< draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis   rfc5280.txt 
Network Working Group D. Cooper Network Working Group D. Cooper
Internet-Draft NIST Request for Comments: 5280 NIST
Obsoletes: 3280, 4325, 4630 (if approved) S. Santesson Obsoletes: 3280, 4325, 4630 S. Santesson
Expires: August 2008 Microsoft Category: Standards Track Microsoft
S. Farrell S. Farrell
Trinity College Dublin Trinity College Dublin
S. Boeyen S. Boeyen
Entrust Entrust
R. Housley R. Housley
Vigil Security Vigil Security
W. Polk W. Polk
NIST NIST
February 4, 2008 May 2008
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-11.txt
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http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
Copyright Notice Status of This Memo
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008). This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
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improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
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Abstract Abstract
This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate
revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this
approach and model are provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 approach and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3
certificate format is described in detail, with additional certificate format is described in detail, with additional
information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name
forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two
Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required
certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is
described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific
extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is
described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the
appendices. appendices.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1. Introduction ....................................................4
2 Requirements and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2. Requirements and Assumptions ....................................6
2.1 Communication and Topology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.1. Communication and Topology .................................7
2.2 Acceptability Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.2. Acceptability Criteria .....................................7
2.3 User Expectations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.3. User Expectations ..........................................7
2.4 Administrator Expectations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.4. Administrator Expectations .................................8
3 Overview of Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3. Overview of Approach ............................................8
3.1 X.509 Version 3 Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.1. X.509 Version 3 Certificate ................................9
3.2 Certification Paths and Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.2. Certification Paths and Trust .............................10
3.3 Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3.3. Revocation ................................................13
3.4 Operational Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3.4. Operational Protocols .....................................14
3.5 Management Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3.5. Management Protocols ......................................14
4 Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile . . . . . 16 4. Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile .................16
4.1 Basic Certificate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.1. Basic Certificate Fields ..................................16
4.1.1 Certificate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4.1.1. Certificate Fields .................................17
4.1.1.1 tbsCertificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4.1.1.1. tbsCertificate ............................18
4.1.1.2 signatureAlgorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.1.1.2. signatureAlgorithm ........................18
4.1.1.3 signatureValue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.1.1.3. signatureValue ............................18
4.1.2 TBSCertificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.1.2. TBSCertificate .....................................18
4.1.2.1 Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.1.2.1. Version ...................................19
4.1.2.2 Serial number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.1.2.2. Serial Number .............................19
4.1.2.3 Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.1.2.3. Signature .................................19
4.1.2.4 Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.1.2.4. Issuer ....................................20
4.1.2.5 Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4.1.2.5. Validity ..................................22
4.1.2.5.1 UTCTime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4.1.2.5.1. UTCTime ........................23
4.1.2.5.2 GeneralizedTime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4.1.2.5.2. GeneralizedTime ................23
4.1.2.6 Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4.1.2.6. Subject ...................................23
4.1.2.7 Subject Public Key Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 4.1.2.7. Subject Public Key Info ...................25
4.1.2.8 Unique Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 4.1.2.8. Unique Identifiers ........................25
4.1.2.9 Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 4.1.2.9. Extensions ................................26
4.2 Certificate Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 4.2. Certificate Extensions ....................................26
4.2.1 Standard Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 4.2.1. Standard Extensions ................................27
4.2.1.1 Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 4.2.1.1. Authority Key Identifier ..................27
4.2.1.2 Subject Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 4.2.1.2. Subject Key Identifier ....................28
4.2.1.3 Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 4.2.1.3. Key Usage .................................29
4.2.1.4 Certificate Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4.2.1.4. Certificate Policies ......................32
4.2.1.5 Policy Mappings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 4.2.1.5. Policy Mappings ...........................35
4.2.1.6 Subject Alternative Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 4.2.1.6. Subject Alternative Name ..................35
4.2.1.7 Issuer Alternative Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 4.2.1.7. Issuer Alternative Name ...................38
4.2.1.8 Subject Directory Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . 38 4.2.1.8. Subject Directory Attributes ..............39
4.2.1.9 Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 4.2.1.9. Basic Constraints .........................39
4.2.1.10 Name Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 4.2.1.10. Name Constraints .........................40
4.2.1.11 Policy Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 4.2.1.11. Policy Constraints .......................43
4.2.1.12 Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 4.2.1.12. Extended Key Usage .......................44
4.2.1.13 CRL Distribution Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 4.2.1.13. CRL Distribution Points ..................45
4.2.1.14 Inhibit anyPolicy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 4.2.1.14. Inhibit anyPolicy ........................48
4.2.1.15 Freshest CRL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 4.2.1.15. Freshest CRL (a.k.a. Delta CRL
4.2.2 Private Internet Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Distribution Point) ......................48
4.2.2.1 Authority Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . 48 4.2.2. Private Internet Extensions ........................49
4.2.2.2 Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 4.2.2.1. Authority Information Access ..............49
5 CRL and CRL Extensions Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 4.2.2.2. Subject Information Access ................51
5.1 CRL Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 5. CRL and CRL Extensions Profile .................................54
5.1.1 CertificateList Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 5.1. CRL Fields ................................................55
5.1.1.1 tbsCertList . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 5.1.1. CertificateList Fields .............................56
5.1.1.2 signatureAlgorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 5.1.1.1. tbsCertList ...............................56
5.1.1.3 signatureValue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 5.1.1.2. signatureAlgorithm ........................57
5.1.2 Certificate List "To Be Signed" . . . . . . . . . . . 56 5.1.1.3. signatureValue ............................57
5.1.2.1 Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 5.1.2. Certificate List "To Be Signed" ....................58
5.1.2.2 Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 5.1.2.1. Version ...................................58
5.1.2.3 Issuer Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 5.1.2.2. Signature .................................58
5.1.2.4 This Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 5.1.2.3. Issuer Name ...............................58
5.1.2.5 Next Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 5.1.2.4. This Update ...............................58
5.1.2.6 Revoked Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 5.1.2.5. Next Update ...............................59
5.1.2.7 Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 5.1.2.6. Revoked Certificates ......................59
5.2 CRL Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 5.1.2.7. Extensions ................................60
5.2.1 Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 5.2. CRL Extensions ............................................60
5.2.2 Issuer Alternative Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 5.2.1. Authority Key Identifier ...........................60
5.2.3 CRL Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 5.2.2. Issuer Alternative Name ............................60
5.2.4 Delta CRL Indicator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 5.2.3. CRL Number .........................................61
5.2.5 Issuing Distribution Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 5.2.4. Delta CRL Indicator ................................62
5.2.6 Freshest CRL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 5.2.5. Issuing Distribution Point .........................65
5.2.7 Authority Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 5.2.6. Freshest CRL (a.k.a. Delta CRL Distribution
5.3 CRL Entry Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Point) .............................................67
5.3.1 Reason Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 5.2.7. Authority Information Access .......................67
5.3.2 Invalidity Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 5.3. CRL Entry Extensions ......................................69
5.3.3 Certificate Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 5.3.1. Reason Code ........................................69
6 Certification Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 5.3.2. Invalidity Date ....................................70
6.1 Basic Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 5.3.3. Certificate Issuer .................................70
6.1.1 Inputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 6. Certification Path Validation ..................................71
6.1.2 Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 6.1. Basic Path Validation .....................................72
6.1.3 Basic Certificate Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 6.1.1. Inputs .............................................75
6.1.4 Preparation for Certificate i+1 . . . . . . . . . . . 82 6.1.2. Initialization .....................................77
6.1.5 Wrap-up procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 6.1.3. Basic Certificate Processing .......................80
6.1.6 Outputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 6.1.4. Preparation for Certificate i+1 ....................84
6.2 Using the Path Validation Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . 87 6.1.5. Wrap-Up Procedure ..................................87
6.3 CRL Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 6.1.6. Outputs ............................................89
6.3.1 Revocation Inputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 6.2. Using the Path Validation Algorithm .......................89
6.3.2 Initialization and Revocation State Variables . . . . 88 6.3. CRL Validation ............................................90
6.3.3 CRL Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 6.3.1. Revocation Inputs ..................................91
7 Processing Rules for Internationalized Names . . . . . . 92 6.3.2. Initialization and Revocation State Variables ......91
7.1 Internationalized Names in Distinguished Names . . . . 93 6.3.3. CRL Processing .....................................92
7.2 Internationalized Domain Names in GeneralName . . . . . 94 7. Processing Rules for Internationalized Names ...................95
7.3 Internationalized Domain Names in Distinguished Names . 95 7.1. Internationalized Names in Distinguished Names ............96
7.4 Internationalized Resource Identifiers . . . . . . . . 95 7.2. Internationalized Domain Names in GeneralName .............97
7.5 Internationalized Electronic Mail Addresses . . . . . . 97 7.3. Internationalized Domain Names in Distinguished Names .....98
8 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 7.4. Internationalized Resource Identifiers ....................98
9 Intellectual Property Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 7.5. Internationalized Electronic Mail Addresses ..............100
10 Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 8. Security Considerations .......................................100
11 IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 9. IANA Considerations ...........................................105
12 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 10. Acknowledgments ..............................................105
13 Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 11. References ...................................................105
Appendix A. Pseudo-ASN.1 Structures and OIDs . . . . . . . 108 11.1. Normative References ....................................105
A.1 Explicitly Tagged Module, 1988 Syntax . . . . . . . . . 108 11.2. Informative References ..................................107
A.2 Implicitly Tagged Module, 1988 Syntax . . . . . . . . . 122 Appendix A. Pseudo-ASN.1 Structures and OIDs ....................110
Appendix B. ASN.1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 A.1. Explicitly Tagged Module, 1988 Syntax ....................110
Appendix C. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 A.2. Implicitly Tagged Module, 1988 Syntax ....................125
C.1 RSA Self-Signed Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 Appendix B. ASN.1 Notes ..........................................133
C.2 End Entity Certificate Using RSA . . . . . . . . . . . 136 Appendix C. Examples .............................................136
C.3 End Entity Certificate Using DSA . . . . . . . . . . . 139 C.1. RSA Self-Signed Certificate ..............................137
C.4 Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 C.2. End Entity Certificate Using RSA .........................140
Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 C.3. End Entity Certificate Using DSA .........................143
C.4. Certificate Revocation List ..............................147
1 Introduction 1. Introduction
This specification is one part of a family of standards for the X.509 This specification is one part of a family of standards for the X.509
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for the Internet. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for the Internet.
This specification profiles the format and semantics of certificates This specification profiles the format and semantics of certificates
and certificate revocation lists (CRLs) for the Internet PKI. and certificate revocation lists (CRLs) for the Internet PKI.
Procedures are described for processing of certification paths in the Procedures are described for processing of certification paths in the
Internet environment. Finally, ASN.1 modules are provided in the Internet environment. Finally, ASN.1 modules are provided in the
appendices for all data structures defined or referenced. appendices for all data structures defined or referenced.
Section 2 describes Internet PKI requirements, and the assumptions Section 2 describes Internet PKI requirements and the assumptions
that affect the scope of this document. Section 3 presents an that affect the scope of this document. Section 3 presents an
architectural model and describes its relationship to previous IETF architectural model and describes its relationship to previous IETF
and ISO/IEC/ITU-T standards. In particular, this document's and ISO/IEC/ITU-T standards. In particular, this document's
relationship with the IETF PEM specifications and the ISO/IEC/ITU-T relationship with the IETF PEM specifications and the ISO/IEC/ITU-T
X.509 documents are described. X.509 documents is described.
Section 4 profiles the X.509 version 3 certificate, and section 5 Section 4 profiles the X.509 version 3 certificate, and Section 5
profiles the X.509 version 2 CRL. The profiles include the profiles the X.509 version 2 CRL. The profiles include the
identification of ISO/IEC/ITU-T and ANSI extensions which may be identification of ISO/IEC/ITU-T and ANSI extensions that may be
useful in the Internet PKI. The profiles are presented in the 1988 useful in the Internet PKI. The profiles are presented in the 1988
Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) rather than the 1997 ASN.1 Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) rather than the 1997 ASN.1
syntax used in the most recent ISO/IEC/ITU-T standards. syntax used in the most recent ISO/IEC/ITU-T standards.
Section 6 includes certification path validation procedures. These Section 6 includes certification path validation procedures. These
procedures are based upon the ISO/IEC/ITU-T definition. procedures are based upon the ISO/IEC/ITU-T definition.
Implementations are REQUIRED to derive the same results but are not Implementations are REQUIRED to derive the same results but are not
required to use the specified procedures. required to use the specified procedures.
Procedures for identification and encoding of public key materials Procedures for identification and encoding of public key materials
and digital signatures are defined in [RFC 3279], [RFC 4055], and and digital signatures are defined in [RFC3279], [RFC4055], and
[RFC 4491]. Implementations of this specification are not required [RFC4491]. Implementations of this specification are not required to
to use any particular cryptographic algorithms. However, conforming use any particular cryptographic algorithms. However, conforming
implementations that use the algorithms identified in [RFC 3279], implementations that use the algorithms identified in [RFC3279],
[RFC 4055], and [RFC 4491] MUST identify and encode the public key [RFC4055], and [RFC4491] MUST identify and encode the public key
materials and digital signatures as described in those materials and digital signatures as described in those
specifications. specifications.
Finally, three appendices are provided to aid implementers. Appendix Finally, three appendices are provided to aid implementers. Appendix
A contains all ASN.1 structures defined or referenced within this A contains all ASN.1 structures defined or referenced within this
specification. As above, the material is presented in the 1988 specification. As above, the material is presented in the 1988
ASN.1. Appendix B contains notes on less familiar features of the ASN.1. Appendix B contains notes on less familiar features of the
ASN.1 notation used within this specification. Appendix C contains ASN.1 notation used within this specification. Appendix C contains
examples of conforming certificates and a conforming CRL. examples of conforming certificates and a conforming CRL.
This specification obsoletes [RFC 3280]. Differences from RFC 3280 This specification obsoletes [RFC3280]. Differences from RFC 3280
are summarized below: are summarized below:
* Enhanced support for internationalized names is specified in * Enhanced support for internationalized names is specified in
section 7, with rules for encoding and comparing internationalized Section 7, with rules for encoding and comparing
domain names, IRIs, and distinguished names. These rules are Internationalized Domain Names, Internationalized Resource
aligned with comparison rules established in current RFCs, Identifiers (IRIs), and distinguished names. These rules are
including [RFC 3490], [RFC 3987], and [RFC 4518]. aligned with comparison rules established in current RFCs,
including [RFC3490], [RFC3987], and [RFC4518].
* Sections 4.1.2.4 and 4.1.2.6 incorporate the conditions for * Sections 4.1.2.4 and 4.1.2.6 incorporate the conditions for
continued use of legacy text encoding schemes that were specified continued use of legacy text encoding schemes that were
in [RFC 4630]. Where in use by an established PKI, transition to specified in [RFC4630]. Where in use by an established PKI,
UTF8String could cause denial of service based on name chaining transition to UTF8String could cause denial of service based on
failures or incorrect processing of name constraints. name chaining failures or incorrect processing of name
constraints.
* Section 4.2.1.4 in RFC 3280, which specified the * Section 4.2.1.4 in RFC 3280, which specified the
privateKeyUsagePeriod certificate extension but deprecated its privateKeyUsagePeriod certificate extension but deprecated its
use, was removed. Use of this ISO standard extension is neither use, was removed. Use of this ISO standard extension is neither
deprecated nor recommended for use in the Internet PKI. deprecated nor recommended for use in the Internet PKI.
* Section 4.2.1.5 recommends marking the policy mappings extension * Section 4.2.1.5 recommends marking the policy mappings extension
as critical. RFC 3280 required that the policy mappings extension as critical. RFC 3280 required that the policy mappings
be marked as non-critical. extension be marked as non-critical.
* Section 4.2.1.11 requires marking the policy constraints * Section 4.2.1.11 requires marking the policy constraints
extension as critical. RFC 3280 permitted the policy constraints extension as critical. RFC 3280 permitted the policy
extension to be marked as critical or non-critical. constraints extension to be marked as critical or non-critical.
* The Authority Information Access (AIA) CRL extension, as * The Authority Information Access (AIA) CRL extension, as
specified in [RFC 4325], was added as section 5.2.7. specified in [RFC4325], was added as Section 5.2.7.
* Sections 5.2 and 5.3 clarify the rules for handling unrecognized * Sections 5.2 and 5.3 clarify the rules for handling unrecognized
CRL extensions and CRL entry extensions, respectively. CRL extensions and CRL entry extensions, respectively.
* Section 5.3.2 in RFC 3280, which specified the * Section 5.3.2 in RFC 3280, which specified the
holdInstructionCode CRL entry extension, was removed. holdInstructionCode CRL entry extension, was removed.
* The path validation algorithm specified in section 6 no longer * The path validation algorithm specified in Section 6 no longer
tracks the criticality of the certificate policies extensions in a tracks the criticality of the certificate policies extensions in
chain of certificates. In RFC 3280, this information was returned a chain of certificates. In RFC 3280, this information was
to a relying party. returned to a relying party.
* The Security Considerations section addresses the risk of * The Security Considerations section addresses the risk of
circular dependencies arising from the use of https or similar circular dependencies arising from the use of https or similar
schemes in the CRL distribution points, authority information schemes in the CRL distribution points, authority information
access, or subject information access extensions. access, or subject information access extensions.
* The Security Considerations section addresses risks associated * The Security Considerations section addresses risks associated
with name ambiguity. with name ambiguity.
* The Security Considerations section references RFC 4210 for * The Security Considerations section references RFC 4210 for
procedures to signal changes in CA operations. procedures to signal changes in CA operations.
The ASN.1 modules in appendix A are unchanged from RFC 3280, except The ASN.1 modules in Appendix A are unchanged from RFC 3280, except
that ub-emailaddress-length was changed from 128 to 255 in order to that ub-emailaddress-length was changed from 128 to 255 in order to
align with PKCS #9 [RFC 2985]. align with PKCS #9 [RFC2985].
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2 Requirements and Assumptions 2. Requirements and Assumptions
The goal of this specification is to develop a profile to facilitate The goal of this specification is to develop a profile to facilitate
the use of X.509 certificates within Internet applications for those the use of X.509 certificates within Internet applications for those
communities wishing to make use of X.509 technology. Such communities wishing to make use of X.509 technology. Such
applications may include WWW, electronic mail, user authentication, applications may include WWW, electronic mail, user authentication,
and IPsec. In order to relieve some of the obstacles to using X.509 and IPsec. In order to relieve some of the obstacles to using X.509
certificates, this document defines a profile to promote the certificates, this document defines a profile to promote the
development of certificate management systems; development of development of certificate management systems, development of
application tools; and interoperability determined by policy. application tools, and interoperability determined by policy.
Some communities will need to supplement, or possibly replace, this Some communities will need to supplement, or possibly replace, this
profile in order to meet the requirements of specialized application profile in order to meet the requirements of specialized application
domains or environments with additional authorization, assurance, or domains or environments with additional authorization, assurance, or
operational requirements. However, for basic applications, common operational requirements. However, for basic applications, common
representations of frequently used attributes are defined so that representations of frequently used attributes are defined so that
application developers can obtain necessary information without application developers can obtain necessary information without
regard to the issuer of a particular certificate or certificate regard to the issuer of a particular certificate or certificate
revocation list (CRL). revocation list (CRL).
skipping to change at page 7, line 29 skipping to change at page 7, line 20
or non-repudiation services associated with the public key in a or non-repudiation services associated with the public key in a
particular certificate. To this end, this standard does not particular certificate. To this end, this standard does not
prescribe legally binding rules or duties. prescribe legally binding rules or duties.
As supplemental authorization and attribute management tools emerge, As supplemental authorization and attribute management tools emerge,
such as attribute certificates, it may be appropriate to limit the such as attribute certificates, it may be appropriate to limit the
authenticated attributes that are included in a certificate. These authenticated attributes that are included in a certificate. These
other management tools may provide more appropriate methods of other management tools may provide more appropriate methods of
conveying many authenticated attributes. conveying many authenticated attributes.
2.1 Communication and Topology 2.1. Communication and Topology
The users of certificates will operate in a wide range of The users of certificates will operate in a wide range of
environments with respect to their communication topology, especially environments with respect to their communication topology, especially
users of secure electronic mail. This profile supports users without users of secure electronic mail. This profile supports users without
high bandwidth, real-time IP connectivity, or high connection high bandwidth, real-time IP connectivity, or high connection
availability. In addition, the profile allows for the presence of availability. In addition, the profile allows for the presence of
firewall or other filtered communication. firewall or other filtered communication.
This profile does not assume the deployment of an X.500 directory This profile does not assume the deployment of an X.500 directory
system [X.500] or a Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) system [X.500] or a Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)
directory system [RFC 4510]. The profile does not prohibit the use directory system [RFC4510]. The profile does not prohibit the use of
of an X.500 directory or a LDAP directory; however, any means of an X.500 directory or an LDAP directory; however, any means of
distributing certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRLs) may distributing certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRLs) may
be used. be used.
2.2 Acceptability Criteria 2.2. Acceptability Criteria
The goal of the Internet Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is to meet The goal of the Internet Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is to meet
the needs of deterministic, automated identification, authentication, the needs of deterministic, automated identification, authentication,
access control, and authorization functions. Support for these access control, and authorization functions. Support for these
services determines the attributes contained in the certificate as services determines the attributes contained in the certificate as
well as the ancillary control information in the certificate such as well as the ancillary control information in the certificate such as
policy data and certification path constraints. policy data and certification path constraints.
2.3 User Expectations 2.3. User Expectations
Users of the Internet PKI are people and processes who use client Users of the Internet PKI are people and processes who use client
software and are the subjects named in certificates. These uses software and are the subjects named in certificates. These uses
include readers and writers of electronic mail, the clients for WWW include readers and writers of electronic mail, the clients for WWW
browsers, WWW servers, and the key manager for IPsec within a router. browsers, WWW servers, and the key manager for IPsec within a router.
This profile recognizes the limitations of the platforms these users This profile recognizes the limitations of the platforms these users
employ and the limitations in sophistication and attentiveness of the employ and the limitations in sophistication and attentiveness of the
users themselves. This manifests itself in minimal user users themselves. This manifests itself in minimal user
configuration responsibility (e.g., trusted CA keys, rules), explicit configuration responsibility (e.g., trusted CA keys, rules), explicit
platform usage constraints within the certificate, certification path platform usage constraints within the certificate, certification path
constraints that shield the user from many malicious actions, and constraints that shield the user from many malicious actions, and
applications that sensibly automate validation functions. applications that sensibly automate validation functions.
2.4 Administrator Expectations 2.4. Administrator Expectations
As with user expectations, the Internet PKI profile is structured to As with user expectations, the Internet PKI profile is structured to
support the individuals who generally operate CAs. Providing support the individuals who generally operate CAs. Providing
administrators with unbounded choices increases the chances that a administrators with unbounded choices increases the chances that a
subtle CA administrator mistake will result in broad compromise. subtle CA administrator mistake will result in broad compromise.
Also, unbounded choices greatly complicate the software that process Also, unbounded choices greatly complicate the software that process
and validate the certificates created by the CA. and validate the certificates created by the CA.
3 Overview of Approach 3. Overview of Approach
Following is a simplified view of the architectural model assumed by Following is a simplified view of the architectural model assumed by
the PKIX specifications. the Public-Key Infrastructure using X.509 (PKIX) specifications.
The components in this model are: The components in this model are:
end entity: user of PKI certificates and/or end user system that is end entity: user of PKI certificates and/or end user system that is
the subject of a certificate; the subject of a certificate;
CA: certification authority; CA: certification authority;
RA: registration authority, i.e., an optional system to which RA: registration authority, i.e., an optional system to which
a CA delegates certain management functions; a CA delegates certain management functions;
CRL issuer: a system that generates and signs CRLs; CRL issuer: a system that generates and signs CRLs; and
repository: a system or collection of distributed systems that stores repository: a system or collection of distributed systems that stores
certificates and CRLs and serves as a means of certificates and CRLs and serves as a means of
distributing these certificates and CRLs to end entities. distributing these certificates and CRLs to end entities.
CAs are responsible for indicating the revocation status of the CAs are responsible for indicating the revocation status of the
certificates that they issue. Revocation status information may be certificates that they issue. Revocation status information may be
provided using the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) provided using the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
[RFC 2560], certificate revocation lists (CRLs), or some other [RFC2560], certificate revocation lists (CRLs), or some other
mechanism. In general, when revocation status information is mechanism. In general, when revocation status information is
provided using CRLs, the CA is also the CRL issuer. However, a CA provided using CRLs, the CA is also the CRL issuer. However, a CA
may delegate the responsibility for issuing CRLs to a different may delegate the responsibility for issuing CRLs to a different
entity. entity.
Note that an Attribute Authority (AA) might also choose to delegate Note that an Attribute Authority (AA) might also choose to delegate
the publication of CRLs to a CRL issuer. the publication of CRLs to a CRL issuer.
+---+ +---+
| C | +------------+ | C | +------------+
skipping to change at page 9, line 45 skipping to change at page 9, line 36
| p | Publish certificate +------------+ | p | Publish certificate +------------+
| o | Publish CRL ^ ^ | o | Publish CRL ^ ^
| s | | | Management | s | | | Management
| i | +------------+ | | transactions | i | +------------+ | | transactions
| t | <--------------| CRL Issuer |<----+ | | t | <--------------| CRL Issuer |<----+ |
| o | Publish CRL +------------+ v | o | Publish CRL +------------+ v
| r | +------+ | r | +------+
| y | | CA | | y | | CA |
+---+ +------+ +---+ +------+
Figure 1 - PKI Entities Figure 1. PKI Entities
3.1 X.509 Version 3 Certificate 3.1. X.509 Version 3 Certificate
Users of a public key require confidence that the associated private Users of a public key require confidence that the associated private
key is owned by the correct remote subject (person or system) with key is owned by the correct remote subject (person or system) with
which an encryption or digital signature mechanism will be used. which an encryption or digital signature mechanism will be used.
This confidence is obtained through the use of public key This confidence is obtained through the use of public key
certificates, which are data structures that bind public key values certificates, which are data structures that bind public key values
to subjects. The binding is asserted by having a trusted CA to subjects. The binding is asserted by having a trusted CA
digitally sign each certificate. The CA may base this assertion upon digitally sign each certificate. The CA may base this assertion upon
technical means (a.k.a., proof of possession through a challenge- technical means (a.k.a., proof of possession through a challenge-
response protocol), presentation of the private key, or on an response protocol), presentation of the private key, or on an
assertion by the subject. A certificate has a limited valid assertion by the subject. A certificate has a limited valid
lifetime, which is indicated in its signed contents. Because a lifetime, which is indicated in its signed contents. Because a
certificate's signature and timeliness can be independently checked certificate's signature and timeliness can be independently checked
by a certificate-using client, certificates can be distributed via by a certificate-using client, certificates can be distributed via
skipping to change at page 10, line 27 skipping to change at page 10, line 16
ITU-T X.509 (formerly CCITT X.509) or ISO/IEC 9594-8, which was first ITU-T X.509 (formerly CCITT X.509) or ISO/IEC 9594-8, which was first
published in 1988 as part of the X.500 directory recommendations, published in 1988 as part of the X.500 directory recommendations,
defines a standard certificate format [X.509]. The certificate defines a standard certificate format [X.509]. The certificate
format in the 1988 standard is called the version 1 (v1) format. format in the 1988 standard is called the version 1 (v1) format.
When X.500 was revised in 1993, two more fields were added, resulting When X.500 was revised in 1993, two more fields were added, resulting
in the version 2 (v2) format. in the version 2 (v2) format.
The Internet Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) RFCs, published in 1993, The Internet Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) RFCs, published in 1993,
include specifications for a public key infrastructure based on X.509 include specifications for a public key infrastructure based on X.509
v1 certificates [RFC 1422]. The experience gained in attempts to v1 certificates [RFC1422]. The experience gained in attempts to
deploy RFC 1422 made it clear that the v1 and v2 certificate formats deploy RFC 1422 made it clear that the v1 and v2 certificate formats
were deficient in several respects. Most importantly, more fields were deficient in several respects. Most importantly, more fields
were needed to carry information that PEM design and implementation were needed to carry information that PEM design and implementation
experience had proven necessary. In response to these new experience had proven necessary. In response to these new
requirements, ISO/IEC, ITU-T and ANSI X9 developed the X.509 version requirements, the ISO/IEC, ITU-T, and ANSI X9 developed the X.509
3 (v3) certificate format. The v3 format extends the v2 format by version 3 (v3) certificate format. The v3 format extends the v2
adding provision for additional extension fields. Particular format by adding provision for additional extension fields.
extension field types may be specified in standards or may be defined Particular extension field types may be specified in standards or may
and registered by any organization or community. In June 1996, be defined and registered by any organization or community. In June
standardization of the basic v3 format was completed [X.509]. 1996, standardization of the basic v3 format was completed [X.509].
ISO/IEC, ITU-T, and ANSI X9 have also developed standard extensions ISO/IEC, ITU-T, and ANSI X9 have also developed standard extensions
for use in the v3 extensions field [X.509][X9.55]. These extensions for use in the v3 extensions field [X.509][X9.55]. These extensions
can convey such data as additional subject identification can convey such data as additional subject identification
information, key attribute information, policy information, and information, key attribute information, policy information, and
certification path constraints. certification path constraints.
However, the ISO/IEC, ITU-T, and ANSI X9 standard extensions are very However, the ISO/IEC, ITU-T, and ANSI X9 standard extensions are very
broad in their applicability. In order to develop interoperable broad in their applicability. In order to develop interoperable
implementations of X.509 v3 systems for Internet use, it is necessary implementations of X.509 v3 systems for Internet use, it is necessary
to specify a profile for use of the X.509 v3 extensions tailored for to specify a profile for use of the X.509 v3 extensions tailored for
the Internet. It is one goal of this document to specify a profile the Internet. It is one goal of this document to specify a profile
for Internet WWW, electronic mail, and IPsec applications. for Internet WWW, electronic mail, and IPsec applications.
Environments with additional requirements may build on this profile Environments with additional requirements may build on this profile
or may replace it. or may replace it.
3.2 Certification Paths and Trust 3.2. Certification Paths and Trust
A user of a security service requiring knowledge of a public key A user of a security service requiring knowledge of a public key
generally needs to obtain and validate a certificate containing the generally needs to obtain and validate a certificate containing the
required public key. If the public key user does not already hold an required public key. If the public key user does not already hold an
assured copy of the public key of the CA that signed the certificate, assured copy of the public key of the CA that signed the certificate,
the CA's name, and related information (such as the validity period the CA's name, and related information (such as the validity period
or name constraints), then it might need an additional certificate to or name constraints), then it might need an additional certificate to
obtain that public key. In general, a chain of multiple certificates obtain that public key. In general, a chain of multiple certificates
may be needed, comprising a certificate of the public key owner (the may be needed, comprising a certificate of the public key owner (the
end entity) signed by one CA, and zero or more additional end entity) signed by one CA, and zero or more additional
certificates of CAs signed by other CAs. Such chains, called certificates of CAs signed by other CAs. Such chains, called
certification paths, are required because a public key user is only certification paths, are required because a public key user is only
initialized with a limited number of assured CA public keys. initialized with a limited number of assured CA public keys.
There are different ways in which CAs might be configured in order There are different ways in which CAs might be configured in order
for public key users to be able to find certification paths. For for public key users to be able to find certification paths. For
PEM, RFC 1422 defined a rigid hierarchical structure of CAs. There PEM, RFC 1422 defined a rigid hierarchical structure of CAs. There
are three types of PEM certification authority: are three types of PEM certification authority:
(a) Internet Policy Registration Authority (IPRA): This (a) Internet Policy Registration Authority (IPRA): This
authority, operated under the auspices of the Internet Society, authority, operated under the auspices of the Internet
acts as the root of the PEM certification hierarchy at level 1. Society, acts as the root of the PEM certification hierarchy
It issues certificates only for the next level of authorities, at level 1. It issues certificates only for the next level
PCAs. All certification paths start with the IPRA. of authorities, PCAs. All certification paths start with the
IPRA.
(b) Policy Certification Authorities (PCAs): PCAs are at level 2 (b) Policy Certification Authorities (PCAs): PCAs are at level 2
of the hierarchy, each PCA being certified by the IPRA. A PCA of the hierarchy, each PCA being certified by the IPRA. A
shall establish and publish a statement of its policy with respect PCA shall establish and publish a statement of its policy
to certifying users or subordinate certification authorities. with respect to certifying users or subordinate certification
Distinct PCAs aim to satisfy different user needs. For example, authorities. Distinct PCAs aim to satisfy different user
one PCA (an organizational PCA) might support the general needs. For example, one PCA (an organizational PCA) might
electronic mail needs of commercial organizations, and another PCA support the general electronic mail needs of commercial
(a high-assurance PCA) might have a more stringent policy designed organizations, and another PCA (a high-assurance PCA) might
for satisfying legally binding digital signature requirements. have a more stringent policy designed for satisfying legally
binding digital signature requirements.
(c) Certification Authorities (CAs): CAs are at level 3 of the (c) Certification Authorities (CAs): CAs are at level 3 of the
hierarchy and can also be at lower levels. Those at level 3 are hierarchy and can also be at lower levels. Those at level 3
certified by PCAs. CAs represent, for example, particular are certified by PCAs. CAs represent, for example,
organizations, particular organizational units (e.g., departments, particular organizations, particular organizational units
groups, sections), or particular geographical areas. (e.g., departments, groups, sections), or particular
geographical areas.
RFC 1422 furthermore has a name subordination rule, which requires RFC 1422 furthermore has a name subordination rule, which requires
that a CA can only issue certificates for entities whose names are that a CA can only issue certificates for entities whose names are
subordinate (in the X.500 naming tree) to the name of the CA itself. subordinate (in the X.500 naming tree) to the name of the CA itself.
The trust associated with a PEM certification path is implied by the The trust associated with a PEM certification path is implied by the
PCA name. The name subordination rule ensures that CAs below the PCA PCA name. The name subordination rule ensures that CAs below the PCA
are sensibly constrained as to the set of subordinate entities they are sensibly constrained as to the set of subordinate entities they
can certify (e.g., a CA for an organization can only certify entities can certify (e.g., a CA for an organization can only certify entities
in that organization's name tree). Certificate user systems are able in that organization's name tree). Certificate user systems are able
to mechanically check that the name subordination rule has been to mechanically check that the name subordination rule has been
followed. followed.
The RFC 1422 uses the X.509 v1 certificate format. The limitations RFC 1422 uses the X.509 v1 certificate format. The limitations of
of X.509 v1 required imposition of several structural restrictions to X.509 v1 required imposition of several structural restrictions to
clearly associate policy information or restrict the utility of clearly associate policy information or restrict the utility of
certificates. These restrictions included: certificates. These restrictions included:
(a) a pure top-down hierarchy, with all certification paths (a) a pure top-down hierarchy, with all certification paths
starting from IPRA; starting from IPRA;
(b) a naming subordination rule restricting the names of a CA's (b) a naming subordination rule restricting the names of a CA's
subjects; and subjects; and
(c) use of the PCA concept, which requires knowledge of (c) use of the PCA concept, which requires knowledge of
individual PCAs to be built into certificate chain verification individual PCAs to be built into certificate chain
logic. Knowledge of individual PCAs was required to determine if verification logic. Knowledge of individual PCAs was
a chain could be accepted. required to determine if a chain could be accepted.
With X.509 v3, most of the requirements addressed by RFC 1422 can be With X.509 v3, most of the requirements addressed by RFC 1422 can be
addressed using certificate extensions, without a need to restrict addressed using certificate extensions, without a need to restrict
the CA structures used. In particular, the certificate extensions the CA structures used. In particular, the certificate extensions
relating to certificate policies obviate the need for PCAs and the relating to certificate policies obviate the need for PCAs and the
constraint extensions obviate the need for the name subordination constraint extensions obviate the need for the name subordination
rule. As a result, this document supports a more flexible rule. As a result, this document supports a more flexible
architecture, including: architecture, including:
(a) Certification paths start with a public key of a CA in a (a) Certification paths start with a public key of a CA in a
user's own domain, or with the public key of the top of a user's own domain, or with the public key of the top of a
hierarchy. Starting with the public key of a CA in a user's own hierarchy. Starting with the public key of a CA in a user's
domain has certain advantages. In some environments, the local own domain has certain advantages. In some environments, the
domain is the most trusted. local domain is the most trusted.
(b) Name constraints may be imposed through explicit inclusion of (b) Name constraints may be imposed through explicit inclusion of
a name constraints extension in a certificate, but are not a name constraints extension in a certificate, but are not
required. required.
(c) Policy extensions and policy mappings replace the PCA (c) Policy extensions and policy mappings replace the PCA
concept, which permits a greater degree of automation. The concept, which permits a greater degree of automation. The
application can determine if the certification path is acceptable application can determine if the certification path is
based on the contents of the certificates instead of a priori acceptable based on the contents of the certificates instead
knowledge of PCAs. This permits automation of certification path of a priori knowledge of PCAs. This permits automation of
processing. certification path processing.
X.509 v3 also includes an extension that identifies the subject of a X.509 v3 also includes an extension that identifies the subject of a
certificate as being either a CA or an end entity, reducing the certificate as being either a CA or an end entity, reducing the
reliance on out-of-band information demanded in PEM. reliance on out-of-band information demanded in PEM.
This specification covers two classes of certificates: CA This specification covers two classes of certificates: CA
certificates and end entity certificates. CA certificates may be certificates and end entity certificates. CA certificates may be
further divided into three classes: cross-certificates; self-issued further divided into three classes: cross-certificates, self-issued
certificates; and self-signed certificates. Cross-certificates are certificates, and self-signed certificates. Cross-certificates are
CA certificates in which the issuer and subject are different CA certificates in which the issuer and subject are different
entities. Cross-certificates describe a trust relationship between entities. Cross-certificates describe a trust relationship between
the two CAs. Self-issued certificates are CA certificates in which the two CAs. Self-issued certificates are CA certificates in which
the issuer and subject are the same entity. Self-issued certificates the issuer and subject are the same entity. Self-issued certificates
are generated to support changes in policy or operations. Self- are generated to support changes in policy or operations. Self-
signed certificates are self-issued certificates where the digital signed certificates are self-issued certificates where the digital
signature may be verified by the public key bound into the signature may be verified by the public key bound into the
certificate. Self-signed certificates are used to convey a public certificate. Self-signed certificates are used to convey a public
key for use to begin certification paths. End entity certificates key for use to begin certification paths. End entity certificates
are issued to subjects that are not authorized to issue certificates. are issued to subjects that are not authorized to issue certificates.
3.3 Revocation 3.3. Revocation
When a certificate is issued, it is expected to be in use for its When a certificate is issued, it is expected to be in use for its
entire validity period. However, various circumstances may cause a entire validity period. However, various circumstances may cause a
certificate to become invalid prior to the expiration of the validity certificate to become invalid prior to the expiration of the validity
period. Such circumstances include change of name, change of period. Such circumstances include change of name, change of
association between subject and CA (e.g., an employee terminates association between subject and CA (e.g., an employee terminates
employment with an organization), and compromise or suspected employment with an organization), and compromise or suspected
compromise of the corresponding private key. Under such compromise of the corresponding private key. Under such
circumstances, the CA needs to revoke the certificate. circumstances, the CA needs to revoke the certificate.
X.509 defines one method of certificate revocation. This method X.509 defines one method of certificate revocation. This method
involves each CA periodically issuing a signed data structure called involves each CA periodically issuing a signed data structure called
a certificate revocation list (CRL). A CRL is a time stamped list a certificate revocation list (CRL). A CRL is a time-stamped list
identifying revoked certificates that is signed by a CA or CRL issuer identifying revoked certificates that is signed by a CA or CRL issuer
and made freely available in a public repository. Each revoked and made freely available in a public repository. Each revoked
certificate is identified in a CRL by its certificate serial number. certificate is identified in a CRL by its certificate serial number.
When a certificate-using system uses a certificate (e.g., for When a certificate-using system uses a certificate (e.g., for
verifying a remote user's digital signature), that system not only verifying a remote user's digital signature), that system not only
checks the certificate signature and validity but also acquires a checks the certificate signature and validity but also acquires a
suitably recent CRL and checks that the certificate serial number is suitably recent CRL and checks that the certificate serial number is
not on that CRL. The meaning of "suitably recent" may vary with not on that CRL. The meaning of "suitably recent" may vary with
local policy, but it usually means the most recently issued CRL. A local policy, but it usually means the most recently issued CRL. A
new CRL is issued on a regular periodic basis (e.g., hourly, daily, new CRL is issued on a regular periodic basis (e.g., hourly, daily,
skipping to change at page 14, line 31 skipping to change at page 14, line 26
applicable in some environments as an alternative to the X.509 CRL. applicable in some environments as an alternative to the X.509 CRL.
On-line revocation checking may significantly reduce the latency On-line revocation checking may significantly reduce the latency
between a revocation report and the distribution of the information between a revocation report and the distribution of the information
to relying parties. Once the CA accepts a revocation report as to relying parties. Once the CA accepts a revocation report as
authentic and valid, any query to the on-line service will correctly authentic and valid, any query to the on-line service will correctly
reflect the certificate validation impacts of the revocation. reflect the certificate validation impacts of the revocation.
However, these methods impose new security requirements: the However, these methods impose new security requirements: the
certificate validator needs to trust the on-line validation service certificate validator needs to trust the on-line validation service
while the repository does not need to be trusted. while the repository does not need to be trusted.
3.4 Operational Protocols 3.4. Operational Protocols
Operational protocols are required to deliver certificates and CRLs Operational protocols are required to deliver certificates and CRLs
(or status information) to certificate using client systems. (or status information) to certificate-using client systems.
Provisions are needed for a variety of different means of certificate Provisions are needed for a variety of different means of certificate
and CRL delivery, including distribution procedures based on LDAP, and CRL delivery, including distribution procedures based on LDAP,
HTTP, FTP, and X.500. Operational protocols supporting these HTTP, FTP, and X.500. Operational protocols supporting these
functions are defined in other PKIX specifications. These functions are defined in other PKIX specifications. These
specifications may include definitions of message formats and specifications may include definitions of message formats and
procedures for supporting all of the above operational environments, procedures for supporting all of the above operational environments,
including definitions of or references to appropriate MIME content including definitions of or references to appropriate MIME content
types. types.
3.5 Management Protocols 3.5. Management Protocols
Management protocols are required to support on-line interactions Management protocols are required to support on-line interactions
between PKI user and management entities. For example, a management between PKI user and management entities. For example, a management
protocol might be used between a CA and a client system with which a protocol might be used between a CA and a client system with which a
key pair is associated, or between two CAs that cross-certify each key pair is associated, or between two CAs that cross-certify each
other. The set of functions that potentially need to be supported by other. The set of functions that potentially need to be supported by
management protocols include: management protocols include:
(a) registration: This is the process whereby a user first makes (a) registration: This is the process whereby a user first makes
itself known to a CA (directly, or through an RA), prior to that itself known to a CA (directly, or through an RA), prior to
CA issuing a certificate or certificates for that user. that CA issuing a certificate or certificates for that user.
(b) initialization: Before a client system can operate securely (b) initialization: Before a client system can operate securely,
it is necessary to install key materials that have the appropriate it is necessary to install key materials that have the
relationship with keys stored elsewhere in the infrastructure. appropriate relationship with keys stored elsewhere in the
For example, the client needs to be securely initialized with the infrastructure. For example, the client needs to be securely
public key and other assured information of the trusted CA(s), to initialized with the public key and other assured information
be used in validating certificate paths. of the trusted CA(s), to be used in validating certificate
paths.
Furthermore, a client typically needs to be initialized with its Furthermore, a client typically needs to be initialized with
own key pair(s). its own key pair(s).
(c) certification: This is the process in which a CA issues a (c) certification: This is the process in which a CA issues a
certificate for a user's public key, and returns that certificate certificate for a user's public key, and returns that
to the user's client system and/or posts that certificate in a certificate to the user's client system and/or posts that
repository. certificate in a repository.
(d) key pair recovery: As an option, user client key materials (d) key pair recovery: As an option, user client key materials
(e.g., a user's private key used for encryption purposes) may be (e.g., a user's private key used for encryption purposes) may
backed up by a CA or a key backup system. If a user needs to be backed up by a CA or a key backup system. If a user needs
recover these backed up key materials (e.g., as a result of a to recover these backed-up key materials (e.g., as a result
forgotten password or a lost key chain file), an on-line protocol of a forgotten password or a lost key chain file), an on-line
exchange may be needed to support such recovery. protocol exchange may be needed to support such recovery.
(e) key pair update: All key pairs need to be updated regularly, (e) key pair update: All key pairs need to be updated regularly,
i.e., replaced with a new key pair, and new certificates issued. i.e., replaced with a new key pair, and new certificates
issued.
(f) revocation request: An authorized person advises a CA of an (f) revocation request: An authorized person advises a CA of an
abnormal situation requiring certificate revocation. abnormal situation requiring certificate revocation.
