

Studies in Intelligence

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Journal of the American Intelligence Professional

Laos: Operation MILLPOND, 1961

Foundations of Anglo-American Intelligence Sharing

The National Intelligence Council, 2009–2014

Evaluating Insider Risk—The Critical-Path Method



Book Reviews

88 Days to Kandahar

The Zhivago Affair

The Iran-Iraq War

Rice Paddy Recon

Histories of Airborne Collection

Two Cryptological Nights at the Cinema

Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf

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Change and Continuity: The National Intelligence Council, 2009–2014

Christopher A. Kojm

Government institutions change in response to the times. And so it was at the National Intelligence Council during the five years I had the privilege to serve as its chairman.

Introduction

Government institutions change in response to the times. And so it was at the National Intelligence Council (NIC) during the five years (2009–14) I had the privilege to serve as its chairman. Those changes related to the unfolding impact of the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) that reorganized the Intelligence Community and created the director of national intelligence (DNI).¹ Three changes had significant and positive impact on the NIC:

First, in 2010, in the sixth year after the implementation of the act in 2005, General James R. Clapper became the DNI and took the spirit and intent of the IRTPA to its logical conclusion. He directed intelligence integration (what the 9/11 Commission called “unity of effort”²) across all mission areas. His creation of National Intelligence Managers in 2010 led to some internal controversy at the outset,³ but, as I will argue, his reforms resulted in a significant increase in both the quantity and value to policymakers of the NIC’s analytic products.

Second, the DNI’s strong relationship with the White House meant a continuous and powerful demand for the Intelligence Community’s

(IC’s) best analytic judgments. As the director’s analytic arm, the NIC became the focal point for production for deputies’ and principals’ meetings. Over time, the number of taskings from these meetings for the IC grew appreciably. The ability of the NIC to meet this rising demand rested on two conditions: the willingness of analysts across the agencies (above all, CIA analysts) to draft community products, and the ability of national intelligence officers and their deputies to concentrate on the analytic mission. The director’s focus on intelligence integration made both possible. His insistence on mission integration gave impetus to powerful positive trends already underway. His creation of National Intelligence Managers (NIMs) liberated NIOs from a multitude of managerial tasks that drained time and attention from analytic work.

Third, the IRTPA’s emphasis on analytic integrity and quality gave a powerful boost to reforms in the structure and presentation of analysis, especially National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). The report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the 2002 NIE on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction built political momentum for the creation of the DNI,⁴ who was then charged to ensure analytic integrity in the future. The law requires the DNI—and those

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Every editorial reform during my time in office was intended to improve clarity of presentation, accessibility, and utility of the NIC's products for the policy customer.

who work for him, including the NIC chairman—to take steps to ensure analytic integrity.⁵

In addition to significant reform efforts since 2004 by my predecessors to restore the integrity of NIEs, I wanted to restore their utility. I wanted to return them to their central role in framing key issues for policymakers. Every editorial reform during my time in office was intended to improve clarity of presentation, accessibility, and utility of the NIC's products for the policy customer. I wanted to make NIEs shorter, more readable, and therefore more useful for our senior readers.

Director Clapper and Intelligence Integration

Director Clapper took his oath of office on 9 August 2010 and his first meeting with ODNI senior staff followed soon thereafter, on 12 August.⁶ It was memorable: normally in such introductory meetings, everyone around the table briefs the new boss; however, Director Clapper decided he would be the briefer. He gave a slide presentation with a single overarching theme: intelligence integration. For the DNI, the spirit, intent, and purpose of the IRTPA could not have been more clear: fostering unity of effort across the community. The statute itself had created the National CounterTerrorism Center⁷ and the National Counterproliferation Center.⁸ His predecessors created mission managers for Iran, North Korea, and Cuba/Venezuela. It was now his turn.

Director Clapper created NIMs across the board. He wanted managers for all regional and functional topics—to unify collection, analysis, budget, resources, personnel, and training across every mission area. Under his model, one officer took on responsibility and accountability for the entirety of the community's effort. The goal was not to replace individual agency efforts on any given topic, but to guide, shape, and ultimately integrate those efforts, so that the totality of the community's intelligence support was far more than the sum of its parts.

Change is always hard, and so it was with the director's initiative. In one respect, the director's plan was an homage to the NIC. His presentation of 12 August explicitly referenced the 30-year history of the NIC—leading analysis, coordinating products, and building community. Throughout the transition, he reiterated this vision. In many respects, he wanted to extend the NIC model to the world of collection and the totality of IC effort.

Not surprisingly, some NIOs and others on the NIC saw the director's plan as a threat to the NIC's traditional role. They expressed outright opposition to the NIM concept. Would the new model diminish the stature of NIOs and their access to policymakers? Would analysts simply become cogs in the wheel of another bureaucratic process? Could the NIC even survive?

I had long conversations with the vice chairman of the NIC, Vaughn Bishop. We were keenly aware of

the NIOs' doubts and anxieties. We pondered the right course and acted in the interests of the NIC: we embraced the director's vision. From the outset, Vaughn and I were convinced the director's reforms and the integrity of the NIC were compatible. But the burden of persuasion was on us, internally and outside the NIC, to make it so.

There were many bumps along the way. I think none of the participants in the ensuing restructuring—including its leader Robert Cardillo, the director's choice for deputy director for intelligence integration—would want to relive that first year. The questions were many: who would report to whom? Who would speak for the community? What organizations would be collapsed or repurposed? Where would people sit? Who was in charge of reviewing and approving analysis?

Robert Cardillo and his deputies, Didi Rapp and, later, Andrew Hallman and Mike Dempsey, were masterful in finding ways forward. The NIMs formed their own council, and the NIC remained intact. Matrix management ensured fair evaluation of NIOs by NIMs, as the raters, and the chairman of the NIC as reviewer. The NIC remained in the spaces it had long inhabited, and TANDBERGs (classified Skypes) helped foster continuous communication between the two organizations.

Lanes in the road sorted themselves out as well. Managers had their hands full drafting and implementing unifying, community-wide intelligence strategies. The successful managers—and most were—looked to NIOs to not only lead and produce analysis in accordance with the strat-

egy, but to be a partner in developing it as well. Managers served on the selection panels for NIO, and the NIC chair served on the selection panel for NIMs. The rotation of officers and managers ensured fresh perspectives and growing acceptance of the new model.

The most sensitive question remained, “Who would speak for the IC’s analytic line on an issue and who would represent the IC at downtown policy meetings”? Since most policy questions relate to analytic judgments rather than to collection postures, the NIO seemed to be the natural leading figure for inclusion. In point of fact, managers would defer much of the time to NIOs, but the ability of NIMs to decide that they themselves should be at the table instead of an NIO did rankle and still does. In either case, it is the wide and immediate sharing with the relevant communities of information obtained from such policy meetings that matters most. And that is exactly what is taking place.

The NIC: the DNI’s Analytic Horsepower

The real test of any restructuring is whether it changes behavior and outcomes. What have been the results of the director’s initiative on intelligence integration? I will leave it to others to assess its overall impact, especially with respect to collection, but I can speak with confidence to its impact on analysis.

In short, there has been a significant and positive benefit. This is the case in terms of both the demand signal and the community’s capacity to

The real test of any restructuring is whether it changes behavior and outcomes.

produce analytic products. Under the IRTPA, the NIC became the DNI’s analytic arm, preparing him and his deputies to represent the IC’s position in deputies’ and principals’ committee meetings.⁹ What began in 2005 under Director John Negroponte has accelerated during DNI Clapper’s tenure.

From 2010 to 2014, there was a three-fold increase in the production of NIC analysis in support of those policy meetings. Policymakers came to rely increasingly on IC support to assist in their decisionmaking process. Community-coordinated analysis became the coin of the realm, for both the *President’s Daily Briefing* as well as the materials prepared for downtown policy meetings. The NIC could not have met this three-fold increase in demand without greater contributions from analysts at individual agencies—first and foremost, from the CIA. The NIC serves as the bridge between analysts and the policy community, and provides analysts with important insights into the policymaking process that they might not otherwise get. In turn, analysts have a greater incentive to contribute because they can make a more informed—and therefore more valuable—contribution.

NIMs also have been key to the increase in analytic production. They have taken on responsibilities for collection and other essential but time-consuming management tasks that detract from time spent on analysis (before the creation of NIMs, these responsibilities defaulted to NIOs in areas where mission managers were not specified).¹⁰

The DNI’s emphasis on intelligence integration both accelerated cultural change at agencies in favor of community production as a valued outcome and provided direct relief for overtaxed NIOs so that they could concentrate on their core competency: quality analysis pursued with rigorous application of quality tradecraft. These positive trends made possible an overall doubling of NIC production between 2010 and 2014—during the same period of time in which staff was reduced by 6 percent.

The NIC also developed into a more flexible production shop. While the NIE is, and will likely remain, the single best-known and most important product of the NIC, other publications have risen in importance. Shorter publications, with shorter turnaround times, now predominate. These include Intelligence Community Assessments; Sense of the Community Memoranda (exactly the length of the front and the back of a single piece of paper); and NIC memos (normally just a few pages) requested by single customers, later turned into disseminated products for a wider policy audience. Altogether, these shorter publications now represent most of NIC production.¹¹

The advantage here is self-evident: shorter products can address a wider range of topics with far quicker turnaround times, meeting policymakers’ urgent requirements. What is important to note, however, is that from 2010 to 2014 there was no diminution in the production of National Intelligence Estimates. Their numbers actually increased since 2010, and held steady over the next three

The argument put to me was simple: length was a major obstacle to the NIE's utility, and thus undermined its credibility. Senior policymakers simply would not take the time to read them . . .

years at a level 50-percent above 2010 levels. Production of long-term strategic analysis increased at a time of rapid expansion of other, shorter product lines. Such an outcome became a reality only because of the benefits intelligence integration made possible.

Changes to the National Intelligence Estimate

As I prepared to come to the NIC in 2009, I spoke to senior intelligence and policy officials, past and present. One point was mentioned again and again: NIEs are too long. The argument put to me was simple: length was a major obstacle to the NIE's utility and thus undermined its credibility. Senior policymakers simply would not take the time to read them; in fact, a former vice chairman of the NIC, Mark M. Lowenthal, wrote in an Op-Ed in March 2009 that estimates are "long, ponderous, tortuously written, and largely lacking in influence."¹² It was troubling to come into an organization when one of my respected predecessors had labeled its flagship publication as irrelevant.

Just two months after I started, a Brookings Institution study wrote the following:

Many NIEs run to a length of upwards of 90 pages. At the highest policymaking levels, very busy people do not have time to read a document of that length. . . . According to the

*interviews of former senior policymakers, the finished NIE itself frequently is too late, too long, and too detailed. . . .*¹³

I was discouraged by what I heard and read. After I arrived, I directed a short survey that showed, indeed, that the length of NIEs had drifted upward over time, from an average length of 36 pages in 2006 to an average length of 68 pages in 2009.¹⁴ Even more discouraging, I learned that several long and complex NIEs had "Volume IIs" of equal or greater length. While I had no particular question about their quality or their utility to technical experts, I felt certain that no senior policymaker would ever read them. It became a question of opportunity costs. The NIC's work should always make a difference: I was committed to redirecting talent, expertise, and resources to those products that the nation's most senior policymakers would read.

I started to think about form and structure. I read a published estimate on an East Asia topic that had intriguing key judgments, and I wanted to learn more about them. However, as I went inside the document, I had great difficulty finding the analysis in support of those judgments. In the case of one judgment, such analysis was altogether absent. There was no clear link between the underlying analysis and the key judgments. Given that the key judgments are the only part of an estimate that we know all senior policymakers are likely to read, I thought we had an obligation

to structure our documents in a way that would better inform them and accurately reflect the voice of the community.

If the three pages of the key judgments are the most important part of an estimate, then the rest of the document should be in support of those key judgments. It seemed to me that the entirety of the NIE should be structured, in sequence, in support of those key judgments. If the topic or material didn't support the key judgments, it did not belong in the body of the estimate.

This formulation, I knew, would help with the problem of length, because it provided a method for streamlining the NIE. But how long is the right length?

Many outside of government appealed to the model of the United Kingdom's Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), whose papers are typically five to seven pages. I thought that model was inexact, insofar as JIC papers are a mix of policy and intelligence judgments, and they do not purport to be analogous to the NIE as a comprehensive estimative treatment of a given topic.¹⁵ In any event, they serve a different system of government and a different set of policy masters.

I thought a limit of 10 pages or less was too severe—that it simply would not meet the test of credibility, much less the community's rigorous tradecraft standards adopted in the aftermath of the 2002 Iraq WMD NIE debacle. It was just not plausible to provide skeptical Cabinet officers or members of Congress controversial analytic judgments on the nation's most important national security

questions with just a couple of pages of supporting material.

So, if fewer than 10 pages was insufficient, it certainly seemed that 30 pages was too much. For me, the argument was settled when I met with Denis McDonough, then the National Security Council chief of staff and director of strategic communication. I explained to him what I was doing, trying to find the sweet spot, balancing rigor of analysis with accessibility for the policymaker. It seemed to me that 20 pages of analysis in support of three pages of key judgments was the outer limit. Denis said that, on an important topic, the president would read 20 pages. His comment was enormously helpful in helping to push internal reform forward.

In addition, a 20-page limit would play a constructive forcing function—making the community differentiate between what was interesting and what was essential knowledge for the policymaker. A page limit would impose additional rigor on internal discussion and drafting. I appreciated this would not make the process any easier: as Mark Twain said, “I didn’t have time to write a short letter, so I wrote a long one instead.”¹⁶

Of course, there is always skepticism about the necessity of change. As the newcomer in a room full of experienced and distinguished NIOs, I approached the question of change in an indirect fashion, posing more questions at the outset than prescribing outcomes. After a series of council sessions, some saw where I was trying to go and the rationale for trying to get there. I am forever grateful to NIO for Military Issues

The question was not whether to exclude such material from the estimate, but how to organize it in such a way as to maximize utility for the busy policy reader.

John Landry for blurting out his support for page limits—that the time was right for change. After an officer of his experience and stature agreed, persuading the rest of the room became easier.

While the 20-page limit was one I enforced strictly, I did support the concept of liberally adding annexes to NIEs. On any given estimate topic, there is additional relevant material of value—economic statistics, military orders of battle, demographic and polling data, leadership profiles, etc. While it might not figure into the storyline of the key judgments of the estimate, the material can be of significant interest to a particular reader, and can provide additional context.

The question was not whether to exclude such material from the estimate, but how to organize it in such a way as to maximize its utility for the busy policy reader. Hence, annexes were broken into short, discrete, one- or two-page topics, organized in the order of the topics they addressed as they arose in the text of the NIE itself. I did not try to limit the number of annexes—the alphabet has 26 letters, after all. A typical estimate might have six to 10 annexes. The DNI often commented favorably on annexes, saying that he learned a lot from them. I would add that careful organization and presentation of material made them accessible in a way that simply was not possible—or had been too frustrating—under the old model.

Changes under the IRTPA also contributed to better NIEs. Because NIOs were now so deeply involved

in support for deputies’ and principals’ meetings, they had constant access to policymakers. They came to intimately understand policy priorities and information needs. Therefore, they were able to refine each NIE’s key questions and insure their relevance and utility. This continuous interchange also meant that NIOs had the opportunity to provide emerging key judgments whenever the question was ripe for policy consideration and decision. This iterative process made the questions better and the answers more timely. The process and the product were thereby both improved.

In estimates and in all products, I placed great emphasis on the use of graphics. For example, because key judgments always begin on a right-handed page, the facing page on the left is almost always available for the placement of a graphic to underscore visually the message or messages that appear on the right. For busy policymakers who are bombarded with information and overwhelmed with meetings, it is often the graphics they will find most accessible and may best remember. Particularly with economics, a storyline linked to graphic data is essential.

Looking ahead to the day when not only short pieces but NIEs will be read exclusively on tablets, we need to think about links to videos and interactive graphics as part of the estimate—no different from hyperlinks common in stories on the web today.¹⁷ Just as the newspaper business changed in the transition to web-based news, estimates, too,

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will need to adjust to the way a rising generation of policymakers interface with other sources of information. The goal will always be to present information in ways that are brief, clear, and accessible to policy readers, enabling them to maximize the value of their always scarce time.^a

The National Intelligence Board

I served with three outstanding vice chairmen—Steve Kaplan, Vaughn Bishop, and Joe Gartin. They had the same authority as I to approve for dissemination and release all NIC products, save one—the NIE. All estimates must go before the National Intelligence Board (NIB), which is chaired by the DNI, for adjudication and approval. Individual community agencies and elements are represented at the board, and my role was to run the meeting on behalf of the DNI. Estimates are published under the name of the DNI and, as such, they must ultimately meet with his approval. That said, the director always encouraged an open process of give-and-take and discussion at board meetings.

The role I adopted in these meetings reflected my experience as a committee staffer on Capitol Hill, working to prepare for a committee mark-up. That role, in short, was to take the pulse of all agencies and

those officials who would represent them at the NIB, to identify points of contention, and to work out beforehand, insofar as possible, points of difference.

This did not mean “watering down” judgments or papering over differences.¹⁸ Quite the contrary. In the aftermath of the 2002 Iraqi WMD estimate, the IRTPA spelled out in statutory language the importance of identifying and highlighting analytic differences. I recognized not only a legal but an institutional responsibility to do the same—to be an honest broker, ensuring that all voices were heard and that all points and supporting data were discussed. The community would either come together based on discussion and common understanding—or it would not. If not, I felt it was my obligation to ensure that those differences were presented with clarity, and to highlight those differences in the key judgments if they were important.¹⁹

Even with our best efforts to work out differences beforehand, a substantive discussion around the table almost always took place. The point here is that effort, beforehand, to resolve differences meant that discussion did not sprawl across several topics of contention, but rather centered on just one or two points—and therefore principals were able to resolve them. I would not seek to schedule an estimate if there were too many unresolved questions. On two occasions, I canceled NIB meetings because the gaps became too large for resolution at the table.

The Role of the National Intelligence Officer

The role of the NIO has been shaped by history, culture, and law. The concept originated with Director of Central Intelligence William Colby. He took office in 1973 and commented in his memoir, “how badly the machinery was organized to serve me.”²⁰ He decided to dissolve the half-vacant Board of National Estimates and “use the 12 positions thus made available to appoint 12 senior assistants to report directly to me on each of the main issues facing me.”²¹ He called these assistants national intelligence officers. In 1979, these officers were assembled into a group under the leadership of Richard Lehman, and thus began the National Intelligence Council.

While experience with collection is always a welcome benefit, the central requirement for an NIO is to be the community’s lead analyst—and to communicate that expertise effectively. The IRTPA retained the 1992 codification of the National Intelligence Council²² and its existing practices of officer selection, stating that the NIC

*shall be composed of senior analysts within the intelligence community and substantive experts from the public and private sector;*²³

[and] “*the members of the National Intelligence Council shall constitute the senior intelligence advisers of the intelligence community for purposes of representing the views of the intelligence community within the United States Government.*”²⁴

a. For a discussion of the use of tablets for the presentation of the *President's Daily Briefing*, see Lawrence Meador and Vinton Cerf, “Rethinking the President’s Daily Intelligence Brief,” *Studies in Intelligence* 57, No. 4 (December 2013).

As lead analyst, the NIO has responsibility for planning, assigning, drafting, editing and representing analysis, in both written and oral form, to the most senior policymakers in the US government. The NIO is the bridge to the policy world, and is responsible for insuring analytic standards and integrity. The position was viewed, in 1979 and now, as highly desirable and as a career aspiration for all intelligence analysts.

Diversity of Backgrounds among NIOS

At the outset, the NIOs principally came from the CIA, even as Colby made clear he wanted the door open to others.²⁵ Over time, officers came from increasingly diverse backgrounds. Ellen Laipson from the Congressional Research Service served under Director of Central Intelligence Gates as his NIO for the Near East and South Asia; she later served as vice chair under Chairman John Gannon (1997–2001). Chairman Joe Nye (1993–1994) appointed Richard Neu from RAND as the NIO for Economics, Enid Schoettle from the Ford Foundation as the first NIO for Global and Economic Issues, and Ezra Vogel, a Harvard professor and noted Japan and China expert, as the NIO for East Asia. Ezra was followed by Richard Bush, a China expert from Capitol Hill. Gannon appointed David Gordon from Capitol Hill and academia as the NIO for Economics; David later served as vice chairman under Chairman Bob Hutchings (2003–2005) and Vice Chairman Tom Fingar (2005–2008). Tom appointed senior foreign service officers as NIOs for South Asia and Africa. The culture and expectation became that the very best experts and analysts—not just from inside the IC, but from

There came to be an appreciation, especially after the end of the Cold War, of the importance of outreach and expertise beyond the confines of the IC.

elsewhere in government or outside government—would come to serve for a period of time as NIOs.

Also, there came to be an appreciation, especially after the end of the Cold War, of the importance of outreach and expertise beyond the confines of the IC. Especially under John Gannon's leadership, the NIC took on a significant outreach role, expanded by each of his successors.²⁶ The growing need to synthesize information from a wide variety of sources placed a premium on diverse perspectives and on officers with a wide variety of backgrounds and expertise.

During my time, I saw my role to build on the strong record of my predecessors in expanding diversity of backgrounds and perspectives. For every NIO position, we posted a vacancy notice that was open to applicants both inside and outside of government. We spent a lot of time on outreach, making sure the word got out in the academic, think-tank, and policy communities, with the result that we saw a great increase in the number of applicants for NIO positions. For example, for a Russia-Eurasia position, we had over 20 applicants; over 30 for a Europe NIO; and over 70 applicants for the new position of a technology NIO. And the numbers corresponded to quality: frequently panel interviews spanned two days, often with as many as 10 candidates.

The accomplishment of which I am most proud during my time at the NIC is attracting people of the exceptional quality needed to serve there. CIA officers still make up the

single largest share of the NIC and NIO workforce—approximately 40 percent. I am also pleased that three DIA officers became NIOs and, for the first time, an officer from the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. Both State and Defense Department officers came on board as NIOs. Several deputies came from State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). This was an exceptional contribution, in that only three deputies from INR represent some two percent of its overall analytic workforce—a far larger contribution to the NIC, proportionately, than by any other agency. Deputies came from eight of the 16 agencies, in addition to several from the ODNI cadre.

This breadth of perspective across the agencies was complemented by the wide range of experience brought by those hired as term appointments. The first-ever NIO for Cyber Issues possesses not only deep technical expertise but also New York City law firm experience with IT mergers and acquisitions, and strong ties with IT industry and trade associations. The first-ever NIO for Technology came from a position as research professor and director of outreach for a technology and applied science institute at a leading technology university. NIOs for Economics have come from Wall Street and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in one case, and from the West Point faculty, National Defense University, and economics briefer for the chairman of the joint chiefs in another. NIOs for Europe have come from the German Marshall Fund and from the State Department.

We wanted officers who were widely recognized inside and outside of government, and respected for their expertise.

In addition, the NIO workforce became more diverse. When I started, there were three female NIOs. When I left, there were six, plus women held senior leadership positions, as counselor and as director of the Strategic Futures Group. Minority representation increased from one to three, out of a total of 16 NIOs.

Peer Review

This diversity of backgrounds and perspectives played out time and again to good effect in discussions around the NIC table, particularly in peer review. The process of compulsory peer review was mandated by my predecessor, Bob Hutchings, as a reform in the aftermath of the Iraq WMD estimate. All estimates must go through a process in which their terms of reference (outlines) are read and discussed by the council, and then drafts of the estimate are reviewed as well. The process can be quite bracing, as NIOs don't stint in their efforts to comment. NIOs accept the criticism because they know it is in the spirit of preparing the best possible document on behalf of the NIC and the IC as a whole. The NIC consciously fosters and encourages critical questioning, from concept to publication.

This process of constant review is a powerful one. For example, the NIO for Economics brought forward perspectives from the investor community, vastly improving draft articles on Russia, Egypt, and numerous other topics. An officer detailed from the National Center for Medical Intelligence ensured that discussion of HIV figured prominently in drafts

relating to Africa. An officer with little experience on a given topic nonetheless provided great insight, because his strong public diplomacy background helped drafters better understand the evolving narratives and storylines adversaries sought to propagate. In short, the wealth of diverse background and experience around the table is one of the NIC's great strengths.

Qualifications

The qualifications for NIO, as I saw them, were really two distinct sets of skills. First, there was substantive expertise. We wanted officers who were widely recognized inside and outside of government, and respected for their expertise. Yet expertise was only the first cut. It was a threshold for consideration—a high bar, for sure—but expertise alone was insufficient. We also gave great prominence to leadership—the ability to bring together a fractious community of analysts on difficult topics; the ability to build productive relationships with counterpart agencies and with policy customers; and the ability to serve as an honest broker and ensure that alternative views were represented fairly. Leadership also entailed a willingness to contribute to the NIC's collective best efforts through the peer review process and collaboration with NIC colleagues. Those sets of skills—expertise and leadership—were not always easy to find in the same person, and a few times we had to re-do the job vacancy and selection process. But we would not proceed unless the selection panel was convinced the candidate excelled at both.

Renewal

A final point about personnel at NIC is the importance of turnover. There is no greater contributor to fresh perspectives, new energy and enthusiasm than new personnel. I participated in the hiring of 21 NIOs during my five years; only four NIOs both pre-dated and post-dated my time of service. Time and again, I saw a fresh burst of energy with the arrival of a new officer and new deputies.

Before I came on board, some advised me to replace the longest-serving officers at the NIC. When I arrived, I decided to just have an open mind and evaluate what I saw: I was frankly impressed with their performance. I did not act on the advice I was given. In the case of all officers, the vice chair and I would perform an evaluation each year, seeking to learn whether officers were continuing to produce at the very highest level and generating the quality of analysis required to serve well the most senior policymakers in the US government. We wanted to make sure that they—and we—continued to discharge that duty.

While I never asked an officer to leave, I spoke out on many occasions about the importance of leadership renewal. The ideal tour of duty for an NIO should be three to four years. Officers who return to their home agencies—or go on to positions of importance in the policy or professional world—become part of the close mesh of networks and contacts so important for the NIC's work. These “formers” help foster and build a sense of community as they return to their home agencies, or become well-informed users of intelligence in their policy jobs, or become part of the NIC's network of expert outreach.

While a few people encouraged me to seek a waiver to extend my generous five-year appointment at the NIC, I made no such effort. I felt strongly I needed to live up to my own guidance, that the NIC is always improved by the quality of the new people who walk through the door.

The Role of the Chairman

The head of any organization has multiple roles and responsibilities. While a successful officer has to carry out each of these functions, each chairman decides where to emphasize time, attention, and resources.

I believed—and still believe—that the chairman's most important function is to ensure that a steady stream of superior and diverse talent continually refreshes and energizes the NIC. Closely related to this function is that of enabling talented officers to succeed. Sometimes the requirement is as banal—and as crucial—as getting the creaky human resources process to work, such that new officers and deputies are able to come on board. Sometimes the requirement is working information-sharing issues. Sometimes it is helping to mediate agency differences. Sometimes it is counseling—and most often, it is simply listening.

Outreach

Historically, the NIC chairman also has played the role of the community's lead advocate for outreach. I did so happily, and with great conviction. Because of the press of business and inherent limits on time and resources, there could never be enough outreach. Therefore, I felt I had to always lean hard against those

While other voices joined with the NIC in making the case for outreach, there was just no doubt in my mind that all in the IC looked to the NIC to lead in this area.

limits—to speak up for outreach, to invite outside speakers, to attend NIC-sponsored seminars and conferences, and to defend the budget. While other voices joined with the NIC in making the case for outreach, there was just no doubt in my mind that all in the IC looked to the NIC to lead in this area.

