefer, Morell was ready to leave the demanding, high-stress—and career enhancing—position and was appointed deputy to the director of intelligence. While there, he was involved with the analyses leading up to the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003. He also oversaw CIA support to then-Secretary of State Colin Powell's presentation to the United Nations about supposed Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Morell candidly admits the WMD estimates were wrong for a variety of reasons.

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a. Morell's description of that day appeared in *Studies in Intelli-* *gence* 50, 3 (September 2006). It is available in redacted form at http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/DOC_0001407035.pdf

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All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

Regarding the Powell speech, he describes extraordinary efforts to get it right. He notes the unusual direct involvement in the WMD discussion of Vice President Dick Cheney and the CIA's reliance on what turned out to be fabricated information from a source known as CURVE-BALL. Morell acknowledges discussions with analysts and collectors who had opposing views, but he does not comment on inputs from Tyler Drumheller,[4] the Chief of the Europe Division of the Directorate of Operations, who claimed to have warned the DCI of doubts about CURVE-BALL. Morell notes only that he saw nothing "to suggest that either [John] McLaughlin [Tenet's deputy] or Tenet was made aware of the dispute at the time." (97) Nevertheless, he apologizes to Secretary Powell for the analytic disaster.

As to CIA's view of the Iraq war, he frankly adds that notwithstanding the admonition to avoid recommending policy, "I believe we did have a responsibility prewar to produce a detailed analysis of the likely postwar scenarios… but that paper was never written." (98) Morell does present an extended discussion that answers the question "how could we get it so wrong" from both the analysis and collection points of view. In the end, a major unintended consequence of the war, writes Morell, was that "al Qa'ida… was given a new boost by a narrative that said the United States was intent on bringing war to Muslim lands." (107)

In the summer of 2003, Morell's assignment to the DI ended, and he became the CIA's analytic liaison in the United Kingdom. The intelligence topics of concern—Iraq and al Qa'ida—remained the same but he acquired new perspectives and contacts. But the circumstances around his working out his next assignment in 2006 will spark reader interest if not cynical amusement. It was a time of "enormous tension between the CIA and the newly created DNI," says Morell. (125) And when offered several positions in the community, the players engaged in a bureaucratic food-fight over decision authority. Even congress was peripherally involved. In the end Morell was a casualty, and he came home to the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC)—another new organizational element that functionally duplicated some of the work of the CIA CounterTerrorist Center—and he writes that it was not his first or second choice.

Four months later, demonstrating a resilience that characterizes his CIA career, Morell benefited from

an unusual circumstance, when in May 2006 the new director of CIA, Michael Hayden, appointed him the CIA executive officer, replacing the disgraced "Dusty" Foggo. Morell was now a "member of CIA's senior leadership team." (127) At this point, Morell's book provides a view of an agency in turmoil and discusses how Hayden moved quickly to "turn the situation around," (128) while simultaneously supporting actions against terrorist operations that were "foiled by the excellent work of the intelligence community and the FBI." (130)

Morell remained executive officer under Leon Panetta, the DCIA appointed by President Obama. He describes Panetta's "rough start with the Agency" because of his views on torture expressed to congress during his confirmation hearings. But Panetta clearly enjoyed his job, and he gradually earned the respect of all after he repulsed DNI attempts to usurp traditional CIA responsibilities. Panetta and Morell worked well together, and by May 2009 the director had appointed him deputy director of CIA. Morell retained this position until his retirement in 2013. In the period, he twice served as acting director, after the departures of Panetta and Director David Petraeus.

From the director's suite on the seventh floor, Morell gained direct knowledge of IC and CIA roles in major operations and events. Examples include congressional oversight, White House politics, the enhanced interrogation program, the Bin Laden operation, the Snowden affair, the drone program, the Benghazi "talking points," and developments in the Middle East. Morell gives all brief, though substantial and incisive attention. In these discussions, he does not avoid the moral issues that confronted the agency, and he makes his positions clear explicitly and implicitly. The final chapter sums up his views on what needs to be done to meet the national security challenges of the future. He calls it "the most important chapter in the book" (321) and it is worth close attention.

The Great War of Our Time tells a story of US intelligence—the good and the bad—from a uniquely wide-ranging perspective. Michael Morell had an extraordinary career and his memoir should serve to guide those who follow in his footsteps.

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Chinese Industrial Espionage: Technology Acquisition and Military Modernization
William C. Hannas, James Mulvenon, and Anna B. Puglisi. (Routledge, 2013), 378 pp.

Reviewed by Arturo G. Munoz

Chinese Industrial Espionage: Technology Acqui-sition and Military Modernization provides the most thorough and insightful review to date of the covert and overt mechanisms China uses to acquire foreign technology. Delving into China's "elaborate, comprehensive system for spotting foreign technologies, acquiring them by every means imaginable and converting them into weapons and competitive goods," the book concludes that "there is nothing like it in the world." (2-3) The People's Republic of China (PRC) is implementing "a deliberate, state-sponsored project to circumvent the costs of research, overcome cultural disadvantages and 'leapfrog' to the forefront by leveraging the creativity of other nations," thereby achieving "the greatest transfer of wealth in history." (78, 216)

Although PRC espionage is global in scope, the most important target is the United States. Relying primarily on Chinese-language government and non-government sources, the coauthors intend to raise awareness of the threat nationally and alert decisionmakers to the gravity of the problem. Trained as Chinese linguists, with considerable experience dealing with Chinese affairs, they are uniquely qualified for the task. William C. Hannas has a Ph.D. in Asian languages, published two books on Asian orthography and served in various US government posts, including at the Joint Special Operations Command. James Mulvenon is a leading expert on Chinese cyber issues and has published widely on China's military affairs and communist party-army relations. Senior analyst Anna B. Puglisi studied in Beijing and subsequently was a visiting scholar at Nankai University, where she studied China's science and technology (S&T) policies and infrastructure development.

The main topics are human intelligence (HUMINT) and open source intelligence (OSINT), but cyber espionage is defined briefly as "the latest and perhaps most devastating form of Chinese espionage," with the potential to "erode the United States' long term position as world leader in S&T innovation and competitiveness." (216–17) To begin its HUMINT review, the book reviews and debunks commonly-held assumptions about Chinese clandestine tradecraft put forth in previous works such as *The Tiger Trap*: *America's Secret Spy War with China*: [a]

- The "thousand grains of sand" approach relying on large numbers of amateur collectors

- Preference for elicitation of secrets or "inducing people to give them away" rather than paying for them as part of a traditional agent-case officer relationship

- Preference for ethnic Chinese agents

- Preference for using "good" or normal people without flawed or vulnerable personalities

- Eschewing traditional tradecraft (188)

The authors conclude that Chinese case officers employ the same methods as other nations, including paying for information. They also argue that the prevalence of ethnic Chinese agents does not mean that they are always preferred. China wants to recruit many more non-Chinese agents, but simply has failed to do so. However, *Chinese Industrial Espionage* is so eager to discredit "urban myths" that the book downplays a significant caveat: China does complement standard tradecraft with non-traditional techniques. Citing senior FBI counterintelligence officers, *Tiger Trap* insists that "China has a different approach to intelligence," which helps explain why Chinese case officers are rarely caught spying.[b] Instead, China "co-opts some of the thousands of students, tourists, business travelers, trade delegations, and scientists who visit the United States every year" and manipulates visitors to

a.David Wise, *Tiger Trap: America's Secret Spy War with China* (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011)
b.Ibid, 12.

China to reveal secrets inadvertently in meetings ostensibly intended to "exchange ideas and solve problems."[a]

Despite the damage done by the Chinese efforts, *Chinese Industrial Espionage* emphasizes that little of the technology transfer program is secret. On the contrary, "the projects are laid out in policy documents, discussed in the media, and implemented through venues whose general features are open to inspection." (2) In this sense the book's title is misleading. A large part of it does not deal with espionage per se, but with overt mechanisms, according to the six categories set out in the book:

1. International research and development (R&D) in China

Beijing encourages multinational corporations to conduct R&D in China as a means to promote domestic technological innovation. Increasingly, key firms are complying for their own self-interest; Microsoft's Chinese R&D center produces many patents.

2. National technology transfer centers

Led by the China Association for Science and Technology (CAST), these centers link prioritized industries and companies to "a three way alliance of business, universities and research institutes." (93–94) The US chapter of CAST works "to establish cooperative relations with American corporations, enterprises, institutions and organizations…in seeking funds, market development, technology transfer and investment opportunities." (111)

3. Advocacy groups based in the United States

Supported by Chinese diplomats, advocacy groups arrange for American delegations to visit China to market technology or engage in joint ventures. The Washington DC Center for US-China Technology Innovation and Development and its affiliates "spot new US technology, find PRC customers for it, determine how to pass the technology to China in a cost-effective way and help the projects get off the ground." (116–17) Groups in California predominate. Silicon Valley Chinese-American Computer Association members have brought computer technology to Taiwan and China and produced hardware exported back to the United States. (128) Silicon Valley Chinese Overseas Business Association members advise national, provincial and municipal governments in China, where

"they assist and participate in planning and policymaking for the development of China's high-tech industry," while the Silicon Valley Chinese Engineers Association aims to establish "channels to allow members to engage in China's rapid economic development." (122–26)

4. Employment of foreign subject matter experts in China

The China Association for the International Exchange of Personnel "invites experienced foreign specialists to China to solve technical and management problems for Chinese industry" through symposiums held in the United States and other venues. To that end, the State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs maintains a data base to identify and contact appropriate experts. As a result, about 440,000 foreign experts work in China annually, half from the West and Japan. (79, 80, 95)

5. Monitoring and use of "returning" Chinese students and scholars

Numerous organizations provide assistance for foreign study, followed by practical exploitation of the acquired knowledge. The North American Chinese Scholars International Exchange Center, based in McLean, Virginia, maintains a "database of talented personnel" to select US-based Chinese scholars whose skills match the "concrete personnel needs" of industries in China. (115) The ethnic nationalist appeal is so strong that some respond to it even though they have not lived in China. The PRC declares that "Chinese students overseas have strong patriotic feelings and a fervent desire to serve their country.... The way in which they can do this includes holding concurrent posts or part-time positions in China, carrying out cooperative research projects with scientists or institutes in China, traveling to China to give lectures, participating in academic and technical exchanges, establishing companies in China, providing consulting services, acting as intermediaries." (97–99, 155) *Chinese Industrial Espionage* points out that many returning students do not adjust well to Chinese bureaucracy, rampant academic plagiarism, inadequate health insurance, pollution and high rents.

6. Contributions of "overseas Chinese" professionals

According to a senior Chinese engineer in the Silicon Valley: "I think if we quit America and went entirely back to China, China's development would halt… America is the base that will allow China to develop." He adds that

a. Ibid, 13

"China regards those of us living overseas as essential. It extends a hand to us, encourages us to make the results of our research blossom on Chinese soil. It also asks us for know-how to develop its market." (125–26) Surpassing that advisory role, the Union of Chinese American Professional Organizations relocates enterprises to China. Chinese university alumni associations with many thousands of members in the US constitute another important venue. An Overseas Chinese Affairs Office gathering in Los Angeles described such attendees as "people who live abroad but whose hearts and minds belong to China." (108–10, 113)

7. Open source collection (OSINT)

The PRC reorganized the entire system to achieve greater efficiency in "collecting, transmitting and managing foreign languages, text, voice, images, tables and data," keyed to intelligence requirements. (23) Dissemination of technological information is augmented by profiles of foreign organizations and persons with access to that information. China's "spy manual," *Sources and Methods of Obtaining National Defense Science and Technology Intelligence,[a]* stresses that OSINT should be

carefully targeted, metrics-based on customer feedback, and include all types of media. Extraordinary attention is devoted to cataloging and indexing data to provide it to users in industrial, commercial, scientific or military sectors via a vast system of libraries, Internet web sites and national and local level S&T organizations.[b] *Sources and Methods* compares the advantages of openly available materials in the United States from corporate, civilian government and military sources. Readers are made aware of possible declassification errors by US agencies, which in the past have yielded highly useful data. Regarding classified data, *Sources and Methods* counsels:

A common saying has it that there are no walls that completely block the wind, nor is absolute secrecy achievable, and invariably there will be numerous open situations in which things are revealed, either in a tangible or intangible form. By picking here and there among the vast amount of public materials and accumulating information a drop at a time, often it is possible to basically reveal the outlines of some secret intelligence. (28)

As the authors of this impressive work have shown, in Chinese industrial espionage, overt and covert collection meld.

a. *Sources and Methods* was published in 1991 in Beijing by Kexue Jishu Wenxuan Publishing Company and sold to the public. A US government English-language translation was completed in 2000 and is posted at www.fas.org/irp/world/china/docs/sources.html. The authors, Hou Zhongwen and Wang Zongxiao, belonged to a government S&T Intelligence Bureau and compiled the material as part of a graduate course at the China Defense Science and Technology Information Center. They intended the book to be read by "each respective intelligence organization," but apparently felt no compunction about ordinary citizens, or even foreigners reading it. According to *Chinese Industrial Espionage*, "the use of foreign models to guide S&T development is so pervasive in China that no one imagined any comeback." (25–26)

b. The National Science and Technology library runs an online retrieval service of the holdings of member libraries offering access to 4.9 million foreign journals, 1.8 million foreign S&T conference papers, 900,000 foreign dissertations, reports and standards and about 11 million foreign patents. Foreign S&T journals are especially prized as a source of useful information (24, 35).

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Spies, Patriots, and Traitors: American Intelligence in the Revolutionary War

Kenneth A. Daigler. (Georgetown University Press, 2014), 317 pp., illustrations, endnotes, bibliography, and index.

Reviewed by David Robarge

Intelligence during the American Revolution has attracted much scholarly attention in the past decade. Books dealing with British and patriot spies, France's covert assistance to the Continental Army, American and British use of cryptology and steganography, and the patriots' privateer fleet have significantly added to our knowledge of how both sides in the conflict used—or, in the case of the British, generally failed to use—espionage, covert action, and intelligence methods to gain insights into their adversaries' intentions and capabilities and to achieve advantage on the battlefield.[1] All of the new works are valuable to experts in American Revolution and intelligence history, but the general reader needs an overview that synthesizes the detailed historiography and assesses the overall impact intelligence activities had on the war's outcome. Kenneth Daigler, a former CIA operations officer with several US government publications to his credit, has satisfied that requirement admirably with *Spies, Patriots, and Traitors*, the first comprehensive look at the secret War for Independence in nearly 60 years.[2]

In 13 economical and clearly written chapters that rely mainly on secondary accounts and published documentary collections along with some archival sources, Daigler covers the key specific topics of the intelligence war in the broad areas of espionage, covert action, and counterintelligence: the Boston Mechanics spy ring and the British penetration agent in its midst, Benjamin Church; martyr-spy Nathan Hale; France's *sub rosa* provision of essential military aid; Benjamin Franklin's propaganda and other covert activities as "chief of Paris Station"; George Washington's intuitive grasp of the intelligence business and his clever use of deception and disinformation to choose the right moment to strike at while keeping away from the always stronger British enemy; the operations of the Culper Ring in and around New York City[3]; Benedict Arnold, the epitome of self-interested treason; John Jay's adept counterintelligence apparatus in New York; the contributions of African-Americans as patriot spies; and the overlooked importance of intelli-

gence in the guerrilla-style combat in the southern theater. Daigler's main contribution to these mostly familiar stories is providing an intelligence practitioner's perspective to the patriots' sources, methods, and operational management. Using the tradecraft terms he provides in a helpful glossary but without lapsing into insider jargon, Daigler explains the various paraphernalia of spycraft—including types of agents and covers, covert communication techniques, encryption systems, and categories of intelligence.

When Daigler weaves these specialized concepts into narratives of well-known political and military events, the hidden history of the American Revolution appears prominently. The decentralized quality of the patriots' intelligence organizations—the Mechanics in Boston, the Continental Congress' secret committees in Pennsylvania and its agents in Europe, Jay's counterspies in New York, Washington's assortment of operatives wherever he and the Continental Army happened to be—was a product of the fragmented political structure of the emerging United States. Intelligence had important roles in crucial patriot victories at Trenton and Princeton, in enabling Washington to keep one move ahead of his British adversaries and transform the conflict from a conventional war to an insurgency, which the patriots had a much better chance of winning, and in securing vital European support, especially France's. Intelligence probably prevented a disastrous British ambush of French troops at Newport in 1780 and helped maneuver Cornwallis into surrendering at Yorktown the year after. It almost certainly shortened the war and saved lives and property, although how much cannot be readily quantified. Daigler discusses British intelligence only briefly, but his observations about its shortcomings—not understanding the operational environment, not altering preconceived views in the face of persuasive contrary information, not taking advantage of espionage successes—help explain why the Americans were so much more proficient at the intelligence game and sound depressingly familiar today. As Daigler portrays him, Washington was more adept at running agents, double

agents, and deceptions than at planning battlefield tactics. In the longer term, Washington, Jefferson, and Madison used their direct or indirect knowledge of intelligence's part in winning independence to conduct espionage and covert action operations during their presidencies.[4]

In some instances, Daigler tries too hard to interpret past events using modern intelligence concepts. Nearly all of chapter two about the political agitation of the prewar years, much of it incited by the Sons of Liberty, is an unconvincing attempt to ascribe to a succession of often spontaneous events the characteristics of orchestrated political action that CIA would carry out during the Cold War. In chapter nine, Daigler blames the failure of the André-Arnold plot to turn over West Point to the British to the former's lack of basic intelligence professionalism, but he measures André's judgments and actions against a rigorous canon of practice developed in an organized fashion centuries later. Generally, however, Daigler avoids such ex post facto wisdom and lets the reader appreciate that, at least on the American side, intelligence officers then were talented novices who had no accessible institutional history to fall back on and learned their trade through the school of hard experience.