(g) cross-certification: Two CAs exchange information used in (g) cross-certification: Two CAs exchange information used in
establishing a cross-certificate. A cross-certificate is a establishing a cross-certificate. A cross-certificate is a
certificate issued by one CA to another CA that contains a CA certificate issued by one CA to another CA that contains a CA
signature key used for issuing certificates. signature key used for issuing certificates.
Note that on-line protocols are not the only way of implementing the Note that on-line protocols are not the only way of implementing the
above functions. For all functions there are off-line methods of above functions. For all functions, there are off-line methods of
achieving the same result, and this specification does not mandate achieving the same result, and this specification does not mandate
use of on-line protocols. For example, when hardware tokens are use of on-line protocols. For example, when hardware tokens are
used, many of the functions may be achieved as part of the physical used, many of the functions may be achieved as part of the physical
token delivery. Furthermore, some of the above functions may be token delivery. Furthermore, some of the above functions may be
combined into one protocol exchange. In particular, two or more of combined into one protocol exchange. In particular, two or more of
the registration, initialization, and certification functions can be the registration, initialization, and certification functions can be
combined into one protocol exchange. combined into one protocol exchange.
The PKIX series of specifications defines a set of standard message The PKIX series of specifications defines a set of standard message
formats supporting the above functions. The protocols for conveying formats supporting the above functions. The protocols for conveying
these messages in different environments (e.g., email, file transfer, these messages in different environments (e.g., email, file transfer,
and WWW) are described in those specifications. and WWW) are described in those specifications.
4 Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile 4. Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile
This section presents a profile for public key certificates that will This section presents a profile for public key certificates that will
foster interoperability and a reusable PKI. This section is based foster interoperability and a reusable PKI. This section is based
upon the X.509 v3 certificate format and the standard certificate upon the X.509 v3 certificate format and the standard certificate
extensions defined in [X.509]. The ISO/IEC and ITU-T documents use extensions defined in [X.509]. The ISO/IEC and ITU-T documents use
the 1997 version of ASN.1; while this document uses the 1988 ASN.1 the 1997 version of ASN.1; while this document uses the 1988 ASN.1
syntax, the encoded certificate and standard extensions are syntax, the encoded certificate and standard extensions are
equivalent. This section also defines private extensions required to equivalent. This section also defines private extensions required to
support a PKI for the Internet community. support a PKI for the Internet community.
Certificates may be used in a wide range of applications and Certificates may be used in a wide range of applications and
environments covering a broad spectrum of interoperability goals and environments covering a broad spectrum of interoperability goals and
a broader spectrum of operational and assurance requirements. The a broader spectrum of operational and assurance requirements. The
goal of this document is to establish a common baseline for generic goal of this document is to establish a common baseline for generic
applications requiring broad interoperability and limited special applications requiring broad interoperability and limited special
purpose requirements. In particular, the emphasis will be on purpose requirements. In particular, the emphasis will be on
supporting the use of X.509 v3 certificates for informal Internet supporting the use of X.509 v3 certificates for informal Internet
electronic mail, IPsec, and WWW applications. electronic mail, IPsec, and WWW applications.
4.1 Basic Certificate Fields 4.1. Basic Certificate Fields
The X.509 v3 certificate basic syntax is as follows. For signature The X.509 v3 certificate basic syntax is as follows. For signature
calculation, the data that is to be signed is encoded using the ASN.1 calculation, the data that is to be signed is encoded using the ASN.1
distinguished encoding rules (DER) [X.690]. ASN.1 DER encoding is a distinguished encoding rules (DER) [X.690]. ASN.1 DER encoding is a
tag, length, value encoding system for each element. tag, length, value encoding system for each element.
Certificate ::= SEQUENCE { Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsCertificate TBSCertificate, tbsCertificate TBSCertificate,
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signatureValue BIT STRING } signatureValue BIT STRING }
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critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
extnValue OCTET STRING extnValue OCTET STRING
-- contains the DER encoding of an ASN.1 value -- contains the DER encoding of an ASN.1 value
-- corresponding to the extension type identified -- corresponding to the extension type identified
-- by extnID -- by extnID
} }
The following items describe the X.509 v3 certificate for use in the The following items describe the X.509 v3 certificate for use in the
Internet. Internet.
4.1.1 Certificate Fields 4.1.1. Certificate Fields
The Certificate is a SEQUENCE of three required fields. The fields The Certificate is a SEQUENCE of three required fields. The fields
are described in detail in the following subsections. are described in detail in the following subsections.
4.1.1.1 tbsCertificate 4.1.1.1. tbsCertificate
The field contains the names of the subject and issuer, a public key The field contains the names of the subject and issuer, a public key
associated with the subject, a validity period, and other associated associated with the subject, a validity period, and other associated
information. The fields are described in detail in section 4.1.2; information. The fields are described in detail in Section 4.1.2;
the tbsCertificate usually includes extensions, which are described the tbsCertificate usually includes extensions, which are described
in section 4.2. in Section 4.2.
4.1.1.2 signatureAlgorithm 4.1.1.2. signatureAlgorithm
The signatureAlgorithm field contains the identifier for the The signatureAlgorithm field contains the identifier for the
cryptographic algorithm used by the CA to sign this certificate. cryptographic algorithm used by the CA to sign this certificate.
[RFC 3279], [RFC 4055], and [RFC 4491] list supported signature [RFC3279], [RFC4055], and [RFC4491] list supported signature
algorithms, but other signature algorithms MAY also be supported. algorithms, but other signature algorithms MAY also be supported.
An algorithm identifier is defined by the following ASN.1 structure: An algorithm identifier is defined by the following ASN.1 structure:
AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL } parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL }
The algorithm identifier is used to identify a cryptographic The algorithm identifier is used to identify a cryptographic
algorithm. The OBJECT IDENTIFIER component identifies the algorithm algorithm. The OBJECT IDENTIFIER component identifies the algorithm
(such as DSA with SHA-1). The contents of the optional parameters (such as DSA with SHA-1). The contents of the optional parameters
field will vary according to the algorithm identified. field will vary according to the algorithm identified.
This field MUST contain the same algorithm identifier as the This field MUST contain the same algorithm identifier as the
signature field in the sequence tbsCertificate (section 4.1.2.3). signature field in the sequence tbsCertificate (Section 4.1.2.3).
4.1.1.3 signatureValue 4.1.1.3. signatureValue
The signatureValue field contains a digital signature computed upon The signatureValue field contains a digital signature computed upon
the ASN.1 DER encoded tbsCertificate. The ASN.1 DER encoded the ASN.1 DER encoded tbsCertificate. The ASN.1 DER encoded
tbsCertificate is used as the input to the signature function. This tbsCertificate is used as the input to the signature function. This
signature value is encoded as a BIT STRING and included in the signature value is encoded as a BIT STRING and included in the
signature field. The details of this process are specified for each signature field. The details of this process are specified for each
of the algorithms listed in [RFC 3279], [RFC 4055], and [RFC 4491]. of the algorithms listed in [RFC3279], [RFC4055], and [RFC4491].
By generating this signature, a CA certifies the validity of the By generating this signature, a CA certifies the validity of the
information in the tbsCertificate field. In particular, the CA information in the tbsCertificate field. In particular, the CA
certifies the binding between the public key material and the subject certifies the binding between the public key material and the subject
of the certificate. of the certificate.
4.1.2 TBSCertificate 4.1.2. TBSCertificate
The sequence TBSCertificate contains information associated with the The sequence TBSCertificate contains information associated with the
subject of the certificate and the CA that issued it. Every subject of the certificate and the CA that issued it. Every
TBSCertificate contains the names of the subject and issuer, a public TBSCertificate contains the names of the subject and issuer, a public
key associated with the subject, a validity period, a version number, key associated with the subject, a validity period, a version number,
and a serial number; some MAY contain optional unique identifier and a serial number; some MAY contain optional unique identifier
fields. The remainder of this section describes the syntax and fields. The remainder of this section describes the syntax and
semantics of these fields. A TBSCertificate usually includes semantics of these fields. A TBSCertificate usually includes
extensions. Extensions for the Internet PKI are described in section extensions. Extensions for the Internet PKI are described in Section
4.2. 4.2.
4.1.2.1 Version 4.1.2.1. Version
This field describes the version of the encoded certificate. When This field describes the version of the encoded certificate. When
extensions are used, as expected in this profile, version MUST be 3 extensions are used, as expected in this profile, version MUST be 3
(value is 2). If no extensions are present, but a UniqueIdentifier (value is 2). If no extensions are present, but a UniqueIdentifier
is present, the version SHOULD be 2 (value is 1); however version MAY is present, the version SHOULD be 2 (value is 1); however, the
be 3. If only basic fields are present, the version SHOULD be 1 (the version MAY be 3. If only basic fields are present, the version
value is omitted from the certificate as the default value); however SHOULD be 1 (the value is omitted from the certificate as the default
the version MAY be 2 or 3. value); however, the version MAY be 2 or 3.
Implementations SHOULD be prepared to accept any version certificate. Implementations SHOULD be prepared to accept any version certificate.
At a minimum, conforming implementations MUST recognize version 3 At a minimum, conforming implementations MUST recognize version 3
certificates. certificates.
Generation of version 2 certificates is not expected by Generation of version 2 certificates is not expected by
implementations based on this profile. implementations based on this profile.
4.1.2.2 Serial number 4.1.2.2. Serial Number
The serial number MUST be a positive integer assigned by the CA to The serial number MUST be a positive integer assigned by the CA to
each certificate. It MUST be unique for each certificate issued by a each certificate. It MUST be unique for each certificate issued by a
given CA (i.e., the issuer name and serial number identify a unique given CA (i.e., the issuer name and serial number identify a unique
certificate). CAs MUST force the serialNumber to be a non-negative certificate). CAs MUST force the serialNumber to be a non-negative
integer. integer.
Given the uniqueness requirements above, serial numbers can be Given the uniqueness requirements above, serial numbers can be
expected to contain long integers. Certificate users MUST be able to expected to contain long integers. Certificate users MUST be able to
handle serialNumber values up to 20 octets. Conforming CAs MUST NOT handle serialNumber values up to 20 octets. Conforming CAs MUST NOT
use serialNumber values longer than 20 octets. use serialNumber values longer than 20 octets.
Note: Non-conforming CAs may issue certificates with serial numbers Note: Non-conforming CAs may issue certificates with serial numbers
that are negative, or zero. Certificate users SHOULD be prepared to that are negative or zero. Certificate users SHOULD be prepared to
gracefully handle such certificates. gracefully handle such certificates.
4.1.2.3 Signature 4.1.2.3. Signature
This field contains the algorithm identifier for the algorithm used This field contains the algorithm identifier for the algorithm used
by the CA to sign the certificate. by the CA to sign the certificate.
This field MUST contain the same algorithm identifier as the This field MUST contain the same algorithm identifier as the
signatureAlgorithm field in the sequence Certificate (section signatureAlgorithm field in the sequence Certificate (Section
4.1.1.2). The contents of the optional parameters field will vary 4.1.1.2). The contents of the optional parameters field will vary
according to the algorithm identified. [RFC 3279], [RFC 4055], and according to the algorithm identified. [RFC3279], [RFC4055], and
[RFC 4491] list supported signature algorithms, but other signature [RFC4491] list supported signature algorithms, but other signature
algorithms MAY also be supported. algorithms MAY also be supported.
4.1.2.4 Issuer 4.1.2.4. Issuer
The issuer field identifies the entity that has signed and issued the The issuer field identifies the entity that has signed and issued the
certificate. The issuer field MUST contain a non-empty distinguished certificate. The issuer field MUST contain a non-empty distinguished
name (DN). The issuer field is defined as the X.501 type Name name (DN). The issuer field is defined as the X.501 type Name
[X.501]. Name is defined by the following ASN.1 structures: [X.501]. Name is defined by the following ASN.1 structures:
Name ::= CHOICE { -- only one possibility for now -- Name ::= CHOICE { -- only one possibility for now --
rdnSequence RDNSequence } rdnSequence RDNSequence }
RDNSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName RDNSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName
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As noted above, distinguished names are composed of attributes. This As noted above, distinguished names are composed of attributes. This
specification does not restrict the set of attribute types that may specification does not restrict the set of attribute types that may
appear in names. However, conforming implementations MUST be appear in names. However, conforming implementations MUST be
prepared to receive certificates with issuer names containing the set prepared to receive certificates with issuer names containing the set
of attribute types defined below. This specification RECOMMENDS of attribute types defined below. This specification RECOMMENDS
support for additional attribute types. support for additional attribute types.
Standard sets of attributes have been defined in the X.500 series of Standard sets of attributes have been defined in the X.500 series of
specifications [X.520]. Implementations of this specification MUST specifications [X.520]. Implementations of this specification MUST
be prepared to receive the following standard attribute types in be prepared to receive the following standard attribute types in
issuer and subject (section 4.1.2.6) names: issuer and subject (Section 4.1.2.6) names:
* country, * country,
* organization, * organization,
* organizational unit, * organizational unit,
* distinguished name qualifier, * distinguished name qualifier,
* state or province name, * state or province name,
* common name (e.g., "Susan Housley"), and * common name (e.g., "Susan Housley"), and
* serial number. * serial number.
In addition, implementations of this specification SHOULD be prepared In addition, implementations of this specification SHOULD be prepared
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* locality, * locality,
* title, * title,
* surname, * surname,
* given name, * given name,
* initials, * initials,
* pseudonym, and * pseudonym, and
* generation qualifier (e.g., "Jr.", "3rd", or "IV"). * generation qualifier (e.g., "Jr.", "3rd", or "IV").
The syntax and associated object identifiers (OIDs) for these The syntax and associated object identifiers (OIDs) for these
attribute types are provided in the ASN.1 modules in appendix A. attribute types are provided in the ASN.1 modules in Appendix A.
In addition, implementations of this specification MUST be prepared In addition, implementations of this specification MUST be prepared
to receive the domainComponent attribute, as defined in [RFC 4519]. to receive the domainComponent attribute, as defined in [RFC4519].
The Domain Name System (DNS) provides a hierarchical resource The Domain Name System (DNS) provides a hierarchical resource
labeling system. This attribute provides a convenient mechanism for labeling system. This attribute provides a convenient mechanism for
organizations that wish to use DNs that parallel their DNS names. organizations that wish to use DNs that parallel their DNS names.
This is not a replacement for the dNSName component of the This is not a replacement for the dNSName component of the
alternative name extensions. Implementations are not required to alternative name extensions. Implementations are not required to
convert such names into DNS names. The syntax and associated OID for convert such names into DNS names. The syntax and associated OID for
this attribute type are provided in the ASN.1 modules in appendix A. this attribute type are provided in the ASN.1 modules in Appendix A.
Rules for encoding internationalized domain names for use with the Rules for encoding internationalized domain names for use with the
domainComponent attribute type are specified in section 7.3. domainComponent attribute type are specified in Section 7.3.
Certificate users MUST be prepared to process the issuer Certificate users MUST be prepared to process the issuer
distinguished name and subject distinguished name (section 4.1.2.6) distinguished name and subject distinguished name (Section 4.1.2.6)
fields to perform name chaining for certification path validation fields to perform name chaining for certification path validation
(section 6). Name chaining is performed by matching the issuer (Section 6). Name chaining is performed by matching the issuer
distinguished name in one certificate with the subject name in a CA distinguished name in one certificate with the subject name in a CA
certificate. Rules for comparing distinguished names are specified certificate. Rules for comparing distinguished names are specified
in section 7.1. If the names in the issuer and subject field in a in Section 7.1. If the names in the issuer and subject field in a
certificate match according to the rules specified in section 7.1 certificate match according to the rules specified in Section 7.1,
then the certificate is self-issued. then the certificate is self-issued.
4.1.2.5 Validity 4.1.2.5. Validity
The certificate validity period is the time interval during which the The certificate validity period is the time interval during which the
CA warrants that it will maintain information about the status of the CA warrants that it will maintain information about the status of the
certificate. The field is represented as a SEQUENCE of two dates: certificate. The field is represented as a SEQUENCE of two dates:
the date on which the certificate validity period begins (notBefore) the date on which the certificate validity period begins (notBefore)
and the date on which the certificate validity period ends and the date on which the certificate validity period ends
(notAfter). Both notBefore and notAfter may be encoded as UTCTime or (notAfter). Both notBefore and notAfter may be encoded as UTCTime or
GeneralizedTime. GeneralizedTime.
CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate
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The validity period for a certificate is the period of time from The validity period for a certificate is the period of time from
notBefore through notAfter, inclusive. notBefore through notAfter, inclusive.
In some situations, devices are given certificates for which no good In some situations, devices are given certificates for which no good
expiration date can be assigned. For example, a device could be expiration date can be assigned. For example, a device could be
issued a certificate that binds its model and serial number to its issued a certificate that binds its model and serial number to its
public key; such a certificate is intended to be used for the entire public key; such a certificate is intended to be used for the entire
lifetime of the device. lifetime of the device.
To indicate that a certificate has no well defined expiration date, To indicate that a certificate has no well-defined expiration date,
the notAfter SHOULD be assigned the GeneralizedTime value of the notAfter SHOULD be assigned the GeneralizedTime value of
99991231235959Z. 99991231235959Z.
When the issuer is not be able to maintain status information until When the issuer will not be able to maintain status information until
the notAfter date (including when the notAfter date is the notAfter date (including when the notAfter date is
99991231235959Z), the issuer MUST ensure that no valid certification 99991231235959Z), the issuer MUST ensure that no valid certification
path exists for the certificate after maintenance of status path exists for the certificate after maintenance of status
information is terminated. This may be accomplished by expiration or information is terminated. This may be accomplished by expiration or
revocation of all CA certificates containing the public key used to revocation of all CA certificates containing the public key used to
verify the signature on the certificate and discontinuing use of the verify the signature on the certificate and discontinuing use of the
public key used to verify the signature on the certificate as a trust public key used to verify the signature on the certificate as a trust
anchor. anchor.
4.1.2.5.1 UTCTime 4.1.2.5.1. UTCTime
The universal time type, UTCTime, is a standard ASN.1 type intended The universal time type, UTCTime, is a standard ASN.1 type intended
for representation of dates and time. UTCTime specifies the year for representation of dates and time. UTCTime specifies the year
through the two low order digits and time is specified to the through the two low-order digits and time is specified to the
precision of one minute or one second. UTCTime includes either Z precision of one minute or one second. UTCTime includes either Z
(for Zulu, or Greenwich Mean Time) or a time differential. (for Zulu, or Greenwich Mean Time) or a time differential.
For the purposes of this profile, UTCTime values MUST be expressed in For the purposes of this profile, UTCTime values MUST be expressed in
Greenwich Mean Time (Zulu) and MUST include seconds (i.e., times are Greenwich Mean Time (Zulu) and MUST include seconds (i.e., times are
YYMMDDHHMMSSZ), even where the number of seconds is zero. Conforming YYMMDDHHMMSSZ), even where the number of seconds is zero. Conforming
systems MUST interpret the year field (YY) as follows: systems MUST interpret the year field (YY) as follows:
Where YY is greater than or equal to 50, the year SHALL be Where YY is greater than or equal to 50, the year SHALL be
interpreted as 19YY; and interpreted as 19YY; and
Where YY is less than 50, the year SHALL be interpreted as 20YY. Where YY is less than 50, the year SHALL be interpreted as 20YY.
4.1.2.5.2 GeneralizedTime 4.1.2.5.2. GeneralizedTime
The generalized time type, GeneralizedTime, is a standard ASN.1 type The generalized time type, GeneralizedTime, is a standard ASN.1 type
for variable precision representation of time. Optionally, the for variable precision representation of time. Optionally, the
GeneralizedTime field can include a representation of the time GeneralizedTime field can include a representation of the time
differential between local and Greenwich Mean Time. differential between local and Greenwich Mean Time.
For the purposes of this profile, GeneralizedTime values MUST be For the purposes of this profile, GeneralizedTime values MUST be
expressed in Greenwich Mean Time (Zulu) and MUST include seconds expressed in Greenwich Mean Time (Zulu) and MUST include seconds
(i.e., times are YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ), even where the number of seconds (i.e., times are YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ), even where the number of seconds
is zero. GeneralizedTime values MUST NOT include fractional seconds. is zero. GeneralizedTime values MUST NOT include fractional seconds.
4.1.2.6 Subject 4.1.2.6. Subject
The subject field identifies the entity associated with the public The subject field identifies the entity associated with the public
key stored in the subject public key field. The subject name MAY be key stored in the subject public key field. The subject name MAY be
carried in the subject field and/or the subjectAltName extension. If carried in the subject field and/or the subjectAltName extension. If
the subject is a CA (e.g., the basic constraints extension, as the subject is a CA (e.g., the basic constraints extension, as
discussed in section 4.2.1.9, is present and the value of cA is discussed in Section 4.2.1.9, is present and the value of cA is
TRUE), then the subject field MUST be populated with a non-empty TRUE), then the subject field MUST be populated with a non-empty
distinguished name matching the contents of the issuer field (section distinguished name matching the contents of the issuer field (Section
4.1.2.4) in all certificates issued by the subject CA. If the 4.1.2.4) in all certificates issued by the subject CA. If the
subject is a CRL issuer (e.g., the key usage extension, as discussed subject is a CRL issuer (e.g., the key usage extension, as discussed
in section 4.2.1.3, is present and the value of cRLSign is TRUE) then in Section 4.2.1.3, is present and the value of cRLSign is TRUE),
the subject field MUST be populated with a non-empty distinguished then the subject field MUST be populated with a non-empty
name matching the contents of the issuer field (section 5.1.2.3) in distinguished name matching the contents of the issuer field (Section
all CRLs issued by the subject CRL issuer. If subject naming 5.1.2.3) in all CRLs issued by the subject CRL issuer. If subject
information is present only in the subjectAltName extension (e.g., a naming information is present only in the subjectAltName extension
key bound only to an email address or URI), then the subject name (e.g., a key bound only to an email address or URI), then the subject
MUST be an empty sequence and the subjectAltName extension MUST be name MUST be an empty sequence and the subjectAltName extension MUST
critical. be critical.
Where it is non-empty, the subject field MUST contain an X.500 Where it is non-empty, the subject field MUST contain an X.500
distinguished name (DN). The DN MUST be unique for each subject distinguished name (DN). The DN MUST be unique for each subject
entity certified by the one CA as defined by the issuer name field. entity certified by the one CA as defined by the issuer field. A CA
A CA MAY issue more than one certificate with the same DN to the same MAY issue more than one certificate with the same DN to the same
subject entity. subject entity.
The subject name field is defined as the X.501 type Name. The subject field is defined as the X.501 type Name. Implementation
Implementation requirements for this field are those defined for the requirements for this field are those defined for the issuer field
issuer field (section 4.1.2.4). Implementations of this (Section 4.1.2.4). Implementations of this specification MUST be
specification MUST be prepared to receive subject names containing prepared to receive subject names containing the attribute types
the attribute types required for the issuer field. Implementations required for the issuer field. Implementations of this specification
of this specification SHOULD be prepared to receive subject names SHOULD be prepared to receive subject names containing the
containing the recommended attribute types for the issuer field. The recommended attribute types for the issuer field. The syntax and
syntax and associated object identifiers (OIDs) for these attribute associated object identifiers (OIDs) for these attribute types are
types are provided in the ASN.1 modules in appendix A. provided in the ASN.1 modules in Appendix A. Implementations of this
Implementations of this specification MAY use the comparison rules in specification MAY use the comparison rules in Section 7.1 to process
section 7.1 to process unfamiliar attribute types (i.e., for name unfamiliar attribute types (i.e., for name chaining) whose attribute
chaining) whose attribute values use one of the encoding options from values use one of the encoding options from DirectoryString. Binary
DirectoryString. Binary comparison should be used when unfamiliar comparison should be used when unfamiliar attribute types include
attribute types include attribute values with encoding options other attribute values with encoding options other than those found in
than those found in DirectoryString. This allows implementations to DirectoryString. This allows implementations to process certificates
process certificates with unfamiliar attributes in the subject name. with unfamiliar attributes in the subject name.
When encoding attribute values of type DirectoryString, conforming When encoding attribute values of type DirectoryString, conforming
CAs MUST use PrintableString or UTF8String encoding, except that: CAs MUST use PrintableString or UTF8String encoding, with the
following exceptions:
(a) When the subject of the certificate is a CA the subject field (a) When the subject of the certificate is a CA, the subject
MUST be encoded in the same way as it is encoded in the issuer field MUST be encoded in the same way as it is encoded in the
field (section 4.1.2.4) in all certificates issued by the subject issuer field (Section 4.1.2.4) in all certificates issued by
CA. Thus, if the subject CA encodes attributes in the issuer the subject CA. Thus, if the subject CA encodes attributes
fields of certificates that it issues using the TeletexString, in the issuer fields of certificates that it issues using the
BMPString, or UniversalString encodings, then the subject field of TeletexString, BMPString, or UniversalString encodings, then
certificates issued to that CA MUST use the same encoding. the subject field of certificates issued to that CA MUST use
the same encoding.
(b) When the subject of the certificate is a CRL issuer the (b) When the subject of the certificate is a CRL issuer, the
subject field MUST be encoded in the same way as it is encoded in subject field MUST be encoded in the same way as it is
the issuer field (section 5.1.2.3) in all CRLs issued by the encoded in the issuer field (Section 5.1.2.3) in all CRLs
subject CRL issuer. issued by the subject CRL issuer.
(c) TeletexString, BMPString, and UniversalString are included (c) TeletexString, BMPString, and UniversalString are included
for backward compatibility, and SHOULD NOT be used for for backward compatibility, and SHOULD NOT be used for
certificates for new subjects. However, these types MAY be used certificates for new subjects. However, these types MAY be
in certificates where the name was previously established, used in certificates where the name was previously
including cases in which a new certificate is being issued to an established, including cases in which a new certificate is
existing subject or a certificate is being issued to a new subject being issued to an existing subject or a certificate is being
where the attributes being encoded have been previously issued to a new subject where the attributes being encoded
established in certificates issued to other subjects. Certificate have been previously established in certificates issued to
users SHOULD be prepared to receive certificates with these types. other subjects. Certificate users SHOULD be prepared to
receive certificates with these types.
Legacy implementations exist where an electronic mail address is Legacy implementations exist where an electronic mail address is
embedded in the subject distinguished name as an emailAddress embedded in the subject distinguished name as an emailAddress
attribute [RFC 2985]. The attribute value for emailAddress is of attribute [RFC2985]. The attribute value for emailAddress is of type
type IA5String to permit inclusion of the character '@', which is not IA5String to permit inclusion of the character '@', which is not part
part of the PrintableString character set. emailAddress attribute of the PrintableString character set. emailAddress attribute values
values are not case-sensitive (e.g., "subscriber@example.com" is the are not case-sensitive (e.g., "subscriber@example.com" is the same as
same as "SUBSCRIBER@EXAMPLE.COM"). "SUBSCRIBER@EXAMPLE.COM").
Conforming implementations generating new certificates with Conforming implementations generating new certificates with
electronic mail addresses MUST use the rfc822Name in the subject electronic mail addresses MUST use the rfc822Name in the subject
alternative name extension (section 4.2.1.6) to describe such alternative name extension (Section 4.2.1.6) to describe such
identities. Simultaneous inclusion of the emailAddress attribute in identities. Simultaneous inclusion of the emailAddress attribute in
the subject distinguished name to support legacy implementations is the subject distinguished name to support legacy implementations is
deprecated but permitted. deprecated but permitted.
4.1.2.7 Subject Public Key Info 4.1.2.7. Subject Public Key Info
This field is used to carry the public key and identify the algorithm This field is used to carry the public key and identify the algorithm
with which the key is used (e.g., RSA, DSA, or Diffie-Hellman). The with which the key is used (e.g., RSA, DSA, or Diffie-Hellman). The
algorithm is identified using the AlgorithmIdentifier structure algorithm is identified using the AlgorithmIdentifier structure
specified in section 4.1.1.2. The object identifiers for the specified in Section 4.1.1.2. The object identifiers for the
supported algorithms and the methods for encoding the public key supported algorithms and the methods for encoding the public key
materials (public key and parameters) are specified in [RFC 3279], materials (public key and parameters) are specified in [RFC3279],
[RFC 4055], and [RFC 4491]. [RFC4055], and [RFC4491].
4.1.2.8 Unique Identifiers 4.1.2.8. Unique Identifiers
These fields MUST only appear if the version is 2 or 3 (section These fields MUST only appear if the version is 2 or 3 (Section
4.1.2.1). These fields MUST NOT appear if the version is 1. The 4.1.2.1). These fields MUST NOT appear if the version is 1. The
subject and issuer unique identifiers are present in the certificate subject and issuer unique identifiers are present in the certificate
to handle the possibility of reuse of subject and/or issuer names to handle the possibility of reuse of subject and/or issuer names
over time. This profile RECOMMENDS that names not be reused for over time. This profile RECOMMENDS that names not be reused for
different entities and that Internet certificates not make use of different entities and that Internet certificates not make use of
unique identifiers. CAs conforming to this profile MUST NOT generate unique identifiers. CAs conforming to this profile MUST NOT generate
certificates with unique identifiers. Applications conforming to certificates with unique identifiers. Applications conforming to
this profile SHOULD be capable of parsing certificates that include this profile SHOULD be capable of parsing certificates that include
unique identifiers, but there are no processing requirements unique identifiers, but there are no processing requirements
associated with the unique identifiers. associated with the unique identifiers.
4.1.2.9 Extensions 4.1.2.9. Extensions
This field MUST only appear if the version is 3 (section 4.1.2.1). This field MUST only appear if the version is 3 (Section 4.1.2.1).
If present, this field is a SEQUENCE of one or more certificate If present, this field is a SEQUENCE of one or more certificate
extensions. The format and content of certificate extensions in the extensions. The format and content of certificate extensions in the
Internet PKI are defined in section 4.2. Internet PKI are defined in Section 4.2.
4.2 Certificate Extensions 4.2. Certificate Extensions
The extensions defined for X.509 v3 certificates provide methods for The extensions defined for X.509 v3 certificates provide methods for
associating additional attributes with users or public keys and for associating additional attributes with users or public keys and for
managing relationships between CAs. The X.509 v3 certificate format managing relationships between CAs. The X.509 v3 certificate format
also allows communities to define private extensions to carry also allows communities to define private extensions to carry
information unique to those communities. Each extension in a information unique to those communities. Each extension in a
certificate is designated as either critical or non-critical. A certificate is designated as either critical or non-critical. A
certificate using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters certificate-using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters
a critical extension it does not recognize or a critical extension a critical extension it does not recognize or a critical extension
that contains information that it cannot process. A non-critical that contains information that it cannot process. A non-critical
extension MAY be ignored if it is not recognized, but MUST be extension MAY be ignored if it is not recognized, but MUST be
processed if it is recognized. The following sections present processed if it is recognized. The following sections present
recommended extensions used within Internet certificates and standard recommended extensions used within Internet certificates and standard
locations for information. Communities may elect to use additional locations for information. Communities may elect to use additional
extensions; however, caution ought to be exercised in adopting any extensions; however, caution ought to be exercised in adopting any
critical extensions in certificates that might prevent use in a critical extensions in certificates that might prevent use in a
general context. general context.
Each extension includes an OID and an ASN.1 structure. When an Each extension includes an OID and an ASN.1 structure. When an
extension appears in a certificate, the OID appears as the field extension appears in a certificate, the OID appears as the field
extnID and the corresponding ASN.1 DER encoded structure is the value extnID and the corresponding ASN.1 DER encoded structure is the value
of the octet string extnValue. A certificate MUST NOT include more of the octet string extnValue. A certificate MUST NOT include more
than one instance of a particular extension. For example, a than one instance of a particular extension. For example, a
certificate may contain only one authority key identifier extension certificate may contain only one authority key identifier extension
(section 4.2.1.1). An extension includes the boolean critical, with (Section 4.2.1.1). An extension includes the boolean critical, with
a default value of FALSE. The text for each extension specifies the a default value of FALSE. The text for each extension specifies the
acceptable values for the critical field for CAs conforming to this acceptable values for the critical field for CAs conforming to this
profile. profile.
Conforming CAs MUST support key identifiers (sections 4.2.1.1 and Conforming CAs MUST support key identifiers (Sections 4.2.1.1 and
4.2.1.2), basic constraints (section 4.2.1.9), key usage (section 4.2.1.2), basic constraints (Section 4.2.1.9), key usage (Section
4.2.1.3), and certificate policies (section 4.2.1.4) extensions. If 4.2.1.3), and certificate policies (Section 4.2.1.4) extensions. If
the CA issues certificates with an empty sequence for the subject the CA issues certificates with an empty sequence for the subject
field, the CA MUST support the subject alternative name extension field, the CA MUST support the subject alternative name extension
(section 4.2.1.6). Support for the remaining extensions is OPTIONAL. (Section 4.2.1.6). Support for the remaining extensions is OPTIONAL.
Conforming CAs MAY support extensions that are not identified within Conforming CAs MAY support extensions that are not identified within
this specification; certificate issuers are cautioned that marking this specification; certificate issuers are cautioned that marking
such extensions as critical may inhibit interoperability. such extensions as critical may inhibit interoperability.
At a minimum, applications conforming to this profile MUST recognize At a minimum, applications conforming to this profile MUST recognize
the following extensions: key usage (section 4.2.1.3), certificate the following extensions: key usage (Section 4.2.1.3), certificate
policies (section 4.2.1.4), the subject alternative name (section policies (Section 4.2.1.4), subject alternative name (Section
4.2.1.6), basic constraints (section 4.2.1.9), name constraints 4.2.1.6), basic constraints (Section 4.2.1.9), name constraints
(section 4.2.1.10), policy constraints (section 4.2.1.11), extended (Section 4.2.1.10), policy constraints (Section 4.2.1.11), extended
key usage (section 4.2.1.12), and inhibit anyPolicy (section key usage (Section 4.2.1.12), and inhibit anyPolicy (Section
4.2.1.14). 4.2.1.14).
In addition, applications conforming to this profile SHOULD recognize In addition, applications conforming to this profile SHOULD recognize
the authority and subject key identifier (sections 4.2.1.1 and the authority and subject key identifier (Sections 4.2.1.1 and
4.2.1.2), and policy mappings (section 4.2.1.5) extensions. 4.2.1.2) and policy mappings (Section 4.2.1.5) extensions.
4.2.1 Standard Extensions 4.2.1. Standard Extensions
This section identifies standard certificate extensions defined in This section identifies standard certificate extensions defined in
[X.509] for use in the Internet PKI. Each extension is associated [X.509] for use in the Internet PKI. Each extension is associated
with an OID defined in [X.509]. These OIDs are members of the id-ce with an OID defined in [X.509]. These OIDs are members of the id-ce
arc, which is defined by the following: arc, which is defined by the following:
id-ce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 29 } id-ce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 29 }
4.2.1.1 Authority Key Identifier 4.2.1.1. Authority Key Identifier
The authority key identifier extension provides a means of The authority key identifier extension provides a means of
identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to
sign a certificate. This extension is used where an issuer has sign a certificate. This extension is used where an issuer has
multiple signing keys (either due to multiple concurrent key pairs or multiple signing keys (either due to multiple concurrent key pairs or
due to changeover). The identification MAY be based on either the due to changeover). The identification MAY be based on either the
key identifier (the subject key identifier in the issuer's key identifier (the subject key identifier in the issuer's
certificate) or on the issuer name and serial number. certificate) or the issuer name and serial number.
The keyIdentifier field of the authorityKeyIdentifier extension MUST The keyIdentifier field of the authorityKeyIdentifier extension MUST
be included in all certificates generated by conforming CAs to be included in all certificates generated by conforming CAs to
facilitate certification path construction. There is one exception; facilitate certification path construction. There is one exception;
where a CA distributes its public key in the form of a "self-signed" where a CA distributes its public key in the form of a "self-signed"
certificate, the authority key identifier MAY be omitted. The certificate, the authority key identifier MAY be omitted. The
signature on a self-signed certificate is generated with the private signature on a self-signed certificate is generated with the private
key associated with the certificate's subject public key. (This key associated with the certificate's subject public key. (This
proves that the issuer possesses both the public and private keys.) proves that the issuer possesses both the public and private keys.)
In this case, the subject and authority key identifiers would be In this case, the subject and authority key identifiers would be
identical, but only the subject key identifier is needed for identical, but only the subject key identifier is needed for
certification path building. certification path building.
The value of the keyIdentifier field SHOULD be derived from the The value of the keyIdentifier field SHOULD be derived from the
public key used to verify the certificate's signature or a method public key used to verify the certificate's signature or a method
that generates unique values. Two common methods for generating key that generates unique values. Two common methods for generating key
identifiers from the public key are described in section 4.2.1.2. identifiers from the public key are described in Section 4.2.1.2.
Where a key identifier has not been previously established, this Where a key identifier has not been previously established, this
specification RECOMMENDS use of one of these methods for generating specification RECOMMENDS use of one of these methods for generating
keyIdentifiers or use of a similar method that uses a different hash keyIdentifiers or use of a similar method that uses a different hash
algorithm. Where a key identifier has been previously established, algorithm. Where a key identifier has been previously established,
the CA SHOULD use the previously established identifier. the CA SHOULD use the previously established identifier.
This profile RECOMMENDS support for the key identifier method by all This profile RECOMMENDS support for the key identifier method by all
certificate users. certificate users.
Conforming CAs MUST mark this extension non-critical. Conforming CAs MUST mark this extension as non-critical.
id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 35 } id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 35 }
AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
keyIdentifier [0] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, keyIdentifier [0] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
authorityCertIssuer [1] GeneralNames OPTIONAL, authorityCertIssuer [1] GeneralNames OPTIONAL,
authorityCertSerialNumber [2] CertificateSerialNumber OPTIONAL } authorityCertSerialNumber [2] CertificateSerialNumber OPTIONAL }
KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING
4.2.1.2 Subject Key Identifier 4.2.1.2. Subject Key Identifier
The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying
certificates that contain a particular public key. certificates that contain a particular public key.
To facilitate certification path construction, this extension MUST To facilitate certification path construction, this extension MUST
appear in all conforming CA certificates, that is, all certificates appear in all conforming CA certificates, that is, all certificates
including the basic constraints extension (section 4.2.1.9) where the including the basic constraints extension (Section 4.2.1.9) where the
value of cA is TRUE. In conforming CA certificates, the value of the value of cA is TRUE. In conforming CA certificates, the value of the
subject key identifier MUST be the value placed in the key identifier subject key identifier MUST be the value placed in the key identifier
field of the Authority Key Identifier extension (section 4.2.1.1) of field of the authority key identifier extension (Section 4.2.1.1) of
certificates issued by the subject of this certificate. Applications certificates issued by the subject of this certificate. Applications
are not required to verify that key identifiers match when performing are not required to verify that key identifiers match when performing
certification path validation. certification path validation.
For CA certificates, subject key identifiers SHOULD be derived from For CA certificates, subject key identifiers SHOULD be derived from
the public key or a method that generates unique values. Two common the public key or a method that generates unique values. Two common
methods for generating key identifiers from the public key are: methods for generating key identifiers from the public key are:
(1) The keyIdentifier is composed of the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the (1) The keyIdentifier is composed of the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the
value of the BIT STRING subjectPublicKey (excluding the tag, value of the BIT STRING subjectPublicKey (excluding the tag,
length, and number of unused bits). length, and number of unused bits).
(2) The keyIdentifier is composed of a four bit type field with (2) The keyIdentifier is composed of a four-bit type field with
the value 0100 followed by the least significant 60 bits of the the value 0100 followed by the least significant 60 bits of
SHA-1 hash of the value of the BIT STRING subjectPublicKey the SHA-1 hash of the value of the BIT STRING
(excluding the tag, length, and number of unused bits). subjectPublicKey (excluding the tag, length, and number of
unused bits).
Other methods of generating unique numbers are also acceptable. Other methods of generating unique numbers are also acceptable.
For end entity certificates, the subject key identifier extension For end entity certificates, the subject key identifier extension
provides a means for identifying certificates containing the provides a means for identifying certificates containing the
particular public key used in an application. Where an end entity particular public key used in an application. Where an end entity
has obtained multiple certificates, especially from multiple CAs, the has obtained multiple certificates, especially from multiple CAs, the
subject key identifier provides a means to quickly identify the set subject key identifier provides a means to quickly identify the set
of certificates containing a particular public key. To assist of certificates containing a particular public key. To assist
applications in identifying the appropriate end entity certificate, applications in identifying the appropriate end entity certificate,
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For end entity certificates, subject key identifiers SHOULD be For end entity certificates, subject key identifiers SHOULD be
derived from the public key. Two common methods for generating key derived from the public key. Two common methods for generating key
identifiers from the public key are identified above. identifiers from the public key are identified above.
Where a key identifier has not been previously established, this Where a key identifier has not been previously established, this
specification RECOMMENDS use of one of these methods for generating specification RECOMMENDS use of one of these methods for generating
keyIdentifiers or use of a similar method that uses a different hash keyIdentifiers or use of a similar method that uses a different hash
algorithm. Where a key identifier has been previously established, algorithm. Where a key identifier has been previously established,
the CA SHOULD use the previously established identifier. the CA SHOULD use the previously established identifier.
Conforming CAs MUST mark this extension non-critical. Conforming CAs MUST mark this extension as non-critical.
id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 14 } id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 14 }
SubjectKeyIdentifier ::= KeyIdentifier SubjectKeyIdentifier ::= KeyIdentifier
4.2.1.3 Key Usage 4.2.1.3. Key Usage
The key usage extension defines the purpose (e.g., encipherment, The key usage extension defines the purpose (e.g., encipherment,
signature, certificate signing) of the key contained in the signature, certificate signing) of the key contained in the
certificate. The usage restriction might be employed when a key that certificate. The usage restriction might be employed when a key that
could be used for more than one operation is to be restricted. For could be used for more than one operation is to be restricted. For
example, when an RSA key should be used only to verify signatures on example, when an RSA key should be used only to verify signatures on
objects other than public key certificates and CRLs, the objects other than public key certificates and CRLs, the
digitalSignature and/or nonRepudiation bits would be asserted. digitalSignature and/or nonRepudiation bits would be asserted.
Likewise, when an RSA key should be used only for key management, the Likewise, when an RSA key should be used only for key management, the
keyEncipherment bit would be asserted. keyEncipherment bit would be asserted.
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is extremely uncommon; almost all applications use key transport is extremely uncommon; almost all applications use key transport
or key agreement to establish a symmetric key. or key agreement to establish a symmetric key.
The keyAgreement bit is asserted when the subject public key is The keyAgreement bit is asserted when the subject public key is
used for key agreement. For example, when a Diffie-Hellman key is used for key agreement. For example, when a Diffie-Hellman key is
to be used for key management, then this bit is set. to be used for key management, then this bit is set.
The keyCertSign bit is asserted when the subject public key is The keyCertSign bit is asserted when the subject public key is
used for verifying signatures on public key certificates. If the used for verifying signatures on public key certificates. If the
keyCertSign bit is asserted, then the cA bit in the basic keyCertSign bit is asserted, then the cA bit in the basic
constraints extension (section 4.2.1.9) MUST also be asserted. constraints extension (Section 4.2.1.9) MUST also be asserted.
The cRLSign bit is asserted when the subject public key is used The cRLSign bit is asserted when the subject public key is used
for verifying signatures on certificate revocation lists (e.g., for verifying signatures on certificate revocation lists (e.g.,
CRLs, delta CRLs, or ARLs). CRLs, delta CRLs, or ARLs).
The meaning of the encipherOnly bit is undefined in the absence of The meaning of the encipherOnly bit is undefined in the absence of
the keyAgreement bit. When the encipherOnly bit is asserted and the keyAgreement bit. When the encipherOnly bit is asserted and
the keyAgreement bit is also set, the subject public key may be the keyAgreement bit is also set, the subject public key may be
used only for enciphering data while performing key agreement. used only for enciphering data while performing key agreement.
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Combining the nonRepudiation bit in the keyUsage certificate Combining the nonRepudiation bit in the keyUsage certificate
extension with other keyUsage bits may have security implications extension with other keyUsage bits may have security implications
depending on the context in which the certificate is to be used. depending on the context in which the certificate is to be used.
Further distinctions between the digitalSignature and nonRepudiation Further distinctions between the digitalSignature and nonRepudiation
bits may be provided in specific certificate policies. bits may be provided in specific certificate policies.
This profile does not restrict the combinations of bits that may be This profile does not restrict the combinations of bits that may be
set in an instantiation of the keyUsage extension. However, set in an instantiation of the keyUsage extension. However,
appropriate values for keyUsage extensions for particular algorithms appropriate values for keyUsage extensions for particular algorithms
are specified in [RFC 3279], [RFC 4055], and [RFC 4491]. When the are specified in [RFC3279], [RFC4055], and [RFC4491]. When the
keyUsage extension appears in a certificate, at least one of the bits keyUsage extension appears in a certificate, at least one of the bits
MUST be set to 1. MUST be set to 1.