With respect to outreach, the NIC's *Global Trends* publication is perhaps the most powerful example. There are no classified sources that can tell you what the world will look like 15 years from now. It is only through a process of intense engagement with experts in academia, think-tanks, government, and the business community that such a report can be created. Moreover, the dialogue with interlocutors in Brussels, Brasilia, Johannesburg, Moscow, New Delhi, Singapore, Shanghai, and many other great cities and capitals is just as important.²⁷

Thought Leader

Some NIC chairs see themselves as thought leaders, driving the agenda on foreign policy and national security issues to put before the policy community. I saw that as an aspect of my role, but not necessarily the central one. During my time, the NIC did take up serious analytic work on several topics that it had not examined previously—the national security implications of water issues,²⁸ global atrocities prevention,²⁹ and multiple emerging cyber issues, to name just a few. I thought it important to take on at least one or two groundbreaking topics for NIEs each year, as well as to revisit important countries and

topics that had not been examined in recent years.

Still, I was circumspect about this aspect of my role. Most of the NIC's work is, in fact, in direct response to or in anticipation of policymaker requests. While I believe that the NIC should retain the ability to shape its own analytic workplan, only a few of its major pieces each year are truly self-initiated.

Giving Voice

I also saw my role as one of giving voice to the NIOs, and to the IC. The US government spends a great deal of taxpayer money collecting and analyzing information. It hires thousands of analysts who spend their careers looking at important questions, including those relating to Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. I never thought my role was to substitute my judgment for theirs; rather, my role was to help them present their views in the most effective way possible so that their voices would be heard.

Looking to the Future

Today's National Intelligence Council would certainly be recognizable to its first officers from 35 years ago. Its structure, with NIOs as the focal point for the community's coordinated analysis, is essentially unchanged.

The mission of the NIC is also recognizable and today more urgent than ever: to provide the Intelligence Community's best analysis, to help

Embracing intelligence integration has brought considerable benefit to the work of the NIC

policymakers understand a complex and messy world, to help them make better decisions.

To fulfill that mission, the NIC has changed with the times. Embracing intelligence integration has brought considerable benefit to the work of

the NIC, enabling it to meet the ever-increasing demand for the community's analysis of the hardest national security problems facing our leaders and our country. With the support of the director, the NIC will continue to fulfill that role in the future.



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The Foundations of Anglo-American Intelligence Sharing

Dr. Michael S. Goodman

If there was one constant to any account of post-war British foreign policy it is the centrality of the United States. In the past 20 years, the importance and role of the intelligence relationship that underpin this factor has become more prevalent.

If there was one constant to any account of postwar British foreign policy, it is the centrality of the United States. In the past 20 years, the importance and role of the intelligence relationship that underpins this factor have become more prevalent.¹ Yet, attention is often focused on specific aspects. The 1946 UK-USA Agreement, for instance, which provided the backbone to the sharing of signals intelligence to this day, is often cited as the central pillar of the special intelligence relationship.² Similarly, in episodic instances the covert relationship is cited, with notable examples including the restoration to power of the shah of Iran in 1953 and the running of agents like Oleg Penkovksy.³

The analytical intelligence relationship, however, has received far less attention. This article seeks to fill this lacuna by concentrating on the origins and early evolution of the relationship that developed between the two preeminent analytical bodies in both countries, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the United States and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in the United Kingdom.

Wartime Origins

To understand the nature of the postwar relationship, it is first necessary to understand its origins. The prewar US intelligence effort was a very limited endeavor. Small, dedicated components of the US military worked on intelligence, but there was no civilian intelligence function or coordinating outfit. The UK community, such as it was, was slightly larger and better evolved, but there was little collaboration among its constituents.

In the summer of 1936, as the potential for conflict with Germany was steadily increasing, the decision was taken in London to create the JIC, a subcommittee of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Its function was two-fold: to ensure the community was better joined up to remove duplication of effort and, in turn, to ensure that those making military plans were provided with the best intelligence appreciations possible.⁴

The United Kingdom and the United States had first discussed military equipment and plans in 1937.⁵ There had been relatively little mention of intelligence, however. What there had been was confined to dialogue between the two navies. In

This article is drawn only from released official records and published sources, and the views expressed are those of the author, an academic historian. All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations by either the government of United Kingdom or the United States. © M. S. Goodman

Donovan's appointment as Roosevelt's coordinator of information was welcomed by the British.

the first months of 1940, intelligence relations were extended with the creation of British Security Coordination (the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) office in New York responsible for liaison with the Americans) and by the visit of several FBI officers to London.⁶

In June 1940, US Army Gen. Raymond Lee was sent to London as military attaché and head of intelligence. Lee had been the military attaché in London from 1935 to 1939, but he had been brought back to Washington at the outbreak of war to “whip American peacetime soldiers into shape.” As the early months of the war proceeded and the German army advanced, “his superiors decided that once again he was the man America needed in London.”⁷

In July 1940, at the insistence of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, WW I hero Col. William Donovan was despatched to London as the president's special envoy. He had spent most of the interwar period as an attorney in New York before becoming one of Roosevelt's trusted aides.⁸ Colonel Donovan's primary role was to assess Britain's chances—both in terms of its ability and its will—to withstand a German invasion, and while in London in July 1940, he met Churchill and the various British intelligence chiefs.^{a, 9}

a. Lee, who discussed Donovan's findings with him before his return to brief Roosevelt, noted that Donovan felt Britain's chances of “beating off” the Germans were 60–40, whereas Lee was more confident, arguing 2 to 1, “barring some magical secret weapon.”

Perhaps as a response, the JIC was instructed in August to prepare a memorandum on how Washington, in organizational terms, was approaching the war.¹⁰ The same month it was decided that the *Dominion Wire*, a regular product based on the JIC's daily summary, should be forwarded to the US ambassador in London, with Lord Lothian, the British ambassador in Washington, instructed to show it to Roosevelt.¹¹ These would be the first stirrings in the serious exchange of analyzed intelligence.

In late August 1940, a meeting was held in London between the British Chiefs of Staff and Brig. Gen. George Strong, the assistant chief of staff for the US Army. At the meeting, Strong disclosed the fact that the Americans were reading Japanese codes and that “considerable progress” had been made in reading Italian ones. Strong proposed that the time was ripe for the free exchange of intelligence.¹² The Chiefs of Staff agreed, and a few weeks later Roosevelt approved the dissemination of all relevant information to the British. In early 1941, a succession of further meetings strengthened this new alliance at a time when the United States had not yet entered the war.¹³

On a further fact-finding mission in March 1941, Colonel Donovan attended a JIC meeting.¹⁴ At the same time, the JIC was also involved in discussions about the means by which American information would be transmitted back to the UK.¹⁵ The timing was opportune: in March 1941, the United States had approved the Lend-Lease Act, which allowed US defense and other supplies to be passed across the Atlantic.

Donovan's appointment as Roosevelt's coordinator of information was welcomed by the British, although a report on the appointment called him the “Coordinator of Intelligence.”^{b16} At the same time though, British officials remained skeptical of the intelligence benefits the Americans could offer. Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, the JIC's Foreign Office chairman, for instance, wrote: “We must bear in mind that Washington is far worse informed than ourselves (odd as this may seem to those who complain of our intelligence)... I believe that their intelligence departments are primitive and rather inexperienced... there is little contact or collaboration between American Government Departments.”¹⁷

Cavendish-Bentinck's last point, about the lack of coordination in the American machinery, was increasingly vexing the British. In June 1941, Rear Adm. John Godfrey, the director of naval intelligence (DNI), had visited the United States.¹⁸ In reporting back to the JIC he referred to the problems and wrote about the need to create “a joint intelligence machinery at Washington.”¹⁹ At the same time General Lee, the US representative in London, wrote to Washington emphasizing the “necessity for a Joint Intelligence Committee in Washington.” The justification was a strong endorsement of what Lee had encountered in London: “We cannot get along much longer without something like this. The Joint Committees here are so numerous and so effective that nothing that comes to the atten-

b. The Foreign Office note of the appointment, dated 26 June 1941, predates the US officially given date of the assignment, which was in July.

tion of any department fails to reach all the others in a very short time.”²⁰

In the meantime, Admiral Godfrey informed the London JIC that, indeed, two groups had been created in Washington to manage intelligence-related issues with the Americans. Both were called JIC (Washington) and were set up along the lines of the London JIC: the “senior” JIC (W) was only to meet on matters of major policy; the “junior” JIC (W) met every day and was tasked with collating all information from the US government and producing reports that were dispatched daily to London. The latter was also responsible for liaising with relevant American authorities and distributing London JIC assessments as necessary. Finally, it was at the beck and call of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), “for such purposes as they see fit.”²¹

Although the JIC in London had been involved in the creation of overseas intelligence structures before, JIC (W) was novel.²² Here, for the first time, was a body designed specifically to manage the intelligence relations of the two countries.²³ Although there were bilateral links between various components of British intelligence and their American counterparts, until the creation of JIC (W) there was no unified attempt to ensure that material was not duplicated.

Intelligence exchange between the London and Washington JICs was not always straightforward, and there were occasions when JIC (W) complained about the lack of information it was receiving from London. Yet this should not overshadow its main contribution at this time: It provided a direct line of communication

Intelligence exchange between the London and Washington JICs was not always straightforward.

between London and Washington.²⁴ This would prove to be invaluable as the United States was propelled into war.

The British hoped JIC (W) might “induce” the Americans to set up their own coordinating body.²⁵ Initially, at least, US officials in Washington did not look favorably on the idea—despite Lee’s impassioned pleas from London. It would be some time before an American equivalent to the JIC was created. In his memoir of service in London, Lee reproduced the objections Col. Hayes Kroner—soon to become the head of the War Department’s Military Intelligence Service—said he had heard from members of the War Department:

We are not going to copy British organization and procedure.

We are not convinced that such a central clearing house and assimilating center are needed here.

It is far more difficult to put into effect than Lee imagines.

The “high ups” still don’t feel the danger of incompleteness in their information.

The fact that Beaumont-Nesbitt, Godfrey, and Noel Hall are here and that they serve in the [British] Joint Intelligence Committee and recommended it, is having an unfavorable effect.

The British have not been successful, so far, in the war: why should they advise us?

*Many other alarmingly ignorant and prejudiced reactions.*²⁶

Eventually the Americans began to change their minds, assisted largely by Donovan’s appointment and the fact that he had gained Roosevelt’s confidence.²⁷ In early 1942, a US JIC was finally created, comprising the directors of intelligence from the Army and Navy, representatives from the State Department, and the Board of Economic Warfare, and Donovan.²⁸ Both the American JIC and JIC (W), would work closely with the main JIC in London. Following its creation in 1942, its members would also work closely with the Anglo-American “Combined Intelligence Committee,” which reported to the Combined Staff Planners, who were responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.²⁹

Allies at Last

British intelligence had played an important role in the creation and establishment of an American analytical intelligence community.³⁰ By late 1942, however, there was a feeling in London that relations were not as close as they should be and that JIC (W) needed “improvement.” This was despite the fact that steps had been taken not long before to ensure that the “special intelligence,” the sobriquet given to ULTRA intelligence, was transmitted to Washington.³¹

Many British intelligence officers saw themselves as the elder statesmen in the partnership and were keen to offer their thoughts and advice whenever possible. In considering an American JIC paper on Japanese capabilities, for instance, the deputy director of military intelligence com-

Discussions appear to have been cordial, with topics including the improved intelligence relationship, and a comparison of some UK and US assessments.

mented that although the paper was to have dealt with “capabilities,”

*the conclusions in paragraph 5 refer to intentions. We have previously noticed this tendency on the part of American intelligence papers. They confuse capabilities and intentions, and are apt to assume that, because Japan is capable of a certain course of action, she intends to take that course. We feel that this paper provides a good opportunity to tactfully raise this point with America.*³²

The response was to send Denis Capel-Dunn, the JIC’s influential secretary, over to Washington to gauge progress, offer advice, and report back to the JIC upon his return to London.³³ One of Capel-Dunn’s main tasks, as he saw it, was to ensure that the intelligence setup was optimized given that “the Americans are right into the war in the West” and that “a good deal may depend on the ‘I’ [Intelligence] party in Washington.”³⁴

Capel-Dunn submitted the report on his visit at the end of January 1943. His impression was not one of an overly developed system. He took note of the parallels in the US structure—including the existence of both senior and junior JICs—with London’s, but the American JIC had never, as far as he could tell, met either the US JCS or the planners. Furthermore, the British JIC in Washington had no direct contact with the US JIC. While in the United States, Capel-Dunn had been “embarrassed” to be asked to address a combined meeting of the JIC (W)

and US “working committee,” where he had commented on the closeness of intelligence and planning in the UK, and how “we lived together and worked together.”³⁵

Capel-Dunn’s proposed solution—an interchange of British and American officers—was greeted with muted enthusiasm in the JIC, with the Air Ministry and Admiralty wanting time to consider how this might work in practice.³⁶ Relations between both nations’ intelligence communities in London had not been quite so inhibited, with weekly meetings being held between the US intelligence representative and the “junior” JIC, the deputy director’s level of the committee.

These discussions must have been useful because by April 1943 some improvements were being noted. The director of military intelligence (DMI), Maj. Gen. Francis Davidson, noted how JIC (W) had been “regularly” called upon by the senior American JIC to discuss and comment on papers. Furthermore, US JIC papers were increasingly taken more seriously by the US joint chiefs.³⁷

This improvement in both internal and external relations continued throughout 1943. In late April, the JIC noted that the different American factions were now in regular communication, both with one another and with their British counterparts, and that where there were differences in opinion they were reasonably and sensibly debated.³⁸

Discussions between British and American military planners contin-

ued to take place to define the future conduct of the war. The following month, Edward Mason of the newly created Office of Strategic Services (OSS)—with Donovan in charge—visited London and was invited to attend a JIC meeting. Discussions appear to have been cordial, with topics including the improved intelligence relationship, and a comparison of some UK and US assessments. This was followed by a visit in October of Stanley Hornbeck of the American senior JIC.³⁹ A further Anglo-American conference in December described UK-US intelligence relations as “very good.”⁴⁰ The Anglo-American intelligence communities had, therefore, become allies at last.

PostWar Liaison

Aside from the production of assessments, the JIC had a number of other functions. Perhaps primary among these was establishing and maintaining Allied and foreign liaison. This took several forms: monitoring regional outposts of British intelligence; maintaining liaison with Commonwealth and other Allied countries; but perhaps above all, it was concerned with cementing the foundations developed with the United States during the war.

Liaison was a crucial aspect of the JIC’s role. It included: sharing intelligence assessments; contributing to and commenting upon other countries’ papers; allowing other nations to participate in the British JIC system; helping establish Allied intelligence organizations, often based on tried and tested British models; maintaining a window on distant parts of the world; and, finally, ensuring that

British intelligence forecasts could have a greater impact on Cold War policymaking beyond the confines of Whitehall. It is difficult to measure the importance of the relationships that were created at this formative stage of the Cold War, although the longevity of many of them certainly shows how valuable they must have been, both in London and elsewhere.

What is clear is that the members of the JIC, by the end of war, saw themselves as the senior statesmen of the intelligence world. While this might seem a blasé, even arrogant, stance now, it is important to remember that Britain had one of the longest traditions of intelligence and, in the form of the JIC, had a unique, central system for the production of assessments and the management of the intelligence community. It is no surprise, then, that the JIC model was copied and exported to many other countries.

What is perhaps more unexpected though, is how frequently this system would flounder. Indeed, it was destined to survive only in Britain, British colonial possessions, or other Commonwealth members: in other words, in systems modeled on the Whitehall cabinet system of government, where officials, from the head of the organization down, maintained a strict political neutrality.

The most important relationship was the Atlantic Alliance. In early 1946, the British JIC in Washington, JIC (W), wrote a detailed report to its counterpart in London outlining how Anglo-American intelligence collaboration had progressed since the end of the war. The report covered military and economic intelligence, deliberately excluding political top-

As to civilian intelligence agencies, the war had left something of a void in the United States.

ics. Of these, naval and military intelligence relations were strong, though air force collaboration had suffered because of the changing personnel involved and the lack of any constant RAF presence in the United States. Economic intelligence, a much newer field for collaboration, was less established but good foundations had been laid.⁴¹

As to civilian intelligence agencies, the war had left something of a void in the United States. President Truman had disbanded the OSS in September 1945 despite having no clear proposals for what should follow. The counterintelligence and foreign intelligence collection and some subordinated support components had been sent to the War Department as the Strategic Services Unit to preserve at least some of the capabilities developed during the war. The analytic component, Research and Analysis, was dispatched to the Department of State, where it began to lose people and struggled for stature. As leaders in Washington debated the nature and role of a postwar national security apparatus, the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), created by presidential order, served as a stopgap measure to ensure some central coordination of government intelligence.⁴²

In the meantime, in late 1945 a review of the British intelligence system was completed by William H. Jackson on behalf of General Donovan. Jackson, a future deputy director of central intelligence and a noted Anglophile, produced a report that focused specifically on whether elements of the British system could be used to create an American cen-

tralized system. In turn this led, via several other studies, to the creation of the US estimative process.⁴³

In April 1946, Lt. Cmdr. W. M. Scott, the chief of mission for the SSU/CIG at the US embassy in London, wrote to its head in Washington on the difficulties faced by the uncertainty over US intelligence:

For months we have been “hanging on” with an indefinite status, changing our organization’s name and generally lacking a fixed place in the intelligence picture...our friends here have been exceedingly patient and we, by dodging issues and slightly “coloring” our status, have been able to hold our own in practically all phases of liaison with the British...in all conversations with British intelligence personnel they have repeatedly stressed the need for more coordination of our intelligence services...for the good of the American government the question of the status of our organization must soon be settled one way or the other; relations which are of extreme importance to American intelligence are not going to be possible to maintain unless we have a definite status soon.⁴⁴

In August 1946, Col. William Quinn, the head of SSU, visited London. Reporting on his trip, Quinn said he had emphasized to British counterparts his desire for the SSU to stand on its two feet and for liaison on “secret” and “special operations” to be limited; nonetheless, he continued, “I personally feel that if at all

An ongoing, specific concern in passing information to the Americans was security in the State Department, the new home of the veterans of the OSS Research and Analysis department.

possible, such liaison as is effected with the British should be maintained in London.”⁴⁵

Back in London, the JIC took a keen interest in developments on the other side of the Atlantic. It requested and was given regular updates from its British counterparts in the United States, who described and analyzed progress.⁴⁶ Despite the history of wartime closeness, there were still some in the United Kingdom who questioned how much information should be shared with the Americans. At the service level intelligence exchange was extensive, yet at the more strategic level—the realm at which the JIC operated—collaboration had largely dropped off after the war, with reports generally only being passed between the British COS and American JCS.

In April 1946, the question was raised within the JIC of whether a series of reports on Russia should be released to the Americans, not because of their sensitivity (though some were codeword documents), but because they would “reveal to the Americans the extent of our concentration in that particular field.”⁴⁷ In turn, Brig. Arthur Cornwall-Jones (the secretary of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington and of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and who had been a prewar secretary of the JIC) gave his opinion: “We have a feeling that it would pay us to try to develop our association with the Americans.... The present time, when Russian activities are causing us much concern in the world, would

appear to be an appropriate moment to start off.”⁴⁸

The JIC was evidently persuaded by this. It was nevertheless decreed that papers should be “topped and tailed” so that anyone reading them in the United States would not know that they were British JIC reports. The rationale behind the decision was clear: “The Sub-Committee [i.e. JIC] fervently hope that an exchange of appreciations on such matters will result.”⁴⁹ To the British, the great originator and purveyor of modern intelligence, this was not a purely altruistic move, for it was felt by the service’s directors of intelligence that “it was desirable to educate United States departments in our views.”⁵⁰

An ongoing, specific concern in passing information to the Americans was security in the State Department, the new home for the veterans of the OSS Research and Analysis department. Many within the JIC system, particularly those in the committee in Washington, had grave doubts about circulating assessments to people there. Fortunately, it was reported that within the new Central Intelligence Group structure, there were only two State Department officials, both junior and neither privy to JIC papers. Thus satisfied, the JIC approved and the matter was passed to the Chiefs of Staff, who also agreed, and it was decided to start transmitting JIC papers on the Soviet Union to the Americans.⁵¹

This was not, however, the full extent of the JIC’s dealings with the United States. In considering how

collaboration might be increased, the JIC produced a brief report on what it considered to be an optimum system, whereby British officers would be in “direct working contact” with US intelligence officers.⁵²

By the end of 1946 then, the backbone of the Anglo-American intelligence partnership had been forged. Bilateral links that had been created during the war between the services’ intelligence departments were extended and further strengthened through the UK-USA Agreement, which had been formalized in March 1946.⁵³

At the committee level, British assessments were making their way across the Atlantic and, in return, US views on them and separate American appreciations were being received. In addition, on the rare occasions they visited London, senior US intelligence officers attended the JIC, though only for specific items on the agenda.

Enter the CIA

The creation of the CIA in the late summer of 1947 presented a new opportunity for the British, one that they were keen to grasp. Anglo-American dealings were not always straightforward and cordial. Relations, albeit strong at the departmental level, were often undermined by differing views at the political level. A classic example of this is the difference of opinion between Washington and London over the recognition of the communist government that came to power in China in 1949. The different points of view had a direct impact on the exchange

of intelligence before the outbreak of the Korean War.⁵⁴

Another difficulty was gauging the reactions of American politicians who, from a British perspective, were exhibiting an increasingly introspective view of the world. In British minds there was a risk that this would have an impact on how much information the Americans might be prepared to share.

A further complicating factor was the American reluctance to have their information communicated to Commonwealth countries, or indeed to Commonwealth officers working with their British counterparts. This was no trivial matter. The JIC's view was rational, stating that "there is no need to inform the Americans officially" when this might happen. Although this sounds underhanded, it reflected the British belief that relations with US intelligence agencies at the working level were cordial and considered to be important, whereas at a more senior, political level doubts persisted and so there was no reason to discuss the technicalities of the relationship.⁵⁵

US politics were integral to these British thoughts. In early discussions about US-UK relations, the Americans had informed the JIC that one of the arguments used to persuade Congress to pass the 1947 National Security Act had been the necessity before the war to rely on the British for intelligence. Congress had, consequently, wanted an assurance that the CIA would be able to rely on its own sources of intelligence and not depend too much on foreign assistance. As such, although collaboration was desirable, the British presumed that the Americans would withhold certain information from Congress.

By early 1950, it was calculated that 90 percent of JIC reports were being passed to the Americans. However, problems remained in getting reciprocation, with no US JIC papers being sent to London, and with only very few US comments received on British JIC papers.

It was therefore occasionally necessary to muddy the waters. For instance, in discussions over the decision to partition Palestine in early 1948, it was agreed not to circulate relevant JIC papers to the CIA because of perceived Jewish sympathies in Washington.⁵⁶ Despite the occasional hiccup, on the whole the system worked well, and the level of trust and collaboration exhibited by the British increased. The "topping and tailing" procedure for JIC papers, for instance, was scrapped in 1948.⁵⁷

Against the backdrop to these and ensuing discussions were the rapidly developing Cold War and a succession of US actions. The August 1946 Atomic Energy Act, better known as the McMahon Act after the senator who sponsored it, ended the technical exchange of atomic information between the United States and the United Kingdom, and this had an immediate effect on intelligence sharing. The 1947 Truman Doctrine and the 1948 Marshall Plan ensured a US commitment to Europe, much to the relief of the British. These were followed by the military guarantees established by the creation of NATO in 1949. The January 1950 Burns-Templer Agreement, designed to ensure the complete exchange of military information between the UK and US governments, was useful in reinforcing relations, and would later be used by the JIC as part of its justification for collaboration with the CIA.⁵⁸

By early 1950, it was calculated that 90 percent of JIC reports were being passed to the Americans. However, problems remained in getting reciprocation, with no US JIC papers being sent to London, and with only very few US comments received on British JIC papers.⁵⁹ The Americans cited several factors for this: the US JIC produced very few papers; manpower commitments meant that there was very little time to offer comments; and once US JIC assessments were approved, they became US JCS papers, and so were prohibited from being exchanged.

Participating in the Drafting Process

With the postwar restructuring of US intelligence, the US JIC had become a largely redundant body: The work of the US JIC, a military committee, was meant to be complemented by the nonmilitary assessments produced by the CIA but in practice the agency had assumed much of its work. This was not immediately obvious to the British JIC, though it would rapidly become so. On the US side, the major catalyst for collaboration was the CIA. As far as the JIC was concerned, this was considered particularly crucial, for while relations at the agency-to-agency level were good, a recent UK-US assessment conference had revealed the differences between the two nation's strategic positions.⁶⁰

In mid-1951, Col. Dante Edward Pemberton Hodgson, late of the Welsh Guards, was chosen to represent the

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JIC in Washington. His duties, broadly defined, were to "act in a liaison capacity and represent JIC (London) with any US intelligence agency which may request your services."⁶¹

Located within the CIA was the newly established Office of National Estimates (ONE). The ONE gradually assumed the responsibilities, originally allocated to the US JIC, for preparing assessments. ONE differed from the British JIC in that its members were not representatives of parent departments; indeed, of the eight full-time members in 1951, three were university professors, two were retired military men, and a further two were classed as "professional" intelligence officers. Perhaps as a result of this disparate composition, Hodgson reported a far greater level of debate and argument. Of the members, it is worth mentioning the presence of Sherman Kent, a university history professor, who would write about the theory and practice of strategic intelligence production in the United States and who would come to be seen as the founder of the US intelligence analysis profession.⁶²

The US Intelligence Community, and the CIA in particular, was now much more self-sufficient, and the previous London bias had swung firmly in Washington's favor. From an American perspective, then, the relationship was functioning well. Ray Cline, who had been sent to London to act as a second representative, has written about how his new position provided

*the benefits of seeing how the evidence on common strategic problems looked from the viewpoint of another nation, a close ally with similar but separate interests...my real awakening in London was the discovery of how much we still benefitted from formal liaison exchanges.*⁶³

It is interesting to note here how Cline's attitude altered, once he was in London, from the view prevalent in the United States on liaison. The more senior representative attended relevant JIC meetings, whereas Cline, as the junior member, was primarily involved with the Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS), the drafters of the JIC assessments. The JIC noted that Cline's presence was positive, and that he provided "much useful information." The collaboration was, therefore, a two-way street as far as relations in London were concerned.

In Washington, however, Hodgson was still being given only restricted access to papers and personnel. For the JIC back in London this was a result of the "rigidity of the American system and to inter-service and inter-departmental jealousies in Washington." The decidedly lopsided balance of exchange was not lost on the JIC: "The position thus is that for five months [the senior US representative] has been attending at least part of nearly every JIC meeting and Mr. Cline has had something like a free run of our JIS, without our enjoying any comparable treatment in Washington: and that we have been main-

taining in Washington a full Colonel's post which is almost valueless."⁶⁴

The spate of British spy cases, including the identification of Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean, and Klaus Fuchs as Soviet agents, certainly reinforced US reluctance to engage in a full exchange of intelligence.⁶⁵ The JIC recognized that the system of governance in the United States meant that regardless of his position as director of central intelligence, Gen. Walter Bedell Smith could not simply decide to increase British access to US intelligence. Shortly after President Eisenhower's inauguration, he installed the deputy director, Allen Dulles, as the new director. Dulles wasted no time, and within a month of his appointment had invited Hodgson to call on him. For the British, his appointment would prove to be immensely important.