A persistent problem for historians of American Revolution intelligence has been the relative lack of documentation compared to the massive volume available to chroniclers of political, social, diplomatic, and military events of the time. Much of that lacunae can be attributed to the understandable security concerns of those involved in secret work that required them to destroy documents and later to remain silent about their actions. As Daigler concludes, "There is little doubt that today, over two hundred years after the war, details of the vast majority of American intelligence activities undertaken during the conflict still remain out of public view." On occasion, however, the unexpected appearance of previously unknown records adds immeasurably to our knowledge of the clandestine American Revolution, such as Morton Pennypacker's discovery of the Culper Ring's operational correspondence in the 1920s[5] and the Library of Congress' acquisition in 2000 of a contemporary manuscript history of the American Revolution written by a member of a Tory family that described why and how Nathan Hale had fallen into a counterintelligence trap arranged by legendary English commando leader Robert Rogers.[6] As Daigler hopes, "Perhaps a musty New England attic or the reconstruction of an old wall in the southern colonial mansion will provide additional insights into what we do know or provide the first details of a new intelligence operation. The story is not over." (231) In the meantime, he has written the most accessible and authoritative examination so far of the history of American Revolution intelligence. Today's officers who read *Spies, Patriots, and Traitors* will be surprised to realize that, except for the individuals and countries involved, the technologies used, and the clothing and wigs worn, the basics of the intelligence business have changed in nearly two centuries.

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1. John A. Nagy, *Dr. Benjamin Church, Spy* (Westholme, 2011); idem, *Invisible Ink: Spycraft of the American Revolution* (Westholme, 2010); idem, *Spies in the Continental Capital: Espionage across Pennsylvania during the American Revolution* (Westholme, 2011); Robert H. Patton, *Patriot Pirates: The Privateer War for Freedom and Fortune in the American Revolution* (Pantheon, 2008); Joel Richard Paul, *Unlikely Allies: How a Merchant, a Playwright, and a Spy Saved the American Revolution* (Riverhead, 2009); M. William Phelps, *Nathan Hale: The Life and Death of America's First Spy* (St. Martin's 2008); James M. Potts, *French Covert Action in the American Revolution* (Universe, 2005); Alexander Rose, *Washington's Spies: The Story of America's First Spy Ring* (Bantam, 2006); Thomas J. Schaeper, *Edward Bancroft: Scientist, Author, Spy* (Yale University Press, 2011); Michael J. Sulick, *Spying in America: Espionage from the Revolutionary War to the Dawn of the Cold War* (Georgetown University Press, 2012); Harlow Giles Unger, *Improbable Patriot: The Secret History of Monsieur de Beaumarchais, the French Playwright Who Saved the American Revolution* (University Press of New England, 2011). Unger's book is the only one of the recent crop that the volume under review did not reference in its otherwise exhaustive bibliography.

2. John Bakeless, *Turncoats, Traitors, and Heroes* (J.B. Lippincott, 1959) is the most recent full-length effort, but it deals exclusively with espionage and does not discuss covert action. G.J.A. O'Toole has five useful chapters on all of the war's intelligence aspects in *Honorable Treachery: A History of U.S. Intelligence, Espionage, and Covert Action from the American Revolution to the CIA* (Atlantic Monthly, 1991). While working for CIA, Daigler wrote his publications under the pseudonym P.K. Rose. They are available on the CIA's public web

site.

3. Daigler's treatment of the Culper Ring is an essential antidote to the inaccuracies and distortions in the television series *Turn: Washington's Spies*, which is supposedly based on Alexander Rose's book cited above but takes huge liberties with the historical record for dramatic purposes.

4. For detailed discussions of the last point, see Christopher Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (HarperCollins, 1995), chap. 1; and Stephen F. Knott, *Secret and Sanctioned: Covert Operations and the American Presidency* (Oxford University Press, 1996), chaps. 1-5.

5. Morton Pennypacker, *General Washington's Spies on Long Island and in New York* (first published in 1926; reprint ed., Scholar's Book-shelf, 2005). Not all of Pennypacker's conclusions have proven reliable, notably his contention that an agent encrypted as 355 in the Culper Ring's codebook as "Lady" was the lover of Robert Townsend, the network's key collector in New York City (codenamed Samuel Culper Jr.), and was arrested by the British and died on a prison ship in New York harbor. Their illegitimate child, supposedly named Robert Townsend Jr., survived and went on to serve a term in the New York State legislature. Reputable researchers discredited the story in the 1990s—the child was born after the war, a product of an affair Townsend had with his housekeeper—but the fancy that 355 was an important but unacknowledged female member of Washington's New York spy network persists, such as in a 2011 episode of the cable television series Brad Meltzer's *Decoded* titled "The President's Inner Circle," which enthusiastically, but without any additional evidence, makes the case that 355 was an important female operative in the ring who exposed Benedict Arnold's treachery. She was part of the Culper Ring, but not in the way these "romantic myths" (Daigler's words, p. 189) suggest. As Daigler and others he references have conclusively shown, the clearest indications from the single reference to 355 in the ring's correspondence are that she was Anna Strong, an important support asset whose prominence in the ring, regrettably, has been egregiously overstated in the television series Turn.

6. James Hutson, "Nathan Hale Revisited: A Tory Account of the Arrest of the First American Spy," *Library of Congress Information Bulletin*, July/August 2003, www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/0307-8/hale.html.

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The Fighting Group against Inhumanity: Resistance and Espionage in the Cold War, 1948–1959
(German title: *Die Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit (KgU): Widerstand und Spionage im Kalten Krieg 1948–1959*)
Enrico Heitzer (Böhlau Verlag, 2015).

Reviewed by Thomas Boghardt

During the early years of the Cold War, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) embarked on a global campaign of espionage and covert action to assess the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union and to contain the spread of international communism. Well-known examples of this clandestine endeavor include CIA support of non-communist parties in Italy's 1948 parliamentary elections, as well as of pro-Western coups d'état in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954). Since divided Germany constituted the epicenter of the early Cold War, it comes as no surprise that the CIA became very active in this theater as well. One of the agency's principal local auxiliaries was a militantly anti-communist organization called the *Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit* (KgU). In his doctoral dissertation, German historian Enrico Heitzer has produced the definitive study of the KgU, including careful documentation of the organization's numerous links to US intelligence agencies.

Heitzer's book is comprehensive, well-organized, and thoroughly researched. The author mines an impressive array of primary sources, including the KgU's own records and those of its chief antagonist, the East German Ministry for State Security (MfS). Heitzer is also the first historian to exploit the large volume of recently-declassified CIA documents on the agency's collaboration with the KgU, a project codenamed DTLINEN. In four parts—"organization," "individual actors," "operations," and "setbacks"—Heitzer chronicles the genesis, rise, and fall of the KgU.

The KgU was established in Berlin during the Soviet blockade of the city's western sectors in 1948. The communist East German regime constituted the KgU's principal target—whence the organization's name, a reference to the "inhumane" conditions in the Soviet Zone. Its leaders were Rainer Hildebrandt, a historian and publicist, and Ernst Tillich, a Protestant pastor. "Hilly and Tilly," as the CIA referred to them, had served time in prison during the Third Reich for their anti-Nazi activities and always

claimed that their militant anti-communism represented a natural continuation of their opposition to Nazism.

The group employed both overt and covert means in pursuit of their goals. During the postwar years, thousands of people vanished in prisons in the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany, and the KgU built up an extensive database to help relatives track their loved ones. In the process, the KgU collected data on nearly 250,000 individuals. Much of this information subsequently came in handy in covert operations. The KgU also identified numerous informers of the East German regime and gave their names to the US Radio in the American Sector (RIAS), which broadcast so-called "snitch reports" in an effort to silence the informers and deter others from engaging in similar activities.

US intelligence was chiefly interested in the KgU's covert operations capabilities. According to CIA documents, in the early 1950s the KgU ran approximately 500 agents in East Germany and provided hundreds of reports on political and military issues to the CIA's Berlin Station. According to Heitzer, this rate of productivity put the KgU on par with the proto-West German intelligence service of Reinhard Gehlen. In collaboration with the CIA, the KgU also ran an aggressive economic disruption campaign aimed at a "breakdown in the whole [East German] administrative system," in the words of the agency. For example, in Operation *Osterhase* (Easter Bunny), the KgU sent 150,000 forged letters to state-owned East German stores, ordering them to cut prices drastically, and causing a run on already-scarce consumer goods. Following the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950, the CIA recruited "stay behind" agents in West Germany who were to operate behind enemy lines in the event of a Soviet invasion, and Heitzer documents the involvement of the KgU in this endeavor.

During its heyday in the early 1950s, the KgU had considerable political clout. Tillich met with West Ger-

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All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

man Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and testified before the House Committee on Un-American Activities on the evils of the East German regime. Hildebrandt met with Eleanor Roosevelt during a visit to the United States. By the late 1950s, however, successful penetration by MfS agents and the arrest of many KgU operatives in East Germany had thrown the group on the ropes, and its crusading anti-communism put it squarely outside the political culture of West Germany. In 1959, the once-powerful organization was quietly dissolved, with many of its records going to the CIA.

Heitzer's book shows that the KgU was never controlled by, but throughout its existence closely cooperated with, US intelligence. The US Army's Counter Intelligence Corps provided funding from the late 1940s, and the CIA gradually replaced the Army as the KgU's principal American benefactor in the early 1950s. Berlin-based CIA officers who worked with the KgU included station chief Peter Sichel and his deputy Harry Rositzke, who used the rather conspicuous cover name "John Wayne" in his dealings with the Germans.

The relationship between the KgU and US intelligence is best described as a partnership between two independent parties with identical goals—the weakening of the East German regime through espionage and covert action. In this bargain, the CIA contributed funds and guidance, and occasionally intervened on behalf of the KgU with the West German government and judiciary. In exchange, the KgU provided information and manpower, and absorbed massive MfS counter-strikes: numerous KgU agents were kidnapped, arrested, and received long prison sentences, and at least 126 were executed. The intensity of the MfS's response to the KgU's operations suggests that the group had at least some impact in East Germany. The CIA certainly considered the KgU valuable, calling it "the most promising and successful" of the various anti-communist organizations used for similar purposes in Germany.

Heitzer delivers a nuanced and detailed study of the KgU, however, his own assessment of the group grew more negative in the course of his research. For one, Heitzer dismisses Hildebrandt's and Tillich's claim that the group was equally opposed to all forms of totalitarianism, points out that the KgU used numerous activists with a Nazi past, and suggests that many hadn't changed their political views. He also faults the KgU for pursuing operations that were too extreme and dangerous, including sabotage, arson, and poison attacks. Heitzer's disapproving stance puts him at odds with many of the KgU's former members as well as some contemporary German historians who see the group first and foremost as an organization dedicated to a just fight against the totalitarian East German regime. Readers may make up their own minds, but whatever one's take on the KgU, no one will be able to discuss this controversial organization and its place in early Cold War Germany without taking into account Heitzer's excellent book.

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Half-Life: The Divided Life of Bruno Pontecorvo—Physicist or Spy?
Frank Close (Basic, 2015), 378 pps.

Reviewed by John Ehrman

Was he or wasn't he a spy? This is the unanswered, and possibly unanswerable, question that has been asked about Bruno Pontecorvo for more than 60 years. Pontecorvo was from a prominent Jewish-Italian family and became one of the world's most prominent physicists in the mid-20th century, living and working in Italy, France, the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. He was, however, also a secret communist and defected to the Soviet Union in 1950. Now, in a carefully researched and generally well-presented biography, Frank Close untangles the threads of Pontecorvo's life.

Pontecorvo came from a privileged background. Born in 1913 to a family that had become wealthy in the textile industry, he was one of eight children. Bruno was athletic and intellectually gifted and, at the age of 16, entered the University of Pisa as an engineering student. He switched to physics, however, and transferred to the University of Rome, where he became a protégé of Enrico Fermi and, at 21, joined the great physicist's team. Soon he was engaged in the work that would eventually make him a pioneer in research on neutrinos.

Pontecorvo began his career at a time of enormous ferment in both physics and international politics. Nuclear physics was in its infancy, and Close gives a good sense of the excitement in the field, as new discoveries about the atom seemed to come every week. At the same time, however, fascism was descending on Europe. With official anti-Semitism taking hold in Italy, Pontecorvo moved in 1936 to Paris, where he joined Frederic Joliot-Curie—the son-in-law of Madame Curie—and his laboratory. Also in Paris, Pontecorvo married a Swedish woman, Marianne Nordblom, and under Joliot-Curie's tutelage, became a communist. In 1940, Bruno, Marianne, and their young son fled from France to Portugal and then came to the United States.

At this point, Pontecorvo's story starts to become murky. When he arrived in the United States, Pontecorvo settled in Tulsa and went to work in the oil industry,

applying his discoveries about neutrons to the search for oil deposits. After the United States entered the war and started the project to build the atomic bomb, Pontecorvo was quickly recruited for atomic work. Instead of going to Los Alamos, however, he went to Canada and worked on the Anglo-Canadian end of the atomic project. After the war, he moved to England to work at the new British atomic energy establishment at Harwell.

Even though he remained scientifically productive and received offers of professorships at several prominent universities, the late 1940s were not a good time for Pontecorvo. The start of the cold war and then the arrests of the atomic spies in the United States and Britain led the FBI and MI-5 to start looking into his background and reports of communist ties. As questions about him grew, the British decided to ease Pontecorvo out of Harwell and into a nonsensitive position at the University of Liverpool. Before this could happen, however, Pontecorvo and his family left Britain in the summer of 1950 for a vacation in Italy and from there disappeared. It was not until 1955 that the Soviets confirmed he was in the USSR.

The exact reason for Pontecorvo's defection remains unclear; it is the question at the heart of *Half-Life*. Close makes an admittedly circumstantial case that Pontecorvo had spied for the Soviets before he left for Moscow, noting in particular that no one has yet determined how the Soviets obtained blueprints for the Canadian reactor where Pontecorvo worked or samples of uranium from Canada. He also argues that Pontecorvo's defection was so sudden that it may have been the result of Soviet instructions, perhaps because Moscow feared he was about to be caught.

Close's case is not convincing however. Pontecorvo's name does not appear in Venona or the Mitrokhin volumes, he has not been conclusively linked to known spies or rings, and Close has not uncovered any admission by Pontecorvo or his associates that he had been involved in

espionage. One suspects that, had Pontecorvo truly been a Soviet spy, we would know it by now.

Perhaps the best explanation of Pontecorvo's defection is the simplest: he was a communist and, with the deepening of the Cold War and communists under pressure in the West, simply decided that he would be better off living in the USSR. Supporting this is Close's overall portrait of Pontecorvo, which is the familiar one of a man who was a brilliant scientist but, in the political realm, childishly unsophisticated. It is striking to note that Close does not give any examples of Pontecorvo discussing politics or communist theory, let alone in a thoughtful way. Instead, *Half-Life* gives the impression of a man who was devoted to science and gave little thought to politics but joined the communists because he was told they opposed the fascists who persecuted him and his family. Pontecorvo's communism appears superficial, but even that would have been difficult to explain to security investigators in 1950.

Not surprisingly, the Soviet Union hardly turned out to be a land of dreams. The Pontecorvo family first was housed in Moscow and then at the nuclear research facility at Dubna, living in isolation and forbidden to have contact with family and friends in the West. Bruno continued his work, but Soviet secrecy and a lack of access to the more advanced facilities in the West meant that his colleagues in Europe and the United States were able to build on his earlier research and then surpass it; Close believes this cost Pontecorvo an otherwise almost-certain Nobel Prize.

This part of Pontecorvo's story is similar to that of Joel Barr and Alfred Sarant, the two members of Julius Rosenberg's industrial espionage ring who escaped to the USSR and helped found the Soviet microelectronics industry. Barr and Sarant had great hopes for their industry but found to their sorrow that Soviet bureaucracy, state controls, and internal politicking left them further and further behind the West.