4.2.1.4 Certificate Policies 4.2.1.4. Certificate Policies
The certificate policies extension contains a sequence of one or more The certificate policies extension contains a sequence of one or more
policy information terms, each of which consists of an object policy information terms, each of which consists of an object
identifier (OID) and optional qualifiers. Optional qualifiers, which identifier (OID) and optional qualifiers. Optional qualifiers, which
MAY be present, are not expected to change the definition of the MAY be present, are not expected to change the definition of the
policy. A certificate policy OID MUST NOT appear more than once in a policy. A certificate policy OID MUST NOT appear more than once in a
certificate policies extension. certificate policies extension.
In an end entity certificate, these policy information terms indicate In an end entity certificate, these policy information terms indicate
the policy under which the certificate has been issued and the the policy under which the certificate has been issued and the
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Applications with specific policy requirements are expected to have a Applications with specific policy requirements are expected to have a
list of those policies that they will accept and to compare the list of those policies that they will accept and to compare the
policy OIDs in the certificate to that list. If this extension is policy OIDs in the certificate to that list. If this extension is
critical, the path validation software MUST be able to interpret this critical, the path validation software MUST be able to interpret this
extension (including the optional qualifier), or MUST reject the extension (including the optional qualifier), or MUST reject the
certificate. certificate.
To promote interoperability, this profile RECOMMENDS that policy To promote interoperability, this profile RECOMMENDS that policy
information terms consist of only an OID. Where an OID alone is information terms consist of only an OID. Where an OID alone is
insufficient, this profile strongly recommends that use of qualifiers insufficient, this profile strongly recommends that the use of
be limited to those identified in this section. When qualifiers are qualifiers be limited to those identified in this section. When
used with the special policy anyPolicy, they MUST be limited to the qualifiers are used with the special policy anyPolicy, they MUST be
qualifiers identified in this section. Only those qualifiers limited to the qualifiers identified in this section. Only those
returned as a result of path validation are considered. qualifiers returned as a result of path validation are considered.
This specification defines two policy qualifier types for use by This specification defines two policy qualifier types for use by
certificate policy writers and certificate issuers. The qualifier certificate policy writers and certificate issuers. The qualifier
types are the CPS Pointer and User Notice qualifiers. types are the CPS Pointer and User Notice qualifiers.
The CPS Pointer qualifier contains a pointer to a Certification The CPS Pointer qualifier contains a pointer to a Certification
Practice Statement (CPS) published by the CA. The pointer is in the Practice Statement (CPS) published by the CA. The pointer is in the
form of a URI. Processing requirements for this qualifier are a form of a URI. Processing requirements for this qualifier are a
local matter. No action is mandated by this specification regardless local matter. No action is mandated by this specification regardless
of the criticality value asserted for the extension. of the criticality value asserted for the extension.
User notice is intended for display to a relying party when a User notice is intended for display to a relying party when a
certificate is used. Only user notices returned as a result of path certificate is used. Only user notices returned as a result of path
validation are intended for display to the user. If a notice is validation are intended for display to the user. If a notice is
duplicated only one copy need be displayed. To prevent such duplicated, only one copy need be displayed. To prevent such
duplication, this qualifier SHOULD only be present in end entity duplication, this qualifier SHOULD only be present in end entity
certificates and CA certificates issued to other organizations. certificates and CA certificates issued to other organizations.
The user notice has two optional fields: the noticeRef field and the The user notice has two optional fields: the noticeRef field and the
explicitText field. Conforming CAs SHOULD NOT use the noticeRef explicitText field. Conforming CAs SHOULD NOT use the noticeRef
option. option.
The noticeRef field, if used, names an organization and The noticeRef field, if used, names an organization and
identifies, by number, a particular textual statement prepared by identifies, by number, a particular textual statement prepared by
that organization. For example, it might identify the that organization. For example, it might identify the
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text indicated by the noticeRef option, then that text SHOULD be text indicated by the noticeRef option, then that text SHOULD be
displayed; otherwise, the explicitText string SHOULD be displayed. displayed; otherwise, the explicitText string SHOULD be displayed.
Note: While the explicitText has a maximum size of 200 characters, Note: While the explicitText has a maximum size of 200 characters,
some non-conforming CAs exceed this limit. Therefore, certificate some non-conforming CAs exceed this limit. Therefore, certificate
users SHOULD gracefully handle explicitText with more than 200 users SHOULD gracefully handle explicitText with more than 200
characters. characters.
id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 32 } id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 32 }
anyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-certificate-policies 0 } anyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-certificatePolicies 0 }
certificatePolicies ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyInformation certificatePolicies ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyInformation
PolicyInformation ::= SEQUENCE { PolicyInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
policyIdentifier CertPolicyId, policyIdentifier CertPolicyId,
policyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF policyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
PolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL } PolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL }
CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
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NoticeReference ::= SEQUENCE { NoticeReference ::= SEQUENCE {
organization DisplayText, organization DisplayText,
noticeNumbers SEQUENCE OF INTEGER } noticeNumbers SEQUENCE OF INTEGER }
DisplayText ::= CHOICE { DisplayText ::= CHOICE {
ia5String IA5String (SIZE (1..200)), ia5String IA5String (SIZE (1..200)),
visibleString VisibleString (SIZE (1..200)), visibleString VisibleString (SIZE (1..200)),
bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..200)), bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..200)),
utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..200)) } utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..200)) }
4.2.1.5 Policy Mappings 4.2.1.5. Policy Mappings
This extension is used in CA certificates. It lists one or more This extension is used in CA certificates. It lists one or more
pairs of OIDs; each pair includes an issuerDomainPolicy and a pairs of OIDs; each pair includes an issuerDomainPolicy and a
subjectDomainPolicy. The pairing indicates the issuing CA considers subjectDomainPolicy. The pairing indicates the issuing CA considers
its issuerDomainPolicy equivalent to the subject CA's its issuerDomainPolicy equivalent to the subject CA's
subjectDomainPolicy. subjectDomainPolicy.
The issuing CA's users might accept an issuerDomainPolicy for certain The issuing CA's users might accept an issuerDomainPolicy for certain
applications. The policy mapping defines the list of policies applications. The policy mapping defines the list of policies
associated with the subject CA that may be accepted as comparable to associated with the subject CA that may be accepted as comparable to
the issuerDomainPolicy. the issuerDomainPolicy.
Each issuerDomainPolicy named in the policy mappings extension SHOULD Each issuerDomainPolicy named in the policy mappings extension SHOULD
also be asserted in a certificate policies extension in the same also be asserted in a certificate policies extension in the same
certificate. Policies MUST NOT be mapped either to or from the certificate. Policies MUST NOT be mapped either to or from the
special value anyPolicy (section 4.2.1.4). special value anyPolicy (Section 4.2.1.4).
In general, certificate policies that appear in the In general, certificate policies that appear in the
issuerDomainPolicy field of the policy mappings extension are not issuerDomainPolicy field of the policy mappings extension are not
considered acceptable policies for inclusion in subsequent considered acceptable policies for inclusion in subsequent
certificates in the certification path. In some circumstances, a CA certificates in the certification path. In some circumstances, a CA
may wish to map from one policy (p1) to another (p2), but still wants may wish to map from one policy (p1) to another (p2), but still wants
the issuerDomainPolicy (p1) to be considered acceptable for inclusion the issuerDomainPolicy (p1) to be considered acceptable for inclusion
in subsequent certificates. This may occur, for example, if the CA in subsequent certificates. This may occur, for example, if the CA
is in the process of transitioning from the use of policy p1 to the is in the process of transitioning from the use of policy p1 to the
use of policy p2 and has valid certificates that were issued under use of policy p2 and has valid certificates that were issued under
each of the policies. A CA may indicate this by including two policy each of the policies. A CA may indicate this by including two policy
mappings in the CA certificates that it issues. Each policy mapping mappings in the CA certificates that it issues. Each policy mapping
would have an issuerDomainPolicy of p1; one policy mapping would have would have an issuerDomainPolicy of p1; one policy mapping would have
a subjectDomainPolicy of p1 and the other would have a a subjectDomainPolicy of p1 and the other would have a
subjectDomainPolicy of p2. subjectDomainPolicy of p2.
This extension MAY be supported by CAs and/or applications. This extension MAY be supported by CAs and/or applications.
Conforming CAs SHOULD mark this extension critical. Conforming CAs SHOULD mark this extension as critical.
id-ce-policyMappings OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 33 } id-ce-policyMappings OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 33 }
PolicyMappings ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SEQUENCE { PolicyMappings ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SEQUENCE {
issuerDomainPolicy CertPolicyId, issuerDomainPolicy CertPolicyId,
subjectDomainPolicy CertPolicyId } subjectDomainPolicy CertPolicyId }
4.2.1.6 Subject Alternative Name 4.2.1.6. Subject Alternative Name
The subject alternative name extension allows identities to be bound The subject alternative name extension allows identities to be bound
to the subject of the certificate. These identities may be included to the subject of the certificate. These identities may be included
in addition to or in place of the identity in the subject field of in addition to or in place of the identity in the subject field of
the certificate. Defined options include an Internet electronic mail the certificate. Defined options include an Internet electronic mail
address, a DNS name, an IP address, and a uniform resource identifier address, a DNS name, an IP address, and a Uniform Resource Identifier
(URI). Other options exist, including completely local definitions. (URI). Other options exist, including completely local definitions.
Multiple name forms, and multiple instances of each name form, MAY be Multiple name forms, and multiple instances of each name form, MAY be
included. Whenever such identities are to be bound into a included. Whenever such identities are to be bound into a
certificate, the subject alternative name (or issuer alternative certificate, the subject alternative name (or issuer alternative
name) extension MUST be used; however, a DNS name MAY also be name) extension MUST be used; however, a DNS name MAY also be
represented in the subject field using the domainComponent attribute represented in the subject field using the domainComponent attribute
as described in section 4.1.2.4. Note that where such names are as described in Section 4.1.2.4. Note that where such names are
represented in the subject field implementations are not required to represented in the subject field implementations are not required to
convert them into DNS names. convert them into DNS names.
Because the subject alternative name is considered to be definitively Because the subject alternative name is considered to be definitively
bound to the public key, all parts of the subject alternative name bound to the public key, all parts of the subject alternative name
MUST be verified by the CA. MUST be verified by the CA.
Further, if the only subject identity included in the certificate is Further, if the only subject identity included in the certificate is
an alternative name form (e.g., an electronic mail address), then the an alternative name form (e.g., an electronic mail address), then the
subject distinguished name MUST be empty (an empty sequence), and the subject distinguished name MUST be empty (an empty sequence), and the
subjectAltName extension MUST be present. If the subject field subjectAltName extension MUST be present. If the subject field
contains an empty sequence, then the issuing CA MUST include a contains an empty sequence, then the issuing CA MUST include a
subjectAltName extension that is marked as critical. When including subjectAltName extension that is marked as critical. When including
the subjectAltName extension in a certificate that has a non-empty the subjectAltName extension in a certificate that has a non-empty
subject distinguished name, conforming CAs SHOULD mark the subject distinguished name, conforming CAs SHOULD mark the
subjectAltName extension as non-critical. subjectAltName extension as non-critical.
When the subjectAltName extension contains an Internet mail address, When the subjectAltName extension contains an Internet mail address,
the address MUST be stored in the rfc822Name. The format of an the address MUST be stored in the rfc822Name. The format of an
rfc822Name is a "Mailbox" as defined in section 4.1.2 of [RFC 2821]. rfc822Name is a "Mailbox" as defined in Section 4.1.2 of [RFC2821].
A Mailbox has the form "Local-part@Domain". Note that a Mailbox has A Mailbox has the form "Local-part@Domain". Note that a Mailbox has
no phrase (such as a common name) before it, has no comment (text no phrase (such as a common name) before it, has no comment (text
surrounded in parentheses) after it, and is not surrounded by "<" and surrounded in parentheses) after it, and is not surrounded by "<" and
">". Rules for encoding Internet mail addresses that include ">". Rules for encoding Internet mail addresses that include
internationalized domain names are specified in section 7.5. internationalized domain names are specified in Section 7.5.
When the subjectAltName extension contains a iPAddress, the address When the subjectAltName extension contains an iPAddress, the address
MUST be stored in the octet string in "network byte order," as MUST be stored in the octet string in "network byte order", as
specified in [RFC 791]. The least significant bit (LSB) of each specified in [RFC791]. The least significant bit (LSB) of each octet
octet is the LSB of the corresponding byte in the network address. is the LSB of the corresponding byte in the network address. For IP
For IP Version 4, as specified in RFC 791, the octet string MUST version 4, as specified in [RFC791], the octet string MUST contain
contain exactly four octets. For IP Version 6, as specified in exactly four octets. For IP version 6, as specified in
[RFC 2460], the octet string MUST contain exactly sixteen octets. [RFC2460], the octet string MUST contain exactly sixteen octets.
When the subjectAltName extension contains a domain name system When the subjectAltName extension contains a domain name system
label, the domain name MUST be stored in the dNSName (an IA5String). label, the domain name MUST be stored in the dNSName (an IA5String).
The name MUST be in the "preferred name syntax," as specified by The name MUST be in the "preferred name syntax", as specified by
section 3.5 of [RFC 1034] and as modified by section 2.1 of Section 3.5 of [RFC1034] and as modified by Section 2.1 of
[RFC 1123]. Note that while upper and lower case letters are allowed [RFC1123]. Note that while uppercase and lowercase letters are
in domain names, no significance is attached to the case. In allowed in domain names, no significance is attached to the case. In
addition, while the string " " is a legal domain name, subjectAltName addition, while the string " " is a legal domain name, subjectAltName
extensions with a dNSName of " " MUST NOT be used. Finally, the use extensions with a dNSName of " " MUST NOT be used. Finally, the use
of the DNS representation for Internet mail addresses of the DNS representation for Internet mail addresses
(subscriber.example.com instead of subscriber@example.com) MUST NOT (subscriber.example.com instead of subscriber@example.com) MUST NOT
be used; such identities are to be encoded as rfc822Name. Rules for be used; such identities are to be encoded as rfc822Name. Rules for
encoding internationalized domain names are specified in section 7.2. encoding internationalized domain names are specified in Section 7.2.
When the subjectAltName extension contains a URI, the name MUST be When the subjectAltName extension contains a URI, the name MUST be
stored in the uniformResourceIdentifier (an IA5String). The name stored in the uniformResourceIdentifier (an IA5String). The name
MUST NOT be a relative URI, and it MUST follow the URI syntax and MUST NOT be a relative URI, and it MUST follow the URI syntax and
encoding rules specified in [RFC 3986]. The name MUST include both a encoding rules specified in [RFC3986]. The name MUST include both a
scheme (e.g., "http" or "ftp") and a scheme-specific-part. URIs that scheme (e.g., "http" or "ftp") and a scheme-specific-part. URIs that
include an authority ([RFC 3986], section 3.2) MUST include a fully include an authority ([RFC3986], Section 3.2) MUST include a fully
qualified domain name or IP address as the host. Rules for encoding qualified domain name or IP address as the host. Rules for encoding
internationalized resource identifiers (IRIs) are specified in Internationalized Resource Identifiers (IRIs) are specified in
section 7.4. Section 7.4.
As specified in [RFC 3986], the scheme name is not case-sensitive As specified in [RFC3986], the scheme name is not case-sensitive
(e.g., "http" is equivalent to "HTTP"). The host part, if present, (e.g., "http" is equivalent to "HTTP"). The host part, if present,
is also not case-sensitive, but other components of the scheme- is also not case-sensitive, but other components of the scheme-
specific-part may be case-sensitive. Rules for comparing URIs are specific-part may be case-sensitive. Rules for comparing URIs are
specified in section 7.4. specified in Section 7.4.
When the subjectAltName extension contains a DN in the directoryName, When the subjectAltName extension contains a DN in the directoryName,
the encoding rules are the same as those specified for the issuer the encoding rules are the same as those specified for the issuer
field in section 4.1.2.4. The DN MUST be unique for each subject field in Section 4.1.2.4. The DN MUST be unique for each subject
entity certified by the one CA as defined by the issuer name field. entity certified by the one CA as defined by the issuer field. A CA
A CA MAY issue more than one certificate with the same DN to the same MAY issue more than one certificate with the same DN to the same
subject entity. subject entity.
The subjectAltName MAY carry additional name types through the use of The subjectAltName MAY carry additional name types through the use of
the otherName field. The format and semantics of the name are the otherName field. The format and semantics of the name are
indicated through the OBJECT IDENTIFIER in the type-id field. The indicated through the OBJECT IDENTIFIER in the type-id field. The
name itself is conveyed as value field in otherName. For example, name itself is conveyed as value field in otherName. For example,
Kerberos [RFC 4120] format names can be encoded into the otherName, Kerberos [RFC4120] format names can be encoded into the otherName,
using using a Kerberos 5 principal name OID and a SEQUENCE of the using a Kerberos 5 principal name OID and a SEQUENCE of the Realm and
Realm and the PrincipalName. the PrincipalName.
Subject alternative names MAY be constrained in the same manner as Subject alternative names MAY be constrained in the same manner as
subject distinguished names using the name constraints extension as subject distinguished names using the name constraints extension as
described in section 4.2.1.10. described in Section 4.2.1.10.
If the subjectAltName extension is present, the sequence MUST contain If the subjectAltName extension is present, the sequence MUST contain
at least one entry. Unlike the subject field, conforming CAs MUST at least one entry. Unlike the subject field, conforming CAs MUST
NOT issue certificates with subjectAltNames containing empty NOT issue certificates with subjectAltNames containing empty
GeneralName fields. For example, an rfc822Name is represented as an GeneralName fields. For example, an rfc822Name is represented as an
IA5String. While an empty string is a valid IA5String, such an IA5String. While an empty string is a valid IA5String, such an
rfc822Name is not permitted by this profile. The behavior of clients rfc822Name is not permitted by this profile. The behavior of clients
that encounter such a certificate when processing a certification that encounter such a certificate when processing a certification
path is not defined by this profile. path is not defined by this profile.
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registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER } registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { OtherName ::= SEQUENCE {
type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }
EDIPartyName ::= SEQUENCE { EDIPartyName ::= SEQUENCE {
nameAssigner [0] DirectoryString OPTIONAL, nameAssigner [0] DirectoryString OPTIONAL,
partyName [1] DirectoryString } partyName [1] DirectoryString }
4.2.1.7 Issuer Alternative Name 4.2.1.7. Issuer Alternative Name
As with 4.2.1.6, this extension is used to associate Internet style As with Section 4.2.1.6, this extension is used to associate Internet
identities with the certificate issuer. Issuer alternative name MUST style identities with the certificate issuer. Issuer alternative
be encoded as in 4.2.1.6. Issuer alternative names are not processed name MUST be encoded as in 4.2.1.6. Issuer alternative names are not
as part of the certification path validation algorithm in section 6. processed as part of the certification path validation algorithm in
(That is, issuer alternative names are not used in name chaining and Section 6. (That is, issuer alternative names are not used in name
name constraints are not enforced.) chaining and name constraints are not enforced.)
Where present, conforming CAs SHOULD mark this extension non- Where present, conforming CAs SHOULD mark this extension as non-
critical. critical.
id-ce-issuerAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 18 } id-ce-issuerAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 18 }
IssuerAltName ::= GeneralNames IssuerAltName ::= GeneralNames
4.2.1.8 Subject Directory Attributes 4.2.1.8. Subject Directory Attributes
The subject directory attributes extension is used to convey The subject directory attributes extension is used to convey
identification attributes (e.g., nationality) of the subject. The identification attributes (e.g., nationality) of the subject. The
extension is defined as a sequence of one or more attributes. extension is defined as a sequence of one or more attributes.
Conforming CAs MUST mark this extension non-critical. Conforming CAs MUST mark this extension as non-critical.
id-ce-subjectDirectoryAttributes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 9 } id-ce-subjectDirectoryAttributes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 9 }
SubjectDirectoryAttributes ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute SubjectDirectoryAttributes ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute
4.2.1.9 Basic Constraints 4.2.1.9. Basic Constraints
The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the
certificate is a CA and the maximum depth of valid certification certificate is a CA and the maximum depth of valid certification
paths that include this certificate. paths that include this certificate.
The cA boolean indicates whether the certified public key may be used The cA boolean indicates whether the certified public key may be used
to verify certificate signatures. If the cA boolean is not asserted, to verify certificate signatures. If the cA boolean is not asserted,
then the keyCertSign bit in the key usage extension MUST NOT be then the keyCertSign bit in the key usage extension MUST NOT be
asserted. If the basic constraints extension is not present in a asserted. If the basic constraints extension is not present in a
version 3 certificate, or the extension is present but the cA boolean version 3 certificate, or the extension is present but the cA boolean
is not asserted, then the certified public key MUST NOT be used to is not asserted, then the certified public key MUST NOT be used to
verify certificate signatures. verify certificate signatures.
The pathLenConstraint field is meaningful only if the cA boolean is The pathLenConstraint field is meaningful only if the cA boolean is
asserted and the key usage extension, if present, asserts the asserted and the key usage extension, if present, asserts the
keyCertSign bit (section 4.2.1.3). In this case, it gives the keyCertSign bit (Section 4.2.1.3). In this case, it gives the
maximum number of non-self-issued intermediate certificates that may maximum number of non-self-issued intermediate certificates that may
follow this certificate in a valid certification path. (Note: The follow this certificate in a valid certification path. (Note: The
last certificate in the certification path is not an intermediate last certificate in the certification path is not an intermediate
certificate, and is not included in this limit. Usually, the last certificate, and is not included in this limit. Usually, the last
certificate is an end entity certificate, but it can be a CA certificate is an end entity certificate, but it can be a CA
certificate.) A pathLenConstraint of zero indicates that no non- certificate.) A pathLenConstraint of zero indicates that no non-
self-issued intermediate CA certificates may follow in a valid self-issued intermediate CA certificates may follow in a valid
certification path. Where it appears, the pathLenConstraint field certification path. Where it appears, the pathLenConstraint field
MUST be greater than or equal to zero. Where pathLenConstraint does MUST be greater than or equal to zero. Where pathLenConstraint does
not appear, no limit is imposed. not appear, no limit is imposed.
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CAs MUST NOT include the pathLenConstraint field unless the cA CAs MUST NOT include the pathLenConstraint field unless the cA
boolean is asserted and the key usage extension asserts the boolean is asserted and the key usage extension asserts the
keyCertSign bit. keyCertSign bit.
id-ce-basicConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 19 } id-ce-basicConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 19 }
BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
cA BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, cA BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
pathLenConstraint INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL } pathLenConstraint INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL }
4.2.1.10 Name Constraints 4.2.1.10. Name Constraints
The name constraints extension, which MUST be used only in a CA The name constraints extension, which MUST be used only in a CA
certificate, indicates a name space within which all subject names in certificate, indicates a name space within which all subject names in
subsequent certificates in a certification path MUST be located. subsequent certificates in a certification path MUST be located.
Restrictions apply to the subject distinguished name and apply to Restrictions apply to the subject distinguished name and apply to
subject alternative names. Restrictions apply only when the subject alternative names. Restrictions apply only when the
specified name form is present. If no name of the type is in the specified name form is present. If no name of the type is in the
certificate, the certificate is acceptable. certificate, the certificate is acceptable.
Name constraints are not applied to self-issued certificates (unless Name constraints are not applied to self-issued certificates (unless
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critical and SHOULD NOT impose name constraints on the x400Address, critical and SHOULD NOT impose name constraints on the x400Address,
ediPartyName, or registeredID name forms. Conforming CAs MUST NOT ediPartyName, or registeredID name forms. Conforming CAs MUST NOT
issue certificates where name constraints is an empty sequence. That issue certificates where name constraints is an empty sequence. That
is, either the permittedSubtrees field or the excludedSubtrees MUST is, either the permittedSubtrees field or the excludedSubtrees MUST
be present. be present.
Applications conforming to this profile MUST be able to process name Applications conforming to this profile MUST be able to process name
constraints that are imposed on the directoryName name form and constraints that are imposed on the directoryName name form and
SHOULD be able to process name constraints that are imposed on the SHOULD be able to process name constraints that are imposed on the
rfc822Name, uniformResourceIdentifier, dNSName, and iPAddress name rfc822Name, uniformResourceIdentifier, dNSName, and iPAddress name
forms. If a name constraints extension that is marked critical forms. If a name constraints extension that is marked as critical
imposes constraints on a particular name form, and an instance of imposes constraints on a particular name form, and an instance of
that name form appears in the subject field or subjectAltName that name form appears in the subject field or subjectAltName
extension of a subsequent certificate, then the application MUST extension of a subsequent certificate, then the application MUST
either process the constraint or reject the certificate. either process the constraint or reject the certificate.
Within this profile, the minimum and maximum fields are not used with Within this profile, the minimum and maximum fields are not used with
any name forms, thus minimum MUST be zero, and maximum MUST be any name forms, thus, the minimum MUST be zero, and maximum MUST be
absent. However, if an application encounters a critical name absent. However, if an application encounters a critical name
constraints extension that specifies other values for minimum or constraints extension that specifies other values for minimum or
maximum for a name form that appears in a subsequent certificate, the maximum for a name form that appears in a subsequent certificate, the
application MUST either process these fields or reject the application MUST either process these fields or reject the
certificate. certificate.
For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name. The For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name. The
constraint MUST be specified as a fully qualified domain name and MAY constraint MUST be specified as a fully qualified domain name and MAY
specify a host or a domain. Examples would be "host.example.com" and specify a host or a domain. Examples would be "host.example.com" and
".example.com". When the the constraint begins with a period, it MAY ".example.com". When the constraint begins with a period, it MAY be
be expanded with one or more subdomains. That is, the constraint expanded with one or more labels. That is, the constraint
".example.com" is satisfied by both host.example.com and ".example.com" is satisfied by both host.example.com and
my.host.example.com. However, the constraint ".example.com" is not my.host.example.com. However, the constraint ".example.com" is not
satisfied by "example.com". When the constraint does not begin with satisfied by "example.com". When the constraint does not begin with
a period, it specifies a host. If a constraint is applied to the a period, it specifies a host. If a constraint is applied to the
uniformResourceIdentifier name form and a subsequent certificate uniformResourceIdentifier name form and a subsequent certificate
includes a subjectAltName extension with a uniformResourceIdentifier includes a subjectAltName extension with a uniformResourceIdentifier
that does not include an authority component with a host name that does not include an authority component with a host name
specified as a fully qualified domain name (e.g., if the URI either specified as a fully qualified domain name (e.g., if the URI either
does not include an authority component or includes an authority does not include an authority component or includes an authority
component in which the host name is specified as an IP address), then component in which the host name is specified as an IP address), then
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"example.com". To indicate all Internet mail addresses on a "example.com". To indicate all Internet mail addresses on a
particular host, the constraint is specified as the host name. For particular host, the constraint is specified as the host name. For
example, the constraint "example.com" is satisfied by any mail example, the constraint "example.com" is satisfied by any mail
address at the host "example.com". To specify any address within a address at the host "example.com". To specify any address within a
domain, the constraint is specified with a leading period (as with domain, the constraint is specified with a leading period (as with
URIs). For example, ".example.com" indicates all the Internet mail URIs). For example, ".example.com" indicates all the Internet mail
addresses in the domain "example.com", but not Internet mail addresses in the domain "example.com", but not Internet mail
addresses on the host "example.com". addresses on the host "example.com".
DNS name restrictions are expressed as host.example.com. Any DNS DNS name restrictions are expressed as host.example.com. Any DNS
name that can be constructed by simply adding zero or more subdomains name that can be constructed by simply adding zero or more labels to
to the left hand side of the name satisfies the name constraint. For the left-hand side of the name satisfies the name constraint. For
example, www.host.example.com would satisfy the constraint but example, www.host.example.com would satisfy the constraint but
host1.example.com would not. host1.example.com would not.
Legacy implementations exist where an electronic mail address is Legacy implementations exist where an electronic mail address is
embedded in the subject distinguished name in an attribute of type embedded in the subject distinguished name in an attribute of type
emailAddress (section 4.1.2.6). When constraints are imposed on the emailAddress (Section 4.1.2.6). When constraints are imposed on the
rfc822Name name form, but the certificate does not include a subject rfc822Name name form, but the certificate does not include a subject
alternative name, the rfc822Name constraint MUST be applied to the alternative name, the rfc822Name constraint MUST be applied to the
attribute of type emailAddress in the subject distinguished name. attribute of type emailAddress in the subject distinguished name.
The ASN.1 syntax for emailAddress and the corresponding OID are The ASN.1 syntax for emailAddress and the corresponding OID are
supplied in appendix A. supplied in Appendix A.
Restrictions of the form directoryName MUST be applied to the subject Restrictions of the form directoryName MUST be applied to the subject
field in the certificate (when the certificate includes a non-empty field in the certificate (when the certificate includes a non-empty
subject field) and to any names of type directoryName in the subject field) and to any names of type directoryName in the
subjectAltName extension. Restrictions of the form x400Address MUST subjectAltName extension. Restrictions of the form x400Address MUST
be applied to any names of type x400Address in the subjectAltName be applied to any names of type x400Address in the subjectAltName
extension. extension.
When applying restrictions of the form directoryName, an When applying restrictions of the form directoryName, an
implementation MUST compare DN attributes. At a minimum, implementation MUST compare DN attributes. At a minimum,
implementations MUST perform the DN comparison rules specified in implementations MUST perform the DN comparison rules specified in
section 7.1. CAs issuing certificates with a restriction of the form Section 7.1. CAs issuing certificates with a restriction of the form
directoryName SHOULD NOT rely on implementation of the full ISO DN directoryName SHOULD NOT rely on implementation of the full ISO DN
name comparison algorithm. This implies name restrictions MUST be name comparison algorithm. This implies name restrictions MUST be
stated identically to the encoding used in the subject field or stated identically to the encoding used in the subject field or
subjectAltName extension. subjectAltName extension.
The syntax of iPAddress MUST be as described in section 4.2.1.6 with The syntax of iPAddress MUST be as described in Section 4.2.1.6 with
the following additions specifically for name constraints. For IPv4 the following additions specifically for name constraints. For IPv4
addresses, the iPAddress field of GeneralName MUST contain eight (8) addresses, the iPAddress field of GeneralName MUST contain eight (8)
octets, encoded in the style of RFC 4632 (CIDR) to represent an octets, encoded in the style of RFC 4632 (CIDR) to represent an
address range [RFC 4632]. For IPv6 addresses, the iPAddress field address range [RFC4632]. For IPv6 addresses, the iPAddress field
MUST contain 32 octets similarly encoded. For example, a name MUST contain 32 octets similarly encoded. For example, a name
constraint for "class C" subnet 192.0.2.0 is represented as the constraint for "class C" subnet 192.0.2.0 is represented as the
octets C0 00 02 00 FF FF FF 00, representing the CIDR notation octets C0 00 02 00 FF FF FF 00, representing the CIDR notation
192.0.2.0/24 (mask 255.255.255.0). 192.0.2.0/24 (mask 255.255.255.0).
Additional rules for encoding and processing name constraints are Additional rules for encoding and processing name constraints are
specified in section 7. specified in Section 7.
The syntax and semantics for name constraints for otherName, The syntax and semantics for name constraints for otherName,
ediPartyName, and registeredID are not defined by this specification, ediPartyName, and registeredID are not defined by this specification,
however syntax and semantics for name constraints for other name however, syntax and semantics for name constraints for other name
forms may be specified in other documents. forms may be specified in other documents.
id-ce-nameConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 30 } id-ce-nameConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 30 }
NameConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { NameConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
permittedSubtrees [0] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL, permittedSubtrees [0] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL,
excludedSubtrees [1] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL } excludedSubtrees [1] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL }
GeneralSubtrees ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralSubtree GeneralSubtrees ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralSubtree
GeneralSubtree ::= SEQUENCE { GeneralSubtree ::= SEQUENCE {
base GeneralName, base GeneralName,
minimum [0] BaseDistance DEFAULT 0, minimum [0] BaseDistance DEFAULT 0,
maximum [1] BaseDistance OPTIONAL } maximum [1] BaseDistance OPTIONAL }
BaseDistance ::= INTEGER (0..MAX) BaseDistance ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)
4.2.1.11 Policy Constraints 4.2.1.11. Policy Constraints
The policy constraints extension can be used in certificates issued The policy constraints extension can be used in certificates issued
to CAs. The policy constraints extension constrains path validation to CAs. The policy constraints extension constrains path validation
in two ways. It can be used to prohibit policy mapping or require in two ways. It can be used to prohibit policy mapping or require
that each certificate in a path contain an acceptable policy that each certificate in a path contain an acceptable policy
identifier. identifier.
If the inhibitPolicyMapping field is present, the value indicates the If the inhibitPolicyMapping field is present, the value indicates the
number of additional certificates that may appear in the path before number of additional certificates that may appear in the path before
policy mapping is no longer permitted. For example, a value of one policy mapping is no longer permitted. For example, a value of one
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policy identifier in the certificate policies extension. An policy identifier in the certificate policies extension. An
acceptable policy identifier is the identifier of a policy required acceptable policy identifier is the identifier of a policy required
by the user of the certification path or the identifier of a policy by the user of the certification path or the identifier of a policy
that has been declared equivalent through policy mapping. that has been declared equivalent through policy mapping.
Conforming applications MUST be able to process the Conforming applications MUST be able to process the
requireExplicitPolicy field and SHOULD be able to process the requireExplicitPolicy field and SHOULD be able to process the
inhibitPolicyMapping field. Applications that support the inhibitPolicyMapping field. Applications that support the
inhibitPolicyMapping field MUST also implement support for the inhibitPolicyMapping field MUST also implement support for the
policyMappings extension. If the policyConstraints extension is policyMappings extension. If the policyConstraints extension is
marked critical and the inhibitPolicyMapping field is present, marked as critical and the inhibitPolicyMapping field is present,
applications that do not implement support for the applications that do not implement support for the
inhibitPolicyMapping field MUST reject the certificate. inhibitPolicyMapping field MUST reject the certificate.
Conforming CAs MUST NOT issue certificates where policy constraints Conforming CAs MUST NOT issue certificates where policy constraints
is an empty sequence. That is, either the inhibitPolicyMapping field is an empty sequence. That is, either the inhibitPolicyMapping field
or the requireExplicitPolicy field MUST be present. The behavior of or the requireExplicitPolicy field MUST be present. The behavior of
clients that encounter an empty policy constraints field is not clients that encounter an empty policy constraints field is not
addressed in this profile. addressed in this profile.
Conforming CAs MUST mark this extension as critical. Conforming CAs MUST mark this extension as critical.
id-ce-policyConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 36 } id-ce-policyConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 36 }
PolicyConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { PolicyConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
requireExplicitPolicy [0] SkipCerts OPTIONAL, requireExplicitPolicy [0] SkipCerts OPTIONAL,
inhibitPolicyMapping [1] SkipCerts OPTIONAL } inhibitPolicyMapping [1] SkipCerts OPTIONAL }
SkipCerts ::= INTEGER (0..MAX) SkipCerts ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)
4.2.1.12 Extended Key Usage 4.2.1.12. Extended Key Usage
This extension indicates one or more purposes for which the certified This extension indicates one or more purposes for which the certified
public key may be used, in addition to or in place of the basic public key may be used, in addition to or in place of the basic
purposes indicated in the key usage extension. In general, this purposes indicated in the key usage extension. In general, this
extension will appear only in end entity certificates. This extension will appear only in end entity certificates. This
extension is defined as follows: extension is defined as follows:
id-ce-extKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 37 } id-ce-extKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 37 }
ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId
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id-kp-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 8 } id-kp-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 8 }
-- Binding the hash of an object to a time -- Binding the hash of an object to a time
-- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature
-- and/or nonRepudiation -- and/or nonRepudiation
id-kp-OCSPSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 } id-kp-OCSPSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 }
-- Signing OCSP responses -- Signing OCSP responses
-- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature
-- and/or nonRepudiation -- and/or nonRepudiation
4.2.1.13 CRL Distribution Points 4.2.1.13. CRL Distribution Points
The CRL distribution points extension identifies how CRL information The CRL distribution points extension identifies how CRL information
is obtained. The extension SHOULD be non-critical, but this profile is obtained. The extension SHOULD be non-critical, but this profile
RECOMMENDS support for this extension by CAs and applications. RECOMMENDS support for this extension by CAs and applications.
Further discussion of CRL management is contained in section 5. Further discussion of CRL management is contained in Section 5.
The cRLDistributionPoints extension is a SEQUENCE of The cRLDistributionPoints extension is a SEQUENCE of
DistributionPoint. A DistributionPoint consists of three fields, DistributionPoint. A DistributionPoint consists of three fields,
each of which is optional: distributionPoint, reasons, and cRLIssuer. each of which is optional: distributionPoint, reasons, and cRLIssuer.
While each of these fields is optional, a DistributionPoint MUST NOT While each of these fields is optional, a DistributionPoint MUST NOT
consist of only the reasons field; either distributionPoint or consist of only the reasons field; either distributionPoint or
cRLIssuer MUST be present. If the certificate issuer is not the CRL cRLIssuer MUST be present. If the certificate issuer is not the CRL
issuer, then the cRLIssuer field MUST be present and contain the Name issuer, then the cRLIssuer field MUST be present and contain the Name
of the CRL issuer. If the certificate issuer is also the CRL issuer, of the CRL issuer. If the certificate issuer is also the CRL issuer,
then conforming CAs MUST omit the cRLIssuer field and MUST include then conforming CAs MUST omit the cRLIssuer field and MUST include
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authorityRevocationList attribute. The CRL is to be obtained by the authorityRevocationList attribute. The CRL is to be obtained by the
application from whatever directory server is locally configured. application from whatever directory server is locally configured.
The protocol the application uses to access the directory (e.g., DAP The protocol the application uses to access the directory (e.g., DAP
or LDAP) is a local matter. or LDAP) is a local matter.
If the DistributionPointName contains a general name of type URI, the If the DistributionPointName contains a general name of type URI, the
following semantics MUST be assumed: the URI is a pointer to the following semantics MUST be assumed: the URI is a pointer to the
current CRL for the associated reasons and will be issued by the current CRL for the associated reasons and will be issued by the
associated cRLIssuer. When the HTTP or FTP URI scheme is used, the associated cRLIssuer. When the HTTP or FTP URI scheme is used, the
URI MUST point to a single DER encoded CRL as specified in URI MUST point to a single DER encoded CRL as specified in
[RFC 2585]. HTTP server implementations accessed via the URI SHOULD [RFC2585]. HTTP server implementations accessed via the URI SHOULD
specify the media type application/pkix-crl in the content-type specify the media type application/pkix-crl in the content-type
header field of the response. When the LDAP URI scheme [RFC 4516] is header field of the response. When the LDAP URI scheme [RFC4516] is
used, the URI MUST include a <dn> field containing the distinguished used, the URI MUST include a <dn> field containing the distinguished
name of the entry holding the CRL, MUST include a single <attrdesc> name of the entry holding the CRL, MUST include a single <attrdesc>
that contains an appropriate attribute description for the attribute that contains an appropriate attribute description for the attribute
that holds the CRL [RFC 4523], and SHOULD include a <host> that holds the CRL [RFC4523], and SHOULD include a <host>
(e.g., <ldap://ldap.example.com/cn=example%20CA,dc=example,dc=com? (e.g., <ldap://ldap.example.com/cn=example%20CA,dc=example,dc=com?
certificateRevocationList;binary>). Omitting the <host> (e.g., certificateRevocationList;binary>). Omitting the <host> (e.g.,
<ldap:///cn=CA,dc=example,dc=com?authorityRevocationList;binary>) has <ldap:///cn=CA,dc=example,dc=com?authorityRevocationList;binary>) has
the effect of relying on whatever a priori knowledge the client might the effect of relying on whatever a priori knowledge the client might
have to contact an appropriate server. When present, have to contact an appropriate server. When present,
DistributionPointName SHOULD include at least one LDAP or HTTP URI. DistributionPointName SHOULD include at least one LDAP or HTTP URI.
If the DistributionPointName contains the single value If the DistributionPointName contains the single value
nameRelativeToCRLIssuer, the value provides a distinguished name nameRelativeToCRLIssuer, the value provides a distinguished name
fragment. The fragment is appended to the X.500 distinguished name fragment. The fragment is appended to the X.500 distinguished name
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unused (0), unused (0),
keyCompromise (1), keyCompromise (1),
cACompromise (2), cACompromise (2),
affiliationChanged (3), affiliationChanged (3),
superseded (4), superseded (4),
cessationOfOperation (5), cessationOfOperation (5),
certificateHold (6), certificateHold (6),
privilegeWithdrawn (7), privilegeWithdrawn (7),
aACompromise (8) } aACompromise (8) }
4.2.1.14 Inhibit anyPolicy 4.2.1.14. Inhibit anyPolicy
The inhibit anyPolicy extension can be used in certificates issued to The inhibit anyPolicy extension can be used in certificates issued to
CAs. The inhibit anyPolicy extension indicates that the special CAs. The inhibit anyPolicy extension indicates that the special
anyPolicy OID, with the value { 2 5 29 32 0 }, is not considered an anyPolicy OID, with the value { 2 5 29 32 0 }, is not considered an
explicit match for other certificate policies except when it appears explicit match for other certificate policies except when it appears
in an intermediate self-issued CA certificate. The value indicates in an intermediate self-issued CA certificate. The value indicates
the number of additional non-self-issued certificates that may appear the number of additional non-self-issued certificates that may appear
in the path before anyPolicy is no longer permitted. For example, a in the path before anyPolicy is no longer permitted. For example, a
value of one indicates that anyPolicy may be processed in value of one indicates that anyPolicy may be processed in
certificates issued by the subject of this certificate, but not in certificates issued by the subject of this certificate, but not in
additional certificates in the path. additional certificates in the path.
Conforming CAs MUST mark this extension as critical. Conforming CAs MUST mark this extension as critical.
id-ce-inhibitAnyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 54 } id-ce-inhibitAnyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 54 }
InhibitAnyPolicy ::= SkipCerts InhibitAnyPolicy ::= SkipCerts
SkipCerts ::= INTEGER (0..MAX) SkipCerts ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)
4.2.1.15 Freshest CRL (a.k.a. Delta CRL Distribution Point) 4.2.1.15. Freshest CRL (a.k.a. Delta CRL Distribution Point)
The freshest CRL extension identifies how delta CRL information is The freshest CRL extension identifies how delta CRL information is
obtained. The extension MUST be marked as non-critical by conforming obtained. The extension MUST be marked as non-critical by conforming
CAs. Further discussion of CRL management is contained in section 5. CAs. Further discussion of CRL management is contained in Section 5.
The same syntax is used for this extension and the The same syntax is used for this extension and the
cRLDistributionPoints extension, and is described in section cRLDistributionPoints extension, and is described in Section
4.2.1.13. The same conventions apply to both extensions. 4.2.1.13. The same conventions apply to both extensions.
id-ce-freshestCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 46 } id-ce-freshestCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 46 }
FreshestCRL ::= CRLDistributionPoints FreshestCRL ::= CRLDistributionPoints
4.2.2 Private Internet Extensions 4.2.2. Private Internet Extensions
This section defines two extensions for use in the Internet Public This section defines two extensions for use in the Internet Public
Key Infrastructure. These extensions may be used to direct Key Infrastructure. These extensions may be used to direct
applications to on-line information about the issuer or the subject. applications to on-line information about the issuer or the subject.
Each extension contains a sequence of access methods and access Each extension contains a sequence of access methods and access
locations. The access method is an object identifier that indicates locations. The access method is an object identifier that indicates
the type of information that is available. The access location is a the type of information that is available. The access location is a
GeneralName that implicitly specifies the location and format of the GeneralName that implicitly specifies the location and format of the
information and the method for obtaining the information. information and the method for obtaining the information.
skipping to change at page 48, line 34 skipping to change at page 49, line 28
under the arc id-pe within the arc id-pkix. Any future extensions under the arc id-pe within the arc id-pkix. Any future extensions
defined for the Internet PKI are also expected to be defined under defined for the Internet PKI are also expected to be defined under
the arc id-pe. the arc id-pe.
id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) }
id-pe OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 1 } id-pe OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 1 }
4.2.2.1 Authority Information Access 4.2.2.1. Authority Information Access
The authority information access extension indicates how to access The authority information access extension indicates how to access
information and services for the issuer of the certificate in which information and services for the issuer of the certificate in which
the extension appears. Information and services may include on-line the extension appears. Information and services may include on-line
validation services and CA policy data. (The location of CRLs is not validation services and CA policy data. (The location of CRLs is not
specified in this extension; that information is provided by the specified in this extension; that information is provided by the
cRLDistributionPoints extension.) This extension may be included in cRLDistributionPoints extension.) This extension may be included in
end entity or CA certificates. Conforming CAs MUST mark this end entity or CA certificates. Conforming CAs MUST mark this
extension as non-critical. extension as non-critical.
skipping to change at page 49, line 14 skipping to change at page 50, line 4
AccessDescription ::= SEQUENCE { AccessDescription ::= SEQUENCE {
accessMethod OBJECT IDENTIFIER, accessMethod OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
accessLocation GeneralName } accessLocation GeneralName }
id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 } id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 }
id-ad-caIssuers OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 2 } id-ad-caIssuers OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 2 }
id-ad-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 1 } id-ad-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 1 }
Each entry in the sequence AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax describes the Each entry in the sequence AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax describes the
format and location of additional information provided by the issuer format and location of additional information provided by the issuer
of the certificate in which this extension appears. The type and of the certificate in which this extension appears. The type and
format of the information is specified by the accessMethod field; the format of the information are specified by the accessMethod field;
accessLocation field specifies the location of the information. The the accessLocation field specifies the location of the information.
retrieval mechanism may be implied by the accessMethod or specified The retrieval mechanism may be implied by the accessMethod or
by accessLocation. specified by accessLocation.