By mid-1953, it is clear that committee members felt that while the quality of the shared CIA product was now beginning to match the material the United States was receiving, the quantity of exchanged material was still heavily in America's favour. Briefing Prime Minister Winston Churchill in June 1953 before his talks with Eisenhower in Bermuda, the JIC wrote:

*For some time now we have been concerned at the one-sidedness of our intelligence co-operation with the United States...the best way to improve co-operation is to convince the Americans that they stand to gain by it. Many Americans already appreciate this and are aware that we are not getting our fair share of the bargain. We believe that Mr Allen Dulles...is among them.*⁶⁶

As prophesized, the forces for change were beginning to spread across the Atlantic. In a forthright letter to JIC Chairman Patrick Dean, Dulles himself admitted that relations had been strained but that “the need has become substantially greater, or at least more evident, for close working-level contact.” Following a discussion at the JIC, Dean wrote a remarkably candid reply, emphasizing in very plain language the contrast between the relative access granted in London and Washington. Dean ended by confirming why the British were so intent on pursuing American collaboration: “It is our [the JIC’s] belief that our joint effort in all matters of intelligence is the firmest foundation [on which to base policy]...which is of such value to both our countries particularly in times of emergency.”⁶⁷

Among JIC members there was a feeling that, despite the promises, if matters did not improve then the US representatives in London would have to have their access withdrawn. However, the JIC was able to detect small glimmers of improvement:

*We fear, however, that there is little hope of an early general improvement in UK/US Intelligence Cooperation, and we feel that probably the only real sympathy in America...comes from the CIA, especially its Director, Mr Dulles, who certainly appreciates the value of our contribution.*⁶⁸

The necessary change of views in Washington lay, as the JIC had already realized, with the politicians and not the CIA. In late 1953 the committee was informed that the increased threat posed by the Soviet Union had led to a step change on

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Capitol Hill, where it was now felt necessary to improve any warning that might be given of a Soviet nuclear attack. In practical terms this meant a warmer approach to liaison relations, especially with the British.

These shifts in the political landscape were conveyed to the JIC by a London-based US representative.⁷⁰ The reverberations of the US decision can be inferred from later moves. Foremost among these was the approval of a new JIC liaison officer in Washington, who was to achieve greater access than his predecessor. Upon the completion of his two-year tour in the States, Colonel Hodgson was recalled to the United Kingdom.

His replacement was Dr. Alan Crick, who was to be attached to the deputy director for intelligence in the CIA. This was a novel but calculated move as Hodgson had been attached to ONE, and over lunch one day Sherman Kent had informally told the then-JIC chairman, Patrick Reilly, that the “Hodgson approach would never get us anywhere.” Hodgson had been privy to the debates and discussions within ONE between the different military factions regarding the content of assessments and was aware that the Americans did not want to air their “disputes in the presence of a British representative.” Crick’s attachment to a different part of the CIA was considered beneficial as it would avoid these concerns.

Crick was no newcomer to the secret world. He had served in the army during the Second World War, including a spell as intelligence offi-

cer to SHAEF. After the war he had joined the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB), a postwar creation focused on topographical and economic intelligence, becoming its first representative on the JIS in 1946. Following his two-year spell with the JIC, he returned to the JIB. In the summer of 1953, he was sent to Washington, where he remained for three years. Shortly before his departure for the United States, Crick was briefed by the JIC as to his future role. Broadly speaking this included: liaison with the CIA generally and participation in the work of the US Watch Committee and the Office of National Estimates. Crick was instructed to “work tactfully.”^a

In May 1954, JIC Chairman Dean visited the United States and Canada. The “really big item,” as he put it, was meeting Allen Dulles and securing closer cooperation with US intelligence. Discussions went well, helped, no doubt, by Crick’s successful appointment. As Dean subsequently informed the JIC, “Crick seemed to me to have done amazingly well. He is very popular and well known throughout the CIA...the doors are opening for him all round and he has settled down very quickly and expanded his influence just as we hoped.” Dulles reiterated his desire to strengthen relations and, as an incen-

a. Following a further period back at the JIB, he returned to Washington as JIC representative for the years 1963–65, before becoming the chairman of the JIS (1965–68) prior to its conversion into the modern day Assessments Staff.

The details of the rise and fall in relations are less important than what they tell us about the changing balance of power between the intelligence communities at this time.

tive, Dean suggested that the Americans participate in the deliberations of the theatre JIC (Far East). Thus, it would seem that by late 1953 the JIC had finally secured a substantial line of access into the CIA and the American assessment procedures.

On leaving Washington in late 1956, Crick provided a valedictory note for the JIC, which revealed something of the closeness between the intelligence communities yet, in other respects, the differences in policy: “in recent years there has been a growing exchange of National Estimates and JIC reports and each country now takes fuller and more critical cognizance of the other’s appreciations. This has done much to reduce the gaps in Intelligence thinking even if it has not led very appreciably to the reduction of major differences in policy.

The earlier imbalance was still, to an extent, present, for Crick was never allowed the same kind of access as his opposite numbers were granted in London. To Crick the reason behind this was simple, “the sensitiveness of the Americans about revealing to other nationals, even their most trusted collaborators, anything they consider likely to look foolish when received, or any product they consider slipshod or unworthy.”⁶⁹

In Sum

The details of the rise and fall in relations are less important than what they tell us about the changing balance of power between the intelligence communities at this time. The earliest discussions clearly show that the JIC saw itself as the senior partner in the relationship. Gradually, and perhaps unnoticed at the time, this began to change.

The moment the relationship reversed is never explicitly recorded, but it is clear from the JIC’s unrelenting desire to maintain and improve liaison that it must have been realized that the US intelligence effort had much to offer and that it was no longer simply a case of educating Americans in the finer arts of intelligence analysis. Indeed, even in the face of the decisions by the United States—whereby Americans retained full access while withdrawing a reciprocal arrangement with the British—the JIC, seeming to recognize its lesser standing, never once complained formally. Relations would improve with a new president, a new DCI, and, perhaps most importantly, a new (and pervading) sense of threat. With this came a new emphasis on acting in concert, which called for common intelligence analysis.

A final word can be left to an unidentified British speaker in an

undated speech delivered to the US Intelligence Advisory Committee, the closest thing in US intelligence to the JIC at that time:

We realise in London that our effort can in many respects not compare with yours. You devote a much larger amount of manpower, money and other resources to the whole field of intelligence and you have developed facilities and resources for collation and research which we admire and envy but cannot expect to emulate...but to set against this we have certain special facilities and advantages, which are of great value in present conditions. The main advantage is that we are so widely dispersed and can maintain a world-wide intelligence organisation.... I should make it plain that we intend to remain deployed in this fashion and the facilities and advantages which it gives us compensate to a great degree for our comparatively smaller organisation in London.⁷¹

The speech acknowledged the balance in the developing Anglo-American intelligence partnership. The United States had the money, the resources, and the technology; Britain had the people, the organization and, perhaps above all else, the global real estate for intelligence access. It would be a beautiful marriage.



Endnotes

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16. A4904/769/45. Handwritten note, 26 June 1941. TNA: FO 371/26231. Unfortunately it is not possible to work out who the signer was from his signature. The date and name cited above are taken from the FO document. Although the report of the appointment called him "Coordinator of Intelligence," American sources, by contrast, state that Donovan was appointed in July 1941 and that his job title was "Coordinator of Information." See M. Warner, *The Office of Strategic Services: America's First Intelligence Agency* (CIA, 2000). Available at www.cia.gov
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18. For Godfrey's own account see his unpublished memoir in Churchill College Archives, University of Cambridge: John Godfrey papers: GDFY 1/6.
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Operation MILLPOND: The Beginning of a Distant Covert War

Timothy N. Castle

Operation MILLPOND became the taproot for what eventually emerged...as the “largest, most innovative program of irregular warfare ever conducted by CIA.”

Much has been written about the CIA-led Bay of Pigs operation in mid-April 1961, the failed covert paramilitary operation intended to overthrow Fidel Castro.¹ When it became public, the botched operation became a deep personal embarrassment for President John F. Kennedy and set off considerable domestic and international debate regarding the credibility and competence of the new administration.

Responsibility for the overall Cuban program, then known as JMATE,^a lay with CIA Deputy Director for Plans Richard M. Bissell Jr. With the failure and exposure of the Bay of Pigs landing, Bissell, who was said to be in line to replace long-time Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Allen Dulles,² quickly found himself a major target of Kennedy’s supporters who sought to shift blame from questionable presidential decisions on to faulty intelligence and poor military advice.³

Scant scholarship, however, has focused on another risky covert operation scheduled to begin the same week as the Cuba landing, Operation MILLPOND, which was a joint CIA-Pentagon plan to attack Soviet-supplied military stores and antigovernment forces in neutral Laos. The plan included the use of

Thailand-based B-26 bombers flown by CIA contractors.⁴ As the CIA’s top representative to President Kennedy’s Laos Task Force, Bissell was concurrently responsible for two military operations with profound Cold War implications.⁵

Ultimately, as the assault on Cuba faltered, the Laos airstrikes were abruptly canceled. Nonetheless, and perhaps unintentionally, the presidentially-authorized preparations for Operation MILLPOND became the taproot for what eventually emerged, in one veteran’s words, as the “largest, most innovative program of irregular warfare ever conducted by CIA.”⁶

Introduction

Watching President Kennedy play golf on Sunday afternoon with his sister and brother-in-law, an uninformed observer could reasonably conclude the new leader of the United States harbored not a care in the world. In fact, on 16 April 1961 Kennedy had plenty on his mind. US-directed forces were about to launch nearly simultaneous covert airstrikes on two sovereign countries.⁷

Inheriting from the Eisenhower administration serious foreign policy challenges in Laos and Cuba, Kennedy had agreed in both cases to allow

a. The plan’s original cryptonym was JMARC.

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Bissell and his covert action specialists to continue planning begun during the Eisenhower administration for significant military interventions.⁸ While ordering movement toward the brink of employing “deniable” armed action, the president remained cautious and insisted that the military and intelligence operators be kept on a short leash—the final OK to launch the strikes would be his.⁹

Just before his departure to Virginia, Kennedy had markedly changed the CIA-developed and Pentagon-reviewed plan for an air attack on Cuba at the 15 April onset of JMATE. Bissell and his staff had decided to use 16 readily available WW II B-26 bombers in a pre-invasion attack on key communications facilities and airfields. The destruction of Castro’s offensive air capability was judged a key element in protecting the mostly defenseless rebel air attacks and amphibious landings.¹⁰

Kennedy, however, had concluded that the CIA air plan was “too noisy” and wanted Bissell to tone down the strikes. There was no further discussion as Bissell slashed the force in half. With grave consequences for the overall JMATE operation, the eight bombers were only partially successful in destroying Castro’s air force.¹¹ The disastrous outcome of the landing on the beach in the Bay of Pigs is well known and has been the subject of numerous histories

In the wake of the operation that was publicly tagged “a perfect failure,” a humiliated and angry Kennedy exclaimed to Advisor Theodore Sorensen, “How could I have been so

stupid?”¹² The president’s poor, mostly CIA-influenced, decisionmaking on Cuba had resulted in a monumental foreign policy nightmare.

Meanwhile, Across the Pacific

But, there was another covert action to account for, Operation MILLPOND in Laos. Kennedy had also ordered the CIA and Pentagon to arrange other covert airstrikes on the other side of the globe. A full examination of Kennedy’s post-Bay of Pigs mindset must, therefore, include a thoughtful consideration of concurrent events in Southeast Asia.

Nearly 9,000 miles away at Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base (and 11 time zones ahead of Washington, DC), a mix of pilots including those flying for CIA’s proprietary Air America and “sheep-dipped”^a US military pilots were asleep in their bunks. They had been recruited to fly 16 unmarked B-26 aircraft in a daring move to deliver decisive bombing support for a Royal Lao military ground offensive.¹³ A few hours earlier, they had received their final instructions to make a surreptitious crossing of the Thai-Lao border to bomb an airfield and attack other communist positions on a strategically located area in central Laos known as the Plain of Jars.¹⁴ (See map on facing page.)

When Kennedy gave Bissell the order on the afternoon of the 16th to

a. US military personnel who assume civilian status in order to support specialized CIA missions.

proceed with the Bay of Pigs landings both men were fully aware that the MILLPOND pilots and their loaded bombers were less than four hours from a scheduled 17 April takeoff. A few hours later, in a decision that has remained obscured for more than 50 years, Kennedy suddenly canceled the MILLPOND strikes. The debate continues as to the circumstances, but sometime around 9 p.m., Kennedy also called off the next day’s JMATE airstrikes.¹⁵ To date, very little attention has been focused on the nexus of these simultaneous events in Cuba and Southeast Asia.

Piecing together declassified DoD and Department of State records and the recollections of MILLPOND participants, however, this article details this key chapter of US Cold War involvement in Laos. Moreover, an examination of the Thailand-based B-26 scheme provides a fuller understanding of America’s artfully hidden foreign policy goals in Laos. Flagrant communist breaches of Laotian territory brought about equally prohibited US contraventions of the 1954—and later the 1962—Geneva agreements. Searching for a politically tenable strategy to oppose further communist expansion in Southeast Asia, the Kennedy administration ultimately chose to secretly employ CIA and DoD resources. These US policies continued until 1973, when the White House ended CIA paramilitary programs in Laos.¹⁶

The president’s cancellation of the MILLPOND airstrikes, however, left in force plans to greatly expanded the covert action he had approved in Laos. The authorization paved the way for CIA’s decade-long paramilitary programs in Thailand and Laos. Most importantly, MILLPOND

generated a surge in the growth of the Taipei-headquartered Civil Air Transport (CAT)/Air America (AAM) air support complex known within CIA by the cryptonym HBILKA.¹⁷

Additionally, I will address the important support links between the JMATE and MILLPOND operations. Veteran CAT and AAM employees were deeply involved in training the Cuban exile transport pilots and two of these HBILKA fliers ultimately joined their trainees and flew combat missions over Cuba. So, too, volunteers from the Alabama Air National Guard (AANG) secretly provided maintenance and flight training for the attacking Cuban force. As the rebel air missions were battered over well defended Cuban positions, the guardsmen bravely entered the fray and American blood was spilled.¹⁸

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Handed a Mess

Looking over histories of the costly and lengthy Vietnam War, more descriptively and properly called the Second Indochina War, it is easy to forget the small country that initially captured the attention of the Kennedy administration. In his first State of the Union address on 31 January 1961, the president mentioned South Vietnam just once:

In Asia, the relentless pressures of the Chinese Communists menace the security of the entire area—from the borders of India and South Viet Nam to the jungles of Laos, struggling to protect its newly won independence. We seek in Laos what

“An American invasion, a Communist victory or whatever, I wish it would happen before we take over and get blamed for it.”

we seek in all Asia, and, indeed, in all of the world—freedom for the people and independence for the government. And this Nation shall persevere in our pursuit of these objectives.

Kennedy then chose to end his foreign policy section by placing tiny, and virtually unknown, Laos in particular (if hyperbolic) prominence.

The hopes of all mankind rest upon us—not simply upon those of us in this chamber, but upon the peasant in Laos, the fisherman in Nigeria, the exile from Cuba, the spirit that moves every man and Nation who shares our hopes for freedom and the future.”¹⁹

With Kennedy just into the second week of his presidency, few could have imagined the imminent and stunning impact of his ongoing secret decisions related to Laos and Cuba.

A month later President Kennedy reassured Thai prime minister Sarit Thanarat of Washington’s continued commitment to the “historic friendship and close partnership” between their two countries. Alluding to the on-going crisis in the ostensibly neutral kingdom of Laos, which shared a long and porous border with Thailand, Kennedy wrote in a personal communication,

I fully appreciate your Excellency’s deep concern over the events now taking place in Southeast Asia and I wish to assure you that Thailand will have our unswerving support in

resisting Communist aggression and subversion.

The president went on to affirm US responsibilities under the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), “We shall fully honor our obligation to Thailand as an ally and friend.”²⁰

Laos was not a new presidential headache. By late 1960, according to Theodore Sorensen, who has provided an early insider’s description of the new administration, Kennedy was well aware of the Laotian “mess” he would inherit. “The president-elect said to me, ‘An American invasion, a Communist victory or whatever, I wish it would happen before we take over and get blamed for it.’”²¹

In the final months of the Eisenhower administration the political and military danger to the Royal Lao government consisted of a mix of former army paratroopers led by Captain Kong Le and communist Pathet Lao (PL) forces under the nominal control of Prince Souphanouvong. Half brother of Prince Souvanna Phouma, the on again, off again Lao Prime Minister Souphanouvong was widely regarded as Hanoi’s puppet.²²

In August 1960 Captain Kong Le successfully staged a coup against the US-supported right wing Lao government. Declaring himself a neutralist, within weeks Kong Le turned the government over to Souvanna. Royal Lao Army (FAR) general Phoumi Nosavan, staunchly anticommunist and a US and Thai favorite, then requested and received logistical assistance from Bangkok and Washington in recapturing the capital of Vien-

Seeking to cut off Soviet military assistance to the Lao rebels, on 3 March the president ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to plan the seizure of the Plain of Jars.

tiane. According to an official US Air Force history, “substantial deliveries were made by [Air America] contract C-46s and C-47s to the royalist base at Savannakhet.” The Phoumi forces were also augmented by the arrival of 200 Lao paratroops that had just completed training in Thailand.²³

Kong Le and his troops then moved to the Plain of Jars in central Laos, where they joined with Souphanouvong’s soldiers. For months the Soviet Union had been airlifting supplies to the rebels, and the weak Lao central government had virtually collapsed under intense internal bickering. With Kennedy determined to save Laos from communism, and the USSR under President Nikita Khrushchev sensing an opportunity spread its will in Southeast Asia, tiny Laos gained the potential to become a Cold War conflagration.²⁴

Sorensen wrote that the president ultimately decided there were four courses of action open to the United States in Laos: do nothing; provide overt military assistance; divide the country and defend the southern half with outside forces; seek negotiations aimed at the establishment of a neutral coalition government.²⁵ A close examination of previously classified documents, however, shows that, in fact, Kennedy actually embarked on yet another choice.

MILLPOND

Seeking to cut off Soviet military assistance to the Lao rebels, on 3 March the president ordered the

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to plan the seizure of the Plain of Jars. With a JCS response, the MILLPOND plan, in hand, Kennedy moved forward on 9 March and approved National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) No. 29, which laid out a comprehensive and dramatic stand against North Vietnamese and Soviet-backed rebel activity in Laos.²⁶ His rationale for covert military action was partially influenced by advice from State Department officials who believed “that if the PDJ plan is successful, and if it were to trigger a peace-seeking by the Communist side, we would then hope to continue about where we were in the Geneva Accord.” Although Kennedy told the bureaucrats their assessment was “nonsense,” he had no good options.²⁷

NSAM 29 contained a list of 17 measures intended to promote Laotian sovereignty and US-sponsored Thai military assistance. The measures authorized CIA to increase the recruitment of Lao irregular forces, ordered the Pentagon to assist CIA in the immediate expansion of the agency’s regional helicopter and fixed wing air assets, brought together CIA and DOD capabilities in the establishment of a covert B-26 bomber force, set the stage for increased US covert military logistical support into Laos, and directed senior US military and State Department leaders to press for improved Thai and Lao government cooperation.²⁸

The president charged CIA with primary responsibility for a covert war in Laos that, because of the passivity of the conventional Lao military, was principally fought and

supported by surrogate ground and air forces. CIA assigned the Laos program the cryptonym CYNCOPE.^a The Pentagon would also be heavily involved in Laos, but it would operate mostly from Thailand. American diplomats, in Washington, Bangkok, and Vientiane would become quasi-military commanders and, as was often necessary, be tasked to bring about the cooperation of Thai and Laotian authorities.²⁹ Managed by only a few hundred paramilitary officers, project CYNCOPE “became for nearly all its CIA participants the adventure of their professional lives.”³⁰

Thailand’s Essential Role

In order to conduct a successful and plausibly deniable war in Laos the United States required a reliable regional partner. Thailand’s strongly anticommunist leaders, Prime Minister Sarit in particular, were understandably concerned by the expansion of Soviet and Chinese influence.³¹ When the 1954 Geneva Agreements established a neutral government in Laos fears in Bangkok and Washington were heightened rather than allayed because the Lao government could not be trusted to not support communist activities in the region.³²

Thai officials were anxious to halt the spread of communism on their side of the Mekong River lest it proliferate in the poor regions of Thailand’s northern and northeastern border provinces and eventually threaten the kingdom.³³ The US stake was definitively declared on 5 Sep-

* Not its true cryptonym.

tember 1956 in National Security Council policy statement 5612/1.

*The United States is likely to remain the only major outside source of power to counteract the Russian-Chinese Communist thrust into Southeast Asia. Thus, the retention of this area in the free world will continue to depend on the extent and effectiveness of US support as well as on the local efforts of the countries themselves.*³⁴

Kennedy's approval of NSAM 29 was a bold use of his covert action authorities and created a watershed moment for US-Thai paramilitary cooperation in supposedly neutral Laos. The president directed high priority negotiations with Prime Minister Sarit "for immediate availability of up to four 105mm batteries (Thai soldiers, equipment, and supplies for six cannons in each battery)" for deployment into Laos.

Sarit, who concurrently held the rank of field marshal of the Thai Army, approved the request and thereby set in motion a more than 12-year long covert relationship of the CIA and a joint Thai military and police organization known as Headquarters 333. The placement in Laos of regular Royal Thai Army artillery units, later substantially expanded with Thai volunteers placed into CIA-controlled Special Guerrilla Units (SGUs), would be one of the most important aspects of US-Thai security cooperation. By 1971 the movement of these soldiers and police into Laos would represent the greatest deployment of Thai "expeditionary forces" since WW II.³⁵

A significant challenge to CIA's program was the extremely moun-

tainous Lao countryside and undeveloped infrastructure. A security force capable of protecting a country with virtually no roads would require air mobility.³⁶ CIA historian Thomas Ahern's history of the Laos war says, "Unanticipated by any of the program's managers, air support almost immediately became the single most important ingredient in [deleted] administration of the Hmong irregulars. Panhandle operations, launched at the end of the year, came to rely on it too."³⁷

NSAM 29's directive that the Defense Department provide "16 H-34 helicopters to CIA for CAT use" was, therefore, an essential contribution to CYNCOPE. The addition of the aircraft energized a critical flow of military-trained pilots into the Air America proprietary. Brig. Gen. Andrew Boyle, chief of the US Military Assistance Group in Laos, told an Air Force civilian contracting officer, "I want airplanes to fly where I want

them, when I want them, and with no interference. Now get me a contract that will get what I want as soon as possible."

Justification for the arrangements included the statement that the services were "in the interest of National Defense, which because of military considerations, should not be publicly disclosed and for which Air America, Inc. is the only known source." Arrangements for H-34 personnel and maintenance, based with Thai government approval at Udorn, were formalized in July 1961 when the Air Force signed an \$2.5 million per year contract with Air America.³⁸

Why did the historically cautious Thais decide to involve themselves so completely with US actions in Laos?³⁹ Since the 1950s Thai leaders had unsuccessfully sought a firm US defense umbrella for Thailand. The 1955 establishment of SEATO, with headquarters in Bangkok, failed



A US H-34 helicopter in operation in Laos (Photo from Ahern, *Undercover Armies.*)

To avoid the introduction of US military trainers and reduce the total number of Americans working with the Hmong, CIA increased its association with the Royal Thai Army and the paramilitary Thai Border Patrol Police.

to assuage Thai security concerns, however. As Sarit repeatedly reminded the Washington, the group's requirement for member unanimity in all decisions virtually guaranteed SEATO would take no action against the growing communist threat in Laos.⁴⁰

Agreeing to assist the Americans with secret operations in Laos allowed the Thais to win a major and public US security guarantee outside the problematic SEATO protocols. On 6 March 1962, the Department of State issued a communique, known as the Rusk-Thanat Agreement, saying, "The United States regards the preservation of the independence and integrity of Thailand as vital to the national interest of the United States and to world peace."⁴¹ In return the Thais opened their country to the eventual basing of nearly 50,000 Americans engaged in bombing targets in the neighboring states of Laos, Cambodia, and in North and South Vietnam.⁴²

NSAM 29 also authorized CIA to increase to 4,000 the number of Hmong to be recruited for an irregular armed force in northeastern Laos.⁴³ Why the Hmong? Finding the lowland-based conventional Lao army to be unmotivated and riddled with weak and politically driven leadership, the CIA turned principally to the socially well organized, historically hardy, and self-reliant Hmong hill tribe clans. As communist forces increased their activities in Laos, often moving on routes near Hmong villages, the outsiders represented a

real danger to families, livestock, and crops. It was not difficult, therefore, for the clan leaders to accept CIA-provided weapons and training.⁴⁴

To avoid the introduction of US military trainers and reduce the total number of Americans working with the Hmong, CIA increased its association with the Royal Thai Army and the paramilitary Thai Border Patrol Police. The most elite of these police elements were known as the Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit (PARU).⁴⁵ These specialists, working in Laos since at least 1960, were especially important in providing CIA field officers with interpreters, advisers, and trainers.⁴⁶ The integration of the Thais, with a similar language and physical appearance to the Lao, helped to maintain the deniability of US intervention in Laos. Having found surrogate trainers and warriors, CIA officers began building an important fighting force.

Under CIA direction and the leadership of Vang Pao, a charismatic FAR officer, these mountain fighters would become a major irritant to communist troops operating in northeastern Laos. With Thai assistance CIA officers would also recruit and train southern Laos hill tribes to conduct anti-infiltration operations in the Laotian panhandle. In addition to advisory and support cadre, Bangkok also provided artillery specialists for deployment in defense of key Lao transportation arteries and military bases.⁴⁷

Takhli, Thailand

Located in rural central Thailand, some 140 miles northwest of Bangkok, Takhli air base was a tangible demonstration of Thai support for American covert operations. Since the late 1950's HBILKA employees and USAF personnel had used the nominally Royal Thai Air Force facility to launch and recover East Asia special air missions.⁴⁸ In January 1960, a feisty USAF major on detail to CIA's air branch, Harry C. "Heinie" Aderholt, took command of the Okinawa-based Detachment 2, 1045th Operational Evaluation Training Group. The transport unit was established to provide CIA with military support to a growing Southeast Asia mission and Aderholt was soon a constant presence at Takhli.⁴⁹ Aderholt's talents would quickly extend to providing advice on clandestine air operations and the development of hundreds of small landing strips throughout Laos known as "Lima Sites."⁵⁰

NSAM 29 provided CIA with a huge infusion of aircraft, and HBILKA responded by gathering the personnel and aircraft needed to support the Lao operations. Thomas Jenny, a former US Marine Corps fighter and ground attack pilot, had served as a Japan-based Air America DC-6 copilot for just over a year. In January 1961, while in Taipei for company training, Jenny was asked by Air America Chief Pilot Robert Rousselot if he would consider flying the B-26 for a special project.⁵¹ Within the AAM community such direct and confidential arrangements were standard practice and Jenny quickly agreed. Three other Air America pilots, Ronald Sutphin, William Beale, and Truman Barnes, joined Jenny.⁵²

Beale had just returned from assisting with the JMATE training program in Guatemala, but he never mentioned this to any of his fellow pilots.⁵³

The four HBILKA fliers, using unmarked B-26s already at Takhli, were designated to take charge of the planned 16-ship attack on the Plain

of Jars. Each of the pilots was to lead a flight of four aircraft. The men rarely flew the B-26s; Jenny could only recall two early April flights around the Takhli field. As they stood by for their bombing mission, when familiarization flights in the B-26 would have been possible, the pilots were instead called on to fill other Laos

flying assignments. Along with other HBILKA crews, the four began flying C-46 transports on twice-a-day arms and ammunition drops into Laos.⁵⁴

One ammunition resupply mission was particularly eventful and nearly caused the cancellation of MILLPOND. Bill Beale and copilot Tom Jenny, accompanied by a mixed American-Thai parachute delivery crew, had trouble locating the drop zone. Flying in Laos, with changing weather conditions and ever-present mountains and enemy gunfire, was always a challenge. Despite good visibility, Beale suddenly realized he was flying the airplane directly at a limestone ridge line. With no room to maneuver, the C-46 barely passed over the formation. Luck quickly gave out as the plane then struck the top of a second karst and hit a tree. With the airplane now in an engine stall and essentially falling along the side of the mountain, Beale used the steep drop to regain engine power and control. The pilots managed to save the aircraft and the badly damaged C-46 made an emergency landing in Thailand at Udorn airfield.⁵⁵ According to an eyewitness, "On the left side, a branch a foot in diameter had passed between the fuselage and the propeller arc, missing the prop but driving a hole two feet deep in the wing root. Everywhere there was damage that just barely missed being fatal."⁵⁶



Map from Ahern, *Undercover Armies*, xxvii

What can be confirmed is a sudden end to the Laos airstrikes mission.

others took custody of 12 B-26s and two RB-26Cs (photo reconnaissance models) and returned to Takhli.⁵⁷

Under the command of Major Aderholt the men immediately began a much-needed training program. Aderholt later explained, “Only two of the men had been in combat and none had flown the B-26. Most had never dropped a bomb, so the first thing I had to do was build a bombing range in the Gulf of Siam, go down there, and teach them how to bomb.”⁵⁸ Jenny’s recollections confirm that the military pilots were poor choices for the tricky bombing mission ahead.

