

History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

**The Joint Chiefs of Staff
and National Policy
1945 – 1947**



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Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Left to right: seated: James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, and Robert Patterson, Secretary of War. Left to right: standing: Major General Lauris Norstad, Army Air Forces; Fleet Admiral William Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief; General of the Army Dwight Eisenhower, Chief of Staff, Army; Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, Chief of Naval Operations; and Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman.*



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Armed Services Committee hearing on Merger Plan. *Left to right: General of the Army Dwight Eisenhower, Chief of Staff, Army; Senator Chan Gurney; Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, Chief of Naval Operations; and General Carl Spaatz, Commanding General, Army Air Forces.*

History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Volume I

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1945 – 1947

James F. Schnabel



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Foreword

Established during World War II to advise the President regarding the strategic direction of armed forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) continued in existence after the war and, as military advisers and planners, have played a significant role in the development of national policy. Knowledge of JCS relations with the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense in the years since World War II is essential to an understanding of their current work. An account of their activity in peacetime and during times of crisis provides, moreover, an important series of chapters in the military history of the United States. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an official history be written for the record. Its value for instructional purposes, for the orientation of officers newly assigned to the JCS organization, and as a source of information for staff studies will be readily recognized.

The series, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, treats the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since the close of World War II. Because of the nature of the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the sensitivity of the sources, the volumes of the series were originally prepared in classified form. Classification designations, in text and footnotes, are those that appeared in the original classified volume. Following review and declassification, the initial four volumes, covering the years 1945–1952 and the Korean War, were distributed in unclassified form within the Department of Defense and copies were deposited with the National Archives and Records Administration. These volumes are now being made available as official publications.

Volume I describes JCS activities during the period 1945–1947 except for activities related to Indochina, which are covered in a separate series. The volume was originally planned by Dr. Ernest R. May, who developed an outline and wrote a preliminary draft. Following a lapse of some years, Dr. May's draft was revised by Dr. Walter S. Poole. Subsequently, Mr. James F. Schnabel reviewed the existing drafts, carried out additional research, and wrote the volume in its present form. Resource constraints have prevented revision to reflect recent scholarship.

Foreword

This volume was reviewed for declassification by the appropriate US Government departments and agencies and cleared for release. The volume is an official publication of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but, inasmuch as the text has not been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it must be construed as descriptive only and does not constitute the official position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on any subject.

Washington, DC
August 1996

DAVID A. ARMSTRONG
Director for Joint History

Preface

This history is designed to present the actions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in contributing to the formulation of national policy during the months following the end of World War II. The Cold War, which began in this period, was essentially a political struggle pitting the nations of the Western world, led by the United States, against the Communist bloc of nations under Soviet domination. Because this Cold War was not a shooting war and its main battles were political, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not play a central part. Nevertheless, the presence of strong military overtones in any type of confrontation between two nations so powerful as the Soviet Union and the United States was inescapable. Hence the Joint Chiefs of Staff were concerned with almost every aspect of the Cold War to some degree. Political activities have therefore been described briefly but with every effort to avoid distorting the relative importance of JCS contribution in any particular case.

When the war ended in September 1945, most of the former belligerents experienced a traumatic reaction to the costly sacrifices and the terrible human suffering of the wartime years and looked forward to a resumption of peaceful pursuits. But as the armies of the Western world were being disbanded in haste and disarray, the Soviet Union kept its military strength almost at wartime levels, strategically deployed in Eastern Europe and in the Far East. This combination of factors created an extremely fortuitous climate for the realization of Soviet ambitions. Through the threat of military action, which they were fully capable of carrying out successfully, the Soviet Union imposed its will upon its neighbors and caused the Western nations to yield on important political issues. These developments had a profound effect on the postwar world.

There had been plain signs before the war ended that US and Soviet interests were moving into opposition. No one event, however, can be said to have marked the beginning of the Cold War, and few Americans realized that it had begun until it was well under way. They were slow to recognize, and reluctant to admit, that the wartime alliance with the Soviet Union was breaking apart and that the Soviets were, as a matter of national policy, taking unilateral actions directly against the interest of the West.

As shall be seen, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were among the earliest to recognize Soviet moves as a threat to US interests and to the peace and security of the world. This awareness of the dangers of allowing Soviet aggrandizement to continue unopposed is clearly evident in the few planning documents of the period. The growing Soviet capability and Soviet intentions inimical to the West are

frankly pointed out in these documents although they were embryonic and inconclusive and received only minimal approval and official sanction. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, although still functioning under the tenuous authority granted them in World War II, sought to promote military policies for the nation that would place it in the best possible military position to oppose Soviet actions. Their efforts were hampered by a massive reduction of US wartime strength and by service disagreements fomented and kept alive by special interests and rivalries for limited national resources.

American leaders were slow to react initially. But by the end of the period covered in this history they had become convinced that resistance to the Soviets was necessary. From this conviction stemmed such major national policies as the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. By the nature of their advice to their superiors the Joint Chiefs of Staff were instrumental in bringing about these policies. Notable instances in which their counsel undoubtedly helped shape the national policy lie in their insistent warnings to the Secretary of State in the confrontation over the Turkish Straits and to the President in the matter of relations with the Soviet Union.

In preparing this volume the author has received invaluable assistance from experts in several fields. Among these have been Dr. Robert J. Watson, Chief of the JCS Historical Division and Mr. Kenneth W. Condit, Chief of the Histories Branch of the division, who have reviewed successive drafts of this history. Their judicious counsel has been instrumental in greatly improving the original manuscript and rendering a more balanced and readable presentation. In addition Mr. Condit has supervised all arrangements for physical production of this history to include its assembly and printing. Mrs. Janet W. Ball, Editorial Assistant of the division, performed typing, copy editing, and carried out other administrative requirements in connection with production. The extensive research in official files that was necessary in the writing of this history would not have been possible without the skillful and willing support of Mr. Sigmund W. Musinski, Chief of the Records and Information Retrieval Branch, Documents Division, JCS, and his very capable and responsive staff.

Since records for this period have been retired to the National Archives, it has been necessary to request the temporary transfer of numerous documents to the Pentagon for research purposes. In every case these requests have been met with dispatch and efficiency by Mr. William Cunliffe of the Modern Military Records Branch, Military Archives Division, National Archives and Records. The declassification of these records prior to their use in this history was carried out most effectively by CW4 William A. Barbee, Chief of the Declassification and Archival Branch, Documents Division, Joint Secretariat. Mr. Barbee was ably assisted in this function by Mrs. Janet M. Lekang of the same office.

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History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

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The Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1945

On 14 August 1945, Japan accepted the Potsdam Surrender terms, thus bringing World War II to a close. At this date, the Joint Chiefs of Staff occupied a central position in the US military establishment. They provided the US representation on the Combined Chiefs of Staff. They served as the primary US national agency for the coordination and strategic direction of the Army and Navy, responsible directly to the President as Commander in Chief. Throughout World War II they had advised the President on war plans and strategy, military relations with allies, the munitions, shipping, and manpower requirements of US forces, and matters of joint Army-Navy policy. Other wartime functions included responsibilities for military research and development, cognizance over the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and operational (not merely advisory), responsibilities for allocation of shipping, munitions and petroleum products.¹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had come into being shortly following US entry into World War II. The immediate reason for their establishment had been the need to provide an effective US counterpart to the British Chiefs of Staff so that the two groups of national military leaders might function together as the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the principal allied military mechanism for strategic direction of the war against the Axis Powers. The first official meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had occurred on 9 February 1942. President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued no formal statement or definition of duties and responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, owing primarily to a desire to allow them the necessary latitude and flexibility to carry out such activities as they might find necessary to satisfy the requirements of the war.²

When World War II ended, the Joint Chiefs of Staff included the military leaders who had guided the United States to victory: Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, who presided at JCS meetings and maintained liaison with the White House; General of the Army George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, US Army; Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, Com-

mander in Chief US Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations; and General of the Army Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General of the Army Air Force.

The membership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff changed during the first year following the end of World War II, as the wartime members retired to be replaced by officers who had commanded the major US and Allied forces in the field. General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had been Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the European Theater during the war, replaced General of the Army Marshall as Chief of Staff, US Army, on 19 November 1945. One month later, on 15 December 1945, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz took over as Chief of Naval Operations from Fleet Admiral King.³ Admiral Nimitz had rendered distinguished service to the nation as Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas and US Pacific Fleet, during the war against the Japanese. General Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces, was replaced in that post on 1 March 1946 by General Carl Spaatz. General Spaatz had commanded US Strategic Air Forces in Europe in 1944 and in 1945 had commanded the US Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific during the final strategic bombing of Japan.

The organization supporting the Joint Chiefs of Staff consisted primarily of part-time interservice committees whose members represented their individual Services rather than constituting a true joint staff. Most of these committees were served by full-time staffs. The committees varied widely in size and in importance. Some of them were purely technical. Others had broad planning and operational functions. A few performed important policy/advisory roles. Some committees carried out only the JCS interservice responsibilities while others furnished members to the Combined US/British Committees. A Joint Secretariat performed the administrative and support activities essential to the effective functioning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁴

Probably the most influential element of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization was the full-time Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC), comprising three flag or general officers who performed long-range planning and advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff on current strategic matters. The members of the JSSC as the war drew near an end were: Lieutenant General Stanley D. Embick, USA; Major General Muir S. Fairchild, USA; and Vice Admiral Russell Willson, USN.

Another key element of the organization was the Joint Staff Planners (JPS), who were charged with day-to-day preparation of detailed plans, based on guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff or, occasionally, from the JSSC. Members of the JPS also served as planning officers within their respective Services. Other important committees of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and the Joint Logistics Committee (JLC).

Relationships with the President

The controlling relationship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff within the framework of the United States Government was that maintained with the President of the United States, to whom they were principal advisers on all military matters.

During most of the war, the Joint Chiefs of Staff dealt with President Roosevelt mainly through Admiral Leahy, his Chief of Staff. The Office of Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief was without precedent in US military history. It had been created expressly for Admiral Leahy in July 1942. The appointment seems to have been fortunate for the Joint Chiefs of Staff since Admiral Leahy was able to serve as a channel for transmittal of daily "decisions, intents, and requirements of the Commander in Chief to his staff." Admiral Leahy was able in turn to pass to the Commander in Chief the opinions and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other data he needed for making informed decisions on military matters. This system did not preclude face-to-face consultations by the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the President, but it reduced the requirements for such meetings to exchange opinions, information, and directions.⁵

President Roosevelt employed a very personal approach to the business of government, including that of prosecuting the war against the Axis. He believed in flexibility and was often deceptively casual and informal in his working relationships. He was known to prefer individual advice to the recommendations of an organized body. He took a greater interest in the day-to-day detailed direction of the US military forces than had most US Presidents in earlier wars. He seems to have looked upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff primarily as his personal advisers on the military conduct of the war and to have valued and followed their recommendations.⁶ As one authority has noted concerning the JCS relationship with President Roosevelt:

Whatever uncertainty there was about the definition of the powers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as an organization, the relationship of its individual members to the President as Commander in Chief was well established and provided a sufficient legal sanction for their actions. . . . so long as the Joint Chiefs of Staff retained the confidence of their Commander in Chief there was little reason to fear a challenge to their authority in the military direction of the war.⁷

The death of President Roosevelt on 12 April 1945 brought into office a man unlike his predecessor and whose accession was to have a marked influence on the nature of JCS postwar functions. Harry S. Truman, the new President, had been kept out of policy deliberations by President Roosevelt during his term as Vice President, a fact which made his first months in office more difficult. His methods of operation were quite different from those of Mr. Roosevelt. He was, for example, proud of his ability to make decisions quickly. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson later recalled of Mr. Truman, "It was a wonderful relief to preceding conferences with our former Chief to see the promptness and snappiness with which Truman took up each matter and decided it." Mr. Stimson also recalls, however, that this same approach to problems led President Truman during his first months in office to make several hasty decisions on the basis of insufficient information. When the war ended he had been in office only four months. Only time would tell whether he would measure up to the challenges of the post-war period of turbulence and uncertainty.⁸

As he was to demonstrate, President Truman trusted and relied upon the individual members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for expert military advice. That this advice in some areas, was not always so clear-cut and timely as it might have been, reflected not upon the abilities and dedication of the individual members but was instead, owing to the emergence of Service rivalries and disagreement, and divergent interests and perceptions of priorities, aggravated by stringent shortages in military appropriations.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of War, Navy and State

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had no direct responsibilities to, nor were they responsive to instructions from the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, Henry L. Stimson and James V. Forrestal respectively. They were responsible only to the President in matters affecting military conduct of the war and did not consult with either of the Secretaries regarding purely military advice to the President. The Secretaries of War and Navy were not included on the regular distribution lists of JCS papers.⁹

In their Service roles, of course, both General Marshall and Admiral King had close working relationships with the Secretaries of their individual Services. The Chief of Staff, US Army, served as the "immediate adviser" to the Secretary of War on all matters affecting the military establishment and was charged by him with the planning, development and execution of the Army military program. In like fashion the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander in Chief, US Fleet, combined in the person of Admiral King, was the primary adviser and executive to the Secretary of the Navy for the conduct of activities of the naval establishment. As for the relationship among the Secretaries, the Military Chiefs, and the President, the War and Navy Secretaries continued to be the President's advisers and administrative deputies in the Armed Services, and he regarded the Army Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations as his direct executive agents in matters of military strategy and operations.¹⁰ The JCS relationship to the Secretary of State was never clearly defined but nevertheless was an operative one in which the Secretary occasionally asked for and received advice directly from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This practice became even more frequent in the postwar period following the replacement of Secretary Edward R. Stettinius by Secretary James F. Byrnes in June 1945.

JCS Relations with the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff worked closely with the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee an important agency created late in World War II. Shortly after Mr. Stettinius replaced Cordell Hull as Secretary of State on 1 Decem-

ber 1944, the decision was made to create SWNCC. Its establishment stemmed from the obvious need for providing an agency to deal in postwar policy preparation and also reflected an increasing involvement of the State Department in military matters. There was, in addition, a necessity to provide a basis for interdepartmental staff work and to bring foreign policy formulation into closer connection with the deliberations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the work of the JCS committees. Following discussions among the members of the three Departments during the Dumbarton Oaks conversations, Secretaries Stettinius, Stimson, and Forrestal agreed to appoint a committee to represent each of their Departments. This committee was charged with developing recommendations to the Secretary of State on questions with both military and political aspects and with coordinating the views of the three Departments in matters of common interest. Mr. James C. Dunn was named State member and Chairman; Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy and Assistant Secretary of the Navy Artemus L. Gates were the other members. Advisers to the committee, which first met on 19 December 1944, included Admiral Willson of the JSSC.

The SWNCC was supported by subcommittees on Europe, Latin America, the Far East, and the Near and Middle East. The SWNCC coordinated Departmental views, particularly on matters involving foreign policy and relations with foreign nations. In all cases where military operations were a prime factor SWNCC papers on the situation would be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and comment. The SWNCC system and the JCS system were well suited to each other and worked smoothly.¹¹

JCS Participation in the United Nations

The formation of the United Nations organization created another relationship and another responsibility for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The UN Charter provided for a military Staff Committee to consist of "Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives." In reviewing this provision in late 1945 the Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledged that they, as individuals, must be US members of the Military Staff Committee. But they elected to be seconded by representatives who, though not JCS deputies in the strict sense, were authorized to make decisions when dealing with foreign representatives. These representatives, one from each of the Services, were coordinate and coequal among themselves. "In short," the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed SWNCC, "the organization of the US representatives on the Military Staff Committee should be based on that of the present organization of the United States Chiefs of Staff."¹²

On 28 December 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that each individual representative would have full and free communication with his own Service Chiefs of Staff. However, all policy matters would be referred by the representatives as a collective body to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for decision. They would communicate through the Joint Secretariat.¹³

Future Prospects

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had been formed during wartime to carry out a wartime mission. They had done this extremely well. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff had no legal sanction for their existence, and the matter of whether or not they would continue to exist and function following the end of the war remained in doubt until the National Security Act became law on 26 July 1947. Even more uncertain was the type of function the Joint Chiefs of Staff would perform in the postwar period. As matters turned out, the primary concern and responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff became the several broad military problems that arose in the wake of World War II. It was to these problems that most of their effort was devoted. However, difficult and persistent political and diplomatic problems arose for the nation as World War II ended, deepening in the months and years that followed. Mainly, these problems stemmed from the expansionist policies of the Soviet Union and the hostility of the Stalinist regime when Western Nations opposed them. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not play a major role in the political and diplomatic actions necessary to cope with these problems, the problems themselves became central to the course of national and international events and therefore are of great importance to any history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the postwar period.

Between War and Peace

Initial US Views of the Postwar World

During World War II, US leaders held an optimistic view of the world that would emerge in the postwar years. The British and Soviet views, on the other hand, tended to be more pragmatic and much less optimistic. Unlike its allies the United States counted heavily on the emergence of free democratic processes in large areas of the world following the war. It believed that many former enslaved peoples would be allowed self-determination and would choose their own forms of government. It counted heavily on this fact and upon the growth of free economic exchange and trade to resolve future conflicts among the nations. President Roosevelt and other US leaders worked hard to bring about a world organization that would enforce peace following the war, an organization that ultimately emerged as the United Nations. They did not question that the big powers would dominate this organization but counted upon their doing so with fairness and impartiality. Even more important to the future peace of the world, in the US view, was the maintenance of good relations among the USSR, Great Britain, and the United States in the postwar years. Because the Soviet Union had cooperated with the United States in defeating Germany, and because Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin had shrewdly disbanded the Comintern, the Soviet mechanism for spreading communist ideology into other nations, US leaders had come to believe that the USSR was no longer bent on fostering a world revolution. This belief and the policies that flowed from it were attractive to the American people and tended in the postwar years to retard US recognition of the Soviet threat as it developed.

In mid-1944 the Joint Chiefs of Staff attempted to analyze what postwar Europe would be like. The war, they believed, was bringing "fundamental and revolutionary" alterations in the structure of Europe. Most significant was the phoenix-like rise of the Soviet Union as the strongest nation in Europe. There was no way of telling just how strong the Soviet Union would become, but its phenomenal development would surely have "epochal" influence on international relationships.

A relationship that particularly concerned the Joint Chiefs of Staff was that between the USSR and Britain. British strength and influence would diminish markedly in the postwar period and would not serve to offset the growth of Soviet power. The United States, of course, would remain a great power. In any war in the foreseeable future between the Soviet Union and Britain, the United States would very likely side with Britain. So great was Soviet strength on the continent that while the United States might be able to defend Britain successfully, it could not defeat the Soviet Union. It was essential therefore that US efforts be devoted to preventing such a war by promoting a spirit of "mutual cooperation between Britain, Russia and ourselves." The greatest danger to world peace in the postwar era, in the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, lay in either the USSR or Great Britain "seeking to attach to herself parts of Europe to the disadvantage and possible danger of her potential adversary."¹

On 3 August 1944, in connection with consideration of the proposed international organization of the United Nations and of postwar territorial settlements, the Joint Chiefs of Staff volunteered another forecast of the postwar military balance of power throughout the world. They did not forecast a conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. "The defeat of Germany," the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated in a memorandum to the Secretary of State, "will leave Russia in a position of assured military dominance in Eastern Europe and in the Middle East." In the period immediately following the German surrender the United States and Great Britain would predominate in western Europe; but with demobilization and the inevitable withdrawal of all but occupation forces their strength in that area would decline.

Final allied victory would find the relative national military strengths of the world's powers drastically changed. This was of fundamental importance in its bearing upon future international political settlements. The United States and the USSR would be the strongest military powers in the world, with Britain much weaker.

China would be for many years, despite her vast population and area, a minor military power of "but little military strength." France would be even weaker militarily than Great Britain although she would be able to strengthen herself eventually. Italy would remain a "relatively minor military power," largely dependent upon others for her munitions.

The United States and the USSR would be dominant in their respective areas; neither could defeat the other, even with the help of the British; Great Britain was the third strongest nation but much weaker than either of the others; the three great powers, the USSR, the United States, and Great Britain, could preserve the peace if they wished.²

Differences over Eastern Europe: First Signs of Rift between East and West

The first signs of serious disagreement between the Soviet Union and its Western allies appeared as the Red Armies pushed into the Balkans and Eastern Europe in late 1944. The nations of this area had passed under German domina-

tion in one way or another. Some were governed outright by the Nazis, their legitimate rulers having fled into exile; others were under dictatorial regimes that had more or less willingly joined Nazi Germany's attack on the Soviet Union. All were on or near the borders of the Soviet Union and thus strategically important to her. In some of them rival partisan groups were fighting for control. It soon became obvious that the Soviet Union seriously intended to bring these countries under its exclusive sway by threat and force. When the Western allies expressed objection, the Soviets made it unmistakably clear that, in this matter, they would yield only to the most extreme pressure. And neither the United States nor Great Britain, whose ground forces were largely removed from the scene, was capable of or inclined to exert such pressure on the Soviets.

Soviet efforts to dominate the liberated nations of Central Europe and the Balkans were effective because of the tremendous preponderance of Soviet military strength concentrated in and near these nations. As German forces were defeated and driven out of these countries, Soviet occupation forces replaced them. US and British members of control commissions for these countries were sharply restricted in their movements and activities and were unable to learn exactly what was taking place, much less to influence events. Under these conditions it was relatively simple for the Soviets to place trusted communists in the existing governments under the pretext of coalition rule. From that point it was only a matter of time until noncommunist elements were forced out of the government, leaving communists in power. The will of the people was not a factor. Great Britain and the United States watched helplessly as the communists thus took over the reins of government in Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Hungary, and Poland.³

Facilitating this process in several instances, Great Britain and the Soviet Union had, in the spring of 1944, tacitly agreed on the degree of interest each should enjoy in some of the Balkan nations. Claiming "military necessity" for so doing, the two allies agreed that Great Britain should have predominant interest in Greece and the Soviet Union in Rumania, and that both should bear equal influence in Yugoslavia. In late 1944 these "understandings" were expanded, apparently with US knowledge. Premier Joseph Stalin and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, meeting in October 1944, agreed that the Soviet Union would have a 90 percent predominance in Rumania and 75 percent predominance in Bulgaria; Great Britain would enjoy 90 percent predominance in Greece. The two nations would wield equal influence in Yugoslavia and Hungary.⁴

Western influence and participation in Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Hungary was gradually eliminated in spite of protests from US and British diplomats. In Yugoslavia a somewhat different situation existed, with an already strong indigenous communist government being established with minimum support from the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia was under strong communist pressures as the war ended. The nation that more than any other came into contention between the Soviet Union and the Western allies was Poland.

Poland, aside from the Soviet Union the major power in Eastern Europe prior to World War II, had been invaded by Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939. Her armies had been smashed, her cities destroyed, her people slaughtered,

deported or enslaved. Thousands of Polish soldiers and airmen were serving with allied forces. A government in exile, headed by Stanislaw Mikolajczyk and established in London, was supported by the British Government and recognized as legitimate by both the United States and Great Britain. It had been widely assumed that at war's end Poland would be restored to her place among the world's democratic nations and that the territories wrested from her by the Soviet Union in 1939 would be restored. Such was not to be the case.

The Soviet interest in Poland was largely strategic. Lying as she did on Russia's borders, Poland could serve as either a protective buffer or an invasion route to the Soviet Union as history had demonstrated. Premier Stalin had determined that Poland would come under Soviet control with a government of his choosing and completely responsive to him. Selecting a group of Polish communists living in the Soviet Union, he formed a puppet government in 1943, and when circumstances permitted, moved it into Lublin, Poland, where it was allowed to begin functioning. Since the existence of this government was incompatible with the existence of the "London" government recognized by the United States and Great Britain, the stage was set for confrontation and conflict over Poland's future. Soviet forces drove the Germans from Warsaw and entered the Polish capital on 17 January 1945. The Soviet Union announced its recognition of the Lublin government as the rightful government of Poland while the United States and Great Britain continued to recognize the London government. With Soviet forces occupying Poland, the "Lublin Poles" became the de facto government of Poland.

In an effort to resolve these differences over Poland, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill corresponded with Premier Stalin, urging him to forego his insistence on a communist-dominated government for Poland. Thus matters stood on the eve of the meeting of the three leaders at Yalta in February 1945.⁵

A Cautious Reappraisal of Soviet Intentions

These unilateral actions by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe aroused concern within the JCS organization. The Joint Intelligence Committee, on its own initiative, drew up a statement of these matters and circulated it to the Staff in early January 1945. This intelligence statement had a faintly ominous ring, somewhat different from earlier appraisals of the Soviet Union. "In carrying out its national security policies," the JIC report forecast, "the Soviet Union will rely heavily upon the development of its own influence upon other nations. In peripheral areas, such as Eastern Europe, the USSR will insist upon control or predominant influence. In Central Europe, China, and perhaps Japan," the report continued, "it will insist upon an influence at least equal to that of the Western powers. In Western Europe and the Mediterranean, it will attempt to make British influence less than Soviet influence in Eastern Europe." And in more distant regions, the Soviets would "probably be content to wield a merely negative power such as will prevent anti-Soviet orientation of the countries involved. In

carrying out these policies, the USSR will use the local communist parties and other means at its disposal."

Underlying this judgment, in which intelligence officials went to some pains to avoid the appearance of being alarmist, was a realization that Soviet strength would be a major factor in shaping the postwar world and that no one in the West really knew which direction Soviet policy would take. The joint estimate stated that the Soviet Union would emerge from the war politically stable. Its people would have a high morale and would grant the government full freedom of action in whatever policy it chose to execute. Soviet foreign policy, which would be backed by a very strong military force (3,000,000 men would probably be kept under arms), would be motivated by a fear of capitalist encirclement and a desire for access to the high seas. "The Soviet Union," the report noted enigmatically, "has no strong economic motive for an expansion of territory or influence."

To achieve its maximum economic recovery, the Soviet Union would need to avoid a conflict with Great Britain or the United States and the tensions that might lead to an arms race. To this end it would probably adopt a peaceful policy "unless it conceives its vital interests relating to national security are threatened."

As for the contemplated international organization for the preservation of world peace, the Soviet Union would probably cooperate to a degree but would remain skeptical of the organization's practicality, suspicious that it might become an instrument of the capitalist nations in their efforts to encircle the USSR.⁶

The Joint Chiefs of Staff gave no official approval to this report, but an action they took shortly thereafter suggests that they had taken its message to heart. Late in 1944 Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov had demanded that the Norwegian Government cede Bear Island to the Soviet Union and place Spitsbergen Island under a "Russo-Norwegian condominium." These two islands lay directly north of Norway in the Arctic Ocean. When asked for their views on this matter the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised SWNCC on 23 July 1945 that the Soviet proposals should be considered along with all other territorial changes arising out of the war. If it were necessary to discuss them separately, however, the United States should oppose the Soviet position. "This war has been fought," the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated, "to prevent an aggressive nation from dominating Europe, and ultimately threatening the Western Hemisphere." From the standpoint of long-range security, and until the post-war situation and Soviet policy could be seen more clearly, the United States should, in so far as practicable, "resist demands and policies which tend to improve the Soviet position in Western Europe."⁷

The Yalta Conference

As they had done on several occasions earlier, the Heads of State of the three major allied powers met from 5 to 11 February 1945 to discuss combined policy and strategy. The meeting at Yalta, in the Crimea, became particularly sig-

nificant owing to the imminence of victory over Germany, the nature of the topics discussed, and the later impact of decisions reached at the meeting. Viewed contemporarily as an outstanding example of cooperation among Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, Yalta was, in reality, the origin of later differences with regard to postwar policies and international arrangements. Important political decisions and promises on postwar settlements emerged from the Yalta Conference, decisions that were to have a profound effect on the postwar world and promises that were ignored or broken. President Roosevelt focused primarily on three questions during his talks with Premier Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill. These issues were the future of Poland, Soviet entry into the War against Japan, and the new international organization for preservation of world peace that had been agreed upon by representatives of the major wartime allies at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944.⁸

Strong arguments among the three allies accompanied consideration of the Polish issue at Yalta. Both President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill questioned the Soviet actions in Poland that were designed to bring that country under Soviet domination. Premier Stalin argued vehemently and with strong feeling that Poland must be placed under a government friendly to the Soviet Union. The arguments of the Western leaders had little effect on him.