This profile defines two accessMethod OIDs: id-ad-caIssuers and This profile defines two accessMethod OIDs: id-ad-caIssuers and
id-ad-ocsp. id-ad-ocsp.
In a public key certificate, the id-ad-caIssuers OID is used when the In a public key certificate, the id-ad-caIssuers OID is used when the
additional information lists certificates that were issued to the CA additional information lists certificates that were issued to the CA
that issued the certificate containing this extension. The that issued the certificate containing this extension. The
referenced CA issuers description is intended to aid certificate referenced CA issuers description is intended to aid certificate
users in the selection of a certification path that terminates at a users in the selection of a certification path that terminates at a
point trusted by the certificate user. point trusted by the certificate user.
When id-ad-caIssuers appears as accessMethod, the accessLocation When id-ad-caIssuers appears as accessMethod, the accessLocation
field describes the referenced description server and the access field describes the referenced description server and the access
protocol to obtain the referenced description. The accessLocation protocol to obtain the referenced description. The accessLocation
field is defined as a GeneralName, which can take several forms. field is defined as a GeneralName, which can take several forms.
When the accessLocation is a directoryName, the information is to be When the accessLocation is a directoryName, the information is to be
obtained by the application from whatever directory server is locally obtained by the application from whatever directory server is locally
configured. The entry for the directoryName contains CA certificates configured. The entry for the directoryName contains CA certificates
in the crossCertificatePair and/or cACertificate attributes as in the crossCertificatePair and/or cACertificate attributes as
specified in [RFC 4523]. The protocol that application uses to specified in [RFC4523]. The protocol that application uses to access
access the directory (e.g., DAP or LDAP) is a local matter. the directory (e.g., DAP or LDAP) is a local matter.
Where the information is available via LDAP, the accessLocation Where the information is available via LDAP, the accessLocation
SHOULD be a uniformResourceIdentifier. The LDAP URI [RFC 4516] MUST SHOULD be a uniformResourceIdentifier. The LDAP URI [RFC4516] MUST
include a <dn> field containing the distinguished name of the entry include a <dn> field containing the distinguished name of the entry
holding the certificates, MUST include an <attributes> field that holding the certificates, MUST include an <attributes> field that
lists appropriate attribute descriptions for the attributes that hold lists appropriate attribute descriptions for the attributes that hold
the DER encoded certificates or cross-certificate pairs [RFC 4523], the DER encoded certificates or cross-certificate pairs [RFC4523],
and SHOULD include a <host> (e.g., <ldap://ldap.example.com/cn=CA, and SHOULD include a <host> (e.g., <ldap://ldap.example.com/cn=CA,
dc=example,dc=com?cACertificate;binary,crossCertificatePair;binary>). dc=example,dc=com?cACertificate;binary,crossCertificatePair;binary>).
Omitting the <host> (e.g., <ldap:///cn=exampleCA,dc=example,dc=com? Omitting the <host> (e.g., <ldap:///cn=exampleCA,dc=example,dc=com?
cACertificate;binary>) has the effect of relying on whatever a priori cACertificate;binary>) has the effect of relying on whatever a priori
knowledge the client might have to contact an appropriate server. knowledge the client might have to contact an appropriate server.
Where the information is available via HTTP or FTP, accessLocation Where the information is available via HTTP or FTP, accessLocation
MUST be a uniformResourceIdentifier and the URI MUST point to either MUST be a uniformResourceIdentifier and the URI MUST point to either
a single DER encoded certificate as specified in [RFC 2585] or a a single DER encoded certificate as specified in [RFC2585] or a
collection of certificates in a BER or DER encoded "certs-only" CMS collection of certificates in a BER or DER encoded "certs-only" CMS
message as specified in [RFC 2797]. message as specified in [RFC2797].
Conforming applications that support HTTP or FTP for accessing Conforming applications that support HTTP or FTP for accessing
certificates MUST be able to accept individual DER encoded certificates MUST be able to accept individual DER encoded
certificates and SHOULD be able to accept "certs-only" CMS messages. certificates and SHOULD be able to accept "certs-only" CMS messages.
HTTP server implementations accessed via the URI SHOULD specify the HTTP server implementations accessed via the URI SHOULD specify the
media type application/pkix-cert [RFC 2585] in the content-type media type application/pkix-cert [RFC2585] in the content-type header
header field of the response for a single DER encoded certificate and field of the response for a single DER encoded certificate and SHOULD
SHOULD specify the media type application/pkcs7-mime [RFC 2797] in specify the media type application/pkcs7-mime [RFC2797] in the
the content-type header field of the response for "certs-only" CMS content-type header field of the response for "certs-only" CMS
messages. For FTP, the name of a file that contains a single DER messages. For FTP, the name of a file that contains a single DER
encoded certificate SHOULD have a suffix of ".cer" [RFC 2585] and the encoded certificate SHOULD have a suffix of ".cer" [RFC2585] and the
name of a file that contains a "certs-only" CMS message SHOULD have a name of a file that contains a "certs-only" CMS message SHOULD have a
suffix of ".p7c" [RFC 2797]. Consuming clients may use the media suffix of ".p7c" [RFC2797]. Consuming clients may use the media type
type or file extension as a hint to the content, but should not or file extension as a hint to the content, but should not depend
depend solely on the presence of the correct media type or file solely on the presence of the correct media type or file extension in
extension in the server response. the server response.
The semantics of other id-ad-caIssuers accessLocation name forms are The semantics of other id-ad-caIssuers accessLocation name forms are
not defined. not defined.
An authorityInfoAccess extension may include multiple instances of An authorityInfoAccess extension may include multiple instances of
the id-ad-caIssuers accessMethod. The different instances may the id-ad-caIssuers accessMethod. The different instances may
specify different methods for accessing the same information or may specify different methods for accessing the same information or may
point to different information. When the id-ad-caIssuers point to different information. When the id-ad-caIssuers
accessMethod is used, at least one instance SHOULD specify an accessMethod is used, at least one instance SHOULD specify an
accessLocation that is an HTTP [RFC 2616] or LDAP [RFC 4516] URI. accessLocation that is an HTTP [RFC2616] or LDAP [RFC4516] URI.
The id-ad-ocsp OID is used when revocation information for the The id-ad-ocsp OID is used when revocation information for the
certificate containing this extension is available using the Online certificate containing this extension is available using the Online
Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [RFC 2560]. Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [RFC2560].
When id-ad-ocsp appears as accessMethod, the accessLocation field is When id-ad-ocsp appears as accessMethod, the accessLocation field is
the location of the OCSP responder, using the conventions defined in the location of the OCSP responder, using the conventions defined in
[RFC 2560]. [RFC2560].
Additional access descriptors may be defined in other PKIX Additional access descriptors may be defined in other PKIX
specifications. specifications.
4.2.2.2 Subject Information Access 4.2.2.2. Subject Information Access
The subject information access extension indicates how to access The subject information access extension indicates how to access
information and services for the subject of the certificate in which information and services for the subject of the certificate in which
the extension appears. When the subject is a CA, information and the extension appears. When the subject is a CA, information and
services may include certificate validation services and CA policy services may include certificate validation services and CA policy
data. When the subject is an end entity, the information describes data. When the subject is an end entity, the information describes
the type of services offered and how to access them. In this case, the type of services offered and how to access them. In this case,
the contents of this extension are defined in the protocol the contents of this extension are defined in the protocol
specifications for the supported services. This extension may be specifications for the supported services. This extension may be
included in end entity or CA certificates. Conforming CAs MUST mark included in end entity or CA certificates. Conforming CAs MUST mark
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SubjectInfoAccessSyntax ::= SubjectInfoAccessSyntax ::=
SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AccessDescription SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AccessDescription
AccessDescription ::= SEQUENCE { AccessDescription ::= SEQUENCE {
accessMethod OBJECT IDENTIFIER, accessMethod OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
accessLocation GeneralName } accessLocation GeneralName }
Each entry in the sequence SubjectInfoAccessSyntax describes the Each entry in the sequence SubjectInfoAccessSyntax describes the
format and location of additional information provided by the subject format and location of additional information provided by the subject
of the certificate in which this extension appears. The type and of the certificate in which this extension appears. The type and
format of the information is specified by the accessMethod field; the format of the information are specified by the accessMethod field;
accessLocation field specifies the location of the information. The the accessLocation field specifies the location of the information.
retrieval mechanism may be implied by the accessMethod or specified The retrieval mechanism may be implied by the accessMethod or
by accessLocation. specified by accessLocation.
This profile defines one access method to be used when the subject is This profile defines one access method to be used when the subject is
a CA and one access method to be used when the subject is an end a CA and one access method to be used when the subject is an end
entity. Additional access methods may be defined in the future in entity. Additional access methods may be defined in the future in
the protocol specifications for other services. the protocol specifications for other services.
The id-ad-caRepository OID is used when the subject is a CA that The id-ad-caRepository OID is used when the subject is a CA that
publishes certificates it issues in a repository. The accessLocation publishes certificates it issues in a repository. The accessLocation
field is defined as a GeneralName, which can take several forms. field is defined as a GeneralName, which can take several forms.
When the accessLocation is a directoryName, the information is to be When the accessLocation is a directoryName, the information is to be
obtained by the application from whatever directory server is locally obtained by the application from whatever directory server is locally
configured. When the extension is used to point to CA certificates, configured. When the extension is used to point to CA certificates,
the entry for the directoryName contains CA certificates in the the entry for the directoryName contains CA certificates in the
crossCertificatePair and/or cACertificate attributes as specified in crossCertificatePair and/or cACertificate attributes as specified in
[RFC 4523]. The protocol the application uses to access the [RFC4523]. The protocol the application uses to access the directory
directory (e.g., DAP or LDAP) is a local matter. (e.g., DAP or LDAP) is a local matter.
Where the information is available via LDAP, the accessLocation Where the information is available via LDAP, the accessLocation
SHOULD be a uniformResourceIdentifier. The LDAP URI [RFC 4516] MUST SHOULD be a uniformResourceIdentifier. The LDAP URI [RFC4516] MUST
include a <dn> field containing the distinguished name of the entry include a <dn> field containing the distinguished name of the entry
holding the certificates, MUST include an <attributes> field that holding the certificates, MUST include an <attributes> field that
lists appropriate attribute descriptions for the attributes that hold lists appropriate attribute descriptions for the attributes that hold
the DER encoded certificates or cross-certificate pairs [RFC 4523], the DER encoded certificates or cross-certificate pairs [RFC4523],
and SHOULD include a <host> (e.g., <ldap://ldap.example.com/cn=CA, and SHOULD include a <host> (e.g., <ldap://ldap.example.com/cn=CA,
dc=example,dc=com?cACertificate;binary,crossCertificatePair;binary>). dc=example,dc=com?cACertificate;binary,crossCertificatePair;binary>).
Omitting the <host> (e.g., <ldap:///cn=exampleCA,dc=example,dc=com? Omitting the <host> (e.g., <ldap:///cn=exampleCA,dc=example,dc=com?
cACertificate;binary>) has the effect of relying on whatever a priori cACertificate;binary>) has the effect of relying on whatever a priori
knowledge the client might have to contact an appropriate server. knowledge the client might have to contact an appropriate server.
Where the information is available via HTTP or FTP, accessLocation Where the information is available via HTTP or FTP, accessLocation
MUST be a uniformResourceIdentifier and the URI MUST point to either MUST be a uniformResourceIdentifier and the URI MUST point to either
a single DER encoded certificate as specified in [RFC 2585] or a a single DER encoded certificate as specified in [RFC2585] or a
collection of certificates in a BER or DER encoded "certs-only" CMS collection of certificates in a BER or DER encoded "certs-only" CMS
message as specified in [RFC 2797]. message as specified in [RFC2797].
Conforming applications that support HTTP or FTP for accessing Conforming applications that support HTTP or FTP for accessing
certificates MUST be able to accept individual DER encoded certificates MUST be able to accept individual DER encoded
certificates and SHOULD be able to accept "certs-only" CMS messages. certificates and SHOULD be able to accept "certs-only" CMS messages.
HTTP server implementations accessed via the URI SHOULD specify the HTTP server implementations accessed via the URI SHOULD specify the
media type application/pkix-cert [RFC 2585] in the content-type media type application/pkix-cert [RFC2585] in the content-type header
header field of the response for a single DER encoded certificate and field of the response for a single DER encoded certificate and SHOULD
SHOULD specify the media type application/pkcs7-mime [RFC 2797] in specify the media type application/pkcs7-mime [RFC2797] in the
the content-type header field of the response for "certs-only" CMS content-type header field of the response for "certs-only" CMS
messages. For FTP, the name of a file that contains a single DER messages. For FTP, the name of a file that contains a single DER
encoded certificate SHOULD have a suffix of ".cer" [RFC 2585] and the encoded certificate SHOULD have a suffix of ".cer" [RFC2585] and the
name of a file that contains a "certs-only" CMS message SHOULD have a name of a file that contains a "certs-only" CMS message SHOULD have a
suffix of ".p7c" [RFC 2797]. Consuming clients may use the media suffix of ".p7c" [RFC2797]. Consuming clients may use the media type
type or file extension as a hint to the content, but should not or file extension as a hint to the content, but should not depend
depend solely on the presence of the correct media type or file solely on the presence of the correct media type or file extension in
extension in the server response. the server response.
The semantics of other id-ad-caRepository accessLocation name forms The semantics of other id-ad-caRepository accessLocation name forms
are not defined. are not defined.
A subjectInfoAccess extension may include multiple instances of the A subjectInfoAccess extension may include multiple instances of the
id-ad-caRepository accessMethod. The different instances may specify id-ad-caRepository accessMethod. The different instances may specify
different methods for accessing the same information or may point to different methods for accessing the same information or may point to
different information. When the id-ad-caRepository accessMethod is different information. When the id-ad-caRepository accessMethod is
used, at least one instance SHOULD specify an accessLocation that is used, at least one instance SHOULD specify an accessLocation that is
an HTTP [RFC 2616] or LDAP [RFC 4516] URI. an HTTP [RFC2616] or LDAP [RFC4516] URI.
The id-ad-timeStamping OID is used when the subject offers The id-ad-timeStamping OID is used when the subject offers
timestamping services using the Time Stamp Protocol defined in timestamping services using the Time Stamp Protocol defined in
[RFC 3161]. Where the timestamping services are available via HTTP [RFC3161]. Where the timestamping services are available via HTTP or
or FTP, accessLocation MUST be a uniformResourceIdentifier. Where FTP, accessLocation MUST be a uniformResourceIdentifier. Where the
the timestamping services are available via electronic mail, timestamping services are available via electronic mail,
accessLocation MUST be an rfc822Name. Where timestamping services accessLocation MUST be an rfc822Name. Where timestamping services
are available using TCP/IP, the dNSName or iPAddress name forms may are available using TCP/IP, the dNSName or iPAddress name forms may
be used. The semantics of other name forms of accessLocation (when be used. The semantics of other name forms of accessLocation (when
accessMethod is id-ad-timeStamping) are not defined by this accessMethod is id-ad-timeStamping) are not defined by this
specification. specification.
Additional access descriptors may be defined in other PKIX Additional access descriptors may be defined in other PKIX
specifications. specifications.
id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 } id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 }
id-ad-caRepository OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 5 } id-ad-caRepository OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 5 }
id-ad-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 3 } id-ad-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 3 }
5 CRL and CRL Extensions Profile 5. CRL and CRL Extensions Profile
As discussed above, one goal of this X.509 v2 CRL profile is to As discussed above, one goal of this X.509 v2 CRL profile is to
foster the creation of an interoperable and reusable Internet PKI. foster the creation of an interoperable and reusable Internet PKI.
To achieve this goal, guidelines for the use of extensions are To achieve this goal, guidelines for the use of extensions are
specified, and some assumptions are made about the nature of specified, and some assumptions are made about the nature of
information included in the CRL. information included in the CRL.
CRLs may be used in a wide range of applications and environments CRLs may be used in a wide range of applications and environments
covering a broad spectrum of interoperability goals and an even covering a broad spectrum of interoperability goals and an even
broader spectrum of operational and assurance requirements. This broader spectrum of operational and assurance requirements. This
skipping to change at page 53, line 49 skipping to change at page 54, line 42
that has been authorized by the CA to issue CRLs. CAs publish CRLs that has been authorized by the CA to issue CRLs. CAs publish CRLs
to provide status information about the certificates they issued. to provide status information about the certificates they issued.
However, a CA may delegate this responsibility to another trusted However, a CA may delegate this responsibility to another trusted
authority. authority.
Each CRL has a particular scope. The CRL scope is the set of Each CRL has a particular scope. The CRL scope is the set of
certificates that could appear on a given CRL. For example, the certificates that could appear on a given CRL. For example, the
scope could be "all certificates issued by CA X", "all CA scope could be "all certificates issued by CA X", "all CA
certificates issued by CA X", "all certificates issued by CA X that certificates issued by CA X", "all certificates issued by CA X that
have been revoked for reasons of key compromise and CA compromise", have been revoked for reasons of key compromise and CA compromise",
or could be a set of certificates based on arbitrary local or a set of certificates based on arbitrary local information, such
information, such as "all certificates issued to the NIST employees as "all certificates issued to the NIST employees located in
located in Boulder". Boulder".
A complete CRL lists all unexpired certificates, within its scope, A complete CRL lists all unexpired certificates, within its scope,
that have been revoked for one of the revocation reasons covered by that have been revoked for one of the revocation reasons covered by
the CRL scope. A full and complete CRL lists all unexpired the CRL scope. A full and complete CRL lists all unexpired
certificates issued by a CA that have been revoked for any reason. certificates issued by a CA that have been revoked for any reason.
(Note that since CAs and CRL issuers are identified by name, the (Note that since CAs and CRL issuers are identified by name, the
scope of a CRL is not affected by the key used to sign the CRL or the scope of a CRL is not affected by the key used to sign the CRL or the
key(s) used to sign certificates.) key(s) used to sign certificates.)
If the scope of the CRL includes one or more certificates issued by If the scope of the CRL includes one or more certificates issued by
an entity other than the CRL issuer, then it is an indirect CRL. The an entity other than the CRL issuer, then it is an indirect CRL. The
scope of an indirect CRL may be limited to certificates issued by a scope of an indirect CRL may be limited to certificates issued by a
single CA or may include certificates issued by multiple CAs. If the single CA or may include certificates issued by multiple CAs. If the
issuer of the indirect CRL is a CA, then the scope of the indirect issuer of the indirect CRL is a CA, then the scope of the indirect
CRL MAY also include certificates issued by the issuer of the CRL. CRL MAY also include certificates issued by the issuer of the CRL.
The CRL issuer MAY also generate delta CRLs. A delta CRL only lists The CRL issuer MAY also generate delta CRLs. A delta CRL only lists
those certificates, within its scope, whose revocation status has those certificates, within its scope, whose revocation status has
changed since the issuance of a referenced complete CRL. The changed since the issuance of a referenced complete CRL. The
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This profile defines one private Internet CRL extension but does not This profile defines one private Internet CRL extension but does not
define any private CRL entry extensions. define any private CRL entry extensions.
Environments with additional or special purpose requirements may Environments with additional or special purpose requirements may
build on this profile or may replace it. build on this profile or may replace it.
Conforming CAs are not required to issue CRLs if other revocation or Conforming CAs are not required to issue CRLs if other revocation or
certificate status mechanisms are provided. When CRLs are issued, certificate status mechanisms are provided. When CRLs are issued,
the CRLs MUST be version 2 CRLs, include the date by which the next the CRLs MUST be version 2 CRLs, include the date by which the next
CRL will be issued in the nextUpdate field (section 5.1.2.5), include CRL will be issued in the nextUpdate field (Section 5.1.2.5), include
the CRL number extension (section 5.2.3), and include the authority the CRL number extension (Section 5.2.3), and include the authority
key identifier extension (section 5.2.1). Conforming applications key identifier extension (Section 5.2.1). Conforming applications
that support CRLs are REQUIRED to process both version 1 and version that support CRLs are REQUIRED to process both version 1 and version
2 complete CRLs that provide revocation information for all 2 complete CRLs that provide revocation information for all
certificates issued by one CA. Conforming applications are not certificates issued by one CA. Conforming applications are not
required to support processing of delta CRLs, indirect CRLs, or CRLs required to support processing of delta CRLs, indirect CRLs, or CRLs
with a scope other than all certificates issued by one CA. with a scope other than all certificates issued by one CA.
5.1 CRL Fields 5.1. CRL Fields
The X.509 v2 CRL syntax is as follows. For signature calculation, The X.509 v2 CRL syntax is as follows. For signature calculation,
the data that is to be signed is ASN.1 DER encoded. ASN.1 DER the data that is to be signed is ASN.1 DER encoded. ASN.1 DER
encoding is a tag, length, value encoding system for each element. encoding is a tag, length, value encoding system for each element.
CertificateList ::= SEQUENCE { CertificateList ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsCertList TBSCertList, tbsCertList TBSCertList,
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signatureValue BIT STRING } signatureValue BIT STRING }
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version Version OPTIONAL, version Version OPTIONAL,
-- if present, MUST be v2 -- if present, MUST be v2
signature AlgorithmIdentifier, signature AlgorithmIdentifier,
issuer Name, issuer Name,
thisUpdate Time, thisUpdate Time,
nextUpdate Time OPTIONAL, nextUpdate Time OPTIONAL,
revokedCertificates SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { revokedCertificates SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
userCertificate CertificateSerialNumber, userCertificate CertificateSerialNumber,
revocationDate Time, revocationDate Time,
crlEntryExtensions Extensions OPTIONAL crlEntryExtensions Extensions OPTIONAL
-- if present, MUST be v2 -- if present, version MUST be v2
} OPTIONAL, } OPTIONAL,
crlExtensions [0] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL crlExtensions [0] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL
-- if present, MUST be v2 -- if present, version MUST be v2
} }
-- Version, Time, CertificateSerialNumber, and Extensions -- Version, Time, CertificateSerialNumber, and Extensions
-- are all defined in the ASN.1 in section 4.1 -- are all defined in the ASN.1 in Section 4.1
-- AlgorithmIdentifier is defined in section 4.1.1.2 -- AlgorithmIdentifier is defined in Section 4.1.1.2
The following items describe the use of the X.509 v2 CRL in the The following items describe the use of the X.509 v2 CRL in the
Internet PKI. Internet PKI.
5.1.1 CertificateList Fields 5.1.1. CertificateList Fields
The CertificateList is a SEQUENCE of three required fields. The The CertificateList is a SEQUENCE of three required fields. The
fields are described in detail in the following subsections. fields are described in detail in the following subsections.
5.1.1.1 tbsCertList 5.1.1.1. tbsCertList
The first field in the sequence is the tbsCertList. This field is The first field in the sequence is the tbsCertList. This field is
itself a sequence containing the name of the issuer, issue date, itself a sequence containing the name of the issuer, issue date,
issue date of the next list, the optional list of revoked issue date of the next list, the optional list of revoked
certificates, and optional CRL extensions. When there are no revoked certificates, and optional CRL extensions. When there are no revoked
certificates, the revoked certificates list is absent. When one or certificates, the revoked certificates list is absent. When one or
more certificates are revoked, each entry on the revoked certificate more certificates are revoked, each entry on the revoked certificate
list is defined by a sequence of user certificate serial number, list is defined by a sequence of user certificate serial number,
revocation date, and optional CRL entry extensions. revocation date, and optional CRL entry extensions.
5.1.1.2 signatureAlgorithm 5.1.1.2. signatureAlgorithm
The signatureAlgorithm field contains the algorithm identifier for The signatureAlgorithm field contains the algorithm identifier for
the algorithm used by the CRL issuer to sign the CertificateList. the algorithm used by the CRL issuer to sign the CertificateList.
The field is of type AlgorithmIdentifier, which is defined in section The field is of type AlgorithmIdentifier, which is defined in Section
4.1.1.2. [RFC 3279], [RFC 4055], and [RFC 4491] list supported 4.1.1.2. [RFC3279], [RFC4055], and [RFC4491] list supported
algorithms for this specification, but other signature algorithms MAY algorithms for this specification, but other signature algorithms MAY
also be supported. also be supported.
This field MUST contain the same algorithm identifier as the This field MUST contain the same algorithm identifier as the
signature field in the sequence tbsCertList (section 5.1.2.2). signature field in the sequence tbsCertList (Section 5.1.2.2).
5.1.1.3 signatureValue 5.1.1.3. signatureValue
The signatureValue field contains a digital signature computed upon The signatureValue field contains a digital signature computed upon
the ASN.1 DER encoded tbsCertList. The ASN.1 DER encoded tbsCertList the ASN.1 DER encoded tbsCertList. The ASN.1 DER encoded tbsCertList
is used as the input to the signature function. This signature value is used as the input to the signature function. This signature value
is encoded as a BIT STRING and included in the CRL signatureValue is encoded as a BIT STRING and included in the CRL signatureValue
field. The details of this process are specified for each of the field. The details of this process are specified for each of the
supported algorithms in [RFC 3279], [RFC 4055], and [RFC 4491]. supported algorithms in [RFC3279], [RFC4055], and [RFC4491].
CAs that are also CRL issuers MAY use one private key to digitally CAs that are also CRL issuers MAY use one private key to digitally
sign certificates and CRLs, or MAY use separate private keys to sign certificates and CRLs, or MAY use separate private keys to
digitally sign certificates and CRLs. When separate private keys are digitally sign certificates and CRLs. When separate private keys are
employed, each of the public keys associated with these private keys employed, each of the public keys associated with these private keys
is placed in a separate certificate, one with the keyCertSign bit set is placed in a separate certificate, one with the keyCertSign bit set
in the key usage extension, and one with the cRLSign bit set in the in the key usage extension, and one with the cRLSign bit set in the
key usage extension (section 4.2.1.3). When separate private keys key usage extension (Section 4.2.1.3). When separate private keys
are employed, certificates issued by the CA contain one authority key are employed, certificates issued by the CA contain one authority key
identifier, and the corresponding CRLs contain a different authority identifier, and the corresponding CRLs contain a different authority
key identifier. The use of separate CA certificates for validation key identifier. The use of separate CA certificates for validation
of certificate signatures and CRL signatures can offer improved of certificate signatures and CRL signatures can offer improved
security characteristics; however, it imposes a burden on security characteristics; however, it imposes a burden on
applications, and it might limit interoperability. Many applications applications, and it might limit interoperability. Many applications
construct a certification path, and then validate the certification construct a certification path, and then validate the certification
path (section 6). CRL checking in turn requires a separate path (Section 6). CRL checking in turn requires a separate
certification path to be constructed and validated for the CA's CRL certification path to be constructed and validated for the CA's CRL
signature validation certificate. Applications that perform CRL signature validation certificate. Applications that perform CRL
checking MUST support certification path validation when certificates checking MUST support certification path validation when certificates
and CRLs are digitally signed with the same CA private key. These and CRLs are digitally signed with the same CA private key. These
applications SHOULD support certification path validation when applications SHOULD support certification path validation when
certificates and CRLs are digitally signed with different CA private certificates and CRLs are digitally signed with different CA private
keys. keys.
5.1.2 Certificate List "To Be Signed" 5.1.2. Certificate List "To Be Signed"
The certificate list to be signed, or TBSCertList, is a sequence of The certificate list to be signed, or TBSCertList, is a sequence of
required and optional fields. The required fields identify the CRL required and optional fields. The required fields identify the CRL
issuer, the algorithm used to sign the CRL, and the date and time the issuer, the algorithm used to sign the CRL, and the date and time the
CRL was issued. CRL was issued.
Optional fields include the date and time by which the CRL issuer Optional fields include the date and time by which the CRL issuer
will issue the next CRL, lists of revoked certificates, and CRL will issue the next CRL, lists of revoked certificates, and CRL
extensions. The revoked certificate list is optional to support the extensions. The revoked certificate list is optional to support the
case where a CA has not revoked any unexpired certificates that it case where a CA has not revoked any unexpired certificates that it
has issued. This profile requires conforming CRL issuers to include has issued. This profile requires conforming CRL issuers to include
the nextUpdate field and the CRL number and authority key identifier the nextUpdate field and the CRL number and authority key identifier
CRL extensions in all CRLs issued. CRL extensions in all CRLs issued.
5.1.2.1 Version 5.1.2.1. Version
This optional field describes the version of the encoded CRL. When This optional field describes the version of the encoded CRL. When
extensions are used, as required by this profile, this field MUST be extensions are used, as required by this profile, this field MUST be
present and MUST specify version 2 (the integer value is 1). present and MUST specify version 2 (the integer value is 1).
5.1.2.2 Signature 5.1.2.2. Signature
This field contains the algorithm identifier for the algorithm used This field contains the algorithm identifier for the algorithm used
to sign the CRL. [RFC 3279], [RFC 4055], and [RFC 4491] list OIDs to sign the CRL. [RFC3279], [RFC4055], and [RFC4491] list OIDs for
for the most popular signature algorithms used in the Internet PKI. the most popular signature algorithms used in the Internet PKI.
This field MUST contain the same algorithm identifier as the This field MUST contain the same algorithm identifier as the
signatureAlgorithm field in the sequence CertificateList (section signatureAlgorithm field in the sequence CertificateList (Section
5.1.1.2). 5.1.1.2).
5.1.2.3 Issuer Name 5.1.2.3. Issuer Name
The issuer name identifies the entity that has signed and issued the The issuer name identifies the entity that has signed and issued the
CRL. The issuer identity is carried in the issuer name field. CRL. The issuer identity is carried in the issuer field.
Alternative name forms may also appear in the issuerAltName extension Alternative name forms may also appear in the issuerAltName extension
(section 5.2.2). The issuer name field MUST contain a non-empty (Section 5.2.2). The issuer field MUST contain a non-empty X.500
X.500 distinguished name (DN). The issuer name field is defined as distinguished name (DN). The issuer field is defined as the X.501
the X.501 type Name, and MUST follow the encoding rules for the type Name, and MUST follow the encoding rules for the issuer name
issuer name field in the certificate (section 4.1.2.4). field in the certificate (Section 4.1.2.4).
5.1.2.4 This Update 5.1.2.4. This Update
This field indicates the issue date of this CRL. thisUpdate may be This field indicates the issue date of this CRL. thisUpdate may be
encoded as UTCTime or GeneralizedTime. encoded as UTCTime or GeneralizedTime.
CRL issuers conforming to this profile MUST encode thisUpdate as CRL issuers conforming to this profile MUST encode thisUpdate as
UTCTime for dates through the year 2049. CRL issuers conforming to UTCTime for dates through the year 2049. CRL issuers conforming to
this profile MUST encode thisUpdate as GeneralizedTime for dates in this profile MUST encode thisUpdate as GeneralizedTime for dates in
the year 2050 or later. Conforming applications MUST be able to the year 2050 or later. Conforming applications MUST be able to
process dates that are encoded in either UTCTime or GeneralizedTime. process dates that are encoded in either UTCTime or GeneralizedTime.
Where encoded as UTCTime, thisUpdate MUST be specified and Where encoded as UTCTime, thisUpdate MUST be specified and
interpreted as defined in section 4.1.2.5.1. Where encoded as interpreted as defined in Section 4.1.2.5.1. Where encoded as
GeneralizedTime, thisUpdate MUST be specified and interpreted as GeneralizedTime, thisUpdate MUST be specified and interpreted as
defined in section 4.1.2.5.2. defined in Section 4.1.2.5.2.
5.1.2.5 Next Update 5.1.2.5. Next Update
This field indicates the date by which the next CRL will be issued. This field indicates the date by which the next CRL will be issued.
The next CRL could be issued before the indicated date, but it will The next CRL could be issued before the indicated date, but it will
not be issued any later than the indicated date. CRL issuers SHOULD not be issued any later than the indicated date. CRL issuers SHOULD
issue CRLs with a nextUpdate time equal to or later than all previous issue CRLs with a nextUpdate time equal to or later than all previous
CRLs. nextUpdate may be encoded as UTCTime or GeneralizedTime. CRLs. nextUpdate may be encoded as UTCTime or GeneralizedTime.
Conforming CRL issuers MUST include the nextUpdate field in all CRLs. Conforming CRL issuers MUST include the nextUpdate field in all CRLs.
Note that the ASN.1 syntax of TBSCertList describes this field as Note that the ASN.1 syntax of TBSCertList describes this field as
OPTIONAL, which is consistent with the ASN.1 structure defined in OPTIONAL, which is consistent with the ASN.1 structure defined in
[X.509]. The behavior of clients processing CRLs that omit [X.509]. The behavior of clients processing CRLs that omit
nextUpdate is not specified by this profile. nextUpdate is not specified by this profile.
CRL issuers conforming to this profile MUST encode nextUpdate as CRL issuers conforming to this profile MUST encode nextUpdate as
UTCTime for dates through the year 2049. CRL issuers conforming to UTCTime for dates through the year 2049. CRL issuers conforming to
this profile MUST encode nextUpdate as GeneralizedTime for dates in this profile MUST encode nextUpdate as GeneralizedTime for dates in
the year 2050 or later. Conforming applications MUST be able to the year 2050 or later. Conforming applications MUST be able to
process dates that are encoded in either UTCTime or GeneralizedTime. process dates that are encoded in either UTCTime or GeneralizedTime.
Where encoded as UTCTime, nextUpdate MUST be specified and Where encoded as UTCTime, nextUpdate MUST be specified and
interpreted as defined in section 4.1.2.5.1. Where encoded as interpreted as defined in Section 4.1.2.5.1. Where encoded as
GeneralizedTime, nextUpdate MUST be specified and interpreted as GeneralizedTime, nextUpdate MUST be specified and interpreted as
defined in section 4.1.2.5.2. defined in Section 4.1.2.5.2.
5.1.2.6 Revoked Certificates 5.1.2.6. Revoked Certificates
When there are no revoked certificates, the revoked certificates list When there are no revoked certificates, the revoked certificates list
MUST be absent. Otherwise, revoked certificates are listed by their MUST be absent. Otherwise, revoked certificates are listed by their
serial numbers. Certificates revoked by the CA are uniquely serial numbers. Certificates revoked by the CA are uniquely
identified by the certificate serial number. The date on which the identified by the certificate serial number. The date on which the
revocation occurred is specified. The time for revocationDate MUST revocation occurred is specified. The time for revocationDate MUST
be expressed as described in section 5.1.2.4. Additional information be expressed as described in Section 5.1.2.4. Additional information
may be supplied in CRL entry extensions; CRL entry extensions are may be supplied in CRL entry extensions; CRL entry extensions are
discussed in section 5.3. discussed in Section 5.3.
5.1.2.7 Extensions 5.1.2.7. Extensions
This field may only appear if the version is 2 (section 5.1.2.1). If This field may only appear if the version is 2 (Section 5.1.2.1). If
present, this field is a sequence of one or more CRL extensions. CRL present, this field is a sequence of one or more CRL extensions. CRL
extensions are discussed in section 5.2. extensions are discussed in Section 5.2.
5.2 CRL Extensions 5.2. CRL Extensions
The extensions defined by ANSI X9, ISO/IEC, and ITU-T for X.509 v2 The extensions defined by ANSI X9, ISO/IEC, and ITU-T for X.509 v2
CRLs [X.509] [X9.55] provide methods for associating additional CRLs [X.509] [X9.55] provide methods for associating additional
attributes with CRLs. The X.509 v2 CRL format also allows attributes with CRLs. The X.509 v2 CRL format also allows
communities to define private extensions to carry information unique communities to define private extensions to carry information unique
to those communities. Each extension in a CRL may be designated as to those communities. Each extension in a CRL may be designated as
critical or non-critical. If a CRL contains a critical extension critical or non-critical. If a CRL contains a critical extension
that the application cannot process then the application MUST NOT use that the application cannot process, then the application MUST NOT
that CRL to determine the status of certificates. However, use that CRL to determine the status of certificates. However,
applications may ignore unrecognized non-critical extensions. The applications may ignore unrecognized non-critical extensions. The
following subsections present those extensions used within Internet following subsections present those extensions used within Internet
CRLs. Communities may elect to include extensions in CRLs that are CRLs. Communities may elect to include extensions in CRLs that are
not defined in this specification. However, caution should be not defined in this specification. However, caution should be
exercised in adopting any critical extensions in CRLs that might be exercised in adopting any critical extensions in CRLs that might be
used in a general context. used in a general context.
Conforming CRL issuers are REQUIRED to include the authority key Conforming CRL issuers are REQUIRED to include the authority key
identifier (section 5.2.1) and the CRL number (section 5.2.3) identifier (Section 5.2.1) and the CRL number (Section 5.2.3)
extensions in all CRLs issued. extensions in all CRLs issued.
5.2.1 Authority Key Identifier 5.2.1. Authority Key Identifier
The authority key identifier extension provides a means of The authority key identifier extension provides a means of
identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to
sign a CRL. The identification can be based on either the key sign a CRL. The identification can be based on either the key
identifier (the subject key identifier in the CRL signer's identifier (the subject key identifier in the CRL signer's
certificate) or on the issuer name and serial number. This extension certificate) or the issuer name and serial number. This extension is
is especially useful where an issuer has more than one signing key, especially useful where an issuer has more than one signing key,
either due to multiple concurrent key pairs or due to changeover. either due to multiple concurrent key pairs or due to changeover.
Conforming CRL issuers MUST use the key identifier method, and MUST Conforming CRL issuers MUST use the key identifier method, and MUST
include this extension in all CRLs issued. include this extension in all CRLs issued.
The syntax for this CRL extension is defined in section 4.2.1.1. The syntax for this CRL extension is defined in Section 4.2.1.1.
5.2.2 Issuer Alternative Name 5.2.2. Issuer Alternative Name
The issuer alternative name extension allows additional identities to The issuer alternative name extension allows additional identities to
be associated with the issuer of the CRL. Defined options include an be associated with the issuer of the CRL. Defined options include an
electronic mail address (rfc822Name), a DNS name, an IP address, and electronic mail address (rfc822Name), a DNS name, an IP address, and
a URI. Multiple instances of a name form and multiple name forms may a URI. Multiple instances of a name form and multiple name forms may
be included. Whenever such identities are used, the issuer be included. Whenever such identities are used, the issuer
alternative name extension MUST be used; however, a DNS name MAY be alternative name extension MUST be used; however, a DNS name MAY be
represented in the issuer field using the domainComponent attribute represented in the issuer field using the domainComponent attribute
as described in section 4.1.2.4. as described in Section 4.1.2.4.
Conforming CRL issuers SHOULD mark the issuerAltName extension non- Conforming CRL issuers SHOULD mark the issuerAltName extension as
critical. non-critical.
The OID and syntax for this CRL extension are defined in section The OID and syntax for this CRL extension are defined in Section
4.2.1.7. 4.2.1.7.
5.2.3 CRL Number 5.2.3. CRL Number
The CRL number is a non-critical CRL extension that conveys a The CRL number is a non-critical CRL extension that conveys a
monotonically increasing sequence number for a given CRL scope and monotonically increasing sequence number for a given CRL scope and
CRL issuer. This extension allows users to easily determine when a CRL issuer. This extension allows users to easily determine when a
particular CRL supersedes another CRL. CRL numbers also support the particular CRL supersedes another CRL. CRL numbers also support the
identification of complementary complete CRLs and delta CRLs. CRL identification of complementary complete CRLs and delta CRLs. CRL
issuers conforming to this profile MUST include this extension in all issuers conforming to this profile MUST include this extension in all
CRLs and MUST mark this extension non-critical. CRLs and MUST mark this extension as non-critical.
If a CRL issuer generates delta CRLs in addition to complete CRLs for If a CRL issuer generates delta CRLs in addition to complete CRLs for
a given scope, the complete CRLs and delta CRLs MUST share one a given scope, the complete CRLs and delta CRLs MUST share one
numbering sequence. If a delta CRL and a complete CRL that cover the numbering sequence. If a delta CRL and a complete CRL that cover the
same scope are issued at the same time, they MUST have the same CRL same scope are issued at the same time, they MUST have the same CRL
number and provide the same revocation information. That is, the number and provide the same revocation information. That is, the
combination of the delta CRL and an acceptable complete CRL MUST combination of the delta CRL and an acceptable complete CRL MUST
provide the same revocation information as the simultaneously issued provide the same revocation information as the simultaneously issued
complete CRL. complete CRL.
If a CRL issuer generates two CRLs (two complete CRLs, two delta If a CRL issuer generates two CRLs (two complete CRLs, two delta
CRLs, or a complete CRL and a delta CRL) for the same scope at CRLs, or a complete CRL and a delta CRL) for the same scope at
different times, the two CRLs MUST NOT have the same CRL number. different times, the two CRLs MUST NOT have the same CRL number.
That is, if the this update field (section 5.1.2.4) in the two CRLs That is, if the this update field (Section 5.1.2.4) in the two CRLs
are not identical, the CRL numbers MUST be different. are not identical, the CRL numbers MUST be different.
Given the requirements above, CRL numbers can be expected to contain Given the requirements above, CRL numbers can be expected to contain
long integers. CRL verifiers MUST be able to handle CRLNumber values long integers. CRL verifiers MUST be able to handle CRLNumber values
up to 20 octets. Conforming CRL issuers MUST NOT use CRLNumber up to 20 octets. Conforming CRL issuers MUST NOT use CRLNumber
values longer than 20 octets. values longer than 20 octets.
id-ce-cRLNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 20 } id-ce-cRLNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 20 }
CRLNumber ::= INTEGER (0..MAX) CRLNumber ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)
5.2.4 Delta CRL Indicator 5.2.4. Delta CRL Indicator
The delta CRL indicator is a critical CRL extension that identifies a The delta CRL indicator is a critical CRL extension that identifies a
CRL as being a delta CRL. Delta CRLs contain updates to revocation CRL as being a delta CRL. Delta CRLs contain updates to revocation
information previously distributed, rather than all the information information previously distributed, rather than all the information
that would appear in a complete CRL. The use of delta CRLs can that would appear in a complete CRL. The use of delta CRLs can
significantly reduce network load and processing time in some significantly reduce network load and processing time in some
environments. Delta CRLs are generally smaller than the CRLs they environments. Delta CRLs are generally smaller than the CRLs they
update, so applications that obtain delta CRLs consume less network update, so applications that obtain delta CRLs consume less network
bandwidth than applications that obtain the corresponding complete bandwidth than applications that obtain the corresponding complete
CRLs. Applications that store revocation information in a format CRLs. Applications that store revocation information in a format
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the corresponding fields of the delta CRL used in its construction. the corresponding fields of the delta CRL used in its construction.
In addition, the locally constructed CRL inherits the issuing In addition, the locally constructed CRL inherits the issuing
distribution point from the delta CRL. distribution point from the delta CRL.
A complete CRL and a delta CRL MAY be combined if the following four A complete CRL and a delta CRL MAY be combined if the following four
conditions are satisfied: conditions are satisfied:
(a) The complete CRL and delta CRL have the same issuer. (a) The complete CRL and delta CRL have the same issuer.
(b) The complete CRL and delta CRL have the same scope. The two (b) The complete CRL and delta CRL have the same scope. The two
CRLs have the same scope if either of the following conditions are CRLs have the same scope if either of the following
met: conditions are met:
(1) The issuingDistributionPoint extension is omitted from (1) The issuingDistributionPoint extension is omitted from
both the complete CRL and the delta CRL. both the complete CRL and the delta CRL.
(2) The issuingDistributionPoint extension is present in both (2) The issuingDistributionPoint extension is present in both
the complete CRL and the delta CRL, and the values for each of the complete CRL and the delta CRL, and the values for
the fields in the extensions are the same in both CRLs. each of the fields in the extensions are the same in both
CRLs.