Defection took a toll on Bruno's family, too. Marianne, already psychologically fragile, fell into depression and was in and out of hospitals. Nonetheless, Bruno stayed true to his communism and it was not until after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 that he began to admit that his faith had been misplaced. Finally allowed to travel to the West in the late 1970s, Pontecorvo visited Italy and other European countries until his death in 1993. With the USSR crumbling, he fully realized the terrible political, personal, and professional mistakes he had made, admitting to a journalist "I was a cretin." (290)

Half-Life is a solid account of a life that, while not wasted, certainly went off the rails. Close, a physicist at Oxford, has mined the archives and talked to Pontecorvo's surviving family members to give a nuanced, detailed portrait of him. Close's explanations of the science of neutrinos, muons, pions, and other subatomic topics are generally clear enough for the layman but did get dense in places.

Close seems to be exercised about McCarthyism, noting several times the horror of this period in American history; this is a point that need only have been made once. These passages play mostly a supporting role, however, and the biographical, political, and intelligence aspects of the book easily carry the story and make for the most interesting reading. *Half-Life* is well worth the time of anyone interested in the intersection of science, politics and—perhaps—espionage.

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Defence Intelligence and the Cold War: Britain's Joint Intelligence Bureau, 1945–1964

Huw Dylan (Oxford University Press, 2014), 256 pp., index.

Reviewed by Ryan Shaffer

Huw Dylan examines the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB) under Major General Kenneth Strong during the Cold War. Using declassified records from around the world and private papers from important intelligence figures, Dylan explores internal British debates about centralizing intelligence and the JIB's role until it merged with the Service Intelligence and created the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS). Tracing the Joint Intelligence Bureau's mission to acquire accurate maps of the Soviet Union to its new mission of analyzing Soviet atomic bombs and missiles, the book follows the JIB's expanding role and broader impact on international intelligence during the Cold War. While not as well-known as Britain's Security Service or the Secret Intelligence Service, the Joint Intelligence Bureau was significant in acquiring intelligence about Soviet military and economic weaknesses.

Following the Second World War, the British military and political establishment saw the need to keep the wartime intelligence structure in peacetime. To properly do this, the Joint Intelligence Committee argued that "first class" intelligence would mean less financial investment in war preparations. Several reforms were instituted, including better "efficiency" and "preparedness" under the Joint Intelligence Bureau, which was "designed to collect and collate economic, topographic, and operational intelligence." (10) In contrast to the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) that continued its wartime role coordinating interdepartmental intelligence and drafting reports, the Joint Intelligence Bureau was created for assessing economic, scientific, and topographic data. Dylan finds that shortly after the war the JIB proved those "who believed that central, more civilianized organizations could perform certain tasks previously assigned to military intelligence had gained a degree of ascendancy." (38)

At the start of the Cold War, the JIB's main focus was topographical intelligence, which grew in importance when the Soviets gained nuclear capability and Britain needed to know how to knock out Soviet air and rail transport before an attack. Dylan argues that the JIB successfully filled its purpose acquiring intelligence from a range of sources, exploiting intelligence from Germany and gathering intelligence that previously would have been duplicated by military departments. He describes how, in the first few years, the JIB proved to be "a collating and analysis institution that planners could depend on as a national data warehouse of military-relevant information." (68) Another major focus for the JIB was economic intelligence, including trade surveillance, which was used to formulate embargoes and plan economic warfare. It was tasked with monitoring shipping and recommending banning goods desired by communist countries, but this proved difficult as some items, like rubber, were valuable British exports. He highlights specific cases where the JIB "was instrumental in analysing the Soviet economy and determining which commodities were to be controlled." (105)

Though the Joint Intelligence Bureau remained involved in the economic Cold War, it also assessed Soviet bombs and missiles during the 1950s. After the defeat of Nazi Germany, the JIC directed the JIB to collect intelligence about "guided weapons," including bomber and missile threats, and this became more urgent after the Soviets tested their first hydrogen bomb in 1955. Concurrently, "the principle of centralization was gaining support in Whitehall," which the JIB leadership argued would improve intelligence organization. (122) In analyzing "gaps" about bombers and atomic intelligence, the author explains how the JIB's assessment of the Soviet Union's "capabilities were not developing as quickly or significantly as the Americans believed or the Soviets claimed." (145) By the early 1960s, American and British intelligence had an improved view of the Soviet military threat because of better technical and human intelligence, and the JIB's influence increased with the coordination of data about the atomic threat.

The Cold War resulted in "unprecedented" international cooperation, not only with American allies, but "the JIB's international liaison arrangements extended further, to sister agencies and to international business." (157) Dylan shows the close connection with US intelligence, with exchanges of data and people, while Commonwealth agencies similar to the JIB in Australia and Canada proved important in maintaining Britain's influence in the globalized world of intelligence. The book closes by discussing the move to centralize civilian intelligence, with JIB's merging with Service Intelligence to create the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) in 1964 and argues that "the JIB was the nucleus of the newly formed DIS." (184) Dylan draws parallels between the DIS and the United States Defense Intelligence Agency, but notes that finances were more of an issue for the British, which necessitated reorganizing military and nonmilitary focuses, such as economics and science, for better efficiency.

Defence Intelligence and the Cold War is a well-researched study on the Joint Intelligence Bureau's history and internal debates about centralizing British intelligence. Dylan successfully explains its origins to prevent duplication with other intelligence services and how it adapted to the Cold War reality by gathering maps of Soviet terrain in preparation for military conflict. Needing to cut costs, the JIB built connections with foreign intelligence agencies and businesses to obtain data about Soviet military capabilities.

The book shows how the JIB was involved in key Cold War intelligence gathering and gained "a surer grasp of the Soviet threat," but also how it shaped government policy with scientific and economic intelligence. (211) While the book provides solid analysis about the JIB's successes as well as problems, more detail about actual operations—as opposed to organizational and bureaucratic history—would have demonstrated the JIB's broader impact. In addition, the author successfully compares and discusses links with American and commonwealth agencies, but analysis of connections with Western European countries would have improved the international dimension of the book.

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John McCone As Director of Central Intelligence 1961–1965

David Robarge (Central Intelligence Agency, 2015), 482 pp., footnotes, bibliography, photos, index; available at http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/john-mccone-director-central-intelligence-1961-1965

Reviewed by Hayden Peake

The Bay of Pigs calamity led directly to the retirement of Allen Dulles, the fifth and best known director of central intelligence (DCI). His successor, John McCone, was a conservative Republican industrialist who had served in the Pentagon and been chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission during the Eisenhower administration. His selection by President Kennedy "came as a complete surprise to me" recalled McCone, (28) but some Kennedy loyalists were appalled and privately expressed opposition. The 59-year-old McCone didn't fit the youthful image of the new administration: he opposed arms control, and he was, after all, a Republican. "Liberal and left-wing circles" also voiced "loud objections" (31) but Kennedy ignored them. Intelligence Community leaders and CIA careerists were similarly unsettled by the selection of someone with no experience in the business and they wondered: who is this man, why was he chosen, and what are his marching orders? Only partial answers to these questions emerged during McCone's tenure.

Few would discover his "overalls to riches" story that included graduating with honors from U. C. Berkeley with a degree in mechanical engineering, working as a riveter for 40 cents an hour, and his steady rise to the top of Consolidated Steel Corporation during the depression. These details and 'the rest of his story' are skillfully told by CIA historian, David Robarge, in *John McCone As Director of Central Intelligence 1961–1965*.

The broad reasons for President Kennedy's choice quickly became apparent. McCone's appointment was announced on 27 September 1961 and he signed on as a consultant on 13 October to familiarize himself with the Intelligence Community of which he would become the titular leader when he was sworn-in on 29 November 1961.[a] After meeting with the various heads of Community elements and visiting CIA stations overseas where he met with allied intelligence service leaders, "it was clear

to any observer," writes Robarge, "that boardroom efficiency had replaced [the] faculty club collegiality" of the Dulles years. (32) This was particularly so at the CIA.

Unlike Dulles, whose style of leadership Robarge characterizes as *intelligence operator*, McCone is viewed as a *manager-reformer outsider* and that is just how he approached the curious paradox he found at the CIA. The administration had lost "faith in intelligence generally" after the Bay of Pigs, the successful Penkovsky case notwithstanding, while at the same time retaining its "enchantment with covert action and counterinsurgency." (33) Complicating matters, McCone found the agency "in a state of shock" (34) resulting from, inter alia, the furor caused by an inspector general's report that many insiders felt unjustly criticized for the agency's performance during of the Bay of Pigs. Surprisingly, Robarge notes, McCone agreed that the president's withdrawal of air power "was the fatal error that caused the failure." Nevertheless, McCone concluded that the CIA had to assume most of the "responsibility for the operation's failure." (40)

Despite a demanding and sometimes abrupt style—McCone didn't tolerate war stories at meetings—Robarge shows how a forceful and decisive McCone gradually turned things around by choosing good lieutenants, delegating authority, and working as hard as they did. By the end of his first year, he had made substantive changes in the organization, given day-to-day administration of the CIA to others, and initiated steps to improve the agency's scientific and technical programs. Perhaps most important, he had begun to restore White House confidence in CIA's fundamental missions of analysis and clandestine operations. At the same time, he established contacts with policymakers and Congress while giving "the work of the Intelligence Community" priority attention. He regarded the latter mission as "more important than overseeing CIA's activities." (59) Perhaps the most remarkable achievement of his first year was the relationship that

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a. It was a recess appointment and he wouldn't be confirmed by the Senate until 21 January 1962.

evolved with the president. Robarge describes how McCone gained his trust—McCone would speak truth to power—and how Kennedy often sought his views on policy. Despite the unwritten rule that DCIs should leave that task to the decisionmakers, Robarge shows that it became a routine part of McCone's role throughout his tenure.

It was also during his first year that McCone encountered the events that would command his attention in the years that followed. Robarge examines the major topics—Cuban operations, counterinsurgency in South East Asia, science and technology, counterintelligence, and the post Kennedy years—in separate chapters. As he does so, the reader should keep in mind that many of the events discussed overlapped or occurred simultaneously, all in less than four years.

The covert action operations against Castro were aggressively promoted by the Kennedy brothers. And though they were interrupted by the Cuban Missile Crisis (Robarge gives a detailed account of McCone's role in that operation), these operations were aimed at removing Castro from power, one way or another. The main effort—an interdepartmental program, Operation MONGOOSE—was run by BG Edward Lansdale out of the White House. It involved "sabotage, propaganda, and espionage." (84) Since McCone "agreed with administration strategy but not with its tactics," he concentrated on not involving the CIA in another "questionable covert enterprise." (83) Thus, while the agency supported Lansdale administratively, its anti-Cuban espionage and sabotage operations were run separately by William Harvey, head of Task Force W. Harvey would later become more well known for his involvement in the eight attempts to assassinate Castro under a program codenamed ZRRIFLE. None of these operations went smoothly or accomplished any of the foreign policy objectives the Kennedys set out. They all involved serious personality and bureaucratic conflicts at high levels and Robarge gives them an objective account. He also notes that some lingering controversies—as, for example, how much McCone knew about the assassination plots—remain in dispute absent hard evidence and McCone's inconsistent recollections. Surprisingly, while these events were underway, as revealed by a previously classified paragraph, "McCone participated in . . . discussions about the administration's diplomatic feelers to the Cuban leader in October and November 1963," which were intended to "explore 'various possibilities of establishing channels of communication to

Castro." Some unofficial contacts were in fact made, but McCone viewed them as "a cynical exercise to buy time" for Cuban subversive activities. (150) The gesture was moot when the president was assassinated.

While McCone was dealing with the Cuban issues, he was also a member of the *Special Group Counterinsurgency* (SGC). This high level committee was created by the White House to deal with what Robarge terms "Camelot's counterinsurgencies" (153) in the third world and initially focused on Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand. McCone had no experience in this area, though he did have an "overall skepticism" about covert action and the attorney general's imprecise conception of counterinsurgency as "social reform under pressure." Thus, he sought to limit CIA's participation to tasks historically associated with an intelligence service. "His dilemma was figuring out how to be responsive, protective, and not obstructionist, all at the same time." (157)

Robarge discusses how, despite some policy disagreements with the White House and the State Department, McCone struggled to manage CIA's role in Laos after the 1962 Geneva agreement that attempted to create a neutral Laos. The CIA "assumed full responsibility for training and supporting the 17,000 Hmong fighters," a number later expanded to 23,000. (165-66) Although there were some initial successes at stemming North Vietnam's Laotian incursion, what was meant to be a limited covert action gradually became an "adjunct to the intensifying conventional war in Vietnam." (166) The result was an expansion of CIA's role in Southeast Asia, accompanied by what McCone saw as unjustified optimism, especially in Vietnam.

From the outset, McCone "had doubts about the efficacy of covert action against the Vietnamese communists . . . and he was skeptical about the quality of intelligence being sent to Washington, particularly from the military." He also "disagreed with many of the diplomatic and military tactics the administration was using, in Vietnam," even questioning whether the objectives could be met. (171ff) And then, in what appeared to be a gesture to help the administration and despite the CIA's own pessimistic assessments about the war in 1963, McCone suddenly insisted "that the Community produce and optimistic estimate on Vietnam's future." (175) That act subjected him to charges of demanding intelligence to please. Robarge sorts all this out amidst describing McCone's opposition

to the overthrow of Diem, his battles with Ambassador Lodge's authority over the CIA station in Saigon—which he lost—and the assumption of the responsibility for the pacification program by the military. McCone returned from a trip to Vietnam in on 21 November 1963, "more discouraged… than ever." (192) As Robarge astutely observes in retrospect, how can success be achieved when an ally "seemed unable or unwilling to bear its share of the burden"? (397)

While Cuba and Vietnam consumed much of McCone's attention, it was the creation of the Science and Technology Directorate and the preservation of CIA's satellite mission where, in Robarge's judgment, his leadership was most significant. And it was leadership that was important here; he didn't make the changes by decree. Both projects had been proposed before he became director and he managed the required changes in personnel while balancing bureaucratic and operational equities. Opposition was intense and persistent; the changes took years to implement. The formation of the S & T directorate was largely an internal matter and was finally overcome when Albert 'Bud' Wheelon became its director. The battle to retain the agency's role in the space program was equally problematic: the CIA had been responsible for the U-2 and the CORONA satellite platforms and McCone wanted responsibility for designing follow-on systems. He also sought and achieved a high level position in the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) that managed these programs. All this required overcoming challenges posed by the Air Force and its "almost unbelievable phobia over its position" in the space program. (203) Robarge tracks the sometimes tortuous bureaucratic exchanges among the key players in the Department of Defense, the CIA, and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

The paramount purpose of the satellite systems and other technical capabilities was, of course, to monitor and assess the strategic threat from the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) with emphasis on the former. Robarge looks at how McCone, as chairman of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), managed the Intelligence Community's analytical efforts that produced its premier product: the annual Soviet estimate and its supporting documents. Throughout his tenure, he battled conflicting estimates of Soviet military strength produced by the Air Force and "never succeeded in gaining Air Force concurrence with a Soviet strategic forces esti-

mate." (236) By the mid-1960s, however, there was consensus that the Soviet strategic capabilities were growing at a robust rate." (237)

At the same time, McCone was involved in the administration's efforts to achieve a nuclear test ban treaty. This placed him, Robarge observes, "at the intersection of intelligence and policy." (238) In those early days of the Cold War, the critical problems of monitoring the Soviet order of battle—how many and what type of weapons—and verification that the treaty obligations are met, were of central importance. In Robarge's words: "distrust and verify." (246)

McCone's immersion in strategic policy continued when national estimates concerning the PRC were formulated. Robarge notes that Kennedy regarded China "as a greater threat to global peace than the Soviet Union," though not all policymakers shared that view. McCone, again ignoring the precedent that a DCI didn't comment on policy, sided with Kennedy and commented on a State Department policy paper that "it seems a little bland." (261) Of particular concern regarding PRC was its plan to detonate an atom bomb. Satellite photography kept President Kennedy and later President Johnson up to date on their plans and progress. In order to avoid any charge of surprise as happened with the first Soviet test, McCone and other officials recommended that Johnson issue a public warning that the test was near, and he did so.

Not all questions raised by policymakers about the Soviet Union and the PRC could be answered or even addressed by satellite coverage or other technical means. And while McCone clearly "valued technical collection over traditional espionage," he also recognized that "'spies in the sky' had significant limitations and must be used in conjunction with . . . reliable human sources." (277-8) Nevertheless, his strong support for HUMINT-related activities was confined to the policy level, leaving implementation to his deputies. This would later lead to difficulties during the Church Committee investigations of the CIA when one of his executive assistants denied McCone had been informed about two controversial internally generated projects, MKULTRA (testing LSD and other mind-altering drugs on humans) and HTLINGUAL, the Soviet mail opening program. McCone's deputy, Richard Helms, contradicted this view when he "said that HTLINGUAL was well known to John McCone." The official record indicates, Robarge writes in a previously

classified paragraph, that McCone did indeed know about both of them since he "ordered their suspension." (281) McCone was no longer DCI by this time and there the matter rested.