Only about three seemed up to the task. They were the only ones who were confident enough to do the dive-bombing we [HBILKA pilots] believed was necessary. This was the only way to hit the target. The others—some of whom were very emotional about this pos-

*sibility—wanted no part of the tactic.*⁵⁹

On the evening of 16 April Major Aderholt gathered together the MILLPOND pilots and passed out final targeting instructions. The men were given commissions in the Royal Lao Air Force, blood chits with some gold coins, and sent to bed. There was no doubt that the mission to attack the Laotian Plain of Jars was going forward.⁶⁰

The No-go Decision

Where historians of the Bay of Pigs fiasco now have much in the way of declassified materials and participant recollections to root through and ponder,⁶¹ details on the final hours of MILLPOND have remained largely unavailable and incomplete. Based on the notification to the pilots in Thailand, 3 a.m. local time on Monday 17 April, the president must

have canceled the Laos airstrikes a few hours after he authorized the *continuation* of the JMATE operation.

What can be confirmed is a sudden end to the Laos airstrikes mission. Thomas Jenney recalled in an interview that he was awakened with the other pilots and told by Aderholt the mission “was dead.” Although the fiercely proud Alabama native was aware that his hometown guard unit was heavily involved, Aderholt told the stunned pilots only that “events in Cuba had forced cancellation” of their mission. The “events in Cuba,” later known to be the failed JMATE plan, had reverberated from *Bahia de Los Cochinos* to Washington and suddenly upended events in distant Takhli. There was nothing else to do, Jenny recalls, but “go back to sleep.”⁶²

The president’s Laos Task Force met on the afternoon of 17 April (by then the early morning of 18 April in Thailand) and mostly considered a looming communist threat aimed at Thakhek, a key town on the Mekong River. In a memorandum to the president, Rostow wrote, “The B-26s, while capable of shooting up supplies in the Plaine des Jarres, are unlikely to be able to stop the investiture of Takhek [sic] if the Pathet Lao proceed to that point.” Signaling the very sensitive nature of the decision to halt the Plain of Jars strikes, there is no mention of the aborted MILLPOND plans.⁶³

A week later, concerned that communist forces were being positioned to attack a number of important Lao cities and towns, US ambassador to Laos Winthrop Brown requested presidential authority to draw upon the firepower of the Takhli-based



The remains of a HBILKA aircraft that crashed into a Laotian karst formation. (Undated photo from Ahern, *Undercover Armies*.)

B-26s. By now, of course, there was no White House support for covert airstrikes in Laos.⁶⁴ Instead, in accordance with SEATO Plan 5, on 26 April Kennedy authorized the deployment of US carrier forces to the area. Before US conventional military forces could be employed, however, a ceasefire was declared in Laos and the United States agreed to participate as a full member in a new Geneva peace conference.⁶⁵ In technical violation of the ceasefire, Kennedy allowed the continuation of limited assistance to the Hmong,⁶⁶ and after the 1962 agreements were trampled by communist violations, CIA would ratchet up CYNCOPE operations.⁶⁷

Soon after the decision to cancel the Laos airstrikes, the MILLPOND pilots left for other assignments.⁶⁸ For some months, because of continued Lao government military setbacks, the B-26s and some of the military men remained at Takhli as a contingency force. During this period Ronald Allaire and Claude Gilliam were sent on a reconnaissance mission over the northeastern Laos town of Nape. Flying an RB-26 the men made a successful initial film pass over the town. On a second, and unwisely chosen similar flight path, a 37mm antiaircraft gun raked the airplane's left horizontal stabilizer and elevator. Uninjured, but surely more schooled on enemy tactics, Allaire and Gilliam managed to safely return to Takhli. By August all the B-26s had been flown to storage on Okinawa, and the military men returned to their more mundane lives.⁶⁹

The US-Thai alliance continued, however. In a matter of a few years, more than 300 Air America pilots, copilots, flight mechanics, and airfreight specialists were operating

JMATE, HBILKA, AND THE AANG

HBILKA's role in the Bay of Pigs operation began in the fall of 1960, when half-a-dozen CIA proprietary pilots delivered C-46 and C-54 transport planes to a CIA training base (JMMADD) in Retalhuleu, Guatemala. CIA deemed airpower essential for the operation. The transports would provide platforms for much needed resupply drops and the insertion of the paratroops of rebel Brigade 2506 onto the island. Two of the American ferry pilots, Connie Seigrist and William Beale,^a went to work training the Cuban aircrews in combat airdrop procedures.⁷¹

Pentagon air experts also recognized the invasion would require an aerial punch to destroy Castro's offensive and defensive air capabilities and protect the amphibious landings. Just as the CIA had turned to the B-26 for MILLPOND, JMATE planners selected the durable and readily available bomber. Planners also believed that choosing an aircraft that was also flown by the Cuban military would provide a measure of deniability.⁷² Maintenance and training for the Brigade 2506 B-26 unit was tasked to the Alabama Air National Guard (AANG).

- Based in Birmingham, Alabama, the hometown of MILLPOND air commander Henie Aderholt, the 117th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing was the last US Air Force unit to fly the B-26. Sending the bombers to the mothball fleet in 1957 the 117th then transitioned to flying RF-84F jets. Despite being asked to accept a foreign training mission and a return to flying a propeller plane, CIA officers found an eager reception when they briefed the wing's commander, Brig.Gen. George Doster and his boss, Alabama Governor John Patterson. Sworn to secrecy and dressed in civilian clothing, beginning in December 1960, a group of some 80 AANG aircrew members, armament specialists, and maintenance men began flowing to the JMMADD base.⁷³

In March the rebel air force and their American trainers moved from Retalhuleu to a CIA facility (JMTIDE) at Puerto Cabeza, Nicaragua. CIA staff officer Garfield "Gar" Thorsrud arrived from air branch to become the base chief and quickly became an essential link between the field and headquarters. An HBILKA veteran who had served with Seigrist and Beale in Indonesia during the anti-Sukarno government "Operation HAIK" campaign, Thorsrud was no stranger to air proprietary covert operations. Seigrist was designated head of transport operations and General Doster remained in charge of the B-26 training unit. Douglas Price, another CAT veteran, assisted with transport pilot training.⁷⁴

a. Beale would leave the Cuban program by year's end and, as detailed above, become a MILLPOND pilot.

some 50 fixed wing and 30 helicopters, in support of Laos operations. Most of these personnel, their families, and the essential maintenance facilities, were located in Thailand.⁷⁰

"Totally unbelievable!"

Kennedy's late Sunday order to cancel the imminent D-Day airstrikes

over Cuba was relayed to the CIA Deputy Director, Air Force General Charles Cabell, by national security advisor McGeorge Bundy. Cabell and Bissell quickly appealed this most unwelcome order in person to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, presumably repeating the point consistently briefed to White House officials that air dominance over Castro's military was critical.⁷⁵ In the presence of the CIA officers, Rusk telephoned

“By about November 1960, the impossibility of running Zapata as a covert operation under CIA should have been recognized and the situation reviewed.”

the president, who held fast to his decision. Offered the opportunity to speak directly to Kennedy, Cabell and Bissell declined. Both agreed, according to Bissell, further discussion was pointless and they returned to the CIA command center at Quarters Eye about 10:30 p.m.⁷⁶

Saturday morning’s surprise airstrikes had failed to destroy all of Castro’s parked T-33 jet trainers and B-26 and British-built Hawker Sea Fury airplanes.⁷⁷ When notified of the president’s decision on Sunday evening to cancel D-Day airstrikes, Gar Thorsrud exclaimed, “totally unbelievable!” and concluded JMATE was lost. General Doster’s angry response, “There goes the fucking war,” well described the AANG’s gut level reaction.⁷⁸ Over the next days Castro’s aircraft were spectacularly deadly in the sinking of exposed rebel boats and ships and the downing of numerous Brigade 2506-flown aircraft.⁷⁹ Especially lethal were the T-33’s, which, unknown to CIA, had been fitted with .50-caliber machine guns and rockets.⁸⁰

Awash with a sense of futility, seemingly abandoned by the United States, the brigade air crews were now near the breaking point.⁸¹ Despite a standing CIA prohibition against the direct combat involvement of Americans, HBILKA pilots Seigris and Price sought and received Thorsrud’s permission to fly B-26 strike missions over the communist island. Attacking in the late afternoon of 18 April with six aircraft (CIA headquarters insisted Cubans be a part of the American action) the air-

men reportedly “destroyed 30 vehicles and inflicted some 900 casualties on the Cuban militia.” The hastily arranged strike force was lucky. Two of Castro’s T-33 jet fighters “appeared in the area less than a minute after the B-26s had departed.”⁸² With their slow speed and limited self-defense capability, the B-26s would have been easy targets for the jets.

The next day eight Alabama guardsmen, four pilots and four crewmen, “stepped forward” to join the crumbling Brigade 2506 air and ground assault. Flying the vulnerable B-26’s, but with the expectation of air cover from the nearby carrier USS *Essex*, only two of the American-flown aircraft survived. Major Riley Shamburger and observer Wade Gray died when their airplane was jumped just offshore by a T-33 and shot-down. Attempting to attack an inland target, Capt. Thomas Ray and crew member Leo Baker survived a shoot-down but were killed in a fire-fight with Cuban militiamen.⁸³

With the promise of US fighter protection, Seigris and Price launched again. Unable to gain radio contact with the *Essex*, the pilots nonetheless decided to continue their bombing runs. However, as they began to cross the Cuban coastline the airmen were told to abort their mission.⁸⁴ The facts remain cloudy as to why US Navy jets failed to appear as planned.⁸⁵ Seigris later wrote,

a. In 1978, CIA honored the four airmen posthumously with the Distinguished Intelligence Cross, the Agency’s highest decoration for bravery.

“There was no way to back up and start again. We had lost. Period.”⁸⁶

Burying the Bodies

JMATE had ended in a rout and the recriminations and writing of history quickly ensued.⁸⁷ There were two formal investigations. Kennedy handpicked retired Gen. Maxwell Taylor, a former US Army Chief of Staff, to chair a commission called the Cuba Study Group.⁸⁸ At CIA, Director Dulles asked the inspector general (IG), Lyman Kirkpatrick, to conduct an internal review officially known as the Survey of the Cuban Operation. Among the principal findings, the Cuba Study Group reported to the president:

By about November 1960, the impossibility of running Zapata as a covert operation under CIA should have been recognized and the situation reviewed. The subsequent decision might then have been made to limit the efforts to attain covertness to the degree and nature of U.S. participation, and to assign responsibility for the amphibious operation to the Department of Defense. Failing such a reorientation, the project should have been abandoned.

The leaders of the operation did not always present their case with sufficient force and clarity to the senior officials of the Government to allow the latter to appreciate the consequences of some of their decisions. This remark applies in particular to the circumstances surrounding

*the cancellation of the D-Day strikes.*⁸⁹

The CIA IG results, which were not shared outside the Agency, set off a firestorm within the Directorate of Plans. According to a CIA historian the survey placed unfair blame on the JMATE principals, particularly Richard Bissell. The report stated:

When the project became known [via media leaks], the Agency should have informed higher authority that it was no longer operating within its charter. A civilian [Bissell] without military experience, and the DDCI, an Air Force general, did not follow the advice of the project's paramilitary chief, a specialist in amphibious operations. And the President made this vital, last minute decision [to cancel] without direct contact with the military chiefs of the invasion operation.

*The Agency became so wrapped up in the military operation that it failed to appraise the chances of success realistically. Furthermore, it failed to keep the national policymakers adequately and realistically informed of the conditions considered essential for success.*⁹⁰

Kennedy did not wait for the investigations to end before taking action. After a 22 April meeting with President Eisenhower, during which Kennedy reportedly received a “tongue-lashing” for the failed operation, Kennedy is quoted as saying “I’ve got to do something about those CIA bastards.”⁹¹

Under pressure from the White House, Allen Dulles, who, at Bis-

Rusk would later concede “his failure to voice his skepticism clearly at [planning] meetings did not serve Kennedy well.”

sell’s urging, had been absent from CIA headquarters and out of the decisionmaking loop during the operation, resigned seven months later.⁹² Bissell was also expected to resign by year’s end. However, the new CIA chief, John McCone, convinced Kennedy that Bissell should remain and head the newly created directorate of science and technology. Bissell declined; he had always sought the top job and he knew that position was now a “closed option.” In February 1962 Bissell retired from CIA, writing in his memoir “with successes and regrets and a legacy that still has not been put to rest historically and perhaps never will be.”⁹³

But, Bissell’s reputation was not the only one left hanging in uncertainty. In an unpublished paper on the JMATE program cited in Bissell’s memoir, a reflective Allen Dulles declared at the time, “[O]ne never succeeds unless there is determination to succeed, a willingness to risk some unpleasant political repercussions, and a willingness to provide the basic military necessities. At the decisive moment of the Bay of Pigs operation, all three of these were lacking.”⁹⁴ Dulles’s successor McCone has also authored a pointed critique. In 1986, McCone wrote to Bissell:

I have lodged in my mind two and only two serious errors by individuals. First, it seemed to me Allen Dulles made a serious mistake in judgment by darting

a. Bissell had suggested that Dulles go ahead with a scheduled speaking engagement in Puerto Rico during the operation because it would be “good cover.”

*off to Puerto Rico ... on the very eve of the most serious undertaking of his career as Director of CIA. The second responsibility rests squarely on the shoulders of President Kennedy, who apparently was persuaded by Adlai Stevenson and possibly others to “stand down” the B-26 air support which was vital to the success of the brigade landing.*⁹⁵

McCone’s assessment, of course, does not address the passive stance of both Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Ultimately, as Brigade 2506 was at greatest risk, Rusk advised the president to cancel the critical D-Day airstrikes. Rusk would later concede “his failure to voice his skepticism clearly at [planning] meetings did not serve Kennedy well.”

According to his biographer, “Rusk did, in fact, have misgivings about the plan, but he had been too silent on the issue and Kennedy had been too determined.”⁹⁶ As to McNamara, Bissell has written, “In the Cuba operation, it was the CIA, above all other government agencies, that had the action.” In a further attempt to describe the Washington jungle he observed, “Reframed within the context of bureaucratic prerogatives, McNamara’s and [JCS Chairman] Lemnitzer’s behavior suggests that from their perspective a failure at the Bay of Pigs was a loss for CIA but not necessarily for the Department of Defense.”⁹⁷

Bissell may have been correct that DoD leaders believed they would

Aided by the US military, aggressive US diplomats, Thai support, and the unique capabilities of Air America, the secret war saved Laos from dismemberment.

not be held responsible for the Bay of Pigs muddle, but their credibility in the White House became nil. Eminent historian William Rust has well described the scattered pieces of advice Kennedy received from the JCS, including the Army chief of staff's declaration that the United States could not "win a conventional war in Southeast Asia" and should "consider using nuclear bombs." Rust also noted National Security Advisor Rostow's tart statement, "I never saw the American military less clear in mind, less helpful to a President, than in the first four months of Kennedy's administration."⁹⁸

The Immediate Aftermath

On 21 April 1961, the day Kennedy addressed the US press and accepted responsibility for the Bay of Pigs operation, Walt Rostow advised the president, in effect, to stay the fundamental, anticommunist course in Southeast Asia:

Right now the greatest problem we face is not to have the whole of our foreign policy thrown off balance by what we feel and what we do about Cuba. We must bring to bear all the

resources—technical, economic, and intellectual—we have to prove that Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia can be held. The ultimate outcome in Laos will substantially depend, I believe, on the Viet-Nam exercise.⁹⁹

The Kennedy administration would thus adopt a two-pronged approach in Laos. Publicly it turned toward a negotiated settlement in Laos.¹⁰⁰ Privately, "CIA was still racing to complete its guerrilla organization in northern Laos when its operation at the Bay of Pigs came to a catastrophic end."¹⁰¹ Over the next 12 years CIA officers assigned to CYNCOPE continued their effort to build and manage a reliable and effective unconventional army in Laos as an alternative to the deployment of thousands of American troops into Laos—a conventional military operation that would most certainly have exploded the region into a far larger and bloodier war.

That war would eventually arrive, but in the meantime, aided by the US military, aggressive US diplomats, Thai support, and the unique capabilities of Air America, the secret war saved Laos from dismemberment. Regrettably for the people of Laos and a generation of CIA officers

who served there, the kingdom's fate would indeed be determined in Vietnam. Following victories by the People's Army of Vietnam in South Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, in December 1975, North Vietnamese-backed Lao communists established the Lao People's Democratic Republic.¹⁰²

The Legacy for CIA

In fact, intended or not, Kennedy's initial push for the Laos program through NSAM 29 proved quite prescient.¹⁰³ The decisions that fueled MILLPOND established a covert intelligence and security assistance framework involving the Departments of Defense and State and CIA that was embraced and expanded under the Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon administrations in the conduct of the war in Vietnam. During the years up to the 1973 withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam, "CIA had run the only serious ground incursions into Hanoi's supply corridor in the [south Laos] Panhandle. Its flexibility—tactical, logistics, and managerial—and the economy of its effort represent admirable features of the Agency's performance in Laos."¹⁰⁴ Three decades later, well-read CIA officers in Iraq and Afghanistan would aptly have applied the hard earned lessons of Laos.



Endnotes

1. See especially Howard Jones, *The Bay of Pigs* (Oxford University Press, 2008); Peter Wyden, *The Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story* (Simon and Schuster, 1979); Trumbull Higgins, *The Perfect Failure: Kennedy, Eisenhower, and the CIA at the Bay of Pigs* (WW Norton & Company, 1987); William M. Leary and Leonard A. LeSchack, *Project Coldfeet* (Naval Institute Press, 1996); Richard M. Bissell, *Reflections of a Cold Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs* (Yale University Press, 1996); Evan Thomas, *The Very Best Men: The Early Years of the CIA* (Simon and Schuster, 1995); Warren A. Trest and Donald Dodd, *Wings of Denial: The Alabama Air National Guard's Covert Role at the Bay of Pigs* (NewSouth Books, 2001); and Timothy N. Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam. U.S. Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government 1955–1975* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). Many relevant primary documents can be accessed on-line at <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB341/index.htm> and in the Freedom of Information Act Reading Room at www.cia.gov.
2. Kennedy is reported to have told a senior State Department official earlier in his administration that Bissell was “going to take Allen Dulles’s job on July 1.” Thomas, *The Very Best Men*, 239.
3. Michael Warner, “The CIA’s Internal Probe of the Bay of Pigs Affair.” https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/winter98_99/art08.html.
4. I first wrote about Operation MILLPOND in 1993, using mostly oral history interviews, well before Defense and State Department declassification efforts provided additional written records. Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam*, 34–36. The Douglas-built B-26 was a light bomber originally designated as an attack platform; the A-26 *Invader*. Following the retirement of the older Martin-built B-26 *Marauder*, the Douglas aircraft was redesignated a bomber and became the B-26 *Invader*.
5. Writing in his memoir about his attendance at a major Joint Chiefs of Staff presentation on Laos, Bissell says he had “close involvement for well over a year” with Laos, including a recent visit to the Lao capital of Vientiane. In somewhat of a contradiction, Bissell then says he “did not pretend to be an expert on Laos” and, therefore, did not speak out at the meeting against Pentagon plans that seemed “surreal.” Bissell goes on to make a startling observation. “Later, when I would make similar presentations to the president about our covert military plans to overthrow Castro, the Joint Chiefs chose to remain silent about their reservations. This was quite simply the etiquette of bureaucracy, and it exemplifies the way ingrained Washington habits are sometimes detrimental to policy making.” Bissell, *Reflections of a Cold Warrior*, 147–48.
6. Thomas L. Ahern, *Undercover Armies: CIA and Surrogate Warfare in Laos* (Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2006), 6. The redacted, declassified version is available at <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/vietnam-histories>. The collection contains four other redacted, declassified histories by Ahern of CIA activities in Southeast Asia.
7. Thomas, *The Very Best Men*, 257; Richard Reeves, *President Kennedy: Profile of Power* (Simon&Schuster, 1994), 91. Kennedy much preferred escaping the White House for an ocean venue.
8. On the eve of Kennedy’s inauguration the two men spent a good deal of time discussing the distant kingdom. Cuba, however, was also discussed. Eisenhower told Kennedy the plans were not finalized, but said, “We cannot let the present [Castro] government there go on.” Reeves, *President Kennedy*, 32. Exactly what was said, especially with regard to Eisenhower’s view on unilateral US military intervention in Laos, remains a matter of interpretation. William J. Rust, *Before the Quagmire: American Intervention in Laos, 1954–1961* (University Press of Kentucky, 2012) 256–59. See also Fred Greenstein and Richard Immerman, “What Did Eisenhower Tell Kennedy About Indochina? The Politics of Misperception” in the *Journal of American History*, September 1992. I am much indebted to my longtime mentor and friend Professor Immerman for his generous insights and assistance in the preparation of this article. Any errors, of course, are mine.
9. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1961–1963 Vol. XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 25, “Memorandum of Conference with President Kennedy,” 9 March 1961. As to Cuba, following an 8 February briefing by Bissell (also attended by senior Pentagon officials), Kennedy asserted that he “reserved the right to cancel the operation up to the end.” Higgins, *Perfect Failure*, 85. In early April, Kennedy asked Bissell “how the operation might be cancelled at the last minute” and was told the rebels could be diverted to Puerto Rico “with little notice.” Higgins, *Perfect Failure*, 116.
10. Jones, *Bay of Pigs*, 35 and 10. Grayston L. Lynch, *Decision for Disaster: Betrayal at the Bay of Pigs* (Potomac Books, 1998) 23. A factor in the decision to use the B-26 was that the Cuban Air Force also had them, thus offering, it was thought, another element of plausibility to denials if they became needed. As it turned out, however, Castro’s B-26s were visibly different from those flown by the rebels and their American pilots.
11. Wyden, *Bay of Pigs*, 193; Trest and Dodd, *Wings of Denial*, 64–66
12. Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (Harper and Row, 1965), 308–309.
13. Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam*, 34.
14. Thomas Jenny, interview with author, 28 July 2014. Notes in author’s possession. Jenny was a MILLPOND pilot.
15. Thomas, *The Very Best Men*, 258–59; Lynch, *Decision for Disaster*, 76–77.
16. Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam*, 120–22.
17. Central Intelligence Agency History Staff, *Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol 1, “Air Operations, March 1960 – April 1961,”* 98 (CIA, 1979). The 300 plus page document was released in July 2011 and can be found at <http://www.foia.cia.gov/document/>

Endnotes (cont.)

- official-history-bay-pigs-operation-volume-1-part-1. In March 1959 CAT Incorporated was renamed Air America, Inc. (AAM) and its Chinese subsidiary Asiatic Aeronautical Company Limited (AACL) became Air Asia Company Limited (AACL). All of these organizations were part of an “air complex” of proprietary companies owned by CIA – all referenced under the HBILKA cryptonym. James N. Glerum, interview with author, 7 February 2013. Notes in author’s possession. As a CIA operations officer Glerum was assigned to various aspects of the HBILKA program for more than 15 years, including lengthy service at Udorn, Thailand. Glerum went on to senior positions in the CIA, including director of personnel.
18. Trest and Dodd, *Wings of Denial*, 14-15 and 84–86.
 19. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=8045>
 20. President John F. Kennedy to Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat, 28 February 1961, John F. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Thailand, Vol. I, 1/61–5/61. Secretary of State Rusk prompted Kennedy to send the letter. See FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. XXIII, Southeast Asia, Document 397, “Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, 24 February 1961. For a review of America’s response to the 1954 Geneva Accords, see Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam*, 11–12. SEATO was formally established in 1955, five months after the signing of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, known as the Manila Pact. SEATO membership consisted of Australia, Great Britain, New Zealand, France, Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, and the United States. For details on U.S. military assistance given to Thailand in the 1950’s see Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam*, 12–13.
 21. Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 640.
 22. Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam*, 6–7.
 23. Ibid, 23 and R. Sean Randolph, *The United States and Thailand: Alliance Dynamics, 1950–1985* (University of California, Institute of East Asian Studies: 1986) 38. The acronym FAR comes from the French *Forces Armée Royale*.
 24. Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam*, 23–25.
 25. Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 641–42.
 26. William J. Rust, *So Much to Lose: John F. Kennedy and American Foreign Policy in Laos*, (Lexington, 2014) 16–19. Mr. Rust has been especially generous with his own research and provided me key MILLPOND documents.
 27. FRUS, 1961–1963 Vol. XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 25, “Memorandum of Conference with President Kennedy,” 9 March 1961.
 28. The most complete copy of NSAM 29 can be accessed at the National Security Archive website <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB342>
 29. Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam*, 2.
 30. Ahern, *Undercover Armies*, xvii.
 31. Sutayut Osornprasop, “Thailand and the American Secret War in Indochina, 1960–1974,” Doctoral dissertation, Corpus Christi College, Cambridge University, (Cambridge University, 2006), 13–14.
 32. Randolph, *The United States and Thailand*, 36; Rust, *Before the Quagmire*, 20–21.
 33. Donald E. Nuechterlein, *Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia* (Cornell University Press, 1965) 139.
 34. FRUS, 1955–1957 Vol. XXI, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Document 119, “National Security Council Report, 5 September 1956, Document 119.
 35. Sutayut, “Thailand and the American Secret War in Indochina,” 169 and 212.
 36. For a review of these internal Laos obstacles see Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam*, 3–6.
 37. Ahern, *Undercover Armies*, 93.
 38. These contracts were processed under the name “Project Mad River.” About half of the original Mad River pilots and mechanics were “sheep-dipped” active duty military personnel. Most would eventually return to their uniformed jobs, while others left the military and joined Air America as civilians. Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam*, 43–44.
 39. John L. S. Girling, *Thailand. Society and Politics* (Cornell University Press, 1981) 231–32; Randolph, *The United States and Thailand*, 10.
 40. Randolph, *The United States and Thailand*, 36–37 and FRUS, Vol. XXIII, Southeast Asia, 1961–1963, Editorial Note, Document 413.
 41. Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam*, 51.
 42. Donald Kirk, *Wider War. The Struggle for Cambodia, Thailand and Laos* (New York, 1971) 180–81; Randolph, *The United States and Thailand*, 65. From 1965 to 1976 the United States spent \$388 million on Thai facilities alone. Randolph, *The United States and Thailand*, 76.
 43. National Security Archive website <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB342/doc05b.PDF>
 44. Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam*, 5–6.
 45. CIA’s relationship with the PARU is revealed in a 10 August 1961 memorandum “Meo Operations,” written by Deputy Director Bissell. “The major assistance furnished to the Meos in the form of specialized personnel involves PARU which is an CIA developed and controlled and funded asset.” FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. XXIV, Microfiche Supplement, Fiche 12, Document, 194. Cited in Arthur J. Dommen, *The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans: Nationalism and Communism in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam* (University of Indiana Press, 2002), 484. The acronym PARU is also sometimes written out as Police Aerial Reconnaissance Unit or Police Aerial Resupply Unit.
 46. Sutayut, “Thailand and the American Secret War in Indochina,” 62–63; Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam*, 37–38.

Endnotes (cont.)