(c) The CRL number of the complete CRL is equal to or greater (c) The CRL number of the complete CRL is equal to or greater
than the BaseCRLNumber specified in the delta CRL. That is, the than the BaseCRLNumber specified in the delta CRL. That is,
complete CRL contains (at a minimum) all the revocation the complete CRL contains (at a minimum) all the revocation
information held by the referenced base CRL. information held by the referenced base CRL.
(d) The CRL number of the complete CRL is less than the CRL (d) The CRL number of the complete CRL is less than the CRL
number of the delta CRL. That is, the delta CRL follows the number of the delta CRL. That is, the delta CRL follows the
complete CRL in the numbering sequence. complete CRL in the numbering sequence.
CRL issuers MUST ensure that the combination of a delta CRL and any CRL issuers MUST ensure that the combination of a delta CRL and any
appropriate complete CRL accurately reflects the current revocation appropriate complete CRL accurately reflects the current revocation
status. The CRL issuer MUST include an entry in the delta CRL for status. The CRL issuer MUST include an entry in the delta CRL for
each certificate within the scope of the delta CRL whose status has each certificate within the scope of the delta CRL whose status has
changed since the generation of the referenced base CRL: changed since the generation of the referenced base CRL:
(a) If the certificate is revoked for a reason included in the (a) If the certificate is revoked for a reason included in the
scope of the CRL, list the certificate as revoked. scope of the CRL, list the certificate as revoked.
(b) If the certificate is valid and was listed on the referenced (b) If the certificate is valid and was listed on the referenced
base CRL or any subsequent CRL with reason code certificateHold, base CRL or any subsequent CRL with reason code
and the reason code certificateHold is included in the scope of certificateHold, and the reason code certificateHold is
the CRL, list the certificate with the reason code removeFromCRL. included in the scope of the CRL, list the certificate with
the reason code removeFromCRL.
(c) If the certificate is revoked for a reason outside the scope (c) If the certificate is revoked for a reason outside the scope
of the CRL, but the certificate was listed on the referenced base of the CRL, but the certificate was listed on the referenced
CRL or any subsequent CRL with a reason code included in the scope base CRL or any subsequent CRL with a reason code included in
of this CRL, list the certificate as revoked but omit the reason the scope of this CRL, list the certificate as revoked but
code. omit the reason code.
(d) If the certificate is revoked for a reason outside the scope (d) If the certificate is revoked for a reason outside the scope
of the CRL and the certificate was neither listed on the of the CRL and the certificate was neither listed on the
referenced base CRL nor any subsequent CRL with a reason code referenced base CRL nor any subsequent CRL with a reason code
included in the scope of this CRL, do not list the certificate on included in the scope of this CRL, do not list the
this CRL. certificate on this CRL.
The status of a certificate is considered to have changed if it is The status of a certificate is considered to have changed if it is
revoked (for any revocation reason, including certificateHold), revoked (for any revocation reason, including certificateHold), if it
released from hold, or if its revocation reason changes. is released from hold, or if its revocation reason changes.
It is appropriate to list a certificate with reason code It is appropriate to list a certificate with reason code
removeFromCRL on a delta CRL even if the certificate was not on hold removeFromCRL on a delta CRL even if the certificate was not on hold
in the referenced base CRL. If the certificate was placed on hold in in the referenced base CRL. If the certificate was placed on hold in
any CRL issued after the base but before this delta CRL and then any CRL issued after the base but before this delta CRL and then
released from hold, it MUST be listed on the delta CRL with released from hold, it MUST be listed on the delta CRL with
revocation reason removeFromCRL. revocation reason removeFromCRL.
A CRL issuer MAY optionally list a certificate on a delta CRL with A CRL issuer MAY optionally list a certificate on a delta CRL with
reason code removeFromCRL if the notAfter time specified in the reason code removeFromCRL if the notAfter time specified in the
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and nextUpdate fields. Under some circumstances, the CRL issuer may and nextUpdate fields. Under some circumstances, the CRL issuer may
publish one or more delta CRLs before the time indicated by the publish one or more delta CRLs before the time indicated by the
nextUpdate field. If more than one current delta CRL for a given nextUpdate field. If more than one current delta CRL for a given
scope is encountered, the application SHOULD consider the one with scope is encountered, the application SHOULD consider the one with
the latest value in thisUpdate to be the most current one. the latest value in thisUpdate to be the most current one.
id-ce-deltaCRLIndicator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 27 } id-ce-deltaCRLIndicator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 27 }
BaseCRLNumber ::= CRLNumber BaseCRLNumber ::= CRLNumber
5.2.5 Issuing Distribution Point 5.2.5. Issuing Distribution Point
The issuing distribution point is a critical CRL extension that The issuing distribution point is a critical CRL extension that
identifies the CRL distribution point and scope for a particular CRL, identifies the CRL distribution point and scope for a particular CRL,
and it indicates whether the CRL covers revocation for end entity and it indicates whether the CRL covers revocation for end entity
certificates only, CA certificates only, attribute certificates only, certificates only, CA certificates only, attribute certificates only,
or a limited set of reason codes. Although the extension is or a limited set of reason codes. Although the extension is
critical, conforming implementations are not required to support this critical, conforming implementations are not required to support this
extension. However, implementations that do not support this extension. However, implementations that do not support this
extension MUST either treat the status of any certificate not listed extension MUST either treat the status of any certificate not listed
on this CRL as unknown or locate another CRL that does not contain on this CRL as unknown or locate another CRL that does not contain
any unrecognized critical extensions. any unrecognized critical extensions.
The CRL is signed using the CRL issuer's private key. CRL The CRL is signed using the CRL issuer's private key. CRL
Distribution Points do not have their own key pairs. If the CRL is distribution points do not have their own key pairs. If the CRL is
stored in the X.500 directory, it is stored in the directory entry stored in the X.500 directory, it is stored in the directory entry
corresponding to the CRL distribution point, which may be different corresponding to the CRL distribution point, which may be different
than the directory entry of the CRL issuer. from the directory entry of the CRL issuer.
The reason codes associated with a distribution point MUST be The reason codes associated with a distribution point MUST be
specified in onlySomeReasons. If onlySomeReasons does not appear, specified in onlySomeReasons. If onlySomeReasons does not appear,
the distribution point MUST contain revocations for all reason codes. the distribution point MUST contain revocations for all reason codes.
CAs may use CRL distribution points to partition the CRL on the basis CAs may use CRL distribution points to partition the CRL on the basis
of compromise and routine revocation. In this case, the revocations of compromise and routine revocation. In this case, the revocations
with reason code keyCompromise (1), cACompromise (2), and with reason code keyCompromise (1), cACompromise (2), and
aACompromise (8) appear in one distribution point, and the aACompromise (8) appear in one distribution point, and the
revocations with other reason codes appear in another distribution revocations with other reason codes appear in another distribution
point. point.
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If a CRL includes an issuingDistributionPoint extension with If a CRL includes an issuingDistributionPoint extension with
onlySomeReasons present, then every certificate in the scope of the onlySomeReasons present, then every certificate in the scope of the
CRL that is revoked MUST be assigned a revocation reason other than CRL that is revoked MUST be assigned a revocation reason other than
unspecified. The assigned revocation reason is used to determine on unspecified. The assigned revocation reason is used to determine on
which CRL(s) to list the revoked certificate, however, there is no which CRL(s) to list the revoked certificate, however, there is no
requirement to include the reasonCode CRL entry extension in the requirement to include the reasonCode CRL entry extension in the
corresponding CRL entry. corresponding CRL entry.
The syntax and semantics for the distributionPoint field are the same The syntax and semantics for the distributionPoint field are the same
as for the distributionPoint field in the cRLDistributionPoints as for the distributionPoint field in the cRLDistributionPoints
extension (section 4.2.1.13). If the distributionPoint field is extension (Section 4.2.1.13). If the distributionPoint field is
present, then it MUST include at least one of names from the present, then it MUST include at least one of names from the
corresponding distributionPoint field of the cRLDistributionPoints corresponding distributionPoint field of the cRLDistributionPoints
extension of every certificate that is within the scope of this CRL. extension of every certificate that is within the scope of this CRL.
The identical encoding MUST be used in the distributionPoint fields The identical encoding MUST be used in the distributionPoint fields
of the certificate and the CRL. of the certificate and the CRL.
If the distributionPoint field is absent, the CRL MUST contain If the distributionPoint field is absent, the CRL MUST contain
entries for all revoked unexpired certificates issued by the CRL entries for all revoked unexpired certificates issued by the CRL
issuer, if any, within the scope of the CRL. issuer, if any, within the scope of the CRL.
If the scope of the CRL only includes certificates issued by the CRL If the scope of the CRL only includes certificates issued by the CRL
issuer then the indirectCRL boolean MUST be set to FALSE. Otherwise, issuer, then the indirectCRL boolean MUST be set to FALSE.
if the scope of the CRL includes certificates issued by one or more Otherwise, if the scope of the CRL includes certificates issued by
authorities other than the CRL issuer, the indirectCRL boolean MUST one or more authorities other than the CRL issuer, the indirectCRL
be set to TRUE. The authority responsible for each entry is boolean MUST be set to TRUE. The authority responsible for each
indicated by the certificate issuer CRL entry extension (section entry is indicated by the certificate issuer CRL entry extension
5.3.3). (Section 5.3.3).
If the scope of the CRL only includes end entity public key If the scope of the CRL only includes end entity public key
certificates then onlyContainsUserCerts MUST be set to TRUE. If the certificates, then onlyContainsUserCerts MUST be set to TRUE. If the
scope of the CRL only includes CA certificates then scope of the CRL only includes CA certificates, then
onlyContainsCACerts MUST be set to TRUE. If either onlyContainsCACerts MUST be set to TRUE. If either
onlyContainsUserCerts or onlyContainsCACerts is set to TRUE then the onlyContainsUserCerts or onlyContainsCACerts is set to TRUE, then the
scope of the CRL MUST NOT include any version 1 or version 2 scope of the CRL MUST NOT include any version 1 or version 2
certificates. Conforming CRLs issuers MUST set the certificates. Conforming CRLs issuers MUST set the
onlyContainsAttributeCerts boolean to FALSE. onlyContainsAttributeCerts boolean to FALSE.
Conforming CRLs issuers MUST NOT issue CRLs where the DER encoding of Conforming CRLs issuers MUST NOT issue CRLs where the DER encoding of
the issuing distribution point extension is an empty sequence. That the issuing distribution point extension is an empty sequence. That
is, if onlyContainsUserCerts, onlyContainsCACerts, indirectCRL, and is, if onlyContainsUserCerts, onlyContainsCACerts, indirectCRL, and
onlyContainsAttributeCerts are all FALSE then either the onlyContainsAttributeCerts are all FALSE, then either the
distributionPoint field or the onlySomeReasons field MUST be present. distributionPoint field or the onlySomeReasons field MUST be present.
id-ce-issuingDistributionPoint OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 28 } id-ce-issuingDistributionPoint OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 28 }
IssuingDistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE { IssuingDistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE {
distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL, distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL,
onlyContainsUserCerts [1] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, onlyContainsUserCerts [1] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
onlyContainsCACerts [2] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, onlyContainsCACerts [2] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
onlySomeReasons [3] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL, onlySomeReasons [3] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL,
indirectCRL [4] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, indirectCRL [4] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
onlyContainsAttributeCerts [5] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE } onlyContainsAttributeCerts [5] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE }
-- at most one of onlyContainsUserCerts, onlyContainsCACerts, -- at most one of onlyContainsUserCerts, onlyContainsCACerts,
-- and onlyContainsAttributeCerts may be set to TRUE. -- and onlyContainsAttributeCerts may be set to TRUE.
5.2.6 Freshest CRL (a.k.a. Delta CRL Distribution Point) 5.2.6. Freshest CRL (a.k.a. Delta CRL Distribution Point)
The freshest CRL extension identifies how delta CRL information for The freshest CRL extension identifies how delta CRL information for
this complete CRL is obtained. Conforming CRL issuers MUST mark this this complete CRL is obtained. Conforming CRL issuers MUST mark this
extension non-critical. This extension MUST NOT appear in delta extension as non-critical. This extension MUST NOT appear in delta
CRLs. CRLs.
The same syntax is used for this extension as the The same syntax is used for this extension as the
cRLDistributionPoints certificate extension, and is described in cRLDistributionPoints certificate extension, and is described in
section 4.2.1.13. However, only the distribution point field is Section 4.2.1.13. However, only the distribution point field is
meaningful in this context. The reasons and cRLIssuer fields MUST be meaningful in this context. The reasons and cRLIssuer fields MUST be
omitted from this CRL extension. omitted from this CRL extension.
Each distribution point name provides the location at which a delta Each distribution point name provides the location at which a delta
CRL for this complete CRL can be found. The scope of these delta CRL for this complete CRL can be found. The scope of these delta
CRLs MUST be the same as the scope of this complete CRL. The CRLs MUST be the same as the scope of this complete CRL. The
contents of this CRL extension are only used to locate delta CRLs; contents of this CRL extension are only used to locate delta CRLs;
the contents are not used to validate the CRL or the referenced delta the contents are not used to validate the CRL or the referenced delta
CRLs. The encoding conventions defined for distribution points in CRLs. The encoding conventions defined for distribution points in
section 4.2.1.13 apply to this extension. Section 4.2.1.13 apply to this extension.
id-ce-freshestCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 46 } id-ce-freshestCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 46 }
FreshestCRL ::= CRLDistributionPoints FreshestCRL ::= CRLDistributionPoints
5.2.7 Authority Information Access 5.2.7. Authority Information Access
This section defines the use of the Authority Information Access This section defines the use of the Authority Information Access
extension in a CRL. The syntax and semantics defined in section extension in a CRL. The syntax and semantics defined in Section
4.2.2.1 for the certificate extension are also used for the CRL 4.2.2.1 for the certificate extension are also used for the CRL
extension. extension.
This CRL extension MUST be marked non-critical. This CRL extension MUST be marked as non-critical.
When present in a CRL, this extension MUST include at least one When present in a CRL, this extension MUST include at least one
AccessDescription specifying id-ad-caIssuers as the accessMethod. AccessDescription specifying id-ad-caIssuers as the accessMethod.
The id-ad-caIssuers OID is used when the information that is The id-ad-caIssuers OID is used when the information available lists
available lists certificates that can be used to verify the signature certificates that can be used to verify the signature on the CRL
on the CRL (i.e., certificates that have a subject name that matches (i.e., certificates that have a subject name that matches the issuer
the issuer name on the CRL and that have a subject public key that name on the CRL and that have a subject public key that corresponds
corresponds to the private key used to sign the CRL). Access method to the private key used to sign the CRL). Access method types other
types other than id-ad-caIssuers MUST NOT be included. At least one than id-ad-caIssuers MUST NOT be included. At least one instance of
instance of AccessDescription SHOULD specify an accessLocation that AccessDescription SHOULD specify an accessLocation that is an HTTP
is an HTTP [RFC 2616] or LDAP [RFC 4516] URI. [RFC2616] or LDAP [RFC4516] URI.
Where the information is available via HTTP or FTP, accessLocation Where the information is available via HTTP or FTP, accessLocation
MUST be a uniformResourceIdentifier and the URI MUST point to either MUST be a uniformResourceIdentifier and the URI MUST point to either
a single DER encoded certificate as specified in [RFC 2585] or a a single DER encoded certificate as specified in [RFC2585] or a
collection of certificates in a BER or DER encoded "certs-only" CMS collection of certificates in a BER or DER encoded "certs-only" CMS
message as specified in [RFC 2797]. message as specified in [RFC2797].
Conforming applications that support HTTP or FTP for accessing Conforming applications that support HTTP or FTP for accessing
certificates MUST be able to accept individual DER encoded certificates MUST be able to accept individual DER encoded
certificates and SHOULD be able to accept "certs-only" CMS messages. certificates and SHOULD be able to accept "certs-only" CMS messages.
HTTP server implementations accessed via the URI SHOULD specify the HTTP server implementations accessed via the URI SHOULD specify the
media type application/pkix-cert [RFC 2585] in the content-type media type application/pkix-cert [RFC2585] in the content-type header
header field of the response for a single DER encoded certificate and field of the response for a single DER encoded certificate and SHOULD
SHOULD specify the media type application/pkcs7-mime [RFC 2797] in specify the media type application/pkcs7-mime [RFC2797] in the
the content-type header field of the response for "certs-only" CMS content-type header field of the response for "certs-only" CMS
messages. For FTP, the name of a file that contains a single DER messages. For FTP, the name of a file that contains a single DER
encoded certificate SHOULD have a suffix of ".cer" [RFC 2585] and the encoded certificate SHOULD have a suffix of ".cer" [RFC2585] and the
name of a file that contains a "certs-only" CMS message SHOULD have a name of a file that contains a "certs-only" CMS message SHOULD have a
suffix of ".p7c" [RFC 2797]. Consuming clients may use the media suffix of ".p7c" [RFC2797]. Consuming clients may use the media type
type or file extension as a hint to the content, but should not or file extension as a hint to the content, but should not depend
depend solely on the presence of the correct media type or file solely on the presence of the correct media type or file extension in
extension in the server response. the server response.
When the accessLocation is a directoryName, the information is to be When the accessLocation is a directoryName, the information is to be
obtained by the application from whatever directory server is locally obtained by the application from whatever directory server is locally
configured. When one CA public key is used to validate signatures on configured. When one CA public key is used to validate signatures on
certificates and CRLs, the desired CA certificate is stored in the certificates and CRLs, the desired CA certificate is stored in the
crossCertificatePair and/or cACertificate attributes as specified in crossCertificatePair and/or cACertificate attributes as specified in
[RFC 4523]. When different public keys are used to validate [RFC4523]. When different public keys are used to validate
signatures on certificates and CRLs, the desired certificate is signatures on certificates and CRLs, the desired certificate is
stored in the userCertificate attribute as specified in [RFC 4523]. stored in the userCertificate attribute as specified in [RFC4523].
Thus, implementations that support the directoryName form of Thus, implementations that support the directoryName form of
accessLocation MUST be prepared to find the needed certificate in any accessLocation MUST be prepared to find the needed certificate in any
of these three attributes. The protocol that an application uses to of these three attributes. The protocol that an application uses to
access the directory (e.g., DAP or LDAP) is a local matter. access the directory (e.g., DAP or LDAP) is a local matter.
Where the information is available via LDAP, the accessLocation Where the information is available via LDAP, the accessLocation
SHOULD be a uniformResourceIdentifier. The LDAP URI [RFC 4516] MUST SHOULD be a uniformResourceIdentifier. The LDAP URI [RFC4516] MUST
include a <dn> field containing the distinguished name of the entry include a <dn> field containing the distinguished name of the entry
holding the certificates, MUST include an <attributes> field that holding the certificates, MUST include an <attributes> field that
lists appropriate attribute descriptions for the attributes that hold lists appropriate attribute descriptions for the attributes that hold
the DER encoded certificates or cross-certificate pairs [RFC 4523], the DER encoded certificates or cross-certificate pairs [RFC4523],
and SHOULD include a <host> (e.g., <ldap://ldap.example.com/cn=CA, and SHOULD include a <host> (e.g., <ldap://ldap.example.com/cn=CA,
dc=example,dc=com?cACertificate;binary,crossCertificatePair;binary>). dc=example,dc=com?cACertificate;binary,crossCertificatePair;binary>).
Omitting the <host> (e.g., <ldap:///cn=exampleCA,dc=example,dc=com? Omitting the <host> (e.g., <ldap:///cn=exampleCA,dc=example,dc=com?
cACertificate;binary>) has the effect of relying on whatever a priori cACertificate;binary>) has the effect of relying on whatever a priori
knowledge the client might have to contact an appropriate server. knowledge the client might have to contact an appropriate server.
5.3 CRL Entry Extensions 5.3. CRL Entry Extensions
The CRL entry extensions defined by ISO/IEC, ITU-T, and ANSI X9 for The CRL entry extensions defined by ISO/IEC, ITU-T, and ANSI X9 for
X.509 v2 CRLs provide methods for associating additional attributes X.509 v2 CRLs provide methods for associating additional attributes
with CRL entries [X.509] [X9.55]. The X.509 v2 CRL format also with CRL entries [X.509] [X9.55]. The X.509 v2 CRL format also
allows communities to define private CRL entry extensions to carry allows communities to define private CRL entry extensions to carry
information unique to those communities. Each extension in a CRL information unique to those communities. Each extension in a CRL
entry may be designated as critical or non-critical. If a CRL entry may be designated as critical or non-critical. If a CRL
contains a critical CRL entry extension that the application cannot contains a critical CRL entry extension that the application cannot
process then the application MUST NOT use that CRL to determine the process, then the application MUST NOT use that CRL to determine the
status of any certificates. However, applications may ignore status of any certificates. However, applications may ignore
unrecognized non-critical CRL entry extensions. unrecognized non-critical CRL entry extensions.
The following subsections present recommended extensions used within The following subsections present recommended extensions used within
Internet CRL entries and standard locations for information. Internet CRL entries and standard locations for information.
Communities may elect to use additional CRL entry extensions; Communities may elect to use additional CRL entry extensions;
however, caution should be exercised in adopting any critical CRL however, caution should be exercised in adopting any critical CRL
entry extensions in CRLs that might be used in a general context. entry extensions in CRLs that might be used in a general context.
Support for the CRL entry extensions defined in this specification is Support for the CRL entry extensions defined in this specification is
optional for conforming CRL issuers and applications. However, CRL optional for conforming CRL issuers and applications. However, CRL
issuers SHOULD include reason codes (section 5.3.1) and invalidity issuers SHOULD include reason codes (Section 5.3.1) and invalidity
dates (section 5.3.2) whenever this information is available. dates (Section 5.3.2) whenever this information is available.
5.3.1 Reason Code 5.3.1. Reason Code
The reasonCode is a non-critical CRL entry extension that identifies The reasonCode is a non-critical CRL entry extension that identifies
the reason for the certificate revocation. CRL issuers are strongly the reason for the certificate revocation. CRL issuers are strongly
encouraged to include meaningful reason codes in CRL entries; encouraged to include meaningful reason codes in CRL entries;
however, the reason code CRL entry extension SHOULD be absent instead however, the reason code CRL entry extension SHOULD be absent instead
of using the unspecified (0) reasonCode value. of using the unspecified (0) reasonCode value.
The removeFromCRL (8) reasonCode value may only appear in delta CRLs The removeFromCRL (8) reasonCode value may only appear in delta CRLs
and indicates that a certificate is to be removed from a CRL because and indicates that a certificate is to be removed from a CRL because
either the certificate expired or was removed from hold. All other either the certificate expired or was removed from hold. All other
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cACompromise (2), cACompromise (2),
affiliationChanged (3), affiliationChanged (3),
superseded (4), superseded (4),
cessationOfOperation (5), cessationOfOperation (5),
certificateHold (6), certificateHold (6),
-- value 7 is not used -- value 7 is not used
removeFromCRL (8), removeFromCRL (8),
privilegeWithdrawn (9), privilegeWithdrawn (9),
aACompromise (10) } aACompromise (10) }
5.3.2 Invalidity Date 5.3.2. Invalidity Date
The invalidity date is a non-critical CRL entry extension that The invalidity date is a non-critical CRL entry extension that
provides the date on which it is known or suspected that the private provides the date on which it is known or suspected that the private
key was compromised or that the certificate otherwise became invalid. key was compromised or that the certificate otherwise became invalid.
This date may be earlier than the revocation date in the CRL entry, This date may be earlier than the revocation date in the CRL entry,
which is the date at which the CA processed the revocation. When a which is the date at which the CA processed the revocation. When a
revocation is first posted by a CRL issuer in a CRL, the invalidity revocation is first posted by a CRL issuer in a CRL, the invalidity
date may precede the date of issue of earlier CRLs, but the date may precede the date of issue of earlier CRLs, but the
revocation date SHOULD NOT precede the date of issue of earlier CRLs. revocation date SHOULD NOT precede the date of issue of earlier CRLs.
Whenever this information is available, CRL issuers are strongly Whenever this information is available, CRL issuers are strongly
encouraged to share it with CRL users. encouraged to share it with CRL users.
The GeneralizedTime values included in this field MUST be expressed The GeneralizedTime values included in this field MUST be expressed
in Greenwich Mean Time (Zulu), and MUST be specified and interpreted in Greenwich Mean Time (Zulu), and MUST be specified and interpreted
as defined in section 4.1.2.5.2. as defined in Section 4.1.2.5.2.
id-ce-invalidityDate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 24 } id-ce-invalidityDate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 24 }
InvalidityDate ::= GeneralizedTime InvalidityDate ::= GeneralizedTime
5.3.3 Certificate Issuer 5.3.3. Certificate Issuer
This CRL entry extension identifies the certificate issuer associated This CRL entry extension identifies the certificate issuer associated
with an entry in an indirect CRL, that is, a CRL that has the with an entry in an indirect CRL, that is, a CRL that has the
indirectCRL indicator set in its issuing distribution point indirectCRL indicator set in its issuing distribution point
extension. When present, the certificate issuer CRL entry extension extension. When present, the certificate issuer CRL entry extension
includes one or more names from the issuer field and/or issuer includes one or more names from the issuer field and/or issuer
alternative name extension of the certificate that corresponds to the alternative name extension of the certificate that corresponds to the
CRL entry. If this extension is not present on the first entry in an CRL entry. If this extension is not present on the first entry in an
indirect CRL, the certificate issuer defaults to the CRL issuer. On indirect CRL, the certificate issuer defaults to the CRL issuer. On
subsequent entries in an indirect CRL, if this extension is not subsequent entries in an indirect CRL, if this extension is not
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Conforming CRL issuers MUST include in this extension the Conforming CRL issuers MUST include in this extension the
distinguished name (DN) from the issuer field of the certificate that distinguished name (DN) from the issuer field of the certificate that
corresponds to this CRL entry. The encoding of the DN MUST be corresponds to this CRL entry. The encoding of the DN MUST be
identical to the encoding used in the certificate. identical to the encoding used in the certificate.
CRL issuers MUST mark this extension as critical since an CRL issuers MUST mark this extension as critical since an
implementation that ignored this extension could not correctly implementation that ignored this extension could not correctly
attribute CRL entries to certificates. This specification RECOMMENDS attribute CRL entries to certificates. This specification RECOMMENDS
that implementations recognize this extension. that implementations recognize this extension.
6 Certification Path Validation 6. Certification Path Validation
Certification path validation procedures for the Internet PKI are Certification path validation procedures for the Internet PKI are
based on the algorithm supplied in [X.509]. Certification path based on the algorithm supplied in [X.509]. Certification path
processing verifies the binding between the subject distinguished processing verifies the binding between the subject distinguished
name and/or subject alternative name and subject public key. The name and/or subject alternative name and subject public key. The
binding is limited by constraints that are specified in the binding is limited by constraints that are specified in the
certificates that comprise the path and inputs that are specified by certificates that comprise the path and inputs that are specified by
the relying party. The basic constraints and policy constraints the relying party. The basic constraints and policy constraints
extensions allow the certification path processing logic to automate extensions allow the certification path processing logic to automate
the decision making process. the decision making process.
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binding is limited by constraints that are specified in the binding is limited by constraints that are specified in the
certificates that comprise the path and inputs that are specified by certificates that comprise the path and inputs that are specified by
the relying party. The basic constraints and policy constraints the relying party. The basic constraints and policy constraints
extensions allow the certification path processing logic to automate extensions allow the certification path processing logic to automate
the decision making process. the decision making process.
This section describes an algorithm for validating certification This section describes an algorithm for validating certification
paths. Conforming implementations of this specification are not paths. Conforming implementations of this specification are not
required to implement this algorithm, but MUST provide functionality required to implement this algorithm, but MUST provide functionality
equivalent to the external behavior resulting from this procedure. equivalent to the external behavior resulting from this procedure.
Any algorithm may be used by a particular implementation so long as Any algorithm may be used by a particular implementation so long as
it derives the correct result. it derives the correct result.
In section 6.1, the text describes basic path validation. Valid In Section 6.1, the text describes basic path validation. Valid
paths begin with certificates issued by a trust anchor. The paths begin with certificates issued by a trust anchor. The
algorithm requires the public key of the CA, the CA's name, and any algorithm requires the public key of the CA, the CA's name, and any
constraints upon the set of paths that may be validated using this constraints upon the set of paths that may be validated using this
key. key.
The selection of a trust anchor is a matter of policy: it could be The selection of a trust anchor is a matter of policy: it could be
the top CA in a hierarchical PKI; the CA that issued the verifier's the top CA in a hierarchical PKI, the CA that issued the verifier's
own certificate(s); or any other CA in a network PKI. The path own certificate(s), or any other CA in a network PKI. The path
validation procedure is the same regardless of the choice of trust validation procedure is the same regardless of the choice of trust
anchor. In addition, different applications may rely on different anchor. In addition, different applications may rely on different
trust anchors, or may accept paths that begin with any of a set of trust anchors, or may accept paths that begin with any of a set of
trust anchors. trust anchors.
Section 6.2 describes methods for using the path validation algorithm Section 6.2 describes methods for using the path validation algorithm
in specific implementations. in specific implementations.
Section 6.3 describes the steps necessary to determine if a Section 6.3 describes the steps necessary to determine if a
certificate is revoked when CRLs are the revocation mechanism used by certificate is revoked when CRLs are the revocation mechanism used by
the certificate issuer. the certificate issuer.
6.1 Basic Path Validation 6.1. Basic Path Validation
This text describes an algorithm for X.509 path processing. A This text describes an algorithm for X.509 path processing. A
conforming implementation MUST include an X.509 path processing conforming implementation MUST include an X.509 path processing
procedure that is functionally equivalent to the external behavior of procedure that is functionally equivalent to the external behavior of
this algorithm. However, support for some of the certificate this algorithm. However, support for some of the certificate
extensions processed in this algorithm are OPTIONAL for compliant extensions processed in this algorithm are OPTIONAL for compliant
implementations. Clients that do not support these extensions MAY implementations. Clients that do not support these extensions MAY
omit the corresponding steps in the path validation algorithm. omit the corresponding steps in the path validation algorithm.
For example, clients are not required to support the policy mappings For example, clients are not required to support the policy mappings
extension. Clients that do not support this extension MAY omit the extension. Clients that do not support this extension MAY omit the
path validation steps where policy mappings are processed. Note that path validation steps where policy mappings are processed. Note that
clients MUST reject the certificate if it contains an unsupported clients MUST reject the certificate if it contains an unsupported
critical extension. critical extension.
While the certificate and CRL profiles specified in sections 4 and 5 While the certificate and CRL profiles specified in Sections 4 and 5
of this document specify values for certificate and CRL fields and of this document specify values for certificate and CRL fields and
extensions that are considered to be appropriate for the Internet extensions that are considered to be appropriate for the Internet
PKI, the algorithm presented in this section is not limited to PKI, the algorithm presented in this section is not limited to
accepting certificates and CRLs that conform to these profiles. accepting certificates and CRLs that conform to these profiles.
Therefore, the algorithm only includes checks to verify that the Therefore, the algorithm only includes checks to verify that the
certification path is valid according to X.509 and does not include certification path is valid according to X.509 and does not include
checks to verify that the certificates and CRLs conform to this checks to verify that the certificates and CRLs conform to this
profile. While the algorithm could be extended to include checks for profile. While the algorithm could be extended to include checks for
conformance to the profiles in sections 4 and 5, this profile conformance to the profiles in Sections 4 and 5, this profile
RECOMMENDS against including such checks. RECOMMENDS against including such checks.
The algorithm presented in this section validates the certificate The algorithm presented in this section validates the certificate
with respect to the current date and time. A conforming with respect to the current date and time. A conforming
implementation MAY also support validation with respect to some point implementation MAY also support validation with respect to some point
in the past. Note that mechanisms are not available for validating a in the past. Note that mechanisms are not available for validating a
certificate with respect to a time outside the certificate validity certificate with respect to a time outside the certificate validity
period. period.
The trust anchor is an input to the algorithm. There is no The trust anchor is an input to the algorithm. There is no
requirement that the same trust anchor be used to validate all requirement that the same trust anchor be used to validate all
certification paths. Different trust anchors MAY be used to validate certification paths. Different trust anchors MAY be used to validate
different paths, as discussed further in section 6.2. different paths, as discussed further in Section 6.2.
The primary goal of path validation is to verify the binding between The primary goal of path validation is to verify the binding between
a subject distinguished name or a subject alternative name and a subject distinguished name or a subject alternative name and
subject public key, as represented in the target certificate, based subject public key, as represented in the target certificate, based
on the public key of the trust anchor. In most cases the target on the public key of the trust anchor. In most cases, the target
certificate will be an end entity certificate, but the target certificate will be an end entity certificate, but the target
certificate may be a CA certificate as long as the subject public key certificate may be a CA certificate as long as the subject public key
is to be used for a purpose other than verifying the signature on a is to be used for a purpose other than verifying the signature on a
public key certificate. Verifying the binding between the name and public key certificate. Verifying the binding between the name and
subject public key requires obtaining a sequence of certificates that subject public key requires obtaining a sequence of certificates that
support that binding. The procedure performed to obtain this support that binding. The procedure performed to obtain this
sequence of certificates is outside the scope of this specification. sequence of certificates is outside the scope of this specification.
To meet this goal, the path validation process verifies, among other To meet this goal, the path validation process verifies, among other
things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n
certificates) satisfies the following conditions: certificates) satisfies the following conditions:
(a) for all x in {1, ..., n-1}, the subject of certificate x is (a) for all x in {1, ..., n-1}, the subject of certificate x is
the issuer of certificate x+1; the issuer of certificate x+1;
(b) certificate 1 is issued by the trust anchor; (b) certificate 1 is issued by the trust anchor;
(c) certificate n is the certificate to be validated (i.e., the (c) certificate n is the certificate to be validated (i.e., the
target certificate); and target certificate); and
(d) for all x in {1, ..., n}, the certificate was valid at the (d) for all x in {1, ..., n}, the certificate was valid at the
time in question. time in question.
A certificate MUST NOT appear more than once in a prospective A certificate MUST NOT appear more than once in a prospective
certification path. certification path.
When the trust anchor is provided in the form of a self-signed When the trust anchor is provided in the form of a self-signed
certificate, this self-signed certificate is not included as part of certificate, this self-signed certificate is not included as part of
the prospective certification path. Information about trust anchors the prospective certification path. Information about trust anchors
are provided as inputs to the certification path validation algorithm is provided as inputs to the certification path validation algorithm
(section 6.1.1). (Section 6.1.1).
A particular certification path may not, however, be appropriate for A particular certification path may not, however, be appropriate for
all applications. Therefore, an application MAY augment this all applications. Therefore, an application MAY augment this
algorithm to further limit the set of valid paths. The path algorithm to further limit the set of valid paths. The path
validation process also determines the set of certificate policies validation process also determines the set of certificate policies
that are valid for this path, based on the certificate policies that are valid for this path, based on the certificate policies
extension, policy mappings extension, policy constraints extension, extension, policy mappings extension, policy constraints extension,
and inhibit anyPolicy extension. To achieve this, the path and inhibit anyPolicy extension. To achieve this, the path
validation algorithm constructs a valid policy tree. If the set of validation algorithm constructs a valid policy tree. If the set of
certificate policies that are valid for this path is not empty, then certificate policies that are valid for this path is not empty, then
the result will be a valid policy tree of depth n, otherwise the the result will be a valid policy tree of depth n, otherwise the
result will be a null valid policy tree. result will be a null valid policy tree.
A certificate is self-issued if the same DN appears in the subject A certificate is self-issued if the same DN appears in the subject
and issuer fields (the two DNs are the same if they match according and issuer fields (the two DNs are the same if they match according
to the rules specified in section 7.1). In general, the issuer and to the rules specified in Section 7.1). In general, the issuer and
subject of the certificates that make up a path are different for subject of the certificates that make up a path are different for
each certificate. However, a CA may issue a certificate to itself to each certificate. However, a CA may issue a certificate to itself to
support key rollover or changes in certificate policies. These self- support key rollover or changes in certificate policies. These
issued certificates are not counted when evaluating path length or self-issued certificates are not counted when evaluating path length
name constraints. or name constraints.
This section presents the algorithm in four basic steps: (1) This section presents the algorithm in four basic steps: (1)
initialization, (2) basic certificate processing, (3) preparation for initialization, (2) basic certificate processing, (3) preparation for
the next certificate, and (4) wrap-up. Steps (1) and (4) are the next certificate, and (4) wrap-up. Steps (1) and (4) are
performed exactly once. Step (2) is performed for all certificates performed exactly once. Step (2) is performed for all certificates
in the path. Step (3) is performed for all certificates in the path in the path. Step (3) is performed for all certificates in the path
except the final certificate. Figure 2 provides a high-level except the final certificate. Figure 2 provides a high-level
flowchart of this algorithm. flowchart of this algorithm.
+-------+ +-------+
skipping to change at page 73, line 40 skipping to change at page 75, line 40
| Wrap up | | Prepare for | | | Wrap up | | Prepare for | |
+----------------+ | Next Cert | | +----------------+ | Next Cert | |
| +----------------+ | | +----------------+ |
V | | V | |
+-------+ +--------------+ +-------+ +--------------+
| STOP | | STOP |
+-------+ +-------+
Figure 2. Certification Path Processing Flowchart Figure 2. Certification Path Processing Flowchart
6.1.1 Inputs 6.1.1. Inputs
This algorithm assumes the following nine inputs are provided to the This algorithm assumes that the following nine inputs are provided to
path processing logic: the path processing logic:
(a) a prospective certification path of length n. (a) a prospective certification path of length n.
(b) the current date/time. (b) the current date/time.
(c) user-initial-policy-set: A set of certificate policy (c) user-initial-policy-set: A set of certificate policy
identifiers naming the policies that are acceptable to the identifiers naming the policies that are acceptable to the
certificate user. The user-initial-policy-set contains the certificate user. The user-initial-policy-set contains the
special value any-policy if the user is not concerned about special value any-policy if the user is not concerned about
certificate policy. certificate policy.
(d) trust anchor information, describing a CA that serves as a (d) trust anchor information, describing a CA that serves as a
trust anchor for the certification path. The trust anchor trust anchor for the certification path. The trust anchor
information includes: information includes:
(1) the trusted issuer name, (1) the trusted issuer name,
(2) the trusted public key algorithm, (2) the trusted public key algorithm,
(3) the trusted public key, and (3) the trusted public key, and
(4) optionally, the trusted public key parameters associated (4) optionally, the trusted public key parameters associated
with the public key. with the public key.
The trust anchor information may be provided to the path The trust anchor information may be provided to the path
processing procedure in the form of a self-signed certificate. processing procedure in the form of a self-signed certificate.
When the trust anchor information is provided in the form of a When the trust anchor information is provided in the form of a
certificate, the name in the subject field is used as the trusted certificate, the name in the subject field is used as the trusted
issuer name and the contents of the subjectPublicKeyInfo field is issuer name and the contents of the subjectPublicKeyInfo field is
used as the source of the trusted public key algorithm and the used as the source of the trusted public key algorithm and the
trusted public key. The trust anchor information is trusted trusted public key. The trust anchor information is trusted
because it was delivered to the path processing procedure by some because it was delivered to the path processing procedure by some
trustworthy out-of-band procedure. If the trusted public key trustworthy out-of-band procedure. If the trusted public key
algorithm requires parameters, then the parameters are provided algorithm requires parameters, then the parameters are provided
along with the trusted public key. along with the trusted public key.
(e) initial-policy-mapping-inhibit, which indicates if policy (e) initial-policy-mapping-inhibit, which indicates if policy
mapping is allowed in the certification path. mapping is allowed in the certification path.
(f) initial-explicit-policy, which indicates if the path must be (f) initial-explicit-policy, which indicates if the path must be
valid for at least one of the certificate policies in the user- valid for at least one of the certificate policies in the
initial-policy-set. user-initial-policy-set.
(g) initial-any-policy-inhibit, which indicates whether the (g) initial-any-policy-inhibit, which indicates whether the
anyPolicy OID should be processed if it is included in a anyPolicy OID should be processed if it is included in a
certificate. certificate.
(h) initial-permitted-subtrees, which indicates for each name type (h) initial-permitted-subtrees, which indicates for each name
(e.g., X.500 distinguished names, email addresses, or IP type (e.g., X.500 distinguished names, email addresses, or IP
addresses) a set of subtrees within which all subject names in addresses) a set of subtrees within which all subject names
every certificate in the certification path MUST fall. The in every certificate in the certification path MUST fall.
initial-permitted-subtrees input includes a set for each name The initial-permitted-subtrees input includes a set for each
type. For each name type, the set may consist of a single subtree name type. For each name type, the set may consist of a
that includes all names of that name type or one or more subtrees single subtree that includes all names of that name type or
that each specifies a subset of the names of that name type, or one or more subtrees that each specifies a subset of the
the set may be empty. If the set for a name type is empty, then names of that name type, or the set may be empty. If the set
the certificaton path will be considered invalid if any for a name type is empty, then the certification path will be
certificate in the certification path includes a name of that name considered invalid if any certificate in the certification
type. path includes a name of that name type.
(i) initial-excluded-subtrees, which indicates for each name type (i) initial-excluded-subtrees, which indicates for each name type
(e.g., X.500 distinguished names, email addresses, or IP (e.g., X.500 distinguished names, email addresses, or IP
addresses) a set of subtrees within which no subject name in any addresses) a set of subtrees within which no subject name in
certificate in the certification path may fall. The initial- any certificate in the certification path may fall. The
excluded-subtrees input includes a set for each name type. For initial-excluded-subtrees input includes a set for each name
each name type, the set may be empty or may consist of one or more type. For each name type, the set may be empty or may
subtrees that each specifies a subset of the names of that name consist of one or more subtrees that each specifies a subset
type. If the set for a name type is empty, then no names of that of the names of that name type. If the set for a name type
name type are excluded. is empty, then no names of that name type are excluded.
Conforming implementations are not required to support the setting of Conforming implementations are not required to support the setting of
all of these inputs. For example, a conforming implementation may be all of these inputs. For example, a conforming implementation may be
designed to validate all certification paths using a value of FALSE designed to validate all certification paths using a value of FALSE
for initial-any-policy-inhibit. for initial-any-policy-inhibit.
6.1.2 Initialization 6.1.2. Initialization
This initialization phase establishes eleven state variables based This initialization phase establishes eleven state variables based
upon the nine inputs: upon the nine inputs:
(a) valid_policy_tree: A tree of certificate policies with their (a) valid_policy_tree: A tree of certificate policies with their
optional qualifiers; each of the leaves of the tree represents a optional qualifiers; each of the leaves of the tree
valid policy at this stage in the certification path validation. represents a valid policy at this stage in the certification
If valid policies exist at this stage in the certification path path validation. If valid policies exist at this stage in
validation, the depth of the tree is equal to the number of the certification path validation, the depth of the tree is
certificates in the chain that have been processed. If valid equal to the number of certificates in the chain that have
policies do not exist at this stage in the certification path been processed. If valid policies do not exist at this stage
validation, the tree is set to NULL. Once the tree is set to in the certification path validation, the tree is set to
NULL, policy processing ceases. NULL. Once the tree is set to NULL, policy processing
ceases.
Each node in the valid_policy_tree includes three data objects: Each node in the valid_policy_tree includes three data
the valid policy, a set of associated policy qualifiers, and a set objects: the valid policy, a set of associated policy
of one or more expected policy values. If the node is at depth x, qualifiers, and a set of one or more expected policy values.
the components of the node have the following semantics: If the node is at depth x, the components of the node have
the following semantics:
(1) The valid_policy is a single policy OID representing a (1) The valid_policy is a single policy OID representing a
valid policy for the path of length x. valid policy for the path of length x.
(2) The qualifier_set is a set of policy qualifiers associated (2) The qualifier_set is a set of policy qualifiers associated
with the valid policy in certificate x. with the valid policy in certificate x.
(3) The expected_policy_set contains one or more policy OIDs (3) The expected_policy_set contains one or more policy OIDs
that would satisfy this policy in the certificate x+1. that would satisfy this policy in the certificate x+1.
The initial value of the valid_policy_tree is a single node with The initial value of the valid_policy_tree is a single node with
valid_policy anyPolicy, an empty qualifier_set, and an valid_policy anyPolicy, an empty qualifier_set, and an
expected_policy_set with the single value anyPolicy. This node is expected_policy_set with the single value anyPolicy. This node is
considered to be at depth zero. considered to be at depth zero.
Figure 3 is a graphic representation of the initial state of the Figure 3 is a graphic representation of the initial state of the
valid_policy_tree. Additional figures will use this format to valid_policy_tree. Additional figures will use this format to
describe changes in the valid_policy_tree during path processing. describe changes in the valid_policy_tree during path processing.