Some of the more time consuming clandestine operations in which McCone played a role involved KGB defectors to the CIA and, in one rather unusual instance, a suspected defector to the KGB. The latter case concerned U-2 pilot Gary Powers about whom, Robarge suggests, McCone held "persistent suspicions" never totally resolved in his mind and wondering at one point whether Powers had defected, even after officially cleared. (322-3)

Turning to the KGB defectors, Anatoli Golitsyn and Yuri Nosenko get the most attention because of the vigorous internal conflicts their cases created and the public notoriety they eventually generated. Golitsyn came first (1961) and demanded star treatment. Considered at first a very valuable agent, he met with McCone eleven times, "in several cases alone." McCone also arranged for one of Golitsyn's visits to Robert Kennedy. It was Golitsyn who insisted that the Sino-Soviet split was a deception operation and he convinced many of his supporters that Nosenko was a dispatched KGB officer sent to discredit all the valuable information Golitsyn was providing. Robarge reveals, for the first time officially, how McCone and the CIA dealt with Golitsyn's "arrogance and irascibility" and why he approved Angleton's unprecedented request to make Golitsyn an adviser to his CI Staff. (312) It was Golitsyn's work on the staff that led to the molehunt at CIA that began a few months before McCone left office.

The Nosenko defection in 1964 received high level attention because he claimed to have read the KGB file on Lee Harvey Oswald and could therefore affirm that the KGB played no role in the president's assassination. Years of hostile interrogation—"12 of his 16 months occurred during McCone's tenure"—(345) failed to change his story. The FBI believed Nosenko and this led to strained relations between the two agencies. But doubt remained in the CI Staff and McCone was persuaded that Nosenko should not give testimony to the Warren Commission. McCone did testify, but as Robarge notes, "his answer was neither frank nor accurate" and he explains why. (342)

The relationship McCone developed with President Johnson was not as close as it had been with Kennedy. Johnson didn't want one-on-one daily briefings and this led to the creation of the President's Daily Brief (PDB) on 1 December 1964, that Johnson liked. (354) The president also wanted to get McCone "out of the cloak and dagger business" (383) in the public's mind at least, since it contributed to the administration's 'dirty trick' image in the press. Robarge explains how, as McCone worked to burnish the agency image, his efforts were complicated by exposé books. The dogged and intense press coverage and the leaks that followed caused extraordinary public turmoil. The book that caused the greatest uproar was *The Invisible Government,*[a] that, to McCone's dismay, claimed to disclose CIA's basic secrets. CIA analysis revealed "120 significant security discloses" along with "200 significant inaccuracies." (386) Robarge's account of McCone's unsuccessful attempts to suppress publication—he dealt with the publishers and met with the authors—will have an ironic overtone familiar to readers today. But to McCone at the time, it was a "frightening and sickening" episode that left him disheartened. (413)

As the fury over *Invisible Government* diminished, a second book started another controversy. *The Bay of Pigs: The Leader's Story of Brigade 2506*[b] asserted that a CIA field officer had been directed to "disobey administration orders to suspend the landing at the Bay of Pigs." Of serious internal concern, the officer denied the claim and fortunately the book didn't create much of a fuss.

While the books controversy was going on, "McCone's forthright criticisms of US policy in Southeast Asia" further estranged him from the president. (371) Robarge reveals that McCone didn't think Johnson knew how to fight a war and told him so. (409) When his recommendations concerning covert actions and insurgency programs the world over were ignored by the administration, he knew it was time to leave. Asked who should succeed him, McCone recommended Richard Helms or Ray Cline, both experienced intelligence officers, only to be stunned when Johnson picked the inexperienced admiral, William Raborn. After the president received his first briefing from Raborn, he bluntly told him, "I'm sick and tired of John McCone's tugging at my shirt tails. If I want to see you, Raborn, I'll call you." (416)

a. David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, *The Invisible Government* (Random House, 1964).
b. Haynes Johnson with Manuel Artime et. al., *The Bay of Pigs: The Leader's Story of Brigade 2506* (W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1964).

John McCone As Director of Central Intelligence 1961–1965 concludes by noting "McCone was the right DCI for the times—the manager and leader CIA desperately needed" and he showed that neither a career intelligence officer nor a Washington insider was essential to running the Community effectively. Robarge also makes clear that the DCI's dual-hatted responsibilities without the corresponding authority meant that McCone never achieved the level of Community control that he sought.

Official histories by in-house historians risk accusations of writing-to-please or favorably shaping the institutional image. CIA historian, David Robarge, avoids this dilemma in his study of John McCone. It is a fine book, superbly documented, with many new insights. For those wondering how the CIA rebounded from the Bay of Pigs and attained new respect in the Intelligence Community, it is essential reading.

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Death in the Congo: Murdering Patrice Lumumba
Emmanuel Gerard and Bruce Kuklick (Harvard University Press, 2015), 276 pp., illustrations, maps.

Reviewed by Stephen R. Weissman

"For over fifty years," this valuable study begins, "the circumstances of the assassination [of Patrice Lumumba, the charismatic, democratically-elected prime minister of the newly independent Democratic Republic of the Congo] have absorbed scholars and fascinated the general public." (3) Coinciding with the CIA's anti-Lumumba covert action program, the murder cast a long shadow over both the agency and American foreign policy.

In recent years, new evidence has emerged about this grisly event and those responsible for it. Of particular importance have been the gradually declassified files of the 1975–76 US Senate Church Committee's investigation of CIA assassination plots against Lumumba, the report of a Belgian parliamentary inquiry in 2001, Congo Station Chief Larry Devlin's 2007 memoir, and the long awaited appearance in 2013 of a "retrospective" Congo volume in the State Department's *Foreign Relations of the United States* series, which contains extensive CIA operational documents from the 1960s.

Death in the Congo taps into all these sources and more. It is distinguished from other works on the assassination by its breadth of analysis. Co-authored by a Belgian historian (one of four academic experts employed by the Belgian inquiry) and an American one, it brings together in one place the intersecting outlooks and behavior of four sets of actors whom the authors hold accountable for having destroyed Lumumba both politically and physically: his Congolese political opponents, the governments of Belgium and the United States, and the United Nations. Rather than focusing narrowly upon the penultimate execution (which is described based on eyewitness testimony), it properly conceives of Lumumba's death as the result of a lengthy "shared process of murder" (218) that began during efforts to remove him from power, continued through attempts to kill or capture and imprison him, and culminated in his transfer to secessionist enemies who had publicly voiced their murderous intent.

The study's conclusions are mainly well founded although there are some significant shortcomings. The book will also intrigue intelligence professionals because it implicitly raises enduring issues about covert action that continue to be discussed today.

Like other scholars, Gerard and Kuklick dismiss the anti-communist rationale for Western intervention against Lumumba. They cite CIA and State Department intelligence analyses that portrayed Lumumba as a proud nationalist and Pan-Africanist who strove to be neutral in the Cold War. Unfortunately, agency heads and President Eisenhower thought they knew better and disregarded this intelligence.

The authors maintain that the governments of Belgium and the United States—including their covert operators—were largely responsible for "this traveling carnival of death." (215) They insist that the West cannot escape accountability for the consequences of its actions by arguing that it was "the locals" who pulled the trigger:

> *Along with their own attempts to deliver the coup de grace, US and Belgian officials more and more turned to Lumumba's opponents...The Europeans and Americans goaded the Africans to imprison Lumumba and to secure a capital sentence. The politicians in Leopoldville proved willing to jail him, but were afraid either to bring him to trial or put him to death. Those in Katanga [a Belgian-supported secessionist province] were not afraid, and the Belgians and Americans and the Leopoldville Group knew that. With Western urging, [President Joseph] Kasavubu and his cohorts sent Lumumba to Elizabethville and his doom.* (216)

Regarding the US role at the end, they present a very strong circumstantial case. The United States, through the CIA, was demonstrably trying to do Lumumba in—directly and through its cooperating Congolese leaders—from August through November 1960. In January 1961, these same clients gave the station chief advance notice of their plan to ship Lumumba to his bitterest enemies and he did nothing to discourage them.

Gerard and Kuklick are notably severe on Western and UN officials whose autobiographies, memoirs, and authorized biographies "distanced the authors from anything

that had to do with the murder. . . . Contemporary evidence," they demonstrate, "contradicts these recollections and shows their self-serving nature." (3)

Buttressed by the latest declassified cables, *Death in the Congo* is, in this reviewer's opinion, a powerful rejoinder to the oft-cited but poorly justified conclusion of the Church Committee Assassinations Report, which exempted the US government from any responsibility for Lumumba's death. At the same time, it suffers from several major weaknesses, particularly in its analysis of US and CIA policies and operations: the authors contend that the Eisenhower administration's decision to get rid of Lumumba was partially motivated by Belgian Secretary-General of NATO Paul Spaak's threat to resign over insufficient US support of Belgium in the UN Security Council. But they offer no evidence that this concern rather than anti-communism provoked Eisenhower's probable order to assassinate Lumumba. Nor does their assertion that "Western security arrangements might unravel at a decisive moment" if Spaak departed hold water. (70)

They speculate that CIA Director Allen Dulles was a reluctant assassin, dragging his feet for a few weeks before implementing the president's mandate. Yet Dulles had already approved a murder plot against Cuban president Fidel Castro and would shortly launch *ZRRIFLE*, a project to create an agency assassination capability. The authors fail to appreciate the timing problem in attempting to suddenly introduce assassination into an ongoing Belgian-American political action operation to displace Lumumba by "semi-constitutional means."

Relying too exclusively on information developed by the Belgian parliamentary inquiry, Gerard and Kuklick significantly underplay the CIA role in President Kasavubu's dismissal of Lumumba and Colonel Joseph Mobutu's decisive military coup. The documentary record generally supports portions of Devlin's memoir giving the Agency significant agency credit for these developments.[a] Similarly, the authors' contention that Mobutu acted independently of the CIA and remained "neutral" between Lumumba and Kasavubu for weeks afterwards defies the facts. Devlin put Mobutu on his payroll a week before the coup after the latter had made his anti-Lumumba, anti-Soviet stance crystal clear and had revealed his plan to move troops to the capital. Within four days of his announce-

ment that he was "neutralizing" Lumumba and Kasavubu, appointing a temporary College of Commissioners to govern the country, Mobutu assured Devlin that the Commissioners would take orders from Kasavubu.[b]

While it lifts the veil on major fractures in Belgian policy making and implementation, the book's treatment of two apparent breakdowns in executive control of CIA covert action is seriously inadequate. The authors note that Devlin withheld his knowledge of his Congolese clients' plan to send Lumumba to his sworn enemies from his superiors for three days until Lumumba had been rendered and killed. They pose the question of whether Devlin was purposely trying to dispose of Lumumba before the arrival of the John F. Kennedy administration whose policymakers were reconsidering Eisenhower's hard line towards the Congolese leader. They should have probed further. On the same day Devlin was informed about the planned transfer, he learned that his request to Washington for funds to pay off a Congolese garrison on the verge of a mutiny that might restore Lumumba to power had been blocked by the State Department. The latter wanted to hold off on this matter "of high policy" until the new administration arrived in six days. This turndown, ignored by the authors, provided the worried but self-confident station chief with a powerful incentive to conduct US policy on his own. In addition, the authors fail to notice that this was not the first time that Devlin had pushed this envelope. After putting Mobutu on his payroll and discussing with him "the beginning of the plan for Mobutu to take over the government," he waited six days—until the eve of the coup—before filing a report with Headquarters. Since his preferred course of action ran counter to the US policy of pursuing a "semi-constitutional" solution, it is not surprising that his cable was vague about his and Mobutu's intentions.[c]

Furnishing readers with many useful insights into a past CIA operation, *Death in the Congo* also provides needed historical perspective on continuing controversies over covert action. Targeted killings that may be based on faulty assumptions? Rendition of suspects to third parties who may harm them? Lapses in agency controls over officers? All of these issues came to the fore in the Congo a half century ago.

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a. Compare Larry Devlin, *Chief of Station Congo: A Memoir of 1960–67* (Public Affairs, 2007), 63–70, 76–91 with US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States Volume XXIII Congo 1960–1968* (US Government Printing Office, 2013), 18, 20–41. The FRUS volume was reviewed by CIA Chief Historian David Robarge in *Studies in Intelligence* 58, No. 3 (September 2014)

b. US Department of State, *Congo 1960–1968*, 35.
c. US Department of State, *Congo 1960–1968*, 72–79, 28–31. For a fuller analysis of Devlin's influence in the Congolese leaders' decision to transfer Lumumba to secessionist Katanga Province see Stephen R. Weissman, "An Extraordinary Rendition," *Intelligence and National Security*, 25, no. 2 (April 2010), 98–122.

Surveillance and Spies in the Civil War: Exposing Confederate Conspiracies in America's Heartland

Stephen E. Towne (Ohio University Press, 2015), 430 pp.

Reviewed by Clayton Laurie

One of the factors that makes history a living and changing discipline is that new evidence often revises older interpretations. Facts of history remain the same, of course, but fresh information often changes how we view events or the actions or motivations of historical figures. Stephen E. Towne's *Surveillance and Spies in the Civil War: Exposing Confederate Conspiracies in America's Heartland* convincingly revises one long held view of anti-war dissent in the North and contains much of interest to today's intelligence officer. As an associate archivist at Indiana and Purdue Universities, Towne has "uncovered and recovered Civil War-era records that had been lost for generations or perhaps had never been examined by either archivist or researcher." (ix)

Historians have often noted the darker side of Abraham Lincoln's presidency: the suspension of habeas corpus and many other civil liberties, especially freedoms of speech and press, and the wholesale detention without charge of dissenting citizens. The traditional narrative of the last 50 years has supported this view of a later much-beloved and martyred president acting during a time of crisis in an arbitrary and capricious manner against those questioning him, the Union war effort, and government policies regarding conscription and emancipation. On the latter, as one group protested, they were decrying "illegal measures taken by 'King Abraham' Lincoln's administration and the perversion of the war to save the Union into a war to abolish slavery." (63) That most of those incurring Lincoln's wrath happened to be members of the opposition Democratic Party only reinforced the arguments of his critics that executive actions were out-of-bounds—politically motivated attacks meant to squelch debate for ideological purposes rather than remove any real threat to the conduct of the war or stability of the North. Copperheads led by Ohio's ex-Congressman Clement L. Vallandigham and his allies such as Daniel W. Voorhees of Indiana, as the most cited examples, were only exercising First Amendment rights to question government policies and conduct, and in no way posed an existential threat to the United States. These views have

predominated since the 1960s, when the first of many studies on the Copperheads and wartime dissent by historian Frank L. Klement appeared. Towne's work overturns this accepted view, and reinforces newer interpretation by academic scholars such as Jennifer L. Weber.[a]

Towne's book contains 87 pages of multiple-source, discursive footnotes, and a 15-page comprehensive bibliography listing largely untouched government records, manuscripts, private papers, and correspondence of participants in some 20 separate state archives and historical societies. The author lists contemporary books and newspaper accounts, many not previously available or reviewed, and many scholarly and popular histories published during the last 150 years. As the author's notes, and as his bibliography shows, little has appeared on this subject since the 1960s.

Based on his extensive research, Towne demonstrates that Democratic Party dissenters against federal policies, be it the draft, the war, or emancipation, were more than mere conscientious objectors, or loyal citizens exercising their Constitutional rights, but were actual traitors and conspirators. They worked covertly with Confederate civilian and military agents hoping to foment a rebellion with the goal of establishing a Northern Confederacy in the Old Northwest states of Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, and Michigan, as well as in neighboring Missouri and Kentucky. While the records show no military-Republican

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a. Histories depicting Civil War Democrats and Copperheads as traitors and subversives predominated for nearly a century until Frank L. Klement's *The Copperheads of the Middle West* (University of Chicago Press, 1960) appeared. See also Klement, *Dark Lanterns: Secret Societies, Conspiracies, and Treason Trials in the Civil War* (Louisiana University Press, 1984), *The Limits of Dissent: Clement L. Valladigham and the Civil War* (University of Kentucky Press, 1970), and *Lincoln's Critics: The Copperheads of the North* (White Mane, 1999). Jennifer L. Weber, in *Copperheads: The Rise and Fall of Lincoln's Opponents in the North* (Oxford University Press, 2006), presents a view of Democratic dissent in the North very similar to Towne's and is representative of the current historiography.