Nevertheless, apparently in concession to the obviously strong feelings shared by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, Premier Stalin agreed to a statement of policy on Poland that appeared to give some hope for establishment of a broad-based and democratic government. This statement included a pledge that the present Lublin government would be "reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad." This new coalition government would be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. To accomplish this reorganization, Foreign Minister Molotov would consult in Moscow with the US and British Ambassadors to the Soviet Union, W. Averell Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, with the leadership of the Lublin government, and "with other Polish democratic leaders within Poland and abroad." The resulting new government would be "pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot." The new government would be recognized by the United States and Great Britain, as well as the Soviet Union.

With respect to the sensitive issue of Soviet retention of lands seized from Poland in 1939, the Heads of State decreed that the eastern frontier of Poland would be adjusted to follow the "Curzon Line" with certain digressions in favor of Poland. In return for this substantial loss of territory to the Soviet Union, Poland would be compensated by "substantial accessions of territory on the north and west" at Germany's expense.⁹

It thus appeared for the moment that the three allies had achieved a diplomatic solution to what had threatened to become a major political problem among them. The illusion was short lived.

In respect to Poland and other nations as well, the United States and Great Britain placed a great deal of faith in the Declaration on Liberated Europe, issued

at Yalta, as the ultimate solution in achieving peaceful and prosperous “democratic” governments for all nations freed from German domination. At the time, this document was considered to be the most significant of all those generated at Yalta. In it, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union pledged that they would “concert” their policies, during the period of temporary instability sure to follow on German defeat, in assisting the peoples of former Axis satellite states in Europe “to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.” They reaffirmed the principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they would live—and promised to restore sovereign rights and self government to those who had been forcibly deprived of them by aggressor nations. They further promised to form interim governments broadly representative of all “democratic” elements and to establish as soon as possible, through free elections, governments responsive to the will of the people. Where necessary, they would facilitate the holding of such elections.¹⁰

In the important matter of what to do with a defeated Germany, the Soviets agreed very reluctantly to French participation in the occupation, provided that the zone assigned to France be taken from the territory already allotted to the United States and Great Britain. The Soviet leaders also sought harsh terms for Germany in the matter of reparations, terms that were resisted by both the United States and Great Britain.

As an adjunct to securing Soviet agreement to enter the war against Japan, a secret protocol was worked out among the three leaders in which Soviet territorial demands in the Far East were accepted, including: (1) Soviet acquisition of the Sakhalins and adjacent islands; (2) recognition of preeminent Soviet interests in the port of Dairen; (3) restoration of the lease of Port Arthur as a Soviet naval base; (4) Soviet acquisition of the Kurile Islands; (5) joint Soviet-Chinese operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchuria Railway. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not present nor were they consulted on this protocol.¹¹

Upon returning from Yalta, President Roosevelt reported to the US Congress. He stated two main purposes for having met with Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin, “to bring defeat to Germany” and “to continue to build the foundation for an international accord which would bring order and security . . . and give some assurance of lasting peace . . .” Never before, he asserted, had the major allies been more closely united—in war aims and peace aims. There had, he admitted, been instances of “political confusion and unrest in . . . liberated areas—Greece, Poland, Yugoslavia, and other places.” Worse than that, the President continued, “there actually have come to grow up in some of them vaguely defined ‘spheres of influence’ which were incompatible with the basic principles of international collaboration. . . .” However, the President maintained that he was “convinced that the agreement on Poland, under the circumstances, is the most hopeful agreement possible for a free, independent, and prosperous Polish state. . . . The Conference in the Crimea was a turning point in American History.”¹²

Worsening Relations over Eastern Europe

According to Mr. James F. Byrnes, who was shortly to become the Secretary of State, the Yalta Conference was proof of allied unity, strength, and power of decision. The tide of Anglo-American-Soviet friendship, he noted, had reached a new high in Yalta. But Mr. Byrnes added, somewhat ruefully, that President Roosevelt had barely returned to American soil when that tide began to ebb.¹³ The illusion of good feeling and cooperative relationships among the Soviet Union and the Western powers faded quickly in the aftermath of Yalta. Incident followed incident, recrimination grew, and misunderstanding became the order of the day rather than the exception.

Within only a few days after the conclusion of the Yalta Conference and the Declaration of Liberated Europe, the communists provoked a political crisis in Rumania.¹⁴ On 6 March, supported by Soviet military power, a communist coup d'état placed Rumania under a communist government. This thoroughly displeased the United States and Great Britain, but in an exchange with Prime Minister Churchill, the US President declared that Rumania was not a good test case as a violation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe. "The Russians," he pointed out, "have been in undisputed control from the beginning and with Rumania lying athwart the Russian lines of communications it is moreover difficult to contest the plea of military necessity and security which they are using to justify their action."

For his part, the British Prime Minister noted that the Western position was greatly weakened by the agreement he had made with Premier Stalin in October, granting Russia 90 percent influence in Rumania. In this connection he was very conscious of the fact that the Soviet leader had shown remarkable restraint with regard to communist actions in Greece and was obviously keeping his part of the bargain. He feared that any move by the United States to protest seriously the Soviet actions in Rumania might endanger the British position in Greece. Thus almost by tacit agreement the United States and Great Britain acceded to the seizure of Rumania by the puppet government so strongly backed by the Soviet Union.¹⁵

Developments concerning Poland were no more satisfactory to the West. As agreed at Yalta, Ambassadors Harriman and Kerr met in Moscow with Foreign Minister Molotov beginning in late February in order to effect a reorganization of the Lublin government and to bring into it some of the noncommunist Polish leaders. At every turn the Soviets remained obstructive, obstinately refusing to give ground and obviously having no intention of allowing any but their own selected Poles to serve in the Provisional government.

Frustrated by Soviet actions, Prime Minister Churchill sent a message to President Roosevelt on 13 March in which he foresaw that Poland was to lose her freedom. "We are in the presence of a great failure and an utter breakdown of what was settled at Yalta, . . . we British have not the necessary strength to carry the matter further and . . . the limits of our capacity to act have been reached." He warned that if the United States and Great Britain did not act in concert "the doom of Poland is sealed."¹⁶

President Roosevelt hesitated, but after almost two weeks of continued Soviet intransigence and at the persistent urging of the British Prime Minister he sent Premier Stalin a strongly worded protest on 1 April 1945, saying "I must make it quite plain to you that . . . a thinly disguised continuance of the present Warsaw regime would be unacceptable and would cause the people of the United States to regard the Yalta agreement as having failed." The President called for a fair and speedy settlement of the Polish question and warned that if this were not done "all of the difficulties and dangers to Allied unity which we had so much in mind in reaching our decision at the Crimea will face us in an even more acute form."¹⁷

Premier Stalin replied to President Roosevelt's message within the week. On 7 April the Soviet leader denied that his government was responsible for the failure to agree on Poland, charging instead that the US and British members of the Moscow Commission were obstructing progress. His reply, a model of sweet reason on the surface, was nevertheless a flat rebuff of the President."¹⁸

President Roosevelt remained outwardly optimistic about the prospects of closer relations and friendly collaboration with the Soviet Union. On the day before his death he sent a personal message to Prime Minister Churchill, who had told the President of his intent to make a statement in the House of Commons relative to Poland and other issues with the Soviet Union. "I would minimize the general Soviet problem as much as possible," President Roosevelt advised the British leader, "because these problems, in one form or another, seem to arise every day and most of them straighten out. . . . We must be firm, however, and our course thus far is correct."¹⁹

President Roosevelt died at Warm Springs, Georgia, on 12 April. Harry S Truman immediately took office as President of the United States. In Moscow Ambassador Harriman called upon Mr. Molotov and Premier Stalin with the news of President Roosevelt's death. He made a special point of assuring both Soviet officials that the new President would carry on his predecessor's policies and plans exactly as he understood them.²⁰

The plethora of problems developing with the Soviet Union over its actions in Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland, and the inability to deal with them through normal political processes, irritated the new President. He took the occasion of a visit by Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov to the White House on 22 April to display this irritation. He assured Mr. Molotov that the United States intended to carry out all agreements made at Yalta, but that, to this point, these agreements had been a one way street and that this could not continue.

At a meeting on the next day with his principal advisers, President Truman asked for views on how to deal with Soviets over Poland. He set the tone for the meeting by repeating his observation that so far all US-British agreements with the Soviet Union had been "a one way street" and that this could not go on. It was, he said, "now or never." As for plans to hold the United Nations Conference in San Francisco, the United States would go ahead with those plans. If the Russians did not care to join in they could "go to hell."²¹

Secretary of War Stimson advised that the United States should take a cautious approach toward the Soviet Union on the Polish issue until the depth of

Soviet determination had been ascertained and Soviet motives analyzed. Secretary of State Byrnes, after reading aloud the portion of the Yalta agreement relating to the formation of a new government and the holding of free elections, asserted that this could only be interpreted in one way. Secretary of the Navy Forrestal took the strong view that Poland was not an isolated incident, that the Soviets seemed to feel that the United States would not object if they took over all of Eastern Europe. He charged that if the Soviets continued to be intransigent, the United States would be better off having a "show down" with them "now" rather than "later."

Of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who were present only Admiral Leahy and General Marshall expressed opinions and both were somewhat equivocal. Admiral Leahy believed that the Yalta agreement was susceptible of two interpretations. It would be a serious matter to break with the Soviets, but the United States should at least tell them that it stood for a free and independent Poland. General Marshall agreed with Secretary of War Stimson that caution was advisable. He was not familiar with details of the Polish issue but he was familiar with the military situation. The problem of defeating Japan concerned him and he was hoping for Soviet participation against Japan. Should the United States break with the Soviet Union over Poland there was a good chance the Soviets would delay entry into the war in the Far East until after the United States had done "all the dirty work." Admiral King expressed no views on the Polish question.

At the conclusion of this meeting President Truman instructed the Secretary of State to prepare a statement for Mr. Molotov to hand to Marshal Stalin, a list of points to be given orally to Mr. Molotov, and a draft statement to the press. Later that same day the President, the Secretary of State, Admiral Leahy, and Ambassador Harriman met with Foreign Minister Molotov and Ambassador Andrei A. Gromyko. The President handed Mr. Molotov a strong statement demanding prompt and fair settlement of the Polish question as provided for at the Yalta Conference. He spoke very firmly to Mr. Molotov on the necessity for Marshal Stalin to honor his word and to carry out the agreement that had been reached on Poland by the three powers.²²

So sharp was the President's message and demeanor that Mr. Molotov remonstrated, saying that he had never before been spoken to in that manner. "Carry out your agreements," President Truman replied, "and you won't get talked to like that."²³

Occupation Plans for Germany and Austria

Insofar as the United States and Great Britain were concerned, the war in Europe came to an end officially with the unconditional surrender of Germany on 7 May 1945—"V-E Day." Most of Europe lay in ruins. Soviet forces had seized Berlin. US, British, and other allies lay in possession of western Germany. Even in this propitious moment of victory, Soviet leaders harbored suspicion of their

allies' motives. Although Soviet representatives took part in the signing of the surrender document at General Eisenhower's headquarters in Rheims, France, on 7 May, Premier Stalin remained suspicious that the Germans were surrendering only to the Anglo-Americans. He therefore refused to recognize the validity of the Rheims document. Only after a second surrender by Germany, solemnized with the Soviets in the shattered German capital of Berlin on 8 May 1945, would Premier Stalin consider the war at an end.²⁴

The attainment of the common goal that had cost each allied nation dearly in blood and wealth brought no lessening in the friction among them. Indeed, in the months that followed, greater and greater differences developed, to the point that the United States, Britain, and France would soon be estranged from the Soviet Union and the countries that had fallen under its domination and influence.

The surrender terms for Germany provided that, since the German Government was no longer effective, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, and France possessed supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of this authority, they would take such steps as they deemed necessary for peace and security,²⁵ including the complete disarmament, demilitarization, and dismemberment of Germany.

The victorious powers divided Germany into four zones. The Soviet Zone encompassed the northeastern quadrant; the British Zone, the northwestern quarter; and the US Zone, the central and southern portion. France was allotted a somewhat smaller section in the west along her own borders. Bremen and Bremerhaven were designated as a port enclave for the United States. The city of Berlin was divided into four sectors, assigned to Soviet, French, United States, and British control, although the city itself lay in the heart of the Soviet Zone. A protocol on the zones of occupation and administration of the "Greater Berlin" area had been developed by US, UK, and Soviet representatives in London in September 1944.

An amendment of November 1944 allocated the northwestern parts of Germany and Greater Berlin to the United Kingdom, established the Bremen enclave for the United States and assigned the southwestern part of Germany and the southern part of Berlin to the United States. The protocol was approved by the United States on 2 February 1945, by the United Kingdom on 5 December 1944, and by the Soviet Union on 6 February 1945. In accordance with the Yalta agreement this protocol was further amended on 26 July 1945 to provide for French occupation zones, both in Germany and Greater Berlin.²⁶

The victorious powers agreed also on machinery by which Germany as a whole would be governed. A protocol on control machinery for Germany was agreed on 14 November 1944. The agreement, after approval by the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, was amended in May 1945 to provide for the participation of France. Supreme authority in Germany would be exercised within their respective zones by the Commanders in Chief of the armed forces of the four powers. Acting as a body they would form a Control Council which would meet regularly to decide on the chief military, economic, political, and other questions affecting Germany as a whole.²⁷

In May 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued to General Eisenhower as Commander in Chief of the US Forces of Occupation a directive for his guidance in the military government of that portion of Germany to be occupied by US forces. This directive was based on the political decisions that had already been reached by the Big Three powers with respect to Germany. It instructed General Eisenhower to carry out and support in the US zone the policies agreed in the Control Council. In the absence of policies he would be guided by directives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.²⁸

Although they issued this directive to General Eisenhower, the Joint Chiefs of Staff played only a minor role in its development. The major influence in drafting the policy directive had come from the Departments of State and War, with the Treasury Department exerting some influence. However, President Truman had approved the directive after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.²⁹

The Allies viewed Austria in a somewhat different light from Germany, which had absorbed the smaller nation in 1936. In a declaration at Moscow in November 1943, the Big Three had promised to "liberate Austria from German domination and to make it possible for the Austrian people to find their own way to political and economic security." The basic aim at the war's end, therefore, was the separation of Austria from Germany and the establishment of an independent Austria. It was necessary however that Austria, as part of a defeated enemy state, be occupied and governed for a time. This was not accomplished as smoothly as might have been hoped. An agreement among the United States, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the provisional government of the French Republic was reached on control machinery in Austria and signed at a meeting in London on 4 July 1945.³⁰

The agreement on the zones of occupation for Austria and the administration of the city of Vienna was a different matter. The question was negotiated within the European Advisory Commission in London for nearly eight months without being resolved. The main zones of allied occupation had been agreed provisionally in April. However, the Soviets would not agree to the number of airfields that the United States, the United Kingdom, and the French wished to use in Vienna. In the meantime the war had ended but the Soviet commanders whose forces occupied much of Austria refused to let troops of the other three nations into territory controlled by them. On 9 July 1945 agreement was reached on the airfields question, and the agreement on occupation zones was signed. Problems continued on Austria, however, until final ratification of the agreement on 24 July in London. Until that time, Soviet commanders were entirely uncooperative and refused to discuss with US or UK commanders any of the arrangements for occupation. But at the Potsdam Conference on 24 July, Marshal Stalin agreed to cooperate in the occupation of Austria and to allow US, British, and French troops to occupy their zones immediately.³¹

Austria was divided into four zones of occupation as follows: France-western Austria; United States-north western Austria; United Kingdom-southern Austria; and USSR-north eastern Austria. The city of Vienna was occupied by all four powers, with the outer fringes of the city divided into zones on a unilateral basis and the inner city occupied jointly.³²

Before these agreements had even been concluded, Prime Minister Churchill, alarmed by Soviet actions, urged President Truman not to withdraw US forces to the occupation lines. To do so, he wrote the President on 1 May 1945,

would mean the tide of Russian domination sweeping forward 120 miles on a front of 300 or 400 miles. This would be an event which, if it occurred, would be one of the most melancholy in history. . . . territories under Russian control would include the Baltic provinces, all of Germany to the occupational line, all of Czechoslovakia, a large part of Austria, the whole of Yugoslavia, Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria. . . . It would include the great capitals Berlin, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia.

Mr. Churchill warned that the United States and Britain should not pull back from their present positions "until satisfied about Poland, . . . about the temporary character of the Russian occupation of Germany, and the conditions to be established in . . . Russian-controlled countries in the Danube valley particularly Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakia and the Balkans." If these matters were not settled before the US armies left Europe, Mr. Churchill feared, "there are no prospects of a satisfactory solution and very little of preventing a third world war."³³

I have always worked for friendship with Russia, but like you, I feel deep anxiety because of their misinterpretation of the Yalta decisions, their attitude towards Poland, their overwhelming influence in the Balkans excepting Greece, the difficulties they make about Vienna, the combination of Russian power and the territories under control or occupied, coupled with the Communist technique in so many other countries, and above all their power to maintain very large armies in the field for a long time. What will be the position in a year or two, when the British and American armies have melted and the French has not yet been formed on any major scale, when we may have a handful of divisions mostly French, and when Russia may choose to keep two or three hundred on active service?³⁴

President Truman, however, was unwilling to challenge the occupation provisions. Through a special representative, Mr. Joseph E. Davies, he informed Mr. Churchill that all the agreements made by President Roosevelt would be honored.³⁵

The Venezia Giulia Confrontation

In spite of the potential for misunderstanding or incidents where forces of two allies with conflicting interests met, the link-up of US-British and Soviet forces in Germany and Austria took place without serious difficulty or incident. The same could not be said of the Italian theater, where the Yugoslavian ally proved hostile, stubborn, and difficult. A serious confrontation had developed early in 1945, as Yugoslav forces fighting the Germans under the leadership of the communist partisan Josip Broz (Tito) approached the borders of Italy. Marshal Tito declared his intention to take over portions of northern Italy, including the

important seaport of Trieste and the surrounding territory of Venezia Giulia. The Allied commander responsible for this area, Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander, SACMED (Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean), realizing that Marshal Tito had already infiltrated much of Venezia Giulia and set up his own civil administration, informed the Yugoslav leader that he intended to occupy Venezia Giulia and to administer it by military government. Marshal Tito initially appeared agreeable to this, asking only that his civil administration be retained in those places where it was already operating.³⁶

As the German forces fell back under the combined attack of US-British forces in Italy and of Yugoslav forces in Yugoslavia, the need for a firm agreement with the Tito regime became more apparent. Field Marshal Alexander on 26 April 1945 informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff that he meant to occupy those portions of Venezia Giulia essential to his operations. These would include the city of Trieste, the naval base of Pola, and the lines of communication from those points leading into Austria.³⁷

Field Marshal Alexander had no directive to occupy these places because the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not acted on a proposal that would set up Allied Military Government in Venezia Giulia. This had been prepared by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee and approved by the British Chiefs of Staff in early April. Prime Minister Churchill pressed President Truman for swift action, saying:

The great thing is to be there before Tito's guerrillas are in occupation. Therefore it does not seem to me there is a minute to wait. The actual status of Trieste can be determined at leisure. Possession is nine points of the law. I beg you for an early decision.³⁸

Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew wished to authorize allied occupation "as a matter of great political urgency." On 28 April he asked Secretary of War Stimson to concur. General Marshall, whose opinion was sought by Secretary Stimson, counseled caution in confronting the Yugoslavs. He suggested that Field Marshal Alexander be instructed, in case the Yugoslavs failed to cooperate, to take no action on the spot but to consult with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Instructions to this effect were sent to SACMED on 28 April.³⁹

Warned by the Acting Secretary of State on 30 April that Marshal Tito would probably not accept allied control over Venezia Giulia without some kind of resistance and that the British commander presently had authority to use US forces under his command as he saw fit anywhere in Italy, President Truman emphasized to Prime Minister Churchill on 1 May his wish that US forces not be used to fight Yugoslav forces or for political purposes in the Balkans. Mr. Churchill had just counseled the President that the Yugoslavs were "Russian tools and beneficiaries." If the United States and Great Britain took a strong stance in Venezia Giulia, it would "split or render ineffective the Communist movement in Italy." Later that day Secretary Stimson informed Mr. Grew that the Army Staff was "inclined to stay off completely." They thought the Russians

were supporting the Yugoslavs and considered that a clash with Tito's forces was "very likely."⁴⁰

On 2 May British troops entered Trieste, mingling warily with Yugoslav forces already there. Marshal Tito protested strongly to Field Marshal Alexander over the entry of British forces in areas that he considered his exclusive sphere of operation. In doing so he clearly repudiated his previous agreements, telling SACMED that his forces would "liberate" and administer all land lying east of the Isonzo River, deep within Venezia Giulia. This he claimed as a reward for all the Yugoslav blood that had been shed in the allied cause.

United States forces were not yet involved in Venezia Giulia, although SACMED forces contained about 50 percent American troops. The garrison of 7,000 Germans in Trieste had surrendered to British forces who were under instructions not to use force against the Yugoslavs except in self defense.⁴¹

When Germany surrendered, and President Truman proclaimed that "the flags of freedom fly all over Europe," the question remained: whose flags would fly in Trieste? SACMED suggested that his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General William D. Morgan, travel to Belgrade and attempt to negotiate a military demarcation agreement. The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed, provided such a pact did not prejudice final territorial disposition in the peace settlement.⁴²

During discussions with General Morgan, Marshal Tito remained adamant. He continued to insist upon the right to occupy the region east of the Isonzo and asserted that, at the peace conference, he would claim additional territory west of that river.⁴³

Acting Secretary of State Grew believed that what was taking place in Yugoslavia was intolerable and of such importance to the future peace of Europe and to US policy and prestige that the President must act. Denouncing Marshal Tito's actions, Mr. Grew informed the President on 10 May that the question was whether the United States was going to "uphold the fundamental principal of territorial settlement by orderly processes, against force, intimidation or blackmail." It was a matter also of whether the United States was going to permit the Soviet Union, which had acted directly in the case of Poland, to operate through its satellite, Yugoslavia, in the Mediterranean theater to set up whatever states and boundaries looked best for the future power of the USSR. Yugoslavian (Russian) occupation of Trieste, which was the vital outlet of large areas of Central Europe, would have most far reaching consequences beyond the immediate territory involved, Mr. Grew warned the President.⁴⁴

On 11 May, the President consulted Admiral Leahy, General Marshall and Mr. Grew on the problem in Venezia Giulia. General Marshall emphasized that the United States had no military interest in the territory. One US division was in the area, and he feared that even minor clashes might embroil the United States with the USSR. Therefore, the Army Chief of Staff thought that presentation of a strong joint communication to Marshal Tito should precede the dispatch of action orders to SACMED. Diplomatic pressure might move the Yugoslavs to accept a face-saving formula that would assure allied control of the essential lines of communication. President Truman remarked that these representations, then being written in the State Department, should be "very strong."⁴⁵

A few hours later, the President cabled to the British Prime Minister:

Although the stability of Italy and the future orientation of that country with respect to Russia may well be at stake the present issue, as I see it, . . . is essentially one of deciding whether our two countries are going to permit our Allies to engage in uncontrolled land grabbing or tactics which are all too reminiscent of those of Hitler and Japan.

He suggested that they insist upon "complete and exclusive control of Trieste and Pola, the line of communication through Gorizia and Monfalcone, and an area sufficiently to the east of this line to permit proper administrative control." In closing, Mr. Truman raised the larger issue of East-West relations:

I also suggest we both inform Stalin. . . . If we stand firm on this issue, as we are doing on Poland, we can hope to avoid a host of other similar encroachments.

Concurrently, General Marshall drafted a cautionary message for SACMED:

For the time being, you will exert no military pressure on Tito. . . . You should take steps and make arrangements so that hostilities involving your forces and those of Yugoslavia can only [be precipitated] by the Yugoslavs.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff dispatched this communication on 12 May.⁴⁶

Meanwhile, the Prime Minister heartily endorsed the President's message of 11 May and pressed him to seek "an early and speedy showdown and settlement with Russia." Mr. Churchill sought a prompt summit conference and pleaded that allied armies should stay in Central Europe until satisfactory settlements were achieved. His message of 12 May contained a passage that later became famous:

An iron curtain is drawn down upon their front. We do not know what is going on behind. . . . To sum up, this issue of a settlement with Russia before our strength has gone seems to me to dwarf all others.

Mr. Churchill's plea left US policymakers unmoved. A terse comment by Admiral Leahy to the President typified the Administration's attitude: "An arrangement with the Soviets satisfactory to Great Britain can be accomplished only in several years, if ever." On 14 May, President Truman told the Prime Minister that he wished to "await further developments" before halting redeployment of US forces, some of whom were to go to the Far East. Then swinging from Central Europe to Italy, he added that "unless Tito's forces should attack, it is impossible for me to involve this country in another war."⁴⁷

On 14 May, Field Marshal Alexander defined his needs as (a) occupation of Trieste and the lines of communication to Austria and (b) full use—though he did not specify actual possession—of Pola. Forthwith, the US and UK Governments formally asked Marshal Tito to accept the authority of SACMED over those areas; they also advised Premier Stalin of their action. Three days later, the Yugoslavs agreed that allied forces could use Trieste and the lines of communication run-

ning to Tarvisio in Austria. Further, they stated that their troops west of the Isonzo already had withdrawn. They insisted, however, that all territory to the eastward must remain under their control. Although it was clothed in conciliatory phrases, Marshal Tito's answer amounted to a refusal, since he did not agree to US-UK occupation of Trieste, only use of its port. The Yugoslav Army would hold Trieste, he stated.⁴⁸

Marshal Tito's defiant attitude had already raised the possibility that some sort of military action against Yugoslavia might become necessary. Shortly before the Marshal's reply had been received, President Truman had met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discuss possible military measures. He was particularly anxious to know what allied forces could be concentrated in the affected areas if it appeared a show of military strength were needed. "I believed," President Truman later wrote, "that all that it was necessary for us to do to impress Tito was to show such overpowering strength that he would back down. . . ." He asked if General Eisenhower could send three divisions of US troops to southern Austria where they could be in easy range of Trieste. He also asked Admiral King about sending naval units into the Adriatic and sought information from General Arnold about air support for necessary operations. "General Marshall reported," President Truman recalled, "that Eisenhower was prepared to dispatch General Patton with up to five armored divisions to the Brenner Pass and, if necessary, into Italy. Admiral King reported that units of the Mediterranean fleet had been alerted to steam into the Adriatic, and General Arnold told me that several Air Force squadrons were ready to move at a moment's notice."⁴⁹

Yugoslav refusal to allow the occupation of Trieste was reported by Field Marshal Alexander to General Eisenhower on 17 May along with the observation that it appeared to him that the Yugoslavs could be stopped only by military force. Two days later Prime Minister Churchill, at a higher level, called Marshal Tito's answer "completely negative." "We clearly cannot leave matters in this state," he told President Truman in a message on 19 May, "... immediate action will now be necessary."⁵⁰

President Truman agreed. But his interpretation of "immediate action" was not an attack with military forces but a rejection of Marshal Tito's answer and a call upon him to reconsider his decision. At the same time, he suggested to Prime Minister Churchill that they put up a show of force by immediately reinforcing the front lines so that the allies would have a clear and readily visible preponderance of force. General Eisenhower was already in touch with Field Marshal Alexander concerning the necessary preparations. On 20 May, the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved plans submitted by General Eisenhower for moving the five divisions into central Austria directly north of the Italy-Yugoslav border.⁵¹

Before these military measures could be put into effect, Marshal Tito began retreating from his hard-line position. On 21 May, he notified the UK Foreign Office that he accepted Allied Military Government (AMG) throughout the designated area, provided that (1) AMG acted through civil authorities already functioning, (2) Yugoslav Army units remained in the area, and (3) representatives of the Yugoslav Army participated in AMG. Premier Stalin promptly supported this solution, but SACMED was not completely satisfied. In a message to the Com-

bined Chiefs of Staff on 23 May, Field Marshal Alexander recommended rejection of Tito's provisos. SACMED still wanted a line of demarcation (the "Morgan Line") west of which Yugoslav forces would be limited to 2,000 regulars. He reported, however, that occupation of the port of Pola was neither necessary nor desirable.⁵²

The British Chiefs of Staff supported SACMED's stand, but the US State Department asked President Truman to adopt the earlier position that included actual possession of Pola. To this the Joint Chiefs of Staff objected. Since SACMED said occupation was unnecessary, they saw no point in trying to acquire the town. If the State Department found political factors overriding, they asked that this military opinion be presented to the President. Secretaries Stimson and Forrestal endorsed the JCS position. Mr. Truman ruled that, although allied negotiators would ask for Pola, SACMED would not be required to occupy the town if Marshal Tito remained adamant.⁵³

This position was transmitted to Belgrade on 2 June. Mr. Churchill had wished to present a three-day ultimatum and then, if Marshal Tito failed to provide satisfaction, to order Field Marshal Alexander to occupy as much of Venezia Giulia as he thought necessary. Once more, the Prime Minister reminded the President of wider issues:

The fact that the Russians have so far remained quiescent is important. If we once let it be thought that there is no point beyond which we cannot be pushed about, there will be no future for Europe except another war more terrible than anything the world has yet seen.