+----------------+ +----------------+
| anyPolicy | <---- valid_policy | anyPolicy | <---- valid_policy
+----------------+ +----------------+
| {} | <---- qualifier_set | {} | <---- qualifier_set
+----------------+ +----------------+
| {anyPolicy} | <---- expected_policy_set | {anyPolicy} | <---- expected_policy_set
+----------------+ +----------------+
Figure 3. Initial value of the valid_policy_tree state variable Figure 3. Initial Value of the valid_policy_tree State Variable
(b) permitted_subtrees: A set of root names for each name type (b) permitted_subtrees: a set of root names for each name type
(e.g., X.500 distinguished names, email addresses, or IP (e.g., X.500 distinguished names, email addresses, or IP
addresses) defining a set of subtrees within which all subject addresses) defining a set of subtrees within which all
names in subsequent certificates in the certification path MUST subject names in subsequent certificates in the certification
fall. This variable includes a set for each name type, and the path MUST fall. This variable includes a set for each name
initial value is initial-permitted-subtrees. type, and the initial value is initial-permitted-subtrees.
(c) excluded_subtrees: A set of root names for each name type (c) excluded_subtrees: a set of root names for each name type
(e.g., X.500 distinguished names, email addresses, or IP (e.g., X.500 distinguished names, email addresses, or IP
addresses) defining a set of subtrees within which no subject name addresses) defining a set of subtrees within which no subject
in subsequent certificates in the certification path may fall. name in subsequent certificates in the certification path may
This variable includes a set for each name type, and the initial fall. This variable includes a set for each name type, and
value is initial-excluded-subtrees. the initial value is initial-excluded-subtrees.
(d) explicit_policy: an integer that indicates if a non-NULL (d) explicit_policy: an integer that indicates if a non-NULL
valid_policy_tree is required. The integer indicates the number valid_policy_tree is required. The integer indicates the
of non-self-issued certificates to be processed before this number of non-self-issued certificates to be processed before
requirement is imposed. Once set, this variable may be decreased, this requirement is imposed. Once set, this variable may be
but may not be increased. That is, if a certificate in the path decreased, but may not be increased. That is, if a
requires a non-NULL valid_policy_tree, a later certificate cannot certificate in the path requires a non-NULL
remove this requirement. If initial-explicit-policy is set, then valid_policy_tree, a later certificate cannot remove this
the initial value is 0, otherwise the initial value is n+1. requirement. If initial-explicit-policy is set, then the
initial value is 0, otherwise the initial value is n+1.
(e) inhibit_anyPolicy: an integer that indicates whether the (e) inhibit_anyPolicy: an integer that indicates whether the
anyPolicy policy identifier is considered a match. The integer anyPolicy policy identifier is considered a match. The
indicates the number of non-self-issued certificates to be integer indicates the number of non-self-issued certificates
processed before the anyPolicy OID, if asserted in a certificate to be processed before the anyPolicy OID, if asserted in a
other than an intermediate self-issued certificate, is ignored. certificate other than an intermediate self-issued
Once set, this variable may be decreased, but may not be certificate, is ignored. Once set, this variable may be
increased. That is, if a certificate in the path inhibits decreased, but may not be increased. That is, if a
processing of anyPolicy, a later certificate cannot permit it. If certificate in the path inhibits processing of anyPolicy, a
initial-any-policy-inhibit is set, then the initial value is 0, later certificate cannot permit it. If initial-any-policy-
otherwise the initial value is n+1. inhibit is set, then the initial value is 0, otherwise the
initial value is n+1.
(f) policy_mapping: an integer that indicates if policy mapping (f) policy_mapping: an integer that indicates if policy mapping
is permitted. The integer indicates the number of non-self-issued is permitted. The integer indicates the number of non-self-
certificates to be processed before policy mapping is inhibited. issued certificates to be processed before policy mapping is
Once set, this variable may be decreased, but may not be inhibited. Once set, this variable may be decreased, but may
increased. That is, if a certificate in the path specifies policy not be increased. That is, if a certificate in the path
mapping is not permitted, it cannot be overridden by a later specifies that policy mapping is not permitted, it cannot be
certificate. If initial-policy-mapping-inhibit is set, then the overridden by a later certificate. If initial-policy-
initial value is 0, otherwise the initial value is n+1. mapping-inhibit is set, then the initial value is 0,
otherwise the initial value is n+1.
(g) working_public_key_algorithm: the digital signature (g) working_public_key_algorithm: the digital signature
algorithm used to verify the signature of a certificate. The algorithm used to verify the signature of a certificate. The
working_public_key_algorithm is initialized from the trusted working_public_key_algorithm is initialized from the trusted
public key algorithm provided in the trust anchor information. public key algorithm provided in the trust anchor
information.
(h) working_public_key: the public key used to verify the (h) working_public_key: the public key used to verify the
signature of a certificate. The working_public_key is initialized signature of a certificate. The working_public_key is
from the trusted public key provided in the trust anchor initialized from the trusted public key provided in the trust
information. anchor information.
(i) working_public_key_parameters: parameters associated with (i) working_public_key_parameters: parameters associated with
the current public key, that may be required to verify a signature the current public key that may be required to verify a
(depending upon the algorithm). The working_public_key_parameters signature (depending upon the algorithm). The
variable is initialized from the trusted public key parameters working_public_key_parameters variable is initialized from
provided in the trust anchor information. the trusted public key parameters provided in the trust
anchor information.
(j) working_issuer_name: the issuer distinguished name expected (j) working_issuer_name: the issuer distinguished name expected
in the next certificate in the chain. The working_issuer_name is in the next certificate in the chain. The
initialized to the trusted issuer name provided in the trust working_issuer_name is initialized to the trusted issuer name
anchor information. provided in the trust anchor information.
(k) max_path_length: this integer is initialized to n, is (k) max_path_length: this integer is initialized to n, is
decremented for each non-self-issued certificate in the path, and decremented for each non-self-issued certificate in the path,
may be reduced to the value in the path length constraint field and may be reduced to the value in the path length constraint
within the basic constraints extension of a CA certificate. field within the basic constraints extension of a CA
certificate.
Upon completion of the initialization steps, perform the basic Upon completion of the initialization steps, perform the basic
certificate processing steps specified in 6.1.3. certificate processing steps specified in 6.1.3.
6.1.3 Basic Certificate Processing 6.1.3. Basic Certificate Processing
The basic path processing actions to be performed for certificate i The basic path processing actions to be performed for certificate i
(for all i in [1..n]) are listed below. (for all i in [1..n]) are listed below.
(a) Verify the basic certificate information. The certificate (a) Verify the basic certificate information. The certificate
MUST satisfy each of the following: MUST satisfy each of the following:
(1) The signature on the certificate can be verified using (1) The signature on the certificate can be verified using
working_public_key_algorithm, the working_public_key, and the working_public_key_algorithm, the working_public_key, and
working_public_key_parameters. the working_public_key_parameters.
(2) The certificate validity period includes the current time. (2) The certificate validity period includes the current time.
(3) At the current time, the certificate is not revoked. This (3) At the current time, the certificate is not revoked. This
may be determined by obtaining the appropriate CRL (section may be determined by obtaining the appropriate CRL
6.3), status information, or by out-of-band mechanisms. (Section 6.3), by status information, or by out-of-band
mechanisms.
(4) The certificate issuer name is the working_issuer_name. (4) The certificate issuer name is the working_issuer_name.
(b) If certificate i is self-issued and it is not the final (b) If certificate i is self-issued and it is not the final
certificate in the path, skip this step for certificate i. certificate in the path, skip this step for certificate i.
Otherwise, verify that the subject name is within one of the Otherwise, verify that the subject name is within one of the
permitted_subtrees for X.500 distinguished names, and verify that permitted_subtrees for X.500 distinguished names, and verify
each of the alternative names in the subjectAltName extension that each of the alternative names in the subjectAltName
(critical or non-critical) is within one of the permitted_subtrees extension (critical or non-critical) is within one of the
for that name type. permitted_subtrees for that name type.
(c) If certificate i is self-issued and it is not the final (c) If certificate i is self-issued and it is not the final
certificate in the path, skip this step for certificate i. certificate in the path, skip this step for certificate i.
Otherwise, verify that the subject name is not within any of the Otherwise, verify that the subject name is not within any of
excluded_subtrees for X.500 distinguished names, and verify that the excluded_subtrees for X.500 distinguished names, and
each of the alternative names in the subjectAltName extension verify that each of the alternative names in the
(critical or non-critical) is not within any of the subjectAltName extension (critical or non-critical) is not
excluded_subtrees for that name type. within any of the excluded_subtrees for that name type.
(d) If the certificate policies extension is present in the (d) If the certificate policies extension is present in the
certificate and the valid_policy_tree is not NULL, process the certificate and the valid_policy_tree is not NULL, process
policy information by performing the following steps in order: the policy information by performing the following steps in
order:
(1) For each policy P not equal to anyPolicy in the (1) For each policy P not equal to anyPolicy in the
certificate policies extension, let P-OID denote the OID for certificate policies extension, let P-OID denote the OID
policy P and P-Q denote the qualifier set for policy P. for policy P and P-Q denote the qualifier set for policy
Perform the following steps in order: P. Perform the following steps in order:
(i) For each node of depth i-1 in the valid_policy_tree (i) For each node of depth i-1 in the valid_policy_tree
where P-OID is in the expected_policy_set, create a child where P-OID is in the expected_policy_set, create a
node as follows: set the valid_policy to P-OID; set the child node as follows: set the valid_policy to P-OID,
qualifier_set to P-Q, and set the expected_policy_set to set the qualifier_set to P-Q, and set the
{P-OID}. expected_policy_set to
{P-OID}.
For example, consider a valid_policy_tree with a node of For example, consider a valid_policy_tree with a node
depth i-1 where the expected_policy_set is {Gold, White}. of depth i-1 where the expected_policy_set is {Gold,
Assume the certificate policies Gold and Silver appear in White}. Assume the certificate policies Gold and
the certificate policies extension of certificate i. The Silver appear in the certificate policies extension of
Gold policy is matched but the Silver policy is not. This certificate i. The Gold policy is matched, but the
rule will generate a child node of depth i for the Gold Silver policy is not. This rule will generate a child
policy. The result is shown as Figure 4. node of depth i for the Gold policy. The result is
shown as Figure 4.
+-----------------+ +-----------------+
| Red | | Red |
+-----------------+ +-----------------+
| {} | | {} |
+-----------------+ node of depth i-1 +-----------------+ node of depth i-1
| {Gold, White} | | {Gold, White} |
+-----------------+ +-----------------+
| |
| |
| |
V V
+-----------------+ +-----------------+
| Gold | | Gold |
+-----------------+ +-----------------+
| {} | | {} |
+-----------------+ node of depth i +-----------------+ node of depth i
| {Gold} | | {Gold} |
+-----------------+ +-----------------+
Figure 4. Processing an exact match Figure 4. Processing an Exact Match
(ii) If there was no match in step (i) and the (ii) If there was no match in step (i) and the
valid_policy_tree includes a node of depth i-1 with the valid_policy_tree includes a node of depth i-1 with
valid_policy anyPolicy, generate a child node with the the valid_policy anyPolicy, generate a child node with
following values: set the valid_policy to P-OID; set the the following values: set the valid_policy to P-OID,
qualifier_set to P-Q, and set the expected_policy_set to set the qualifier_set to P-Q, and set the
{P-OID}. expected_policy_set to {P-OID}.
For example, consider a valid_policy_tree with a node of For example, consider a valid_policy_tree with a node
depth i-1 where the valid_policy is anyPolicy. Assume the of depth i-1 where the valid_policy is anyPolicy.
certificate policies Gold and Silver appear in the Assume the certificate policies Gold and Silver appear
certificate policies extension of certificate i. The Gold in the certificate policies extension of certificate
policy does not have a qualifier, but the Silver policy has i. The Gold policy does not have a qualifier, but the
the qualifier Q-Silver. If Gold and Silver were not matched Silver policy has the qualifier Q-Silver. If Gold and
in (i) above, this rule will generate two child nodes of Silver were not matched in (i) above, this rule will
depth i, one for each policy. The result is shown as Figure generate two child nodes of depth i, one for each
5. policy. The result is shown as Figure 5.
+-----------------+ +-----------------+
| anyPolicy | | anyPolicy |
+-----------------+ +-----------------+
| {} | | {} |
+-----------------+ node of depth i-1 +-----------------+ node of depth i-1
| {anyPolicy} | | {anyPolicy} |
+-----------------+ +-----------------+
/ \ / \
/ \ / \
/ \ / \
/ \ / \
+-----------------+ +-----------------+ +-----------------+ +-----------------+
| Gold | | Silver | | Gold | | Silver |
+-----------------+ +-----------------+ +-----------------+ +-----------------+
| {} | | {Q-Silver} | | {} | | {Q-Silver} |
+-----------------+ nodes of +-----------------+ +-----------------+ nodes of +-----------------+
| {Gold} | depth i | {Silver} | | {Gold} | depth i | {Silver} |
+-----------------+ +-----------------+ +-----------------+ +-----------------+
Figure 5. Processing unmatched policies when a leaf node Figure 5. Processing Unmatched Policies when a
specifies anyPolicy Leaf Node Specifies anyPolicy
(2) If the certificate policies extension includes the policy (2) If the certificate policies extension includes the policy
anyPolicy with the qualifier set AP-Q and either (a) anyPolicy with the qualifier set AP-Q and either (a)
inhibit_anyPolicy is greater than 0 or (b) i<n and the inhibit_anyPolicy is greater than 0 or (b) i<n and the
certificate is self-issued, then: certificate is self-issued, then:
For each node in the valid_policy_tree of depth i-1, for each For each node in the valid_policy_tree of depth i-1, for
value in the expected_policy_set (including anyPolicy) that each value in the expected_policy_set (including
does not appear in a child node, create a child node with the anyPolicy) that does not appear in a child node, create a
following values: set the valid_policy to the value from the child node with the following values: set the valid_policy
expected_policy_set in the parent node; set the qualifier_set to the value from the expected_policy_set in the parent
to AP-Q, and set the expected_policy_set to the value in the node, set the qualifier_set to AP-Q, and set the
valid_policy from this node. expected_policy_set to the value in the valid_policy from
this node.
For example, consider a valid_policy_tree with a node of depth For example, consider a valid_policy_tree with a node of
i-1 where the expected_policy_set is {Gold, Silver}. Assume depth i-1 where the expected_policy_set is {Gold, Silver}.
anyPolicy appears in the certificate policies extension of Assume anyPolicy appears in the certificate policies
certificate i with no policy qualifiers, but Gold and Silver do extension of certificate i with no policy qualifiers, but
not appear. This rule will generate two child nodes of depth Gold and Silver do not appear. This rule will generate
i, one for each policy. The result is shown below as Figure 6. two child nodes of depth i, one for each policy. The
result is shown below as Figure 6.
+-----------------+ +-----------------+
| Red | | Red |
+-----------------+ +-----------------+
| {} | | {} |
+-----------------+ node of depth i-1 +-----------------+ node of depth i-1
| {Gold, Silver} | | {Gold, Silver} |
+-----------------+ +-----------------+
/ \ / \
/ \ / \
/ \ / \
/ \ / \
+-----------------+ +-----------------+ +-----------------+ +-----------------+
| Gold | | Silver | | Gold | | Silver |
+-----------------+ +-----------------+ +-----------------+ +-----------------+
| {} | | {} | | {} | | {} |
+-----------------+ nodes of +-----------------+ +-----------------+ nodes of +-----------------+
| {Gold} | depth i | {Silver} | | {Gold} | depth i | {Silver} |
+-----------------+ +-----------------+ +-----------------+ +-----------------+
Figure 6. Processing unmatched policies when the certificate Figure 6. Processing Unmatched Policies When the
policies extension specifies anyPolicy Certificate Policies Extension Specifies anyPolicy
(3) If there is a node in the valid_policy_tree of depth i-1 (3) If there is a node in the valid_policy_tree of depth i-1
or less without any child nodes, delete that node. Repeat this or less without any child nodes, delete that node. Repeat
step until there are no nodes of depth i-1 or less without this step until there are no nodes of depth i-1 or less
children. without children.
For example, consider the valid_policy_tree shown in Figure 7 For example, consider the valid_policy_tree shown in
below. The two nodes at depth i-1 that are marked with an 'X' Figure 7 below. The two nodes at depth i-1 that are
have no children, and are deleted. Applying this rule to the marked with an 'X' have no children, and they are deleted.
resulting tree will cause the node at depth i-2 that is marked Applying this rule to the resulting tree will cause the
with an 'Y' to be deleted. In the resulting tree there are no node at depth i-2 that is marked with a 'Y' to be deleted.
nodes of depth i-1 or less without children, and this step is In the resulting tree, there are no nodes of depth i-1 or
complete. less without children, and this step is complete.
(e) If the certificate policies extension is not present, set the (e) If the certificate policies extension is not present, set the
valid_policy_tree to NULL. valid_policy_tree to NULL.
(f) Verify that either explicit_policy is greater than 0 or the (f) Verify that either explicit_policy is greater than 0 or the
valid_policy_tree is not equal to NULL; valid_policy_tree is not equal to NULL;
If any of steps (a), (b), (c), or (f) fails, the procedure If any of steps (a), (b), (c), or (f) fails, the procedure
terminates, returning a failure indication and an appropriate reason. terminates, returning a failure indication and an appropriate reason.
If i is not equal to n, continue by performing the preparatory steps If i is not equal to n, continue by performing the preparatory steps
listed in 6.1.4. If i is equal to n, perform the wrap-up steps listed in Section 6.1.4. If i is equal to n, perform the wrap-up
listed in 6.1.5. steps listed in Section 6.1.5.
+-----------+ +-----------+
| | node of depth i-3 | | node of depth i-3
+-----------+ +-----------+
/ | \ / | \
/ | \ / | \
/ | \ / | \
+-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+
| | | | | Y | nodes of | | | | | Y | nodes of
+-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ depth i-2 +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ depth i-2
skipping to change at page 82, line 29 skipping to change at page 84, line 42
+-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ i-1 +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ i-1
| / | \ | / | \
| / | \ | / | \
| / | \ | / | \
+-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ nodes of +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ nodes of
| | | | | | | | depth | | | | | | | | depth
+-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ i +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ i
Figure 7. Pruning the valid_policy_tree Figure 7. Pruning the valid_policy_tree
6.1.4 Preparation for Certificate i+1 6.1.4. Preparation for Certificate i+1
To prepare for processing of certificate i+1, perform the To prepare for processing of certificate i+1, perform the
following steps for certificate i: following steps for certificate i:
(a) If a policy mappings extension is present, verify that the (a) If a policy mappings extension is present, verify that the
special value anyPolicy does not appear as an issuerDomainPolicy special value anyPolicy does not appear as an
or a subjectDomainPolicy. issuerDomainPolicy or a subjectDomainPolicy.
(b) If a policy mappings extension is present, then for each (b) If a policy mappings extension is present, then for each
issuerDomainPolicy ID-P in the policy mappings extension: issuerDomainPolicy ID-P in the policy mappings extension:
(1) If the policy_mapping variable is greater than 0, for each (1) If the policy_mapping variable is greater than 0, for each
node in the valid_policy_tree of depth i where ID-P is the node in the valid_policy_tree of depth i where ID-P is the
valid_policy, set expected_policy_set to the set of valid_policy, set expected_policy_set to the set of
subjectDomainPolicy values that are specified as equivalent to subjectDomainPolicy values that are specified as
ID-P by the policy mappings extension. equivalent to ID-P by the policy mappings extension.
If no node of depth i in the valid_policy_tree has a If no node of depth i in the valid_policy_tree has a
valid_policy of ID-P but there is a node of depth i with a valid_policy of ID-P but there is a node of depth i with a
valid_policy of anyPolicy, then generate a child node of the valid_policy of anyPolicy, then generate a child node of
node of depth i-1 that has a valid_policy of anyPolicy as the node of depth i-1 that has a valid_policy of anyPolicy
follows: as follows:
(i) set the valid_policy to ID-P; (i) set the valid_policy to ID-P;
(ii) set the qualifier_set to the qualifier set of the (ii) set the qualifier_set to the qualifier set of the
policy anyPolicy in the certificate policies extension of policy anyPolicy in the certificate policies
certificate i; and extension of certificate i; and
(iii) set the expected_policy_set to the set of (iii) set the expected_policy_set to the set of
subjectDomainPolicy values that are specified as equivalent subjectDomainPolicy values that are specified as
to ID-P by the policy mappings extension. equivalent to ID-P by the policy mappings extension.
(2) If the policy_mapping variable is equal to 0: (2) If the policy_mapping variable is equal to 0:
(i) delete each node of depth i in the valid_policy_tree (i) delete each node of depth i in the valid_policy_tree
where ID-P is the valid_policy. where ID-P is the valid_policy.
(ii) If there is a node in the valid_policy_tree of depth (ii) If there is a node in the valid_policy_tree of depth
i-1 or less without any child nodes, delete that node. i-1 or less without any child nodes, delete that
Repeat this step until there are no nodes of depth i-1 or node. Repeat this step until there are no nodes of
less without children. depth i-1 or less without children.
(c) Assign the certificate subject name to working_issuer_name. (c) Assign the certificate subject name to working_issuer_name.
(d) Assign the certificate subjectPublicKey to (d) Assign the certificate subjectPublicKey to
working_public_key. working_public_key.
(e) If the subjectPublicKeyInfo field of the certificate contains (e) If the subjectPublicKeyInfo field of the certificate contains
an algorithm field with non-null parameters, assign the parameters an algorithm field with non-null parameters, assign the
to the working_public_key_parameters variable. parameters to the working_public_key_parameters variable.
If the subjectPublicKeyInfo field of the certificate contains an If the subjectPublicKeyInfo field of the certificate contains
algorithm field with null parameters or parameters are omitted, an algorithm field with null parameters or parameters are
compare the certificate subjectPublicKey algorithm to the omitted, compare the certificate subjectPublicKey algorithm
working_public_key_algorithm. If the certificate subjectPublicKey to the working_public_key_algorithm. If the certificate
algorithm and the working_public_key_algorithm are different, set subjectPublicKey algorithm and the
the working_public_key_parameters to null. working_public_key_algorithm are different, set the
working_public_key_parameters to null.
(f) Assign the certificate subjectPublicKey algorithm to the (f) Assign the certificate subjectPublicKey algorithm to the
working_public_key_algorithm variable. working_public_key_algorithm variable.
(g) If a name constraints extension is included in the (g) If a name constraints extension is included in the
certificate, modify the permitted_subtrees and excluded_subtrees certificate, modify the permitted_subtrees and
state variables as follows: excluded_subtrees state variables as follows:
(1) If permittedSubtrees is present in the certificate, set (1) If permittedSubtrees is present in the certificate, set
the permitted_subtrees state variable to the intersection of the permitted_subtrees state variable to the intersection
its previous value and the value indicated in the extension of its previous value and the value indicated in the
field. If permittedSubtrees does not include a particular name extension field. If permittedSubtrees does not include a
type, the permitted_subtrees state variable is unchanged for particular name type, the permitted_subtrees state
that name type. For example, the intersection of example.com variable is unchanged for that name type. For example,
and foo.example.com is foo.example.com. And, the intersection the intersection of example.com and foo.example.com is
of example.com and example.net is the empty set. foo.example.com. And the intersection of example.com and
example.net is the empty set.
(2) If excludedSubtrees is present in the certificate, set the (2) If excludedSubtrees is present in the certificate, set the
excluded_subtrees state variable to the union of its previous excluded_subtrees state variable to the union of its
value and the value indicated in the extension field. If previous value and the value indicated in the extension
excludedSubtrees does not include a particular name type, the field. If excludedSubtrees does not include a particular
excluded_subtrees state variable is unchanged for that name name type, the excluded_subtrees state variable is
type. For example, the union of the name spaces example.com unchanged for that name type. For example, the union of
and foo.example.com is example.com. And, the union of the name spaces example.com and foo.example.com is
example.com and example.net is both name spaces. example.com. And the union of example.com and example.net
is both name spaces.
(h) If certificate i is not self-issued: (h) If certificate i is not self-issued:
(1) If explicit_policy is not 0, decrement explicit_policy by (1) If explicit_policy is not 0, decrement explicit_policy by
1. 1.
(2) If policy_mapping is not 0, decrement policy_mapping by 1. (2) If policy_mapping is not 0, decrement policy_mapping by 1.
(3) If inhibit_anyPolicy is not 0, decrement inhibit_anyPolicy (3) If inhibit_anyPolicy is not 0, decrement inhibit_anyPolicy
by 1. by 1.
(i) If a policy constraints extension is included in the (i) If a policy constraints extension is included in the
certificate, modify the explicit_policy and policy_mapping state certificate, modify the explicit_policy and policy_mapping
variables as follows: state variables as follows:
(1) If requireExplicitPolicy is present and is less than (1) If requireExplicitPolicy is present and is less than
explicit_policy, set explicit_policy to the value of explicit_policy, set explicit_policy to the value of
requireExplicitPolicy. requireExplicitPolicy.
(2) If inhibitPolicyMapping is present and is less than (2) If inhibitPolicyMapping is present and is less than
policy_mapping, set policy_mapping to the value of policy_mapping, set policy_mapping to the value of
inhibitPolicyMapping. inhibitPolicyMapping.
(j) If the inhibitAnyPolicy extension is included in the (j) If the inhibitAnyPolicy extension is included in the
certificate and is less than inhibit_anyPolicy, set certificate and is less than inhibit_anyPolicy, set
inhibit_anyPolicy to the value of inhibitAnyPolicy. inhibit_anyPolicy to the value of inhibitAnyPolicy.
(k) If certificate i is a version 3 certificate, verify that the (k) If certificate i is a version 3 certificate, verify that the
basicConstraints extension is present and that cA is set to TRUE. basicConstraints extension is present and that cA is set to
(If certificate i is a version 1 or version 2 certificate, then TRUE. (If certificate i is a version 1 or version 2
the application MUST either verify that certificate i is a CA certificate, then the application MUST either verify that
certificate through out-of-band means or reject the certificate. certificate i is a CA certificate through out-of-band means
Conforming implementations may choose to reject all version 1 and or reject the certificate. Conforming implementations may
version 2 intermediate certificates.) choose to reject all version 1 and version 2 intermediate
certificates.)
(l) If the certificate was not self-issued, verify that (l) If the certificate was not self-issued, verify that
max_path_length is greater than zero and decrement max_path_length max_path_length is greater than zero and decrement
by 1. max_path_length by 1.
(m) If pathLenConstraint is present in the certificate and is (m) If pathLenConstraint is present in the certificate and is
less than max_path_length, set max_path_length to the value of less than max_path_length, set max_path_length to the value
pathLenConstraint. of pathLenConstraint.
(n) If a key usage extension is present, verify that the (n) If a key usage extension is present, verify that the
keyCertSign bit is set. keyCertSign bit is set.
(o) Recognize and process any other critical extension present in (o) Recognize and process any other critical extension present in
the certificate. Process any other recognized non-critical the certificate. Process any other recognized non-critical
extension present in the certificate that is relevant to path extension present in the certificate that is relevant to path
processing. processing.
If check (a), (k), (l), (n) or (o) fails, the procedure terminates, If check (a), (k), (l), (n), or (o) fails, the procedure terminates,
returning a failure indication and an appropriate reason. returning a failure indication and an appropriate reason.
If (a), (k), (l), (n) and (o) have completed successfully, increment If (a), (k), (l), (n), and (o) have completed successfully, increment
i and perform the basic certificate processing specified in 6.1.3. i and perform the basic certificate processing specified in Section
6.1.3.
6.1.5 Wrap-up procedure 6.1.5. Wrap-Up Procedure
To complete the processing of the target certificate, perform the To complete the processing of the target certificate, perform the
following steps for certificate n: following steps for certificate n:
(a) If explicit_policy is not 0, decrement explicit_policy by 1. (a) If explicit_policy is not 0, decrement explicit_policy by 1.
(b) If a policy constraints extension is included in the (b) If a policy constraints extension is included in the
certificate and requireExplicitPolicy is present and has a value certificate and requireExplicitPolicy is present and has a
of 0, set the explicit_policy state variable to 0. value of 0, set the explicit_policy state variable to 0.
(c) Assign the certificate subjectPublicKey to (c) Assign the certificate subjectPublicKey to
working_public_key. working_public_key.
(d) If the subjectPublicKeyInfo field of the certificate contains (d) If the subjectPublicKeyInfo field of the certificate contains
an algorithm field with non-null parameters, assign the parameters an algorithm field with non-null parameters, assign the
to the working_public_key_parameters variable. parameters to the working_public_key_parameters variable.
If the subjectPublicKeyInfo field of the certificate contains an If the subjectPublicKeyInfo field of the certificate contains
algorithm field with null parameters or parameters are omitted, an algorithm field with null parameters or parameters are
compare the certificate subjectPublicKey algorithm to the omitted, compare the certificate subjectPublicKey algorithm
working_public_key_algorithm. If the certificate subjectPublicKey to the working_public_key_algorithm. If the certificate
algorithm and the working_public_key_algorithm are different, set subjectPublicKey algorithm and the
the working_public_key_parameters to null. working_public_key_algorithm are different, set the
working_public_key_parameters to null.
(e) Assign the certificate subjectPublicKey algorithm to the (e) Assign the certificate subjectPublicKey algorithm to the
working_public_key_algorithm variable. working_public_key_algorithm variable.
(f) Recognize and process any other critical extension present in (f) Recognize and process any other critical extension present in
the certificate n. Process any other recognized non-critical the certificate n. Process any other recognized non-critical
extension present in certificate n that is relevant to path extension present in certificate n that is relevant to path
processing. processing.
(g) Calculate the intersection of the valid_policy_tree and the (g) Calculate the intersection of the valid_policy_tree and the
user-initial-policy-set, as follows: user-initial-policy-set, as follows:
(i) If the valid_policy_tree is NULL, the intersection is (i) If the valid_policy_tree is NULL, the intersection is
NULL. NULL.
(ii) If the valid_policy_tree is not NULL and the user- (ii) If the valid_policy_tree is not NULL and the user-
initial-policy-set is any-policy, the intersection is the initial-policy-set is any-policy, the intersection is
entire valid_policy_tree. the entire valid_policy_tree.
(iii) If the valid_policy_tree is not NULL and the user- (iii) If the valid_policy_tree is not NULL and the user-
initial-policy-set is not any-policy, calculate the initial-policy-set is not any-policy, calculate the
intersection of the valid_policy_tree and the user-initial- intersection of the valid_policy_tree and the user-
policy-set as follows: initial-policy-set as follows:
1. Determine the set of policy nodes whose parent nodes 1. Determine the set of policy nodes whose parent nodes
have a valid_policy of anyPolicy. This is the have a valid_policy of anyPolicy. This is the
valid_policy_node_set. valid_policy_node_set.
2. If the valid_policy of any node in the 2. If the valid_policy of any node in the
valid_policy_node_set is not in the user-initial-policy-set valid_policy_node_set is not in the user-initial-
and is not anyPolicy, delete this node and all its children. policy-set and is not anyPolicy, delete this node and
all its children.
3. If the valid_policy_tree includes a node of depth n with 3. If the valid_policy_tree includes a node of depth n
the valid_policy anyPolicy and the user-initial-policy-set with the valid_policy anyPolicy and the user-initial-
is not any-policy perform the following steps: policy-set is not any-policy, perform the following
steps:
a. Set P-Q to the qualifier_set in the node of depth n a. Set P-Q to the qualifier_set in the node of depth n
with valid_policy anyPolicy. with valid_policy anyPolicy.
b. For each P-OID in the user-initial-policy-set that is b. For each P-OID in the user-initial-policy-set that is
not the valid_policy of a node in the not the valid_policy of a node in the
valid_policy_node_set, create a child node whose parent valid_policy_node_set, create a child node whose
is the node of depth n-1 with the valid_policy anyPolicy. parent is the node of depth n-1 with the valid_policy
Set the values in the child node as follows: set the anyPolicy. Set the values in the child node as
valid_policy to P-OID; set the qualifier_set to P-Q; and follows: set the valid_policy to P-OID, set the
set the expected_policy_set to {P-OID}. qualifier_set to P-Q, and set the expected_policy_set
to {P-OID}.
c. Delete the node of depth n with the valid_policy c. Delete the node of depth n with the valid_policy
anyPolicy. anyPolicy.
4. If there is a node in the valid_policy_tree of depth n-1 4. If there is a node in the valid_policy_tree of depth
or less without any child nodes, delete that node. Repeat n-1 or less without any child nodes, delete that node.
this step until there are no nodes of depth n-1 or less Repeat this step until there are no nodes of depth n-1
without children. or less without children.
If either (1) the value of explicit_policy variable is greater than If either (1) the value of explicit_policy variable is greater than
zero, or (2) the valid_policy_tree is not NULL, then path processing zero or (2) the valid_policy_tree is not NULL, then path processing
has succeeded. has succeeded.
6.1.6 Outputs 6.1.6. Outputs
If path processing succeeds, the procedure terminates, returning a If path processing succeeds, the procedure terminates, returning a
success indication together with final value of the success indication together with final value of the
valid_policy_tree, the working_public_key, the valid_policy_tree, the working_public_key, the
working_public_key_algorithm, and the working_public_key_parameters. working_public_key_algorithm, and the working_public_key_parameters.
6.2 Using the Path Validation Algorithm 6.2. Using the Path Validation Algorithm
The path validation algorithm describes the process of validating a The path validation algorithm describes the process of validating a
single certification path. While each certification path begins with single certification path. While each certification path begins with
a specific trust anchor, there is no requirement that all a specific trust anchor, there is no requirement that all
certification paths validated by a particular system share a single certification paths validated by a particular system share a single
trust anchor. The selection of one or more trusted CAs is a local trust anchor. The selection of one or more trusted CAs is a local
decision. A system may provide any one of its trusted CAs as the decision. A system may provide any one of its trusted CAs as the
trust anchor for a particular path. The inputs to the path trust anchor for a particular path. The inputs to the path
validation algorithm may be different for each path. The inputs used validation algorithm may be different for each path. The inputs used
to process a path may reflect application-specific requirements or to process a path may reflect application-specific requirements or
limitations in the trust accorded a particular trust anchor. For limitations in the trust accorded a particular trust anchor. For
example, a trusted CA may only be trusted for a particular example, a trusted CA may only be trusted for a particular
certificate policy. This restriction can be expressed through the certificate policy. This restriction can be expressed through the
inputs to the path validation procedure. inputs to the path validation procedure.
An implementation MAY augment the algorithm presented in section 6.1 An implementation MAY augment the algorithm presented in Section 6.1
to further limit the set of valid certification paths that begin with to further limit the set of valid certification paths that begin with
a particular trust anchor. For example, an implementation MAY modify a particular trust anchor. For example, an implementation MAY modify
the algorithm to apply a path length constraint to a specific trust the algorithm to apply a path length constraint to a specific trust
anchor during the initialization phase, or the application MAY anchor during the initialization phase, or the application MAY
require the presence of a particular alternative name form in the require the presence of a particular alternative name form in the
target certificate, or the application MAY impose requirements on target certificate, or the application MAY impose requirements on
application-specific extensions. Thus, the path validation algorithm application-specific extensions. Thus, the path validation algorithm
presented in section 6.1 defines the minimum conditions for a path to presented in Section 6.1 defines the minimum conditions for a path to
be considered valid. be considered valid.
Where a CA distributes self-signed certificates to specify trust Where a CA distributes self-signed certificates to specify trust
anchor information, certificate extensions can be used to specify anchor information, certificate extensions can be used to specify
recommended inputs to path validation. For example, a policy recommended inputs to path validation. For example, a policy
constraints extension could be included in the self-signed constraints extension could be included in the self-signed
certificate to indicate that paths beginning with this trust anchor certificate to indicate that paths beginning with this trust anchor
should be trusted only for the specified policies. Similarly, a name should be trusted only for the specified policies. Similarly, a name
constraints extension could be included to indicate paths beginning constraints extension could be included to indicate that paths
with this trust anchor should be trusted only for the specified name beginning with this trust anchor should be trusted only for the
spaces. The path validation algorithm presented in section 6.1 does specified name spaces. The path validation algorithm presented in
not assume that trust anchor information is provided in self-signed Section 6.1 does not assume that trust anchor information is provided
certificates and does not specify processing rules for additional in self-signed certificates and does not specify processing rules for
information included in such certificates. Implementations that use additional information included in such certificates.
self-signed certificates to specify trust anchor information are free Implementations that use self-signed certificates to specify trust
to process or ignore such information. anchor information are free to process or ignore such information.
6.3 CRL Validation 6.3. CRL Validation
This section describes the steps necessary to determine if a This section describes the steps necessary to determine if a
certificate is revoked when CRLs are the revocation mechanism used by certificate is revoked when CRLs are the revocation mechanism used by
the certificate issuer. Conforming implementations that support CRLs the certificate issuer. Conforming implementations that support CRLs
are not required to implement this algorithm, but they MUST be are not required to implement this algorithm, but they MUST be
functionally equivalent to the external behavior resulting from this functionally equivalent to the external behavior resulting from this
procedure when processing CRLs that are issued in conformance with procedure when processing CRLs that are issued in conformance with
this profile. Any algorithm may be used by a particular this profile. Any algorithm may be used by a particular
implementation so long as it derives the correct result. implementation so long as it derives the correct result.
This algorithm assumes that all of the needed CRLs are available in a This algorithm assumes that all of the needed CRLs are available in a
local cache. Further, if the next update time of a CRL has passed, local cache. Further, if the next update time of a CRL has passed,
the algorithm assumes a mechanism to fetch a current CRL and place it the algorithm assumes a mechanism to fetch a current CRL and place it
in the local CRL cache. in the local CRL cache.
This algorithm defines a set of inputs, a set of state variables, and This algorithm defines a set of inputs, a set of state variables, and
processing steps that are performed for each certificate in the path. processing steps that are performed for each certificate in the path.
The algorithm output is the revocation status of the certificate. The algorithm output is the revocation status of the certificate.
6.3.1 Revocation Inputs 6.3.1. Revocation Inputs
To support revocation processing, the algorithm requires two inputs: To support revocation processing, the algorithm requires two inputs:
(a) certificate: The algorithm requires the certificate serial (a) certificate: The algorithm requires the certificate serial
number and issuer name to determine whether a certificate is on a number and issuer name to determine whether a certificate is
particular CRL. The basicConstraints extension is used to on a particular CRL. The basicConstraints extension is used
determine whether the supplied certificate is associated with a CA to determine whether the supplied certificate is associated
or an end entity. If present, the algorithm uses the with a CA or an end entity. If present, the algorithm uses
cRLDistributionPoints and freshestCRL extensions to determine the cRLDistributionPoints and freshestCRL extensions to
revocation status. determine revocation status.
(b) use-deltas: This boolean input determines whether delta CRLs (b) use-deltas: This boolean input determines whether delta CRLs
are applied to CRLs. are applied to CRLs.
6.3.2 Initialization and Revocation State Variables 6.3.2. Initialization and Revocation State Variables
To support CRL processing, the algorithm requires the following state To support CRL processing, the algorithm requires the following state
variables: variables:
(a) reasons_mask: This variable contains the set of revocation (a) reasons_mask: This variable contains the set of revocation
reasons supported by the CRLs and delta CRLs processed so far. reasons supported by the CRLs and delta CRLs processed so
The legal members of the set are the possible revocation reason far. The legal members of the set are the possible
values minus unspecified: keyCompromise, cACompromise, revocation reason values minus unspecified: keyCompromise,
affiliationChanged, superseded, cessationOfOperation, cACompromise, affiliationChanged, superseded,
certificateHold, privilegeWithdrawn, and aACompromise. The cessationOfOperation, certificateHold, privilegeWithdrawn,
special value all-reasons is used to denote the set of all legal and aACompromise. The special value all-reasons is used to
members. This variable is initialized to the empty set. denote the set of all legal members. This variable is
initialized to the empty set.
(b) cert_status: This variable contains the status of the (b) cert_status: This variable contains the status of the
certificate. This variable may be assigned one of the following certificate. This variable may be assigned one of the
values: unspecified, keyCompromise, cACompromise, following values: unspecified, keyCompromise, cACompromise,
affiliationChanged, superseded, cessationOfOperation, affiliationChanged, superseded, cessationOfOperation,
certificateHold, removeFromCRL, privilegeWithdrawn, aACompromise, certificateHold, removeFromCRL, privilegeWithdrawn,
the special value UNREVOKED, or the special value UNDETERMINED. aACompromise, the special value UNREVOKED, or the special
This variable is initialized to the special value UNREVOKED. value UNDETERMINED. This variable is initialized to the
special value UNREVOKED.
(c) interim_reasons_mask: This contains the set of revocation (c) interim_reasons_mask: This contains the set of revocation
reasons supported by the CRL or delta CRL currently being reasons supported by the CRL or delta CRL currently being
processed. processed.
Note: In some environments, it is not necessary to check all reason Note: In some environments, it is not necessary to check all reason
codes. For example, some environments are only concerned with codes. For example, some environments are only concerned with
cACompromise and keyCompromise for CA certificates. This algorithm cACompromise and keyCompromise for CA certificates. This algorithm
checks all reason codes. Additional processing and state variables checks all reason codes. Additional processing and state variables
may be necessary to limit the checking to a subset of the reason may be necessary to limit the checking to a subset of the reason
codes. codes.
6.3.3 CRL Processing 6.3.3. CRL Processing
This algorithm begins by assuming the certificate is not revoked. This algorithm begins by assuming that the certificate is not
The algorithm checks one or more CRLs until either the certificate revoked. The algorithm checks one or more CRLs until either the
status is determined to be revoked or sufficient CRLs have been certificate status is determined to be revoked or sufficient CRLs
checked to cover all reason codes. have been checked to cover all reason codes.
For each distribution point (DP) in the certificate's CRL For each distribution point (DP) in the certificate's CRL
distribution points extension, for each corresponding CRL in the distribution points extension, for each corresponding CRL in the
local CRL cache, while ((reasons_mask is not all-reasons) and local CRL cache, while ((reasons_mask is not all-reasons) and
(cert_status is UNREVOKED)) perform the following: (cert_status is UNREVOKED)) perform the following:
(a) Update the local CRL cache by obtaining a complete CRL, a (a) Update the local CRL cache by obtaining a complete CRL, a
delta CRL, or both, as required: delta CRL, or both, as required:
(1) If the current time is after the value of the CRL next (1) If the current time is after the value of the CRL next
update field, then do one of the following: update field, then do one of the following:
(i) If use-deltas is set and either the certificate or the (i) If use-deltas is set and either the certificate or the
CRL contains the freshest CRL extension, obtain a delta CRL CRL contains the freshest CRL extension, obtain a
with the a next update value that is after the current time delta CRL with a next update value that is after the
and can be used to update the locally cached CRL as current time and can be used to update the locally
specified in section 5.2.4. cached CRL as specified in Section 5.2.4.
(ii) Update the local CRL cache with a current complete (ii) Update the local CRL cache with a current complete
CRL, verify that the current time is before the next update CRL, verify that the current time is before the next
value in the new CRL, and continue processing with the new update value in the new CRL, and continue processing
CRL. If use-deltas is set and either the certificate or the with the new CRL. If use-deltas is set and either the
CRL contains the freshest CRL extension, then obtain the certificate or the CRL contains the freshest CRL
current delta CRL that can be used to update the new locally extension, then obtain the current delta CRL that can
cached complete CRL as specified in section 5.2.4. be used to update the new locally cached complete CRL
as specified in Section 5.2.4.
(2) If the current time is before the value of the next update (2) If the current time is before the value of the next update
field, use-deltas is set, and either the certificate or the CRL field, use-deltas is set, and either the certificate or
contains the freshest CRL extension, then obtain the current the CRL contains the freshest CRL extension, then obtain
delta CRL that can be used to update the locally cached the current delta CRL that can be used to update the
complete CRL as specified in section 5.2.4. locally cached complete CRL as specified in Section 5.2.4.
(b) Verify the issuer and scope of the complete CRL as follows: (b) Verify the issuer and scope of the complete CRL as follows:
(1) If the DP includes cRLIssuer, then verify that the issuer (1) If the DP includes cRLIssuer, then verify that the issuer
field in the complete CRL matches cRLIssuer in the DP and that field in the complete CRL matches cRLIssuer in the DP and
the complete CRL contains an issuing distribution point that the complete CRL contains an issuing distribution
extension with the indirectCRL boolean asserted. Otherwise, point extension with the indirectCRL boolean asserted.
verify that the CRL issuer matches the certificate issuer. Otherwise, verify that the CRL issuer matches the
certificate issuer.