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collusion to persecute Democrats, there was "copious evidence of conspiracy and treason" on the part of the political opposition. (308) These pro-rebel Northerners favored a victory of the Southern slave-owning aristocracy, joined secret political societies such as the Order of the Secret Knights, Knights of the Golden Circle, and the Butternut Society, eventually numbering 125,000 members, and in one state, Indiana, counting chapters in 85 of 92 counties. These groups colluded to stockpile arms; plotted with notorious rebel agents, such as Thomas Henry Hines and cavalry commander John Hunt Morgan, to attack communities; and developed schemes to hijack warships on the Great Lakes, destroy military depots, sabotage rail lines and bridges, and attack prisoner of war camps. Hines, for example, from his Canadian base close to Vallandingham's initial residence in exile, plotted to attack Chicago's Camp Douglas, arm the released prisoners from secret weapon stockpiles, and then carry on to target other POW camps such as Camp Morton, in Indianapolis, Indiana. While Klement's earlier work dismissed the Camp Douglas plot as Republican-created fiction, Towne's research reestablishes its validity. As Hines later confessed, 70 Confederate agents waited in Chicago during the Democratic National Convention of August 1864 for the signal to liberate the camp and attack the unwary city. (274–275) Other groups plotted to liberate officer POWs at Johnson Island near Sandusky, Ohio, hoping to release a potential rebel army of thousands into the Union heartland. Other Democratic groups protested conscription and emancipation, seeking to disrupt both, harbored draft dodgers and deserters, and actually skirmished with Union military and civil authorities in armed bands numbering upwards of 150 men. They smuggled rebel mail, engaged in a brisk contraband trade, counterfeited the new Greenback currency, and established a secret communications line into the Confederacy.

Civil law enforcement proved inadequate to meet the threat and responsibility shifted to Union Army officials. Although commanders counted recruitment, administering the draft, training, and guarding prisoners as their primary tasks, they soon added surveillance and intelligence collection and analysis to their already heavy burdens. They hired networks of military investigators and paid-civilian informants, one officer employing some 2,300 agents operating throughout the Old Northwest. As a result, "Army intelligence officers amassed significant evidence of the existence of conspiracy, seized records from the secret groups, opened the private correspon-

dence of participants, obtained numerous confessions of members, collected reliable information from informants, and inserted spies into the organizations to learn their secrets and their plans." (5) Working in close cooperation with civil officials over the course of three years, military officers such as Henry Carrington, Paul Schofield, William Rosecrans, Ambrose Burnside, Joseph Hooker, and Samuel Heintzelman kept the peace, but also constructed an effective intelligence collection and analysis capability.

Military and civil authorities in Washington, DC, including the president, hesitated to act in the face of the mounting evidence until the summer of 1864. At that time, concerns increased that the Democratic opposition in the person of the popular former commander of the Army of the Potomac, George B. McClellan, running as the Democratic presidential candidate on a "peace ticket," could end the war short of victory through negotiation, leaving the Confederacy and slavery intact. At that point, in league with loyal citizen groups, civil law enforcement, and what military forces they could muster at the height of the war, federal officials moved. Through Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, and Ohio, they conducted mass arrests, confiscated arms caches, and arrested leaders of the secret societies and as many members as they could reach. In addition, they published and denounced in local newspapers the names of those arrested, the size and location of their organizations, and the papers and correspondence of their memberships, providing evidence to substantiate treason charges. (244) The threat largely ended with Lincoln's reelection, even though detentions and legal prosecutions continued through the end of the war.

What are the lessons for today's intelligence officer from Towne's study of events from 150 years ago? The history provides insight into the origins of the controversies that fill the news headlines today. The same arguments concerning rights of the individual and the state in times of peace and war, over privacy, freedom of speech, or dissent, all heard then, are still with us. In addition, Towne details the creation of a comprehensive federal domestic intelligence collection and analytical capability of a size, sophistication, and scope unlike anything seen before, which would not reappear until World War I, but which would become a permanent fixture during the Cold War. Towne's history brings to mind even larger and more important lessons for today's intelligence officer. Then as now, the accepted view may not always be the correct one

or even the full story. What may initially seem insignificant, on further investigation might just be the smallest, barely visible sign of a much larger and more significant threat. Each generation has had them, often dismissed by critics or ideological opponents at the time. The FBI's J. Edgar Hoover warned Cold War-era Americans of a communist threat from within, while OSS founder William J. Donovan did the same before World War II regarding Nazi espionage networks working with disloyal Americans. History later confirmed the overwhelming validity of their claims. In our own time, especially since the fall of 2014, a succession of intelligence and homeland security officials have warned of "lone wolf" terrorist attacks, not from abroad, but from sympathizers within the United States. In spite of naysayers, critics, or opposition ideologues, then as now, and as Towne has revealed, the internal threat is often very real, extensive, and capable of inflicting significant harm upon the unwary.

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All the Old Knives

Olen Steinhauer (Minotaur Books, 2015), 304 pp.

Reviewed by John Breen

Espionage fiction can entertain on many levels. Readers might enjoy the genre for the action, the intrigue, or the tension induced by a character who is placed in a life-threatening situation in an exotic, international location. Others prefer a more complex protagonist—the officer forced to maneuver the minefield of ethically or morally challenged decisionmaking that occurs every day in the world of intelligence operations, both fiction and nonfiction. While the former preference may be satisfied by the likes of Ian Fleming and more recently Jason Matthews with his *Red Sparrow*,[a] for the latter, think Le Carre' and perhaps now, Steinhauer.

In *All the Old Knives*, Olen Steinhauer attempts to satisfy both customers. Steinhauer's Henry Pelham is no George Smiley, but they both allow their respective creators to explore something deeper about the human condition, using the spy thriller as the vehicle. On one level we have an action story with a terrorist hijacking in Vienna, assassins, a romantic dinner in seaside Carmel, and spies falling in and out of love—"Celia, I can't stop seeing you when the lights go out. I see each of your parts—I atomize them—and then recreate them. They are exhibits for my own prosecution . . ." These devices, here quite a bit more tantalizing than say Matthews's sordid rendering, are reprised nevertheless in every boilerplate spy story. And, similarly, in *All the Old Knives* these devices can occasionally come off as cliché. But if you can get past them, Steinhauer's effort to explore not so much the details but rather the whys and the wherefores of what happens makes this story worth the read.

Henry is a CIA case officer, operating out of Vienna, Austria, who has flown to California in order to interview Celia Favreau, his former lover and Vienna Station colleague. Over their private dinner we learn details of Henry and Celia's affair, the terrorist hijacking that interrupt-

ed it, and where their lives took them in the aftermath. It is the terrorist attack that now brings them together again, as it once had torn them apart. In the wake of the hijacking, someone betrayed the station's efforts to resolve the crime and it ended badly, with everyone dead.

Through a series of vignettes, each retold from the perspective of either Celia or Henry, we begin to see why this dinner is so consequential for their respective futures—Henry's return to Vienna with a successfully completed counterintelligence investigation, and Celia's return to her husband and children, with their comfortable, if somewhat staid, existence. Steinhauer employs the couple's dinner conversation with great effect to entice the reader to make assumptions, to appreciate revelations along the way, and ultimately to revel in the unsettling surprise ending.

Steinhauer gives us glimpses along the way into the characters of Henry and Celia that ultimately resonate but do not offer too much of a window onto their story's conclusion. Henry, for example, in the months leading up to his and Celia's brush with terrorism in Vienna, is reminded of the events surrounding another event—the Dubrovka Theater disaster, when the Russians pumped a gas into the building to render the terrorists unconscious but also tragically ended up killing most of the hostages. Celia reflects that one of Henry's great strengths as a recruiter of spies is his ability to empathize, to show emotion. But recalling the events surrounding Dubrovka and seeing his distress, Henry's Muslim contacts warn him that "the tragedies that civilization faces come at an alarming rate, and dwelling on something three years old is akin to fretting about Roman history."

Celia, on the other hand, appears to compartmentalize her feelings to a troubling degree—"My parents wrapped a Subaru around an electrical pole when I was fourteen. Things happen. The only thing that matters is how we deal with the now. Either we face the difficult moral decisions with ever-stronger responses, or we do not. Full

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a. Jason Matthews, *Red Sparrow* (Scribner, 2014); the book was reviewed for this journal in 2014—see *Studies in Intelligence* 58, no. 1 (March 2014).

stop." Their characters (and by this I actually mean their distinctive natures) reveal much to the reader, but only in the final pages of the book. So as a mystery novel, and perhaps as a character study, it certainly works, especially if the more educated reader can overlook Steinhauer's truly fictional representation of CIA culture and tradecraft.

But where lies the value for those interested in the more complex ethical and moral issues surrounding the world of intelligence? This is an interesting question, especially when we consider, as example, contemporary leaks to the media from those suggesting rightly or wrongly that we need fuller transparency in order to attain greater accountability for the intelligence post-9/11 counterterror programs. And Steinhauer does explore, throughout this narrative, salient ethical challenges faced in the conduct of espionage—loyalty to agents and colleagues, not to mention loyalty to the CIA, and/or to the truth.

It has been said that the mere act of keeping a secret that is potentially damaging to US national security can, in and of itself, be considered an act of aggression, thereby morally justifying CIA and Intelligence Community conduct of espionage in order to steal these secrets and return the playing field to level. But the United States also keeps secrets damaging to the national security of other nations, and thus these countries similarly have the moral justification to engage in espionage. This is the essence of the "great game," with well-defined rules and regulations (diplomatic immunity and the like), along with generally accepted and relatively minor penalties for straying too far from agreed-upon norms (such as being declared persona non grata and sent home early).

This idea of a playing field has been posited by thinkers like Tony Pfaff and Jeffrey Tiel, who relate the ethics of

espionage to Just War Theory, all taking place on a metaphorical football field.[a] The idea of espionage as a game is helpful, as it seems a reasonable method with which to at least begin a discussion of guidelines for our conduct as intelligence professionals. As long as we all play by the rules and keep our interactions civil, the game goes on with only occasional kerfuffles along the way. The more interesting and challenging questions become, "What does it mean to be on the field?", "Are we loyal to our teammates?", "Who are our teammates?", "What happens when we go after individuals not on the field of play?", and "Can we really say that terrorists even know or care that there is a playing field?" Henry and Celia were certainly on the field back in the day. Are they both still?

Without giving too much away, as dinner ends, the game gets very serious between Henry and Celia. The reader learns more about the choices each made back in Vienna—conscious decisions that stretched the boundaries of the game. They were playing along the sidelines, in and occasionally out of bounds. Professionally and personally, they jumbled commitment and loyalty to each other, to their agents, to their profession, to their country, and lastly to the CIA. For the reader with a more-than-passing interest in the conduct of espionage and specifically in the nuances of recruiting and handling of agents, this is where the story fully comes together. When Celia tells Henry, "These days, I try to follow my conscience more often than my calculations. I'm still working at it.", she sums up the commitment we make to do our duty and get the mission done, but stay on the field of play. And indeed, we are still working at it.

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a. Tony Pfaff and Jeffrey R. Tiel, "The Ethics of Espionage," *Journal of Military Ethics* 3, no. 1:1–15 (January 2004).

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Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf

Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake

CURRENT TOPICS—Special: A Spectrum of Views on the Use of Drones

Drone Wars: Transforming Conflict, Law and Policy, edited by Peter Bergen and Daniel Rothenberg

Kill Chain: The Rise of the High-Tech Assassins, by Andrew Cockburn

Lords Of Secrecy: The National Security Elite and America's Stealth Warfare, by Scott Horton

PREDATOR: The Secret Origins of The Drone Revolution, by Richard Whittle

Sudden Justice: America's Secret Drone Wars, by Chris Woods

A Theory of the Drone, by Grégoire Chamayou

Unmanned: Drones, Data, and the Illusion of Perfect Warfare, by William M. Arkin

GENERAL

Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back, by Bruce Riedel

National Intelligence and Science: Beyond the Great Divide in Analysis and Policy, by Wilhelm Agrell and Gregory Treverton

The New Spymasters: Inside Espionage from the Cold War to Global Terror, by Stephen Grey

The NSA Report: Liberty and Security in a Changing World, by Richard A. Clarke, Michael J. Morell, Geoffrey R. Stone, Cass R. Sunstein and Peter Swire

Open Source Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century: New Approaches and Opportunities, edited by Christopher Hobbs, Matthew Moran, and Daniel Salisbury

HISTORICAL

Back Channel To Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations Between Washington and Havana, by William M. LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh

Enemy Amongst Trojans: A Soviet Spy at USC, by Mike Gruntman

The Forgotten Spy: The Untold Story of Stalin's First British Mole, by Nick Barratt

Hayek: A Collaborative Biography—Part III Fraud, Fascism, and Free Market Religion, by Robert Leeson

Historical Dictionary of International Intelligence, second edition, by Nigel West

Observer: The Colonel George Trofimoff Story—The Tale of America's Highest-ranking Military Officer Convicted of Spying, by Glen Aaron

Sharing The Secret: A History of the Intelligence Corps 1940-2010, by Nick Van Der Bijl

Spies, Scouts, and Secrets in the Gettysburg Campaign: How the Critical Role of Intelligence Impacted the Outcome of Lee's Invasion of the North, June-July, 1863, by Thomas Ryan

A Very Dangerous Woman: The Lives, Loves and Lies of Russia's Most Seductive Spy, by Deborah McDonald and Jeremy Dronfield

CURRENT TOPICS

Drone Wars: Transforming Conflict, Law and Policy, edited by Peter L. Bergen and Daniel Rothenberg. (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 478 pp., end of chapter notes, index.

Kill Chain: The Rise of the High-Tech Assassins, by Andrew Cockburn. (Henry Holt and Company, 2015) 309 pp., endnotes, index.

Lords Of Secrecy: The National Security Elite and America's Stealth Warfare, by Scott Horton. (Nation Books, 2015) 260 pp., endnotes, index.

PREDATOR: The Secret Origins of The Drone Revolution, by Richard Whittle. (Henry Holt and Company, 2014) 353 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Sudden Justice: America's Secret Drone Wars, by Chris Woods. (Oxford University Press) 386 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

A Theory of the Drone, by Grégoire Chamayou. (The New Press, 2015) 292 pp., endnotes, photos, index.

Unmanned: Drones, Data, and the Illusion of Perfect Warfare, by William M. Arkin. (Little Brown and Company, 2015) 391 pp., endnotes, photos, index.

The seven books reviewed as part of this installment's "Current Topics" section focus on the use of drones to combat terrorism and terrorists. They are mostly documented by a combination of anonymous interviews and secondary sources, a factor worth keeping in mind.

The goal of minimizing casualties while inflicting maximum damage on the adversary is an accepted principle of war. With the invention of artillery, close combat warfare began a gradual decline. Tanks, airplanes, battleships, submarines, and ballistic missiles that targeted an unseen enemy each allowed the projection of lethal force while reducing human vulnerability. With the introduction of armed, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones, this concept no longer applies, in the view of French philosopher Grégoire Chamayou. In *A Theory of the Drone*, he argues that the "projection of power... without projecting vulnerability implies that the only vulnerability will be that of the enemy, reduced to the status of mere target." (12) Just so, a military commander might respond. But Chamayou says the use of drones is a form of "Warfare without risk . . . [that] critically undermines the meta-legal principles that underpin the right

to kill in war." In short, he concludes, drones "accommodate the right to targeted assassination . . . " and that in turn risks the possibility that the "subjects of a drone-state" may become that "states own population." (18)

With this background, Chamayou reviews the genealogy of the Predator UAV, its claimed uses for surveillance, and its lethal applications aimed at "the legitimization of drone homicide." He also examines the psychological stress on those in the target area and "the psychic agony of drone operators" while dismissing the "PlayStation mentality" argument expressed by some pilots to explain their risk-free combat immunity. (106) There is also a chapter on drone precision, in which Chamayou quotes former CIA Director Leon Panetta: "It was very precise and is very limited in terms of collateral damage." In response, after making a comparison with the Dresden bombing and Hiroshima in WWII, he dismisses the analogy without elaboration as an "erroneous commonplace . . . a veritable nest of conceptual confusions." (140)

Although *A Theory of the Drone* never postulates a specific theory, it does consider the philosophical implica-

tions of armed drones, invoking Hegel, Hobbs, and Sartre in complex arguments. These envision a future where this weapon may remove humans from supervision and create "a situation in which robots are capable of exerting lethal force without human control or intervention." (207) It is also clear that Chamayou finds drone warfare unethical while accepting other weapons of war that bomb targets with much less precision, entail greater civilian casualties and pilot risk, and incur higher system costs. His theory of drones leaves this dilemma to other philosophers.

The only theory found in Richard Whittle's, *PREDA-TOR: The Secret Origins of The Drone Revolution* is associated with the aeronautics of unmanned remotely controlled aerial vehicles. And while the book doesn't contain any secrets, it does chronicle the evolution of the Predator and its predecessors, especially the Gnat 750.