Although Mr. Truman apparently disapproved issuance of an ultimatum, the allied Ambassaaors did tell the Yugoslavs that this proposal represented the "final word" of their governments. Marshal Tito agreed to allied occupation of all territory west of the so-called "Morgan Line." Trieste and Pola were included in the allied occupation zone, as well as the roads and railroads running from Trieste to Austria.⁵⁴

Creation of the United Nations

One of the foundation stones of President Roosevelt's somewhat Utopian plans for the postwar world was the creation of an organization of nations devoted to the maintenance of continuing peace and security throughout the world—a sort of League of Nations that would succeed. This matter had been discussed intermittently at meetings of US-Soviet-British leaders since 1941, and considerable correspondence had been exchanged containing ideas and suggested principles for establishment of the international organization.⁵⁵

At the Dumbarton Oaks Conference called at US initiative and lasting from 21 August to 7 October 1944, representatives of the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union discussed in detail the composition, objectives and

guiding principles of the contemplated world organization. At the conclusion of the conference, the four nations issued a communique that, in effect, provided the basis for a postwar conference to discuss and, it was hoped, to establish an effective United Nations organization.

The proposals that emerged were based in the main on papers that had been developed in the US State Department in close consultation with President Roosevelt since 1942. Even the name of the organization, the United Nations, had been proposed by President Roosevelt. The most serious stumbling block to unanimous agreement lay in the voting procedures to be adopted for the Security Council, the principal organ of the organization charged with primary responsibility for maintenance of peace and security. These were left unresolved for the moment.⁵⁶

As already noted, one of President Roosevelt's main objectives at Yalta had been to secure agreement on full support of the United Nations organization by Premier Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill. There were growing signs that the Russians were at best "lukewarm" on the creation of such a world body and might well decide not to join in after all if it were not clearly in their self-interest. At Yalta, Premier Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill accepted a compromise proposal on voting in the Security Council and agreed to discuss trusteeship "of dependent areas."⁵⁷

This agreement opened the way for the convocation of a general conference of nations to draft a charter. Forty-six countries were represented at the conference in San Francisco which opened on 25 April 1945. The end of the war in Europe was plainly in sight as the conference convened. Already the widening differences between the Soviet Union and the western allies were assuming an ominous cast that added a sense of urgency to the conference designed to insure and maintain world peace.

The conference dragged on through 51 days of sharp debate and negotiation. Finally, on 25 June 1945, with Germany defeated, delegates of fifty governments unanimously approved a Charter of the United Nations, a Statute for an International Court of Justice, and "Interim Arrangements" for the establishment of a Preparatory Commission of the United Nations. On the following day the Charter was signed by 153 delegates, and a space left for the signature of Poland, whose government was not represented at the conference.⁵⁸

Preliminaries to the Potsdam Conference

The signing of the United Nations Charter did nothing to resolve the growing differences among the wartime allies. As early as March 1945 Prime Minister Churchill had become convinced that another meeting of the Heads of Government was therefore urgently required. He had suggested this in a letter to Premier Stalin in late March but his bid had been ignored. As the problems deepened, however, Prime Minister Churchill grew more determined and brought the matter up with President Truman. The latter agreed that such a meeting would

be desirable but he preferred that the idea originate with Premier Stalin. Meanwhile he told the Prime Minister that "my present intention is to adhere to our interpretation of the Yalta agreements, and to stand firm on our presently announced attitude toward all the questions at issue."⁵⁹

Advised by Ambassador Harriman that the problem of US relations with the USSR had become the number one problem affecting the future of the world, and that at the present the two great powers were drifting farther and farther apart, President Truman decided to establish a direct and more effective contact with Marshal Stalin. In late May, the President sent Mr. Harry Hopkins, formerly President Roosevelt's main adviser and the American believed to be the most trusted by Premier Stalin, to Moscow to discuss the major issues between the two powers. Mr. Hopkins was received warmly by the Soviet Premier and at their first meeting suggested another Heads of Government meeting. Premier Stalin acquiesced readily and the matter was set in motion.⁶⁰

Mr. Hopkins met several times with Premier Stalin in company with Ambassador Harriman and Foreign Minister Molotov and on one occasion dined alone with the Soviet leader. Their conversations, while cordial, were frank and serious. Premier Stalin listed several specific grievances: (1) the US sponsorship of Argentina in the United Nations; (2) the US sponsorship of France as a member of the German Reparations Commission, thereby humiliating the Soviet Union by putting it on an equal basis with France; (3) the disposition of the German Navy and Merchant fleets captured by the Western allies without giving the Soviet Union a one-third share; (4) President Truman's abrupt termination of Lend Lease to the USSR; and (5) the attitude of the United States toward the Polish question. Premier Stalin said that anyone with common sense could see that the present government must form the basis of the new one agreed at Yalta. He blamed British Conservatives for opposing him in Poland. The Soviets were a simple people, he stated, but they were not fools, and this was a mistake the West frequently made. Soviet patience had its limits, he warned.⁶¹

Mr. Hopkins warded off Premier Stalin's objections on these matters, explaining the US reasons for the Argentine and French initiatives, agreeing that the United States would support Soviet claims to German shipping, and giving assurances that the curtailment of lend lease was not intended to offend the Soviet Union or to apply pressure on it. The only concession that the Soviet Premier would make on the Polish question was to agree to allow a few noncommunists to enter the provisional government of Poland. Finally, he insisted that the contemplated summit conference be held in Soviet-dominated Berlin in mid-July, an arrangement to which both President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill agreed.⁶²

JCS Views of Soviet Demands on Turkey

The only participation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in preparations for this conference came as a result of Soviet demands on Turkey. In mid-June 1945

Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov asked the Turkish Government to accede to three Soviet "desires": (1) revision of the 1936 Montreux Convention governing passage through the Turkish territory near the Bosphorus; (2) the cession by Turkey to the USSR of bases in the Straits; (3) retrocession of the Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan in Eastern Turkey. The Turkish Government had rejected all three suggestions.⁶³

Although the Turkish Straits problem was mainly political, there were some military ramifications. Indications pointed to a Soviet intention to bring this matter to a head at Potsdam by pressing for a revision of the Montreux Convention which gave Turkey almost exclusive control of the international waterway. In light of this prospect, the Department of State asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their views. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee drafted two divergent replies for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Generals Embick and Fairchild felt that the United States should support demilitarization of the Straits as the Soviets desired. In the matter of granting the Soviet Union base rights in the Straits, they believed the United States should stand aloof, neither supporting nor opposing it. Admiral Willson, on the other hand, stoutly opposed any concessions to the Soviets on the area, and in a lengthy paper set forth cogent reasons for his stand. The Joint Chiefs of Staff opted for Admiral Willson's views and on 17 July incorporated them into a reply, sent through SWNCC to the Department of State.⁶⁴

The Dardanelles question, and the status of the Kiel Canal, which could arise in the same context, were, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out, only two of a score of similar problems that, in the aggregate, would constitute the overall problems of the peace settlement. Approaching these problems they judged it necessary for the United States to determine, in clearer perspective, how they fit into the larger picture of a general peace settlement. Only such a settlement would establish and stabilize national boundaries and rights and responsibilities in the immediate postwar period, and "thus provide a sound basis for solving the military problems of national and international security."

Other problems that would have to be faced included boundaries and bases in Europe, the disposition of Italian colonial areas, territories "detached" from Japan, islands in the Pacific, restitution of territory to China and the establishment of the trusteeship system. Although there had been no formal international agreement, most nations had accepted the principle that these problems should await the end of the war, or at least be decided as an integrated whole, not separately. The single but important exception to adherence to this principle had been on the part of the Soviet Union.

By agreement or at least by acceptance on the part of her allies, Russia has already established her claims to Eastern Poland, to the Baltic States, to parts of Finland and to Bessarabia and Ruthenia. There is reason to believe she has also obtained agreement as to her claims in the Far East. Whatever the justification of these agreements, the fact remains that, while the other great powers await the peace settlement to negotiate their proposals, and establish their rights and responsibilities, Russia has received preferred treatment, both as regards intrinsic values and as regards priority of treatment.

The reaction of the Soviet Union to this favored treatment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued, had been to demand "further special consideration." It was their understanding "that at present Russia is pressing the question of the Dardanelles, Turkish areas in north east Turkey, is agitating the question of access to the Persian Gulf, has occupied the Island of Bornholm and has made proposals to Norway looking to establish Russian bases in Bear Island and Spitsbergen." Up to now the Soviet Union had succeeded because it had possessed the might, if not the right, and had convinced the other nations involved that in the cases of Poland, the Baltic States, Bessarabia and Ruthenia, it would use force to take what it wanted if its demands were not agreed to.

Soviet pressures on Turkey over the Dardanelles were not of the same nature as the other problems. "While it is true," the Joint Chiefs of Staff asserted, "that the United States and Great Britain could not successfully oppose a determined Russian effort to seize the desired area by force, it is also true that as Russian demands progress further afield, her power to seize her objectives progressively declines, and there is a diminishing ratio of return to risk and effort." Soviet intentions also had to be gauged in the light of the facts that the Soviet Union was "war weary" and weakened economically by its great efforts. The USSR would need years and substantial support and assistance from the United States to recover. Nor was it likely that the USSR would wish to break with the new United Nations organization, or more particularly with the United States over the issue of whether the current demands be met "now" rather than as part of a general peace settlement.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the United States postpone discussion of the Dardanelles and Kiel Canal question if possible. If this were not possible, the United States should agree to the revision of the Montreux Convention and support the demilitarization of the Straits. Failing that, it should oppose granting any nation other than Turkey bases or other rights for military control on the Dardanelles Straits.⁶⁵

These JCS views were forwarded by the SWNCC to the Secretary of State, and there is strong evidence that Secretary Byrnes passed them to President Truman for his use at Potsdam.⁶⁶

The Meeting at Potsdam

President Truman was accompanied to Potsdam by his new Secretary of State, James Byrnes, Prime Minister Churchill by Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, and Premier Stalin by Foreign Minister Molotov. The top military advisers of all three nations, including the US, British, and Soviet Chiefs of Staff, were also present at Potsdam. Prior to the main sessions at Potsdam, the President, who had never met either of his counterparts, met privately with each of them. The first plenary session, of which there were to be sixteen, convened on the afternoon of 17 July and at Stalin's suggestion, President Truman was named to preside over the meetings. On 25 July sessions were suspended to allow the British representa-

tives to return to London to await the results of the General Election. On 28 July meetings again resumed, this time with a new cast; Prime Minister Clement R. Attlee and Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin replaced Messrs. Churchill and Eden, whose party had been defeated in the election. This replacement had little or no effect on the British attitude toward any of the questions at issue. By the time the Potsdam meetings adjourned on 2 August 1945, the Heads of State had taken action on the following major matters: Poland; the Dardanelles; German Reparations and economic policy; and establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers.⁶⁷

The Polish problem had two major facets: establishment of the provisional government agreed at Yalta; and Poland's new borders. These two matters occupied considerable prominence in the discussion of Poland but, in the end, faced with Soviet occupation of Poland and a stubborn and unyielding stance on both issues, the Western leaders felt it necessary to yield and accept the Soviet position despite their own misgivings and distrust of Poland's new government.

At Soviet insistence Great Britain and the United States withdrew their recognition of the Polish Government-in-Exile, the London Government. Great Britain promised to turn over all its assets to the new government. The Three Powers thereupon recognized the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity as the rightful government of Poland. They noted that this government had agreed to the "holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. . . ."

In the second matter, the cession of lands in the west to Poland, the debate was much sharper. At Yalta, Poland's eastern frontier had been moved westward to the Curzon Line, and the vacated lands ceded to the Soviet Union. In compensation for this loss, the Heads of State had pledged that Poland would receive "substantial accession" of territory at the expense of Germany.

As the Soviet armies moved into Germany, conquered territory had been handed over to the Lublin government. Both President Truman and the British leadership felt that the Soviet Union had thereby taken advantage of a wartime situation to create a fifth occupying power in Germany. Premier Stalin explained that it had been necessary to turn over administration of lands conquered in Germany to the Lublin Government in order to maintain a "friendly" rear area for Soviet troops. The Poles were therefore claiming this land as traditional Polish land and as compensation for their losses in eastern Poland. They wanted all German territory up to the line of the Oder-Neisse Rivers, including that portion of East Prussia not given to the USSR and the free city of Danzig. The region in question was an important food-producing area and would represent a substantial loss to the agricultural output available for feeding the millions of Germans in the US and British zones.

Although Premier Stalin claimed that the German population had fled completely, British estimates placed the remaining German population at nine million who would flee into Germany once the Poles took complete control. At Soviet insistence the representatives of the new Polish government were invited to come to Potsdam to explain their claim to this territory. These men talked separately with Prime Minister Churchill and President Truman on 24 July. The decision reached on this matter, although noting that final delimitation of the Polish border must

await the peace settlement, nevertheless in effect gave the Polish government, and the Soviet Union, all conquered German territory that they had asked for.

When the Heads of State took up the Dardanelles question, Premier Stalin, as anticipated, demanded termination of the Montreux Convention, governance of the Black Sea Straits bilaterally by Turkey and the USSR, and the acquisition of Soviet military bases in that area. Following JCS advice, President Truman tried to defer discussion of this question. The Western powers, meanwhile, were working upon a wider plan. Transport was exceedingly scarce in war-ravaged Central Europe. Along the Danube, Anglo-American forces had captured much of the shipping but Soviet troops controlled long stretches of the river bank. Since a multinational Rhine Navigation Agency was coming into being, General Eisenhower suggested that a similar body regulate the Danube River. On 22 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked Mr. Truman to discuss this question directly with Marshal Stalin.⁶⁸

When Premier Stalin returned to the Straits question on 23 July, President Truman tabled a sweeping counter offer:

The United States Government proposes that there be free and unrestricted navigation of such inland waterways as border on two or more states and that the regulation of such navigation be provided by international authorities representative of all nations directly interested in navigation on the waterways concerned.

The Rhine and Danube Rivers, the Black Sea Straits, and the Kiel Canal all would fall within the plan's purview. Prime Minister Churchill supported the US proposal, but Marshal Stalin would discuss only the Turkish Straits. There was no resolution of the Dardanelles question at Potsdam.⁶⁹

Reparations by Germany for the devastation and destruction that she created during World War II was a matter to which the Soviet Union gave the highest priority. At Yalta, Premier Stalin, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill had agreed to use a figure of \$20 billion as a basis for further discussion of German reparations. Of this total the Soviet Union would receive \$10 billion, Great Britain and the United States \$8 billion, and all other countries combined, \$2 billion. An Allied Commission for Reparations had been created at Yalta to study the matter.

In the final agreement, no mention was made of a specific figure but it was agreed that Germany would be required to compensate "to the greatest possible extent for the loss and suffering that she had caused to the United Nations." Basic principles for effecting reparations would be that the Soviet Union would remove her share and that of Poland from her own zone, while the United States and Great Britain similarly would meet their own claims and those of other countries, such as France, from the Western Zones. However, the Soviet Union would be granted from the Western Zones 15 percent of "industrial capital" equipment from the metallurgical, chemical, and machine manufacturing industries excess to Germany's peacetime needs and in exchange would furnish the Western Zones an equivalent in food, various raw materials, and commodities. Above this, an additional 10 percent of such industrial capital equipment would be

granted to the Soviet Union from the Western Zones without any payment or exchange in return. Various other provisions were agreed, mainly regulating the removal of equipment noted above.⁷⁰

The Heads of State also established principles concerning the German economy. They agreed on closely controlled production aimed at Germany's peacetime needs only, decentralization of the German economy to eliminate monopolies, emphasis on agriculture and peaceful domestic industries, and probably most significant, treatment of Germany as a "single economic unit." Only the necessary allied controls would be placed on the German economy and these would be determined by the Control Council and administered by the Germans themselves. Priority measures to be taken included: essential repair of transport; enlargement of coal production; greatest possible increases in agricultural production; and emergency repair of housing and essential utilities.

At the first plenary session, President Truman proposed that a Council of Foreign Ministers be established by the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France, and China. Its mission would be to prepare treaties of peace with the former enemy states in Europe. The Council would also propose settlement of outstanding territorial disputes in Europe and would consider such other matters as the member governments might decide to refer to it. Both Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin agreed in principle to the US proposal but the latter objected to Chinese participation in any but the Italian treaty. As a result of his objections it was agreed that only those powers who had signed the armistice agreement would address themselves to the respective peace treaties. For this purpose France was deemed a signatory of the Italian armistice. Four powers therefore would draft the Italian treaty, three would draft the Balkan treaties, and two, the Soviet Union and Great Britain, the treaty with Finland. The Heads of State decided at Potsdam that the Council of Foreign Ministers would hold its first meeting in London during September 1945. The establishment of this body was in no way to prejudice the periodical consultations among the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union that had been agreed on at Yalta.

The Heads of State also dealt with a number of other issues. Premier Stalin's earlier strong concern that the Soviet Union would be cut out of its equitable share of vessels from the German Merchant and Naval Fleets was dispelled at Potsdam. Both President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill agreed in principle to divide these assets equally among the three powers. With respect to Italy's former colonies, one of which the Soviet Union asked for, it was eventually agreed that the disposition of the Italian colonies would be dealt with by the Council of Foreign Ministers in London in connection with the negotiation of a peace treaty with Italy. A problem that was to have later serious implications, the Soviet occupation of portions of Iran, was dismissed by the three powers with an agreement that all their troops would be withdrawn from Teheran at once. Further withdrawals from Iran would be discussed by the Council of Foreign Ministers in September, although it was agreed that troops might remain under the present treaty until six months after the close of the war with Japan.

The agreements reached at Potsdam did not solve the problems of the post-war world. Little was really accomplished there, despite a show of progress and fairly optimistic pronouncements by the principals.⁷¹

The War Ends

The feeling that Soviet participation in the war against Japan was very necessary and would make victory over the Japanese much less costly and quicker of achievement had been a basic tenet of the policy toward the Soviet Union for several years.⁷² During the Potsdam Conference an event occurred that made Soviet entry much less urgent if indeed at all required. President Truman was informed by Secretary Stimson, who flew hurriedly to Potsdam, that an atomic device had been successfully exploded at Alamogordo, New Mexico, the culmination of many long months of highly secret experimentation. He had confided at once in Prime Minister Churchill, and somewhat later had informed Premier Stalin of the successful test of an atomic device. The latter seemed unsurprised and not particularly impressed. He had told President Truman at the time that he was glad to hear it and hoped the United States would make good use of the device against the Japanese.⁷³

The United States did so. On 5 August 1945 an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, with devastating effect. The Soviet Union announced four days later, on 9 August, that it was at war with Japan and began operations in Manchuria against the Japanese. In the meantime, calls upon the Japanese to surrender had gone unanswered. On 9 August a second atom bomb was dropped on the Japanese city of Nagasaki. On 14 August, after several days of tentative negotiation, the Japanese Government surrendered. The formal surrender documents were signed aboard the battleship USS MISSOURI in Tokyo harbor, General Douglas MacArthur officiating, on 3 September 1945. World War II was over.

US-Soviet Confrontation Intensifies: September 1945–March 1947

The London Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers

By the autumn of 1945, President Truman and his advisers found themselves facing a series of perilous political situations, any of which could have brought the United States and the USSR into open conflict. Unilateral and arbitrary initiatives by the Soviet Union in several areas of Europe steadily eroded any lingering hope that some reasonable accommodation could be reached between that nation and the Western powers. Yet the frank recognition that, militarily, the United States was in no position to force a solution to any of the situations in the Balkans, in the Mediterranean or elsewhere, rendered US officials extremely reluctant to move to a higher level of confrontation. That these troubles were deep-seated became painfully apparent, little more than a week after the formal Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay, when the Council of Foreign Ministers established at Yalta met in London.

The five principals at this meeting, convened on 11 September, were US Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault, and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh. As agreed at Potsdam, their primary purpose was preparation for conferences on peace treaties with Italy, Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. One of the main US concerns, however, was the “unmistakeable evidence” of Soviet expansion, not only in Poland and the Balkans, but elsewhere. By this time the Soviet Union had made clear her demands for portions of East Prussia, a share in the administration of the Ruhr, control of the Dardanelles, and surprisingly, control of the former Italian colony in North Africa, Tripolitania.¹

The conference was a fiasco and a clear setback for those who had still hoped for improved US-Soviet relations. Secretary Byrnes later recalled:

Although I had come to the conference thinking the Foreign Ministers might reach agreement on general principles . . . on the treaties within ten days or two weeks, it was apparent by the end of the first week that this was a vain hope. We had spent hours talking about procedure. France wanted to discuss the control of Germany. Molotov wanted to discuss German reparations. He also raised the question of the Control Council in Japan. We had made little progress on the Italian peace treaty and the Soviet delegation was insisting that Britain and the United States extend diplomatic recognition to their puppet governments in eastern Europe.

This last demand became the main stumbling block, since both the United States and Great Britain steadfastly refused recognition of these countries until demonstrably free elections had been held in each of them.²

Mr. Molotov proved particularly stubborn and perverse. He demanded that France and China be barred from all discussions of Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. While this could be justified under a strict interpretation of the Potsdam Agreement, the Foreign Ministers had agreed at the outset that all members of the Council could participate in discussions. The Western Foreign Ministers would not yield on this issue.³

The conference ended in a complete stalemate. On 2 October, the Council adjourned its London session without even issuing a protocol. This marked a significant turning point in US relations with the USSR. For the first time the United States had allowed a conference to break down rather than make further concessions to Soviet demands.⁴

Within a week following the London conference, the JSSC expressed deep concern over what it termed "the recent aggressive and uncompromising attitude of the Soviet Union." The JSSC warned the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 9 October that important US interests—security in the Pacific, and stability in Europe—were yet to be accomplished through negotiations with the Soviet Union, although such negotiations had been going on for nearly a year. In that same period the Soviet Union had made "imposing" gains by absorbing the Baltic States, the eastern third of Poland, and part of East Prussia. "She controls and is ruthlessly developing her own governmental system in Rumania and Bulgaria and to a lesser extent in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia," the JSSC said. "She is in occupation of Eastern Germany and Austria. In the Pacific, although she was in the war against Japan for only a few days, she has obtained possession of the Kuriles and South Sakhalin and is in occupation of Manchuria and Northern Korea, where the Russian system at its worst is being demonstrated."

While not aware of all Soviet unfulfilled demands, the JSSC did know of Soviet aims with regard to such areas as northeastern Turkey, Latin America, the Dardanelles, the Dodecanese Islands, the Bear Islands, and Spitzbergen. At London, Soviet representatives had also asked for trusteeship rights over former Italian colonies in Africa, stabilization of their position in the Balkans and a "coordinate position in the occupation and administration of Japan." In Latin America the Soviets were carrying on subversive actions on a wide scale that could, if successful, weaken the fundamental US military position. "It is apparent," the JSSC warned, "that Russia's demands thrive on her past successes and develop further

her aggressive attitude." The Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted these views, and, on 15 October, approved the JSSC recommendation for a reassessment of US military capabilities in view of Soviet aggressive policies, to be integrated with State Department views and given to the President.⁵

A Problem in Czechoslovakia

Meanwhile the direct effects of US demobilization and military retrenchment had become apparent in Czechoslovakia. In that recently liberated country, a provisional government under the prewar President, Edouard Benes, was preparing for free elections. US Army units were stationed in the southwestern portion of Czechoslovakia; the Red Army occupied the remainder. Under Soviet pressure, Mr. Benes publicly appealed for all foreign forces to depart as soon as possible. Privately, however, he asked that the United States synchronize its withdrawals with those of the USSR. The Soviets did, in fact, withdraw some of their forces and the United States matched this action. By August only four US divisions remained in the country. On 30 August, General Eisenhower reported that because of the accelerated redeployment of forces from Europe and the overall decline in Army strength all US troops should be pulled out of Czechoslovakia. Since the State Department wanted a token force to stay as long as Soviet soldiers remained, the War Department asked General Eisenhower whether this seemed feasible. On 3 September, he advised that the "only alternative" to complete withdrawal was retention of at least two infantry divisions in Czechoslovakia. If the US contingent became too weak to offer a show of force, he feared that the current "excellent relations" with Czech and Soviet forces would be jeopardized.⁶

The State Department still opposed a total withdrawal. On 17 September, Acting Secretary Dean Acheson addressed Secretary Stimson as follows:

As you are aware, the presence of our troops in Czechoslovakia has been welcomed by the populace and Government as the most concrete and telling evidence possible of our interest in the restoration of stable and democratic conditions in Czechoslovakia. This manifestation of our interest likewise has an important political effect in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

By fostering a belief that the United States had lost interest in the affairs of this area, immediate and total withdrawal might become a "basic and upsetting" factor in the forthcoming Czech elections. Mr. Acheson urged "most strongly" that two divisions remain in Czechoslovakia. The Administration, meanwhile, would seek agreement with the Soviets for a complete (but simultaneous) withdrawal.⁷

This slowdown did not please the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On 6 October, they informed the SWNCC in a forceful memorandum that they had agreed very reluctantly to leave a two division force in Czechoslovakia until 15 November at a cost of "considerable administrative effort." Any postponement beyond that

date would require an upward revision of the theater troop ceiling and a curtailment of demobilization. For these reasons, such a decision must not be taken until approved by the President. They reminded the SWNCC that both the Executive and Legislative branches of government had committed themselves to a speedy demobilization.⁸

A week later elections to the Czech National Assembly produce a noncommunist majority. General Eisenhower then proposed that, as soon as the resettlement of Sudeten Germans ended, US forces should quit the country regardless of Soviet action. His political adviser, Mr. Robert Murphy, said that US influence upon Czech thinking was "exceedingly limited." He saw "small profit, if any, in the indefinite retention of our forces."⁹

Still confronted by State Department opposition, Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson reiterated to the Secretary of State on 26 October the JCS insistence that the withdrawal issue be laid before the Chief Executive should an extension beyond 15 November be contemplated. A confrontation between the two Departments proved unnecessary. Secretary of State Byrnes had been delaying any direct appeal by President Truman to Premier Stalin until the two leaders could discuss more urgent East-West differences. Finally, on 2 November, Mr. Truman asked Marshal Stalin to agree upon the completion of simultaneous withdrawals by 1 December. The Premier cabled his assent on 9 November. US and Soviet soldiers departed, and Czechoslovakia entered a period of precarious neutrality. Thus demobilization severely strained, but did not actually distort, the execution of foreign policy.¹⁰

Defining US Foreign Policy

Obviously concerned over the recent confrontation in London, President Truman delivered his first major foreign policy address on 27 October 1945 at Navy Day ceremonies in New York. Using the device of listing twelve "fundamentals" of US foreign policy, the President warned that the United States disapproved of any territorial changes not based in the free will of the people. He disavowed any intention on the part of the United States to acquire additional territory. The President called for democratic processes in the selection of forms of government by all peoples who were prepared for self-government and for freedom of the seas and free navigation of rivers. He pointedly warned against any outside interference in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere and called for setting up peaceful democratic governments in former enemy states and for cooperative efforts, using force if needed, under the United Nations to ensure peace. In some respects these fundamentals were vague and trite, but the overall effect of his speech was to define a foreign policy, based on specific principles, and to declare that the United States was prepared to defend these principles using whatever force had to be brought to bear to do so. What the speech did not do was spell out clearly for the Soviet Union those areas of US interest consid-

ered most vital nor what concrete policies the United States would follow in respect to any of these interests.¹¹

The Department of State made an attempt to translate the generalities into specific policies on 1 December 1945 when it enumerated the “objectives” of US foreign policy. Again the “objectives” listed were platitudinal in nature and addressed general problems, mainly social and economic. They did stress full support of the United Nations and strong effort to prevent former enemy states from again endangering the peace of the world. But after listing these broad factors, the Department of State got down to particulars.