47. Sutayut, "Thailand and the American Secret War in Indochina," 169 and 212.
48. In the years to come Udorn RTAFB would become the administrative and air hub for Agency and U.S. military Laos-support operations. Takhli, known by the American airmen as the "Ranch" for its austere conditions, would remain a critical and well-used covert air resupply base. For a lengthy review of CIA's involvement in Cold War Tibet air operations see Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison *The CIA's Secret War in Tibet* (University Press of Kansas, 2002).
49. Warren A. Trest, *Air Commando One: Heinie Aderholt and America's Secret Air Wars* (Washington, 2000) 84–92. As the Southeast Asia air war expanded, conventional US units were stationed at Takhli to carry out the "Rolling Thunder" bombing missions. During 1967–68 Takhli-based F-105 "Thud" fighter-bombers would be vectored by a USAF radar site in northeastern Laos to targets in North Vietnam and Laos. Timothy N. Castle, *One Day Too Long. Top Secret Site 85 and the Bombing of North Vietnam* (Columbia University Press, 1993), 52–54.
50. Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam*, 35.
51. Jenny, interview. Later, as part of a special group of Air America pilots called the "A" team, Jenny would fly the heavily armed T-28 aircraft in sensitive search and rescue and ground attack missions in Laos. Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam*, 69–70.
52. Sutphin would become an Air America legend in Laos flying the helio-courier light aircraft. See <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/winter99-00/art7.html>
53. Leary and LeSchack, *Operation Coldfeet*, 113; Jenny, interview.
54. Jenny, interview.
55. Beale reported to management he had encountered "poor visibility" in the drop area. Jenny remained silent. *Ibid.* With a total of four fully qualified bomber pilots it seems likely, had Beale and Jenny been killed or badly injured in the crash, that the MILLPOND strikes would have been cancelled.
56. Jenny, interview, and Donald Courtney, "Above & Beyond: Ration of Luck," *Air and Space Magazine*, November 2002. Courtney was a former smoke jumper and HBILKA employee.
57. Allaire's recollections are detailed in the papers of the late University of Georgia aviation and intelligence scholar William M. Leary. "Air America Notebooks From the William M. Leary Papers." Air America Chronology. Book One, 6–8. (Undated). Much of the material amassed by Leary for a book on Air America can be accessed on-line from the University of Texas at Dallas aviation collection. See <http://www.utdallas.edu/library/specialcollections/hac/cataam/notebooks/index.html> Dr. Leary was a deliberate and generous scholar who spent decades researching a history he regrettably never completed.
58. Trest, *Air Command One*, 111–12. Allaire, in an interview with William Leary, says that he had previously flown the B-26. "Air America Notebooks From the William M. Leary Papers." (Undated)
59. Jenny speculates that the pilots who showed up at Takhli were there because of "a bad economy, the possibility of advancement in the military, and poor record checks." Jenny, interview.
60. Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam*, 35.
61. CIA waited decades to declassify much of its JMATE holdings and some materials remain classified. See <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20140521/>. See also endnote 17 above.
62. Jenny, interview; Trest, *Air Commando One*, 115.
63. FRUS, 1961–1963 Vol. XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 56, "Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy," 17 April 1961.
64. The towns believed at risk were Luang Prabang, Thakhek, Paksane, and Savannakhet. FRUS, 1961–1963 Vol. XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 60, "Telegram from the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State," 26 April 1961.
65. Rust, *So Much to Lose*, 25–26.
66. Repeatedly communist attacks on the nearly defenseless mountain people caused a reversal in this policy. William E. Colby, *Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA* (New York, 1978), 192–93.
67. Ahern, *Undercover Armies*, 138 and 161.
68. William Beale, a participant in the MILLPOND and JMATE programs, was killed the next year in Laos when his small plane hit a tree. Courtney, "Above & Beyond: Ration of Luck."
69. Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam*, 35.
70. Leary, "CIA Air Operations in Laos, 1955–1975." www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/winter99-00/art7.html
71. Joe F. Leeker, "Air America at the Bay of Pigs," 2–3. This essay, available only online, can be accessed at <http://www.utdallas.edu/library/specialcollections/hac/cataam/Leeker/history/index.html> Dr. Leeker, a German academic, has authored an extraordinary set of CAT and AAM essays. His voluminous data on the HBILKA air fleet and corporate identities is especially helpful to researchers. Moreover, Dr. Leeker is a most gracious and always helpful colleague.
72. 76. As it turned out, selection of the B-26 was problematic. Because Castro's pilots also flew B-26s the US planners hoped that painting the brigade aircraft in Cuban Air Force colors would make it appear the attackers were disaffected pilots. Unfortunately, the rebels were flying later model aircraft with a different machine gun configuration and appearance. In particular, the Cuban Air Force B-26s had a very noticeable Plexiglas nose. Following the initial 15 April air attacks on Cuba, when this obvious difference was exposed in

Endnotes (cont.)

- the press, CIA's cover story of an internal revolt was badly damaged. Lynch, *Decision for Disaster*, 75. US Ambassador to the United States, Adlai Stevenson – who was unwitting of the air strikes – went before his colleagues at the United Nations and supported the phony story that the attacks were the work of defecting anti-Castro pilots. When Stevenson learned the truth he was furious with the White House. Jones, *Bay of Pigs*, 81.
73. Trest and Dodd, *Wings of Denial*, 38–51.
74. Leary and LeSchack, *Operation Coldfeet*, 107–15. Thorsrud, a former smokejumper and military jet pilot, was considered an especially gifted airman and air operations manager.
75. Wyden, *The Bay of Pigs*, 99; Bissell, *Reflections of a Cold Warrior*, 175–76 and 184.
76. Bissell, *Reflections of a Cold Warrior*, 184; Thomas, *The Very Best Men*, 259.
77. Wyden, *The Bay of Pigs*, 193. It was believed that Castro's offensive air resources consisted of six B-26s, four T-33s, and two to four Sea Furies. Higgins, *Perfect Failure*, 73.
78. Wyden, *The Bay of Pigs*, 202.
79. Trest and Dodd, *Wings of Denial*, 71–76.
80. Jones, *Bay of Pigs*, 110.
81. Michael E. Haas, *Apollo's Warriors: US Air Force Special Operations during the Cold War* (US Air War College, 1997) 159.
82. Leary and LeSchack, *Operation Coldfeet*, 118–19.
83. Trest and Dodd, *Wings of Denial*, 12–13.
84. Leary and LeSchack, *Operation Coldfeet*, 119.
85. Jones, *Bay of Pigs*, 119–20. For comments regarding the *Essex* air cover controversy see Haas, *Apollo's Warriors*, 159–60.
86. Leary and LeSchack, *Operation Coldfeet*, 119.
87. Bissell, *Reflections of a Cold Warrior*, 190–91.
88. Jones, *Bay of Pigs*, 136.
89. FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. X, Cuba, Document 233, “Memorandum No. 3 From the Cuba Study Group to President Kennedy,” 13 June 1961.
90. Warner, “The CIA's Internal Probe of the Bay of Pigs Affair.” See also Jones, *Bay of Pigs*, 127.
91. Reeves, *President Kennedy*, 103. Kennedy is also reported to have said he wanted to break the Agency “into a thousand pieces.” Thomas, *The Very Best Men*, 265.
92. *Ibid.*, 258. Dulles arrived back in Washington near midnight on 17 April.
93. On 1 March 1962 Bissell and his family were feted at White House where President Kennedy presented him with the National Security Medal. Bissell, *Reflections of a Cold Warrior*, 203.
94. Bissell, *Reflections of a Cold Warrior*, 191.
95. *Ibid.*, 196.
96. Thomas W. Zeiler, *Dean Rusk: Defending the American Mission Abroad* (Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 69.
97. Bissell, *Reflections of a Cold Warrior*, 198–99.
98. Rust, *So Much to Lose*, 33.
99. FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. X, Cuba, Document 163, “Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy,” 21 April 1961.
100. Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam*, 41–61.
101. Ahern, *Undercover Armies*, 69.
102. Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam*, 125–27.
103. William E. Colby *Lost Victory* (Chicago, 1989) 197–98; William E. Colby, *Honorable Men. My Life in the CIA* (New York, 1978, 186.
104. Ahern, *Undercover Armies*, 529.



Application of the Critical-Path Method to Evaluate Insider Risks

Eric Shaw and Laura Sellers

But when [past] cases are reviewed in depth, it becomes clear that a lack of appreciation exists for the factors that increase the risk that insiders will undertake hostile acts against their organizations.

Introduction

Governments and institutions of many kinds have faced the danger of hostile acts by insiders from time immemorial. In the case of the US government, such hostile acts have included betrayals by employees who supplied secrets to hostile powers, committed sabotage, and fatally attacked fellow employees. Relatively recent examples of such activity include the espionage activities of Aldrich Ames, Larry Chin, and Robert Hanssen; the Wikileaks revelations of Bradley Manning; the disclosures of Edward Snowden; and the violent assaults against fellow Americans by Nidal Hassan and Aaron Alexis.^{a,1}

After each of these events investigators produced reports which, in 20/20 hindsight, assessed the damage and demonstrated that warnings of risks had been missed. These case-based, “One should have seen the writing on the wall” exercises often produce increased awareness and

some revisions in policies and practices in screening, adjudication, and risk assessment. But when these cases are reviewed in depth, it becomes clear that a lack of appreciation exists for the factors that increase the risk that insiders will undertake hostile acts against their organizations.

Our purpose in this article is to draw on the most recent and comprehensive empirical studies of insider hostile acts—ranging from formal academic efforts to collections of in-depth case reports—to demonstrate that there exists a common set of factors and a similar pattern of individual and organizational behavior across the many occurrences during recent years. We will describe these factors and the indicators of heightened risk and place them in the context of a “critical-path” analysis, an approach that has been used in business and medical fields to identify the interrelationships of processes and their most critical and vulnerable points. We will apply this framework to historical cases and discuss the implications for counterintelligence and security personnel, as well as for intelligence officers engaged in recruitment activities focused on the insiders in targeted foreign institutions.^b

a. We use the DoD definition of “insider” contained in DoD INSTRUCTION 5240.26, 15 October 2013, as “A person with authorized access, who uses that access, wittingly or unwittingly, to harm national security interests or national security through unauthorized disclosure, data modification, espionage, terrorism, or kinetic actions resulting in loss or degradation of resources or capabilities.”

b. See Eric D. Shaw and Harely V. Stock for a version of this analysis in *Behavioral Risk*

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This critical-path approach describes the personal predispositions that have contributed to individuals' committing acts against their organizations.

What the Case Data Shows

Our effort to better understand these recurring betrayals began with a review of individual cases. We examined case data to answer the following questions:

- What vulnerabilities—personal predispositions that posed risks—did insider offenders bring to their organizations?
- What stressors and/or triggers appeared to activate or exacerbate these underlying vulnerabilities?
- What were the signs of risk that supervisors, coworkers, and personal contacts should have been able to see?
- What were the organizational obstacles and management problems that interfered with successful

interventions with these individuals?

- Why did interventions make matters worse rather than reduce risk?

The pattern of answers to the above questions provided the foundation for the critical path along which a simply troubled employee turned into a danger to the organization and the people who worked in it. This critical-path approach describes the personal predispositions that have contributed to individuals' committing acts against their organizations. It details the personal, professional, and financial stressors that "squeezed" underlying predispositions and resulted in disgruntlement and behaviors—e.g., violations of policies, rules, or even laws—that could have provided warning of increased insider risk.

Visibly concerning behavior often puts individuals on management's radar. Unfortunately, management efforts to respond are often com-


plicated by obstacles to acquiring complete or clear information. In addition, legal, bureaucratic, and psychological constraints exist. Often these obstacles result in abrupt or limited responses that elevate risk. Inadequate organizational responses, together with the accumulation of predispositions and stressors, create the environment in which at-risk employees can plan and execute attacks.

Steps Down the Critical Path to Insider Risk

The four elements of the model—personal predispositions, stressors, concerning behaviors, and problematic organizational responses—are shown in the graphic below. In addition to the specific elements, research in the field has shown that:

- the likelihood, or risk, that individuals will commit hostile acts against their organizations increases with the accumulation of factors acting on them over a period of time;

Indicators of Malicious Insider Theft of Intellectual Property: Misreading the Writing on the Wall (Symantec White Paper, 2011).



- the accumulation of these factors appears to follow in roughly the chronological sequence suggested in the graphic;²
- the number of employees who can be said to have exhibited or been affected by all of the factors represents a very small proportion of any organization's population;
- even if all of the factors can be said to describe an employee, mitigating factors or successful organizational interventions can take people off the path to a hostile act.

Personal Predispositions

Normal and well-adjusted people do not commit hostile insider acts. The personal characteristics that predispose individuals toward becoming insider risks include:

- the existence of a medical or psychiatric disorder affecting judgment;
- maladaptive personality characteristics, social skills, or decisionmaking that affect a person's ability to get along with others or to function within normal social and organizational constraints;
- a history of rule violations;
- social-network risks consisting of relationships with persons who have adversarial or potentially compromising interests; and
- unusual travel, possibly indicative of contact with organizational adversaries or divided loyalties.

Many inside offenders got into trouble with other groups and even the law before they joined the organizations in which they become dangers.

Medical or Psychiatric Disorders

Medical or psychiatric disorders refer to medical conditions or serious mental health problems, or both, that affect perception, judgment, self-control, and decisionmaking—e.g., alcoholism, anxiety, depression. Alcohol abuse has reportedly figured prominently in the lives of individuals convicted of espionage. A 2010 study of 24 convicted US spies found that 20 had difficulties with alcohol: 11 were characterized as heavy drinkers, nine reported an increase in drinking during spying, seven had DWI convictions, and, 16 reported a family history of alcoholism.³ Aldrich Ames was perhaps one of the most widely known spies with a severe alcohol problem, including an extensive record of alcohol-related violations acquired before and after he joined the CIA.

Personality or Social-Skill Problems

Many inside offenders had problems following rules, or preferred social isolation to being part of a group. Their behaviors ranged from extreme shyness and avoidance of others to bullying, exploitation, and manipulation of peers. Personality disorders are systematic biases in the ways in which individuals select and process information that helps them see themselves and others in the world. Narcissistic, psychopathic, and avoidant personality characteristics have been cited as prominent in espionage cases, including the case of Jonathan Pollard who is known to have had marked personality issues. He was bullied throughout his childhood, had difficulties staying at

schools or jobs, used drugs, and compulsively lied to impress others, even when his stories were unbelievable.⁴

History of Rule Violations

Many inside offenders got into trouble with other groups and even the law before they joined the organizations in which they became dangers. They frequently violated organizational policies, practices, or rules or committed minor or major civil or criminal violations. For example, John Walker Jr. was arrested for burglarizing a gas station in 1955. A local judge gave him the choice of jail or military enlistment. One early study of insiders who used computer technology to attack information systems within US critical infrastructure found that 30 percent of their subjects had significant prior violations, including arrests related to violence, alcohol or drug abuse, and fraud.⁵

Social-Network Risks

Many insiders had histories of contacts with persons who had criminal background or competitive interests. Social-network risks included contact—face-to-face, telephone, or digital—with members of an adversarial or competitive group prior to employment with the organizations they betrayed. Some of these contacts may have occurred in the context of family, social, romantic, or professional relationships with others. Because of the very consistent evidence that criminal activity runs in families, a family history of criminal activity or membership in an adversary group has been shown to be a social-network risk. Two generations of Robert Hanssen's family were involved

Two generations of Robert Hanssen’s family were involved in police corruption, and Hanssen reported that this “really lowered the bar” for him to act as he did.

in police corruption, and Hanssen reported that this “really lowered the bar” for him to act as he did. Bradley Manning was affiliated with hacking groups prior to his military service.

Any pre-employment contact with members of groups that pose risks to an organization—even those accounted for by professional responsibilities—can be included in this category. Potentially risky groups will vary for each organization depending on its core functions, but they may include criminal groups—hackers, as in the Manning case—and adversary political or national groups soliciting classified or sensitive information—Wikileaks, terrorist organizations, or foreign military and intelligence organizations.

Travel History

Travel history has been shown to be significant. Thus a subject’s record of immigration or travel to or from areas associated with adversarial groups or individuals is a potential indicator. This travel might be in connection with education, tourism, family visits, and official duties or involve emigration from such an area. For example, Ana Montes—the Defense Intelligence Agency analysts who spied for Cuba—traveled extensively, a fact that may have influenced her political allegiance and provided opportunities for recruitment by adversaries. She reportedly spent many summers with her family in Puerto Rico, where her father was an outspoken advocate of Puerto Rican independence. She spent her junior year of college in Madrid, where she may, in fact, have been

recruited by Cuban intelligence. After graduation she worked in administrative positions in a law firm and social service agency in Puerto Rico.⁶

In sum, personal predispositions such as those described above serve as potential foundations for insider risk by biasing judgment, signaling a propensity for rule violation, and creating the potential for the creation of adversarial identification or affiliation. However, only a small minority of persons with these characteristics or experiences goes on to commit insider actions, and only after they have been exposed to additional stressors on the critical path.

Personal, Professional and Financial Stressors

Stressors in people’s lives can be negative or positive events that result in changes in personal, social, or professional responsibilities that require people to spend effort and energy to adjust. While everyone experiences stress in life, research indicates that stressors especially place pressure on those who possess vulnerable predispositions and can lead such individuals down the next step on the critical path.^{a,7}

Several authors have made the connection between professional stressors and espionage, and a 2010 study found that 78 percent of insiders experienced at least one nega-

a. This formulation is consistent with a psychological model of juvenile crime called General Strain Theory.

tive work-related event—e.g., poor performance review, stressful work environment, or interpersonal problems—prior to communicating with a foreign government, and 92 percent of insiders experienced at least one negative work-related event prior to providing a foreign government with controlled or classified information.⁸

Family tragedy was the stressor in the case of Thomas Dolce, an Army civilian employee convicted of espionage. In an interview, he described the stressors:

I was a real mess for about three years... My mother died very suddenly. And I think that I did not fully appreciate at the time just what the impact of that was. Roughly a year after my mother died, my wife was diagnosed as having cancer. And we both suffered with that for about three years before she died. It was during those three years that the bulk of the [espionage] activity took place.⁹

Financial stress has clearly been implicated in numerous cases. Harold Nicholson, Aldrich Ames, Leandro Aragoncillo, and Brian Regan are examples of spies motivated initially, in part, by financial stress.

Concerning Behaviors: The Obscured “Writing on the Wall”?

Studies of inside offenders have shown that most were known to have committed some form of concerning or problematic behavior before acting directly against their organization. These actions included violations of policy and standard procedure, professional conduct, accepted

practice, rules, regulations, or law through action or inaction (failure to report) that had been observed by managers, supervisors, and coworkers. Specific examples of concerning behaviors in espionage cases have included reports of “kooky” behavior by Jonathan Pollard (threatening to sue his supervisor, dramatic lies of kidnapping and torture) and Ana Montes reportedly leaving an urgent professional meeting at the Pentagon during a crisis and her alienation of colleagues within her specialty area.

Broadly speaking, the manifestation of any form of personal predisposition (medical/psychiatric problems, personality issues impacting behavior, rule violations and unreported contacts with potential adversaries) that occurs during—as opposed to before—employment is also considered concerning behavior. Other concerning behaviors include troublesome communications between coworkers, in person, online, in social media, or in other ways. The above-cited 2010 study of insider actions involving organizational computer systems found violations of organizational personnel policy after the perpetrators had gone through stressful events—and before they had acted against their organizations. Eighty percent of offenders studied had come to the attention of their organizations because of some form of concerning behavior, including tardiness, truancy, arguments with coworkers, or security violations.¹⁰ Other forms of concerning behavior have included technical security violations, unreported foreign travel, and financial misconduct.

Concerning behaviors may also signal the form an insider’s attack might take when it occurs. For exam-

Other concerning behaviors include troublesome communications between coworkers, in person, online, in social media, or in other ways.

ple, before he carried out his assault in the Washington Navy Yard, Aaron Alexis had several reported weapons violations. Bradley Manning posted a video of the inside of a secure classified information facility (SCIF) on YouTube, and Robert Hanssen hacked into his supervisor’s computer to acquire sensitive information.

Problematic Organizational Responses

The last element in this critical-path model is problematic organizational behavior in response to at-risk employees, including inaction, inattentiveness, or lack of understanding of the factors described above. Admittedly, formidable—and often understandable—obstacles prevent managers from learning about the concerning behavior of their employees. These include guidelines governing privacy and information exchange, bureaucratic silos, and limited communication between responsible government offices and contracting organizations, local law enforcement, and other outside groups like health-care providers. In addition, in some settings coworkers are reluctant to report concerns to management for fear of putting a person’s career at risk, anxiety about retribution, or the perception that a troubling employee might even be favored by management.

Certain actions management might take in response to learning of a potential insider threat could, in fact, elevate the risk of damaging ac-

tions or even trigger them. For example, overly aggressive investigative steps or interviews uninformed by an appreciation of a subject’s psychology can backfire and increase the risk the employee will act. For example, several years after being terminated for misusing his position as chief information officer to monitor the communications of key executives, the officer launched hacking attacks against the company. After being caught he said the manner in which security personnel had abruptly, rudely, and angrily dealt with him—humiliating him in the process—motivated his hacking.

Finally, organizational leaders often do not sufficiently appreciate how an intervention, especially a termination, can actually escalate insider risk because they have not sufficiently considered the implications of dismissals. The above-cited study shows that more than 80 percent of incidents of sabotage of critical infrastructure information systems were perpetrated by dismissed employees.¹¹

Commission of the Hostile Act

At the end of the critical path, the commission of a crime or hostile act seldom occurs without planning and a variety of preparations. Such activities might involve surveillance or research; solicitation of the cooperation of witting or unwitting others; the acquisition of resources or skills; rehearsal of activities to gauge a plan’s safety and effectiveness; and attempts at authorized or unauthorized access

At the end of the critical path, the commission of a crime or hostile act seldom occurs without planning and a variety of preparations.

to obtain, replicate and transfer targeted information; deception or other forms of operational security, to name a few.

Given the number of activities involved, it is not surprising that some will be observed. Researchers examining insider attacks on information systems in the financial sector found that in 37 percent of cases examined, insider attack planning was noticeable through online (67 percent) or offline (11 percent) behavior, and in some cases both online and offline (22 percent) behavior. In 31 percent of the attacks, other people—coworkers (64 percent), friends (21 percent), family members (14 percent) or someone else involved in the incident (14 percent) had specific information about an insider’s plans, intentions, and activities.¹²

Historical Examples through the Critical-Path Lens

The table on the facing page illustrates the critical-path analysis through the historical examples of Benedict Arnold’s treachery in 1780 during the Revolutionary War^a; Bradley Manning’s (now Chelsea Manning’s) path to the 2010 delivery to Wikileaks of an enormous store of classified information; and Aaron Alexis’s attack in the Navy Yard in Washington, DC, in September 2013.

a. Thanks to Robert Rice for his counterintelligence analysis of the Arnold case and Drs. Carol Ritter and Stephen Band for their substantive and editorial reviews.

The three cases each show potentially troublesome personal predispositions and significant histories of personal and professional stress, including problems immediately preceding the commission of their insider acts. In each case, problematic organizational responses occurred, generally involving insufficient concern about the extent to which the subjects were disgruntled or inadequate inquiries into exhibited worrisome behavior. The resultant inaction in these cases became the problematic organizational response.

Also evident in these cases, though not shown in the table, was the fact that signs of preparation to commit hostile acts were present. Benedict Arnold carried on covert communications and held personal meetings with his British handlers. Bradley Manning shopped his materials to two news organizations and was in communication with members of the hacking community, which was aware of his disgruntlement and plans. Aaron Alexis attempted to purchase handguns, bought a shotgun and a hacksaw to shorten the barrel, spent hours at a range practicing prior to his attack, and somehow smuggled the weapon in to the Navy Yard.

How the Critical-Path Approach Can Help

While many of the concerning behaviors of these historical examples are a matter of public record, admittedly the discovery of these kinds of pieces of information in current circumstances is made difficult by the

above-mentioned restrictions on the acquisition of information subject to privacy and other protections. Still, the critical-path approach supplies investigators with information targets and rationale for pursuing leads.

In addition to providing general investigative and risk assessment guidance, the critical-path approach can provide a useful empirical framework. Like the itemization of concerning behaviors displayed in historical examples, analysts and investigators can identify and might assign points (values) to risk issues in each category. For example, subjects might be given a total insider risk score, with the result compared to other known cases.¹³ Such values might help investigators prioritize resources and narrow the range of possible investigations. Because the factors can change over time, it can also be used to monitor at-risk populations such as subject with particularly sensitive duties or previous risk issues. Another advantage of the method is that it could produce testable research hypotheses—e.g., Do events on the critical path occur in the hypothesized order?—that could contribute to more valid and reliable screening, adjudication, and risk assessment.

Finally, the approach could be applied to the asset recruitment and management process to supplement or complement existing frameworks.^b For example, the cumulative risk score of a prospective agent could be used to evaluate the likelihood that a target is susceptible to recruitment or

b. See for example, Randy Burkett, “An Alternative Framework for Agent Recruitment: From MICE to RASCLS” in *Studies in Intelligence* 57, No. 1 (March 2013).

Critical Path to Insider Risk in Three Historical Cases

Personal Predispositions

Stressors

Concerning Behaviors

Benedict Arnold

Daredevil; show-off; frequent fights; arrests for assault and disorderly conduct; smuggling; numerous personal and professional relationships with British officials.

History of significant family deaths; paternal alcoholism; crippling physical problems and war injuries, professional reversals, lawsuits; significant financial stress.

Relieved for insubordination; petulant letter to Congress expressing feeling victimization; insults members of court martial; convicted of misdemeanors; disgruntled letter to Washington; charged with abuse of power; reprimanded by Washington; declines command offered by Washington; approaches French for a loan.

The organizational response and hostile actions: George Washington was apparently unaware of the depth of Arnold's disaffection and unconcerned about suspicious queries Arnold had made about American spies working against the British. In addition, Arnold kept concealed his communications and meetings with the British until he was ultimately revealed.

Chelsea (Bradley) Manning

Long-term history of psychological issues including gender identity disorder, oppositional defiant disorder; targeted for bullying; pulled knife on his step-mother; long-term connections to hacker community.

Significant family disruptions, including divorce, parental alcoholism, and depression, forced relocation; suffered bullying and school failures; job losses; problems in military service.

Recommended for discharge at basic training; reprimanded for posting YouTube video of inside of SCIF; referred for psychiatric treatment; violent reaction to performance counseling; demoted and slated for discharge.

The organizational response and hostile actions: The Army ignored both Manning's supervisor's recommendation to discharge him and psychological advice not to deploy him; his weapon was taken but not his accesses after a demotion, a violent episode, and planned discharge. Deeper investigation might also have revealed statements of his intention to leak information to friends, media contacts, and on-going communications with known hackers and WikiLeaks.

Aaron Alexis

Long-term adult history of psychological problems, anti-social behavior, arrests and difficulty getting along with others.

Child of divorce; plagued by mental health problems; complained of discrimination and racism; financial stress.

Counselled for performance issues; tells police he is being followed by people sending vibrations into his body; arrested for disorderly conduct; discharged from Navy for pattern of insubordination, disorderly conduct, unauthorized absence, intoxication; arrested for shooting out tires of vehicle in Seattle in 2004; multiple treatments for psychological issues.

The organizational response and hostile actions: Aaron Alexis's violence risk and psychiatric problems were documented in police records that neither a security clearance organization or his employer accessed—he had never been convicted of a crime. Had they possessed this information prior to employment counseling, the risk to Navy Yard would probably have been avoided.

too great a risk for recruitment. Regularly updated scores might also help case officers evaluate the implications of changes over time in an potential recruitment's situation.

In Sum

The science of determining security risks remains in its infancy, its ability to actually predict who will engage in some kind of harmful insider action not well established. While review in hindsight of insider incidents frequently creates the impression that there was writing on the

wall, it is rarely simply a matter of overlooked or ignored visible clues.

Our hope in placing factors related to insider risk into the critical-path framework has been to suggest a way in which counterintelligence and security personnel might better assess risks associated with employees who have come to their attention and to

help in prioritizing investigative resources.

We do not suggest that this framework is a substitute for more specific risk evaluation methods, such as scales used for assessing violence risk, IP theft risk, or other specific

insider activities. We suggest that the critical-path approach be used to detect the presence of general risk and the more specific scales be used to assess specific risk scenarios.

In our view, the critical-path framework—which has demonstrated

its utility in other fields for decades—represents the best available device for applying knowledge acquired from research on past hostile insider acts to today's work of detecting general risks.



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Intelligence in Public Literature

88 Days to Kandahar: A CIA Diary

Robert L. Grenier (Simon & Schuster, 2015), 442 pp., photos, maps, index.

