EDITOR’S NOTE: The following is a regular summary
of operations at DOE’s Idaho Site. It has been compiled
in response to a request from stakeholders for more
information on health, safety and environmental
incidents at DOE facilities in Idaho. It also includes a
brief summary of accomplishments at the laboratory. The
report is broken down by contractor:
Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project (AMWTP),
Idaho Cleanup Project (ICP)
and
Idaho National Laboratory (INL). This summary will
be sent to everyone on INL’s regular news release
distribution list every other week. To be added to this
distribution list, please call Brad Bugger at (208)
526-0833.
Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project
March 10: BBWI, the contractor at the Advanced Mixed
Waste Treatment Facility, received a Notice of Violation
from the state of Idaho for $45,192 as a result of
noncompliances with the waste acceptance criteria for
the AMWTP supercompactor. The waste acceptance criteria
prohibits pressurized containers from being treated in
the supercompactor. The primary violation involved a
charged fire extinguisher - a pressurized container-
being treated in the AMWTP supercompactor (EM-ID—BBWI-AMWTF-2011-0004).
April 7: During receipt inspection, shackles and
turnbuckles were discovered that were thought to be
counterfeit or suspect parts. The parts were to be used
for tensioning the framing and membrane wall system of
the Retrieval Contamination Enclosure Building. The
items were segregated and placed on hold, and management
was notified. (EM-ID—BBWI-AMWTF-2011-0005).
Operational Summary
Waste Shipments: As of April 2, 2011, a total of
35,108 cubic meters of contact-handled transuranic
waste, 102.82 cubic meters of remote-handled transuranic
waste, and 3,869 cubic meters of previously-buried
transuranic waste have been shipped from Idaho to the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico for disposal.
Idaho Cleanup Project
March 15: A crane operator at the Integrated Waste
Treatment Unit construction site failed to verify the
crane’s block position before operating it, resulting in
the block striking a handrail on an overhead walkway. No
one was injured and the handrail was not damaged, but
there was minor damage to the conduit on the side of the
crane block. A safety “step back” was performed,
electricians performed a lock-out/tag-out to isolate the
energy to the damaged conduit, and an investigation was
initiated. (EM-ID—CWI-IWTU-2011-0001).
Operational Summary
Buried Waste Retrieval: Authorization has been given
to start operations in the Accelerated Retrieval Project
enclosure IV. The ARRA-funded project completed the
milestone for turnover to operations, the contractor
readiness assessment and is completing all
pre-operations activities. The enclosures allow
exhumation of buried transuranic waste for repackaging
and off-site disposal. Over 2.13 acres of buried waste
has been exhumed so far.
Idaho National Laboratory
March 10: During systems testing at the Advanced Test
Reactor, yokes on two emergency firewater injection
system control valves failed. Work was stopped and
management notifications were made. The reactor was
already defueled and shut down, so there was no need for
a shut down due to the inoperability of this system. A
critique was performed. (NE-ID—BEA-ATR-2011-0004).
March 14: During demolition and modification of
process equipment located at the Specific Manufacturing
Capability Project, suspect/counterfeit bolts were
found. The bolts were removed and placed into bonded
storage for disposal. (NE-ID—BEA-SMC-2011-0004).
March 14: Management discovered that two sealed
radiological sources being temporarily stored at the
Materials and Fuels Complex had not been registered and
recorded in the INL radiological source inventory
database. The two sources were being stored in approved
containers within the facility for future installation
into security equipment. Notifications were made and
proper paperwork for source registration was initiated.
(NE-ID—BEA-MFC-2011-0003).
March 21: A manager at the Advanced Test Reactor,
while conducting an observation, noticed that the
personnel door between the reactor main floor and the
canal area did not close. The door is safety class
equipment but was not required to be operable at the
time. The hinges on the door were adjusted so that it
closes properly as designed. (NE-ID—BEA-ATR-2011-0005).
March 24: During a facility inspection at the
Analytical Laboratory, several suspect/counterfeit
fasteners were discovered on equipment in the
laboratory. Management notifications were made and a
nonconformance report was generated.
(NE-ID—BEA-AL-2011-0001).
March 28: A warehouse technician at the Specific
Manufacturing Facility was pushing a 15.5 foot high set
of rolling stairs down an aisle when the top rail of the
stairs struck an emergency light that was suspended from
the ceiling. A work order was issued to reinstall the
emergency light at a higher height because it had been
installed too low for normal operations. Inspection
revealed two additional lights that were at risk because
of their installation height, and a work order was
issued to correct the situation. All other lights were
determined to be placed at the appropriate height for
operations. (NE-ID—BEA-SMC-2011-0005).
April 1: A worker slipped on the ice and injured his
shoulder while working at the Materials and Fuels
Complex in February. The worker later had surgery to
repair his damaged shoulder. (NE-ID—BEA-MFC-2011-005).
April 4: During a walk down of lockout/tagout
procedures at the Advanced Test Reactor, the locking
device, lock, tag and hasp all came loose from the
tagged 120 VAC distribution breaker. An investigation
was performed to determine why the lockout/tagout
components came off. All ATR lockout/tagouts were
checked and all of those of similar design as the one
that broke were removed from service pending further
evaluation. (NE-ID—BEA-ATR-2011-0006).
April 5: It was determined that surveillance for
safety exhaust system filters at the Fuel Conditioning
Facility did not meet applicable standards. The facility
remained in the secure mode until the filter testing
procedures were revised to comply with the applicable
standards, and testing was completed.
(NE-ID—BEA-FCF-2011-0002).
April 7: A technician removed a 120-volt jumper from
a 480-volt switchgear at the Advanced Test Reactor
without proper protective equipment. Management was
notified and a critique of the incident was held.
(NE-ID—BEA-ATR-2011-0007).
Operational Summary
Idaho Research Symposium: More than 50 people from
industry and the Center for Advanced Energy Systems (CAES)
partner institutions attended the Idaho Research
Symposium, which was held last month in Idaho Falls.
During the event, CAES scientists and engineers
described the research capabilities of their respective
institutions in geothermal, energy efficiency, nuclear
energy and bioenergy and discussed potential areas of
private-sector collaboration.
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