With specific respect to US relations with the Soviet Union, the State Department asserted that the United States must never compromise any of its fundamental principles in seeking collaboration with that country. Nevertheless, it was mutually advantageous that the United States and the Soviet Union “collaborate in all decisions in the international relations field.” The State Department felt that “considerable progress had been made in reaching a satisfactory relationship with the Soviet Union” but that there were still a number of “very fundamental unsolved questions.” Some of the questions that had been raised by Soviet unilateral actions and the counteraction recommended by the Department of State were:

1. Soviet establishment and control of totalitarian regimes in Southeastern and Central Europe; in response the United States should refuse to recognize puppet governments in these regions, such as Rumania and Bulgaria.

2. Soviet seizure of economic control over these countries through war booty, reparations, and bilateral trade agreements, which had caused an “economic blackout” in these areas for all other nations; the United States should counter this by being prepared to grant credits to those countries in the area who were making “sincere efforts” to establish democratic regimes, ensuring that these credits would not be used to pay reparations indirectly to the Soviet Union. Also the United States should withhold credits from the Soviet Union until fully assured that Soviet economic policies were in line with those of the United States.

3. The Soviet government’s suppression of news from areas under its control; the United States should press to make sure that US correspondents granted access to those areas were permitted complete freedom in factual reporting.

4. Soviet support to communist elements in the Far East; the United States should consult with the Soviet Union in all matters affecting the area but make sure that “democratic regimes” were established there rather than Soviet-sponsored totalitarian governments.

The State Department noted that because the United States and the Soviet Union had different political and economic systems, the conduct of relations between them requires particular diligence and patience. The analysis concluded:

The adoption of a firm and friendly attitude . . . will put our relations on a much more satisfactory basis than yielding with hope of securing greater consideration in the future, or the adoption of halfway measures, or failure to make our position clear in each case. On the other hand, in order to minimize Soviet suspicions of our motives we should avoid even the appearance of taking unilateral action ourselves.¹²

The Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers

An opportunity to test the validity of the State Department's principles of policy arose when the Foreign Ministers of the Big Three met in Moscow from 16 to 26 December to discuss peace conference arrangements. After considerable debate they agreed that a peace conference would be held not later than 1 May 1946 and invited China and France to concur. Both the Soviets and the Western nations made some concessions. The Soviet Union agreed to accept the list of participating nations sponsored by the United States. For their part, the United States and the United Kingdom agreed to recognize the respective governments of Rumania and Bulgaria as soon as the Soviet Union took steps to democratize them.

The question of control in Japan was resolved fairly amicably, with the United States promising to support the establishment of a Far Eastern Commission to formulate occupation policies for Japan and an Allied Council for Japan to advise the occupation commander. Both bodies would have Soviet members. There is some evidence that, as a result of these concessions, Premier Stalin dropped his insistence on Soviet participation in the occupation of Japan. The Soviet Union agreed to co-sponsor a resolution in the United Nations providing for the creation of a United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.¹³

Secretary Byrnes felt that the impasse with the Soviet Union had been broken. He was much encouraged by the slight concessions that the Soviet leaders had made during the discussion at Moscow. As he later wrote, "... we did face the new year of 1946 with greater hope as a result of the Moscow Conference."¹⁴

Trouble in Iran

The fragility of the spirit of accord seemingly achieved at Moscow was revealed within a few days of the adjournment of the conference. It was shattered by Soviet moves to acquire land and oil rights in Iran, moves that hinted at a sinister Soviet purpose and vitiated any goodwill remaining among the wartime allies. Soviet movement of forces into Iran and high-handed actions by Soviet authorities in that nation had created a simmering problem between the Soviet Union and the Western powers that was, in the next months, to grow more and more serious. Early in the war, in order to keep German forces out of Iran, the Soviet Union and Great Britain had, with Iranian concurrence, stationed combat forces in that country. The Soviet forces occupied a strip of territory covering five provinces along the northern borders of Iran, including the traditionally dissident province of Azerbaijan. British forces were located in the southern and central regions. On 29 January 1942, the governments of the United Kingdom, the USSR, and Iran signed a Tripartite Treaty of Alliance that stated, in part:

The Allied Powers may maintain in Iranian territory, land, sea, and air forces in such numbers as they consider necessary. . . . It is understood that the presence of these forces on Iranian territory does not constitute a military occupation and

will disturb as little as possible the administration and the security forces of Iran, the economic life of the country, the normal movements of the population and the application of Iranian laws and regulations.

The United Kingdom and the Soviet Union pledged to withdraw their troops not later than six months following the end of hostilities.¹⁵

Notwithstanding all agreements, the Soviet Union closed its zone of occupation to all foreign travelers, thereby preventing allied diplomats and newsmen from reporting on conditions in northern Iran. A ban was imposed on the export of staple foodstuffs from the Soviet zone, one of the major food producing areas of Iran. As a result, famine occurred in other parts of the country, including Teheran. As one authority has noted, "The Iron Curtain was thus hung in Iran long before the English speaking democracies learned of its existence."¹⁶

When the Soviet Union demanded that Iran grant it oil concessions that would cover the five provinces bordering on Russia, Iran flatly rejected all oil concessions, not only to the Soviet Union but to the United Kingdom and the United States. On 19 May 1945, following Germany's surrender, Iran demanded that both of the occupying nations withdraw their forces. In reply both the United Kingdom and the USSR made it clear that they would not withdraw before the agreed deadline of six months after the end of hostilities. In August 1945, both nations removed their uniformed forces mainly service troops, from the area of Teheran. The Soviet Union however left thousands of men in plain clothes in the area. These included members of the Soviet secret police, the NKVD.¹⁷

Perhaps the most serious of the transgressions during Soviet occupation occurred in late 1945. Against the will of the Iranian Government, the Soviet Union aided and abetted a change in the form of government in Azerbaijan Province. Soviet forces supported a seizure of government power in Azerbaijan by the communist "Tudeh" party. When the Iranian Government attempted to send military forces to reinforce their garrison in Azerbaijan, Soviet military authorities prevented Iranian troops from entering the province. The Iranian Government was effectively prevented by the Soviet Union from applying Iranian laws in the area. As a result of an uprising of Kurdish tribesmen in the northern area, an uprising openly encouraged by the Soviet Union in December 1945, the entire province of Azerbaijan was separated from the control of the Iranian Government.¹⁸

With the support of the United States, Iran appealed to the United Nations Security Council on 19 January 1946, asking that it investigate the situation and recommend appropriate action. The Soviet Union denounced Iran's action and denied all its allegations. The Security Council, in its first real test, was unable to act, since the Soviet Union took the position that the Council was not competent to handle the dispute. The Security Council then agreed to let the two countries try to settle their differences by direct negotiations. There the matter rested uneasily while the deadline for withdrawal approached.¹⁹

Soviet Policies: Several Views

The Soviet foreign policy that underlay Soviet actions in Iran and elsewhere in the world was enunciated by Soviet Premier Stalin only a few days after the USSR had rejected Iran's appeal to the Security Council. On 9 February 1946, in a sense emulating President Truman, Premier Stalin announced what many US officials viewed as Soviet foreign policy for the postwar world. Appearing before a vast "election" audience in Moscow, he spoke darkly of forces of Fascism and reaction among the "bourgeois democracies." He argued that "peaceful international order" was impossible under the present system of capitalistic development of the world's economy. He charged that the Soviet Union must, therefore, be capable of guarding against any eventuality. The Soviet Union, he pledged, would treble its production of steel for defense. At the same time it would increase the manufacture of consumer goods.

The initial routine analysis of Stalin's speech from US Charge d'Affaires George F. Kennan, in Moscow, was not too alarming. But as verbatim transcripts of the speech arrived, US officials gradually realized the import of what the Premier had said. Secretary Byrnes expressed shock and decided that on the basis of this speech and current Soviet actions there was no longer any reason for minimizing US-Soviet differences. He saw no further justification for believing that the two nations were motivated by the common purpose of an early peace with former enemies. Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, Director of the Office of European Affairs, Department of State, commented, upon reading the speech that it constituted the "most important and authoritative guide to post-war Soviet policy." Secretary Forrestal, already suspicious of the Soviet Union, became convinced that there was no way in which democracy and communism could live together and that US policy could not be founded on the assumption that a peaceful solution of the Russian problem would be possible.²⁰

The significance of the Stalin speech was underscored on 12 February when the Department of State asked Mr. Kennan, acknowledged to be a leading US authority on the Soviet Union, for an interpretative analysis of the Soviet Premier's statements.²¹ In reply, Mr. Kennan sent to Washington on 22 February an extremely long message, which in later months assumed great significance in the shaping of US policy toward the Soviet Union. Mr. Kennan's analysis circulated among top US officials, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. Kennan identified basic features of the postwar Soviet outlook and the probable Soviet policies arising from this outlook. In his view, the Soviet Union would do everything in its power to advance its relative strength within international society. It would miss no chance to cut down the strength and influence of capitalist nations, either collectively or individually. The Soviet Union and her "friends abroad" would work hard to acerbate and exploit differences arising among capitalist nations. Should these differences flare into "an imperialist war," the war must be converted into revolutionary upheavals within the various capitalist nations. "Democratic progressive elements" overseas would be used to pressure capitalist governments into actions agreeable to Soviet interests. Socialist and social-democratic leaders abroad must be fought relentlessly.

Mr. Kennan then outlined the historical reasons for Soviet Russia's pathological suspicion of outsiders. The bitter hostility to capitalism and the neurotic Soviet view of world affairs stemmed from an almost bottomless sense of insecurity. The openness and generosity of the Western nations in cooperating with the Soviet Union during World War II had not impressed Soviet leaders or changed their attitude toward outsiders that was the product of traditional Soviet concepts of insecurity when faced with the outside world. Soviet leaders had feared penetration by foreigners for centuries. They would never compromise and would seek security in the only way they knew, destruction of rival powers. Soviet purposes must always be clothed in Marxism, the dogma that justified their instinctive fear of the outside world.

Mr. Kennan warned that the United States must expect a Soviet policy devoted to increasing the strength and prestige of the Soviet state, to intensive military industrialization, and to maximum development of Soviet armed forces. The Soviets would use every means to expand their influence as they were now seeking to do in such places as Iran and Turkey. They could at any time, should they conceive it to be strategically advantageous, apply pressure at other points.

Soviet policy was conducted on two planes: an official one, with actions taken in the name of the Soviet government, and a "subterranean plane" in which actions were undertaken by agencies of the Soviet government but for which the government would not admit responsibility. With respect to the United Nations Organization, the Soviet Union would participate only so long as it seemed to advance its interests. The USSR would not hesitate to abandon the United Nations if it seemed to be hampering Soviet aims for expansion.

The far-flung Soviet apparatus of communist controlled organizations, parties and puppet governments would be used, Mr. Kennan stated:

To undermine general political and strategic potential of [the] major western powers. Efforts will be made to disrupt national self-confidence, to hamstring measures of national defense, to increase social and industrial unrest, to stimulate all forms of disunity. . . . On [the] unofficial plane particularly violent efforts will be made to weaken the power and influence of Western Powers of [on] colonial backward, or dependent peoples. . . . Soviet dominated puppet political machines will be undergoing preparation to take over domestic power in respective colonial areas when independence is achieved. . . . Where individual governments stand in the path of Soviet purposes pressure will be brought for their removal from office. . . . In foreign countries, Communists will, as a rule, work toward destruction of all forms of personal independence, economic, political or moral. Their system can handle only individuals who have been brought into complete dependence on higher power.

* * * *

In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with the US there can be no permanent *modus vivendi*, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. . . . [The] problem of how to cope with this force in

[is] undoubtedly [the] greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably [the] greatest it will ever have to face.

Mr. Kennan had some reason to believe that the problems raised by Soviet hostility could be solved. He felt that the Soviets were flexible and would pull back if they met strong opposition at any point. The Soviets were actually weaker than the Western world if all things were considered. Their system was unproven and they suffered from great internal instability. All of their propaganda outside the Soviet security sphere was basically negative and destructive and would be relatively easy to fight if a constructive and intelligent program were put into effect. To meet the Soviet threat Mr. Kennan recommended: (1) complete recognition of the threat; (2) education of the US public to the realities of the Russian situation; (3) maintaining the health and vigor of the American society; (4) furnishing guidance and moral support to other nations; and (5) retaining the courage and self-confidence to "cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society."²²

Already, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had produced an analysis in which they, too, predicted continuing antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union. But they proposed steps toward military preparedness, a subject about which Mr. Kennan said nothing. The vehicle for these views was a JCS appraisal, made on 21 February, of the State Department foreign policy statement of 1 December 1945. In this document, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that, from the military standpoint, consolidation and development of Soviet power constituted the greatest threat to the United States in the foreseeable future:

While clashes of vital interest are unlikely to occur immediately, the expansion of Russia in the Far East may ultimately bring about serious conflict with United States policies directly, and its expansion to the west and south may involve clashes with Great Britain into which we might well be drawn.

They believed that countries threatened by this expansion should be supported not only through the United Nations but also, if necessary, by direct US economic assistance. Actual military support, at present would be "difficult if not impracticable."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff warned that the United Nations Organization could not prevent war. Its lack of real power and its ineffective procedures precluded it from settling a "major conflict of policy among major nations." So long as the United Nations maintained its present charter, the United States would need more reliable safeguards to remain secure.

They reminded the SWNCC that the fundamentals of national power and prestige required the United States to have the capability to "back with force" its policies and commitments. Historically, in the past two world wars the United States had not been ready to fight for many months and only its geographical location and defense by its allies had allowed it to build up strength to attack successfully.

In the future neither geography nor allies will render a nation immune from sudden and paralyzing attack should an aggressor arise to plague the peace of the world. Because of this, determination of United States foreign policy should continually give consideration to our immediate capabilities for supporting our policy by arms if the occasion should demand, rather than to our long term potential, which, owing to the length of time required for mobilization of the nation's resources, might not be sufficient to avert disaster in another war.

In the final analysis the greatest single military factor in the security of the world is the absolute military security of the United States.

In sum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff heartily endorsed a "firm and friendly" attitude toward the USSR—"with, however, the emphasis upon 'firmness.'"²³

Shortly thereafter, the Department of State indicated its concurrence in the need for strong US military forces. The Department expressed this view on 1 April in response to a JCS request for political guidance for military planning, to include a "political estimate" of the USSR and an "outline of future United States policy with respect to the Soviet Union," with "any requirement for its implementation on the part of the armed forces."

In its reply of 1 April, the Department of State said the United States must accept the fact that the USSR constituted "an expanding totalitarian state which continues to believe and act on the belief that the world is divided into two irreconcilably hostile camps." As a result, the United States was compelled "to regard its relations with the Soviet Union in a special category." In order to build any basis for peaceful coexistence,

the U.S. at the present time must demonstrate to the Soviet Government in the first instance by diplomatic means and in the last analysis by military force if necessary that the present course of its foreign policy can only lead to disaster for the Soviet Union.

The UN Charter offered "the best and most unassailable means" through which to oppose Soviet physical expansion. However, US relations with Great Britain and other non-Soviet countries were also of special importance. If the Soviets' bid for continental hegemony was to be repulsed, the United Kingdom must remain the principal economic and military power in Western Europe. The United States should, therefore, furnish "all feasible political, economic, and if necessary military support within the framework of the United Nations, to the United Kingdom and the communications of the British Commonwealth."

The State Department saw no evidence that the Soviet Union sought a major war. However, her expansionist policies might be pressed beyond the point of toleration. Successful diplomatic opposition would depend largely upon the Soviets' estimate of US military capabilities and willingness to employ them. The State Department analysis concluded:

It is wise to emphasize therefore the importance of being so prepared militarily and of showing such firmness and resolution that the Soviet Union will not through miscalculation of American intentions and potentialities, push to the point that results in war. In support of the American foreign policy it is essential that:

1) Steps be taken in the immediate future to reconstitute our military establishment so that it can resist Soviet expansion by force of arms in areas of our own choosing should such action prove necessary and to protect, during the period of diplomatic action, areas which would be strategically essential in any armed conflict with the Soviet Union; and

2) To create as soon as possible an informed public opinion concerning the issues involved.²⁴

These misgivings about the Soviet Union were not confined to US officials. On the other side of the Atlantic, Sir Winston Churchill was becoming increasingly concerned over the Soviet Union's seizure of territories in the Balkans and Central Europe and its moves inimical to British interests in southern Europe and the Mediterranean. Although no longer in office, Mr. Churchill commanded great respect and his words bore considerable weight. On 5 March 1946, at Fulton, Missouri, where, at the invitation of President Truman, he made an address at Westminster College, the former British Prime Minister electrified the world—and infuriated Soviet officials—by calling for a military alliance between the United States and Great Britain, saying that only thus could the Soviet Union be prevented from carrying out its unilateral expansion of power.²⁵ Mr. Churchill minced no words. Pointing sternly to Soviet actions in Turkey, Iran, and Germany, he warned:

Nobody knows what Soviet Russia and its Communist international organization intends to do in the immediate future, or what are the limits, if any, to their expansive and proselytising tendencies. But the facts about the present situation in Europe are clear.

From Stettin on the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. . . . Whatever conclusions may be drawn from these facts—and facts they are—this is certainly not the Liberated Europe we fought to build up. . . . I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines. . . . I am convinced that there is nothing they [the Russians] admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for weakness, especially military weakness. . . . If the population of the English-speaking Commonwealths be added to that of the United States with all that such cooperation implies in the air, on the sea, all over the globe and in science and in industry, and in moral force, there will be no quivering, precarious balance of power to offer its temptation to ambition or adventure. On the contrary, there will be an overwhelming sense of security.

This fiery speech had not been officially sanctioned by either the US or British Governments. Yet the Soviet leaders interpreted it as an official statement of the position of both governments.²⁶ Premier Stalin was furious and denounced Sir Winston as a “firebrand of war” and his speech as a “call for war against the Soviet Union.” Assessing the effects of Mr. Churchill's speech, one authority has stated, “The reemerging animosities and differences of belief were brought out by this speech as by a streak of lightning.”²⁷

More Problems in Iran

Meanwhile the situation in Iran had grown more tense. Soviet activities there “threatened the peace of the world” as President Truman described the crisis. In a speech obviously intended as a warning to the Soviet Union over Iran, Secretary Byrnes in late February had pointed out that the United States had “approved many adjustments” and “resolved many disputes” in favor of the Soviet Union. He said the United States welcomed the Soviet Union as a member of the United Nations. He pointed out that great powers as well as small ones had “agreed under the United Nations Charter not to use force or the threat of force except in defense of law and in the purposes of the Charter.” He emphasized that the United States “will not and cannot stand aloof if force is used contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter.”²⁸

Admiral Leahy thought this speech “of superlative value” had it been delivered earlier. In light of Mr. Byrnes’s speech and similar pronouncements by other officials, the Joint Chiefs of Staff discontinued their efforts, begun the previous October, to determine where and with what force Soviet aggression could be successfully resisted. They did so because US Government officials had made the public aware of the current US military weakness and the JPS were continuously studying the problems presented by the possibility of conflict with the USSR.²⁹

British forces withdrew from Iran on 2 March 1946, six months after the Japanese surrender as agreed in the Anglo-Iranian-Soviet treaty. The Soviet Union gave no sign of keeping its pledge of withdrawal. Three days after the deadline date, Secretary of State Byrnes addressed a note to Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov asking that Soviet forces be withdrawn as agreed and warning that the United States could not remain “indifferent” to the situation. Intelligence indicated that Soviet tanks were moving into Iran, deploying toward the Turkish border and the Iraqi frontier. The US Air Attache personally observed Sherman tanks with Soviet markings only 25 miles from Teheran. Secretary Byrnes’ reaction upon learning of this was to observe that the Soviet forces were adding military invasion to political subversion. Reportedly he reacted with some heat and stated “Now we’ll give it to them with both barrels.”³⁰

“Both barrels” took the form of a second note to Foreign Minister Molotov on 8 March saying that it appeared Soviet forces in Iran were being reinforced and asking for an explanation if that were the case. No official Soviet reply was received to either of Mr. Byrnes’ notes, but on 15 March the Soviet news agency, Tass, denied that any reinforcement or redeployment was taking place in Iran.³¹

When Iran again went to the Security Council, accusing the Soviet Union of failure to withdraw from its territory, Soviet diplomats protested sharply. At one point during a Security Council meeting on the subject, Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko stalked out of the meeting. On the other hand, the United States supported Iran more strongly than on the first occasion, with Secretary of State Byrnes personally appearing before the Council. It was apparent that the Soviet Union was bothered by the unfavorable publicity emanating from these meetings, and on 26 March the Soviet representative announced suddenly that Soviet forces would be removed from Iran within six weeks after March 24, 1946,

“if no unforeseen circumstances occur.” On 4 April, Iran announced that an agreement had been reached with the Soviet Union establishing an Iranian-Soviet oil company to be ratified by the Iranian Parliament (Majlis) within seven months of that date. The Soviet Government would hold 51 percent of the stock and the Iranian Government the remaining 49 percent. The Soviet Union subsequently evacuated its forces on schedule, leaving behind a strong communist revolutionary regime in Azerbaijan.³²

Perhaps because US actions remained within diplomatic parameters, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not asked to provide opinions on military options with respect to the situation in Iran or to prepare any plans for military action. The US strategy appeared to be to leave the matter within the purview of the UN Security Council as long as it could safely be done.

The Paris Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers

As arranged at the Moscow Conference, the Deputies of the Foreign Ministers had been meeting in London and Paris since January 1946 in an effort to work out preliminary terms aimed at concluding peace treaties with Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and Finland. It was evident at these meetings that certain problems were going to arise in connection with the Italian treaty. These bothered the Secretary of State and on 12 April he informally asked General Eisenhower and Admiral Nimitz to give him military views on several of them. Mainly, he wanted their opinions on a Soviet demand for unilateral trusteeship over the former Italian colony Tripolitania, in North Africa. He also asked that they consider such matters as the US commitment at Potsdam not to sign a separate treaty with Italy, the question of Venezia Giulia, the possibility of the Soviets arranging with the Yugoslavs for a base at Fiume, Mr. Molotov's expressed desire for control of Tripoli to support expansion of the Soviet merchant marine, Soviet bases in the Dodecanese Islands, and possible Soviet action should the United States refuse to yield on Tripolitania.³³

In reply, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to whom General Eisenhower and Admiral Nimitz had referred the Secretary's request, pointed out that the USSR was seeking chiefly to acquire a strategic position across British lines of communication through the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, India, and the Orient: “Few threats . . . would be more effective in weakening British prestige and promoting the dissolution of the British Empire.” They then cited other possible Soviet motives: to accustom world opinion to far-reaching territorial demands; to embarrass the West and curry Arab favor by conducting an “enlightened” colonial administration; to acquire a base for political infiltration into Africa; to place Italy and Greece between Soviet pincers; and to create, in case of failure, a rationale for securing concessions elsewhere. Also, in the event of war, a Soviet military presence in North Africa would seriously impair allied capability immediately to conduct an air-sea offensive against the USSR. Finally, Great Britain almost certainly would object to a Soviet trusteeship, and a US-UK schism would

be exceedingly undesirable. The Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that to give the Soviet Union unilateral trusteeship over Tripolitania would be “gravely inimical” to US security interests. “Under no circumstances,” they concluded, “should the United States accede to a Soviet trusteeship over Tripolitania.”

The Joint Chiefs of Staff foresaw that if the Soviets were rebuffed, they might seek rights in the Dodecanese Islands, insist upon Yugoslav suzerainty over Venezia Giulia, or refuse to ratify any peace treaty with Italy. Concessions in the Dodecanese would be very dangerous, since the USSR could then threaten Suez and isolate Turkey. Concerning Venezia Giulia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared themselves amenable to any settlement that did not cede Trieste to Yugoslavia. In conclusion, they dismissed Soviet signature of an Italian peace treaty as relatively unimportant. The US objective, after all, was not a mere treaty but a real settlement that would permit the withdrawal of occupation forces.³⁴

The full Council of Foreign Ministers met in Paris in a two-part session that stretched from 25 April to 12 July. The results of the conference were draft peace treaties with the minor former enemy powers that, while “not the best which human wit can devise,” were, in Secretary Byrnes’ words, “the best which human wit could get the four principal Allies to agree upon.” No final disposition of the Italian colonies was reached at this conference, but the Soviets did agree to forego a trusteeship in Tripolitania and to withdraw their objection to cession of the Dodecanese Islands to Greece. The Trieste problem was debated bitterly and agreement finally reached as to the disposition of the territories for the short term. This solution took the form of an internationalized Free Territory of Trieste under United Nations aegis. The actual peace conference at which the final treaties were signed convened in Paris on 29 July 1946.³⁵

Trouble in Venezia Giulia

With agreement on the disposition of Trieste, the Department of State sought JCS advice concerning military measures necessary to ensure the integrity and independence of the Proposed Free Territory. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended, in substance, that US and UK forces should remain until a permanent government became firmly established.³⁶

During the summer Venezia Giulia was wracked by terrorism, sabotage, and border forays. The most dangerous clashes occurred in August, coinciding with the Turkish Straits crisis described in the following chapter. On 9 August, a C-47 transport flying from Vienna to Udine, Italy, strayed over Yugoslav territory; the aircraft was compelled to make a hazardous landing and the crew was interned. Ten days later, another errant C-47 was attacked and destroyed by Yugoslav fighters; it was later learned that five US crewmen perished.

The United States suspended Vienna-Udine runs and dodged a vigorous protest with Yugoslavia. From Paris, on 22 August, Secretary Byrnes proposed that transport flights be resumed with fighter escort. In Washington, Acting Secretary Acheson referred this proposal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They proposed,

instead, that armed but unescorted B-17s be employed for this purpose. Their prescription would give greater assurance of avoiding future clashes because (1) any response would be purely defensive in nature, and (2) the fewer aircraft employed, the smaller the probability of straying from prescribed routes. President Truman accepted the JCS solution, but authorized Secretary Byrnes to decide when flights actually should be resumed. Bomber runs began on 27 September. Meantime, under a virtual ultimatum from Washington, Marshal Tito released the surviving US airmen and promised to pay an indemnity.³⁷ In February 1947, a peace treaty establishing the Free Territory of Trieste was concluded.³⁸

The JCS Appraise the Soviet Threat—July 1946

For nearly a year since the Japanese surrender, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had watched with rising apprehension the growing aggressiveness of the Soviet Union. On 26 July, they took advantage of an opportunity to express their concern directly to the White House. The occasion was a request from Mr. Clark M. Clifford, Special Counsel to the President, for certain information on the Soviet Union. On 16 July, Mr. Clifford asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to furnish him on an urgent basis their recommendations on recent Soviet activities that affected the security of the United States; Soviet policy toward the United Nations; Soviet military policies, present and future; and US military policy with respect to the Soviet Union.³⁹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff passed this problem on to the JSSC, which, in preparing its reply, consulted the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Group, the War Department General Staff, and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. On 27 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted the JSSC paper and forwarded it to Mr. Clifford. This reply, both in content and tone, signaled a full realization that the Soviet Union and the United States, with their respective allies, were locked in a deadly conflict, below the level of a "shooting war" but a war nevertheless.⁴⁰

World domination was the Soviet objective, in the JCS view; a basic tenet of Soviet policy for achieving that goal was that peaceful coexistence with capitalist countries was "in the long run, impossible." The USSR was concentrating therefore on building up its war potential and doing everything it could, short of open warfare, to subjugate the satellite nations, to gain control of strategic areas, and to isolate and weaken the "capitalistic" nations militarily. To this end, the Soviets were thwarting every US effort to secure peace settlements. They were keeping "excessively large" forces in occupied areas. They were firmly in control of the armed forces of their satellites, and in these countries were purging anyone suspected of opposing them. In Germany and eastern Europe, the Soviet Army was deployed in such a manner as to facilitate attacks on western Europe or Turkey. In eastern Siberia, the Soviets were building more air bases, both for attack against US territory and for defense against any US attack.

While condemning US plans to acquire permanent bases in certain areas, the Soviets themselves were pressing for influence and base rights in the Mediterranean and in the Balkans.

They control the Black Sea and are continuing their efforts to control the Dardanelles. They have obtained the right to a voice in the control of Tangier and by their seeking to establish puppet regimes in the Balkans, Turkey, and Iran, the Soviets are projecting corridors to the Adriatic, Eastern Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. By penetration and extension of their influence in the Middle East they are threatening the access of the Western powers to the important oil reserves in that area.