(2) If the complete CRL includes an issuing distribution point (2) If the complete CRL includes an issuing distribution point
(IDP) CRL extension check the following: (IDP) CRL extension, check the following:
(i) If the distribution point name is present in the IDP (i) If the distribution point name is present in the IDP
CRL extension and the distribution field is present in the CRL extension and the distribution field is present in
DP, then verify that one of the names in the IDP matches one the DP, then verify that one of the names in the IDP
of the names in the DP. If the distribution point name is matches one of the names in the DP. If the
present in the IDP CRL extension and the distribution field distribution point name is present in the IDP CRL
is omitted from the DP, then verify that one of the names in extension and the distribution field is omitted from
the IDP matches one of the names in the cRLIssuer field of the DP, then verify that one of the names in the IDP
the DP. matches one of the names in the cRLIssuer field of the
DP.
(ii) If the onlyContainsUserCerts boolean is asserted in (ii) If the onlyContainsUserCerts boolean is asserted in
the IDP CRL extension, verify that the certificate does not the IDP CRL extension, verify that the certificate
include the basic constraints extension with the cA boolean does not include the basic constraints extension with
asserted. the cA boolean asserted.
(iii) If the onlyContainsCACerts boolean is asserted in the (iii) If the onlyContainsCACerts boolean is asserted in the
IDP CRL extension, verify that the certificate includes the IDP CRL extension, verify that the certificate
basic constraints extension with the cA boolean asserted. includes the basic constraints extension with the cA
boolean asserted.
(iv) Verify that the onlyContainsAttributeCerts boolean is (iv) Verify that the onlyContainsAttributeCerts boolean is
not asserted. not asserted.
(c) If use-deltas is set, verify the issuer and scope of the (c) If use-deltas is set, verify the issuer and scope of the
delta CRL as follows: delta CRL as follows:
(1) Verify that the delta CRL issuer matches complete CRL (1) Verify that the delta CRL issuer matches the complete CRL
issuer. issuer.
(2) If the complete CRL includes an issuing distribution point (2) If the complete CRL includes an issuing distribution point
(IDP) CRL extension, verify that the delta CRL contains a (IDP) CRL extension, verify that the delta CRL contains a
matching IDP CRL extension. If the complete CRL omits an IDP matching IDP CRL extension. If the complete CRL omits an
CRL extension, verify that the delta CRL also omits an IDP CRL IDP CRL extension, verify that the delta CRL also omits an
extension. IDP CRL extension.
(3) Verify that the delta CRL authority key identifier (3) Verify that the delta CRL authority key identifier
extension matches complete CRL authority key identifier extension matches the complete CRL authority key
extension. identifier extension.
(d) Compute the interim_reasons_mask for this CRL as follows: (d) Compute the interim_reasons_mask for this CRL as follows:
(1) If the issuing distribution point (IDP) CRL extension is (1) If the issuing distribution point (IDP) CRL extension is
present and includes onlySomeReasons and the DP includes present and includes onlySomeReasons and the DP includes
reasons, then set interim_reasons_mask to the intersection of reasons, then set interim_reasons_mask to the intersection
reasons in the DP and onlySomeReasons in IDP CRL extension. of reasons in the DP and onlySomeReasons in the IDP CRL
extension.
(2) If the IDP CRL extension includes onlySomeReasons but the (2) If the IDP CRL extension includes onlySomeReasons but the
DP omits reasons, then set interim_reasons_mask to the value of DP omits reasons, then set interim_reasons_mask to the
onlySomeReasons in IDP CRL extension. value of onlySomeReasons in the IDP CRL extension.
(3) If the IDP CRL extension is not present or omits (3) If the IDP CRL extension is not present or omits
onlySomeReasons but the DP includes reasons, then set onlySomeReasons but the DP includes reasons, then set
interim_reasons_mask to the value of DP reasons. interim_reasons_mask to the value of DP reasons.
(4) If the IDP CRL extension is not present or omits (4) If the IDP CRL extension is not present or omits
onlySomeReasons and the DP omits reasons, then set onlySomeReasons and the DP omits reasons, then set
interim_reasons_mask to the special value all-reasons. interim_reasons_mask to the special value all-reasons.
(e) Verify that interim_reasons_mask includes one or more reasons (e) Verify that interim_reasons_mask includes one or more reasons
that is not included in the reasons_mask. that are not included in the reasons_mask.
(f) Obtain and validate the certification path for the issuer of (f) Obtain and validate the certification path for the issuer of
the complete CRL. The trust anchor for the certification path the complete CRL. The trust anchor for the certification
MUST be the same as the trust anchor used to validate the target path MUST be the same as the trust anchor used to validate
certificate. If a key usage extension is present in the CRL the target certificate. If a key usage extension is present
issuer's certificate, verify that the cRLSign bit is set. in the CRL issuer's certificate, verify that the cRLSign bit
is set.
(g) Validate the signature on the complete CRL using the public (g) Validate the signature on the complete CRL using the public
key validated in step (f). key validated in step (f).
(h) If use-deltas is set, then validate the signature on the (h) If use-deltas is set, then validate the signature on the
delta CRL using the public key validated in step (f). delta CRL using the public key validated in step (f).
(i) If use-deltas is set, then search for the certificate on the (i) If use-deltas is set, then search for the certificate on the
delta CRL. If an entry is found that matches the certificate delta CRL. If an entry is found that matches the certificate
issuer and serial number as described in section 5.3.3, then set issuer and serial number as described in Section 5.3.3, then
the cert_status variable to the indicated reason as follows: set the cert_status variable to the indicated reason as
follows:
(1) If the reason code CRL entry extension is present, set the (1) If the reason code CRL entry extension is present, set the
cert_status variable to the value of the reason code CRL entry cert_status variable to the value of the reason code CRL
extension. entry extension.
(2) If the reason code CRL entry extension is not present, set (2) If the reason code CRL entry extension is not present, set
the cert_status variable to the value unspecified. the cert_status variable to the value unspecified.
(j) If (cert_status is UNREVOKED), then search for the (j) If (cert_status is UNREVOKED), then search for the
certificate on the complete CRL. If an entry is found that certificate on the complete CRL. If an entry is found that
matches the certificate issuer and serial number as described in matches the certificate issuer and serial number as described
section 5.3.3, then set the cert_status variable to the indicated in Section 5.3.3, then set the cert_status variable to the
reason as described in step (i). indicated reason as described in step (i).
(k) If (cert_status is removeFromCRL), then set cert_status to (k) If (cert_status is removeFromCRL), then set cert_status to
UNREVOKED. UNREVOKED.
(l) Set the reasons_mask state variable to the union of its (l) Set the reasons_mask state variable to the union of its
previous value and the value of the interim_reasons_mask state previous value and the value of the interim_reasons_mask
variable. state variable.
If ((reasons_mask is all-reasons) OR (cert_status is not UNREVOKED)), If ((reasons_mask is all-reasons) OR (cert_status is not UNREVOKED)),
then the revocation status has been determined, so return then the revocation status has been determined, so return
cert_status. cert_status.
If the revocation status has not been determined, repeat the process If the revocation status has not been determined, repeat the process
above with any available CRLs not specified in a distribution point above with any available CRLs not specified in a distribution point
but issued by the certificate issuer. For the processing of such a but issued by the certificate issuer. For the processing of such a
CRL, assume a DP with both the reasons and the cRLIssuer fields CRL, assume a DP with both the reasons and the cRLIssuer fields
omitted and a distribution point name of the certificate issuer. omitted and a distribution point name of the certificate issuer.
That is, the sequence of names in fullName is generated from the That is, the sequence of names in fullName is generated from the
certificate issuer field as well as the certificate issuerAltName certificate issuer field as well as the certificate issuerAltName
extension. After processing such CRLs, if the revocation status has extension. After processing such CRLs, if the revocation status has
still not been determined then return the cert_status UNDETERMINED. still not been determined, then return the cert_status UNDETERMINED.
7 Processing Rules for Internationalized Names 7. Processing Rules for Internationalized Names
Internationalized names may be encountered in numerous certificate Internationalized names may be encountered in numerous certificate
and CRL fields and extensions, including distinguished names, and CRL fields and extensions, including distinguished names,
internationalized domain names, electronic mail addresses, and internationalized domain names, electronic mail addresses, and
internationalized resource identifiers (IRIs). Storage, comparison, Internationalized Resource Identifiers (IRIs). Storage, comparison,
and presentation of such names require special care. Some characters and presentation of such names require special care. Some characters
may be encoded in multiple ways. The same names could be represented may be encoded in multiple ways. The same names could be represented
in multiple encodings (e.g., ASCII or UTF8). This section in multiple encodings (e.g., ASCII or UTF8). This section
establishes conformance requirements for storage or comparison of establishes conformance requirements for storage or comparison of
each of these name forms. Informative guidance on presentation is each of these name forms. Informative guidance on presentation is
provided for some of these name forms. provided for some of these name forms.
7.1 Internationalized Names in Distinguished Names 7.1. Internationalized Names in Distinguished Names
Representation of internationalized names in distinguished names is Representation of internationalized names in distinguished names is
covered in sections 4.1.2.4, Issuer Name, and 4.1.2.6, Subject Name. covered in Sections 4.1.2.4, Issuer Name, and 4.1.2.6, Subject Name.
Standard naming attributes, such as common name, employ the Standard naming attributes, such as common name, employ the
DirectoryString type, which supports internationalized names through DirectoryString type, which supports internationalized names through
a variety of language encodings. Conforming implementations MUST a variety of language encodings. Conforming implementations MUST
support UTF8String and PrintableString. RFC 3280 required only support UTF8String and PrintableString. RFC 3280 required only
binary comparison of attribute values encoded in UTF8String, however, binary comparison of attribute values encoded in UTF8String, however,
this specification requires a more comprehensive handling of this specification requires a more comprehensive handling of
comparison. Implementations may encounter certificates and CRLs with comparison. Implementations may encounter certificates and CRLs with
names encoded using TeletexString, BMPString, or UniversalString but names encoded using TeletexString, BMPString, or UniversalString, but
support for these is OPTIONAL. support for these is OPTIONAL.
Conforming implementations MUST use the LDAP StringPrep profile Conforming implementations MUST use the LDAP StringPrep profile
(including insignificant space handling), as specified in [RFC 4518], (including insignificant space handling), as specified in [RFC4518],
as the basis for comparison of distinguished name attributes encoded as the basis for comparison of distinguished name attributes encoded
in either PrintableString or UTF8String. Conforming implementations in either PrintableString or UTF8String. Conforming implementations
MUST support name comparisons using caseIgnoreMatch. Support for MUST support name comparisons using caseIgnoreMatch. Support for
attribute types that use other equality matching rules is optional. attribute types that use other equality matching rules is optional.
Before comparing names using the caseIgnoreMatch matching rule, Before comparing names using the caseIgnoreMatch matching rule,
conforming implementations MUST perform the six step string conforming implementations MUST perform the six-step string
preparation algorithm described in [RFC 4518] for each attribute of preparation algorithm described in [RFC4518] for each attribute of
type DirectoryString, with the following clarifications: type DirectoryString, with the following clarifications:
* In step 2, Map, the mapping shall include case folding as * In step 2, Map, the mapping shall include case folding as
specified in appendix B.2 of [RFC 3454]. specified in Appendix B.2 of [RFC3454].
* In step 6, Insignificant Character Removal, perform white space * In step 6, Insignificant Character Removal, perform white space
compression as specified in section 2.6.1, Insignificant Space compression as specified in Section 2.6.1, Insignificant Space
Handling of [RFC 4518]. Handling, of [RFC4518].
When performing the string preparation algorithm, attributes MUST be When performing the string preparation algorithm, attributes MUST be
treated as stored values. treated as stored values.
Comparisons of domainComponent attributes MUST be performed as Comparisons of domainComponent attributes MUST be performed as
specified in section 7.3. specified in Section 7.3.
Two naming attributes match if the attribute types are the same and Two naming attributes match if the attribute types are the same and
the values of the attributes are an exact match after processing with the values of the attributes are an exact match after processing with
the string preparation algorithm. Two relative distinguished names the string preparation algorithm. Two relative distinguished names
RDN1 and RDN2 match if they have the same number of naming attributes RDN1 and RDN2 match if they have the same number of naming attributes
and for each naming attribute in RDN1 there is a matching naming and for each naming attribute in RDN1 there is a matching naming
attribute in RDN2. Two distinguished names DN1 and DN2 match if they attribute in RDN2. Two distinguished names DN1 and DN2 match if they
have the same number of RDNs, for each RDN in DN1 there is a matching have the same number of RDNs, for each RDN in DN1 there is a matching
RDN in DN2, and the matching RDNs appear in the same order in both RDN in DN2, and the matching RDNs appear in the same order in both
DNs. A distinguished name DN1 is within the subtree defined by the DNs. A distinguished name DN1 is within the subtree defined by the
distinguished name DN2 if DN1 contains at least as many RDNs as DN2, distinguished name DN2 if DN1 contains at least as many RDNs as DN2,
and DN1 and DN2 are a match when trailing RDNs in DN1 are ignored. and DN1 and DN2 are a match when trailing RDNs in DN1 are ignored.
7.2 Internationalized Domain Names in GeneralName 7.2. Internationalized Domain Names in GeneralName
Internationalized domain names (IDNs) may be included in certificates Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs) may be included in certificates
and CRLs in the subjectAltName and issuerAltName extensions, the name and CRLs in the subjectAltName and issuerAltName extensions, name
constraints extension, authority information access extension, constraints extension, authority information access extension,
subject information access extension, CRL distribution points subject information access extension, CRL distribution points
extension, and issuing distribution point extension. Each of these extension, and issuing distribution point extension. Each of these
extensions uses the GeneralName type; one choice in GeneralName is extensions uses the GeneralName type; one choice in GeneralName is
the dNSName field, which is defined as type IA5String. the dNSName field, which is defined as type IA5String.
IA5String is limited to the set of ASCII characters. To accommodate IA5String is limited to the set of ASCII characters. To accommodate
internationalized domain names in the current structure, conforming internationalized domain names in the current structure, conforming
implementations MUST convert internationalized domain names to the implementations MUST convert internationalized domain names to the
ASCII Compatible Encoding (ACE) format as specified in section 4 of ASCII Compatible Encoding (ACE) format as specified in Section 4 of
RFC 3490 before storage in the dNSName field. Specifically, RFC 3490 before storage in the dNSName field. Specifically,
conforming implementations MUST perform the conversion operation conforming implementations MUST perform the conversion operation
specified in section 4 of RFC 3490, with the following specified in Section 4 of RFC 3490, with the following
clarifications: clarifications:
* in step 1, the domain name SHALL be considered a "stored * in step 1, the domain name SHALL be considered a "stored
string". That is, the AllowUnassigned flag SHALL NOT be set; string". That is, the AllowUnassigned flag SHALL NOT be set;
* in step 3, set the flag called "UseSTD3ASCIIRules"; * in step 3, set the flag called "UseSTD3ASCIIRules";
* in step 4, process each label with the "ToASCII" operation; and * in step 4, process each label with the "ToASCII" operation; and
* in step 5, change all label separators to U+002E (full stop). * in step 5, change all label separators to U+002E (full stop).
When comparing DNS names for equality, conforming implementations When comparing DNS names for equality, conforming implementations
MUST perform a case-insensitive exact match on the entire DNS name. MUST perform a case-insensitive exact match on the entire DNS name.
When evaluating name constraints, conforming implementations MUST When evaluating name constraints, conforming implementations MUST
perform a case-insensitive exact match on a label-by-label basis. As perform a case-insensitive exact match on a label-by-label basis. As
noted in 4.2.1.10, any DNS name that may be constructed by adding noted in Section 4.2.1.10, any DNS name that may be constructed by
labels to the left hand side of the domain name given as the adding labels to the left-hand side of the domain name given as the
constraint is considered to fall within the indicated subtree. constraint is considered to fall within the indicated subtree.
Implementations should convert IDNs to Unicode before display. Implementations should convert IDNs to Unicode before display.
Specifically, conforming implementations should perform the Specifically, conforming implementations should perform the
conversion operation specified in section 4 of RFC 3490, with the conversion operation specified in Section 4 of RFC 3490, with the
following clarifications: following clarifications:
* in step 1, the domain name SHALL be considered a "stored * in step 1, the domain name SHALL be considered a "stored
string". That is, the AllowUnassigned flag SHALL NOT be set; string". That is, the AllowUnassigned flag SHALL NOT be set;
* in step 3, set the flag called "UseSTD3ASCIIRules"; * in step 3, set the flag called "UseSTD3ASCIIRules";
* in step 4, process each label with the "ToUnicode" operation; * in step 4, process each label with the "ToUnicode" operation;
and and
* skip step 5. * skip step 5.
Note: Implementations MUST allow for increased space requirements Note: Implementations MUST allow for increased space requirements
for IDNs. An IDN ACE label will begin with the four additional for IDNs. An IDN ACE label will begin with the four additional
characters "xn--" and may require as many as five ASCII characters to characters "xn--" and may require as many as five ASCII characters to
specify a single international character. specify a single international character.
7.3 Internationalized Domain Names in Distinguished Names 7.3. Internationalized Domain Names in Distinguished Names
Domain Names may also be represented as distinguished names using Domain Names may also be represented as distinguished names using
domain components in the subject field, the issuer field, the domain components in the subject field, the issuer field, the
subjectAltName extension, or the issuerAltName extension. As with subjectAltName extension, or the issuerAltName extension. As with
the dNSName in the GeneralName type, the value of this attribute is the dNSName in the GeneralName type, the value of this attribute is
defined as an IA5String. Each domainComponent attribute represents a defined as an IA5String. Each domainComponent attribute represents a
single label. To represent a label from an IDN in the distinguished single label. To represent a label from an IDN in the distinguished
name, the implementation MUST perform the "ToASCII" label conversion name, the implementation MUST perform the "ToASCII" label conversion
specified in section 4.1 of RFC 3490. The label SHALL be considered specified in Section 4.1 of RFC 3490. The label SHALL be considered
a "stored string". That is, the AllowUnassigned flag SHALL NOT be a "stored string". That is, the AllowUnassigned flag SHALL NOT be
set. set.
Conforming implementations shall perform case-insensitive exact match Conforming implementations shall perform a case-insensitive exact
when comparing domainComponent attributes in distinguished names, as match when comparing domainComponent attributes in distinguished
described in section 7.2. names, as described in Section 7.2.
Implementations should convert ACE labels to Unicode before display. Implementations should convert ACE labels to Unicode before display.
Specifically, conforming implementations should perform the Specifically, conforming implementations should perform the
"ToUnicode" conversion operation specified, as described in section "ToUnicode" conversion operation specified, as described in Section
7.2, on each ACE label before displaying the name. 7.2, on each ACE label before displaying the name.
7.4 Internationalized Resource Identifiers 7.4. Internationalized Resource Identifiers
Internationalized Resource Identifiers (IRIs) are the Internationalized Resource Identifiers (IRIs) are the
internationalized complement to the Uniform Resource Identifier internationalized complement to the Uniform Resource Identifier
(URI). IRIs are sequences of characters from Unicode, while URIs are (URI). IRIs are sequences of characters from Unicode, while URIs are
sequences of characters from the ASCII character set. [RFC 3987] sequences of characters from the ASCII character set. [RFC3987]
defines a mapping from IRIs to URIs. While IRIs are not encoded defines a mapping from IRIs to URIs. While IRIs are not encoded
directly in any certificate fields or extensions, their mapped URIs directly in any certificate fields or extensions, their mapped URIs
may be included in certificates and CRLs. URIs may appear in the may be included in certificates and CRLs. URIs may appear in the
subjectAltName and issuerAltName extensions, the name constraints subjectAltName and issuerAltName extensions, name constraints
extension, authority information access extension, subject extension, authority information access extension, subject
information access extension, issuing distribution point extension, information access extension, issuing distribution point extension,
and CRL distribution points extension. Each of these extensions uses and CRL distribution points extension. Each of these extensions uses
the GeneralName type; URIs are encoded in the the GeneralName type; URIs are encoded in the
uniformResourceIdentifier field in GeneralName, which is defined as uniformResourceIdentifier field in GeneralName, which is defined as
type IA5String. type IA5String.
To accommodate IRIs in the current structure, conforming To accommodate IRIs in the current structure, conforming
implementations MUST map IRIs to URIs as specified in section 3.1 of implementations MUST map IRIs to URIs as specified in Section 3.1 of
[RFC 3987], with the following clarifications: [RFC3987], with the following clarifications:
* in step 1, generate a UCS character sequence from the original * in step 1, generate a UCS character sequence from the original
IRI format normalizing according to the NFC as specified in IRI format normalizing according to the NFC as specified in
Variant b (normalization according to NFC); Variant b (normalization according to NFC);
* perform step 2 using the output from step 1. * perform step 2 using the output from step 1.
Implementations MUST NOT convert the ireg-name component before Implementations MUST NOT convert the ireg-name component before
performing step 2. performing step 2.
Before URIs may be compared, conforming implementations MUST perform Before URIs may be compared, conforming implementations MUST perform
a combination of the syntax-based and scheme-based normalization a combination of the syntax-based and scheme-based normalization
techniques described in [RFC 3987]. Specifically, conforming techniques described in [RFC3987]. Specifically, conforming
implementations MUST prepare URIs for comparison as follows: implementations MUST prepare URIs for comparison as follows:
* Step 1: Where IRIs allow the usage of IDNs, those names MUST be * Step 1: Where IRIs allow the usage of IDNs, those names MUST be
converted to ASCII Compatible Encoding as specified in section 7.2 converted to ASCII Compatible Encoding as specified in Section
above. 7.2 above.
* Step 2: The scheme and host are normalized to lowercase, as * Step 2: The scheme and host are normalized to lowercase, as
described in section 5.3.2.1 of [RFC 3987]. described in Section 5.3.2.1 of [RFC3987].
* Step 3: Perform percent-encoding normalization, as specified in * Step 3: Perform percent-encoding normalization, as specified in
section 5.3.2.3 of [RFC 3987]. Section 5.3.2.3 of [RFC3987].
* Step 4: Perform path segment normalization, as specified in * Step 4: Perform path segment normalization, as specified in
section 5.3.2.4 of [RFC 3987]. Section 5.3.2.4 of [RFC3987].
* Step 5: If recognized, the implementation MUST perform scheme- * Step 5: If recognized, the implementation MUST perform scheme-
based normalization as specified in section 5.3.3 of [RFC 3987]. based normalization as specified in Section 5.3.3 of [RFC3987].
Conforming implementations MUST recognize and perform scheme-based Conforming implementations MUST recognize and perform scheme-based
normalization for the following schemes: ldap, http, https, and ftp. normalization for the following schemes: ldap, http, https, and ftp.
If the scheme is not recognized, Step (5) is omitted. If the scheme is not recognized, step 5 is omitted.
When comparing URIs for equivalence, conforming implementations shall When comparing URIs for equivalence, conforming implementations shall
perform a case-sensitive exact match. perform a case-sensitive exact match.
Implementations should convert URIs to Unicode before display. Implementations should convert URIs to Unicode before display.
Specifically, conforming implementations should perform the Specifically, conforming implementations should perform the
conversion operation specified in section 3.2 of [RFC 3987]. conversion operation specified in Section 3.2 of [RFC3987].
7.5 Internationalized Electronic Mail Addresses 7.5. Internationalized Electronic Mail Addresses
Electronic Mail addresses may be included in certificates and CRLs in Electronic Mail addresses may be included in certificates and CRLs in
the subjectAltName and issuerAltName extensions, the name constraints the subjectAltName and issuerAltName extensions, name constraints
extension, authority information access extension, subject extension, authority information access extension, subject
information access extension, issuing distribution point extension, information access extension, issuing distribution point extension,
or CRL distribution points extension. Each of these extensions uses or CRL distribution points extension. Each of these extensions uses
the GeneralName construct; GeneralName includes the rfc822Name the GeneralName construct; GeneralName includes the rfc822Name
choice, which is defined as type IA5String. To accommodate email choice, which is defined as type IA5String. To accommodate email
addresses with internationalized domain names using the current addresses with internationalized domain names using the current
structure, conforming implementations MUST convert the addresses into structure, conforming implementations MUST convert the addresses into
an ASCII representation. an ASCII representation.
Where the host-part (the Domain of the Mailbox) contains an Where the host-part (the Domain of the Mailbox) contains an
internationalized name, the domain name MUST be converted from an IDN internationalized name, the domain name MUST be converted from an IDN
to the ASCII Compatible Encoding (ACE) format as specified in section to the ASCII Compatible Encoding (ACE) format as specified in Section
7.2. 7.2.
Two email addresses are considered to match if: Two email addresses are considered to match if:
1) the local-part of each name is an exact match, AND 1) the local-part of each name is an exact match, AND
2) the host-part of each name matches using a case-insensitive 2) the host-part of each name matches using a case-insensitive
ASCII comparison. ASCII comparison.
Implementations should convert the host-part of internationalized Implementations should convert the host-part of internationalized
email addresses specified in these extensions to Unicode before email addresses specified in these extensions to Unicode before
display. Specifically, conforming implementations should perform the display. Specifically, conforming implementations should perform the
conversion of the host-part of the Mailbox as described in section conversion of the host-part of the Mailbox as described in Section
7.2. 7.2.
8 References 8. Security Considerations
Normative References
[RFC 791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
September 1981.
[RFC 1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain Names - Concepts and
Facilities", STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
[RFC 1123] Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts --
Application and Support", STD 3, RFC 1123, October 1989.
[RFC 2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC 2460] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998.
[RFC 2585] Housley, R. and P. Hoffman, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure: Operational Protocols: FTP and HTTP", RFC
2585, May 1999.
[RFC 2616] Fielding, R., J. Gettys, J. Mogul, H. Frystyk, L.
Masinter, P. Leach and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
[RFC 2797] Myers, M., X. Liu, J. Schaad and J. Weinstein,
"Certificate Management Messages over CMS", RFC 2797,
April 2000.
[RFC 2821] Klensin, J., Ed., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC
2821, April 2001.
[RFC 3454] Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, "Preparation of
Internationalized Strings (stringprep)", RFC 3454,
December 2002.
[RFC 3490] Falstrom, P., P. Hoffman and A. Costello,
"Internationalizing Domain Names In Applications (IDNA)",
RFC 3490, March 2003.
[RFC 3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.
[RFC 3986] Berners-Lee, T., R. Fielding and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, RFC
3986, January 2005.
[RFC 3987] Duerst, M. and M. Suigard, "Internationalized Resource
Identifiers (IRIs)", RFC 3987, January 2005.
[RFC 4516] Smith, M. and T. Howes, "Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (LDAP): Uniform Resource Locator", RFC 4516,
June 2006.
[RFC 4518] Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP): Internationalized String Preparation", RFC 4518,
June 2006.
[RFC 4523] Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP) Schema Definitions for X.509 Certificates", June
2006.
[RFC 4632] Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing
(CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation
Plan", BCP 122, RFC 4632, August 2006.
[X.680] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-1:2002,
Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One
(ASN.1): Specification of basic notation.
[X.690] ITU-T Recommendation X.690 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8825-1:2002,
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER).
Informative References
[ISO 8859] ISO/IEC 8859-1:1998. Information technology -- 8-bit
single-byte coded graphic character sets -- Part 1: Latin
alphabet No. 1.
[ISO 10646] ISO/IEC 10646:2003. Information technology -- Universal
Multiple-Octet Coded Character Set (UCS).
[NFC] Davis, M. and M. Duerst, "Unicode Standard Annex #15:
Unicode Normalization Forms", October 2006,
<http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr15/>.
[RFC 1422] Kent, S., "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic
Mail: Part II: Certificate-Based Key Management," RFC
1422, February 1993.
[RFC 2277] Alvestrand, H., "IETF Policy on Character Sets and
Languages", BCP 18, RFC 2277, January 1998.
[RFC 2459] Housley, R., W. Ford, W. Polk and D. Solo, "Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Certificate and CRL
Profile", RFC 2459, January 1999.
[RFC 2560] Myers, M., R. Ankney, A. Malpani, S. Galperin and C.
Adams, "Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", June
1999.
[RFC 2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
November 2000.
[RFC 3161] Adams, C., P. Cain, D. Pinkas and R. Zuccherato,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time-Stamp
Protocol (TSP)", RFC 3161, August 2001.
[RFC 3279] Bassham, L., W. Polk and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
Lists (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, April 2002.
[RFC 3280] Housley, R., W. Polk, W. Ford and D. Solo, "Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Certificate and
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
April 2002.
[RFC 4055] Schaad, J., B. Kaliski and R. Housley, "Additional
Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use
in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
Profile", RFC 4055, June 2005.
[RFC 4120] Neuman, C., T. Yu, S. Hartman and K. Raeburn, "The
Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)," RFC 4120,
July 2005.
[RFC 4210] Adams, C., S. Farrell, T. Kause and T. Mononen, "Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management
Protocol (CMP)", RFC 4210, September 2005.
[RFC 4325] Santesson, S. and R. Housley, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Authority Information Access Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) Extension", RFC 4325, December
2005.
[RFC 4491] Leontiev, S., Ed., and D. Shefanovski, Ed., "Using the
GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94
Algorithms with the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile", RFC 4491,
May 2006.
[RFC 4510] Zeilenga, K., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP): Technical Specification Road Map", RFC 4510, June
2006.
[RFC 4512] Zeilenga, K., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP): Directory Information Models", RFC 4512, June
2006.
[RFC 4514] Zeilenga, K., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names",
RFC 4514, June 2006.
[RFC 4519] Sciberras, A., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (LDAP): Schema for User Applications", RFC 4519,
June 2006.
[RFC 4630] Housley, R. and S. Santesson, "Update to DirectoryString
Processing in the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4630, August 2006.
[X.500] ITU-T Recommendation X.500 (2005) | ISO/IEC 9594-1:2005,
Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
The Directory: Overview of concepts, models and services.
[X.501] ITU-T Recommendation X.501 (2005) | ISO/IEC 9594-2:2005,
Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
The Directory: Models.
[X.509] ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (2005) | ISO/IEC 9594-8:2005,
Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate
frameworks.
[X.520] ITU-T Recommendation X.520 (2005) | ISO/IEC 9594-6:2005,
Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
The Directory: Selected attribute types.
[X.660] ITU-T Recommendation X.660 (2004) | ISO/IEC 9834-1:2005,
Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
Procedures for the operation of OSI Registration
Authorities: General procedures, and top arcs of the
ASN.1 Object Identifier tree.
[X.683] ITU-T Recommendation X.683 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-4:2002,
Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One
(ASN.1): Parameterization of ASN.1 specifications.
[X9.55] ANSI X9.55-1997, Public Key Cryptography for the
Financial Services Industry: Extensions to Public Key
Certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists, January
1997.
9 Intellectual Property Rights
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information
on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at
ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
10 Security Considerations
The majority of this specification is devoted to the format and The majority of this specification is devoted to the format and
content of certificates and CRLs. Since certificates and CRLs are content of certificates and CRLs. Since certificates and CRLs are
digitally signed, no additional integrity service is necessary. digitally signed, no additional integrity service is necessary.
Neither certificates nor CRLs need be kept secret, and unrestricted Neither certificates nor CRLs need be kept secret, and unrestricted
and anonymous access to certificates and CRLs has no security and anonymous access to certificates and CRLs has no security
implications. implications.
However, security factors outside the scope of this specification However, security factors outside the scope of this specification
will affect the assurance provided to certificate users. This will affect the assurance provided to certificate users. This
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to other CAs. to other CAs.
The use of a single key pair for both signature and other purposes is The use of a single key pair for both signature and other purposes is
strongly discouraged. Use of separate key pairs for signature and strongly discouraged. Use of separate key pairs for signature and
key management provides several benefits to the users. The key management provides several benefits to the users. The
ramifications associated with loss or disclosure of a signature key ramifications associated with loss or disclosure of a signature key
are different from loss or disclosure of a key management key. Using are different from loss or disclosure of a key management key. Using
separate key pairs permits a balanced and flexible response. separate key pairs permits a balanced and flexible response.
Similarly, different validity periods or key lengths for each key Similarly, different validity periods or key lengths for each key
pair may be appropriate in some application environments. pair may be appropriate in some application environments.
Unfortunately, some legacy applications (e.g., SSL) use a single key Unfortunately, some legacy applications (e.g., Secure Sockets Layer
pair for signature and key management. (SSL)) use a single key pair for signature and key management.
The protection afforded private keys is a critical security factor. The protection afforded private keys is a critical security factor.
On a small scale, failure of users to protect their private keys will On a small scale, failure of users to protect their private keys will
permit an attacker to masquerade as them, or decrypt their personal permit an attacker to masquerade as them or decrypt their personal
information. On a larger scale, compromise of a CA's private signing information. On a larger scale, compromise of a CA's private signing
key may have a catastrophic effect. If an attacker obtains the key may have a catastrophic effect. If an attacker obtains the
private key unnoticed, the attacker may issue bogus certificates and private key unnoticed, the attacker may issue bogus certificates and
CRLs. Existence of bogus certificates and CRLs will undermine CRLs. Existence of bogus certificates and CRLs will undermine
confidence in the system. If such a compromise is detected, all confidence in the system. If such a compromise is detected, all
certificates issued to the compromised CA MUST be revoked, preventing certificates issued to the compromised CA MUST be revoked, preventing
services between its users and users of other CAs. Rebuilding after services between its users and users of other CAs. Rebuilding after
such a compromise will be problematic, so CAs are advised to such a compromise will be problematic, so CAs are advised to
implement a combination of strong technical measures (e.g., tamper- implement a combination of strong technical measures (e.g., tamper-
resistant cryptographic modules) and appropriate management resistant cryptographic modules) and appropriate management
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information available only through CRLs that contain critical information available only through CRLs that contain critical
extensions, particularly if support for those extensions is not extensions, particularly if support for those extensions is not
mandated by this profile. For example, if revocation information is mandated by this profile. For example, if revocation information is
supplied using a combination of delta CRLs and full CRLs, and the supplied using a combination of delta CRLs and full CRLs, and the
delta CRLs are issued more frequently than the full CRLs, then delta CRLs are issued more frequently than the full CRLs, then
relying parties that cannot handle the critical extensions related to relying parties that cannot handle the critical extensions related to
delta CRL processing will not be able to obtain the most recent delta CRL processing will not be able to obtain the most recent
revocation information. Alternatively, if a full CRL is issued revocation information. Alternatively, if a full CRL is issued
whenever a delta CRL is issued, then timely revocation information whenever a delta CRL is issued, then timely revocation information
will be available to all relying parties. Similarly, implementations will be available to all relying parties. Similarly, implementations
of the certification path validation mechanism described in section 6 of the certification path validation mechanism described in Section 6
that omit revocation checking provide less assurance than those that that omit revocation checking provide less assurance than those that
support it. support it.
The certification path validation algorithm depends on the certain The certification path validation algorithm depends on the certain
knowledge of the public keys (and other information) about one or knowledge of the public keys (and other information) about one or
more trusted CAs. The decision to trust a CA is an important more trusted CAs. The decision to trust a CA is an important
decision as it ultimately determines the trust afforded a decision as it ultimately determines the trust afforded a
certificate. The authenticated distribution of trusted CA public certificate. The authenticated distribution of trusted CA public
keys (usually in the form of a "self-signed" certificate) is a keys (usually in the form of a "self-signed" certificate) is a
security critical out-of-band process that is beyond the scope of security critical out-of-band process that is beyond the scope of
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In addition, where a key compromise or CA failure occurs for a In addition, where a key compromise or CA failure occurs for a
trusted CA, the user will need to modify the information provided to trusted CA, the user will need to modify the information provided to
the path validation routine. Selection of too many trusted CAs makes the path validation routine. Selection of too many trusted CAs makes
the trusted CA information difficult to maintain. On the other hand, the trusted CA information difficult to maintain. On the other hand,
selection of only one trusted CA could limit users to a closed selection of only one trusted CA could limit users to a closed
community of users. community of users.
The quality of implementations that process certificates also affects The quality of implementations that process certificates also affects
the degree of assurance provided. The path validation algorithm the degree of assurance provided. The path validation algorithm
described in section 6 relies upon the integrity of the trusted CA described in Section 6 relies upon the integrity of the trusted CA
information, and especially the integrity of the public keys information, and especially the integrity of the public keys
associated with the trusted CAs. By substituting public keys for associated with the trusted CAs. By substituting public keys for
which an attacker has the private key, an attacker could trick the which an attacker has the private key, an attacker could trick the
user into accepting false certificates. user into accepting false certificates.
The binding between a key and certificate subject cannot be stronger The binding between a key and certificate subject cannot be stronger
than the cryptographic module implementation and algorithms used to than the cryptographic module implementation and algorithms used to
generate the signature. Short key lengths or weak hash algorithms generate the signature. Short key lengths or weak hash algorithms
will limit the utility of a certificate. CAs are encouraged to note will limit the utility of a certificate. CAs are encouraged to note
advances in cryptology so they can employ strong cryptographic advances in cryptology so they can employ strong cryptographic
techniques. In addition, CAs SHOULD decline to issue certificates to techniques. In addition, CAs SHOULD decline to issue certificates to
CAs or end entities that generate weak signatures. CAs or end entities that generate weak signatures.
Inconsistent application of name comparison rules can result in Inconsistent application of name comparison rules can result in
acceptance of invalid X.509 certification paths, or rejection of acceptance of invalid X.509 certification paths or rejection of valid
valid ones. The X.500 series of specifications defines rules for ones. The X.500 series of specifications defines rules for comparing
comparing distinguished names that require comparison of strings distinguished names that require comparison of strings without regard
without regard to case, character set, multi-character white space to case, character set, multi-character white space substring, or
substring, or leading and trailing white space. This specification leading and trailing white space. This specification relaxes these
relaxes these requirements, requiring support for binary comparison requirements, requiring support for binary comparison at a minimum.
at a minimum.
CAs MUST encode the distinguished name in the subject field of a CA CAs MUST encode the distinguished name in the subject field of a CA
certificate identically to the distinguished name in the issuer field certificate identically to the distinguished name in the issuer field
in certificates issued by that CA. If CAs use different encodings, in certificates issued by that CA. If CAs use different encodings,
implementations might fail to recognize name chains for paths that implementations might fail to recognize name chains for paths that
include this certificate. As a consequence, valid paths could be include this certificate. As a consequence, valid paths could be
rejected. rejected.
In addition, name constraints for distinguished names MUST be stated In addition, name constraints for distinguished names MUST be stated
identically to the encoding used in the subject field or identically to the encoding used in the subject field or
subjectAltName extension. If not, then name constraints stated as subjectAltName extension. If not, then name constraints stated as
excludedSubtrees will not match and invalid paths will be accepted excludedSubtrees will not match and invalid paths will be accepted
and name constraints expressed as permittedSubtrees will not match and name constraints expressed as permittedSubtrees will not match
and valid paths will be rejected. To avoid acceptance of invalid and valid paths will be rejected. To avoid acceptance of invalid
paths, CAs SHOULD state name constraints for distinguished names as paths, CAs SHOULD state name constraints for distinguished names as
permittedSubtrees wherever possible. permittedSubtrees wherever possible.
In general, using the nameConstraints extension to constrain one name In general, using the nameConstraints extension to constrain one name
form (e.g. DNS names) offers no protection against use of other name form (e.g., DNS names) offers no protection against use of other name
forms (e.g. electronic mail addresses). forms (e.g., electronic mail addresses).
While X.509 mandates that names be unambiguous, there is a risk that While X.509 mandates that names be unambiguous, there is a risk that
two unrelated authorities will issue certificates and/or CRLs under two unrelated authorities will issue certificates and/or CRLs under
the same issuer name. As a means of reducing problems and security the same issuer name. As a means of reducing problems and security
issues related to issuer name collisions, CA and CRL issuer names issues related to issuer name collisions, CA and CRL issuer names
SHOULD be formed in a way that reduces the likelihood of name SHOULD be formed in a way that reduces the likelihood of name
collisions. Implementers should take into account the possible collisions. Implementers should take into account the possible
existence of multiple unrelated CAs and CRL issuers with the same existence of multiple unrelated CAs and CRL issuers with the same
name. At a minimum, implementations validating CRLs MUST ensure that name. At a minimum, implementations validating CRLs MUST ensure that
the certification path of a certificate and the CRL issuer the certification path of a certificate and the CRL issuer
certification path used to validate the certificate terminate at the certification path used to validate the certificate terminate at the
same trust anchor. same trust anchor.
While the local-part of an electronic mail address is case-sensitive While the local-part of an electronic mail address is case sensitive
[RFC 2821], emailAddress attribute values are not case-sensitive [RFC2821], emailAddress attribute values are not case sensitive
[RFC 2985]. As a result, there is a risk that two different email [RFC2985]. As a result, there is a risk that two different email
addresses will be treated as the same address when the matching rule addresses will be treated as the same address when the matching rule
for the emailAddress attribute is used, if the email server exploits for the emailAddress attribute is used, if the email server exploits
the case sensitivity of mailbox local-parts. Implementers should not the case sensitivity of mailbox local-parts. Implementers should not
include an email address in the emailAddress attribute if the email include an email address in the emailAddress attribute if the email
server that hosts the email address treats the local-part of email server that hosts the email address treats the local-part of email
addresses as case-sensitive. addresses as case sensitive.
Implementers should be aware of risks involved if the CRL Implementers should be aware of risks involved if the CRL
distribution points or authority information access extensions of distribution points or authority information access extensions of
corrupted certificates or CRLs contain links to malicious code. corrupted certificates or CRLs contain links to malicious code.
Implementers should always take the steps of validating the retrieved Implementers should always take the steps of validating the retrieved
data to ensure that the data is properly formed. data to ensure that the data is properly formed.
When certificates include a cRLDistributionPoints extension with an When certificates include a cRLDistributionPoints extension with an
https URI or similar scheme, circular dependencies can be introduced. https URI or similar scheme, circular dependencies can be introduced.
The relying party is forced to perform an additional path validation The relying party is forced to perform an additional path validation
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parties that choose to validate the server's certificate when parties that choose to validate the server's certificate when
obtaining information pointed to by an https URI in the obtaining information pointed to by an https URI in the
cRLDistributionPoints, authorityInfoAccess, or subjectInfoAccess cRLDistributionPoints, authorityInfoAccess, or subjectInfoAccess
extensions MUST be prepared for the possibility that this will result extensions MUST be prepared for the possibility that this will result
in unbounded recursion. in unbounded recursion.
Self-issued certificates provide CAs with one automated mechanism to Self-issued certificates provide CAs with one automated mechanism to
indicate changes in the CA's operations. In particular, self-issued indicate changes in the CA's operations. In particular, self-issued
certificates may be used to implement a graceful change-over from one certificates may be used to implement a graceful change-over from one
non-compromised CA key pair to the next. Detailed procedures for "CA non-compromised CA key pair to the next. Detailed procedures for "CA
key update" are specified in [RFC 4210], where the CA protects its key update" are specified in [RFC4210], where the CA protects its new
new public key using its previous private key and vice versa using public key using its previous private key and vice versa using two
two self-issued certificates. Conforming client implementations will self-issued certificates. Conforming client implementations will
process the self-issued certificate and determine whether process the self-issued certificate and determine whether
certificates issued under the new key may be trusted. Self-issued certificates issued under the new key may be trusted. Self-issued
certificates MAY be used to support other changes in CA operations, certificates MAY be used to support other changes in CA operations,
such as additions to the CA's policy set, using similar procedures. such as additions to the CA's policy set, using similar procedures.
Some legacy implementations support names encoded in the ISO 8859-1 Some legacy implementations support names encoded in the ISO 8859-1
character set (Latin1String) [ISO 8859] but tag them as character set (Latin1String) [ISO8859] but tag them as TeletexString.
TeletexString. TeletexString encodes a larger character set than ISO TeletexString encodes a larger character set than ISO 8859-1, but it
8859-1, but it encodes some characters differently. The name encodes some characters differently. The name comparison rules
comparison rules specified in section 7.1 assume that TeletexStrings specified in Section 7.1 assume that TeletexStrings are encoded as
are encoded as described the ASN.1 standard. When comparing names described in the ASN.1 standard. When comparing names encoded using
encoded using the Latin1String character set false positives and the Latin1String character set, false positives and negatives are
negatives are possible. possible.
When strings are mapped from internal representations to visual When strings are mapped from internal representations to visual
representations, sometimes two different strings will have the same representations, sometimes two different strings will have the same
or similar visual representations. This can happen for many or similar visual representations. This can happen for many
different reasons, including use of similar glyphs and use of different reasons, including use of similar glyphs and use of
composed characters (such as e + ' equaling U+00E9, the Korean composed characters (such as e + ' equaling U+00E9, the Korean
composed characters, and vowels above consonant clusters in certain composed characters, and vowels above consonant clusters in certain
languages). As a result of this situation, people doing visual languages). As a result of this situation, people doing visual
comparisons between two different names may think they are the same comparisons between two different names may think they are the same
when in fact they are not. Also, people may mistake one string for when in fact they are not. Also, people may mistake one string for
another. Issuers of certificates and relying parties both need to be another. Issuers of certificates and relying parties both need to be
aware of this situation. aware of this situation.