Reviewed by Hayden Peake

During the 88 days after 9/11, the CIA supported the two Afghan tribal factions that fought to remove the Taliban from power and force their al-Qa'ida allies to abandon their bases in Afghanistan. In his book *First In*,^a Gary Schroen, the leader of the CIA task force working with the Afghan Northern Alliance forces, provides a first-hand account of the operations that liberated Kabul. Schroen's successor, Gary Berntsen, describes further efforts against al-Qa'ida and the attempts to find and capture Usama Bin Laden in his book, *JAWBREAKER*.^b The view of these events from CIA Headquarters is described by Henry Crumpton in his book *The Art Of Intelligence*.^c Overlooked until now were operations coordinated out of the CIA station in Islamabad. Prior to 9/11, the station worked to gain Pakistani help in dealing with al-Qa'ida and Bin Laden; after 9/11, the focus shifted to supporting the defeat of Taliban elements in southern Afghanistan by selected Afghan tribal units. A third operation sought to find a consensus leader for the new Afghan government. In *88 Days To Kandahar*, Robert Grenier, the station chief in Islamabad during these events, provides the first detailed account of the CIA role in each operation.

Grenier begins his book with a summary of an unusual assignment he received in Islamabad. In late September 2001, he was called by Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet and asked for his assessment of "a war strategy for Afghanistan." (3) Tenet explained that he wanted a firsthand assessment before briefing the president the next morning. Grenier acknowledges this amounted to policy advice—generally a no-no at CIA—but he wrote it as a "chief of station field appraisal." (6) It serves well as an introduction to his views on the major

issues of the moment, as well as the long-range problems he anticipated.

Despite the title, *88 Days* is more than an account of Grenier's post 9/11 operations. It is also a five-part memoir of a successful CIA career, one that was not on his radar after graduating from Dartmouth with a degree in philosophy. Only after teaching for a year at a private girls' school did he decide to pursue his longtime interest in the Middle East by pursuing a graduate degree in international relations from the University of Virginia. By then married, Grenier needed a job; some influential friends suggested the CIA, where he could apply his experience as an analyst. But his recruiter, an experienced woman case officer, surprised him by concluding that he was better suited for the National Clandestine Service. He entered on duty in January 1979.

Part 1 of *88 Days* summarizes Grenier's career over the next 20 years. In addition to overseas tours, he served in the National Counterproliferation Center; on the National Intelligence Council; in the State Department; and as the head of the Farm, the CIA training facility. His accounts of the often frustrating CIA bureaucracy, frequently complicated by important interactions with other government bureaucracies, will be familiar to some readers and enlightening to others. In 1999, when due for overseas duty, Grenier was assigned as chief of station in Islamabad, Pakistan. Parts 2–4 of *88 Days* tell that story in considerable detail.

After reviewing the historical circumstances that created the situation that brought him to Islamabad, the central focus of the book concerns his challenging interactions with the Pakistanis, their Taliban allies, al-Qa'ida, and CIA Headquarters. Grenier explains how he developed sources to provide intelligence for headquarters on a variety of issues, from Pakistan's atom bomb program, to tribal leadership disputes, details of potential targets, and the always problematic relations with the ISI. With regard to Bin Laden in particular, his task was "to arrest, or oth-

a. Gary C. Schroen, *First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan* (Ballantine Books, 2005).

b. Gary Berntsen, *JAWBREAKER: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al-Qa'ida—A Personal Account by the CIA's Key Field Commander* (Crown Publishers, 2005).

c. Henry A. Crumpton, *The Art Of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA's Clandestine Service* (The Penguin Press, 2012).

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

erwise to neutralize, a man and an organization that Tenet had described publicly as the greatest current threat to US national security . . . without breaking a federal law.” (45) Toward that goal, Grenier worked—with little success—to gain Pakistani cooperation in evicting al-Qa’ida from its Afghan safe haven and, in general, received little support from them in this effort. Not for the first time, his advice sometimes conflicted with views at Headquarters, and his descriptions of these situations are informative.

After 9/11, his mission changed. Now “Bin Laden would have to be rendered to justice in the United States, or killed in the attempt.” (82) With improved ISI cooperation, Grenier made an unauthorized attempt to reach a deal with the senior Taliban leaders and to avoid war; CIA Headquarters was not pleased. (130ff) When this failed and war was inevitable, Grenier’s tactical marching orders shifted; he was to facilitate Hamid Karzai’s return to Afghanistan and support the takeover of Kandahar by a Afghan tribal leader friendly to the United States. The former task was delegated to a CIA base chief named Greg, who would save Karzai’s life enroute to Kandahar when his team was hit by friendly fire—a 2000-pound smart bomb. (278) Greg was reported killed, but he actually survived and continued to do well in future assignments.

Finding and supporting a leader who could command troops and take over Kandahar from the Taliban was a complicated process that Grenier describes at length. Besides dealing with the Pakistanis and the Afghan forces heading to Kandahar, Grenier had to coordinate with operations in the north and with the Special Forces elements that were providing critical support to both efforts. Complicating matters further were disagreements with instruction from CIA headquarters (236–39) and problems raised during VIP visits (270–73) that Grenier writes about candidly. When Kandahar was liberated on 7 December 2001—on the 88th day—the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, and his followers had fled—but not before leaving

20 land mines “wired together and set to fire downward” in the earthen roof of the governor’s palace. (108–14) The CIA Museum has an exhibit with artifacts from the roof.

The months following the end of what Grenier calls “the first American-Afghan War” (77) saw the creation of a long-sought joint intelligence center with the Pakistanis; the capture of the first high value al-Qa’ida target, Abu Zubayda; the beginning of the rendition program; and the hunt for Usama Bin Laden. The Taliban had retreated to Pakistan and, even in early 2002, writes Grenier, “it was obvious to me that the Pakistanis had no interest in pursuing these people.” (362) Although he offers his views on the matter, it is clear he feels that the solution to those problems would not be found any time soon.

When Grenier’s tour ended in June 2002, he returned to CIA Headquarters and worked, first, as an adviser to Director Tenet and then spent two years as “CIA’s Washington-based Iraq Mission manager.” (356) In 2005, after surviving the tumultuous early days after Porter Goss became director that he describes at length, he was appointed director of the CounterTerrorism Center (CTC). Grenier relates the many changes he made in CTC, the “legal red line” (396) controversies surrounding the interrogation program, and the disputes with higher authority that eventually led to his retirement.

The book *88 Days To Kandahar* is first a stimulating, provocative, and forthright account of America’s First Afghan War. Second, it is an assessment of national security policy since 2001 in South Asia and the resurgence of the Taliban that led to the Second American Afghan War, the one where “there will be no victory, illusionary or otherwise.” (8) Third, and more broadly, it is also an insightful appraisal of the challenges we face today in South Asia. A fine contribution, it deserves a place on the bookshelf—virtual or traditional—of every officer, but only after reading.



The Zhivago Affair: The Kremlin, the CIA, and the Battle Over a Forbidden Book

Peter Finn and Petra Couvée (Pantheon Books, 2014), 368 pp., notes, index, photos.

Reviewed by PJ Neal

Nearly 25 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, memories of the Cold War are beginning to fade in American memory. Bomb shelters built in the shadow of the Cuban Missile Crisis are rusting out across the United States. Russia is rusting out, too, with a GDP today smaller than that of Brazil, and just an eighth that of the United States. There is an International Space Station where there once was a space race, an increasingly unified European economy where the Berlin Wall once stood, and the Fulda Gap is now host to a museum examining the Cold War (€ admission, closed Mondays during winter).

In *The Zhivago Affair*, Peter Finn, the national security editor for the *Washington Post*, and Petra Couvée, a writer, translator, and professor at Saint Petersburg State University in Russia, take the reader back to the height of the Cold War, when the United States and the Soviet Union were wrestling for geopolitical dominance, and the citizens of both nations faced the specter of nuclear war. While many recent Cold War histories focus on major individuals (*Ike's Bluff*, *Shadow Warrior*) or technological feats (*Project AZORIAN*), Finn and Couvée go in a different direction, examining an innovative effort by the Central Intelligence Agency to use literature—specifically, Boris Pasternak's novel, *Doctor Zhivago*—as a potentially destabilizing influence inside the Soviet Union.

Pasternak was a celebrated Russian writer, known both for his original works and for his translations of Shakespearean classics. Over a nearly 40-year period culminating in the 1950s, Pasternak wrote *Doctor Zhivago*, an original novel set between the early 1900s and World War II. The novel contains a number of complex plot lines and themes, including criticisms of the role of the government in the lives of citizens and criticisms of the October Revolution and its aftermath. It is perhaps unsurprising that, when Pasternak submitted the novel to the Soviet publisher *Novy Mir*, it was rejected for ideological failings: “The spirit of your novel is one of non-acceptance of the socialist revolution. The general tenor of your novel is that the October Revolution, the Civil War, and the social transformation involved did not give the people anything

but suffering, and destroyed the Russian intelligentsia, either physically or morally.” (99)

Recognizing that *Doctor Zhivago* would not be printed in the Soviet Union, Pasternak accepted an offer in June 1956 from Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, an Italian publisher, to publish an Italian language version of the novel. Pasternak supplied Feltrinelli with a copy of the novel in the original Russian, and a year later, in November 1957, the book, now translated, was released to the public in Italy.

British intelligence quickly acquired a copy of the manuscript in the original Russian, photographed the work, and supplied the film to the CIA in January 1958, with the suggestion that the CIA might want to distribute the book in the Soviet Union. Agency leaders quickly recognized the value of the work as a weapon in the ongoing conflict against the Soviet Union. As John Maury, the Soviet Russia Division chief wrote, “Pasternak's humanistic message—that every person is entitled to a private life and deserves respect as a human being, irrespective of the extent of his political loyalty or contribution to the state—poses a fundamental challenge to the Soviet ethic of sacrifice of the individual to the Communist system.” (115)

In the summer of 1958, the CIA contacted the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (BVD) to see whether they could facilitate printing the novel in The Hague. BVD agreed, and the CIA sent them the funds to cover the print run, as well as explicit guidance that there should be no indication of the CIA or the United States's involvement. One thousand copies were published by Mouton Publishers, with 200 being sent to CIA headquarters, 200 to Frankfurt, 100 to Berlin, 100 to Munich, 25 to London, 10 to Paris, and the largest quantity, 365, to Brussels.

Belgium was home to the Brussels Universal and International Exposition in the summer and fall of 1958, the first World's Fair after World War II. Forty-three nations participated in the fair, which was held just outside of Brussels. Both the United States and the Soviet Union built large exhibitions as part of the event, and more than

16,000 Soviet citizens received visas to attend. Sixteen thousand Soviet citizens, outside the Soviet Union and in an allied country, was a tempting opportunity for intelligence officers looking to make contact with individuals from the far side of the Iron Curtain. It also delivered a large number of individuals who might pick up a copy of *Doctor Zhivago* and bring it back with them into the Soviet Union to read and distribute to others.

Since the United States government was adamant that US involvement in the publication and distribution of the novel not be seen, the CIA turned to an unlikely partner to help distribute the books in Brussels: the Vatican. Like the United States, USSR, and other nations, the Holy See had a pavilion in Brussels, and as part of their display, there was a small library run by Russian émigré Catholics with books, articles, and pamphlets related to the government suppression of Christianity. This library served as a distribution point for *Doctor Zhivago*, and a very effective one at that: “[T]he book’s blue linen covers were found littering the fairgrounds. Some who got the novel were ripping off the cover, dividing the pages, and stuffing them in their pockets to make the book easier to hide.”^a One news report at the time said that Russian émigrés surrounded a caravan of Soviet busses, throwing copies of the book into their open windows.

The CIA, like any successful publisher, recognized when it had a hit on its hands. Following the successful distribution of the first thousand Russian-language copies of *Doctor Zhivago*, the agency decided to fund a second print run, including 7,000 copies for individuals who would take them into the Soviet Union and leave them for others to discover, and 2,000 copies that would be distributed at the Vienna Youth Festival later that year. The Agency stamped each of these copies as coming from the Société d’Edition et d’Impression Mondiale, a nonexistent French publisher. Further deception was provided by a Russian émigré group that quickly claimed credit for their distribution.

In writing *The Zhivago Affair*, Finn and Couvée drew on the records in government archives in eight countries, more than a dozen interviews, extensive secondary research, and the use of a large number of recently declassified CIA records.^b Couvée was the first writer to uncover the connection between the BVD and *Doctor Zhivago*, writing about it in 1999. Her experience as a researcher and translator shines through in the 60 pages of notes and references that accompany the text. Finn, who first wrote about the potential CIA connection in 2007, has been

with the *Washington Post* for nearly 20 years, including working as the bureau chief in Moscow, and reporting on national security affairs from around the world since 2001. He has a clear understanding of intelligence operations, Soviet culture, and society, and brings an engaging element to the writing.

In addition to its historical significance of shedding light on a relatively unknown Cold War intelligence effort, *The Zhivago Affair* is also an excellent story with a wide cast of characters acting in front of a global backdrop. As the authors write, “There was something of the caper about the Zhivago operation and, more generally, the books program. Émigrés, priests, athletes, students, businessmen, tourists, soldiers, musicians, and diplomats—they all carried books across the iron curtain and into the Soviet Union. Books were sent to Russian prisoners of war in Afghanistan, foisted on Russian truck drivers in Iran, and offered to Russian sailors in the Canary Islands, as well being pressed into the hands of visitors to the Vatican pavilion in Brussels and the World Youth Festival in Vienna.” (263) It was an multinational effort unlike any other in recent history.

As a result of the CIA’s tremendous success, the United States went on to distribute nearly 10 million books and other publications across the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, including at least 165,000 annually during the final years of the Cold War. One historical review of these efforts lauded them, saying the programs were “demonstrably effective in reaching directly significant segments of the professional and technical elite, and, through them, their colleagues in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, with material that can inferentially be said to influence attitudes and reinforce predispositions toward intellectual and cultural freedom, and dissatisfaction with its absence.”^c

At the height of the Cold War, the pen proved mightier than the sword.



a. [Title redacted], Commercial Staff to The Record, “Status of AE-DINOSAUR as of 9 September 1958,” Memorandum, 10 September 1958, Reference AR 70-14.

b. This collection can be accessed online at <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/doctor-zhivago>.

c. Erin R. Mahan and Edward C. Keefer, eds., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XII, Soviet Union*, January 1969–October 1970 (US Government Printing Office, 2006), 463.

The Iran-Iraq War: A Military and Strategic History

Williamson Murray and Kevin M. Woods (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 343 pp., with maps, tables, appendices, index.

Reviewed by Jason U. Manosevitz

In October 1980, the CIA briefed then presidential candidate Ronald Reagan on the impact of the Iran-Iraq War in the Middle East.^a It is doubtful at the time that anyone realized the one-month old conflict would become one of the longest, bloodiest wars of the 20th century (September 1980–August 1988) or a key national security issue for the Reagan administration.

Several excellent works have examined aspects of the Iran-Iraq War, including the US's Iran-Contra affair.^b Most highlight Saddam Hussein's ruthlessness as a dictator and the horrific combat of the war. *The Iran-Iraq War: A Military and Strategic History* goes far beyond these themes, taking a unique look at Saddam's decisionmaking throughout the war. The authors used a treasure trove of original, Iraqi documents (some 600,000) captured during Operation Iraqi Freedom and thousands of hours of interviews with former Iraqi military officials kept at the National Defense University's Conflict Records Research Center.

The coauthors are accomplished military scholars. Murray is an adjunct professor at the US Marine Corps University, a senior fellow at the Potomac Institute, and a professor emeritus at Ohio State University. Woods is a historian and researcher at the Institute for Defense Analyses, where he served as the project manager for the Iraqi Perspectives Project, the US military-sponsored research project aimed at exploiting the captured records, with immediate exploitation conducted of documents pertaining to Iraq's putative involvement in global terrorism—the first report, *Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents* was classified

but a declassified version was released nine months after the classified version was delivered in January 2007.

The Iran-Iraq War's front matter explains that it is the last of three formally published works to appear as a result of this project,^c although the Iraqi documents remain available for further research. These papers have already formed the basis of other revealing work on pre-2003 Iraq, including an examination published in this journal of the Saddam regime's understanding of the Iranian nuclear program.^d

I have no hesitation in saying that today's intelligence analysts will want to add this work of Murray and Woods to their collection of case studies on conflict. In particular, they will benefit from reading the book because it offers insights on extended, multi-year conflicts, the importance of strategic objectives, and intelligence collection.

Murray and Woods start with a rich overview of the modern political and military development of each state leading up to the Iran-Iraq war. They thoroughly review the rise of Iraq's Saddam and Iran's Khomeini, the sweeping changes in Baghdad and Teheran's military institutions that followed, the shifting military balance between the two, and the respective orders of battle on the eve of the war. Successive chapters cover the conflict's major developments—Iraq's initial invasion of Iran, the stalemate that followed, Iran's counter invasion of Iraq, the grinding war of attrition, use of chemical weapons, missile attacks on each other's cities, the tanker war in the Gulf, lumbering moves to find an end to the war, and

a. John L. Helgerson, *Getting to Know the President: Intelligence Briefing of Presidential Candidates, 1952–2004*, Second Edition (CIA, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2014), 112.

b. Two of the best examples are: Dilip Hiro, *The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict* (Grafton, 1989) and Anthony Cordesman, *The Lessons of Modern War, Volume II: The Iran-Iraq War* (Westview Press, 1990).

c. The other two in the trilogy are Woods et al., *The Iraqi Perspectives Report A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam's Senior Leadership* (US Joint Forces Command, 2006). and Kevin Woods, *The Mother of All Battles: Saddam Hussein's Strategic Plan for the Persian Gulf War* (US Naval Institute Press, 2008).

d. "Iraqi Human Intelligence Collection on Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program, 1980–2003—A Case Study of Intelligence in a Dictatorship" in *Studies in Intelligence* 57, No. 4 (December 2013).

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

eventually the cessation of hostilities. Key battles and tactics are reviewed, including Iran's use of human wave attacks.

Along the way, Murray and Woods also unravel a lingering mystery surrounding Iraq's inadvertent attack on the USS *Stark* in 1987. Despite generally cooperating with the US investigation into the incident, the Iraqis oddly refused to allow US officials to interview the pilot responsible for the attack. The Iraqis, it turns out, had modified some of their aircraft to increase their range to permit them to fly longer, safer attack routes into Iran over the Gulf and they feared Iran would learn how they were able to carry out such attacks if they revealed their secret to the United States. (306–307)

The Iran-Iraq War is a good example of long-arc analysis, applicable to this era's circumstances as so many of today's crises are shaping up to be multi-year conflicts. Murray and Woods expertly show how the pace of battle ebbed and flowed, how the momentum shifted, and how both innovated on the battlefield. The authors also review the efforts of both sides to obtain international aid and take note of how prospects for peace came and went.

The book will help analysts think about how best to focus analytic narratives that provide context on the nature of warfare, give warning about dangers, and point out opportunities for policymakers. These questions revolve around what motivates soldiers to fight, military leadership, command and control, operational planning, the use of regular and irregular forces, and of course force generation, training, military procurement, technology, and foreign support. These are, of course, all enduring questions about conflict, but the book's great strength is that it addresses them from a non-western point of view.

Although the authors are quick to point out that the "conflict may have little to offer in the way of strategic lessons or battlefield accomplishments" (7) they give us a rare glimpse into the principle leaders' views on one side about their strategic objectives and wartime intelligence, which analysts would do well to consider for their own work.

Saddam's strategic objective was to become the Arab world's leader. He judged that Egypt had abdicated its traditional regional role by making peace with Israel and that Saudi Arabia lacked the character needed to lead the Arab world. In Saddam's view, this left Iraq as the sole

Arab state qualified to lead the region, particularly since ties with Syria had frayed (28–30). Saddam believed war would unify the Arab world behind Iraq and believed Iran would crumble after a few quick blows. (48–49, 87) The problems were that the military professionals who survived Saddam's political purges before the conflict struggled to translate Saddam's aim to lead the Arab world into operational military plans and Saddam did not understand his own military capabilities.

Indeed, almost as quickly as Saddam started the war, he looked to end it. As Murray and Woods show, Saddam consistently overestimated his military's ability to deliver as poor planning and a lack of training dogged the Iraqis from day one. For example, Iraq had to make last minute changes to its opening offensive, which interestingly was an air strike modeled on Israel's stunning preemptive air attack against Egypt during the 1967 Six Day War. When base commanders learned the details of the operation just 24 hours before it was to start, they quickly saw that Baghdad's planners miscalculated the mission requirements and that without a reduction in bomb loads, Iraq's bombers would not have enough fuel to complete the mission and return to base. (100–102) Needless to say, the air strike did not deliver the punch Saddam had hoped for. In another example, the authors shockingly point out that three years into the war, as the Iraqis cycled troops off the front lines for retraining, Iraqi soldiers were tutored in the most basic military principles, such as following commands, holding fire until targets could be identified, and to not run when the enemy attacked. (216)

Iraq's intelligence collection, capabilities, and analysis certainly fed into Saddam's worldview for achieving his strategic goal but it was poorly aligned to achieve his aims. At the start of the war, Iraq's General Military Intelligence Division (GMID) had only three officers gathering military intelligence on Iran, leaving the Iraqis knowing "almost nothing about Iran's military potential outside of the fact that it had a large population and was equipped with western weapons." (70) Moreover, what human intelligence the GMID and Iraq's other services had came mostly from disgruntled Iranian officers fleeing the new Islamic Republic and spinning stories of a rapidly weakening Iranian military. The shoddy analytic tradecraft explains why in 1980 the GMID reported Iran's army, air force, and navy were quickly declining in the wake of the Islamic revolution, a 180-degree shift from

their 1979 assessment that Iran’s military was steadily improving. (75–77)

Murray and Woods show that for most of the war the Iraqis had robust tactical signals intelligence on Iran, in stark contrast to HUMINT sources and much more than previously thought. This proved to be a doubled-edged sword, however. In 1982 during the Ahvaz Battle, Iraqi signals intelligence provided “detailed advanced warning of the time and location” of Iranian attacks that allowed Iraqi units to successfully defend their positions. (180–182). But biases set in and by 1985 the Iraqis judged Iran was incapable of conducting a deception campaign and believed they would attack Basra as they had done during the previous three years, dismissing reports indicating Iran was preparing to attack the Fao Peninsula. This miscalculation led to a great victory for Tehran. So firm was the Iraqi bias that Saddam refused to believe that Fao was the Iranians’ main point of attack, even as one of his divisions

there was collapsing. (266–68) A key problem for Iraq’s intelligence was that Saddam saw himself as his own chief intelligence officer, telling his ministers that “my job is to absorb, collect intelligence, and make conclusions, and relay it to others to analyze and predict, then examine the details gathered from everybody and extract a historic cognitive conclusion for the correct direction.” (24)

Even though Baghdad and Tehran are now cooperating to fight Sunni Islamic extremists, and many of today’s conflicts elsewhere center around insurgencies or some hybrid of counterinsurgency warfare, Murray and Woods’ work can help Intelligence Community analysts think about stages of analysis during the course of long conflicts and the connection between strategic objectives and the ability of actors to achieve them. The lesson of analytic biases and reliance on single streams of reporting should resonate too.



Rice Paddy Recon: A Marine Officer's Second Tour in Vietnam, 1968–1970

Andrew R. Finlayson (McFarland & Company Publishers, 2014), 310 pp., bibliography, photos, maps, index.

Reviewed by Charles D.

This is Andrew Finlayson's second memoir focused on his service in the Vietnam War. A retired colonel of Marines, he writes in this one of his second tour in Vietnam, which lasted 19 months. His first memoir treated his tour as a Marine reconnaissance officer in northern South Vietnam. Finlayson has also written a scholarly account for the Marine Corps about Marine advisers—like himself—who served with the Vietnamese Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU). The PRU were CIA's Vietnamese action arm in the Phoenix Program, which sought to neutralize the political infrastructure of the Viet Cong (VC) in South Vietnam.^a

Rice Paddy Recon has at least four distinct parts. It begins as a first-person account of the author's time at the start of his second tour as an operations officer with the Marine First Force Reconnaissance Company. Next, Finlayson covers his tour as a rifle company commander in the Second Battalion, Fifth Marines (2/5). This is followed by his assignment with the PRU in Tay Ninh Province. He concludes with an epilogue containing his analysis of why the United States lost the war in Vietnam.

Stitching together his several perspectives from an unusually varied and long tour could not have been easy. To tell his stories, Finlayson draws from his memory, almost daily letters home, official Marine unit histories, and recollections of colleagues. In addition, he deploys a wealth of personal photos and maps. While this is a generally successful approach, it results in parts of the book having differing styles and language, something that take some getting used to. For example, his accounts of operations or patrols that he accompanied have a different style from his accounts of those he did not join. In the latter, he relies on the detailed original patrol reports. In some instances, readers may find too many details on the color

of the enemy's uniforms, types and numbers of weapons, and equipment.

Finlayson provides context for the Vietnam era as he discusses the attitude of the US media towards the war, enemy use of propaganda, and racial tensions in the US military. He personalizes his account by writing about his feelings for the Vietnamese people and the close friendships he made there. One of those has its own chapter and is titled "Qua's Story." It is an account of Tran Van Qua, a Kit Carson Scout, whom Finlayson worked with while serving in 2/5. Qua was a Viet Cong fighter who rallied to the South Vietnamese government in response to the Chieu Hoi program, an effort to encourage guerrillas to switch sides. Drawing on their long discussions, Finlayson gives the reader a glimpse of Qua's life as a VC.

Rice Paddy Recon has powerful descriptions of combat and Finlayson's notes on lessons learned from dealing with improvised explosive devices, a problem in Vietnam, will resonate with those who are serving or have served in Iraq and Afghanistan. His efforts to develop innovative new techniques and equipment for inserting recon teams into terrain too difficult to accommodate a helicopter landing zone are praiseworthy and a good lesson in problem solving. Finlayson also describes how he instituted regular "lessons learned" meetings for his recon team leaders to share information.

Finlayson handles the retelling of some interpersonal conflicts with discretion. While he invariably mentions the names and ranks of Marines he wants to single out for service, he often refers to those with whom he had conflicts only by their positions. That was the case of one division G-3 (Operations) staff officer who ordered Finlayson to set up an entire Marine rifle company on a map location that happened in reality to be a steep, near cliff-like, slope. It was impossible for a company to occupy the spot. The haranguing he received for not following the orders to the letter led Finlayson to conclude of this officer that he was "not dealing with a rational human being."

a. Andrew Finlayson, *Killer Kane: A Marine Long-Range Recon Team Leader in Vietnam, 1967–1968* (McFarland & Co. Publishers, 2013) and *Marine Advisors with the Vietnamese Provincial Reconnaissance Units, 1966–1970* (USMC History Division, 2009).

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Finlayson describes the disappointment of his long “R and R” (rest and relaxation) trip to London, which he obtained in return for extending his tour in Vietnam to a total of 19 months. He planned to visit Captain Robert Asprey, a retired World War II Marine veteran living in Oxford, who was researching and writing on guerrilla warfare. Having looked forward to an intellectual encounter with a leader in the field, Finlayson was disappointed to discover that Asprey was pessimistic about the Vietnam War and did not believe the United States could win it. Ultimately as a post-script, Finlayson reveals they had a final falling out over one of Asprey’s books.

Before Finlayson began his unconventional tour as a PRU adviser, he was a classic Marine officer—a Naval Academy graduate to boot—with the traditional military rank consciousness. When he reports to CIA in Tay Ninh he meets a US Army Special Forces noncommissioned officer assigned to work with him, but they do not hit it off. Finlayson does not appreciate the NCO’s casual manner and habit of using first names with officers and threatens to relieve him for not addressing him “Sir.

Finlayson writes that his mentor in the new assignment was Charles “Chuck” Stainbeck, an experienced and affable case officer who was CIA’s officer in charge in Tay Ninh. (The memoir is dedicated to Stainbeck’s memory.) Finlayson details how the PRU supported the Phoenix Program mainly through intelligence collection and the arrest of VC cadre. He tells how, over time, restrictions on PRU advisors increased, along with attendant frustrations and problems.