Keenly aware that they were lagging behind the United States in military technology, the Soviets were making frantic efforts to overcome the US lead. To this end they were exploiting German scientists and technicians in submarine warfare and warship construction, atomic warfare, guided missiles, and bacteriological warfare. In the field of atomic energy research, French communist scientists were giving much information.

Another facet of Soviet strategy included the creation of economic dependency in areas under their influence by demanding exorbitant reparations, removing large amounts of industrial machinery, and seizing shipping and industrial properties. Even religion was being exploited to accomplish the Soviets' aims. They were playing both sides of the Palestine problem by encouraging the emigration of Jews from Poland and the Soviet Union into the Anglo-American zones, by denouncing British and American Jewish policies and by inflaming the Arabs against these policies.

Soviet aims were being furthered by the Communist Party in the United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff blamed the communists for trying to cripple US industry with strikes, sabotage, and espionage for violent propaganda attacks on US foreign policy, and for pressures for return of US armed forces from overseas areas in order to give the Soviets a free hand. Subversive activities against US armed forces by the US Communist Party included soldier demonstrations, "anticaste" agitation, promotion of left-wing sentiment, and attempts to encourage refusal to act in the event the armed forces were told to suppress domestic disturbances or take over essential industries or utilities.

With respect to the Soviet attitude towards the United Nations, the Soviet Union had joined as a matter of political expediency and would make every effort to dominate the body and frustrate its operations. The Soviet Union would very likely not withdraw from the United Nations but would remain in it in order to enhance its chances of achieving world domination.

As to current and future military policies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the White House, the Soviets were striving to erect a perimeter of client states and trusteeships around themselves. They would insist upon "exclusive" military domination east of the Stettin-Trieste line, would attempt to draw all of Germany and Austria into their sphere of influence, and would seek to frustrate the formation of any Western European security bloc. In Greece, Turkey, and Iran, they sought to put "friendly" governments in power. In the Far East they

would try to neutralize China, Korea, and Japan and would develop bases in Siberia, Sakhalin, the Kuriles, and Port Arthur that could threaten Alaska and the Western Pacific.

To support their policies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, the Soviets were giving the highest priority to building up their war potential and that of their satellites so as to be able to defeat the Western democracies. The Soviets could be expected to seek to overcome deficiencies in such areas as atomic weapons, guided missiles, long-range air power, and sea power. Until this buildup had progressed to the point where it assured victory over any combination of hostile powers, the Soviets were expected to avoid precipitating major war. But once they did resort to armed aggression they could be expected to attempt seizure of military control of most of Eurasia. Their plan would include destruction of US industrial potential before it reached full output for total war. To accomplish its plans for "eventual world domination" the Soviet Union could also be expected to undermine the power of the United States and its allies through subversion and infiltration.⁴¹

Within the White House, Mr. Clifford and his assistant, Mr. George Elsey, edited and expanded this document but did not change the substance of JCS arguments. Their final paragraphs read as follows:

In conclusion, as long as the Soviet Government adheres to its present policy, the United States should maintain military forces powerful enough to restrain the Soviet Union and to confine Soviet influence to its present area. All nations not now within the Soviet sphere should be given generous economic assistance and political support in their opposition to Soviet penetration. . . . Even though Soviet leaders profess to believe that the conflict between Capitalism and Communism is irreconcilable and must eventually be resolved by the triumph of the latter, it is our hope that they will change their minds and work out with us a fair and equitable settlement when they realize that we are too strong to be beaten and too determined to be frightened.

In September, Mr. Clifford presented this paper to the President. After reading the report, Mr. Truman immediately impounded all copies. "This is so hot . . .," he confided, "it could have an exceedingly unfortunate impact on our efforts to try to develop some relationship with the Soviet Union." Apparently, then, the President still had some hopes for an East-West detente.⁴²

Possible Aid to Turkey and Iran

Early in 1946, the Soviet Union began making demands of Turkey in addition to those she had made in connection with the Dardanelles. In early March Soviet Premier Molotov demanded that Turkey surrender two provinces on the border with the Soviet Union, Kars and Ardahan. When Turkey refused, Soviet propagandists attacked the Turkish Government in a manner that created a crisis atmosphere in Soviet-Turkish relations. Adding to this atmosphere, sizeable contingents of Soviet troops were detected massing along the Turkish/Soviet borders.⁴³

On 6 March, with the approval of President Truman, Secretary of State Byrnes addressed a letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff saying:

You are aware of the possible friction in the Eastern Mediterranean because of the Soviet's desire for a cession of certain of the eastern provinces of Turkey and for bases in or near the Straits.

I should be pleased if you could make an appraisal from the military point of view of the effect of such demands if granted in whole or in part upon the security interests of the United States, bearing in mind the possible effect on the security interests of the United States of any undue threat to the security interests of the British Commonwealth of Nations in that area.⁴⁴

On 13 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff replied that they viewed the Soviet demands as a sure sign that the Soviet Union desired to dominate the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey stood squarely in the path of Soviet aims. Soviet leaders knew that Turkey would fight rather than allow her borders to be violated. For Turkey to give up any of her territory to the USSR would not only bestow valuable and strategic territory upon the Soviet Union, it would inevitably impair British prestige in the Middle East and make Soviet infiltration southward much easier.⁴⁵

As for additional bases near the Dardanelles, the Soviet Union had no legitimate need for such bases. It already possessed the power to close the Straits whenever it chose to do so. What the Soviet Union really wanted was "exclusive control over the Dardanelles and the Persian Gulf." Agreement to this demand would inevitably lead to other demands aiming at controlling the Aegean area, thus permitting the Soviets to control the entire Eastern Mediterranean. The Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East were of vital importance to the British Commonwealth of Nations. They contained essential oil supplies and the direct line of communications by sea, land, and air between the United Kingdom and India and the Dominions in the Pacific Ocean. Soviet moves that menaced Britain's control of the Eastern Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, and the Middle East oil fields endangered the British position as a world power. Consequently, from a military point of view Great Britain should fight the moment the Soviets penetrated Turkey. Should the Soviet Union ever dominate Turkey and the Aegean and thus threaten the vital Suez Canal–Aleppo–Basra triangle, Britain must ultimately fight or accept eventual disintegration of the Empire.

Should the British Empire fall, the last bulwark between the United States and Soviet expansion in Eurasia would be removed. In this case even the combined military power of the United States and her potential allies might be insufficient to match that of an expanded Soviet Union. The US position as a world power was therefore closely interwoven with that of Great Britain.

To agree to Soviet demands on Turkey would have another major consequence. It would undermine confidence of other nations in the United Nations organization, which at least could serve as a stabilizing influence among the great powers. "Appeasement of a powerful nation in its questionable claims vis-a-vis a weaker nation cannot fail to undermine that organization," the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted.

In view of all these considerations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that "acquiescence by this country in whole or in part, to these Soviet demands, although they do not constitute a direct threat, will definitely impair our national security by weakening the British position as a world power and reducing the effectiveness of the United Nations."

The Soviet Union's persistent pressure upon Turkey to grant what could only amount to Soviet control of the Dardanelles became increasingly objectionable to US authorities. On 7 August 1946, the USSR proposed to the Turkish Government that a new Straits regime be established exclusively by the Black Sea powers and that Turkey and the Soviet Union "organize joint means of defense of the Straits." The US Ambassador to Turkey warned bluntly that this would put an end to Turkish independence. "It strikes me," he cabled the Department of State, "[that the] maintenance [of] Turkish independence has become [a] vital interest [of the] U[nited] S[tates]. If Turkey falls under Soviet control [the] last barrier [will be] removed in [the] way [of a] Soviet advance to [the] Persian Gulf and Suez and [the] temptation would be more than human nature could withstand."⁴⁶

Careful movement was in order in this matter, and as a first step it was decided by State Department officials that a warning should be sent the Soviet Government before it took measures from which it could not retreat without losing face. Acting Secretary of State Acheson (Secretary Byrnes was in Paris) called upon the Secretaries of War and Navy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to participate in formulating recommendations to the President in the Turkish matter. After a series of meetings, these officials called upon President Truman on 15 August 1946 to present to him their agreed views and recommendations.⁴⁷

Mr. Acheson, spokesman for the advisers, presented their consensus that the Soviet Union was seeking as a primary objective to gain control of Turkey. Success in this effort would very likely eliminate western influence from the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. Once committed to this course, the Soviets could only be deterred by the conviction that the United States would if necessary meet aggression with force.

In our judgement the best hope of preserving peace is that the conviction should be carried to the U.S.S.R., Turkey and all other powers that in case the United Nations is unsuccessful in stopping Soviet aggression, the United States would not hesitate to join other nations in meeting armed aggression by the force of American arms.⁴⁸

Mr. Acheson then began reading a proposed note of protest to the Soviet Government. The President did not wait for him to finish but reportedly exclaimed, "I don't need to hear any more. We are going to send it." Mr. Truman made very clear that he understood this confrontation over Turkey could lead to war between the Soviet Union and the United States. At one point in the meeting he remarked that the United States might as well find out whether the Soviets were bent on world conquest now as in five or ten years.⁴⁹

Four days later, on 19 August 1946, the United States Government sent a note to the Soviet Government stating its "firm opinion" that Turkey should remain

primarily responsible for the defense of the Black Sea Straits and insisting that changes in the Montreux Convention be accomplished under United Nations auspices rather than by the Black Sea Powers alone. "Should the Straits become the object of attack or threat of attack by an aggressor," read the US note, "the resulting situation would constitute a threat to international security and would clearly be a matter for action on the part of the Security Council of the United States."⁵⁰

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the US response to the Soviet threat to Turkey called for more positive action than the delivery of the views contained in the diplomatic note. On 23 August, they addressed a memorandum to the Secretaries of War and Navy in which they recommended that Turkey be offered tangible military and economic support in three categories: (1) encouragement of Turkey to purchase nonmilitary material and supplies that would strengthen Turkey's economic and military position; (2) permission for Turkey to buy arms, military aircraft, and other military equipment to strengthen the defensive abilities of its armed forces; and (3) consideration of the sending of selected US technicians, including officers, to assist its armed forces. They emphasized that any arrangement for Soviet participation in defense of the Straits would inevitably project Soviet military power into an area of vital importance to the Western powers. The Soviet Union would then soon be in a position to dominate Turkey, the most important military factor in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. "If Russia attains military dominance of Turkey by political concessions," the Joint Chiefs of Staff averred, "her military threat is projected so that there is grave doubt that, in case of a major world crisis, the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean could be considered militarily tenable for the non-Soviet powers." Such a coup by the Russians would undermine, if not destroy, the faith that the peoples of this area had in the British and American influence. "From the military standpoint," the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued, "the Joint Chiefs of Staff view with concern the present world situation. In spite of the written word of the United Nations' Charter, many and major indications point to a calculated Soviet policy of expanding Soviet de facto geographical and political control. Such a Soviet policy has the most serious impact on the vital interests of the United States."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized that as things were at present: (1) successful opposition to Soviet efforts against Turkey rested primarily on the continuation of the will of the Turkish Government and people to take a firm stand against Russian demands; (2) the US public was not well informed concerning the situation in Turkey and any useful action was in the end dependent on its comprehension and support; and (3) Great Britain's immediate security interest in the situation was even more acute than that of the United States.⁵¹

The JCS analysis of the Turkish problem was sent to Secretary Byrnes in Paris by Acting Secretary of State William L. Clayton on 12 September. Mr. Clayton drew Secretary Byrnes' special attention to the JCS recommendations for supplying Turkey with military assistance in the form of equipment and advisers. Mr. Clayton stated:

This communication brings us face to face with a problem which we appear to have been approaching for some time. That problem is whether in view of the policy which the Soviet Union appears to be pursuing of endeavoring to undermine the stability and to obtain control of the countries in the Near and Middle East such as Greece, Turkey and Iran, we should make certain changes in our general policies, . . . relating to the sale of combat equipment, to an extent which might enable us to strengthen the will and ability of the various Near and Middle Eastern countries under Soviet pressure to resist that pressure.⁵²

In Mr. Clayton's view, the necessity for clarifying US policy governing the provision of military supplies to Middle Eastern governments arose from the contradictory positions taken in two official documents dealing with the subject. The first paper, produced by the Secretary of State's Staff Committee on 5 February 1946, specified limited disposals of surplus military equipment to certain countries not including those in the Middle East. The second paper, prepared by SWNCC on 21 March 1946 at the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, read as follows:

In accordance with the United States' firm political policy of aiding the countries of the Near and Middle East to maintain their independence and develop sufficient strength to preserve law and order within their boundaries, it is consistent with United States policy to make available additional military supplies, in reasonable quantities, to those countries.⁵³

Mr. Clayton observed that "one of these documents must be changed." He pointed out that in the six months period since the SWNCC policy statement had been made, the case for furnishing weapons to Middle Eastern countries had in fact, been strengthened. The Soviet Union displayed a determination to continue her efforts to create instability in bordering Middle East countries, and to "obtain hegemony" over them. He cited particularly the cases of Iran and Turkey. He also mentioned Greece, where Soviet satellites Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania were applying pressure, undoubtedly with the direct connivance and support of the Soviet Government. The United States had informed Turkey, Iran, and Greece of its "deep interest" in their independence and integrity. Both Iran and Turkey wished to buy US arms, and Greece would undoubtedly seek the same support. Iran had gone so far as to send a military purchasing mission to the United States. Mr. Clayton's recommendation, which he said was supported by all those concerned with supplying military aid, was that present policy should be reviewed and probably changed to allow "a considerable degree of flexibility" in the application of that policy toward nations seeking US help to maintain their sovereignty. These officials did not however believe that the United States should send a military mission to Turkey at the present time. Mr. Clayton added that the Secretary of War and the Under Secretary of the Navy had read his letter and had given it their full approval.⁵⁴

Secretary Byrnes, meanwhile, had also been revising his ideas of foreign aid. Before reading Mr. Clayton's letter, which was delayed, the Secretary of State sent him a letter of his own setting forth his thoughts on economic aid in general and on the situation in Turkey and Greece in particular. World developments

within the past several months had influenced his thinking about what the United States should do in providing economic assistance to countries in Europe and the Middle East. When such assistance had first been contemplated “some months ago” consideration had naturally been given to providing this assistance mainly on the basis of a country’s need, on its ability to repay and on its general attitude toward US aims and methods of expanding world trade. But this no longer applied, in Mr. Byrnes’ view. “The situation has so hardened that the time has now come,” he said, “. . . in the light of the attitude of the Soviet Gov’t and the neighboring states which it dominates in varying degrees, when the implementation of our general policies requires the closest coordination. In other words, we must help our friends in every way and refrain from assisting those who either through helplessness or for other reasons are opposing the principles for which we stand.”

Secretary Byrnes had already received a copy of the JCS memorandum of 23 August “through military channels.” He informed Mr. Clayton that he was “in full accord with the reasoning contained in that document and with its conclusions.” He had already discussed the question of Turkey with British Foreign Minister Bevin and had suggested that Great Britain, because of her alliance with Turkey, might furnish “direct military equipment,” with the United States furnishing all feasible economic assistance. “If the Turks should request a few selected technicians I should favor granting the request,” Mr. Byrnes stated. He also indicated his strong support of economic assistance to Greece, where the political situation was much worse than that in Turkey.

“The world,” he concluded, “is watching the support or lack thereof which we furnish our friends at this critical time and the future policies of many countries will be determined by their estimate of the seriousness or lack thereof with which the US upholds its principles and supports those of like mind.”⁵⁵

The Secretary of State apparently accepted the JCS recommendation for assistance to Turkey, because he approved a policy that opened the door for such aid. On the very well-based assumption that the Soviet Union was attempting to bring Turkey under its domination in order that it could use Turkey both as a defensive buffer and as a springboard for expansion in the Mediterranean and Middle East, the policy provided for the United States to give “positive support” to Turkey. This was based also on the JCS view that Soviet military dominance of Turkey could force the Western powers out of the Mediterranean and Middle East. The policy was based on an assumption that the Turkish people and government were determined to resist Soviet moves and that the Turks had a “relatively effective military force.” The United States must support Turkey with appropriately firm diplomatic measures whenever necessary. The US position on Turkey must be made completely clear to all. The United States must provide economic assistance and support to Turkey “by all available means.” With respect to military assistance to Turkey, the United States should probably leave such assistance to Great Britain for the present. If necessary the United States might furnish Great Britain arms and military equipment to supply to Turkey, or in exceptional cases might supply Turkey

directly. US policy did cover providing technical military advice or military instruction whenever requested by the Turks.⁵⁶

Soviet actions in Iran, particularly Soviet designs on the disputed province of Azerbaijan, continued to attract US attention as a threat to Iranian sovereignty. On 26 September, the Department of State forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, through the SWNCC, a series of questions that were designed to elicit JCS views on the relative importance of Iran as an area "of vital strategic interest to the United States," either in offensive or defensive operations or as a source of supply. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were also asked in what ways US strategic interest in Iran was linked to its interest in the Near and Middle East as a whole and how that interest would be affected by Soviet domination of all or part of Iran. Finally, the State Department asked: "... does the JCS consider that a program of assistance by the U.S. to the Iranian military establishment would contribute to the defense of United States strategic interest in the Near and Middle Eastern area?"⁵⁷

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their answer of 11 October, began by observing that the State Department's questions were based on an assumption of possible war between the United States and the Soviet Union and that their replies were based on the same assumption. Iran, as a major source of oil supply, was militarily of "major strategic interests" to the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded. In a major conflict, whichever side lost control of the oil resources in Iraq and Saudi Arabia would be forced to fight an "oil starved" war. In addition, Iran was geographically located so as to be of great importance both to the defense of the Middle East and as a base for counteroffensive operations from that area.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff then evaluated four possibilities that had been put forth by the Department of State: (1) division of Iran into British and Soviet spheres of influence would advance the Soviet Union's political and strategic objectives, contribute to the encirclement of Turkey, and destroy British ability to defend the Iraqi oil fields; (2) control of the northern province of Azerbaijan by the USSR, although undesirable, would be the least objectionable of the situations listed; (3) creation of a Soviet-dominated autonomous Kurdish state would probably cause the dissolution of the present Iraqi Government and possibly lead to the installation of a Soviet-oriented regime there; and (4) domination of all Iran by the USSR would greatly intensify all the adverse effects listed above.⁵⁸

The Joint Chiefs of Staff made clear that they supported the Department of State suggestion for military aid to Iran. Token assistance to Iran's military forces, they said, could create confidence and good will toward the United States within the Iranian Government and thus contribute to the US strategic posture in the area. To assist Iran in preventing civil disturbances, which could attract intervention by "powerful neighbors" and involve the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff favored giving Iran reasonable amounts of military material that could be used only for keeping internal security. They considered "such non-aggression items" as small arms, light artillery, ammunition, small tanks, transportation and communication equipment, quartermaster supplies, and possibly short range aircraft and naval patrol craft to be appropriate for Iran in reasonable quantities if

requested. The United States must be satisfied, of course, that Iran wanted to maintain its independence within the “community of nations.”

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also believed it would be appropriate for the United States to give technical advice, but it must be done without fanfare and upon request only. Such a step would contribute to “the defense of United States strategic interests in Iran and the Near and Middle East area.” During World War II the United States had, as a matter of course, established two small military missions in Iran. One of these missions advised the Iranian Army, the second advised the Gendarmerie. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that these missions not be removed but that conversely, no new missions be established at this time.⁵⁹

At a conference in the State Department on 29 October 1946, the Secretary of State took certain decisions on aid to the countries of the Middle East that in a sense marked a beginning of aid programs for that area. He decided that in the cases of Greece and Turkey, arms would continue to be furnished by the United Kingdom, in view of existing arrangements and traditional relationships. Arms required for this purpose, but not in possession of the United Kingdom would be furnished to her by the United States for further transfer to Greece and Turkey. In the case of Iran, the United States would sell Iran armament worth not more than \$10 million. There would be no further exception to existing arms policy “at this time.” The language of the existing policy statement would be changed to enable the Secretary of State to depart from existing policy at any time it was clearly in the interests of the United States to do so.⁶⁰

Events in Iran were approaching the crisis stage by mid-October. The State Department’s Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Loy Henderson, considered the situation to be so critical that it might require swift action by the United States. The Prime Minister had become “a prisoner of his own policy of retreating before Soviet pressure.” An Iranian military mission, in Washington to try to purchase \$10 million worth of “nonaggression military equipment,” was running into a stone wall. Mr. Henderson warned that the United States could no longer delay and should sell this equipment to Iran quickly. In support of his recommendation he forwarded a paper setting out the reasons why such aid should be furnished. In the paper, he quoted the JCS statements of 11 October in support of his position. He also favored increasing the strengths of the military missions in Iran and keeping them there so long as they were needed. Secretary of State Byrnes approved Mr. Henderson’s recommendation.⁶¹

The immediate crisis in Iran subsided as 1946 drew to a close. On 24 November, the Iranian Government ordered its forces to march into Azerbaijan to supervise parliamentary elections. The Soviet Government protested this move, warning of possible “disturbances” should Iranian troops enter Azerbaijan. The US Ambassador to Iran, George V. Allen, lauded the move, publicly announcing that it was “quite normal and appropriate.” In this statement, he was backed up by Under Secretary of State Acheson in Washington. The Iranian Army marched into Azerbaijan with only a few minor skirmishes taking place. On 4 December the rebel regime in the dissident province collapsed.⁶²

The Truman Doctrine Evolves

In other areas of the Near and Middle East, however, the crisis atmosphere deepened. In Greece, where economic troubles and dissident political factions had been creating serious problems for the British, communist influence was growing dangerously strong. The Greek Government was traditionally linked to Great Britain. In late 1944 Prime Minister Churchill had sent 50,000 troops to Athens, created a coalition government, and suppressed a communist-inspired insurrection. The rebels retreated to northern strongholds, where they received sanctuary and supplies from the communist governments of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. In the spring of 1946, the Greek electorate awarded the premiership to a conservative monarchist named Constantine Tsaldaris. Another referendum resulted in the return of King George II. The country was war-ravaged; the economy was crumbling; the rightist regime was incompetent. Discontent spiralled into civil war. Terrorism became endemic, especially in Thessaly and western Macedonia.

By late October 1946, the State Department considered that Greece was becoming "a focal point in strained international relations" and felt that "its fate during the next few months may be a deciding factor in the future orientation of the Near and Middle East." If the Greek mainland and islands fell under Soviet sway, the USSR would be able to exert "irresistible" pressure upon Turkey. Unquestionably, the Soviet Union was furnishing military assistance to those elements seeking to overthrow the Greek Government. The United States could not remain idle in the face of these "maneuvers and machinations." Greece must remain independent; the United States must stand ready to take necessary measures to preserve her political and territorial integrity. Specifically, the State Department desired that the following steps be taken:

1. Let the world know that the United States supported Greek independence and territorial integrity.
2. Pressure the Tsaldaris regime toward a policy of moderation in internal affairs.
3. Influence the Greek Government to waive territorial claims, but actively support Greece in the United Nations whenever the occasion warrants.
4. Be prepared, in case of British inability, to sell the Greeks sufficient arms to maintain internal order and defend their territorial integrity.
5. Dispatch an economic mission to Greece immediately.

All these things were done. On 11 December, Mr. Paul A. Porter was appointed Chief of the American Economic Mission to Greece.⁶³ During the opening weeks of 1947, the stream of events suddenly broadened into a veritable flood. On 30 January, the Attlee Cabinet agreed in principle to provide Greece with further assistance. Then a succession of blizzards struck the British Isles. By 7 February, the greater part of British industry stood idle and five million workers found themselves unemployed. Export losses were enormous; massive balance-of-payments deficits were forecast. The world now recognized Great Britain's extreme weakness.⁶⁴

Meanwhile, the plight of Greece grew dramatically worse. Mr. Porter clearly discerned "the makings of a financial collapse"; Ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh

reported that revolution appeared imminent. On 21 February, Mr. Acheson told Secretary of State George C. Marshall, who had succeeded Secretary Byrnes on 21 January 1947, that “unless urgent and immediate support is given to Greece, it seems probable that the Greek Government will be overthrown and a totalitarian regime of the extreme left will come to power.” Loss of the Near East and North Africa might follow. Under present arrangements, Greece was getting neither adequate US economic assistance nor sufficient UK military support. Consequently, Mr. Acheson suggested that Congress be asked quickly to approve a direct loan—and be warned of the dire consequences of inaction. He recommended, furthermore, that US policy on military aid to Greece be reconsidered in light of British inability to provide necessary arms.

On the same day the First Secretary of the British Embassy delivered two notes to Mr. Loy Henderson of the State Department. Briefly, these revealed that Great Britain was compelled to cease supporting Greece and Turkey and requested that the United States shoulder the burdens of supplying financial credits and military materiel. The Attlee Government would give Greece no financial assistance after 31 March; British soldiers would be withdrawn by summer. During the balance of 1947, the British thought that Greek requirements would amount to approximately \$100 million. They said that Turkey was in somewhat better condition, but did not try to estimate her needs.⁶⁵

The immense importance of this message was immediately understood. During 22–23 February, Messrs. Henderson and John D. Hickerson closely analyzed the Greek-Turkish situation with Vice Admiral Forrest P. Sherman (Deputy CNO for Operations) and Major General Lauris Norstad (Director of Plans and Operations, War Department General Staff). On Monday, 24 February, these four men conferred with Secretaries Acheson, Forrestal, and Patterson. After this meeting, Mr. Acheson reported to Secretary Marshall that “the British are wholly sincere in this matter and that the situation is as critical as they state.” He proposed that the State, War, Navy, and Treasury Departments undertake an immediate study, so that a decision (with Congressional leaders participating) could be rendered within the week. Secretary Marshall, meanwhile, had received the British Ambassador, read the two notes, and grasped their “utmost urgency and importance.” Early that afternoon, Secretaries Marshall, Forrestal, and Patterson briefed President Truman on the Greek-Turkish emergency.⁶⁶

A Special Committee of the State Department drafted policy recommendations; these were considered by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy on the morning of 26 February. At Mr. Patterson’s request, they considered a proposal by General Eisenhower to survey requirements of all prospective aid recipients, so that one all-embracing assistance request could be submitted to Congress. After the State Department representatives countered that time was too short to surmount drafting difficulties and Congressional barriers, Secretaries Forrestal and Patterson agreed that legislation should pertain only to Greece and Turkey. The three Secretaries then agreed that:

Every effort be made at the highest governmental level to find means, without waiting for legislation, to alleviate the present Greek financial situation. . . .”

The problem be discussed privately and frankly by the leaders of the administration with appropriate members of the Congress.

Legislation be drafted, . . . [which] might well include authorization for the President under certain conditions [and] within prescribed limits to extend loans, credits, or grants to Greece and/or Turkey; also for the transfer to Greece or Turkey or both of military supplies not transferable under existing law; and any necessary authorization for the supply of personnel.

In the meantime measures be taken immediately to transfer to Greece such available military equipment and other supplies as the three Departments find are urgently needed by Greece and are transferable under existing legislation.

Measures be adopted to acquaint the American people with the situation and with the need for action along the proposed lines.

Messrs. Marshall and Acheson conveyed these conclusions to the White House; President Truman assented, in principle, to measures for immediate aid.⁶⁷

On 27 February, Congressional leaders were summoned to the White House. Speaking to this gathering, Secretary Marshall revealed that the Greek Government confronted economic collapse and needed approximately \$250 million in financial aid. If Greece dissolved into civil war and fell under communist control, Turkey would be surrounded and gravely imperiled. Indeed, Turkey also required monetary and materiel support, since prolonged mobilization was seriously sapping her antiquated economic structure. "It is not alarmist," Secretary Marshall asserted, "to say that we are faced with the first crisis of a series which might extend Soviet domination to Europe, the Middle East and Asia." The United States alone was capable of combating this danger; it could either act with energy or lose by default.

The reaction from Congressional leaders struck Mr. Acheson as "adverse" and "rather trivial." The Under Secretary thereupon took the floor and made a dramatic case for immediate, effective action. The world, he said, had not witnessed such a polarization of power since the days of Rome and Carthage. The Soviets had placed any number of bets; if they could win any one of them, they would collect all. Control of three continents was at stake; the United States must move to protect free peoples against aggression and subversion. When Mr. Acheson concluded, Senator Arthur Vandenberg spoke slowly and gravely: "Mr. President, if you will say that to the Congress and the country, I will support you and I believe most of its members will do the same."⁶⁸

The Administration then proceeded to prepare a legislative program. On 12 March, President Truman appeared before Congress and asked for \$250 million to assist Greece and \$150 million to support Turkey. In a most significant address, he stated:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. . . .