The Gnat 175, writes Whittle, was the first UAV the CIA used to collect intelligence. In 1993, the then-newly confirmed CIA director, James Woolsey, held a meeting to discuss how to obtain aerial coverage of fighting in Bosnia. Satellites were too often blinded by cloud cover and the Serbs were careful to operate at night and at other times when satellites weren't overhead. Woolsey asked his staff: "What about UAVs?" (70) The agency had been experimenting with the Gnat 750—a drone with minimum reconnaissance capability. Woolsey sent Deputy Director of Operations Thomas Twetten to California to see whether the Gnat 750 could loiter over a target below the clouds; it could, and after some modifications, it did. About the same time, at the urging of then-Pentagon procurement czar John Deutch, the Air Force signed a contract for an "endurance UAV" (80) reconnaissance version of the Predator. For reasons of time, not all contractors had been allowed to bid; TRW, in a cameo appearance by TRW executive and former CIA officer Robert Kohler, complained, but Deutch overcame Kohler's objections. In the end, while the results from both systems were impressive and warranted further development, the Predator prevailed.

PREDATOR describes the Air Force program that gradually improved the Predator's capabilities. Located at Wright Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, the program office—nicknamed Big Safari—would develop laser target designator and infrared electro-optical capabili-

ties, and later communications links that would eventually allow real-time target monitoring in the United States.

Whittle writes that CIA began using the Predator after Charlie Allen, then-assistant director for collection, raised the idea with Richard Clarke, Clinton's White House advisor. Clarke then suggested in a memo to senior Pentagon and CIA personnel that the "CIA fly the Predator to search for bin Laden." Whittle writes that, although the option was opposed by those who preferred airplanes with pilots and by others who favored HUMINT, Clarke and Allen won the toss. (147) Whittle's account of how a Predator found and imaged bin Laden but couldn't get White House permission to conduct an air strike (the Predator was unarmed at that time) makes frustrating reading.

The obvious next step was to arm the Predator and make the system operable from the United States. Whittle tells this part of the story in detail. He includes descriptions of the Air Force crews trained to pilot the Predator remotely, the group at CIA who fed them target data, and the proof-of-concept attack that killed al-Qaʻida leader Mohammed Atef.

The revolution in drone capabilities continued with more technological improvements, new drones, and greatly increased targeted killings, writes Whittle, "that raised a set of profound moral, legal, political, and practical questions." (302) He concludes that drones are here to stay, and "society needs to figure out how to cope with [the] implications." (305)

For those interested in how the drone program became an essential component of the war on terror, *PREDATOR* is a good source.

Andrew Cockburn's *Kill Chain: The Rise of the High-Tech Assassins* focuses on failed defense department and so-called CIA high-value target (HVT) armed drone operations that Cockburn labels targeted killings or assassinations; no theory here. To add perspective, he reviews the CIA's failed attempts at assassination in the early Cold War and mistakenly includes the Phoenix program during Vietnam in the same category. Then he describes the origins of the military drone and the gradual improvements in technology and operational

concepts that led to current capabilities. As to "targeted killings," he includes a chapter on how they failed when applied to the post-Cold War "war on drugs."

Kill Chain also discusses the CIA CounterTerrorism Center and its links to the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). But the bulk of his story concentrates on the evolution of drone operations and the practical problems encountered in their unsuccessful efforts to eliminate HVTs. A key factor here is the reduction of "kill time"—from target acquisition to execution—which minimizes civilian casualties. Cockburn includes example after example where problems arose—in Afghanistan and Pakistan—to support his conclusion that drones are counterproductive, expensive, and immoral. (204, 221)

Kill Chain concludes with a discussion of "super-drones" in the planning stage and their susceptibility to Iranian or Chinese interference with the electronic command links. He notes that the solution to this problem is the "autonomous" drone, capable of conducting missions without human intervention that may "be just around the corner." (257) But he suggests that even these systems could be defeated by the same simple measures terrorists employ today to avoid drones.

While Cockburn acknowledges that armed drone warfare makes US personnel less vulnerable, he suggests their use is somehow "sinful." A better solution, he proposes, is that drones be used for reconnaissance only.

In *Sudden Justice: America's Secret Drone Wars*, British investigative journalist Chris Woods takes a broader and more balanced view of drones that collect intelligence and execute armed missions. That is not to say that Woods avoids the controversies publicly associated with the armed Predator—"the world's first airborne sniper rifle"—and its successor, the Reaper; he does not. (xii) But, reflecting on their performance, he acknowledges that "controversial though civilian casualties were, they were still fewer in number when compared to previous conflicts. The relative precision of armed drones . . . means that noncombatants were likely to be at less risk of death or injury than from most other weapon systems."

As collection systems, drones became "key assets . . . crucial to the intelligence revolution now taking place in warfighting." (xv) Surprisingly, Woods reports, "despite the fearsome reputation of armed drones, their lethal use on the battlefield was at first uncommon . . . even in 2014 their focus still remained mostly on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)." (2) And even when not armed, "drones helped facilitate attacks from other air assets." (3) Thus, in the war on terror that followed 9/11, Woods contends, "US foreign policy would increasingly shape itself to the Predator's unique selling point—its effectiveness as an assassination tool." (27) *Sudden Justice* explains how this occurred despite domestic interagency mission conflicts and friction with the governments of the various countries where the targets were located.

Wood describes how the path that ended with an effective drone program began in the mid 1970s with an Israeli engineer, Abe Karem—"the Moses of modern drones"—who designed the Predator prototype in his Los Angeles garage. When the US government learned of Karem's work, a "black" development contract was arranged through the Pentagon and later merged with a CIA program. (33) By 1986, two prototypes had flown. At first, only reconnaissance capabilities were considered; these capabilities were used after 9/11 over Afghanistan. Woods describes the decision to arm the Predator with Hellfire missiles and the successful tests in mid-2001. Then he covers their routine use in targeted killings of al-Qa'ida leaders in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and eventually Yemen.

Of course these operations often resulted in public controversy—in some cases with the governments of the countries where the attacks occurred; in others, the issue was civilian casualties. Woods gives examples of these and deals at length with what he terms "prolonged virtual combat stress" (187) that affected the drone pilots during a targeted killing operation, especially when target identity was in doubt or involved a US citizen.

Sudden Justice concludes with a reminder that many countries already have their own armed drones and that terrorist groups are likely to acquire them. The challenge ahead, he suggests, lies in convincing others "not to follow

Washington's own rule book." (288) His warning is well documented; a path to his solution remains problematical.

Unmanned: Drones, Data, and the Illusion of Perfect Warfare begins with a review of the current state of remotely controlled weapon systems. At the time of 9/11, author William Arkin writes, there were "fewer than 200 unmanned aerial vehicles—drones." Today, the military possesses "in addition to the some 500 in the Predator class . . . well over 11,000 other kinds of drones." (4) There are also numerous unmanned systems—land and sea—controlled by each of the military services. Arkin points out, "the United States is not the sole owner of unmanned vehicles: 88 other nations also operate drones, and 54 nations manufacture their own." (5) As a consequence, he suggests, many nonmilitary observers foresee a "nightmare of spying, and killer robots and autonomous decisionmakers." In his judgment, this explains why the term "drone" has become "a sizzling curse word for some that invokes ethical failure and lawlessness." (6) In response to these critics, he points out that drone systems provide less risk and "ubiquitous surveillance and targeted killing that are necessary for security but also legal." Do the critics, he asks, "really want more risk . . . less precision . . . and more casualties?" (7)

Then, astonishingly, Arkin shoots down his own argument as "totally off the mark." (8) The real problem is with "drones and the Data Machine they serve." They are "the greatest threat to our national security, our safety, and our way of life." (18) *Unmanned* attempts to explain these views in a first-person narrative that is alternatively informative and quirky. The quirkiness derives from Arkin's insistence that "to understand drones you have to understand Gilgamesh," the main character in *The Epic of Gilgamesh*, a 5,000-year-old literary work. Arkin devotes a chapter to the topic and then returns to it from time to time throughout the book. The connections remain obscure, however, and the story he tells of the life of the drone program is not enhanced by his references to *Gilgamesh*.

In the substantive parts of the book, Arkin tracks the development of drones and related unmanned vehicles that preceded the first operational remotely controlled

system, the Predator. He explains their characteristics in detail and provides many examples of their use in the Middle East against high-value targets—not all successful—and some not presented in the other books reviewed here. He also describes the high-level politics involved and the interservice turf battles as, for example, the fight between the Air Force and the Army for "absolute control of the drone program." The Army won and got what it needed—"intelligence." (161) But the theme of *Unmanned* that underlies all the factual and bureaucratic detail is the systemic automation involved, what Arkin calls the Data Machine, with "its vast collection of intelligence" and black boxes. This is the vital long-range threat, as he sees its, to the United States's entire system of national security that is becoming autonomous and unmanned; "even our foreign policy itself is unmanned." (254)

Whether *Unmanned*'s forecast of an excessively automated future, as implied in the final chapter of the science fiction example, is a dilemma left to the reader. The facts of the drone program presented, however, are worth attention.

"There is something about drones that makes people crazy. Some demonize drones, denouncing them for causing civilian deaths or enabling long-distance killing even as they ignore that fact that the same (or worse) could be said of many other weapons delivery systems." (230) "For many Americans, drones make all the sense in the world." (42) These observations from two articles in *Drone Wars* hint at the range of public views on the topic. Editors and contributors Peter Bergen, of the New America Foundation, and University of Arizona professor Daniel Rothenberg point out that "drones are the iconic military technology of the current conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen." But while their unique characteristics and appearance "have captured the public imagination" they have also resulted in divisive debates. (1) The well written, thoughtful articles in *Drone Wars* weigh the military and civilian perspectives—American and foreign—on four of the principal categories associated with those debates: ground applications and consequences, legality and ethics, national security policy, and the future use of drones.

The impact of drones on civilians is a topic that pervades each category. A poignant account by "Adam Kahn" (a pseudonym), a Pakistani merchant in North Waziristan, conveys the effect drones have on the civilians who possess no direct connection to terrorism. At the other end of the civilian perspective spectrum, David Rohde, a former captive of Haqqani terrorists, records that, "My guards absolutely feared drones." In a more general account of this issue, Sarah Holewinski discusses why civilians need to know more about the impact of drones on themselves. (42ff)

The topics of "targeted killings" and "assassination"— equally controversial issues—are addressed at length by William Banks, with an emphasis on their legality. Among other aspects discussed, in an attempt to remove ad hominem attacks from the debate, he suggests that the term "assassination" be applied to "unlawful killing" while reserving the term "targeted killing" for "premeditated acts of an individual by a government or its agents— which may, in fact, be permitted under US law." (137)

Other important topics found in *Drone Wars* include a history of drone technology with implications for the future of warfare, a review of "The Decade of the Drone" with a chronology, a chapter on the misconceptions about drones and their uses, "the Predator effect," and the drone dilemmas of modern warfare with the emergence of data-driven warfare.

Those seeking a balanced overview of this sensitive topic should read *Drone Wars*.

Despite the appearance of a Predator drone on the cover and the implications its subtitle, Scott Horton's *Lords Of Secrecy: The National Security Elite and America's Stealth Warfare* is a not book about drones. Its central theme is excessive secrecy in the executive branch, in general, and the CIA and NSA, in particular. The expression "lords of secrecy"—used throughout, to annoying excess— is Horton's catchphrase for the government leaders who uphold and perpetuate unjustifiable secrecy practices. This is not to say that Horton, a human rights lawyer, opposes secrecy in general: he does acknowl-

edge "a legitimate, though limited, role for secrecy" in three areas—"advanced weapons sensitive systems . . . critical signals intelligence and cryptography . . . and the identity of covert and foreign informants." (179)

Horton strives to establish a basis for his positions by invoking Athenian precedents, the views of several German philosophers, and references to former US Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan. The practical issues Horton discusses include the CIA conflict with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence over the rendition and enhanced interrogation programs, NSA and the Snowden leaks; the "conflict between whistleblowers and the lords of secrecy" and the growth "of authority and control of the lords of secrecy"; and the threat that drones "may trigger broader and more sustained warfare." (24–5)

In his chapter on drones, Horton contends that "the lords of secrecy have chosen a favorite weapon that helps identify and define their power. It is the Predator drone." The one attribute of the drone that makes this possible is that "it is a consummately secret weapon." (110) "Who doesn't know about drone warfare? The people of the United States." (122) This assertion may surprise those who have read some of the books reviewed above.

Horton argues that while drones seem to offer the possibility of "zero-casualty war" their use may in fact "create a slippery slope leading to continual or wider wars." Moreover, there is the risk of civilian casualties or as Horton puts it, "the devaluation of noncombatants." (112) From a legal perspective, he writes, "drones open the prospect for a new kind of war that includes targeted killings" that he categorizes as "extrajudicial," far away from "ground or naval forces." Other disadvantages include political difficulties with nations like Pakistan and the possiblity that other nations will acquire similar capabilities. But, he asserts, the "most disquieting aspect of the drone program has to do with [the] secrecy" surrounding the drone program, especially in the case of "individual attacks" (114) and the CIA's putatively covert role in the post-9/11 warfare. Without suggesting any alternatives to current practices (beyond more transparency), he concludes, "the only real explanation that emerges is

that the use of drone for sustained covert military activity serves the interests of the lords of secrecy." (128)

While *Lords Of Secrecy* raises some genuine concerns regarding government secrecy, readers may well question Horton's grasp of the drone program.

GENERAL

Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back, by Bruce Riedel. (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2013) 230 pp., endnotes, index.

India and Pakistan have fought four wars with each other and came close to another after the Pakistani attack on Mumbai in November 2011. Both are nuclear powers. In *Avoiding Armageddon,* Bruce Riedel, a former senior CIA analyst and South Asia advisor to four presidents, discusses the origins and evolution of the complex Indian-Pakistani relationship and the sometimes less than harmonious association of the United States with both nations.

Riedel begins by examining the attack on Mumbai on 26–29 November 2008 by the Pakistani terrorist group, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) that was manipulated by al-Qaʻida in hopes of provoking a war that would disrupt "the US campaign to defeat al-Qaʻida." (13) This was not the only plan bin Ladin had in mind that stirred US interests. Riedel cites documents captured during the raid that killed bin Ladin, which CIA analysis revealed contained "plans to assassinate President Obama." (14) Thus the Mumbai attack created circumstances that required increased US attention to the Pakistani-Indian relationship.

Drawing on his own extensive experience with both countries, Riedel discusses the obsessive concerns Pakistan—the more provocative of the two—has about India and the political consequences of these concerns.

He reviews the successive Pakistani dictatorships from the end of WW II to the present and their often difficult interactions—diplomatic, military, and eventually the drone program—with each US administration, especially during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the subsequent US post-9/11 operations there. He also describes the ever-increasing tensions created by both countries due to their nuclear weapons programs and the controversy over Kashmir. These, in turn, created problems with other players in South Asia, the Middle East, and even China and Saudi Arabia.

Looking to the future, Riedel sees some hope. US relations with India have improved, in part due to the US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement. (162ff) Pakistan now has an elected government, and the "Pakistanis themselves are increasingly fed up with political gridlock." (184) The United States, Riedel suggests, can help by using diplomacy to assist in resolving the central conflict over Kashmir, and he offers some recommendations toward this end.

Avoiding Armageddon is a forceful examination of a serious world problem that has not received adequate attention. Riedel makes a strong case that the potential for nuclear catastrophe justifies forceful action.

National Intelligence and Science: Beyond the Great Divide in Analysis and Policy, by Wilhelm Agrell and Gregory Treverton. (Oxford University Press, 2015) 219 pp., footnotes, bibliography, index.

Wilhelm Agrell served with Swedish intelligence in the Middle East and is now a professor of intelligence analysis at Lund University, Sweden. Gregory Treverton, formerly with RAND Corporation, is a visiting scholar at

the Swedish National Defense College and also Chairman of the National Intelligence Council in the United States. In *National Intelligence and Science* the authors discuss a factor common to intelligence and science—"remarkably

similar and interlinked domains"—knowledge production. This is not to say the two domains have identical objectives. Scientists seek knowledge for knowledge's sake without considering practical applications. Intelligence analysts, on the other hand, pursue knowledge to answer questions relating to global threats. Yet both function in an atmosphere of uncertainty, balancing constant demands for transparency while working to minimize failures and gain public confidence. However, the authors suggest that academia and intelligence are also "separated by a deep political, cultural, and epistemological divide . . . and another problematical divide . . . caused by overstated uncertainty and loss of trust"; (3) these are considered in detail.

Put another way, while many forces stimulating scientists and analysts in the production of knowledge differ, those methods employed by the scientist are worth considering for use by the analyst. The authors, therefore, look beyond the traditional intelligence model and investigate analysis "as one of several modes of knowledge production for action, modes not limited to intelligence but increasingly transcending other fields including . . . the public role of science." Following this path, they suggest, may lead "far beyond traditional boundaries and defini-

tions . . . to the discovery of approaches and methods" that could fundamentally "alter the existing security intelligence domain." (4) The authors envision "a less distinct dividing line between collection and analysis" and even a possibility in which "collection becomes analysis and separate roles cease to have any meaning." (5)

In less elevated rhetoric, the authors explain the "aim of the book is how the concepts of relevance and uncertainty in intelligence and science to policy have developed and converged." (9) They see intelligence analysis as a system in transition; the book's subsequent chapters deal with examples in intelligence analysis and various scientific disciplines that indicate that a process of convergence is occurring. These include the role of social media, and the problems of failures, uncertainty, client relations, and politicization. Looking to the future, they foresee "the need for the development of hybrid organizations" where experts "interact on a more continuous and integrated basis." (197)

National Intelligence and Science is an intellectual challenge. It offers new thinking for those concerned with how analysis needs to evolve while meeting the demands of the present.