11 IANA Considerations 9. IANA Considerations
Extensions in certificates and CRLs are identified using object Extensions in certificates and CRLs are identified using object
identifiers. The objects are defined in an arc delegated by IANA to identifiers. The objects are defined in an arc delegated by IANA to
the PKIX Working Group. No further action by IANA is necessary for the PKIX Working Group. No further action by IANA is necessary for
this document or any anticipated updates. this document or any anticipated updates.
12 Authors' Addresses 10. Acknowledgments
David Cooper Warwick Ford participated with the authors in some of the design team
National Institute of Standards and Technology meetings that directed development of this document. The design
100 Bureau Drive, Mail Stop 8930 team's efforts were guided by contributions from Matt Crawford, Tom
Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930 Gindin, Steve Hanna, Stephen Henson, Paul Hoffman, Takashi Ito, Denis
USA Pinkas, and Wen-Cheng Wang.
EMail: david.cooper@nist.gov
Stefan Santesson 11. References
Microsoft
Tuborg Boulevard 12
2900 Hellerup
Denmark
EMail: stefans@microsoft.com
Stephen Farrell 11.1. Normative References
Distributed Systems Group
Computer Science Department
Trinity College Dublin
Ireland
EMail: stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie
Sharon Boeyen [RFC791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, September
Entrust 1981.
1000 Innovation Drive
Ottawa, Ontario
Canada K2K 3E7
EMail: sharon.boeyen@entrust.com
Russell Housley [RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain Names - Concepts and Facilities",
Vigil Security, LLC STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
918 Spring Knoll Drive
Herndon, VA 20170
USA
EMail: housley@vigilsec.com
Tim Polk
National Institute of Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive, Mail Stop 8930
Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930
USA
EMail: wpolk@nist.gov
13 Acknowledgments [RFC1123] Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts --
Application and Support", STD 3, RFC 1123, October 1989.
Warwick Ford also participated in the 3280bis design team meetings [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
that directed development of this draft. The design team's efforts Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
were guided by contributions from Matt Crawford, Tom Gindin, Steve
Hanna, Stephen Henson, Paul Hoffman, Takashi Ito, Denis Pinkas, and [RFC2460] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
Wen-Cheng Wang. (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998.
[RFC2585] Housley, R. and P. Hoffman, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure: Operational Protocols: FTP and HTTP", RFC
2585, May 1999.
[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
[RFC2797] Myers, M., Liu, X., Schaad, J., and J. Weinstein,
"Certificate Management Messages over CMS", RFC 2797,
April 2000.
[RFC2821] Klensin, J., Ed., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC
2821, April 2001.
[RFC3454] Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, "Preparation of
Internationalized Strings ("stringprep")", RFC 3454,
December 2002.
[RFC3490] Faltstrom, P., Hoffman, P., and A. Costello,
"Internationalizing Domain Names in Applications (IDNA)",
RFC 3490, March 2003.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, RFC
3986, January 2005.
[RFC3987] Duerst, M. and M. Suignard, "Internationalized Resource
Identifiers (IRIs)", RFC 3987, January 2005.
[RFC4516] Smith, M., Ed., and T. Howes, "Lightweight Directory
Access Protocol (LDAP): Uniform Resource Locator", RFC
4516, June 2006.
[RFC4518] Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP): Internationalized String Preparation", RFC 4518,
June 2006.
[RFC4523] Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP) Schema Definitions for X.509 Certificates", RFC
4523, June 2006.
[RFC4632] Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing
(CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation
Plan", BCP 122, RFC 4632, August 2006.
[X.680] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-1:2002,
Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One
(ASN.1): Specification of basic notation.
[X.690] ITU-T Recommendation X.690 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8825-1:2002,
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER).
11.2. Informative References
[ISO8859] ISO/IEC 8859-1:1998. Information technology -- 8-bit
single-byte coded graphic character sets -- Part 1: Latin
alphabet No. 1.
[ISO10646] ISO/IEC 10646:2003. Information technology -- Universal
Multiple-Octet Coded Character Set (UCS).
[NFC] Davis, M. and M. Duerst, "Unicode Standard Annex #15:
Unicode Normalization Forms", October 2006,
<http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr15/>.
[RFC1422] Kent, S., "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic
Mail: Part II: Certificate-Based Key Management", RFC
1422, February 1993.
[RFC2277] Alvestrand, H., "IETF Policy on Character Sets and
Languages", BCP 18, RFC 2277, January 1998.
[RFC2459] Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, W., and D. Solo, "Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL
Profile", RFC 2459, January 1999.
[RFC2560] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C.
Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online
Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560, June 1999.
[RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
November 2000.
[RFC3161] Adams, C., Cain, P., Pinkas, D., and R. Zuccherato,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time-Stamp
Protocol (TSP)", RFC 3161, August 2001.
[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, April 2002.
[RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
April 2002.
[RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
June 2005.
[RFC4120] Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, "The
Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 4120,
July 2005.
[RFC4210] Adams, C., Farrell, S., Kause, T., and T. Mononen,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 4210, September 2005.
[RFC4325] Santesson, S. and R. Housley, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Authority Information Access Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) Extension", RFC 4325, December 2005.
[RFC4491] Leontiev, S., Ed., and D. Shefanovski, Ed., "Using the
GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94
Algorithms with the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile", RFC 4491, May
2006.
[RFC4510] Zeilenga, K., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP): Technical Specification Road Map", RFC 4510, June
2006.
[RFC4512] Zeilenga, K., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP): Directory Information Models", RFC 4512, June
2006.
[RFC4514] Zeilenga, K., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names", RFC
4514, June 2006.
[RFC4519] Sciberras, A., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP): Schema for User Applications", RFC 4519, June
2006.
[RFC4630] Housley, R. and S. Santesson, "Update to DirectoryString
Processing in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
Profile", RFC 4630, August 2006.
[X.500] ITU-T Recommendation X.500 (2005) | ISO/IEC 9594-1:2005,
Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
The Directory: Overview of concepts, models and services.
[X.501] ITU-T Recommendation X.501 (2005) | ISO/IEC 9594-2:2005,
Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
The Directory: Models.
[X.509] ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (2005) | ISO/IEC 9594-8:2005,
Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate
frameworks.
[X.520] ITU-T Recommendation X.520 (2005) | ISO/IEC 9594-6:2005,
Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
The Directory: Selected attribute types.
[X.660] ITU-T Recommendation X.660 (2004) | ISO/IEC 9834-1:2005,
Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
Procedures for the operation of OSI Registration
Authorities: General procedures, and top arcs of the ASN.1
Object Identifier tree.
[X.683] ITU-T Recommendation X.683 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-4:2002,
Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One
(ASN.1): Parameterization of ASN.1 specifications.
[X9.55] ANSI X9.55-1997, Public Key Cryptography for the Financial
Services Industry: Extensions to Public Key Certificates
and Certificate Revocation Lists, January 1997.
Appendix A. Pseudo-ASN.1 Structures and OIDs Appendix A. Pseudo-ASN.1 Structures and OIDs
This section describes data objects used by conforming PKI components This appendix describes data objects used by conforming PKI
in an "ASN.1-like" syntax. This syntax is a hybrid of the 1988 and components in an "ASN.1-like" syntax. This syntax is a hybrid of the
1993 ASN.1 syntaxes. The 1988 ASN.1 syntax is augmented with 1993 1988 and 1993 ASN.1 syntaxes. The 1988 ASN.1 syntax is augmented
UNIVERSAL Types UniversalString, BMPString and UTF8String. with 1993 UNIVERSAL Types UniversalString, BMPString, and UTF8String.
The ASN.1 syntax does not permit the inclusion of type statements in The ASN.1 syntax does not permit the inclusion of type statements in
the ASN.1 module, and the 1993 ASN.1 standard does not permit use of the ASN.1 module, and the 1993 ASN.1 standard does not permit use of
the new UNIVERSAL types in modules using the 1988 syntax. As a the new UNIVERSAL types in modules using the 1988 syntax. As a
result, this module does not conform to either version of the ASN.1 result, this module does not conform to either version of the ASN.1
standard. standard.
This appendix may be converted into 1988 ASN.1 by replacing the This appendix may be converted into 1988 ASN.1 by replacing the
definitions for the UNIVERSAL Types with the 1988 catch-all "ANY". definitions for the UNIVERSAL Types with the 1988 catch-all "ANY".
A.1 Explicitly Tagged Module, 1988 Syntax A.1. Explicitly Tagged Module, 1988 Syntax
PKIX1Explicit88 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) PKIX1Explicit88 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit(18) } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit(18) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL -- -- EXPORTS ALL --
skipping to change at page 110, line 16 skipping to change at page 112, line 4
AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
type AttributeType, type AttributeType,
value AttributeValue } value AttributeValue }
-- suggested naming attributes: Definition of the following -- suggested naming attributes: Definition of the following
-- information object set may be augmented to meet local -- information object set may be augmented to meet local
-- requirements. Note that deleting members of the set may -- requirements. Note that deleting members of the set may
-- prevent interoperability with conforming implementations. -- prevent interoperability with conforming implementations.
-- presented in pairs: the AttributeType followed by the -- presented in pairs: the AttributeType followed by the
-- type definition for the corresponding AttributeValue -- type definition for the corresponding AttributeValue
-- Arc for standard naming attributes
id-at OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 4 } id-at OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 4 }
-- Naming attributes of type X520name -- Naming attributes of type X520name
id-at-name AttributeType ::= { id-at 41 } id-at-name AttributeType ::= { id-at 41 }
id-at-surname AttributeType ::= { id-at 4 } id-at-surname AttributeType ::= { id-at 4 }
id-at-givenName AttributeType ::= { id-at 42 } id-at-givenName AttributeType ::= { id-at 42 }
id-at-initials AttributeType ::= { id-at 43 } id-at-initials AttributeType ::= { id-at 43 }
id-at-generationQualifier AttributeType ::= { id-at 44 } id-at-generationQualifier AttributeType ::= { id-at 44 }
skipping to change at page 115, line 25 skipping to change at page 118, line 14
-- CRL structures -- CRL structures
CertificateList ::= SEQUENCE { CertificateList ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsCertList TBSCertList, tbsCertList TBSCertList,
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signature BIT STRING } signature BIT STRING }
TBSCertList ::= SEQUENCE { TBSCertList ::= SEQUENCE {
version Version OPTIONAL, version Version OPTIONAL,
-- if present, MUST be v2 -- if present, MUST be v2
signature AlgorithmIdentifier, signature AlgorithmIdentifier,
issuer Name, issuer Name,
thisUpdate Time, thisUpdate Time,
nextUpdate Time OPTIONAL, nextUpdate Time OPTIONAL,
revokedCertificates SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { revokedCertificates SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
userCertificate CertificateSerialNumber, userCertificate CertificateSerialNumber,
revocationDate Time, revocationDate Time,
crlEntryExtensions Extensions OPTIONAL crlEntryExtensions Extensions OPTIONAL
-- if present, MUST be v2 -- if present, version MUST be v2
} OPTIONAL, } OPTIONAL,
crlExtensions [0] Extensions OPTIONAL } crlExtensions [0] Extensions OPTIONAL }
-- if present, MUST be v2 -- if present, version MUST be v2
-- Version, Time, CertificateSerialNumber, and Extensions were -- Version, Time, CertificateSerialNumber, and Extensions were
-- defined earlier for use in the certificate structure -- defined earlier for use in the certificate structure
AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL } parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL }
-- contains a value of the type -- contains a value of the type
-- registered for use with the -- registered for use with the
-- algorithm object identifier value -- algorithm object identifier value
skipping to change at page 118, line 4 skipping to change at page 120, line 50
ExtensionAttribute ::= SEQUENCE { ExtensionAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
extension-attribute-type [0] IMPLICIT INTEGER extension-attribute-type [0] IMPLICIT INTEGER
(0..ub-extension-attributes), (0..ub-extension-attributes),
extension-attribute-value [1] extension-attribute-value [1]
ANY DEFINED BY extension-attribute-type } ANY DEFINED BY extension-attribute-type }
-- Extension types and attribute values -- Extension types and attribute values
common-name INTEGER ::= 1 common-name INTEGER ::= 1
CommonName ::= PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name-length))
CommonName ::= PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name-length))
teletex-common-name INTEGER ::= 2 teletex-common-name INTEGER ::= 2
TeletexCommonName ::= TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name-length)) TeletexCommonName ::= TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name-length))
teletex-organization-name INTEGER ::= 3 teletex-organization-name INTEGER ::= 3
TeletexOrganizationName ::= TeletexOrganizationName ::=
TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-organization-name-length)) TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-organization-name-length))
teletex-personal-name INTEGER ::= 4 teletex-personal-name INTEGER ::= 4
skipping to change at page 120, line 4 skipping to change at page 122, line 49
PostOfficeBoxAddress ::= PDSParameter PostOfficeBoxAddress ::= PDSParameter
poste-restante-address INTEGER ::= 19 poste-restante-address INTEGER ::= 19
PosteRestanteAddress ::= PDSParameter PosteRestanteAddress ::= PDSParameter
unique-postal-name INTEGER ::= 20 unique-postal-name INTEGER ::= 20
UniquePostalName ::= PDSParameter UniquePostalName ::= PDSParameter
local-postal-attributes INTEGER ::= 21
local-postal-attributes INTEGER ::= 21
LocalPostalAttributes ::= PDSParameter LocalPostalAttributes ::= PDSParameter
PDSParameter ::= SET { PDSParameter ::= SET {
printable-string PrintableString printable-string PrintableString
(SIZE(1..ub-pds-parameter-length)) OPTIONAL, (SIZE(1..ub-pds-parameter-length)) OPTIONAL,
teletex-string TeletexString teletex-string TeletexString
(SIZE(1..ub-pds-parameter-length)) OPTIONAL } (SIZE(1..ub-pds-parameter-length)) OPTIONAL }
extended-network-address INTEGER ::= 22 extended-network-address INTEGER ::= 22
skipping to change at page 122, line 11 skipping to change at page 125, line 9
-- Note - upper bounds on string types, such as TeletexString, are -- Note - upper bounds on string types, such as TeletexString, are
-- measured in characters. Excepting PrintableString or IA5String, a -- measured in characters. Excepting PrintableString or IA5String, a
-- significantly greater number of octets will be required to hold -- significantly greater number of octets will be required to hold
-- such a value. As a minimum, 16 octets, or twice the specified -- such a value. As a minimum, 16 octets, or twice the specified
-- upper bound, whichever is the larger, should be allowed for -- upper bound, whichever is the larger, should be allowed for
-- TeletexString. For UTF8String or UniversalString at least four -- TeletexString. For UTF8String or UniversalString at least four
-- times the upper bound should be allowed. -- times the upper bound should be allowed.
END END
A.2 Implicitly Tagged Module, 1988 Syntax A.2. Implicitly Tagged Module, 1988 Syntax
PKIX1Implicit88 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) PKIX1Implicit88 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit(19) } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit(19) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL -- -- EXPORTS ALL --
skipping to change at page 129, line 26 skipping to change at page 133, line 16
id-ce-invalidityDate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 24 } id-ce-invalidityDate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 24 }
InvalidityDate ::= GeneralizedTime InvalidityDate ::= GeneralizedTime
END END
Appendix B. ASN.1 Notes Appendix B. ASN.1 Notes
CAs MUST force the serialNumber to be a non-negative integer, that CAs MUST force the serialNumber to be a non-negative integer, that
is, the sign bit in the DER encoding of the INTEGER value MUST be is, the sign bit in the DER encoding of the INTEGER value MUST be
zero - this can be done by adding a leading (leftmost) `00'H octet if zero. This can be done by adding a leading (leftmost) `00'H octet if
necessary. This removes a potential ambiguity in mapping between a necessary. This removes a potential ambiguity in mapping between a
string of octets and an integer value. string of octets and an integer value.
As noted in section 4.1.2.2, serial numbers can be expected to As noted in Section 4.1.2.2, serial numbers can be expected to
contain long integers. Certificate users MUST be able to handle contain long integers. Certificate users MUST be able to handle
serialNumber values up to 20 octets in length. Conforming CAs MUST serialNumber values up to 20 octets in length. Conforming CAs MUST
NOT use serialNumber values longer than 20 octets. NOT use serialNumber values longer than 20 octets.
As noted in section 5.2.3, CRL numbers can be expected to contain As noted in Section 5.2.3, CRL numbers can be expected to contain
long integers. CRL validators MUST be able to handle cRLNumber long integers. CRL validators MUST be able to handle cRLNumber
values up to 20 octets in length. Conforming CRL issuers MUST NOT values up to 20 octets in length. Conforming CRL issuers MUST NOT
use cRLNumber values longer than 20 octets. use cRLNumber values longer than 20 octets.
The construct "SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF" appears in several ASN.1 The construct "SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF" appears in several ASN.1
constructs. A valid ASN.1 sequence will have zero or more entries. constructs. A valid ASN.1 sequence will have zero or more entries.
The SIZE (1..MAX) construct constrains the sequence to have at least The SIZE (1..MAX) construct constrains the sequence to have at least
one entry. MAX indicates the upper bound is unspecified. one entry. MAX indicates that the upper bound is unspecified.
Implementations are free to choose an upper bound that suits their Implementations are free to choose an upper bound that suits their
environment. environment.
The character string type PrintableString supports a very basic Latin The character string type PrintableString supports a very basic Latin
character set: the lower case letters 'a' through 'z', upper case character set: the lowercase letters 'a' through 'z', uppercase
letters 'A' through 'Z', the digits '0' through '9', eleven special letters 'A' through 'Z', the digits '0' through '9', eleven special
characters ' = ( ) + , - . / : ? and space. characters ' = ( ) + , - . / : ? and space.
Implementers should note that the at sign ('@') and underscore ('_') Implementers should note that the at sign ('@') and underscore ('_')
characters are not supported by the ASN.1 type PrintableString. characters are not supported by the ASN.1 type PrintableString.
These characters often appear in Internet addresses. Such addresses These characters often appear in Internet addresses. Such addresses
MUST be encoded using an ASN.1 type that supports them. They are MUST be encoded using an ASN.1 type that supports them. They are
usually encoded as IA5String in either the emailAddress attribute usually encoded as IA5String in either the emailAddress attribute
within a distinguished name or the rfc822Name field of GeneralName. within a distinguished name or the rfc822Name field of GeneralName.
Conforming implementations MUST NOT encode strings that include Conforming implementations MUST NOT encode strings that include
either the at sign or underscore character as PrintableString. either the at sign or underscore character as PrintableString.
The character string type TeletexString is a superset of The character string type TeletexString is a superset of
PrintableString. TeletexString supports a fairly standard (ASCII- PrintableString. TeletexString supports a fairly standard (ASCII-
like) Latin character set, Latin characters with non-spacing accents like) Latin character set: Latin characters with non-spacing accents
and Japanese characters. and Japanese characters.
Named bit lists are BIT STRINGs where the values have been assigned Named bit lists are BIT STRINGs where the values have been assigned
names. This specification makes use of named bit lists in the names. This specification makes use of named bit lists in the
definitions for the key usage, CRL distribution points and freshest definitions for the key usage, CRL distribution points, and freshest
CRL certificate extensions, as well as the freshest CRL and issuing CRL certificate extensions, as well as the freshest CRL and issuing
distribution point CRL extensions. When DER encoding a named bit distribution point CRL extensions. When DER encoding a named bit
list, trailing zeros MUST be omitted. That is, the encoded value list, trailing zeros MUST be omitted. That is, the encoded value
ends with the last named bit that is set to one. ends with the last named bit that is set to one.
The character string type UniversalString supports any of the The character string type UniversalString supports any of the
characters allowed by [ISO 10646]. ISO 10646 is the Universal characters allowed by [ISO10646]. ISO 10646 is the Universal
multiple-octet coded Character Set (UCS). multiple-octet coded Character Set (UCS).
The character string type UTF8String was introduced in the 1997 The character string type UTF8String was introduced in the 1997
version of ASN.1, and UTF8String was added to the list of choices for version of ASN.1, and UTF8String was added to the list of choices for
DirectoryString in the 2001 version of [X.520]. UTF8String is a DirectoryString in the 2001 version of [X.520]. UTF8String is a
universal type and has been assigned tag number 12. The content of universal type and has been assigned tag number 12. The content of
UTF8String was defined by RFC 2044 and updated in RFC 2279, which was UTF8String was defined by RFC 2044 and updated in RFC 2279, which was
updated in [RFC 3629]. updated in [RFC3629].
In anticipation of these changes, and in conformance with IETF Best In anticipation of these changes, and in conformance with IETF Best
Practices codified in [RFC 2277], IETF Policy on Character Sets and Practices codified in [RFC2277], IETF Policy on Character Sets and
Languages, this document includes UTF8String as a choice in Languages, this document includes UTF8String as a choice in
DirectoryString and in the userNotice certificate policy qualifier. DirectoryString and in the userNotice certificate policy qualifier.
For many of the attribute types defined in [X.520], the For many of the attribute types defined in [X.520], the
AttributeValue uses the DirectoryString type. Of the attributes AttributeValue uses the DirectoryString type. Of the attributes
specified in appendix A, the name, surname, givenName, initials, specified in Appendix A, the name, surname, givenName, initials,
generationQualifier, commonName, localityName, stateOrProvinceName, generationQualifier, commonName, localityName, stateOrProvinceName,
organizationName, organizationalUnitName, title, and pseudonym organizationName, organizationalUnitName, title, and pseudonym
attributes all use the DirectoryString type. X.520 uses a attributes all use the DirectoryString type. X.520 uses a
parameterized type definition [X.683] of DirectoryString to specify parameterized type definition [X.683] of DirectoryString to specify
the syntax for each of these attributes. The parameter is used to the syntax for each of these attributes. The parameter is used to
indicate the maximum string length allowed for the attribute. In indicate the maximum string length allowed for the attribute. In
appendix A, in order to avoid the use of parameterized type Appendix A, in order to avoid the use of parameterized type
definitions, the DirectoryString type written in its expanded form definitions, the DirectoryString type is written in its expanded form
for the definition of each of these attribute types. So, the ASN.1 for the definition of each of these attribute types. So, the ASN.1
in appendix A describes the syntax for each of these attributes as in Appendix A describes the syntax for each of these attributes as
being a CHOICE of TeletexString, PrintableString, UniversalString, being a CHOICE of TeletexString, PrintableString, UniversalString,
UTF8String, and BMPString, with the appropriate constraints on the UTF8String, and BMPString, with the appropriate constraints on the
string length applied to each of the types in the CHOICE, rather than string length applied to each of the types in the CHOICE, rather than
using the ASN.1 type DirectoryString to describe the syntax. using the ASN.1 type DirectoryString to describe the syntax.
Implementers should note that the DER encoding of the SET OF values Implementers should note that the DER encoding of the SET OF values
requires ordering of the encodings of the values. In particular, requires ordering of the encodings of the values. In particular,
this issue arises with respect to distinguished names. this issue arises with respect to distinguished names.
Implementers should note that the DER encoding of SET or SEQUENCE Implementers should note that the DER encoding of SET or SEQUENCE
skipping to change at page 131, line 28 skipping to change at page 135, line 21
encoded certificate or CRL. For example, a BasicConstraints encoded certificate or CRL. For example, a BasicConstraints
extension whose cA value is FALSE would omit the cA boolean from the extension whose cA value is FALSE would omit the cA boolean from the
encoded certificate. encoded certificate.
Object Identifiers (OIDs) are used throughout this specification to Object Identifiers (OIDs) are used throughout this specification to
identify certificate policies, public key and signature algorithms, identify certificate policies, public key and signature algorithms,
certificate extensions, etc. There is no maximum size for OIDs. certificate extensions, etc. There is no maximum size for OIDs.
This specification mandates support for OIDs that have arc elements This specification mandates support for OIDs that have arc elements
with values that are less than 2^28, that is, they MUST be between 0 with values that are less than 2^28, that is, they MUST be between 0
and 268,435,455, inclusive. This allows each arc element to be and 268,435,455, inclusive. This allows each arc element to be
represented within a single 32 bit word. Implementations MUST also represented within a single 32-bit word. Implementations MUST also
support OIDs where the length of the dotted decimal (see [RFC 4512], support OIDs where the length of the dotted decimal (see Section 1.4
section 1.4) string representation can be up to 100 bytes of [RFC4512]) string representation can be up to 100 bytes
(inclusive). Implementations MUST be able to handle OIDs with up to (inclusive). Implementations MUST be able to handle OIDs with up to
20 elements (inclusive). CAs SHOULD NOT issue certificates that 20 elements (inclusive). CAs SHOULD NOT issue certificates that
contain OIDs that exceed these requirements. Likewise, CRL issuers contain OIDs that exceed these requirements. Likewise, CRL issuers
SHOULD NOT issue CRLs that contain OIDs that exceed these SHOULD NOT issue CRLs that contain OIDs that exceed these
requirements. requirements.
The content specific rules for encoding GeneralName field values in The content-specific rules for encoding GeneralName field values in
the nameConstraints extension differ from rules that apply in other the nameConstraints extension differ from rules that apply in other
extensions. In all other certificate, CRL, and CRL entry extensions extensions. In all other certificate, CRL, and CRL entry extensions
specified in this document the encoding rules conform to the rules specified in this document the encoding rules conform to the rules
for the underlying type. For example, values in the for the underlying type. For example, values in the
uniformResourceIdentifier field must contain a valid URI as specified uniformResourceIdentifier field must contain a valid URI as specified
in [RFC 3986]. The content specific rules for encoding values in the in [RFC3986]. The content-specific rules for encoding values in the
nameConstraints extension are specified in section 4.2.1.10, and nameConstraints extension are specified in Section 4.2.1.10, and
these rules may not conform to the rules for the underlying type. these rules may not conform to the rules for the underlying type.
For example, when the uniformResourceIdentifier field appears in a For example, when the uniformResourceIdentifier field appears in a
nameConstraints extension, it must hold a DNS name (e.g., nameConstraints extension, it must hold a DNS name (e.g.,
"host.example.com" or ".example.com") rather than a URI. "host.example.com" or ".example.com") rather than a URI.
Implementors are warned that the X.500 standards community has Implementors are warned that the X.500 standards community has
developed a series of extensibility rules. These rules determine developed a series of extensibility rules. These rules determine
when an ASN.1 definition can be changed without assigning a new when an ASN.1 definition can be changed without assigning a new
object identifier (OID). For example, at least two extension Object Identifier (OID). For example, at least two extension
definitions included in [RFC 2459], the predecessor to this profile definitions included in [RFC2459], the predecessor to this profile
document, have different ASN.1 definitions in this specification, but document, have different ASN.1 definitions in this specification, but
the same OID is used. If unknown elements appear within an the same OID is used. If unknown elements appear within an
extension, and the extension is not marked critical, those unknown extension, and the extension is not marked as critical, those unknown
elements ought to be ignored, as follows: elements ought to be ignored, as follows:
(a) ignore all unknown bit name assignments within a bit string; (a) ignore all unknown bit name assignments within a bit string;
(b) ignore all unknown named numbers in an ENUMERATED type or (b) ignore all unknown named numbers in an ENUMERATED type or
INTEGER type that is being used in the enumerated style, provided INTEGER type that is being used in the enumerated style,
the number occurs as an optional element of a SET or SEQUENCE; and provided the number occurs as an optional element of a SET or
SEQUENCE; and
(c) ignore all unknown elements in SETs, at the end of SEQUENCEs, (c) ignore all unknown elements in SETs, at the end of SEQUENCEs,
or in CHOICEs where the CHOICE is itself an optional element of a or in CHOICEs where the CHOICE is itself an optional element
SET or SEQUENCE. of a SET or SEQUENCE.
If an extension containing unexpected values is marked critical, the If an extension containing unexpected values is marked as critical,
implementation MUST reject the certificate or CRL containing the the implementation MUST reject the certificate or CRL containing the
unrecognized extension. unrecognized extension.
Appendix C. Examples Appendix C. Examples
This section contains four examples: three certificates and a CRL. This appendix contains four examples: three certificates and a CRL.
The first two certificates and the CRL comprise a minimal The first two certificates and the CRL comprise a minimal
certification path. certification path.
Section C.1 contains an annotated hex dump of a "self-signed" Appendix C.1 contains an annotated hex dump of a "self-signed"
certificate issued by a CA whose distinguished name is certificate issued by a CA whose distinguished name is
cn=Example CA,dc=example,dc=com. The certificate contains an RSA cn=Example CA,dc=example,dc=com. The certificate contains an RSA
public key, and is signed by the corresponding RSA private key. public key, and is signed by the corresponding RSA private key.
Section C.2 contains an annotated hex dump of an end entity Appendix C.2 contains an annotated hex dump of an end entity
certificate. The end entity certificate contains an RSA public key, certificate. The end entity certificate contains an RSA public key,
and is signed by the private key corresponding to the "self-signed" and is signed by the private key corresponding to the "self-signed"
certificate in section C.1. certificate in Appendix C.1.
Section C.3 contains an annotated hex dump of an end entity Appendix C.3 contains an annotated hex dump of an end entity
certificate that contains a DSA public key with parameters, and is certificate that contains a DSA public key with parameters, and is
signed with DSA and SHA-1. This certificate is not part of the signed with DSA and SHA-1. This certificate is not part of the
minimal certification path. minimal certification path.
Section C.4 contains an annotated hex dump of a CRL. The CRL is Appendix C.4 contains an annotated hex dump of a CRL. The CRL is
issued by the CA whose distinguished name is issued by the CA whose distinguished name is
cn=Example CA,dc=example,dc=com and the list of revoked certificates cn=Example CA,dc=example,dc=com and the list of revoked certificates
includes the end entity certificate presented in C.2. includes the end entity certificate presented in Appendix C.2.
The certificates were processed using Peter Gutmann's dumpasn1 The certificates were processed using Peter Gutmann's dumpasn1
utility to generate the output. The source for the dumpasn1 utility utility to generate the output. The source for the dumpasn1 utility
is available at <http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/dumpasn1.c>. is available at <http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/dumpasn1.c>.
The binaries for the certificates and CRLs are available at The binaries for the certificates and CRLs are available at
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/documents/pkixtools. http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/documents/pkixtools.
In places in this appendix where a distinguished name is specified In places in this appendix where a distinguished name is specified
using a string representation, the strings are formatted using the using a string representation, the strings are formatted using the
rules specified in [RFC 4514]. rules specified in [RFC4514].
C.1 RSA Self-Signed Certificate C.1. RSA Self-Signed Certificate
This section contains an annotated hex dump of a 578 byte version 3 This appendix contains an annotated hex dump of a 578 byte version 3
certificate. The certificate contains the following information: certificate. The certificate contains the following information:
(a) the serial number is 17; (a) the serial number is 17;
(b) the certificate is signed with RSA and the SHA-1 hash algorithm; (b) the certificate is signed with RSA and the SHA-1 hash algorithm;
(c) the issuer's distinguished name is (c) the issuer's distinguished name is
cn=Example CA,dc=example,dc=com; cn=Example CA,dc=example,dc=com;
(d) the subject's distinguished name is (d) the subject's distinguished name is
cn=Example CA,dc=example,dc=com; cn=Example CA,dc=example,dc=com;
(e) the certificate was issued on April 30, 2004 and expired on (e) the certificate was issued on April 30, 2004 and expired on
April 30, 2005; April 30, 2005;
(f) the certificate contains a 1024 bit RSA public key; (f) the certificate contains a 1024-bit RSA public key;
(g) the certificate contains a subject key identifier extension (g) the certificate contains a subject key identifier extension
generated using method (1) of section 4.2.1.2; and generated using method (1) of Section 4.2.1.2; and
(h) the certificate is a CA certificate (as indicated through the (h) the certificate is a CA certificate (as indicated through the
basic constraints extension.) basic constraints extension).
0 574: SEQUENCE { 0 574: SEQUENCE {
4 423: SEQUENCE { 4 423: SEQUENCE {
8 3: [0] { 8 3: [0] {
10 1: INTEGER 2 10 1: INTEGER 2
: } : }
13 1: INTEGER 17 13 1: INTEGER 17
16 13: SEQUENCE { 16 13: SEQUENCE {
18 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER 18 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha1withRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 5) : sha1withRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 5)
skipping to change at page 136, line 16 skipping to change at page 140, line 10
: 6C F8 02 74 A6 61 E2 64 04 A6 54 0C 6C 72 13 AD : 6C F8 02 74 A6 61 E2 64 04 A6 54 0C 6C 72 13 AD
: 3C 47 FB F6 65 13 A9 85 90 33 EA 76 A3 26 D9 FC : 3C 47 FB F6 65 13 A9 85 90 33 EA 76 A3 26 D9 FC
: D1 0E 15 5F 28 B7 EF 93 BF 3C F3 E2 3E 7C B9 52 : D1 0E 15 5F 28 B7 EF 93 BF 3C F3 E2 3E 7C B9 52
: FC 16 6E 29 AA E1 F4 7A 6F D5 7F EF B3 95 CA F3 : FC 16 6E 29 AA E1 F4 7A 6F D5 7F EF B3 95 CA F3
: 66 88 83 4E A1 35 45 84 CB BC 9B B8 C8 AD C5 5E : 66 88 83 4E A1 35 45 84 CB BC 9B B8 C8 AD C5 5E
: 46 D9 0B 0E 8D 80 E1 33 2B DC BE 2B 92 7E 4A 43 : 46 D9 0B 0E 8D 80 E1 33 2B DC BE 2B 92 7E 4A 43
: A9 6A EF 8A 63 61 B3 6E 47 38 BE E8 0D A3 67 5D : A9 6A EF 8A 63 61 B3 6E 47 38 BE E8 0D A3 67 5D
: F3 FA 91 81 3C 92 BB C5 5F 25 25 EB 7C E7 D8 A1 : F3 FA 91 81 3C 92 BB C5 5F 25 25 EB 7C E7 D8 A1
: } : }
C.2 End Entity Certificate Using RSA C.2. End Entity Certificate Using RSA
This section contains an annotated hex dump of a 629 byte version 3 This appendix contains an annotated hex dump of a 629-byte version 3
certificate. The certificate contains the following information: certificate. The certificate contains the following information:
(a) the serial number is 18; (a) the serial number is 18;
(b) the certificate is signed with RSA and the SHA-1 hash algorithm; (b) the certificate is signed with RSA and the SHA-1 hash algorithm;
(c) the issuer's distinguished name is (c) the issuer's distinguished name is
cn=Example CA,dc=example,dc=com; cn=Example CA,dc=example,dc=com;
(d) the subject's distinguished name is (d) the subject's distinguished name is
cn=End Entity,dc=example,dc=com; cn=End Entity,dc=example,dc=com;
(e) the certificate was valid from September 15, 2004 through March (e) the certificate was valid from September 15, 2004 through March
15, 2005; 15, 2005;
(f) the certificate contains a 1024 bit RSA public key; (f) the certificate contains a 1024-bit RSA public key;
(g) the certificate is an end entity certificate, as the basic (g) the certificate is an end entity certificate, as the basic
constraints extension is not present; constraints extension is not present;
(h) the certificate contains an authority key identifier extension (h) the certificate contains an authority key identifier extension
matching the subject key identifier of the certificate in matching the subject key identifier of the certificate in
appendix C.1; and appendix C.1; and
(i) the certificate includes one alternative name - an electronic (i) the certificate includes one alternative name -- an electronic
mail address (rfc822Name) of "end.entity@example.com". mail address (rfc822Name) of "end.entity@example.com".
0 625: SEQUENCE { 0 625: SEQUENCE {
4 474: SEQUENCE { 4 474: SEQUENCE {
8 3: [0] { 8 3: [0] {
10 1: INTEGER 2 10 1: INTEGER 2
: } : }
13 1: INTEGER 18 13 1: INTEGER 18
16 13: SEQUENCE { 16 13: SEQUENCE {
18 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER 18 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
skipping to change at page 139, line 32 skipping to change at page 143, line 25
: 00 20 28 34 5B 68 32 01 BB 0A 36 0E AD 71 C5 95 : 00 20 28 34 5B 68 32 01 BB 0A 36 0E AD 71 C5 95
: 1A E1 04 CF AE AD C7 62 14 A4 1B 36 31 C0 E2 0C : 1A E1 04 CF AE AD C7 62 14 A4 1B 36 31 C0 E2 0C
: 3D D9 1E C0 00 DC 10 A0 BA 85 6F 41 CB 62 7A B7 : 3D D9 1E C0 00 DC 10 A0 BA 85 6F 41 CB 62 7A B7
: 4C 63 81 26 5E D2 80 45 5E 33 E7 70 45 3B 39 3B : 4C 63 81 26 5E D2 80 45 5E 33 E7 70 45 3B 39 3B
: 26 4A 9C 3B F2 26 36 69 08 79 BB FB 96 43 77 4B : 26 4A 9C 3B F2 26 36 69 08 79 BB FB 96 43 77 4B
: 61 8B A1 AB 91 64 E0 F3 37 61 3C 1A A3 A4 C9 8A : 61 8B A1 AB 91 64 E0 F3 37 61 3C 1A A3 A4 C9 8A
: B2 BF 73 D4 4D E4 58 E4 62 EA BC 20 74 92 86 0E : B2 BF 73 D4 4D E4 58 E4 62 EA BC 20 74 92 86 0E
: CE 84 60 76 E9 73 BB C7 85 D3 91 45 EA 62 5D CD : CE 84 60 76 E9 73 BB C7 85 D3 91 45 EA 62 5D CD
: } : }
C.3 End Entity Certificate Using DSA C.3. End Entity Certificate Using DSA
This section contains an annotated hex dump of a 914 byte version 3 This appendix contains an annotated hex dump of a 914-byte version 3
certificate. The certificate contains the following information: certificate. The certificate contains the following information:
(a) the serial number is 256; (a) the serial number is 256;
(b) the certificate is signed with DSA and the SHA-1 hash algorithm; (b) the certificate is signed with DSA and the SHA-1 hash algorithm;
(c) the issuer's distinguished name is
cn=Example DSA CA,dc=example,dc=com; (c) the issuer's distinguished name is cn=Example DSA
(d) the subject's distinguished name is CA,dc=example,dc=com;
cn=DSA End Entity,dc=example,dc=com;
(e) the certificate was issued on May 2, 2004 and expired on (d) the subject's distinguished name is cn=DSA End
May 2, 2005; Entity,dc=example,dc=com;
(f) the certificate contains a 1024 bit DSA public key with
(e) the certificate was issued on May 2, 2004 and expired on May 2,
2005;
(f) the certificate contains a 1024-bit DSA public key with
parameters; parameters;
(g) the certificate is an end entity certificate (not a CA (g) the certificate is an end entity certificate (not a CA
certificate); certificate);
(h) the certificate includes a subject alternative name of (h) the certificate includes a subject alternative name of
"<http://www.example.com/users/DSAendentity.html>" and an "<http://www.example.com/users/DSAendentity.html>" and an issuer
issuer alternative name of "<http://www.example.com>" - both are alternative name of "<http://www.example.com>" -- both are URLs;
URLs;
(i) the certificate includes an authority key identifier extension (i) the certificate includes an authority key identifier extension
and a certificate policies extension specifying the policy OID and a certificate policies extension specifying the policy OID
2.16.840.1.101.3.2.1.48.9; and 2.16.840.1.101.3.2.1.48.9; and
(j) the certificate includes a critical key usage extension (j) the certificate includes a critical key usage extension
specifying that the public key is intended for verification of specifying that the public key is intended for verification of
digital signatures. digital signatures.
0 910: SEQUENCE { 0 910: SEQUENCE {
4 846: SEQUENCE { 4 846: SEQUENCE {
8 3: [0] { 8 3: [0] {
10 1: INTEGER 2 10 1: INTEGER 2
: } : }
13 2: INTEGER 256 13 2: INTEGER 256
skipping to change at page 142, line 21 skipping to change at page 146, line 22
: } : }
: } : }
649 202: [3] { 649 202: [3] {
652 199: SEQUENCE { 652 199: SEQUENCE {
655 57: SEQUENCE { 655 57: SEQUENCE {
657 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectAltName (2 5 29 17) 657 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectAltName (2 5 29 17)
662 50: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 662 50: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
664 48: SEQUENCE { 664 48: SEQUENCE {
666 46: [6] 666 46: [6]
: 'http://www.example.com/users/DSAendentity.' : 'http://www.example.com/users/DSAendentity.'
: 'html' : 'html'
: } : }
: } : }
: } : }
714 33: SEQUENCE { 714 33: SEQUENCE {
716 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER issuerAltName (2 5 29 18) 716 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER issuerAltName (2 5 29 18)
721 26: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 721 26: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
723 24: SEQUENCE { 723 24: SEQUENCE {
725 22: [6] 'http://www.example.com' 725 22: [6] 'http://www.example.com'
: } : }
: } : }
skipping to change at page 143, line 41 skipping to change at page 147, line 41
870 20: INTEGER 870 20: INTEGER
: 65 57 07 34 DD DC CA CC 5E F4 02 F4 56 42 2C 5E : 65 57 07 34 DD DC CA CC 5E F4 02 F4 56 42 2C 5E
: E1 B3 3B 80 : E1 B3 3B 80
892 20: INTEGER 892 20: INTEGER
: 60 F4 31 17 CA F4 CF FF EE F4 08 A7 D9 B2 61 BE : 60 F4 31 17 CA F4 CF FF EE F4 08 A7 D9 B2 61 BE
: B1 C3 DA BF : B1 C3 DA BF
: } : }
: } : }
: } : }
C.4 Certificate Revocation List C.4. Certificate Revocation List
This section contains an annotated hex dump of a version 2 CRL with This appendix contains an annotated hex dump of a version 2 CRL with
two extensions (cRLNumber and authorityKeyIdentifier). The CRL was two extensions (cRLNumber and authorityKeyIdentifier). The CRL was
issued by cn=Example CA,dc=example,dc=com on February 5, 2005; the issued by cn=Example CA,dc=example,dc=com on February 5, 2005; the
next scheduled issuance was February 6, 2005. The CRL includes one next scheduled issuance was February 6, 2005. The CRL includes one
revoked certificate: serial number 18, which was revoked on November revoked certificate: serial number 18, which was revoked on November
19, 2004 due to keyCompromise. The CRL itself is number 12, and it 19, 2004 due to keyCompromise. The CRL itself is number 12, and it
was signed with RSA and SHA-1. was signed with RSA and SHA-1.
0 352: SEQUENCE { 0 352: SEQUENCE {
4 202: SEQUENCE { 4 202: SEQUENCE {
7 1: INTEGER 1 7 1: INTEGER 1
skipping to change at page 145, line 40 skipping to change at page 150, line 5
: 22 DC 18 7D F7 08 CE CC 75 D0 D0 6A 9B AD 10 F4 : 22 DC 18 7D F7 08 CE CC 75 D0 D0 6A 9B AD 10 F4
: 76 23 B4 81 6E B5 6D BE 0E FB 15 14 6C C8 17 6D : 76 23 B4 81 6E B5 6D BE 0E FB 15 14 6C C8 17 6D
: 1F EE 90 17 A2 6F 60 E4 BD AA 8C 55 DE 8E 84 6F : 1F EE 90 17 A2 6F 60 E4 BD AA 8C 55 DE 8E 84 6F
: 92 F8 9F 10 12 27 AF 4A D4 2F 85 E2 36 44 7D AA : 92 F8 9F 10 12 27 AF 4A D4 2F 85 E2 36 44 7D AA
: A3 4C 25 38 15 FF 00 FD 3E 7E EE 3D 26 12 EB D8 : A3 4C 25 38 15 FF 00 FD 3E 7E EE 3D 26 12 EB D8
: E7 2B 62 E2 2B C3 46 80 EF 78 82 D1 15 C6 D0 9C : E7 2B 62 E2 2B C3 46 80 EF 78 82 D1 15 C6 D0 9C
: 72 6A CB CE 7A ED 67 99 8B 6E 70 81 7D 43 42 74 : 72 6A CB CE 7A ED 67 99 8B 6E 70 81 7D 43 42 74
: C1 A6 AF C1 55 17 A2 33 4C D6 06 98 2B A4 FC 2E : C1 A6 AF C1 55 17 A2 33 4C D6 06 98 2B A4 FC 2E
: } : }
Authors' Addresses
David Cooper
National Institute of Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive, Mail Stop 8930
Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930
USA
EMail: david.cooper@nist.gov
Stefan Santesson
Microsoft
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
USA
EMail: stefans@microsoft.com
Stephen Farrell
Distributed Systems Group
Computer Science Department
Trinity College Dublin
Ireland
EMail: stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie
Sharon Boeyen
Entrust
1000 Innovation Drive
Ottawa, Ontario
Canada K2K 3E7
EMail: sharon.boeyen@entrust.com
Russell Housley
Vigil Security, LLC
918 Spring Knoll Drive
Herndon, VA 20170
USA
EMail: housley@vigilsec.com
Tim Polk
National Institute of Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive, Mail Stop 8930
Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930
USA
EMail: wpolk@nist.gov
Full Copyright Statement Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008). Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights. retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
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