Should we fail to assist Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to the West as well as to the East. . . .

Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events.

I am confident that Congress will face these responsibilities squarely.⁶⁹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not formally participate in the decision-making process described above. After informal discussion with the British Joint Staff Mission, however, Joint Staff Planners prepared an appreciation of the problems involved in providing military assistance to Turkey. They thought that the USSR possessed neither the means nor the desire to wage a major war. However, the Soviets would surely continue to employ political pressure and subversive tactics. This being so, US assistance should seek two objectives: primarily, to stiffen the Turks' will and ability to resist; secondarily, to improve the Turkish military potential. Purely as a preliminary view, the Planners felt that any aid program should take account of the following factors:

1. The greatest emphasis should be assigned to ground forces and air defenses.
2. Organization and equipment should be suited to Turkish capabilities and tailored to effective defense based on terrain.
3. Expansion of the Turkish arms industry should receive most serious consideration.
4. Economic and military assistance should be closely integrated. When communications and logistical facilities were sufficiently improved, for example, some forces could be demobilized and financial strains would decrease.
5. Since the Turks could not approach self-sufficiency in certain critical areas for some time, continuation of their "present political and psychological toughness" might largely depend upon US and UK action to correct whatever maintenance and equipment weaknesses appeared.

In closing, they reaffirmed that political, economic and psychological factors were more important than purely military considerations. Since definitive recommendations could be reached only after analysis of all these elements, the planners proposed that SWNCC undertake such a thorough assessment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this appreciation and, on 13 March, transmitted it to Secretaries Patterson and Forrestal who agreed to support these suggestions.⁷⁰

On 22 May, Congress completed passage of legislation authorizing aid to Greece and Turkey. By then, SWNCC had received an assessment of analogous situations across the globe. Requirements far exceeded available resources; preparation of a comprehensive aid plan (such as General Eisenhower had suggested in February) now seemed imperative. The "Truman Doctrine" began evolving into the European Recovery and Military Assistance Programs.⁷¹

Thus in early 1947 a policy was established that was to mark US resistance to Soviet aggression until the outbreak of the Korean War in mid-1950. It was a policy based on the use of economic resources rather than military force and depended for its success upon the will and cooperation of threatened nations. It was a policy based upon a more complete recognition by the United States of

Soviet motives and objectives, with the realistic acknowledgement that the United States could not, solely by its own armed intervention, prevent the Soviets from succeeding in their planned takeover of strategic areas of the world. The United States would help weaker nations help themselves.

US Military Policy: Strategic Planning and Command Arrangements

Authority for JCS Participation in Postwar Military Policymaking

As of V-J Day the Joint Chiefs of Staff had received no specific directive to continue to address basic military problems jointly in peacetime as they had during the wartime years. Nevertheless, they did have a basis for continuing these activities in the postwar period. This stemmed from a policy approved by the President in late 1943. In November of that year, President Roosevelt had instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare a study for him indicating the general postwar air base requirements of the United States around the world. They had assigned this task to the JSSC. During development of their report, the JSSC, in an unusual action, had drafted what it termed "a Recommended Policy on Post-War Military Problems," completely unrelated to the air base study. The JSSC appended this "Recommended Policy" to its report and sent it forward to the Joint Chiefs of Staff along with its recommendations for air bases. At their meeting on 15 November 1943, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved all the JSSC recommendations and forwarded them, including the policy statement, to President Roosevelt who approved the entire package on 23 November.

The operative portions of the statement of policy regarding the JCS role in postwar policymaking were contained in the first three paragraphs, as follows:

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should be represented in important groups concerned with post-war planning, as may be necessary to insure that military considerations may be integrated with political and economic considerations.
2. Post-war military problems should be studied as an integrated whole rather than as separate problems for the ground, naval and air forces.
3. They must be examined from the points of view of national defense, of prospective international military commitments and related national commercial interests. While in the last analysis national security must dominate, we must be prepared to make concessions to the international organization.¹

Presidential approval of these statements, while not a specific directive to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to engage in postwar planning, was construed as authorizing them to do so. On this basis, the Joint Chiefs of Staff began the process of developing military policy and strategy for the postwar period. By mid-1947, they had approved a military policy, a strategic estimate, and a supporting strategy. The preparation of implementing war plans had begun, albeit at a low level, and had continued within the JCS supporting structure. No approved war plans emerged prior to 1948, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while not formally addressing the efforts of their planners, were aware of their efforts and maintained a close interest in the planning going on.

The dangers facing the United States when this planning began were more political than military. But in light of the apparent Soviet determination to gain supremacy over the capitalist countries of the West, a US-USSR military confrontation in the not-too-distant future loomed as a real possibility. Joint planning directed against this contingency began not so much in response to Soviet actions as at the initiative of individual officers and Joint Committees. As the months passed, however, and the Soviet posture continued to grow more threatening, these joint planning efforts acquired an increasing validity.

The Effects of “New Weapons” on Policy and Strategy

These postwar planning efforts began on 4 August 1945, when the JSSC, the Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC) and the JPS agreed, on their own initiative, that the JPS, assisted by the JWPC, would prepare (1) a postwar military policy, (2) an overall postwar strategic plan on a worldwide basis, and (3) recommendations on US requirements for postwar military bases.²

The JPS and the JWPC shared the view that “a strategic concept and plan and the establishment and development of US bases based on that plan should take into consideration the effect of foreseeable developments in new weapons and countermeasures in the post-war period.” Accordingly, these agencies sought the advice of Dr. Vannevar Bush, Chairman of the Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment, and of Major General Leslie Groves, Director of the Manhattan Project, which was responsible for developing the atomic bomb.³

Dr. Bush met with the Joint Staff Planners on 22 August 1945. He professed much reluctance to give explicit advice on the use and potential of new weapons that had been and were being developed. The two main aspects of the new weaponry were the guided missile and the atomic bomb. While it would take a great deal of thinking by scientists before the potentialities of these new weapons could be accurately assessed, Dr. Bush and his Committee were of the firm opinion that the new weapons should not influence the number, location, or extent of the strategic bases that were now believed essential.

With respect to the guided missile, there was no possibility of extending the V-2 type rocket to a range of 1,000 miles or more. Use of atomic propulsion was at least 20 years in the future in Dr. Bush’s opinion. He pointed out, however,

that even if it were possible to build a guided missile with a 2,000 mile range, the United States would still have to have bases from which to launch such a missile. It would be more practicable and inexpensive to concentrate on missiles of 200 rather than 2,000 mile range. And Dr. Bush insisted that the closer our bases were to a potential enemy, the better. He speculated also that guided missiles traveling at speeds exceeding the speed of sound and guided by radar beams would supersede and replace all present anti-aircraft methods.

One of the principal limiting factors on the use of the atomic bomb as a weapon was that it could not at present be made small enough for adaptation to artillery or naval torpedoes. This meant that at present the atomic bomb should be considered only as a supplement to conventional weaponry and methods of warfare.

Dr. Bush speculated that the Soviet Union would take a long time to develop its own atomic capability. This was not owing to a lack of capable scientists in that nation but to the handicaps that were inherent in an arbitrary form of government.

Dr. Bush stated flatly that there were no countermeasures that would be effective against the atomic bomb once it had been launched. Until the development of the atomic bomb there had been a great premium on first strike capability. This was no longer true. If both adversaries had the atomic bomb, a strike by one could not preclude retaliation if the other side had a great reserve force well-protected underground. If the United States had a reserve stock of atomic bombs and delivery means, it could retaliate against a devastating attack so severely that the enemy would be as badly hurt. Destruction of a nation's industrial potential would not be a determining factor in victory or defeat. The atomic war would be over so quickly that the crippling of a nation's industry would have no effect on the outcome.

General Groves followed Dr. Bush. He agreed that guided missiles would not be developed sufficiently in the immediate future but thought that within 10 to 20 years they would be. The United States was in a favorable position at the present time. It had a complete knowledge of atomic production that would take other countries years to reach. No surprise attack could be launched on the United States for a number of years. The United States should get its bases now and plan not for 10 years but for 50 to 100 years in the future.

In answer to a question, General Groves would only say that the United States had a reasonable number of atomic bombs. He recommended that the United States maintain a maximum production capacity and a reasonable reserve. Like Dr. Bush, he saw no defense against the atomic bomb aside from shooting down the plane that carried it.

The JCS Propose a US Postwar Military Policy

The JPS submitted their proposed statement of US military policy to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 30 August 1945. Significantly, the JPS cited as authority for

developing this postwar policy the 1943 approval by President Roosevelt of the JCS statement of policy for postwar problems. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the JPS paper on 20 September and forwarded it to the Secretaries of War and the Navy, asking that it be given to the Secretary of State and to the President for his approval as a "present expression of United States military policy."

As a basis for this military policy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff postulated a set of major national policies that, taken in the aggregate, were intended to maintain world peace under conditions satisfactory to the United States. The major thrusts of these policies were to protect the United States, the Western Hemisphere, and the Philippine Islands, and to live up to international agreements regarding the United Nations and the occupation of defeated enemy countries. Seven major policies were identified: (1) maintenance of the integrity and security of the United States and its possessions, territories, leased areas, and trust territories; (2) advancement of US political, economic, and social well-being; (3) maintenance of the territorial integrity and sovereignty or political independence of other American states, and regional collaboration to maintain international peace and security in the Western Hemisphere; (4) maintenance of the territorial integrity, security, and when granted, the political independence of the Philippine Islands; (5) participation in and full support of the United Nations; (6) enforcement, in collaboration with allies, of terms imposed upon defeated enemy states; and (7) maintenance of the best possible relative position with respect to the potential enemy powers, ready when necessary to take military action abroad to maintain the security and integrity of the United States. This last item was as close as the Joint Chiefs of Staff came to identifying resistance to Soviet aggression as a major national policy.

The successful maintenance of world peace through these policies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed, depended on cooperation among the Big Three. Since this cooperation would likely not materialize, the United States might have to fight to preserve itself. It must be ready to fight alone, at least initially, and it could not rely on significant outside help. "Any future conflict between major foreign powers," the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned, "will almost certainly precipitate a third world war, in which we could not hope to escape being involved. Any nation, which in the future may attempt to dominate the world, may be expected to make her major effort against the United States and before we can mobilize our forces and productive capacity." New weapons being developed favored such a surprise attack. Geographic location would no longer afford the United States the security and protection that it had once had. On the other hand, the United States would also possess a capability for devastating punitive or retaliatory attacks.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized that the American people would not support overwhelmingly strong forces in peacetime. Nevertheless, the American public should be willing to support an active military force large enough to guarantee security during the initial mobilization period if war broke out. The people must realize that their own safety depended upon a readiness and determination to react effectively overseas in order to prevent an attack on the United States. Other essential requirements for security included an adequate intelligence sys-

tem to provide advance warning of attack, a national organization to coordinate and promote civilian and military technical research and development, and an adequate system of overseas bases.

To achieve these national policies in the face of existing constraints would, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, require a military policy comprising the following elements: (1) strong, trained mobile striking forces with full logistic support; (2) adequate forces to enforce terms imposed on defeated enemy states; (3) forces to protect areas vital to the United States against possible enemy attacks, including attacks with newly developed weapons; (4) an adequate reserve capable of rapid mobilization; (5) an adequate, readily expandable logistic system in the continental United States to support operating forces; (6) an intelligence system to provide adequate information on all potential enemies and the necessary warning of hostile intent and capability; (7) promotion of research, development and provision of new weapons, processes, materiel, and counter-measures to deny these to potential enemies; (8) provision for rapid emergency mobilization of US manpower, resources and industry by supporting such measures as universal military training (UMT), a large US Merchant Marine, large US commercial air transport systems, industries essential to a national war effort, and stockpiling of critical materials; (9) coordination and understanding among all government agencies and industries essential to the national war effort; and (10) liaison with and development and training of the armed forces of the American nations of the Western Hemisphere, the Philippines and other nations contributing to US and hemisphere defense.⁴

Assistant Secretary of War McCloy sent the JCS statement of military policy to the SWNCC whence it reached the Department of State. At a meeting of the Secretary of State's Staff Committee on 13 November, the JCS statement was subjected to some criticism, which was subsequently incorporated in a memorandum to the Committee, dated 16 November. The authors of this document observed that, because application of military policy was of extreme importance, the Department of State should contribute to the formulation of that policy and should also participate with the War and Navy Departments in carrying it out. Turning to specific deficiencies in the JCS statement, the State Department authors maintained that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by emphasizing possible breakdowns in friendly relations between great powers, had slighted "the necessity for insuring the United States adequate allies" as well as the possible effect of US military policy upon friendly relations with other nations. "It also ignores," the State Department criticism continued, "the need for making clear that our military policy must conform with our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations to employ force only under conditions there stipulated."

Department of State officials were also critical of the JCS approach toward the military discharge of occupation duties. Hostilities had only recently ended and no peace treaties were in sight. In political terms, no aspect of US foreign policy held greater potential for the future security of the United States than relations with allies involved in carrying out the surrender and peace terms. Yet the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their statement, seemed largely to have ignored the significance of joint occupation and of joint enforcement of peace terms. Too,

the responsibilities of the United States as a main member of the United Nations should be more prominently considered in making an estimate of future US military requirements.

The State Department found other flaws. If, for example, the United States were, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested, to maintain a large active and reserve merchant marine, it might weaken the economic strength of US potential future allies. The advisability of maintaining "industries essential to the war effort" should be examined on economic as well as foreign policy grounds. The same was true of the "stockpiling of critical strategic materials." It was also questionable whether or not the United States should support the development of armed forces in other American states.

The Department of State also noted that perhaps other policies should be added. These included "respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of other states," notably China, and multilateral regulation of armaments.⁵

At the request of the War Department, the JCS statement of policy was republished as a SWNCC paper on 27 March 1946. On 13 December 1946, the Department of State recommended that no further action be taken. However, an ad hoc committee appointed for the purpose of revising the JCS statement in accordance with comments from State, War, and Navy officials, circulated a revised draft of the statement in early 1947. The statement was eventually overtaken by events and stricken from the SWNCC agenda in 1948.⁶

The JCS Strategic Concept and Plan

Concurrently with the development of the statement of military policy, the JPS had been devising the strategic concept and plan for the employment of US forces. The JSSC concurred in the JPS draft and submitted it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who approved it on 9 October. They forwarded the strategic concept and plan to the Secretaries of War and Navy the next day; they concurred in it on 12 and 17 October.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff once again identified maintaining world peace as the primary objective of the United States and declared that its preservation would require friendly relations among the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain. These countries had emerged from World War II as the major military powers of the world, although Great Britain ranked a poor third behind the other two. The advent of the atomic bomb would not change this existing distribution of power among nations, even if the Soviet Union succeeded in developing the bomb. Smaller nations might eventually acquire atomic weapons, but this would not change their relative military weakness.

A falling out within the Big Three was, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, most likely between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States and Great Britain had many common interests and there was little likelihood of a real disagreement between them. The Soviet Union was a different case, and serious misunderstandings between it and the United States were quite possible.

"The undefined character of Russian aspirations, the background of mutual suspicion existing between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world, and the lack of a common basis of information and understanding with Russia indicate that our relations with that country are of prime importance to the peace of the world," the Joint Chiefs of Staff emphasized.

Because of instability and unrest in the postwar world, the Joint Chiefs of Staff perceived a number of situations that bore the seeds of possible conflict, including the following: (1) territorial settlements in the peace treaties; (2) Soviet determination to insure friendly governments on her borders; (3) political disunity in China; (4) Britain's reaction to its worsening political and economic position and the instability of its colonial empire; (5) any opposition to a strong US position in the western Pacific; (6) France's efforts to restore its national prestige and colonial empire; (7) social upheavals from popular demands for a redistribution of wealth and political power; and (8) the problem of international control of atomic weapons. However, war between the United States and the Soviet Union, they believed, would most likely result, not from any of these areas of conflict, but from Soviet attacks on Western Europe or China.

The United Nations would be barely effective in stabilizing relations among the great powers. It could provide machinery for cooperation and could focus public world opinion upon uncooperative and recalcitrant powers. But armed enforcement of UN principles would certainly not work in the case of major powers. Since the United Nations did not appear capable of resolving a major conflict of interests among the great powers, the United States must make its own military arrangements and be capable of defending itself alone should a major war occur.

Possibly drawing on the information furnished by Dr. Bush and General Groves, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that "foreseeable new weapons" made it essential that the United States obtain accurate and prompt intelligence of foreign progress in new weaponry and deny to foreign nations information of US progress. Retention of the US technological advantage was vital. The United States must further, keep its strategic plans based on new capabilities up-to-date and not allow the potential enemy to strike first. It must prepare to strike the first blow itself, if necessary.

New weapons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed, would have a significant effect on both defensive and offensive operations in the event of major war. In the former, defense of vital installations would require keeping a prospective enemy at the maximum possible distance. This, the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared, "requires forces and installations disposed in an outer perimeter of bases from which to reconnoiter and survey possible enemy actions, to intercept his attacking forces and missiles, to deny him use of such bases, and to launch counteractions which alone can reach a decision satisfactory to us." These peripheral bases could form an integrated system of primary bases and connecting secondary bases. The latter were essential stepping stones to the primary bases providing security in depth. The greatest danger areas were the Arctic air approaches to the North American continent, the Atlantic and Pacific sea approaches, Central and South American countries from which attacks might be made on the Panama

Canal and the United States, and the Atlantic and Pacific sea approaches to the Panama Canal.

In the offensive, the Joint Chiefs of Staff envisioned a rapid series of initial operations, exploiting special weapons and airborne and seaborne striking forces to destroy or disrupt the more dangerous enemy means of action or counteraction and to blockade, bombard, and destroy enemy war-making capacity. Enemy naval forces and shipping would be destroyed early to thwart his operations against the continental United States and to prevent support of his overseas bases. Advanced bases required for the continued campaign or for US security would be seized and occupied. As US reserve industrial and military means became available all military effort would be augmented.⁷

Concept of Operations for a Joint Outline War Plan

In the last months of 1945, the JWPC, acting on its own initiative, began drawing up a detailed concept for operations upon which to base a joint outline war plan for the United States. The JIC and the Joint Logistics Plans Committee (JLPC) worked closely with the JWPC on this. In so doing, the Committees aimed at providing courses of action for the United States in case of a war with the Soviet Union during the next three years.

Although it can not be established from existing records, this planning by the JWPC must have begun in late 1945 as a natural function of officers whose assigned duties called for them to plan and not because of any special instruction or imminent emergency.

It is apparent from remarks made during JPS meetings that as planning progressed during early 1946, aggressive Soviet actions and increasingly belligerent attitudes lent an ever greater sense of urgency and made the effort much more valid in the eyes of the planners. As an example of the thinking of members of the JPS and their staff assistants, Rear Admiral Mathias B. Gardner, Navy Planner, at a meeting on 6 March, stated that if war did come it would break out very suddenly and that if the USSR was going to start a war it "will do it very soon." One officer on the JWPC remarked on the same day, "Time is much more important than when the work on this paper was begun. Thousands, rather than the present small groups, should be working on plans." Another officer pointed out that at the time the JWPC had established a possible date for the beginning of hostilities, January 1948, it could not be known that "pressure would develop as rapidly as it has to date."⁸

On 2 March 1946, the JWPC presented a first draft of the concept of operations to the JPS. The committee members did not believe that the Soviet Union deliberately courted a war with the United States, but this did not mean that war could not come as a result of Soviet policy. The Soviet Union was, in the immediate postwar era, in a period of "vigorous national growth and expansion," in the words of the JWPC. For the next 10 or 15 years the USSR probably stood to gain more from peace than war, and Soviet expansion in various parts of Europe

would probably be by careful step-by-step advancement in a manner to avoid the risk of war. Nevertheless, Soviet expansion in any form would "inevitably endanger the security of the United States." The short range objective of the Soviet Union was to set up a ring of satellite countries to protect its borders, particularly in those sectors where its vital interests were involved. Although this objective had largely been accomplished, the USSR "will vigorously pursue a policy of ideological penetration in all countries where Soviet influence might be enhanced or US or British interests undermined." Here, of course, lay the greatest danger of confrontation and conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. The areas of immediate concern to the Soviet Union, and therefore of interest strategically to the United States, were Finland and the Baltic States, Central Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East, and Manchuria.

The most likely source of a spark that could start the third World War was now considered to be the Middle East where the Soviet Union was currently creating pressures on Turkey and Iran. It was in this area that by cutting too deeply into vital British interests, especially oil and the Suez Canal, the Soviet Union might force Great Britain to fight. Should this occur, the United States would inevitably be drawn in. It was, the planners maintained, "vital to the ultimate security of the United States to prevent the defeat of Great Britain," and if war came, the sooner the United States intervened the better. "Since the present aims in the Middle East of Great Britain and the USSR are conflicting and each considers the accomplishment of its aims vital to national security, further struggle is inevitable," the JWPC informed the JPS.⁹

The JWPC freely admitted that Soviet military strength was far greater than that of the United States and its potential allies. According to the Committee estimate, Soviet military forces consisted of the following: 51 divisions in Germany and Austria; 20 divisions in Poland; 50 divisions located for use in the Near or Middle East; and 20 divisions in Hungary and Yugoslavia. The central reserve in the USSR comprised 152 divisions. Satellite divisions, of less reliability than Soviet divisions but a factor to be counted nonetheless, included 18 in Poland, 43 in Yugoslavia and Hungary, and 26 located in or close to the Near and Middle East. Any ground attack could be supported amply by fighter aircraft and ground attack aircraft. Two thousand effective first-line combat aircraft located in the Soviet Union and in Soviet-dominated areas could be made available for this support.

The Soviet Union would, therefore, possess complete initiative during the first months of any war. Soviet forces could, for instance, overrun Europe west of the Rhine and seize the channel ports of the Low Countries in the first drive. The western allies might succeed in delaying the Soviet forces west of the Rhine but for a short time only. Attacking Soviet units would outnumber the combined US, British, and French forces by at least three times. And these enemy forces could be augmented easily from the Soviet Union. At the same time the main Soviet drive was launched out of Soviet occupied Germany, a subsidiary drive could be made against US-UK forces in northern Italy by combined Yugoslav-Soviet armies. Subsequently, if willing to pay a fairly stiff price, the Soviets could advance into Spain. These attacks would be accompanied by what was described by the planners as "an initial main Soviet offensive" against the Middle East.

In approaching the problem of how US forces should react and the courses of action that should be followed in a war with the Soviet Union, the JWPC concluded that any attempt to match Soviet strength on the ground would be fruitless and the cost prohibitive. Therefore, the United States must, as the planners expressed it, "select operations which are more in consonance with our military capabilities and in which we can exploit our superiority in modern scientific warfare methods." The United States must protect itself, its territories and its bases. It must secure and defend bases and lines of communication in the general vicinity of the British Isles, Egypt, India, and possibly Italy and western China. Air operations employing atomic weapons would be started at once from these bases against the war-making capacity of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union would be blockaded and her naval forces and shipping destroyed. In anticipation of later ground operations against vital Soviet areas, the United States and its allies would try to seize the Caucasus and to open the Dardanelles. US occupation forces in Germany and Austria should, in case of war, withdraw as rapidly as possible from the continent or into Italy or Spain. Forces withdrawn from Europe could be used in North Africa to help defend the Cairo-Suez area. Forces in the Far East should be concentrated in Japan for defense of those islands. As the war progressed, industrial and military means would gradually increase to a point where the air operations and ground operations against the Soviet Union could have a very telling effect. These courses of action were commended to the JPS to be passed on, if approved, in the form of recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹⁰

The JPS discussed the JWPC submission at length in the next month. While they recommended a few changes, the original paper stood up well under JPS scrutiny. However, the planners decided against submitting the paper to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, opting instead to have it circulated merely as a JWPC report.

The JCS Strategic Estimate for the President

As this planning was going on, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had asked the Department of State for a "political estimate" to assist them with military planning. It will be recalled that the Department of State had replied on 1 April 1946, saying, among other things, that the United States must be prepared to demonstrate to the Soviet Union "by military force" if necessary, that its present foreign policy course could only lead it to disaster. The Department of State had also called for immediate reconstitution of US military strength to resist Soviet expansion and to protect areas that would be "strategically essential" in any war with the USSR. In the face of this political estimate, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to present the President and other higher authorities with a military or "strategic estimate" of possible future developments involving relationships with the Soviet Union.¹¹ Taking advantage of the work done by the JWPC, the JPS prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff a strategic estimate, based mainly on the JWPC concept paper, that

would inform the President what might happen "in the unlikely situation of a major outbreak of hostilities." The planners advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they were also preparing a more comprehensive war plan projected into the period when the United States and its allies would have begun to take the initiative. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this JPS estimate on 19 April and directed that it be sent to the President, to the Secretary of Navy, and to the Secretary of War, by Admiral Leahy, Admiral King and General Eisenhower, respectively.¹²

The JCS estimate outlined for the President the probable course of events contained in the JWPC concept. This outline included Soviet capabilities, political considerations, and the steps that the United States and its allies must take to survive and eventually to win in a war with the Soviet Union.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred with the Department of State estimate that while the USSR did not desire to get into a major war at present, Soviet leaders might push their aggressive policies beyond the limits that the United States or Great Britain could tolerate "in their own vital security interest." If war began between Great Britain and the USSR, the United States must prepare for a war with the USSR, which could come at any time after the initial Soviet-British outbreak.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff entertained no illusion about the course of events in the early stages of the war. "It is obvious," they pointed out, "that the initial course of the war would be almost universally unfavorable to us militarily. The initiative would rest with the USSR, and our movement must, in the main, conform until a military balance could be attained and offensive operations initiated."

In these circumstances, the initial US operations would be primarily defensive. The "first basic undertaking" would be to protect the United States, its territories and bases, and the base in the British Isles. However, the fate of US occupation forces would present the most pressing immediate problem. "The withdrawal of our occupation forces in Korea and Germany would be conducted, within our limited military capabilities, with a view to achieving the most favorable military situation possible while still attaining the initial primary objective of extrication of our forces," the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated. "It appears now that withdrawals in Europe should be conducted with a view to continuing to hold a lodgement area on the continent."

In order to bring out its occupation forces and to create a situation more favorable to ultimate success, the United States must make every possible political arrangement before hostilities occurred. These arrangements, at a minimum included: the neutrality of Western European nations and Scandinavia; friendly relations with the countries of Trans-Jordan and the Levant; military collaboration with Turkey; and a neutral Japan and friendly neutrality with China. The optimum political arrangement would involve alliances with the countries of Western Europe and Scandinavian countries.

In the Middle East, the United States and its allies must use all resources to keep the USSR from crossing the desert into the Eastern Mediterranean and to assist Turkey if she opted to fight Russia. The initial US strategy in the Far East envisioned pulling US forces in Korea and residual forces in China back to Japan or the Philippine Islands. The success of this withdrawal would depend on avail-

able shipping. Offensive operations would “reasonably include” strategic air operations against vital areas of the Soviet Union, launched primarily from bases in Great Britain, and possibly Italy and North Africa.

Whatever the course of events, whether the United States concentrated its forces in one area or another, regardless of where its lodgements were held or how its allies reacted, a war in this period would be infinitely more intense and fast-moving than past wars. “The tempo of events would far exceed that of US experience in any war to date,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded. “The consequent requirements would necessitate a mobilization and deployment of all armed forces in the early stages of the war on an accelerated basis, necessitating the most drastic steps to obtain quickly the necessary trained manpower, ships, supplies, and equipment to support the effort. Preceding and accompanying this military and economic action there should be the most complete global political steps to strengthen our position.”

Joint Basic Outline War Plan PINCHER

On 13 April, as the planning project continued, the JWPC published several staff studies complementing the concept of operations. In addition to a main report on the overall problems involved, the staff studies covered occupation forces in Europe and the Far East, and the air base areas that might be required for a strategic air offensive against the USSR. The latter comprised several annexes with details necessary for close planning of air operations.¹³

Most significant of all, on 27 April, one week after the strategic estimate had been sent to the President, the JWPC, on its own initiative, submitted to the JPS the first Joint Basic Outline War Plan ever developed by the JCS organization. Designated PINCHER, the plan was intended to serve as the basis for preparing a Joint Basic War Plan, supporting Army and Navy Basic War plans, and necessary supporting and contributory plans to govern joint action by US military forces against the USSR in the next three years.