Finlayson admits he was not a trained intelligence officer and that he was not involved in running CIA sources, although he offers in one chapter an analysis of a source handled in the province by a CIA case officer. In “America’s Most Valuable Spy,” Finlayson says he learned of the agent from his case officer—sometimes during the offi-

cer’s drunken indiscretions—and from other CIA officers. He had no direct knowledge himself. When Finlayson left Tay Ninh he was replaced by legendary CIA officer Felix Rodriguez, who was responsible for the demise of Che Guevara in Bolivia and who later, after retirement, became embroiled in the Iran-Contra affair.

In the epilogue Finlayson acknowledges how the Vietnam War changed his life. He writes that he spent many years studying the war, including at the US Naval War College, trying to comprehend why we lost it. He describes how the US was reluctant to support the French in Vietnam because the effort appeared doomed. Yet, when the task fell upon the United States to defend South Vietnam, that same conclusion was not reached and the United States pursued a failed strategy. He analyzes North Vietnam’s wartime strategy, including the creation and use of the Ho Chi Minh Trail to supply the fighters and the logistical system for its operations in South Vietnam. Finlayson’s conclusion is that the trail is what allowed North Vietnam to enter the third phase of communist-doctrine guerrilla warfare, mobile warfare. In retrospect, he offers a plan that he asserts would have cut off the Ho Chi Minh Trail by having US forces stationed in Laos. Without the trail network and the logistical support and troop movements it allowed, he believes the United States would have won the war. The reader will have to judge. Perhaps more important than that judgment is the epilogue’s call to study our current conflicts—or those we are about to enter—and understand both our strategies and the enemy’s and how they align.

Rice Paddy Recon should appeal to those interested in Vietnam and Marine Corps history. The book has unique value as a history of a CIA paramilitary operation in Vietnam, and it deserves a place on the bookshelves of today’s CIA paramilitary officers. Colonel Finlayson faithfully served the Corps, CIA, and our country in war. He continues to provide a great service through his writings.



Histories of Airborne Collection

The History of Big Safari

Col. Bill Grimes, USAF Ret. (Archway Publishing, 2014), 484 pp., images, timelines, bibliography, index.

Listening In: Electronic Intelligence Gathering Since 1945

Dave Forster and Chris Gibson (Hikoki, an imprint of Crécy Publishing, 2014), 176 pp., images, index.

Reviewed by Gary K.

Big Safari is the history of the US Air Force's program of "rapid acquisition" of sensitive airborne collection platforms while *Listening In* is the history of British airborne electronic intelligence (ELINT) collection. Both of these books are well-researched, visually appealing, and easy to follow; they are arranged chronologically and each book has a helpful glossary and index. *Big Safari* boasts a remarkably detailed set of four timelines (by detachment) of all of the aircraft ever flown by Big Safari, many revealed to the public possibly for the first time in this book.

USAF Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) conducts "routine" airborne collection for the Air Force and flies missions roughly comparable to those flown by the British RAF ELINT aircraft addressed in *Listening In*. However, the book *Big Safari* looks not at American ISR but instead at the sensitive arm of the Air Force that specializes in the rapid fielding of purpose-built or purpose-modified platforms to perform specific, usually sensitive, missions. The use of bomber aircraft in these roles was avoided when possible.

While the Big Safari organization is not part of USAF ISR nor directly comparable to RAF ELINT programs, each of these books nevertheless adopts a similar format: both are squarely aimed at the aircraft, surveillance equipment, crew, and missions flown.

Listening In gives its purpose in an overview (6) in which the authors explain that ELINT about Soviet radars and other anti-aircraft defenses was required if British bombers were to be able to penetrate Soviet airspace during war.^a *Listening In* reviews many aircraft and

a. *Studies* readers may be interested in the award-winning article by Australian Signals Directorate analyst Kevin Davies, *ELINT "Commandos": Field Unit 12 Takes New Technology to War in the Southwest Pacific* (*Studies in Intelligence* 58(3):11–20, 2014).

missions that contributed to the British understanding of Soviet air defenses and is fairly detailed up to 1975, but much less so from 1975 to 2013. *Big Safari* specifically asserts that much less is included about US aircraft after 2001 because many programs are still active and classified today.

Each work is extensively illustrated with photographs of aircraft and diagrams illustrating the location of specific types of collection equipment and operators' seating. Equally important in *Listening In* are the maps of routes of some of the missions flown that quickly drive home both the extent of the reconnaissance undertaken by these programs and also the danger inherent in flying many of these routes. *Big Safari* has few route maps, but the text sometimes discusses where the planes flew.

Conspicuous by its absence in both books is much discussion about specific targets, the results of the collection of ELINT or other intelligence from those targets, and the impact of the eventual intelligence produced—who saw it and how it was used. One can forgive the authors of both books for not including this kind of material, of course, as most of it remains classified, but it is worth noting that the very point of these flights—intelligence collection and its use by military and civilian analysts and leaders—is mostly missing from these books.

A few examples of exceptions will prove the rule: *Listening In* observes in one case that the operational reason for a given mission was to collect against Soviet cruise missiles (57–59), but all the authors could say about the results was that the mission was "apparently very successful." Similarly, another vignette offers an interesting map of a Soviet air defense system, (72) yet we learn only that the missions supported the UK's nuclear deterrent. Elsewhere, we read that RAF aircraft flew missions off

the Egyptian and Syrian coasts, (83) and targeted mobile phones in Afghanistan after 2002 (185). *Big Safari* treats the targets and the intelligence collected from American missions similarly and includes little about the intelligence collected by the American aircraft.

Listening In may read a bit more smoothly, but when it comes to bibliography and sourcing, *Big Safari* is far and away the better sourced book. *Listening In* offers only nine bibliographic references and no endnotes; one of the nine bibliographic sources for *Listening In* reads, “Many files (too numerous to list) at the [British] National Archives.”

For credibility, books about once-classified subjects should be selected on the basis of readers’ ability to trust the authors know what they are talking about or to provide source notes and bibliographies that allow readers to identify and evaluate sources. Each of these books about Cold War airborne surveillance faces the challenge of presenting the aircraft, missions, and targets without revealing still-classified information. While readers have no reason to suspect that the authors of *Listening In* have the story wrong, the book provides almost no sourcing other than the blanket reference to a vast number of newly-declassified documents. *Big Safari* succeeds here by supplying almost 700 endnotes and over 12 pages of bibliography.

The best previous treatment of the Big Safari program was a chapter in *By Any Means Necessary*, published by

William E. Burrows in 2001. Burrows includes in chapter 6, “The Raven’s Song,” a reasonably accurate, albeit general, 30-page account of the program. Most of Burrows’s book deals with traditional ISR, but he does not withhold a nod to the more covert aspects of US aerial surveillance. Burrows is light on details compared to *Big Safari*, has few photos, route maps, or diagrams and includes none of the newly-declassified information supplied by Col. Grimes, but offers an easier read with a narrative overview. Read together, the two books provide sound insight into Big Safari.

Each of these books will be powerful and, in some cases, emotional reminders of the past for those who flew these aircraft or were associated with them, their crews, and programs. American and British veterans of these programs will keenly remember the crews lost in shoot-downs and accidents during the Cold War and after.

The photographs, aircraft and equipment diagrams, route maps and timelines in these books bring together a wealth of information. In fact, this reviewer was surprised to find a number of previously classified American aircraft and programs covered in *Big Safari*. Historians can now easily reference certain types of aircraft, pieces of gear in use at a particular place and time and the fact that specific missions were flown against specific target sets. Books like these are welcome in the home of any aviation buff and in any public library or the offices of professors who study aviation history or intelligence history.



Two Cryptologic Nights at the Cinema

The Red Machine

Directed by Stephanie Argy and Alex Boehm, 2010

The Imitation Game

Directed by Morten Tyldum, based on the book by Andrew Hodges, 2014

Reviewed by David Hatch

I have long been a movie buff, and have always been a sucker for movies based on history. Films that take care in recreating an historical event or show something about an important person are a joy to watch. For the historian, films that botch the events are also a source of joy, although for different reasons.^a

No motion picture can be absolutely accurate in showing historical events. No historian, least of all me, expects that. But painstaking efforts to show the past can do important things for those in the present: for example, *The Longest Day* (1962), a motion picture that is relatively bloodless compared even to today's television programs, still helps viewers understand the vast scope of the D-Day operation and its complexity, as well as the sacrifice of their future by thousands of young men so that our future could be secure.

This brings us to movies that are less scrupulous in showing the past, and, specifically, to the 2010 production *The Red Machine*. In a generally favorable review, the magazine *Wired* said, "How faithful is the movie's 'Red Machine' to the real thing? [The writer and director] strove for historical accuracy in every respect."

As an historian writing about this film, my dilemma is: where to begin? The film has historical inaccuracies beginning about 30 seconds into the story, and the mistakes just keep on coming.

Set in the late 1930s, the film story opens in a large but sparsely furnished room where half a dozen civilian codebreakers working for the US Navy are scanning and rapidly solving encrypted messages sent by the Japanese Navy. One of them finds an anomalous message, and,

a. A version of this article will appear in a forthcoming issue of *Cryptologic Quarterly*, an internal publication of the National Security Agency.

after consulting reference material and one of his colleagues, decides to show it to "Miss Aggie." Later scenes, by the way, show this building to be a stand-alone, wooden, barracks-style structure in the middle of a Navy base.

Pause for a reality check: the Navy in the 1930s required that its cryptanalysts be active duty officers (the Army did hire civilians.) Until World War II began, the cryptologic work was done in cramped quarters in the Navy Building. This was a large office complex located in the District of Columbia on the site of what is now the Vietnam Memorial.

"Miss Aggie" was a real person, Agnes Myer Driscoll, a civilian exception to the Navy's requirement about active duty officers as cryptologists. She had been involved in cryptology since World War I, and was acknowledged by the uniformed cryptanalysts around her as the most talented of them all. While she was an important person in Navy cryptology in the 1930s, the film depicts her as supervising the effort, which is untrue; in real life she acted in a capacity that we would today call "technical director."

The anomalous message turns out to have been enciphered on a cryptomachine, quickly given the nickname "Red." Admitting that it would take years to solve through pure analysis, the Navy springs a talented young safecracker from a DC jail and offers him his freedom if he will help them break undetected into Japanese facilities to photograph the Red Machine and related keying documents.

The Red Machine is in a locked and guarded room in an apartment rented by the Japanese Naval attaché, while keying documents are in an office safe in the Japanese embassy. The balance of the movie shows the preparation and execution of the two capers.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

When we finally see it, the Red Machine greatly resembles a rubicund ENIGMA. In a thrilling scene, the burglar and the lieutenant minding him fully disassemble it, down seemingly to the dust in the open spaces, for photographing.

There was a Red Machine in real life; however, it was used by the Japanese Foreign Ministry—not the Navy—and it was solved by the US Army, not the Navy. Just to complicate the real life story, the US Navy had pinched a copy of an earlier Japanese Navy codebook, which the Americans called the “Red Code,” based on the binder in which it was kept. (Prewar codebreaking was nothing if not colorful!)

Before World War II, there were a few occasions in which the US Navy conducted “black bag jobs” against Japanese targets. This is not well documented, but appears to have been done against Japanese ships in American ports and, perhaps, consular buildings. A former NSA senior used to refer to this as “second-story cryptanalysis.”

There was one incident in the 1930s that vaguely resembles the black bag job in the movie. Two officers from OP-20-G, the Navy’s cryptologic organization, following a rumor that a Japanese attaché kept cryptographic materials in his apartment, entered the apartment disguised as electric company workers, and searched it. They found nothing, and left—after receiving a quarter tip each from the butler.

Most of the Navy’s cryptanalytic work, like the Army’s, was done by pure analysis. This is important and even exciting, but, unfortunately, is not very cinematic.

One other problem: I’m not into militaria, but something else looks wrong in the film. All the Navy officers wear their medals on their work uniforms—not a ribbon in a row of ribbons, but the actual medal hanging from a strip of cloth. My understanding is that this was done only with the highest level of formal dress uniforms.

The Navy’s pre-World War II cryptanalytic work was vitally important; in fact, we would have been much less well-prepared for the wartime effort if we had not had the COMINT information the Navy produced in the 1930s.

I like a thriller as much as anybody, but *The Red Machine* does a real disservice to cryptology today in misportraying how the work was done. It certainly is

disrespectful to the small and skilled group of professionals who actually solved Japanese codes and ciphers in the 1930s and war years.

The Imitation Game, a major motion picture released in 2014, pays tribute to the accomplishments of Dr. Alan Turing. He was the mathematics genius—a word used carefully, not just as an enthusiastic tribute—who made important contributions at Bletchley Park toward exploiting German cryptosystems in World War II, and whose theoretical work led to development of the modern computer. Turing was homosexual, was forced into hormonal treatments as the result of a court case, and committed suicide in 1954.

The movie is richly filmed, with good acting and a riveting story. Benedict Cumberbatch as the adult Alan Turing is especially memorable and may only have been out-acted by the young man who played the teenaged Turing as he wrestled with questions of his self-identity.

The story, however, is riddled with inaccuracies. Most of them don’t matter much if one looks at the story as a parable people today need to internalize about the misunderstood genius and the tribulations a gay man had to pass through in a hostile society.

A few of the inaccuracies do matter, however. My personal opinion is that the film makers owe an apology to the families of Alastair Denniston and Hugh Alexander. Denniston, the director of Bletchley Park, though he held reserve rank in the Royal Navy, had been a civilian cryptanalyst since World War I. The film portrayed him as a military martinet who opposed Turing because Turing lacked discipline and ignored the chain of command. Denniston was replaced as director early in the war because his management skills were not equal to an industrial-scale enterprise; he did not harass Turing for failing to conform to expected norms of wartime behavior.

Hugh O’Donel Alexander, once chess champion of the British Empire, went on to a long career at GCHQ after the war. The film portrays him as a bragging womanizer; this portrayal runs contrary to all we know about him—he was already married by the outbreak of the war and was a good family man.

These two characters are likely included in the film to show how the bureaucracy reacted to Turing, and to contrast his homosexuality with the actions of an ag-

gressive heterosexual. This doesn't bother my historical sensibilities; on the contrary, these characters help put Turing's life and contribution into perspective. I just wish the filmmakers had used false names for the characters.

The film shows Alan Turing as the center of all the successful cryptanalytic activity at Bletchley Park, including the purchase of parts, and assembly of the cryptanalytic bombe, which exploited ENIGMA-based messages. In actuality, the bombe was designed by Turing but built elsewhere; Turing's bombe was made faster and more efficient by Gordon Welchman, also a Cambridge mathematician.

Turing really was important, but he wasn't Superman. In this aspect, *The Imitation Game* reminds me of those classic "biopix" of the 1930s: young Tom Edison knows, despite all opposition, that he will grow up to invent the light bulb.

One other significant inaccuracy should be noted. In the film, once Turing and a few colleagues have solved the Naval ENIGMA machine and have shown that the bombe can solve messages on a recurring basis, Turing and these colleagues decide how the resulting intelligence—called ULTRA—will be distributed. The source is secret, even the Bletchley Park hierarchy is not to know the ENIGMA has been solved, and the Turing team calculates statistically which decrypts will be released to the military, thus determining who will live or die in battle. This is necessary, they say, to prevent the Germans from realizing that the ENIGMA is vulnerable.

This is not true. The ULTRA decrypts were distributed by the military to a select group of cleared readers, mostly senior commanders and their intelligence officers. The commanders were required to come up with a cover plan to disguise the source of their information before they could act on it. In real life, for example, Allied commanders, who were remarkably well informed about their enemy, would order unnecessary reconnaissance or patrolling to fool the Germans about their intelligence source. Despite a number of myths, no one's life was sacrificed to protect the ULTRA secret.

Let me mention two small but interesting miscues among many inaccuracies. After Turing's arrest, a news-

paper article sports the headline, "Cambridge Professor Convicted of Indecent Acts." Actually, Turing was a professor at the University of Manchester.

There was a Soviet spy at Bletchley Park, and the movie references him. However, the film shows the spy unmasked because he used an insecure "Beale cipher" when passing secrets to the Soviets. In reality, the Beale cipher refers to a specific encrypted message from early 18th century Virginia that is reputed to hide the location of a fabulous buried treasure; it is not a particular kind of cipher.

Lest you think I didn't like *The Imitation Game*, let me say that I did enjoy it as a movie. It is well written, has good performances, and raises social and political issues that still must be settled today. It is good to see Turing getting the public recognition that he deserves, and it is good to remind us all of the unjust and tragic consequences of acting on society's prejudices.

But these inaccuracies affect the Intelligence Community, especially the cryptologic community, in several negative ways. The films give the public a false concept of what cryptology is and how cryptologists protect the country. *The Red Machine* reinforces the idea that intelligence agencies will do anything, including outright criminal acts, to achieve their goals. *The Imitation Game* shows members of the Intelligence Community playing God with people's lives.

If the public accepts these as true to life, and they will—most of us have encountered people who think James Bond movies are documentaries—how long before these false beliefs about cryptologic work are reflected in the actions of their government representation?

Not the least of the negative effects of these false images will be their influence on recruiting the next generation of cryptologists.

It may be impossible to show the drama and excitement of real-life cryptologic work on the screen in any popular way. If this is true, we can only hope that in the future filmmakers will avoid showing it in fanciful ways that have a negative impact on the community.



Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf

Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake, except where otherwise noted.

CURRENT TOPICS

The End of Intelligence: Espionage and State Power in the Information Age, by David Tucker

GENERAL

Applied Thinking for Intelligence Analysis: A Guide for Practitioners, by Charles Vandeppeer; reviewed by Jamie H.

Historical Dictionary of Intelligence Failures, by Glenmore Trenear-Harvey

Historical Dictionary of United States Intelligence, by Michael Turner

HISTORICAL

Blowtorch: Robert Komer, Vietnam, and American Cold War Strategy, by Frank Leith Jones

Churchill's Iceman: The True Story of Geoffrey Pyke: Genius, Fugitive, Spy, by Henry Hemming

Double Agent: The First Hero of World War II and How the FBI Outwitted and Destroyed a Nazi Spy Ring, by Peter Duffy

The Gestapo: Power and Terror in the Third Reich, by Carsten Dams and Michael Stolle

Liar, Temptress, Soldier, Spy: Four Women Undercover in the Civil War, by Karen Abbott

A Matter of Intelligence: MI5 and the Surveillance of Anti-Nazi Refugees, 1933–50, by Charmian Brinson and Richard Dove

The Role of Intelligence in Ending the War in Bosnia in 1995, edited by Timothy R. Walton

Scouting for Grant and Meade: The Reminiscences of Judson Knight, Chief of Scouts, Army of the Potomac, edited by Peter G. Tsouras

Secret Cables of the Comintern, 1933–1943, by Fridrikh I. Firsov, Harvey Klehr, and John Earl Haynes

The Spy Catchers: The Official History of ASIO, 1949–1963, by David Horner

The Spy With 29 Names: The Story of the Second World War's Most Audacious Double Agent, by Jason Webster

State Department Counterintelligence: Leaks, Spies, and Lies, by Robert David Booth

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CURRENT TOPICS

The End of Intelligence: Espionage and State Power in the Information Age, by David Tucker (Stanford University Press, 2014), 241 pp., endnotes, bibliography, appendices, index.

David Tucker is a former Foreign Service Officer and currently a senior fellow at the Ashbrook Center of Ashland University in Ohio. He began his research for *The End of Intelligence* while a student at the Naval Post Graduate School in Monterey, California. The result is one of the more unusual and provocative works on the subject of espionage published to date. For openers, the title is never explained. While one might conceivably infer from the narrative that Tucker is implying the information age will doom espionage, or that the words “the End” in the title implies its purpose or objective, either of which would be just an unsupported guess. There are also two unusual statements worth noting. First, he asserts “that most discussions of intelligence suggest that we need more analysis, probably less espionage, and certainly less covert action. The analysis presented here reaches a somewhat different conclusion: *we could do with much less analysis, at least as it has been institutionalized in American intelligence, but cannot do without espionage and covert action.*” [emphasis added] (2) This assertion is treated in the narrative but is not remotely justified and is never clearly explained. The second unusual statement is, “In the end, [the book] reaches the entirely ineffective conclusion that a ‘standard of goodness or badness beyond results,’ rather than knowledge, is the key to power.” (4) Two things are worth observing about this quotation: the ambiguity is never clarified and, though the statement appears in the introduction, it is not mentioned in the book’s concluding chapter or anywhere else.

The six explicatory chapters of the book discuss various aspects of intelligence and espionage—terms that Tucker often confuses—and power. He begins by considering where espionage fits into the constellation of “information, intelligence, and state power.” (3) His approach is to

compare the differences between ancient—16th century—and modern espionage, in part by invoking the philosophic views of Colbert (Jean-Baptiste, not Steven) and Francis Bacon, and in part by critiquing well-known espionage cases and the thinking of intelligence professionals. Sherman Kent is a favorite target in the latter category. Tucker questions Kent’s advocacy of the “modern scientific method” (19) and “a liberal tradition that deemphasized espionage . . . destined, in his view, to become redundant.” Tucker challenges Kent’s view of analysis, concluding that his methodology “does not alter the conclusion that judgment in espionage is more reliable than judgment in analysis.” (187) Tucker’s rationale for this conclusion is not straightforward and hints at confirmation bias.

Other topics subjected to Tucker’s insights include counterintelligence, covert action, conventional and irregular warfare, plus principals and agents as they figure in the information revolution and espionage. Overall, he concludes, the revolution “helps more than it harms the state.” (160) As to the importance of espionage, he offers many judgments, a few of which exemplify his grasp of the topic. For example, “in recognizing the limits of self-knowledge in espionage organizations, we are again recognizing the limits to the power of information” (185) or, “calling for more espionage in the face of failure... suggests a reliance on espionage as a kind of magic charm.” Then he suggests that “it is difficult to read about William Donovan’s insistence on the effectiveness of operations behind enemy lines, despite all the evidence to the contrary, and not believe that he was in the grip of some belief that intelligence had occult power.” (189)

The End of Intelligence presents some unusual concepts, all of which challenge the mind. Making sense of them, as formulated, is a project without end.

GENERAL

Applied Thinking for Intelligence Analysis: A Guide for Practitioners, by Charles Vandeeper (Royal Australian Air Force, 2014), 118 pp., figures, tables, no index. Reviewed by Jamie H.

In *Applied Thinking for Intelligence Analysis: A Guide for Practitioners*, Squadron Leader Charles Vandeeper of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) introduces readers to the challenges and complexities of intelligence analysis, but fails to offer promised practical guidance on making judgments in an uncertain world. The book was written to provide introductory critical thinking training to RAAF analysts, and the chapters are short and punctuated by simple, clear graphics that reinforce the learning.

Applied Thinking for Intelligence Analysis begins by defining intelligence and the problems analysts face. Readers in the Intelligence Community will appreciate the typology offered to characterize “solvable” and “unsolvable” problems, as well as the probing questions the author offers to narrow an analytic inquiry. This discussion sets up later chapters on prediction and complex-

ity that address the limits of our ability to predict future developments, particularly when people are involved.

In the remainder of the book, the author takes a philosophical approach to an overview of knowledge, reasoning, expertise, and cognitive biases. Short descriptions of each provide historic context and possible missteps, but the book lacks guidance on how to use knowledge, expertise, and reasoning to develop analytic arguments—probably the most important application of thinking to intelligence analysis. Moreover, the book references analytic tools but only provides sufficient instruction for backcasting, mind mapping, nominal group technique, pre-mortem analysis, and indicators and warning. For these reasons, analysts looking for guidance on applying thinking to the production of intelligence will need to look elsewhere.

Historical Dictionary of Intelligence Failures, by Glenmore Trenear-Harvey (Roman & Littlefield, 2014), 299 pp., bibliography, appendix, no index.

American readers may well expect this book to discuss some familiar events, such as the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen penetrations, or the Cambridge Five, and even the more recent Manning and Snowden cases. But they would be wrong, according to British author Glenmore Trenear-Harvey, because of his definition of failure. He draws a distinction between intelligence—what we would call the intelligence product—and security. For example, he characterizes the failure to recognize Kim Philby and George Blake as KGB penetrations of MI6 as “appalling breaches of security,” not intelligence failures. (1) Trenear-Harvey extends this thinking to all other penetrations and unsuccessful covert actions, thus excluding them from this book.

Most of the failures he does include are those based on faulty conclusions drawn from sound data, failure to disseminate intelligence properly, or failure to connect

the dots. The prelude to the 2003 Iraq war (11) and the use of Ryszard Kuklinski’s Polish intelligence (176) are offered as examples of the former and pre-9/11 analyses are illustrative of the latter. For some entries, however, the reason for inclusion is not obvious, the XX Committee being an example. (253) Additionally, the author does not state the criteria for selecting cases that fall within his definition, the preponderance of which involve the CIA.

Like all books in the Historical Intelligence Dictionary series, the publisher declines to allow sources and most often (as in this case), indices. In some respects, this substantially reduces the books’ scholarly value, though when used as starting points these books can spark solid research habits.

However one defines intelligence failure, the examples Trenear-Harvey has included give a clear ex-

H*istorical Dictionary of United States Intelligence*, by Michael Turner (Roman & Littlefield, 2014), 383 pp., bibliography, no index. Second Edition.

In the nearly ten years since the first edition of this book was published, former CIA officer Michael Turner has worked to bring it up to date and correct errors. His criterion for including entries was that they be “the most relevant items important to American intelligence.” (ix) There are more than 100 additional pages in this edition, including a detailed list of acronyms, a valuable chronology, a comprehensive bibliography, and a short summary of American intelligence history.

Though more error-free than the first edition, some remain. For example, neither Britain’s Special Operations Executive (SOE) nor the American OSS launched Jedburgh Teams behind enemy lines in 1943 (xxvi); they didn’t go in until 1944. NSA was not established by Congress in 1952 or in any other year; President Harry Truman created it by classified presidential memorandum on 24 October 1952. There are also a few termi-

nological errors, as, for example, calling Rudolf Abel a Soviet illegal agent (he was a KGB officer). The topic of the Cambridge spies, covered only in the entry on Kim Philby, also requires clarification: Philby’s father was not an aristocrat, and SIS did reinstate Philby as a contract agent. His service in Lebanon was not as a freelance agent; he worked for the *Observer* and *The Economist*. Donald Maclean never worked for British intelligence, and John Cairncross, who did, is not mentioned. Finally, some of the most important espionage cases in American history have been omitted. Examples include Elizabeth Bentley, Aleksandr Ogorodnikov, Yuri Nosenko, and Adolf Tolkachev. While the discrepancies are not earthshaking, they do suggest fact-checking would be wise when using this dictionary as a source.

Overall, this edition of the *Historical Dictionary of American Intelligence* is much improved.

B*lowtorch: Robert Komer, Vietnam, and American Cold War Strategy*, by Frank Leith Jones (Naval Institute Press, 2013), 401 pp., endnotes, bibliography, index.

Robert Komer grew up in St. Louis and went to Harvard to avoid working for his father. An Army intelligence combat historian during WWII, he received a battlefield commission for his work in Italy. After the war, he completed Harvard Business School, married in St. Louis, and then a “wartime intelligence colleague” (18) told him about the newly-formed Central Intelligence Group. He applied and by the time he was hired, Central Intelligence Group had become the Central Intelligence Agency, and he joined as an analyst. He didn’t have a nickname then, but he was already prickly, irascible, and abrasive—character traits that would further develop throughout his career. But it was the combination of his keen analytic skills and his intense passion for the strategic arts that quickly gained command attention. These qualities, coupled with the ability to articulate concepts clearly, quickly—both verbally and in writ-

ing—and his talent for speaking truth to power and surviving, led to rapid promotion. In *Blowtorch*, Army War College security studies professor Frank Leith adds particulars to a colorful though relatively unknown CIA analyst who became an advisor to four presidents.