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*T*he New Spymasters: Inside Espionage from the Cold War to Global Terror, by Stephen Grey. (St. Martin's Press, 2015) 349 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

British journalist Stephen Grey's investigations of spies and secret agents have uncovered some new truths about an old profession—at least that is the message he seeks to convey in *The New Spymasters*. The book begins with a summary of the CIA catastrophe in Khost, Afghanistan, where a double agent suicide bomber killed seven CIA officers, a Jordanian intelligence officer, and an Afghan driver. It was, writes Grey, "a proof-of-life signal" that "the spy game was not over." (2) Returning to this theme later, he writes, "The secret agent is not dead—far from it. For all his faults, attempts to write off the agent were misguided and misinformed. As will become clear, the nature of spies and the value of human intelligence, had [sic] been misunderstood from the beginning. First rule of intelligence: forget everything

you know." (16) Contemplating these pronouncements one might reasonably ask, "Who said 'the spy game was over', the 'secret agent was dead', and where did the 'first rule' come from?" Grey doesn't elaborate, but he does use the term "spymasters" frequently as if it were part of the professional lexicon, which it is not.

As a first step to make things clear and establish what spies do, Grey reviews some classic MI6, MI5, and CIA espionage cases from the Bolshevik Revolution to the end of the Cold War. He includes the exploits of Sidney Reilly; Cambridge spies—incorrectly calling Philby and Blunt double agents; the 'Steak Knife' [sic] (actually STAKEKNIFE) case against the IRA; an operation in Cyprus; and some exemplars from Marks Wolf's East

German foreign intelligence agency. He suggests that these cases and others indicate that "the nature of the spy business is frequently portrayed wrongly [and] so, too, is the character of the Cold War's real warriors—the intelligence officers at the heart of the business." (49) Just what Grey meant by "character of the Cold War warrior" is never made clear. As an example of the incorrect portrayal of the nature of the business, he considers the recruitment process often depicted in memoirs and novels as the slow, careful development of potential agents until they consent to cooperate. Citing former CIA officer Milt Bearden, Grey argues that since most agents were walk-ins (though he does cite some exceptions), "The heart of the business was not recruiting, but rather running spies the handling of active agents. . . to securely handle people in Moscow under the noses" of the KGB. (53) Few would argue with Bearden's assessment, but Grey's conclusion that it constitutes a real change in "the nature of the spy business" is questionable and unsubstantiated.

With this pre-9/11 background, *The New Spymasters* takes a look at the post-9/11 world of espionage. He discusses the difficulties associated with recruiting and handling terrorist agents, and what happens when one is a fabricator, as in the CURVEBALL case. He also adds a more detailed account of the Khost incident, and then comments on the controversial rendition and drone programs, pointing out how technology has influenced the war on terror.

By way of comparison, he mentions the improvements in technical intelligence since WW II. Before the digital age, he writes, "over several decades, the CIA were sent a copy of every telegram in and out of the United States. All overseas phone lines were at one point tapped." (259) With modern technology, he suggests, this is no longer necessary. This out-of-the-blue, unsourced allegation suggests his comprehension of CIA's mission and capabilities needs some major fine tuning. This is not the only questionable, if not inaccurate, statement in the

book. For example, William Donovan did not "found the CIA"—though he did propose such an agency. (35) Then Grey's quote of what was said about Kim Philby at St. Ermin's Hotel; it is at best literary license, since there is no evidence that it happened. (38) Also the statement that Blunt was spying on MI5 for the Soviets in the 1930s is inaccurate; he didn't join MI5 until June 1940. (44) And MI5 officer Michael Bettany never tried "to sell secrets to the Soviet embassy in London." He offered the secrets for free, as Gordievsky explained. (68)

In general uncertain sourcing is a problem throughout *The New Spymasters*. Grey frequently cites anonymous intelligence officers, some making astounding claims. For example, the "former CIA chief of station" who told Grey that "before the Yom Kipper War of 1973, an agent had obtained for him all of Egypt and Syria's invasion plans" but his superiors refused to accept the report, though after the war he was proved correct. (42)

The New Spymasters concludes with some rambling observations on why "spies and spymasters had to become a different breed, because the world is changing." (276) Just what he means by this is unclear, though it invokes globalization, greater cultural understanding, technology, social diversity, and universal values as considerations. While these factors may influence how the intelligence officer does his job, Grey does not seem to understand that these factors are not new and the fundamentals of the business remain unchanged. Sometimes Grey's observations amount to non sequiturs: "When intelligence is absent, spying and spies are the last thing you need." (289) He adds, "If spying is the only way to get a secret, what secrets are really worth stealing?" (292)

For those seeking one man's introductory perspective on intelligence in today's world, *The New Spymasters* meets that need. But it should be treated as the first, not the last, word.

*T*he NSA Report: Liberty and Security in a Changing World, by Richard A. Clarke, Michael J. Morell, Geoffrey R. Stone, Cass R. Sunstein, and Peter Swire. (Princeton University Press, 2014) 239 pp., appendices, glossary, index.

On 27 August 2013, in response to the furor created by the unauthorized release of NSA documents by Edward Snowden, President Barack Obama announced the formation of the Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies. The group's mission was to recommend actions that would permit the Intelligence Community to meet its national security obligations while protecting the public's privacy concerns. The group was made up of Richard Clarke, a former White House national security advisor; Michael Morell, the former deputy director of CIA; Edward Levi, a law professor at the University of Chicago; Cass Sunstein, a professor at Harvard University; and Peter Swire, a professor at the Georgia Institute of Technology.

Following the precedent of most government documents, *The NSA Report* is something of a literary brick. Nevertheless, it presents a succinct summary of the country's national security threats—terrorism, WMD proliferation, cyber espionage, and warfare—and NSA's role in dealing with them while simultaneously protecting public privacy

and civil liberties. On the latter point, the report assumes that these "fundamental values have at times been eroded by excessive intelligence collection" (xv) and makes 46 recommendations intended to correct the problem. The recommendations cover personal surveillance, organizational reform, global security issues, the collection and protection of data, and managing the associated risks.

For those wanting a quick look at the recommendations, there is a section listing each one without any analysis of the justification involved. This is followed by a chapter summarizing the historical lessons that led to the collection of communications data, and the impact of 9/11. The balance of the report repeats each recommendation and adds the supporting rationale. For example, they explain the reasons for recommending that communications data be held by private firms.

The NSA Report recommends many changes intended to protect national security and personal privacy. Whether they will accomplish both must await another report.

*O*pen Source Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century: New Approaches and Opportunities, edited by Christopher Hobbs, Matthew Moran, and Daniel Salisbury. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) 191 pp., end of chapter notes, index.

Open source intelligence or OSINT is commonly thought of as all information in the public domain. Allen Dulles contributed to this view in his 1947 Senate testimony when he said the "proper analysis of intelligence obtainable by these overt, normal, and aboveboard means would supply us with over 80 percent, I should estimate, of the information required for the guidance of our national policy."[a] A more accurate formulation would have reversed the terms "intelligence" and "information." *Open Source Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century* deals with many

aspects of OSINT in a four-part study with nine contributions by academics and former intelligence officers.

Part One begins with an assessment of the role and value of OSINT. It weighs the utility of numerical measures of OSINT's contribution that range from Dulles's 80 percent to a high of 98 percent by other authorities, adding that none explain how intelligence units should be used—articles, bits, time, resources, facts? An alternative qualitative approach to OSINT's contribution that avoids the percentage ambiguity is suggested. But no mention is made of the effort required to validate OSINT. Sometimes public reports on an event or topic differ; analysts must decide which is correct. OSINT is not off-the-shelf intelligence.

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a. US Senate Armed Services Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on the National Defense Establishment, 1st Session, 1947, p. 526.

Then comes a much-needed new "INT": SOC-MINT, or social media intelligence. If fact, this makes sense since social networks and the Internet comprise such a large part of today's communication options. The methods, legalities, potential benefits, and impact of cyber security are considered.

Other topics include the role of OSINT in proliferation analysis and the potential for illicit trade in nuclear materi-

als, and OSINT's contribution to humanitarian crises and counterterrorism. The discussion of the latter topic includes the use of social media in monitoring the traffic between militant groups by civilian agencies and the military.

Open Source Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century is well documented and informative. It leaves no doubt that OSINT plays an important role while stressing the futility of seeking to quantitatively measure its contribution.

HISTORICAL

Back Channel To Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations Between Washington and Havana, by William M. LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh. (The University of North Carolina Press, 2014) 524 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

American University professor William LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh, director of the Cuba documentation project at the National Security Archive, conclude their history of negotiations between Washington and Havana with suggestions for President Obama, should he choose to seek to improve or even normalize relations with the present or a successor government. Whether the president took their advice in doing just that may never be known. What is known, however, is that he is not the first president to consider reaching out to Cuba with better relations in mind. "Every president since Eisenhower has engaged in some form of dialogue with Castro and his representatives . . . [and] has seen some advantage in talking to Cuba." (2) *Back Channel To Cuba* "presents a comprehensive chronicle of dialogues since 1959," both secret and public. (3)

While some of the contacts produced tangible results, most did not. Key sticking points on the Cuban side included, inter alia, Cuba's insistence that the United States lift its economic embargo, its relationship with the Soviet Union, and various Latin America nations, and Castro's need to blame the United States

for Cuba's domestic problems. Factors on the US side included the refusal to recognize Cuba's legitimacy, the impact on domestic politics created by Cuban refugees, human rights issues, and from time to time Cuba's espionage operations in the United States.

One of the early meetings they discuss occurred during the Eisenhower administration, when Castro met in New York City with CIA representative Gerry Droller (also known as Frank Bender, a later participant in the Bay of Pigs operation). During the Kennedy administration, Britain acted to improve relations and helped arrange talks. (108) In the Nixon administration, Secretary of State Rogers suggested the "US attempt 'baseball diplomacy' to advance relations with Cuba." (135) Most of the many attempts at dialogue presented are more substantive and complicated.

The authors base their work on formerly-classified documents and interviews with participants, including Fidel Castro and President Carter. The result is a rich and timely review of the background to the normalization recently achieved.

Enemy Amongst Trojans: A Soviet Spy at USC, by Mike Gruntman. (Figueroa Press, 2010) 76 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, appendix, index.

Shortly after the defection on 5 September 1954 of Igor Gouzenko, a GRU code clerk at the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, Samuel Witczak, an instructor at the University of Southern California, disappeared from a beach in Southern California, never to be seen again. Later his wife disappeared as well. In a 1952 Senate report, he was identified as a Soviet spy; his name had surfaced in the Venona decrypts. The FBI search for Witczak is described in the memoirs of FBI special agent Robert Lamphere. The FBI had learned Witczak had entered the United States from Canada on a false passport and suspected Witczak was not his true name. Later the FBI was able to trace some of Witczak's former agents, but never learned what happened to him. *Enemy Amongst Trojans* tells the rest of the story.

Recent document releases in Britain and Russia, one showing Kim Philby reported on him, identify Witczak as "Iosif Litvin" and explain what happened to him after returning to the Soviet Union. Litvin's GRU career ended during a purge of Jews, but he survived that, later becoming a translator of American books on intelligence.

Mike Gruntman, an astronautics professor at USC, has written an interesting and succinct account of this case that heretofore escaped the attention of other espionage academics. A nice contribution to the literature.

The Forgotten Spy: The Untold Story of Stalin's First British Mole, by Nick Barratt. (Blink Publishing, 2015) 288 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

In 2002, the British National Archives (BNA) released the MI5 files on Ernest Holloway Oldham, a one-time Foreign Office code clerk and Soviet agent from August 1929 until his suicide in 1933. Nick Barratt, a BNA historian and teaching fellow at the University of Dundee, was motivated by more than curiosity when he decided to study the case—Oldham was Barratt's great uncle. *The Forgotten Spy* is the most complete account of the case published to date.

The qualifier "most complete" is necessary since Oldham was not, in fact, a forgotten spy. A brief, somewhat garbled account appeared in 1990, followed by an accurate summary in the Mitrokhin Archive.[a,b] A still more detailed account by Emil Draitser, that Barratt acknowledges, appeared in 2010.[c]

While the previous treatments concentrate on Oldham's espionage, Barratt's story covers his entire life and the historical context in which he lived. In this way, he implicitly addresses the question of motivation. Oldham was a mediocre student who didn't do well in the Foreign Office entrance examinations and was hired in part because of family influence. He nevertheless did well enough to survive. During WW I he served in the trenches as an infantry officer and, at one point, applied for an

a. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *The KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev* (HarperCollins, 1990). A lengthy, slightly muddled account had appeared in 1986 but only used Oldham's codename, though his handlers were correctly identified. See Robert Crowley and William Corson, *The New KGB: Engine of Soviet Power* (William Morrow, 1996).

b. Christopher Andrew and Vasli Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West* (The Penguin Press, 1999).

c. Emil Draitser, *Stalin's Romeo Spy: The Remarkable Rise and Fall of the KGB's Most Daring Operative* (Northwestern University Press, 2010).

intelligence officer assignment but was not selected. He returned to the Foreign Office at the end of hostilities and established a reputation of reliable performance while assigned to duties at the Paris Peace Conference. By now fluent in Spanish, French, Italian, and German, he applied for the consular service, but was rejected with the designation "no sufficient brains" for diplomatic service. (82) But he was accepted into the new communications department that, among other functions, was concerned with codes. He did well and began thinking of "stepping up in the world," even joining a London club. (110) It was about this time that he married a widow with some money and his lifestyle improved; but after some bad stock investments, in an effort to avoid dismissal, he went to the Soviet embassy in Paris and, identifying himself as "Charlie Scott," a typesetter in charge of printing copies of deciphered diplomatic dispatches, offered to sell them.

Barratt tells how the Soviets discovered his real identity and pressured him into a continuing relationship that soon involved Oldham's wife, Lucy. When a series of Soviet defectors revealed the existence of "Mr. Scott", the Foreign Office did its own investigation. Oldham became suspect, and was placed under surveillance, and he was dismissed from the Foreign Office without a pension. Still, the Soviets pressured the now-desperate Oldham to obtain more codes and to recommend a replacement. Oldham made an attempt to satisfy their demands, even breaking into the Foreign Office to obtain the codes. When MI5 learned of his efforts, the pressure increased—but before they could arrest him, Oldham committed suicide.

The Forgotten Spy ranks the Oldham case with the Cambridge spy ring, a judgment that is difficult to accept since Barratt provides no damage assessment. But it is an interesting case, well told, and goes a way toward filling a gap in espionage history.

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*H*ayek: A Collaborative Biography—Part III Fraud, Fascism, and Free Market Religion,* by Robert Leeson. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) 302 pp., end of chapter notes, index.

In 1969, British author Donald McCormick began a series of intelligence services histories, all published under the name of Richard Deacon. The first, *A History of the British Secret Service*, was highly recommended by *Los Angeles Times* book critic Robert Kirsh, "for those addicted to spy fiction."[a] Deacon's 1972 *A History of the Russian Secret Service* contained a numbered factual errors, such as the inclusion of a portrait Byzantine Emperor John VIII mislabeled as Ivan the Terrible.[b] A lengthy 1975 review, "A History of the Chinese Secret Service" in *Studies in Intelligence* noted that Deacon's "penchant for hyperbole and even fabrication tends to negate whatever pretensions for authenticity the book might otherwise have had."[c] Despite these hints of unscholarly behavior, Deacon's works sold well and were frequently cited in books and papers.

And now, in his unwieldy entitled *Hayek: A Collaborative Biography: Part III Fraud, Fascism, and Free Market Religion*, Stanford professor Robert Leeson and eight other contributors have revisited Deacon's enormous corpus of works, many written under his true name, with a view to putting his reputation straight. They tell a depressing story. Leeson notes that beyond intelligence, the range of "Deacon-McCormick's" writing includes biographies, a guide to erotic literature, witchcraft, and UFOs. (10)

Although Leeson explains that some of Deacon's "lies" (11) influenced the writings of economist Friedrick Hayek, six of the 14 articles present a detailed analysis of his intelligence books and the many errors, fabrications, and unjustified assertions they contained. The bottom line is that Deacon was not averse to invention, exaggeration, and fraud; his contributions should not be accepted as reliable sources.

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a. *Los Angeles Times*, 8 May 1970.

b. Anonymous, *London Times Literary Review*, 28 July 1972.

c. Stanley Bergman, "Review of *A History of the Chinese Secret Service*," *Studies in Intelligence* 19, no. 1 (1975): 49–54. Available from the National Archives at https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7283906.