To this end, PINCHER consisted of procedures to be followed by Joint and Service staffs in producing a basic war plan and an outline concept of operations derived from the concept paper of 2 March to guide their planning efforts. PINCHER did not call specifically for employing atomic weapons in the strategic air offensive but did point out that the supply of such weapons was limited. Because of the imponderables in any war pitting the United States against the Soviet Union, the JWPC made no attempt to project either operations or force requirements beyond the initial stages.¹⁴

After amending PINCHER at several meetings, the JPS approved it as the “basis for further planning” on 18 June 1946. The planners addressed PINCHER again on 8 July 1946 and concluded that planning efforts should be limited for the present to further refinement of the concept of operations contained in the plan. They accordingly directed the JWPC to keep the concept up to date “in light

of changing conditions" and to prepare a number of strategic studies of various world areas based on the concept.¹⁵

Among the strategic studies in the PINCHER series, prepared by JWPC and JIC over the next year, were the following: Operations in the Pacific Area; Intelligence Estimate of Specific Areas in Southern Europe; the Middle East and Near East, and Northern Africa; Strategic Study of the Area Between the Alps and the Himalayas; CALDRON, Enemy Threat to Allied Forces in Italy and Most Profitable Allied Course of Action; COCKSPUR, The Soviet Threat in the Far East and the Means Required to Oppose It; MOONRISE, The Soviet Threat Against the Iberian Peninsula and the Means Required to Meet It; DRUMBEAT, Security of Egypt; Capabilities of the USSR for Attack and of the UK for Defense of the British Isles; Strategic Study of the Area Which Encompasses the Northeastern Approach to the North American Continent.¹⁶

On 16 July 1947, the JWPC informed the JPS that studies in the PINCHER series were sufficiently advanced so that it was now feasible and desirable to proceed with a joint war plan for the initial stages of a war that might occur within the next three years. The JWPC recommended this be done. After considering this proposal for over a month, the JPS agreed. On 29 August 1947 the Committee instructed the JWPC to prepare, as a matter of priority, a joint outline plan based on the assumptions, strategic concept, basic undertakings and initial operations which it provided in an enclosure, and upon the further premise that war had been forced on the United States during 1948. This plan was prepared over the next six months.¹⁷

The JCS Advise President Truman on Military Policy

It will be recalled that in response to a request from Mr. Clark Clifford, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had, on 27 July 1946, submitted to President Truman their views on US-Soviet relationships. As an adjunct of this report the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a military policy directed specifically against the Soviet Union. These views were intended to help the President prepare himself for the forthcoming Paris Peace Conference.

It was clear from their report that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been alarmed by Soviet actions in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Venezia Giulia. They warned the Chief Executive that any major war that came in the foreseeable future would be between the Western democracies and the Soviet-led communists, and that it would be brought about by the USSR's determination to destroy all governments other than its own.

Then, in an expression of policy new to them, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asserted it was mandatory that the US base its policy on creating stronger relationships with peoples friendly to the United States, especially those whose principles and concepts were the same. These peoples should be strengthened and prepared to resist communist encroachment in all forms. This idea later was to become a key-

stone of US resistance to the spread of communism and to give rise to extensive military aid programs.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff cautioned, however, against undue reliance on allied forces during the early stages of a conflict. "We must," the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated, "maintain sufficient military strength to insure that we are not in the future dependent upon action of potential allies to protect us during mobilization and the period required for gearing our industrial capacity for war." The United States must, therefore, maintain strong active forces and prepare realistic war plans commensurate with its capabilities. These preparations would include securing minimum requirements for an outlying system of bases recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as necessary to the defense of the United States and its allies.

The United States must also face the fact that the Soviet Union would use every form of weapon available to it, and that it would not observe international rules of warfare or humanitarian principles. The United States must plan with this in mind and contemplate the use of atomic weapons, and bacteriological and chemical warfare. The United States must take special pains to hold the lead in scientific matters, particularly with respect to the atomic weapon. The Joint Chiefs of Staff stated:

We must avoid being led into premature disclosure of our scientific and technological atomic information with a view to accelerating atomic control negotiations until we are assured that workable methods of inspection and control of manufacture are developed, accepted by all nations, thoroughly tested and found completely effective. Such disclosure would greatly reduce the military advantage now held by the United States by virtue of our possession of the atomic bomb.

The United States must, at the same time, continue its efforts in the research and development of new weapons. It must not consider proposals for disarmament or limitation on arms so long as the Soviet Union continued its aggressive policies. Knowledge of Soviet strength and actions was also essential. "One of the most vital prerequisites to our future security is adequate intelligence from inside the USSR," the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated. "This cannot be achieved unless freedom of travel inside the USSR is granted by the Soviets. Pressure should, therefore, be exerted toward lifting current restrictions by applying reciprocal restraint to Soviet nationals within the United States. Until we secure freedom of travel for our citizens within the USSR, every other possibility of obtaining information concerning Soviet warmaking potential and her vital areas should be exhausted."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff touched upon a number of other facets of military policy. They pointed out that political factors would affect US military requirements. If the United States could not keep the USSR from dominating Western Europe, the Middle East, China, and Japan, it would be forced to increase greatly its military strength. On the other hand, if the "iron curtain" could be pushed eastward, US requirements would diminish. They called on the nation's leaders to use every feasible means of preventing communist infiltration of the governmental agencies, the armed forces, and "labor elements" supporting the US war-

making capacity. They proposed that US policy on reparations be aimed at "strengthening those areas which we are endeavouring to keep outside the Soviet sphere of influence."

Adoption of their military policies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained, might well preclude having to fight. "Our military policy and willingness to support our armed forces must be based on the elementary assumption that the Soviet mentality will recognize only one deterrent to their policy of aggression, and that is force," the Joint Chiefs of Staff asserted. The main deterrent to a Soviet attack against the West would be US success in convincing Soviet leaders that the United States was "sufficiently strong, willing, and ready to destroy them" if such an attack were made. Again, this idea of the "deterrent" was new and was in later years to become a basic part of US strategy. In ending, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted, "We must recognize that under our democratic system our own military preparedness cannot be adequately achieved without an informed public opinion. A concrete plan of action along this line must be put in motion in the near future."¹⁸

Strategic Guidance for Industrial Mobilization Planning

The Army-Navy Munitions Board informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 29 October 1946, that the Secretaries of War and Navy wished the Board to prepare an industrial mobilization plan during 1947. To accomplish this the Board needed from the Joint Chiefs of Staff requirement schedules based on joint mobilization and strategic plans.

Since the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not at that time have such plans, satisfying the Munitions Board requirements raised some problems. On 19 November 1946, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a general procedure for providing the necessary guidance to the Army-Navy Munitions Board as well as a directive to the Joint Logistics Committee to prepare a joint mobilization plan.¹⁹ Subsequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the JPS to prepare a joint strategic concept and outline war plan. These would serve as strategic guidance to the JLC in its development of a joint mobilization plan, which in turn would guide the Army-Navy Munitions Board in preparing an industrial mobilization plan for 1947.²⁰

In accordance with their instructions, on 10 February 1947, the JPS forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff an outline war plan and a phases deployment of forces. "Caution must be exercised to prevent planning or operating agencies from assuming that this is an approved war plan and thus undertaking measures to effect implementation," the JPS pointed out in passing the plan upward. The outline war plan was only one of a number of possible lines of action, but it was representative enough to show the major force requirements that would be necessary to carry out "any of the principal alternate plans now foreseeable."

The JPS did not intend that this outline war plan be adopted as the best or most desirable war plan. It was intended instead to provide approximations and estimates of the combat forces and resources that would be needed by the

United States in any major war breaking out within the next three years. The computation of major combat forces in the plan would be applicable to any other course of action that might be forced upon the Western allies in the first two years of war.

A comparison of the concept of operations in this plan with that developed by the JWPC in the Joint Basic Outline War Plan shows that the planners leaned heavily on the latter study in developing this new outline plan. The plan covered a war between the United States and Great Britain on one side and the Soviet Union and its satellites on the other. The relative capabilities of the opponents were based on the latest intelligence, which showed that the Soviet Union possessed ground and tactical air forces much larger than those of the Western allies and had considerable airborne capabilities within a limited range. The Soviet's surface naval forces were not particularly threatening, but their submarine capabilities were impressive and increasing. Their strategic air forces had not been developed, however.

It was assumed that the war had begun with a Soviet attack on the Western allies, that the United States would not use the atomic weapon, and that the USSR did not possess the weapon. Under these assumptions, Soviet armies could overrun Western Europe very quickly and would probably destroy allied occupation forces in Germany and seize the Channel coast of France and the Lowlands in order to neutralize Great Britain. After seizing France, the Soviets would probably continue through Spain to take the western entrance to the Mediterranean. At the same time, they would very likely try to take Turkey and the Middle East to gain control of the eastern Mediterranean and the oil reserves of the Middle East. Greece and parts of Italy would be overrun by Yugoslavia. The USSR would give first priority to operations in Western Europe and the Middle East, thereby slighting her efforts in the Far East. But once in a position to do so, the Soviets could overrun at their leisure Manchuria, Korea, North China, and probably the Japanese island of Hokkaido.

The concept of allied operations developed by the JPS provided for a main offensive effort in Western Eurasia and an active defensive in Eastern Asia. A maximum strategic air bombardment effort would be launched against vital areas of eastern USSR, coupled with operations to secure adequate bases and to waste Soviet resources through political, psychological, and underground operations. In conjunction with these operations, one or more major ground advances would be made to gain and consolidate allied control over selected areas in Europe. Phases foreseen were: I-Stabilization of the Soviet offensive; II-Reduction of Soviet war power and potential; III-Advancement of Allied effort; and IV-Consolidation of Allied control.

In the first stages at least, the allies would be forced to go on the strategic defensive, with operations limited to strategic moves to counter the enemy's powerful offense. Their success would depend a great deal on the amount of advance warning they received and upon the degree of prior support that they gave their small potential allies such as Turkey, Spain, Greece, and Italy. In the event of insufficient warning time, US-allied forces, particularly air forces, would be inadequate to carry out their initial objectives. The allies would have great

trouble concentrating forces fast enough to meet the enemy's moves. "It would be of the greatest importance," the JPS pointed out, "that the United States recognize early that a war is practically at hand, that the war will involve vital American interests, that early US entry will yield important military advantages, and may in fact be essential to the prevention of military domination of the world by the U.S.S.R."

Certain basic undertakings were essential and must be successfully completed if the war was not to be lost. These were: protecting and maintaining the industrial capacity of North America, and protecting the British Isles, certain key areas and bases and minimum essential communications lines. All possible measures must be taken to rescue occupation forces in Europe and Korea and to protect those in Japan. "These basic undertakings are a first charge against our resources," the JPS stated.

It was frankly acknowledged that the United States and its allies would not be able to drive into the USSR on the ground against the vastly superior Soviet ground forces. But the United States did have the capability of beginning an offensive strategic air effort against vital Soviet industrial installations and against Soviet population centers. This appeared to be the only real hope of achieving a final allied victory. The second charge against allied resources, therefore, was the provision of forces and equipment for the development of a sustained strategic air offensive against the "industrial heart of Russia." The plan identified vital areas of the USSR and the distances from nearest allied bases.

In the event the Western allies decided to attack the industrial "heartland" of the USSR, either by air or by land advance, they would have to use one of the two main avenues of approach from the west; a northern approach through Central Europe and Scandinavia; or the southern approach through the Mediterranean and the Near East. While the air attack could be made relatively early in the war, it would be at least three years before the west was strong enough vis-a-vis the Soviet Union to make such an attack on the ground.

Unless the West succeeded in preserving and controlling the Eastern Mediterranean it could not use the southern approach. This could best be done by keeping Turkey out of Soviet hands. Allied success in doing this and in keeping the Soviets from moving through Turkey into the Middle East would depend largely on how much warning the West received and the amount of advance aid given Turkey. Because of the poor land lines of communication in this area the allies had a good chance, provided they moved quickly enough to bring in forces, of holding the Soviet advance to the Palestine area or even further north. However, the most serious threat to the Mediterranean was Soviet conquest of Spain and seizure of the Straits of Gibraltar.

In the Far East no purpose would be served by throwing US ground troops against the enemy on the Asiatic mainland. US action in that area would be primarily naval and air, with US forces operating from bases in Japan, Alaska, and the Pacific. Their purpose would be harassment of the Soviet coastal areas to prevent buildup for invasion from those areas.

The Middle East appeared to be the area that the allies could best defend and from which, in the later stages of the war, ground attacks could be launched

against the Soviet Union. "... It appears at the present time that initial establishment of Allied forces in the Middle East is the most promising course of action, ..." the planners stated. "While detailed studies of other axes of operation have not been made, it is believed that requirement for alternative operations would be such that the industrial program planned to support an initial effort in the Middle East could be adjusted without major loss of time or effort to support alternatives which might be selected as a result of later studies or which might be forced upon us by enemy action." Advantages of the Middle East were (1) as a base area for strategic air operations it was within closest operating range of the greatest percentage of those industrial complexes vital to the Soviet war effort; (2) it constituted a satisfactory base of operations for a surface advance toward vital Soviet areas, should such an advance prove necessary; (3) in this area the US and Britain would have an allied people, the Turks, whose cooperation would be of great strategic value; and (4) retention of a base area in the Middle East would facilitate allied recovery of Middle East oil resources, deny these to the Soviets, and deny access through the Suez area to North Africa.

Providing the minimum forces to carry out the initial tasks would stretch US manpower capabilities to the very limit. Priorities established in the plan for provision of forces and resources derived from specific, interrelated, joint tasks. These were grouped in the plan and programmed in a time schedule related to D-Day. The force tabs set out in the plan reflected the Service differences over roles and missions that was then at the height of controversy. Because of these differences the plan carried duplications relating to Army and Marine Divisions and to Navy and Air Force anti-submarine units.²¹

On 30 April 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted the JPS memorandum and its appendices, including the joint strategic concept and the outline war plan. They also noted that the schedules of force requirements, although not reviewed or integrated jointly, provided a basis for the JLC to develop some joint logistic guidance to the Services and that the Services would compute specified data needed by the Army-Navy Munitions Board, forwarding it to that Board directly. This data would be changed as required by progressive development of joint guidance by the JLC. The JPS and JLC would adjust the strategic concept and requirements in the outline plan on the basis of estimates of US industrial capabilities when furnished by the Army-Navy Munitions Board.²²

Unified Command

While the foundations of strategic war plans were thus being laid, a major complementary action was underway to streamline and improve the mechanisms by which US forces would be commanded and controlled in peacetime and, particularly, in the event of war. It was assumed that these mechanisms would be unified commands under some arrangement similar to the joint command arrangements developed in World War II.

The impetus to amend the existing command apparatus stemmed from the Navy's dissatisfaction with the situation in the Pacific. Early in World War II, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended and the President had approved establishment of unified command in that area. Two major commanders were involved, Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area (CINCSWPA), in the person of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPOA), Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. In each case the JCS directive to the commander granted him command of "all armed forces which the governments have assigned or may assign" to his area.

The conduct of the war against the Japanese in the Pacific went smoothly under this system, so long as the two commands were separated geographically. As the war drew near an end, and in preparation for the invasion of Japan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff changed the command system. They designated CINCSWPA also Commander in Chief, US Army Forces, Pacific (CINCAFPAC), placing under his command all US Army resources in the Pacific Theater (save for the Southeast Pacific Area and the Alaskan Department) and making him responsible for providing Army resources to meet the requirements "for operations in the Pacific directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." At the same time the Joint Chiefs of Staff named Fleet Admiral Nimitz, Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC) to command all US naval resources in the Pacific, charging him with making these resources available for operations in the Pacific directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

These directives to CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC, issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 3 April 1945, became the source of dissension between the Army and Navy over Pacific command in the postwar period. The Army stand was that command should be exercised through service commanders, unifying the great bulk of each service rather than on a basis of territorial areas as had been the case during the war. The Army therefore welcomed the 3 April 1945 directive and chose to consider it as a new basic directive to supersede the old arrangements. The US Navy on the other hand, appeared to consider that command of the Pacific Ocean areas and the consequent responsibility for their defense was still vested in CINCPOA since there had never been any specific mutual agreement for transfer of this area command, even though a transfer of forces had taken place. The Army and Air Force members of the JPS defined the difference as "the Army belief in emphasis on unity of command of forces as compared to a continuing Navy emphasis on unity of command by areas with the resultant effect in the Pacific of disunited Army forces."²³

These diametrically opposed points of view relative to the validity of current directives and as to emphasis on unity of command were not easily resolved even though efforts to do so were instituted at the highest military levels. On 1 February 1946, the Chief of Naval Operations pointed out to his fellow members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the "ambiguous situation in the Pacific Ocean Area" wherein an Army commander, CINCAFPAC, commanded all Army forces in the area while a Navy commander, CINCPAC, commanded all Navy forces in the same area. This being the case, CINCPAC must defend locations in the Pacific using only Navy and Marine forces, depending on Army forces made available

through "cooperation" in an emergency. "This situation," Admiral Nimitz stated, "is obviously unsatisfactory and uneconomical. Furthermore, determination of the forces required of each Service for adequate defense and support of the various island positions held becomes difficult and subject to duplication in some locations and inadequacy in others."

He then called for establishment of a single command comprising the entire Pacific Theater, less Japan, Korea, and China and the coastal areas of Central and South America. Command of the area would be vested in a commander located on Oahu, Hawaii, who would have a joint staff and would "exercise unity of command" of all US forces in the area.²⁴

The Joint Chiefs of Staff at once directed the JPS to recommend a Pacific command system, defining in general terms the responsibilities of the commander or commanders. During discussions of the problem within the JPS the Army planner defined the difference as being one of whether the command structure should be based on a force concept, where the commander commanded a designated, assigned force or whether it should be based on an area concept wherein the commander "ruled over" a specified area. The Navy planner pointed out that only in the Pacific did the United States follow the principle of a force commander. He questioned the logic of a command structure in which General MacArthur, as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Japan (SCAP), would be responsible for forces in Japan and for command of forces in Hawaii at the same time. He stated that current arrangements in the Pacific had not been agreed to by the Navy and had been accepted only for the sake of expediency. The present system did not achieve coordination in the field and was an unsatisfactory arrangement in the Navy view.²⁵

After nearly six weeks of effort and deliberation the JPS were forced to report that they could not agree on a recommendation for a command system. Split along Service lines, the individual planners held their ground. The Navy member still advocated unity of command by area while the Army and Army Air force members insisted on unity of command of forces. This fundamental difference was not apparent, however in the points on which the JPS asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for "specific guidance" on 23 March 1946. Should action be taken now to change the existing arrangements for Pacific command? If so, should there be a single unified Pacific command to include Japan and Korea, or separate unified commands for Japan and Korea, Ryukyus and the Philippines, and the remainder of the Pacific Theater (less the Southeast Pacific area)?²⁶

Because Pacific forces were currently engaged in transitory activities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were willing to postpone changing command arrangements until the situation stabilized. Nevertheless, in order that planning for defense and postwar development of Pacific islands might proceed in an orderly manner, the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested the JPS to review the situation and to recommend an interim command arrangement for the area.²⁷

Even this seemingly simple matter proved troublesome. The Army-Air Force members of the JPS wished to amplify the current command directives by stipulating that plans and measures for the defense of island positions in the Pacific would be "effected jointly between CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC-CINCPAC."

Navy officers took sharp exception to this on the basis that it would change the existing command structure. The Navy version of the amplified directive would have stated that the Army and Navy commanders would "effect plans and measures for defense of island positions in those areas for which they were responsible under existing directives." Admiral Nimitz delivered the coup de grace to the proposed revised directive when he charged that the Army version would actually change the Pacific command structure. He emphatically reminded the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that areas under command of CINCPAC would remain under his command until changed by mutual agreement. Insofar as he was concerned World War II arrangements were still in effect and any plans for defending the areas under CINCPAC would be prepared by him, not on a joint basis. "I will not agree, the Chief of Naval Operations stated, "to a command structure or to an assignment of responsibility for plans and measures for defense which would create at Pearl Harbor a situation resembling that in November 1941, with the added feature of having the Army and Navy Headquarters separated by approximately 3400 miles."²⁸

For almost six months, JCS consideration of command in the Pacific was deferred. Then, on 17 September 1946, General Eisenhower revived the issue, citing a consensus among the Joint Chiefs of Staff that worldwide US command arrangements needed revision to achieve "sound unified command arrangements at the earliest possible date." He presented an outline plan for command arrangements in the Pacific and in other world areas where he believed the situation would be at least as acute as in the Pacific. If the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President approved this plan it could form the basis for detailed directives.

General Eisenhower proposed to establish the following major commands: Western Pacific (China, Korea, Japan, Philippines, Ryukyus, Bonins, Marianas); Central Pacific; Alaska; Northeast (Newfoundland, Labrador, Greenland, Iceland); Caribbean; and European. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would assign forces to each of these commands. Unified command would be established as provided in *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*. The theater commander would be responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and would have a joint staff of officers from all assigned components. Within the unified command, component commanders would be empowered to deal directly with appropriate component headquarters in all matters (i.e., training, supply, etc.) that were not properly a responsibility of joint command. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would exercise strategic direction over all elements of the armed forces in the unified command.²⁹

Admiral Nimitz raised substantial objections to General Eisenhower's proposals because under such command arrangements US naval forces could not be concentrated swiftly in emergency. He pointed out that each of the postwar Fleets, the Atlantic and the Pacific, could muster only about one carrier task force in its area. Each force should be trained as a unit and operated as a unit. He contended that naval forces should be allocated only temporarily to theaters in which land requirements were predominant. Task forces from each of the two major fleets must continue to operate in the Eastern Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, and the Western Pacific under Navy command. "When needed for the accomplishment of the tasks of a local theater commander, a maximum naval

force should be concentrated and made available under appropriate command relationships," Admiral Nimitz stated. The Chief of Naval Operations wanted General Eisenhower's plan modified to reflect the above views. He wanted also to charge the theater commander with support of fleet operations as well as of operations of strategic air forces. He would defer any command changes in Europe until after SACMED had been abolished and a combined command devised for Northern Europe. He stressed also that theater commanders must be allowed temporarily to extend their operations into another theater when necessity required.³⁰

On 20 September 1946, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Operations Deputies, Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman, Major General Lauris Norstad, and Major General Otto Weyland to consider the Eisenhower plan and the comments thereon by Admiral Nimitz, along with certain oral comments by Admiral Leahy, and to amalgamate these into a single paper for their consideration.³¹

Meanwhile, Admiral Nimitz presented another eloquent case for establishment of naval command by area over strategic ocean areas. On 7 October, he proposed that the following commands be established under the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Far East Theater; Pacific Ocean Theater; Alaskan Defense Command; Northeast Defense Command; Atlantic Ocean Theater; Panama Theater; European Theater; and Mediterranean Theater. No action was taken on this, probably because of the work then being done on command arrangements by the Operations Deputies.³²

Late in October, the Operations Deputies presented an outline Command Plan providing for the following commands: Far East (or Western Pacific) Command; Pacific Ocean (or Central Pacific) Command; Alaskan Command; Northeast Command; Atlantic Fleet; Caribbean Command; European Command. In addition to differences of opinion over the names of two other commands, two other points remained at issue. First the Navy wanted marine and naval units in North China to be placed under "naval command" (i.e., Pacific Command), but to receive guidance directly from General Marshall, the President's Special Representative in China. The Army, conversely, felt that these forces should come under control of General MacArthur (i.e., Far East Command). Second, the Navy argued that, since all island positions in the Pacific constituted one strategic entity, the Marianas and Bonins ought to be placed under Pacific Command. The Army contended that the Bonins and Marianas belonged within Far East Command because General MacArthur must draw upon their resources during an emergency.³³

Admiral Leahy supported the Navy's stand, advocating "a simple delineation of areas that are at the present time under the different commands" as a complete solution. If necessary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could easily adjust boundaries to meet changed conditions. He felt that, in peacetime, forces outside designated areas, such as those in China, should be placed under the operational command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Marianas and Bonins ought to be put under Pacific Command, with a proviso that the Joint Chiefs of Staff might temporarily assign control of specific facilities to the Far East and Alaskan Commanders. Predictably, Admiral Nimitz announced his concurrence with Admiral Leahy.³⁴

At this stage, General Spaatz injected another issue into the debate. He proposed that the Northeast and Alaskan Commanders be directed to "support the strategic air commander in his mission."³⁵ Admiral Nimitz had several objections. He had assumed that strategic air forces stationed outside the continental United States (CONUS) would be assigned to appropriate unified commands. However, if General Spaatz was referring to CONUS-based units, "it would appear necessary to clarify their relationship to other forces and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff." General Spaatz responded that, to increase potential striking power to the maximum, Strategic Air Command (SAC) should be controlled by one commander and should be capable of operating on a global basis. This concept, he claimed, had been proven conclusively by the "overwhelming success" of the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces in Europe—a victory achieved under General Spaatz's direction. Postwar development of planes with greatly increased range and tonnage capacity, he contended, further confirmed this truth. In order to overcome Admiral Nimitz's objections, General Spaatz suggested a statement that the commander of the Strategic Air Command would (1) operate in designated areas anywhere in the world "either independently or in cooperation with other components of the armed forces," and (2) act "in, through or over the areas of responsibility of other commands" in accordance with directives issued by the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, as Executive Agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.³⁶

General Eisenhower initiated a compromise. Writing to his JCS colleagues on 4 December, he reminded them that they had appraised nine papers since 17 September without accomplishing anything but interim measures of little consequence. The Army Chief of Staff offered major concessions on all contested points. As to arrangements for SAC, the Alaskan and Northeastern commanders should be tasked to "support strategic air forces as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." He agreed with General Spaatz's ideas but believed that the determination of SAC missions should be deferred. He believed that differences over China arose, in part, from concepts born in World War II when commanders "exercised what amounted to sovereign powers over large areas." Those days were gone; postwar commanders were confined to specific tasks and forces. General Eisenhower preferred a unified command of forces in the Western Pacific. In order to achieve agreement, however, he was willing to place China forces under the "direct operational control" of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the guidance of General Marshall. Should an emergency arise, the Far East Commander would assume control. General Eisenhower condemned as "retrogressive" any arrangement that would separate the Far East Commander from ground and air reinforcements positioned in the Bonins and Marianas. But, recognizing the importance of Guam to the Pacific Fleet, he proposed that these installations be placed under the operational control of the Pacific Command.³⁷

Admiral Nimitz also was inclined to compromise. He still believed that General Spaatz's concept, if accepted without clarification, would "perpetuate a period of confused command relationships which . . . had their inception in the establishment of the Twentieth Air Force during the war."³⁸ Nonetheless, he agreed to put SAC in the plan, provided: (1) that the Strategic Air Commander

was responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff; (2) the Joint Chiefs of Staff allocated forces to the Strategic Air Command; (3) the Strategic Air Command did not control forces normally based in other commands and did not duplicate specialized search and reconnaissance efforts by other commands. Turning to China, Admiral Nimitz noted that any change which by-passed CINCPACFLT in his control of rotation of fleet units from the China coast to the Eastern Pacific would be awkward and would impede ongoing redeployments. For the Bonins and Marianas, finally, Admiral Nimitz insisted upon a "truly unified command, insofar as local defense is concerned, for all forces permanently stationed in Guam, Saipan, and Tinian. This, after all, was a primary lesson of the Pearl Harbor investigation. However, Admiral Nimitz agreed to approve any solution which gave General MacArthur such control over the Marianas' resources as he might require.³⁹

Agreement came quickly and on 12 December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented President Truman with a Unified Command Plan that would serve "as an interim measure for the immediate postwar period." The following major commands were proposed:

Far East Command—this would include forces in Japan, Korea, Ryukyus, Philippines, Marianas, and Bonins. While CINCFE would control forces and local facilities in the Bonins and Marianas, he would bear no responsibility either for military and civil government or for naval administration and logistics. If an emergency arose, CINCFE would assume control of forces "in or affecting" China.

Pacific Command—Intended to "maintain the security of US island positions in the Pacific . . ." CINCPAC would provide naval units needed in China, but the JCS themselves would direct the activities of these forces.

Alaskan Command.

Northeast Command—this would control forces assigned to Newfoundland, Labrador, and Greenland.

The Atlantic Fleet.

Caribbean Command.

European Command.