While serving with Sherman Kent in the Office of National Estimates, Komer became an expert in South Asia, attended the National War College, and then headed the Soviet estimates group; a year later, he was made the CIA representative to the NSC. In less than 10 years he became a GS-16. When the Kennedy administration came to power, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy brought in a new staff of Kennedy associates. Leith tells how Komer survived the changes and became one of the Kennedy in-crowd, working with Walt Rostow on South Asia policy matters and later with Gen. Maxwell Taylor on counterinsurgency issues.

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But it was under President Johnson that Komer reached the height of his analytic and bureaucratic powers. In 1966, Johnson sent him to Vietnam to assess the situation there. It was then that the US ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge, gave Komer the nickname Blowtorch for his “resolute determination.” (3) Not all descriptions of Komer were even obliquely flattering, however. Journalist David Halberstam later found him “bumptious and audacious,” and something of a presidential sycophant for his persistently positive judgments that the war was at least not getting any worse.^a

a. David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (Random House, 1972), 648.

Churchill's Iceman: The True Story of Geoffrey Pyke: Genius, Fugitive, Spy, by Henry Hemming (Preface Publishing, Random House, 2014), 532 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Geoffrey Pyke ranks with Steve Jobs as an innovative genius. In *Churchill's Iceman*, British writer Henry Hemming tells us why. The title comes from Pyke's idea for a gigantic, unsinkable aircraft carrier—made of reinforced ice called pykrete. Lord Mountbatten, Pyke's superior at the time (late 1943) thought the idea brilliant and demonstrated the concept to Churchill by placing a sample of pykrete in his bathtub—it floated—while the PM was in it. Despite Churchill's support, his scientific and military advisors resisted, and the war ended before pykrete got off the drawing board.

Leith devotes considerable attention to Komer's development of and bureaucratic maneuvering for Johnson's Vietnam pacification policies. For Komer, the result was his assignment to Vietnam—with the rank of ambassador—to establish the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Support (CORDS) group and to rejuvenate the pacification program under the military. After nearly 20 months, progress was in dispute, the Phoenix Program was drawing criticism, and his relationship with the new US commander in South Vietnam, Gen. Creighton Abrams, was not going well. The president nominated Komer as ambassador to Turkey, and, as he later admitted, he left “with his tail between his legs.” (216) Leith concludes that “Vietnam haunted Robert Komer.” (267)

The Turkey ambassadorship lasted only a few months after President Nixon was elected; Komer left government to work at the RAND Corporation. He returned during the Carter administration, working in the Defense Department, but left for the last time after Reagan was elected.

Leith concludes that Komer's historical reputation was “linked to the folly of Vietnam,” (283) despite the small portion of his career spent there. His passion for and contribution to strategic issues and national policy have received insufficient attention. *Blowtorch* adjusts the balance.

The First World War began while Pyke was a student at Cambridge, where, wanting to make a contribution to the war effort, he asked himself, “What can I do to help that hasn't been done?” His answer was to go to Berlin as a journalist after all others had been expelled and to report on events there. He managed to arrive in Berlin to be apprehended and sent to Ruhleben, the escape-proof internment camp where John Masterman—future head of the Double Cross Committee—was a fellow prisoner. Pyke promptly escaped and made his way to England, where he was suspected of being a German spy, since no one had escaped, as yet, from

Ruhleben. Undeterred, and never charged with a crime, he wrote a bestselling book about his experience.^a

In the interwar period, Pyke married and produced a son, established a private school where the children decided what they would pursue for learning day-to-day, and tried his hand at investing. As the Nazi threat to world peace grew, Pyke supported Republicans in the Spanish Civil War and began sending material to them—Harley Davidson motorcycles, microscopes, and sphagnum moss for wound dressings—though such acts were prohibited in England. In the summer of 1939, Pyke had the idea of carrying out an undercover opinion poll in Germany—without telling the Nazis—the results of which could be used to dissuade Hitler from going to war; he completed the task as the war began. Next, he worked on the problem of fighting in Norwegian snow and invented a military version of the snowmobile.

In 1942, Pyke was recommended to Lord Mountbatten, then director of programs for combined operations, charged with thinking about mounting an offense against the Germans. Pyke was just the kind of scientific yet unconventional thinker that Mountbatten wanted; the pykrete ice ship was just one of Pyke's contributions.

a. Geoffrey Pyke, *To Ruhleben and Back: A Great Adventure in Three Phases* (Constable, 1916).

Double Agent: The First Hero of World War II and How the FBI Outwitted and Destroyed a Nazi Spy Ring, by Peter Duffy (Scribner, 2014), 338 pp., endnotes, photos, index.

The trial of 33 men and three women on charges of espionage began in September 1941, and ended a week after the Pearl Harbor attack. All were found guilty and Nazi espionage in America was decimated. The key witness at the trial was a naturalized US citizen, William Sebold. *Double Agent* tells his story.

Sebold's role in the case was more than that of just a witness. Born in Germany, he served in the German army during World War I. Seeing little hope in the postwar economy, he signed on with an oil tanker bound for Texas, where he jumped ship. After months working

Hemming interlaces the telling of Pyke's scientific career with the problems Pyke created for himself because of his political views and associates. He was friends with GRU agent Jürgen Kuczynski—who recruited Klaus Fuchs—and atom spy Alan Nunn May, among many other known communists. Documents linking Pyke to the Cambridge Five were found in Guy Burgess's apartment after his defection. (408) Millicent Bagot, the famous MI5 counterintelligence analyst (the model for John le Carré's Connie Sachs) doggedly tracked Pyke throughout the war and suspected he was a Soviet agent, even on his many wartime trips to the United States, but she never had conclusive proof.

After World War II, Pyke worked on problems for Britain's new National Health Service but his own health was not good and he died, by his own hand, in 1948. Among his legacy of convictions was his view that government officials were the greatest barrier to scientifically-based administration and progress.

Churchill's Iceman is skillfully written and superbly documented with interviews and recently declassified MI5 files—a fine lesson in what an innovative person can accomplish.

odd jobs and learning English, he stowed away on a ship bound for Germany, where his mother needed help. He would repeat this cycle twice more. The next time, after traveling via South America, he stayed long enough to marry and become a citizen in 1936. While the reasons for his third trip are not certain, it is known he returned again in February 1939, leaving his wife in New York. In Germany, Sebold found work in a steam-turbine factory, a move that suggested to author Peter Duffy that "he had no immediate plans to return to his wife in New York." (112) Then the Abwehr took over his life.

Duffy tells how Sebold was recruited as an agent and trained to return to America where he would contact other agents. Sebold said he cooperated because of implied threats to his family and the prospect of being called up to serve the Nazis. In any case, he managed to alert the embassy of his situation and, on 8 February 1940 when he landed in New York, the FBI met him. Once he was able to convince the Bureau of his predicament, they recruited him as their first double agent.

Sebold gave the FBI the names of Nazi agents and the contact instructions that he brought with him on microfilm. One of most important names was that of Hermann Lang, who had already given the Nazis some drawings for the very secret Norden bombsight. The Bureau put all the agents under surveillance and created a cover job for Sebold that included an office wired for sound and facilities for filming through two-way

mirrors; this ensured all meetings with agents would be documented. They also established a radio site so he could communicate with his Abwehr masters.

Double Agent describes these events and Sebold's ultimately depressing life after the trial as the first member of what became the FBI's witness protection program. In this regard the author adds much new to the story, which he interweaves—sometimes to excess—with historical events of the times.

Although the espionage part of *Double Agent* has been told elsewhere, including a fantasized version in the movie *The House on 92nd Street*, Duffy has drawn on family interviews, FBI documents, and court records to produce the most accurate version to date. But he doesn't quite make the case that Sebold was a hero, since Sebold clearly acted out of self-serving expediency. Nevertheless, it is an important case, well told.

The Gestapo: Power and Terror in the Third Reich, by Carsten Dams and Michael Stolle (Oxford University Press, 2014), 234 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, glossary, index.

The Gestapo (shorthand for Geheime Staatsappolizei) or secret police, was a Nazi organization that was anything but secret. In the Western media of the day, the Gestapo was portrayed as the omniscient implementer of Nazi evil. In Germany itself, the Gestapo's existence and methods were widely publicized. In reality, though its reputation for malevolent cruelty is indeed justified, its operations and responsibilities were not as pervasive as some writers and historians have suggested. The Nazis had several other organizations involved in various aspects of state security whose functions and operations often overlapped or conflicted with those of the Gestapo. One of these, the Abwehr or military intelligence element, is, for reasons not explained, omitted. With that exception, *The Gestapo* illuminates these players and clarifies their roles.

After a review of the Gestapo's origins and evolution, the authors describe its *modus operandi*, (57ff) which includes its administrative practices, the use of informants, the role of persecution, and the effectiveness of torture.

They also provide examples that illustrate how politics and race influenced decisions about offenses, from the trivial to the more substantive. (78–80) Particular attention is given to the persecution of communists, social democrats, homosexuals, religious minorities, and Jews.

As Hitler's armies invaded country after country in Europe, the geographic mission of the Gestapo increased and expanded accordingly. The Gestapo's penetration of the Polish resistance and its support of the SS (Schutzstaffel or protection squad) and local police in implementing the "final solution" are typical of its operations. By the end of the war, the authors write, the Gestapo had become "the executor of the war of extermination." (157)

The Gestapo concludes with a summary of what happened to its members after the war. While some were prosecuted, the authors state, "The majority of Gestapo members were not summoned to court, and numerous crimes remained unpunished." (165)

The book ends with a discussion of the question, “What remains of the Gestapo?” (180) The authors suggest very little does remain, but they warn soci-

ety should not forget “what people are capable of, when state power gives them a mandate.” (182)

Liar, Temptress, Soldier, Spy: Four Women Undercover in the Civil War, by Karen Abbott (HarperCollins, 2014), 513 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

The four undercover women in *Liar, Temptress, Soldier, Spy* will not be new to readers of Civil War history. Three have written memoirs: Belle Boyd, Rose O’Neal Greenhow, and Sarah Edmonds. The story of the fourth, Elizabeth Van Lew, is based on solid secondary sources. Deciding which heroine fits which appellation in the title is not straightforward. Boyd, Greenhow, and Edmonds each greatly embellished their memoirs and each was a temptress. Boyd and Greenhow both claimed to be successful spies, but the evidence shows otherwise. Greenhow was recruited in Washington at the start of the war to pass along what she could using a crude cipher. She did so before the First Battle of Bull Run, but there is nothing—except her memoirs—to indicate it made any difference whatsoever. She was soon arrested by Pinkerton (whose own memoirs are also grossly inflated), ending her career.

Boyd claims to have passed along valuable order-of-battle data to the Confederates and to have personally warned Stonewall Jackson of an impending attack. All accounts present Boyd as employing all means to elicit information and to get her name in the press, which she frequently accomplished. Only Edmonds was a soldier. She enlisted as Frank Thompson—and later became a

nurse—but no records have been found, to date, that document her claims to have been a spy. The only one of the four to become a successful spy or Union agent was Elizabeth Van Lew, who risked her life in Richmond sending valuable intelligence to General Grant.

Journalist Karen Abbott indicates in an introductory note that she is aware of the historical hazards associated with using her subjects’ memoirs and that she has taken those hazards into account. But she relies much too heavily on their accounts—especially that of Edmonds—and leaves the impression that their contribution to the war greater than it was.

For readers unfamiliar with these events, Abbott tells their stories wonderfully. She interlaces their roles, often indicating what each knew about the others as events proceeded. And she follows each heroine until her death.

Liar, Temptress, Soldier, Spy will serve as an easy-reading introduction to these well-known episodes of the Civil War. But, except for the Van Lew account, for those wondering which details are accurate, further research will be necessary.

A Matter of Intelligence: MI5 and the Surveillance of Anti-Nazi Refugees, 1933–50, by Charmian Brinson and Richard Dove (Manchester University Press, 2014), 254 pp., end-of-chapter notes, bibliography, index.

A Matter of Intelligence is a study of MI5’s surveillance of German and Austrian refugees from Hitler’s Germany between 1933 and 1950, written by British professors Charmian Brinson and Richard Dove. At first glance, one might reasonably suppose that this topic was covered in Christopher Andrew’s authorized his-

tory of MI5 published in 2009.^a When the authors discovered that it was not, they decided to fill the gap.

The authors’ objective was to “trace the course of the surveillance . . . when and why it began, and what

a. Christopher Andrew, *Defend the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5* (Alfred A. Knopf, 2009).

rationale, if any, it was based on . . . and to evaluate how necessary it was or how successful it was.” (2–3) Of the more than 80,000 refugees, 90 percent were Jewish and 10 percent were political exiles, though the categories overlapped. The study examines a portion of the 5,000 files so far released, such that results must be considered preliminary. Besides individuals, MI5 monitored the activities of several suspected communist front organizations using informants. (157) When a refugee found a patron among British citizens—perhaps a relative or former contact—the patron was surveilled, too.

While the book’s subtitle reference to “anti-Nazi refugees” is somewhat misleading, it is completely true. The anti-Nazis came in three principal categories: Jews, communists, and communist Jews. The latter two were designated and treated as Soviet agents or suspected Soviet agents. The authors include short summaries of what the MI5 files revealed about the suspects. Some, such as the espionage aspects of the Jürgen Kuczynski and Edith Tudor-Hart cases, are well known. But here the authors discuss what is recorded in their surveillance files about their daily lives, contacts, and their organizing activities. The file on Englebert Broda, the physical chemist who

found work at the Cavendish Laboratory at Cambridge, shows MI5 was well aware of his communist connections and suspected him of passing secrets to the Soviets—and that is what he did—but they never found any evidence and he managed to escape after the war. (210)

In their conclusions, the authors express consternation that MI5 remained “so intensely concerned with the surveillance of Communists.” They go on to ponder why “the surveillance [continued] and even intensify after the Soviet Union entered the war . . . when the Soviet Union was a war ally.” (232) Then they return to the point they make earlier in book, asking why the surveillance operation has “not become part of the official MI5 history?” (233) The answer, of course, is that some of the suspects—the Fuchs case, for example—and some of those mentioned above were indeed discussed in the authorized history. Their failure to recognize this is unexplained. The suggestion that surveillance of the communists should have been stopped during the war reveals a lack of counterintelligence awareness on the authors’ part.

Overall, an interesting book that does cover much not recorded before. Well documented, it provides detail on what MI5 looked for as it attempted to defend the realm.

The Role of Intelligence in Ending the War in Bosnia in 1995, edited by Timothy R. Walton (Lexington Books, 2014), 192 pp., end-of-chapter notes, photos, index.

Former CIA officer Timothy Walton has edited a collection of papers presented at the Intelligence and the Transition From War to Peace conference, held at James Madison University (JMU) in March 2014. After a thoughtful introduction by JMU President Jonathan R. Alger, Walton sets the historical context in a paper that summarizes the role of intelligence in government in general and Bosnia in particular. He makes the point that intelligence supports policy—and that is the sense in which it is applied in this volume: no operational cases are included; only treated are policy situations in which use is made of various disseminated products. Most of the papers presented were sourced to docu-

ments from the Bosnia, Intelligence, and the Clinton Presidency collection, released in 2013 by CIA.^a

The book’s title is slightly misleading. While many of the 10 papers do discuss the policymaking pertaining to intelligence products on the Bosnian war, other topics are covered. Examples include a paper on ethical reasoning, another on an unusual analytic technique called “text mining and sentiment analysis,” (35ff) and one on a statistical technique used to study the timing of the US intervention in Bosnia. A paper by two Dutch academics, Professor Bob de Graaf and senior

a. <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>

researcher Cees Wiebes, addresses the question, “Was Srebrenica an intelligence failure?” In the final paper, Walton assesses both the compromises the NSC deemed necessary to get a deal that would end the war and the intelligence that contributed to that decision.

Scouting for Grant and Meade: The Reminiscences of Judson Knight, Chief of Scouts, Army of the Potomac, edited by Peter G. Tsouras (Skyhorse Publishing, 2014), 276 pp., bibliography, photos, no index.

Reliable firsthand accounts of Civil War intelligence operations are often truth-challenged and written to embellish the author’s reputation; the memoir of putative general La Fayette C. Baker is a good example.^a *Scouting for Grant and Meade* is a welcome exception. Peter Tsouras has done far more than edit the reminiscences of Judson Knight, former chief scout for the Army of the Potomac. Tsouras’s lengthy introduction provides a summary of Knight’s civilian and military career—essential background for Knight’s articles, which were published some 30 years after the war in the Washington, DC, *National Tribune* that eventually became *The Stars and Stripes*. Although Knight’s accounts mention well-known officers, fellow scouts, and famous battles, he provides no sources. Tsouras sought to determine their reliability by examining Civil War records in the National Archives. He found many reports from generals—Sheridan, Grant, and Meade, to name three—that supported Knight’s accounts, plus other documents that attested to the accuracy of his remarkable recollections.

Judson Knight enlisted in the Union Army in 1861 and first served as a scout during the Peninsula Campaign, Second Bull Run, and Antietam. He became ill in 1862 and was discharged to recover. In the fall of

The Role of Intelligence in Ending the War in Bosnia in 1995 is a valuable addition to the literature on an area that has not previously received much attention.

1863, he rejoined the Army as civilian chief of scouts under the command of Colonel George Sharpe, who headed the newly formed Bureau of Military Intelligence. Much of his scouting supported the sieges of Richmond and Petersburg; but one of his most valuable contributions was establishing the link between Sharpe and Union agent Elizabeth Van Lew. Knight had met Van Lew’s brother, who told Knight his sister wanted to cooperate. (xxxii) Elizabeth became the principal Union source in Richmond. (205)

While most of the accounts in *Scouting for Grant and Meade* were written by Knight, Tsouras also includes some material written by Knight’s scouts. The story of Anson Carney and his role in the disastrous Dahlgren Raid—intended to free Union prisoners in Richmond—is one example. (72ff)

Although Knight worked directly for Sharpe, he also received tasks from General Grant. Knight’s account of his mission to determine whether General Lee was being reinforced after the Battle of Spotsylvania Courthouse is of particular interest, both for its intelligence aspects and for the identification of his contacts among the Confederate civilians whom he met.

Scouting for Grant and Meade is a fine contribution to the Civil War intelligence literature, one of the very few that is both well documented and well told.

a. La Fayette C. Baker, *The United States Secret Service in the Late War: Comprising the Author’s Introduction to the Leading Men at Washington* (Forgotten Books, 2012; originally published 1890).

Secret Cables of the Comintern 1933–1943, by Fridrikh I. Firsov, Harvey Klehr, and John Earl Haynes (Yale University Press, 2014), 308 pp., endnotes, index.

The Communist Internationale (Comintern) was the Soviet umbrella organization through which Stalin controlled communist parties throughout the world between 1919 and 1943. Radio telegraphy was the primary means of communication with the parties from Moscow, although enciphered letters and invisible inks were also employed. In 2005, Nigel West revealed that the British had secretly intercepted and decrypted some 14,000 messages between the Comintern and the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB).^a Code-named MASK, the traffic identified party members and revealed financial transactions, policy decisions, and operational exchanges with the Comintern's intelligence organization, the Foreign Liaison Department (OMS).

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, coauthor Fridrikh Firsov, an archivist in the Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History, gained access to millions but not all of the Comintern cipher cable exchanges with many of the other national communist parties. Working with American scholars Harvey Klehr and John Earl Haynes, *Secret Cables of the Comintern* provides insights into Soviet foreign policy as it describes the Comintern's struggle to establish a worldwide communist order during the final 10 years of its existence.

The authors describe in detail the cipher communications practices employed and what they revealed about the Comintern organizational structure, its administrative practices, how it financed the various parties, and the subversion operations it attempted. Of particular

a. Nigel West, *MASK: MI5's Penetration of the Communist Party of Great Britain* (Routledge, 2005).

The Spy Catchers: The Official History of ASIO, 1949–1963, by David Horner (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2014), 710 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

The Australian Security Intelligence Service (ASIO) is today a well-known and respected security service

interest is the rationale that was disseminated to explain the Hitler-Stalin Pact to the astonished faithful, and the Comintern's role in the Spanish Civil War, especially the International Brigades. And although the Comintern didn't engage in terrorist acts, it was called upon to explain and justify those performed by Stalin and why it was necessary to turn over innocent party members to the party's law enforcement arm, the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), when so ordered.

The Comintern had its own intelligence element that sometimes became involved with NKVD and Red Army military intelligence matters. One interesting example discusses the links between the Red Orchestra's leader, Leopold Trepper, (218) and his networks in Belgium and France. Then there is the administrative battle between Comintern headquarters and the American Communist Party (CPUSA). When Bill Donovan recruited Milton Wolff, an experienced, communist Spanish Civil War veteran, for OSS, Wolff sought CPUSA approval and got it; but when Comintern headquarters was notified, the approval was revoked. The CPUSA appealed and was sternly rebuked; Wolff was forced to withdraw. The story is not new, but the discovery of the Comintern role is.

Secret Cables of the Comintern shows how the nominally political Comintern was linked throughout its existence to the Soviet intelligence services, especially during WWII. Many of its orders came directly from Stalin, (247) but when it became a political impediment, Stalin shut it down. There is much new detail in this impressively documented account. Students of Soviet intelligence will get a better understanding of how the communist movement made inroads so rapidly in many nations of the world.

with a web page that emphasizes its current mission and functions. Now, following precedents established by the

CIA^a and Britain's intelligence services,^b David Horner, professor of defence history at Australian National University, has written the official history of ASIO that tells the story of its often turbulent formative years.

Founded 16 March 1949, ASIO was not Australia's first security organization and Professor Horner begins with a review of its predecessors and their limitations in early the postwar era; later, he shows how ASIO's creation became an operational necessity in the early Cold War era as old threats of communist subversion intensified and new ones, as seen in the Venona decrypts, emerged.

Recognizing the necessity of a solution and implementing it required dealing with political and social opposition, legal and vetting issues, bureaucratic disputes, organizational responsibilities, and most important, ongoing operational matters. Horner treats all of these in great detail, showing how the critical operational situation was complicated in myriad ways. Even before 1949, British and American intelligence services were expressing concern over the lack of Australian security and they excluded Australia from access to signals intelligence. The Australians knew they had leaks but had no evidence of Soviet penetration; furthermore, they were not given access to Venona. The British, at least, sent members of MI5 to assist in the creation of ASIO and, once that was accomplished, the situation improved. At first, MI5 provided excerpts from the Venona decrypts without identifying the source and ASIO began investigations of what they termed "the case." (122ff) Eventually, ASIO was briefed on Venona and their investigations continued as long as the Venona material produced results. Horner describes many of these cases and the countersubversion actions that ensued.

a. Arthur B. Darling, *The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government to 1950* (The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990); Ludwell Lee Montague, *General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence: October 1950–February 1953*, (The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990).

b. Christopher Andrew, *Defend the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5* (Alfred A. Knopf, 2009); Keith Jeffrey, *MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909–1949* (Bloomsbury, 2010).

But the most significant operation ASIO conducted during this period was the defection of MGB officers Vladimir and Evdokia Petrov. He was the MGB rezident and she was the embassy code clerk. Unlike most defectors, they were not walk-ins; instead, they were enlisted as the result of the ASIO policy of observing Soviet embassy personnel, identifying likely candidates for defection, establishing relationships, and ultimately securing their defection. A Royal Commission on Espionage was created to make public the activities of Soviet intelligence in Australia. The Petrovs and the officers and agents involved in their defection testified, though not all of what Petrov reported to ASIO and supported with documents was revealed to the Commission. One example is his knowledge that two of the Cambridge Five, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, were Soviet agents and were in Moscow. Because of British concerns, this information was made public by the British 10 months later. (368)

In his analysis of the Petrov defections, Horner reviews the literature and, where necessary, corrects previous accounts of the case. He also discusses the considerable domestic political turmoil within the government that surrounded the timing of the defection. This watershed case established ASIO's credentials with the Australian public and its sister services.

After the Petrovs's defection, the Soviets withdrew their embassy, not to return until 1959. Horner discusses a number of operations that followed, to demonstrate ASIO's competence as a major security service. *The Spy Catchers* concludes with a lengthy, tradecraft-heavy description of an operation run against KGB officer and first secretary Ivan Skripov that resulted in his expulsion. This is a fine book that demonstrates the many commonalities experienced by new intelligence services and what can be achieved by a dedicated staff. A major contribution to the literature.

The Spy With 29 Names: The Story of the Second World War's Most Audacious Double Agent, by Jason Webster (Chatto & Windus, 2014), 322 pp., endnotes, bibliography, appendices, photos, index.

The first name on the list was GARBO, the MI5 code-name for Juan Pujol Garcia. The second name on the list was ALARIC, the German code name for Juan Pujol Garcia. The other 27 names listed in an appendix of Jason Webster's book are also codenames created and used by Pujol for the fictitious members of his agent network. *The Spy With 29 Names* tells the story of the network's formation and how the Double Cross Committee used it successfully to deceive the Germans before the allied invasion of Europe in World War II.

Webster covers GARBO's early life, his conflicts with the Spanish government and the nationalist insurgents during the Spanish Civil War, and his frustrating attempts to become an agent for the British after WWII began. From the British side, he discusses how the codebreakers in Bletchley Park were puzzled by German references in the traffic between Madrid and

Berlin and GARBO's fictitious ARABEL network in Britain. The content wasn't correct and neither was the timing of events mentioned in his traffic. MI5 was alerted. They discovered that "a Spaniard had been pestering MI6 [in Spain] for months." (23) GARBO was soon located, recruited, and brought to London.

GARBO's story has been told previously in several very good books. Webster adds little new, and there is a good deal of reconstructed conversation that is not sourced. He does add a chapter that speculates about whether GARBO's MI5 case officer, Tommy Harris, was really a Soviet agent. And there are some comments from the Guy Liddell diaries not seen before, plus some conjecturing about what might have been, had GARBO not existed. In short, *The Spy With 29 Names* tells a good story, but not a new one.

State Department Counterintelligence: Leaks, Spies, and Lies, by Robert David Booth (Brown Books Publishing Group, 2014), 383 pp., endnotes, glossary, index.

The State Department formed the Secret Intelligence Bureau (SIB) in 1916 to deal with cases of passport fraud linked to espionage. The SIB has since gone through several reorganizations and is today called the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (BDS). Retired special agent Robert Booth spent 28 years with the BDS working cases overseas and domestically. *State Department Counterintelligence* reviews his career and the BDS history with emphasis on three of the major cases with which he was involved.

The first case he discusses concerns retired State Department officer Kendall Myers and his wife, Gwendolyn, whose affection for Fidel Castro and Cuba led them to become Cuban moles. Kendall is now serving life without parole in a supermax facility; Gwendolyn received an 81-month sentence. Booth tells how he was brought out of retirement as a consultant

to BDS in 2003 and ended up working the case with the FBI. It is a thorough treatment, hiding none of the frustrations endured or tradecraft complexities.

The Taiwanese Femme Fatale, or the case of Donald William Keyser, is the second case Booth discusses. Keyser was principal deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific Affairs and became involved with Isabelle Cheng, "a young, female, Taiwanese clandestine intelligence officer." (81) He also kept top secret CIA documents at home. (157) Keyser served a short term in prison, but did not lose his pension; Isabelle went on to pursue her doctorate in England. How BDS solved the case and why Keyser was treated so leniently by the judge makes interesting reading.

Operation Sacred Ibis, the third case Booth examines, is still in some ways unsolved. The KGB planted a "high

quality transmitter in a seventh floor conference room” (279) in the State Department. Booth reveals how it was discovered and describes some strange post-Cold War security procedures regarding unescorted foreign diplomatic access that may have contributed to its installation. But if it is known just how the SVR did it, Booth isn’t saying. The one benefit was that they found the device—an actuator—that caused the transmitter to function. The details of this device are interesting.

Booth also includes a section on leak cases that reveals how they are treated. It is rather depressing, not because they weren’t all solved, but because they occur so often and some leakers are not disciplined even when caught. Booth speculates that those may have been “authorized.” (250)

State Department Counterintelligence is an interesting and worthwhile account of a relatively unknown organization that shows why it exists, and where it fits in the Intelligence Community.