***H**istorical Dictionary of International Intelligence, second edition,* by Nigel West. (Rowman & Littlefield, 2015) 462 pp., bibliography, index.

While most intelligence operations would seem at first glance to have an international component, intelligence historian Nigel West has chosen cases where the international element is dominant. This new edition of the *Historical Dictionary of International Intelligence* has 130 additional pages that include events the occurred since 2005, when the first edition was published. Examples include the 10 SVR sleeper agents arrested in the United States, the Litvinenko polonium poison case in London, the entry on drones, the raid that killed Usama Bin Ladin, an entry on the Ukraine and its intelligence service, plus a number of entries on terrorism. Many other items have been updated. These include the Peter Lee, Philby, and Pollard cases, and the entries on Northern Ireland, the CIA, Mossad, SVR, and most other intelligence services.

A few errors have crept in. Penkovsky was not "rebuffed as a likely provocation" (19)—the officer sent to make contact just failed. Not all those listed under the heading DCI held that post, and Michael Morell was the acting D/CIA. And Rufina Philby was the fourth, not third, of Kim Philby's wives. (269)

As has become a tradition with West's historical dictionaries, this one has a fine and expanded bibliography preceded by an interesting, updated essay. Despite the publisher's continued refusal to include source citations, this is a solid point of departure for scholars and interested readers.

***O**bserver: The Colonel George Trofimoff Story, The Tale of America's Highest-ranking Military Officer Convicted of Spying,* by Glen Aaron. (CreateSpace, 2015) 560 pp., bibliography, appendices.

It was no accident that Glen Aaron spent a year as the late George Trofimoff's cellmate. Trofimoff knew Aaron had been a lawyer before being sent to prison for two years, and he wanted to tell his story to someone with legal experience who might help him get a new trial. Aaron listened, says he believed Trofimoff, tried to help, but failed.

Trofimoff was convicted in June 2001 of spying for the Soviet and the Russian intelligence services, thanks in part to the revelations of Vasili Mitrokhin, a spectacular sting operation by the FBI, and the testimony of former KGB general Oleg Kalugin. Trofi-

moff's rationalized version of events was that he had been the victim of a set-up and Kalugin's perjury.

As Aaron ends his account, he mentions that, toward the end of their time together, Trofimoff confessed that in an effort to help his brother—an official of the Russian orthodox church—he had in fact passed a few harmless documents to the KGB: just a gesture of brotherhood.

There is nothing in this undocumented book that contradicts the government's case or suggests in any way that Trofimoff was not guilty. Don't be taken in.

***S**haring The Secret: A History of the Intelligence Corps 1940-2010,* by Nick Van Der Bijl. (Sword & Pen Books, Ltd., 2013) 420 pp., bibliography, appendices, photos, index.

The British Army Intelligence Corps (IC) was created on 18 July 1940, nearly a year after the start of WW II. Previously, although there was a director of military intelligence on the general staff, intelligence units, staffs, and schools had been formed and deployed as needed during a conflict.

Sharing The Secret explains what provoked the change. As background, it provides a chronological history covering the pre-World War II days, and the Corps' wartime and peacetime missions, concluding with the post-9/11 era.

Although author and former Intelligence Corps member Nick Van Der Bijl writes that the book is not a regimental history, it often reads like one. The book is a profusion of names, unit designations, and assignment details, and it is sometimes hard to understand command-subordination relationships. Thus, the US reader may find the discussions of operational details more valuable. Besides the usual tactical duties, IC units performed a variety of functions that mirrored their civilian counterparts. These included military security, technical intelligence, counterespionage, photointerpretation, wireless interception, support to the Special Operations Executive during WWII, and support to counterterrorist operations in Ireland during what he calls the coalition years in the Middle East.

IC elements have served worldwide and Van Der Bijl describes many in detail. For example, intelligence officers served in Palestine during the British Mandate period and were involved in the provocation that resulted in the Irgun attack on the King David Hotel in Tel Aviv [sic]—actually Jerusalem. (199) A more positive story concerned the British Military Mission (BRIXMIS) that conducted air, land, and photographic operations against the Soviets in East Berlin and East Germany. The efforts of the East German military intelligence service (called Narks) to inhibit collection—sometimes resorting to crashing their cars—proved futile in the long run.

Sharing The Secret has an impressive story to tell and tells it well.

Spies, Scouts, and Secrets in the Gettysburg Campaign: How the Critical Role of Intelligence Impacted the Outcome of Lee's Invasion of the North, June–July, 1863, by Thomas Ryan. (Savas Beatie, LLC) 481 pp., footnotes, bibliography, photos, maps, index.

Most Civil War histories and memoirs that discuss the Battle of Gettysburg are concerned with the strategy and tactics of the battle and its impact on the politics of the war. Some do mention the problems created for General Lee when he lost contact with his cavalry commander, General Jeb Stuart, before the battle began. And some also discuss the role of scouts and the contribution of General Longstreet's personal civilian agent, Henry Harrison. *Spies, Scouts, and Secrets in the Gettysburg Campaign* takes a different approach; it focuses on the intelligence aspects of the campaign from the Battle of Chancellorsville to Lee's retreat in defeat, back across the Potomac River.

Civil War historian Thomas Ryan describes how intelligence was organized and employed by the northern and southern generals and the influence it had on the outcome. The north created the Bureau of Military Information (BMI)—the first organization of its kind in the US military—to collect and analyze intelligence for the commander, MG Joseph Hooker, and later General George Meade. The BMI employed agents, the Signal Corps, the Balloon Corps, the US Military Telegraph Service, the Cavalry, and special reconnaissance and sharpshooter units. It

also prescribed mandatory practices to be followed at all levels when interrogating deserters, defectors, and POWs. The South also employed many of these techniques. But, with the exception of its Signal Corps, they were less formalized and depended too heavily on the cavalry for their implementation. General Lee did not create a "BMI" and was, in effect, his own intelligence analyst.

Ryan shows how Lee employed deception to prevent Hooker from realizing he was going to invade the North, and how Hooker, who didn't always accept the intelligence from his BMI, eventually learned what was happening. Both generals had major difficulties from their cavalry commanders. Lee had to revise his original objective—to attack into Pennsylvania—after he lost contact with Stuart, who failed to keep track of the Union Army. Hooker's cavalry commander, BG Alfred Pleasanton, often failed to follow orders and his reports on Lee's Army were frequently erroneous, a factor contributing to Hooker's resignation and the appointment of General Meade as Union commander.

Spies, Scouts, and Secrets in the Gettysburg Campaign illuminates how intelligence was collected and applied in more detail than any other book on the entire Gettysburg campaign. It is a valuable contribution to Civil War history.

A Very Dangerous Woman: The Lives, Loves and Lies of Russia's Most Seductive Spy, by Deborah McDonald and Jeremy Dronfield. (Oneworld Publications, 2015) 400 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

In the early days of the Bolshevik Revolution, before Britain had recognized Lenin's government, the Foreign Office dispatched Russian-speaking Robert Bruce Lockhart to head what was called the British Mission in St. Petersburg. Within a year, Lockhart had joined with Sidney Reilly in a failed plot to overthrow the Bolsheviks, only to be arrested and sent to Lubyanka by the Cheka, Lenin's secret police. Initially threatened with death, he was unexpectedly transferred to the Kremlin, where conditions improved, thanks to the efforts of Madam Maria von Benckendorff—known to her friends as Moura, with whom he had been having an passionate affair. Moura had secured his transfer after a private meeting with the deputy head of the Cheka, Yakov Peters, for whom she had been spying on Lockhart. What Peters didn't know was that Lockhart had sent her to Peters in the first place, to offer to spy on Lockhart and thus penetrate the Cheka. When Lockhart was exchanged for the Bolshevik minister to Britain, Moura, now pregnant by Lockhart, had to remain in Moscow and began to plan a reunion in London. *A Very Dangerous Woman* tells the story of her long, crooked path to London and what she found when she arrived.

During Moura's decade-long journey, her husband was mysteriously murdered, she began affairs with Maxim Gorky and H. G. Wells, she continued cooperation with the Cheka, she married Baron Nikolai Budberg, and she had occasional rendezvous with Lockhart. She reached Britain in September 1929, aged 37, with the help of an old MI6 friend, where the Security Service (MI5) suspected her of being a Soviet agent and monitored her phone calls and mail.

The authors deal with each of her adventures at great length, especially her years in London where her children joined her. She soon became famous for her weekly celebrity salons attended by the elite of society. Anthony Blunt and Guy Burgess were frequent guests, as were publishers, actors, writers, British politicians, and Soviet diplomats who enjoyed her hospitality. At the same time, she made frequent trips to see Gorky until his death in the Soviet Union, where she met Stalin, and thus came under closer MI5 scrutiny. When WW II began, MI5 assigned their Russian-speaking agent, Klop Ustinov—Peter Ustinov's father—to monitor her. Klop would eventually recruit her as an MI5 source. Throughout this period she also continued her affair with Wells—often appearing with him as a hostess at book publishing events—and her meetings with Lockhart, until both died.

Whether Baroness Budberg was the dangerous woman MI5 made out is never fully resolved by the authors. In their well-written biography, based on recently released MI5 records, family letters, and unpublished memoirs, they present a convincing portrait of a talented survivor. Reduced to poverty in her final years, she struggled to maintain her way of life until her death in 1974.

A Very Dangerous Woman reads like a Russian novel, centered on a life whose truth is stranger than fiction.

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Books Reviewed in
Studies in Intelligence
2015

Reviews can be reached at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/index.html.

CONTEMPORARY TOPICS

The Use of Drones (special)

Drone Wars: Transforming Conflict, Law and Policy, edited by Peter Bergen and Daniel Rothenberg (59 4 [December], Bookshelf)

Kill Chain: The Rise of the High-Tech Assassins, by Andrew Cockburn (59 4 [December], Bookshelf)

Lords Of Secrecy: The National Security Elite and America's Stealth Warfare, by Scott Horton (59 4 [December], Bookshelf)

PREDATOR: The Secret Origins of The Drone Revolution, by Richard Whittle (59 4 [December], Bookshelf)

Sudden Justice: America's Secret Drone Wars, by Chris Woods (59 4 [December], Bookshelf)

A Theory of the Drone, by Grégoire Chamayou (59 4 [December], Bookshelf)

Unmanned: Drones, Data, and the Illusion of Perfect Warfare, by William M. Arkin (59 4 [December], Bookshelf)

Other

Chinese Industrial Espionage: Technology Acquisition and Military Modernization, William C. Hannas, James Mulvenon, and Anna B. Puglisi. (59 4 [December], Arturo Munoz)

Reviewed by Arturo G. Munoz The End of Intelligence: Espionage and State Power in the Information Age, by David Tucker (59 2 [June], Bookshelf)

Future Crimes: Everything Is Connected, Everyone Is Vulnerable, and What We Can Do About It, by Marc Goodman (59 3 [September], Jay R. Watkins)

The Future of Intelligence: Challenges in the 21st Century, by Isabelle Duyvesteyn, Ben de Jong and Joop van Reijn (eds.) (59 1 [March], Bookshelf)

Interrogation in War and Conflict: A Comparative and Interdisciplinary Analysis, Christopher Andrew and Simona Tobia (eds.) (59 1 [March], Bookshelf)

Need To Know: Eastern and Western Perspectives, edited by Władysław Bułhak and Thomas Wegener Friis (59 3 [September], Bookshelf)

Searching for Scientific Womanpower: Technocratic Feminism and the Politics of National Security, 1940–1980, by Laura Micheletti Puaca (59 3 [September], R. J. A., PhD)

Following book titles and author names are the *Studies in Intelligence* issue in which the review appeared and the name of the reviewer. All bookshelf reviews are by Hayden Peake.

Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis, by Richards J. Heuer, Jr., and Randolph H. Pherson (59 3 [September], Bookshelf)

What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979–1989, by Bruce Riedel (59 1 [March], Bookshelf)

The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan, 2001–2014, by Carlotta Gall (59 1 [March], John H. Kavanagh)

GENERAL

Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners' Perspectives, Second Edition, by Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce (ed.) (59 1 [March], Bookshelf)

Applied Thinking for Intelligence Analysis: A Guide for Practitioners, by Charles Vandepeer (59 2 [June], Jamie H.)

The Art of Intelligence: Simulation, Exercises, and Games, by William J. Lahneman and Rubén Arcos (eds.) (59 1 [March], Bookshelf)

Historical Dictionary of Intelligence Failures, by Glenmore Trenear-Harvey (59 2 [June], Bookshelf)

Historical Dictionary of United States Intelligence, by Michael Turner (59 2 [June], Bookshelf)

The Secret Agent's Bedside Reader: A Compendium of Spy Writing, edited by Michael Smith (59 3 [September], Bookshelf)

Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back, by Bruce Riedel (59 4 [December], Bookshelf)

Dictionary of Espionage and Intelligence: Over 800 Phrases Used in International and Covert Espionage, by Bob Burton (59 3 [September], Bookshelf)

Historical Dictionary of Intelligence Failures, by Glenmore Trenear-Harvey (59 2 [June], Bookshelf)

Historical Dictionary of United States Intelligence, by Michael Turner (59 2 [June], Bookshelf)

Intelligence: From Secrecy to Policy, by Mark Lowenthal (59 3 [September], Bookshelf)

Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies: An Anthology, Fourth Edition, by Loch Johnson and James Wirtz (eds) (59 1 [March], Bookshelf)

National Intelligence and Science: Beyond the Great Divide in Analysis and Policy, by Wilhelm Agrell and Gregory Treverton (59 4 [December], Bookshelf)

The New Spymasters: Inside Espionage from the Cold War to Global Terror, by Stephen Grey (59 4 [December], Bookshelf)

The NSA Report: Liberty and Security in a Changing World, by Richard A. Clarke, Michael J. Morell, Geoffrey R. Stone, Cass R. Sunstein and Peter Swire (59 4 [December], Bookshelf)

Open Source Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century: New Approaches and Opportunities, edited by Christopher Hobbs, Matthew Moran and Daniel Salisbury (59 4 [December], Bookshelf)

The Rise and Fall of Intelligence: An International Security History, by Michael Warner (59 1 [March], Hayden Peake)

Hayek: A Collaborative Biography—Part III Fraud, Fascism, and Free Market Religion, by Robert Lee-son (59 4 [December], Bookshelf)

The Hidden Hand: A Brief History of the CIA, by Richard H. Immerman (59 3 [September], Bookshelf)

Historical Dictionary of International Intelligence, second edition, by Nigel West (59 4 [December], Book-shelf)

The History of Big Safari, by Col. Bill Grimes, USAF Ret. (59 2 [June], Gary K.)

Hugh Trevor-Roper—The Secret World: Behind the Curtain of British Intelligence in World War II and the Cold War, edited by Edward Harrison (59 3 [September], Bookshelf)

The Iran-Iraq War: A Military and Strategic History, by Williamson Murray and Kevin M. Woods (59 2 [June], Jason U. Manosevitz)

Kidnap in Crete by Rick Stroud. (59 4 [December], JR Seeger)

John McCone As Director of Central Intelligence 1961–1965, by David Robarge (59 4 [December], Hayden Peake)

Kidnapping the Enemy: The Special Operations to Capture Generals Charles Lee and Richard Prescott, by Christian M. McBurney (59 1 [March], Bookshelf)

Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II, by William Blum (59 3 [September], Bookshelf)

Kim Philby: Our Man In Moscow—The Life of a Cold War Master Spy, by Christian Shakespeare (59 3 [September], Bookshelf)

Kim Philby: The Unknown Story of the KGB's Master Spy, by Tim Milne (59 1 [March], Thomas G. Cof-fey)

Liar, Temptress, Soldier, Spy: Four Women Undercover in the Civil War, by Karen Abbott (59 2 [June], Bookshelf)

Listening In: Electronic Intelligence Gathering Since 1945, by Dave Forster and Chris Gibson (59 2 [June], Gary K.)

Natural Born Heroes: How a Daring Band of Misfits Mastered the Lost Secrets of Strength and Endurance by Christopher McDougall. (59 4 [December], JR Seeger)

A Matter of Intelligence: MI5 and the Surveillance of Anti-Nazi Refugees, 1933–50, by Charmian Brin-son and Richard Dove (59 2 [June], Bookshelf)

Observer: The Colonel George Trofimoff Story—The tale of America's highest-ranking military officer convicted of spying, by Glen Aaron (59 4 [December], Bookshelf)

Operation Crossbow: The Untold Story of Photographic Intelligence and the Search for Hitler's V Weapons, by Allan Williams (59 3 [September], Bookshelf)

Operation Valuable Fiend: The CIA's First Paramilitary Strike Against the Iron Curtain, by Albert Lu-lushi (59 3 [September], Bookshelf)

Poland's War on Radio Free Europe: 1950–1989, by Paweł Machcewicz (59 3 [September], Bookshelf)

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