Additionally, there was established a *Strategic Air Command* "comprised of strategic air forces not otherwise assigned." SAC planes normally would be based in the United States, under a commander responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The plan then specified that:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff will exercise strategic direction over all elements of the armed forces. Missions and tasks of all independent commands will be prescribed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Forces not specifically assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff will remain under the operational control of the respective Services. However, all action of strategic significance will be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As Admiral Nimitz wished, "the assignment of an area of responsibility to one commander will not be construed as restricting the forces of another command from temporarily extending appropriate operations into that area. . . ." Also, as he desired, each major command would create within itself a unified

system "for purposes of local defense." President Truman approved the plan on 14 December.⁴⁰

On the basis of the Unified Command Plan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff established three major commands on 16 December 1946, designating General Douglas MacArthur as Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE), Admiral J. H. Towers as Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) and Major General H. A. Craig as Commander in Chief, Alaska (CINCAL), all appointments to take effect at 010001Z January 1947.⁴¹

The European Command entered into existence on 15 March and Caribbean Command on 1 November. The "Atlantic Fleet" came into being on 1 November 1947; the title was changed to "Atlantic Command" on 1 December. Northeast Command was not established until October 1950.

Strategic Concept and Deployment Planning for the Pacific

On 17 April 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a strategic concept for the Pacific. This concept had been developed as a necessary corollary of deployment planning directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection with their efforts to establish a command structure.⁴²

The approved strategic concept stated that at present and "for the proximate futures" the United States should plan on an "offensive-defensive" stance in the Pacific. The Pacific area should be considered secondary to the European-Mediterranean area in operational importance to the United States. If war broke out in the Pacific, US strategic objectives would be: (1) to destroy any vital elements of enemy power within the effective operating range of US bases in the Pacific; (2) to deny US island bases to the enemy; (3) to prevent destructive attacks on US vital areas and installations; (4) to protect essential US lines of communication on sea, air and land and deny enemy use of his; and (5) to protect sources of essential raw materials in the Pacific.

Further, the US military policy for the Pacific would support and promote US national policies in the Orient. These policies included an "Open Door" policy in China: establishment and support of governments in China, Japan, Korea, and the Philippines that were stable and friendly to the United States; and prevention of the domination of Manchuria, Korea, and North China by "powers or governments potentially hostile to the United States."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff emphasized the strategic significance of the "Pacific Basin" (the Pacific littoral and the Pacific Ocean), within which lay the territories of many nations and dependencies ranging from the smallest to three of the world's greatest powers. Almost limitless stores of raw materials, great populations and industrial complexes lay within this basin. The vast ocean region was dotted with a number of islands and was enclosed by strategic land areas. Control of this basin was of the utmost importance in any world war.

On the land masses of East Asia in the Pacific littoral, the USSR exerted a strong influence. It had annexed southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, con-

trolled Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang and had gained economic concessions in Manchuria. Soviet forces occupied northern Korea and could, from this position "conceivably exercise control over the remainder of the Korean peninsula at a future date." The defeat of Japan had removed all opposition in this area to further Soviet expansion on the mainland, except for the limited capability of the Chinese Nationalists.

There was always the possibility that at some future time a foreign power might force its way into the Pacific Ocean by way of the Indian Ocean. One of the Asiatic powers, unspecified, might simultaneously attack the United States and Australia, although this was a remote contingency.

It was essential to the US economy that unhindered trade with Pacific nations continue. In wartime it would be vital for the United States to have sure access to the raw materials of the area. "The United States is certain to be quickly involved in case of major aggression by any foreign power in any part of the area," the Joint Chiefs of Staff contended.

Listing the underlying principles of the US strategy in the Pacific, the Joint Chiefs of Staff enumerated the following: (1) Pacific Islands (other than the Kuriles) must be denied to any military power strong enough to become hostile to the United States; (2) United States must control effectively the military use of Pacific Islands north of the equator (other than the Kuriles, Japan, and Asiatic coastal islands) and those islands within effective operating range of the Panama Canal; (3) essential sea and air routes in the Pacific and sources of essential raw materials must be safeguarded in order to allow unhindered US trade and commerce in peacetime; (4) during war destructive attacks should be made on any vital elements of enemy power located within effective operating range of the Pacific area; (5) for the foreseeable future, military and industrial power within or dependent upon the Pacific Basin, or located within range thereof, while considerable, was decidedly secondary to that of the Atlantic-European-Eastern North American area; and (6) the United States should try to secure establishment and maintenance of friendly and stable governments in China, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and in the South Pacific, and to prevent the domination of these areas by potentially hostile powers.

In a thinly-veiled reference to the Soviet Union, the Joint Chiefs of Staff evaluated the military capabilities of "the strongest Asiatic power." Initial enemy capabilities during the next three to five years included aircraft attacks against targets within the line Hainan-northern Luzon-Bonins-Aleutians, with "non-return sorties" being possible to them as far as the Hawaiian Islands and Los Angeles. Within three years the potential enemy might possibly possess the atomic bomb. He could carry out airborne operations against parts of Japan and Alaska. His naval capabilities were not great but he could make short surface forays against US shipping and minor naval forces and carry out limited submarine operations north of the equator, and launch small amphibious operations with limited range. By 1952 the enemy's capabilities would have improved in terms of the range and weight of his air and airborne attacks and submarine operations. He would probably have guided missiles of 3,000 miles effective range "within five or ten years."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff then forwarded a memorandum to the Secretaries of War and Navy that contained proposed peacetime deployment of major units to the Pacific after the occupation in Japan and Korea had ended. "It is recognized," they said, "that these deployments are subject to such modification as may be necessitated by the over-all strengths at which the armed forces are maintained pursuant to legislation or comparable administrative considerations."

Peacetime deployments recommended included 13,600 Army troops in the Marianas Islands of Guam, Saipan and Tinian to service a mounting, staging and training area. In the same islands, 18,700 Army Air Force troops would support an operational and service air base area and 27,900 naval personnel would man a naval operating base, a submarine base and a naval air base. Fleet Marine Forces and Fleet Aviation would be included within this naval personnel total. Deployments in the Ryukyus Islands to provide facilities for air operations, a base and staging area for ground forces, a naval air facility and anchorage for defense of the Western Pacific were set at 11,000 Army, 15,100 Army Air Force and 500 Navy personnel. To provide support in the Philippine Islands for operating bases for air forces and for mounting staging and training ground forces and to provide a fleet anchorage and minor naval operating base the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended strengths of 2,700 Army, 2,300 Army Air Forces, and 1,900 Navy-Marine Corps. Air base and naval anchorage facilities in the Bonin-Volcano Islands would require 2,000 Army and 1,100 Army Air Forces personnel. An aerological station in the Caroline Islands would require 20 Navy men.

Army troops numbering 35,000, plus 7,600 more from the Army Air Forces and naval forces of 14,700, would be stationed in the Hawaiian Islands to operate major ground, air, and naval bases. On Midway Island, 800 Navy men would operate a submarine base and naval air station. On Johnston Island an air base would require 400 Army Air Force personnel. Weather and communication stations and an emergency landing field would be located on Wake Island while weather and communications stations on Marcus Island would need 50 Army Air Force men and officers.

In a separate listing the Joint Chiefs of Staff detailed the major units (see chart) that would need to be supported in the Pacific in the event of an emergency or in wartime. These did not represent an addition to the peacetime deployment but the total forces at wartime strength.⁴³

JCS Recommendations for Deployments in the Pacific⁴⁴

	<i>Peacetime</i>	<i>War or Emergency</i>
<i>Marianas</i>		
Army	1 inf div. 2 AA bn.	3 inf div. 8 AA bn.
AAF	18 sq.*	32 sq.
Navy	Support forces for 1 carrier TG, 1 sub div.	Support forces for 1 carrier TG, 1 ASW grp, 1 sub sq.
Marines	amphib lift, 1 div 1 brig. 6 air sq.	amphib lift, 1 div. 1 div. 1 AA bn. 9 air sq.
<i>Ryukyus</i>		
Army	1 RCT 2 AA bn.	1 inf div. 2 AA bn.
AAF	15 sq.	7 grp.
<i>Philippines</i>		
Army	1 bn.	4 inf div. 5 AA bn.
AAF	3 sq.	9 grp.
Navy	Support forces for 1 sub div.	Support forces for 1 carrier TG and 1 sub div. amphib lift, 1 div.
<i>Bonins-Volcanoes</i>		
Army	2 AA bn.	2 AA bn.
<i>Hawaii</i>		
Army	1 inf div (+) 7 AA bn.	
AAF	11 Sq. Support forces for 1 carrier TG, 1 ASW grp., 1 sub sq.	Support forces for 3 carrier TG, 1 ASW grp, 3 sub sq. 6 air sq.
Marines		

* 3 squadrons constituted 1 group

Postwar Military Forces: Planning and Problems

US Armed Forces on V-J Day

Of the several broad military questions facing the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the nation moved into the postwar era, one of the most troublesome was determination of the size and nature of the nation's peacetime armed forces. Complicating consideration of this issue were important subsidiary questions—unification and roles and missions of the armed forces. And if these were not sufficiently distracting, JCS deliberations took place against the turbulent background of the hurried, pell-mell demobilization that had begun even before Japan's surrender.

During the course of World War II, the United States had created a military machine stronger than any other in its history. Total US military personnel strength by mid-1945 was in excess of 12,000,000 officers and men. The US Army (including Army Air Forces) reached a peak strength on V-E Day of 8,300,000. Of this strength 3,000,000 men were deployed in the European Theater, about 1,500,000 in the Pacific Theater, and roughly 740,000 in the Mediterranean. Other major Army forces were located in Africa and the Middle East, in the Persian Gulf, the China-Burma-India Theater, in Alaska, and in the Caribbean. The United States Navy in mid-1945 comprised 3,377,840 officers and men and the US Marine Corps, 476,709.¹

So long as a visible military requirement existed, the people of the United States were willing to maintain this huge force in spite of the tremendous financial and social burdens. But they would not maintain it for political purposes alone. Once the purely military requirement began to lose its validity, public pressures for disbandment of the military forces of the United States arose almost universally and overnight.²

Early Demobilization Planning

The Joint Chiefs of Staff made no effort to control or direct the process of demobilization, preferring to leave such matters to the Services. They did take part to a limited degree in the early planning for demobilization that had begun in a somewhat desultory fashion, within the Departments of War and Navy as early as 1942. No serious effort was made to coordinate demobilization with postwar plans. At this stage the Joint Chiefs of Staff did nothing through directives or other means, to influence Service plans for demobilizing US ground, sea and air forces. The overriding concern of those who directed and planned demobilization was to reduce the forces as efficiently and swiftly as possible, with a minimum of turmoil so as to avoid the unpleasant experiences that had accompanied demobilization after earlier wars.³

The Joint Chiefs of Staff first discussed demobilization in July 1943, when General Marshall briefed them on War Department planning in that field. The War Department had established a Special Planning Division to consider demobilization and had formulated a set of underlying assumptions. Noting that the time was approaching when the plans of the War and Navy Departments would have to be coordinated with those of civilian agencies concerned with demobilization and reconversion, General Marshall thought it important to reach joint agreement on basic aspects of the military demobilization. He submitted the War Department's planning assumptions for JCS consideration recommending approval.

After receiving the advice of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in late September 1943 approved a revised list of basic assumptions, which they forwarded to the War and Navy Departments. The substance of these assumptions was as follows:

1. At least a year would elapse between V-E Day and the surrender of Japan.
2. Partial demobilization would begin between those dates.
3. The United States would "furnish a share of the emergency interim forces in Europe required to maintain order and to guarantee adequate consideration of American peace aims." One year after V-E Day this force would total about 400,000 men.
4. In Africa, the Middle East, South America, and the Atlantic, all US forces would be withdrawn or reduced to peacetime status, except those required in connection with air transport routes and other activities contributing to the Pacific war.
5. For demobilization planning purposes, possible requirements for an International Police Force would be disregarded.
6. Demobilization discharges would be based on requirements of the military forces and on each individual's physical condition (wounds, sickness, and age), his length of service, length of combat service, and number of dependents.
7. The United States would maintain some form of universal military training which could be assumed adequate to meet immediate postwar requirements.⁴

The assumption that 400,000 troops would remain in Europe a year after V-E Day followed from the Army's estimate of shipping capacity for deploying forces from Europe to the Pacific theater and returning personnel to the United States. Before accepting this figure the Joint Strategic Survey Committee had conferred with representatives of the State Department on probable postwar conditions in Europe and US obligations there. As a result the JSSC informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the expectation that one year after cessation of hostilities in Europe "indigenous governments of at least a provisional character" would have been established in the countries formerly controlled by Germany. Hence it was assumed that by that date the only US combat forces required in Europe would be those needed to occupy a zone in western Germany. The JSSC concluded that "400,000 ground and air personnel is a reasonable estimate."⁵

The basic assumptions provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not bind the War and Navy Departments to a particular rate or scheme of demobilization. During their deliberations the Joint Chiefs of Staff had shown no disposition to arrange for further joint planning on the matter or to consider that the demobilization rate, when the time came, should be jointly controlled.

In seeking to provide a high degree of equity in the determination of priority for discharge, the War Department had rejected the method followed after World War I and previous conflicts of demobilizing by units. On 6 September 1944, the War Department announced that men would be demobilized under a point system computed on the basis of length of service, overseas service, parenthood, and combat service as represented by the award of battle participation stars, decorations for valor, and the Purple Heart. Adoption of the point system committed the Army to demobilizing by individuals rather than by units.⁶

Complicating demobilization was the redeployment from Europe of units destined to take part in the invasion of Japan. In late 1943, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had instructed the Joint Staff Planners to prepare quarterly forecasts of the manpower requirements for the Pacific war as an aid to Service planners in demobilization planning. By early 1945 the Joint Staff Planners had incorporated this task within a broader effort they were devoting to continuous revision of a paper titled "Strategic Deployment of US Forces Following the Defeat of Germany." The version that they submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 29 March appeared to slight the objective of a partial demobilization after Germany's defeat in favor of a literal fulfillment of the strategic concept agreed on at the Malta-Yalta Conferences two months earlier. There the Combined Chiefs of Staff had advised the President and Prime Minister that it was their purpose, upon the defeat of Germany, "to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan."⁷

The JPS study of 29 March 1945 was keyed to the current planning assumption that the war in Europe would end on 1 July 1945. It projected that, depending on the availability of shipping, between 13½ and 17½ months would be required to redeploy troops to the Pacific and to reduce the US occupation force in Europe to the agreed figure of 400,000 men. Giving a virtually absolute priority to the requirements of the Pacific war, the Planners concluded that "no substantial return to the U.S. of personnel and units for demobilization will be possi-

ble before approximately six months following the defeat of Germany." The plan contemplated using most of the units returned from Europe to build up a sizable strategic reserve in the United States. By one year after V-E Day this force would amount to 21 divisions and 29 air groups, totaling more than 1,000,000 men. Its possible employment would be in "undertaking contributory operations should they prove necessary or for increasing the planned troop basis for major operations." The Planners acknowledged, however, that the demobilization rate could be increased if it was decided to reduce the strategic reserve.⁸

On 22 April 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this study for planning purposes only, and with the condition that its revision begin at once. Admiral King had objected that the air deployments set forth in the paper appeared to be based on a determination to employ "all aircraft which can be built, or will be in existence," rather than on an evaluation of actual requirements and support facilities. He termed this "quite unrealistic and unnecessary." General Marshall endorsed Admiral King's view and added that his own "qualified approval" was not a commitment to accept any of the paper's projections in detail. He was concerned that the study showed no personnel decrease "worthy of mention" until 12 months after V-E Day and that more than 11,000,000 men were scheduled to be under arms 18 months after Germany surrendered. General Marshall did not believe that so large a program was required and doubted that the American public could be convinced of the need for forces of such magnitude for a one-front war. He noted with approval the fact that the Planners had already undertaken to reconsider the size of the strategic reserve, but the rate at which troops were to be returned from Europe needed restudy too. "A further examination should be made of ways to employ all types of shipping and aircraft with the view of accelerating the movement to the US," wrote General Marshall. The JPS began the revision of this study at once, but Germany surrendered before it could be completed.⁹

Acting unilaterally, the War Department issued a press release in early May that indicated a planned reduction of Army personnel during the next 12 months from 8,300,000 to 6,968,000. Actually, some 2,000,000 soldiers were expected to be released during this period—about 1,300,000 under the Army's point system and the remainder for such causes as wounds, sickness, and age. The Army planned to place Selective Service calls for about 800,000 men during the same period. At the time of the Japanese surrender, the Army had separated about 370,000 men under its point system, with total separations for all causes amounting to about 581,000.¹⁰

The actual redeployment went slower than expected, because of the movement from Europe of units destined to take part in the invasion of Japan, scheduled for 1 November 1945. General MacArthur had asked for, and been granted, 17 divisions from the European Theater. These divisions had first to be returned to the United States. All long term men were to be replaced with new men before the departure from Europe. After reaching the United States each soldier would receive a 30-day furlough, then rejoin his unit for shipment to the Pacific. First priority out of Europe, however, went to engineer, signal, harbor, depot, and other special troops who were needed in the Pacific to prepare the necessary facilities to support the invasion. The result was that for the first six weeks fol-

lowing V-E Day demobilization out of Europe ran well. But in the second six-weeks, because of debarkation of divisions and other troops destined for the Pacific, a marked slowdown occurred. By 10 August, when Japan sued for peace, 14 of the 17 divisions had reached the United States and their men were on furlough. By this time the Army had separated about 581,000 men.¹¹

Planning for Demobilization after the Defeat of Japan

Shortly before Japan capitulated, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered what to do about demobilization after V-J Day. The question had been raised by the Joint Logistics Committee (JLC), whose members urged that studies be initiated immediately to establish joint policies on the return of personnel, equipment, and materiel to the United States, including coordination of the use of transportation facilities. In a prophetic vein, the JLC forecast, "There will be heavy pressure from public opinion after V-J Day to hasten the return of service personnel overseas; temporary improvisation in personnel, ships, and expedient short cuts may have to be adopted." They recommended that, besides preparing postwar deployment plans, the Joint Chiefs of Staff establish "a joint policy on the method of and rate of release or separation." Here, then, was a recommendation looking to comprehensive joint control of demobilization.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff disclaimed such responsibility almost at once. At the instance of General Marshall, the last of these tasks was amended on 12 August to become the drafting of a joint policy on "the method and rate of redeploying the Armed Forces." The undertaking of most of the other proposed studies was approved, with first priority assigned to the preparation of a presidential proclamation of V-J Day, since its wording might affect the entire pattern of demobilization.¹²

With regard to the phraseology of their proposed proclamation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted the President to avoid such expressions as "end of the war" or "termination of hostilities" in the victory proclamation. Use of these words could have the legal effect of revoking the authority granted by various wartime acts and executive orders and of establishing a six-month period during which most enlisted men would have to be released from service. On 14 August, the day President Truman was to announce that Japan had accepted surrender terms, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised him of this hazard to orderly demobilization and to the fulfillment of US obligations abroad, and they submitted a draft V-J Day proclamation to serve as a guide. The President did not use their prepared statement, but neither in his announcement of 14 August nor in his V-J Day proclamation in early September did he declare the war ended.¹³

Meanwhile, the need for joint demobilization planning had been suggested from a different quarter. On 25 August, Congressman John M. Vorys of Ohio urged the Joint Chiefs of Staff to turn immediately to the development of a joint plan for discharging men from the Services. He was not satisfied with the programs previously announced separately by the War and Navy Departments. In

his view, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should "get up a uniform, fair, understandable and predictable point system for discharge from all services, and stick to it. A man should know just about when he will get home." Reflecting the sentiments reaching him from his constituents in Columbus and from servicemen overseas, the Congressman added:

All who want to come should be brought home as soon as possible; this should be your first consideration. You must, of course, plan for the occupation and for other necessary forces, but your actions must allay the suspicion that our armed forces are being held together so as to avoid loss of rank by officers through shrinkage of their commands, and the suspicion that there are undisclosed imperialistic militaristic plans in the making.¹⁴

In preparing their reply the Joint Chiefs of Staff laid aside the conventional courtesies in the draft supplied by the JLC and used more direct language. The opening paragraph of the letter they dispatched on 11 September dealt rather brusquely with Congressman Vorys' communication:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are not charged with responsibility for the matters raised in your letter of 25 August 1945. It has been referred to the War and Navy Departments whose mission it is to formulate and administer policy on discharges from the Services.

They did take the trouble to explain that the differing nature of the duties of sailors and soldiers made it impracticable to prepare a single policy applying equally to men in both Services. And the JCS letter closed with an assurance that "the basic objective of all concerned is the prompt demobilization of so much of the armed forces as is not required for the occupation and other missions still assigned to the Army and Navy."¹⁵

On 14 September the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a joint policy on "Priority for the Return of Overseas Personnel" and four days later another on "Coordinating all Transportation Phases for Returning Personnel from Overseas." The first of these policies set the order in which different categories of returnees would qualify for places in the available transportation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff put "personnel eligible for discharged" in a priority that allowed higher preference to hospital patients, recovered prisoners of war and internees, units being redeployed in accordance with operational plans, individuals on emergency leave or urgent orders, and hardship cases.¹⁶

The chief remaining area of JCS consideration was joint deployment planning. In theory, at least, this might have been the means of exerting a degree of Joint control over demobilization, assuming that the deployment schedules were drawn to meet the requirements of a comprehensive joint strategic plan. But the true nature of the document prepared by the Joint Staff Planners was clearly indicated by the words with which they submitted it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 27 September 1945:

It contains the planned strategic deployment of U.S. Army forces through 30 June 1946 as furnished by the War Department and of U.S. Navy forces through 30 September 1946 as furnished by the Navy Department. Deployments have been

integrated on a joint basis only to the extent that preliminary shipping estimates have been used to establish the feasibility of performing the movements indicated.¹⁷

The deployment paper did formulate the objectives of: providing occupation forces in Europe and Japan, with an assumption that this commitment would continue for an indefinite period; establishing a strategic reserve in the United States; and reducing forces in Alaska, the Atlantic, and the Caribbean while maintaining at least token garrisons in other outlying bases. But in the main, preparation of the joint deployment paper had been an exercise in striving to keep current with plans of the War and Navy Departments that were constantly changing, always in the direction of more speedy demobilization.

Public pressure on the Congress and on the Executive Branch for acceleration of demobilization soon became overwhelming. The public wanted its sons out of the Service and it wanted them out at once, regardless of any other factors. The Administration was enjoined to increase the rate of demobilization, not only by the general public but by leaders in industry and government, with many of the most strident demands coming from congressmen. These demands were direct and forceful and came in the form of letters, editorials and face-to-face encounters. Particularly distressing was the extent to which otherwise responsible legislators reacted to the demands of vociferous constituents without apparent thought of the national interest.¹⁸

With the defeat of Japan, US Army strength had been cut sharply. But shortly after V-J Day a War Department spokesman informed the Senate Military Affairs Committee that the Army would be reduced to 2,500,000 men by 30 June 1946. By 4 September, that Army figure had been lowered to 2,118,000. Still later, on 27 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were notified of a further revision by the War Department; the goal now was a reduction to 1,950,000 by 30 June 1946.¹⁹

The Navy's timetable for demobilization during 1945 underwent similar changes. In early September officials had forecast that "reductions in [naval] personnel will be relatively small in the immediate future in reflection of the needs for occupational purposes, roll-up and decommissioning of bases, completion of permanent construction work, etc." The estimated personnel reduction for the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard by the end of 1945 totaled only 336,800. Three weeks later this had been raised to 434,100, but the revised figure was itself already out of date. Officials of the Navy Department, in testimony before the Senate committee, had recently predicted a reduction of about twice that number. By mid-October they were testifying that separations through the end of the year might approach 1,200,000.²⁰

Under these circumstances the best efforts of the Planners to see that the latest figures were included could not preserve the joint deployment study's validity. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the study for planning purposes on 10 October 1945, a later decision recognized the pointlessness of basing a supporting logistical plan on the data in the paper. By then it was clear that the study had overestimated the personnel actually remaining overseas at the end of 1945 by 1,724,000.²¹

Demobilization and the Soviet Threat

The nature of modern warfare created a situation wherein a quantitative reduction within the armed forces produced a disproportionate qualitative reduction in the effectiveness of these forces. Any appreciable diminution in numbers of men across the board created an imbalance in operating and support forces by eliminating key leaders, technicians, and specialists—an imbalance quite out of proportion to the size of the force reduction. A cut of 10 percent in numbers could lower the effectiveness of a unit by more than 50 percent. Such a phenomenon resulted from the demobilization of major US forces in the several months following the end of the war. By eliminating key personnel, particularly in units using sophisticated equipment, the military worth of Army divisions, Navy major combatant vessels and Army Air Forces was reduced in a degree far greater than the mere numbers taken away would indicate. Less than two months after Japan's capitulation, millions of Americans remained in uniform but the combat effectiveness of most units had declined from 50 to 75 percent although their authorized strengths had declined by only a small percentage.

The JSSC warned the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 9 October 1945 that the US military situation had deteriorated to a serious degree as a result, mainly, of demobilization. "Since the end of the war," the JSSC stated in a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "the United States has been engaged in liquidating her vast military machine." Demobilization plans made earlier during the war, had been continuously revised in response to political pressure, "invariably with the idea of expediting the processes of liquidation, subject only to the physical limitations of shipping personnel home and processing their discharges." These demobilization processes had naturally reduced US military capabilities at a rapid rate. The people of the United States had helped speed up this deterioration, their primary intent at the moment being to liquidate the military forces to a vaguely defined "minimum."

The JSSC believed that only an actual attack or a direct threat of attack against the United States could reverse this deterioration. Even in this case it would take a year or more to reconstitute US military strength at even a fraction of its recent power.

The dissolution of US military capability that took place as demobilization accelerated coincided with the growing Soviet bellicosity in Eastern Europe. And there were indications that the Soviets did not intend to confine their disruptive actions to that part of the world.²²

Predictably alarmed by the debilitated condition of the US armed forces in the face of Soviet expansionism, elsewhere described, the JSSC warned the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the time had arrived when they should reexamine the current and prospective US military position "in the light of Russian policy. . . ." The United States obviously could not fight the Soviets and win in the Balkans, in Turkey, or in southern Korea, all areas of potential US-USSR confrontation. On the other hand, if there was to be a limit to Soviet demands, "we must know where we can draw the line and examine our military position and be sure that we are not abandoning our military power so rapidly that we shall be unable to

support that line." The JSSC recommended that the JPS be directed to examine the present and prospective US military capabilities and determine in which world areas the United States would be able successfully to resist attempted Soviet aggression. The result of this study would then be furnished the Secretaries of War and Navy, integrated with the views of the Secretary of State and given to the President. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this recommendation on 15 October 1945.²³

The JPS, in preparing the directed study sought the views of the overseas commanders. The Commanding General, US Forces European Theater, reported as of 15 November 1945 that his forces could, if required to mount an offensive, operate for a limited period at less than 50 percent of their wartime efficiency. His ground forces could defend somewhat better than his air units. The Chief of Staff of the European Command believed this estimate to be "frankly optimistic" since it did not consider morale and fighting spirit, both of which he felt to be lacking. United States forces in the Pacific were in a similar or even worse situation. General MacArthur's staff estimated that his ground forces could operate at somewhat less than 50 percent of their normal wartime efficiency, with supporting air elements even less effective.

The Deputy Commander, Continental Air Forces, informed the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, that "Army Air Forces can no longer be considered anything more than a symbolic instrument of National Defense. . . ." "Willy nilly" discharge of trained maintenance specialists and key men was causing the basic structure of the Air Forces to dissipate.²⁴

The rapid deterioration of US military strength discernible in these reports from the field was causing concern also at higher levels of the government. At a SWNCC meeting on 16 October, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal pointed out that the time was soon coming when neither the Army nor the Navy would have sufficient trained manpower to operate effectively. "Our rapid demobilization," he stated, ". . . amounted to notification to the world that we are through with the war and its problems." The situation, in his view, was so serious that the President should alert the American people to the difficulties that the United States was facing in dealing with the Soviet Union. Secretary of State Byrnes, although he shared the concern over Soviet behavior, advised against such a course on the grounds that the Soviet Union might seize upon a public warning as a provocation by the United States which justified its actions.²⁵

On 29 October, General Marshall publicly stated that he favored wholeheartedly the policy of demobilizing at the fastest possible rate to relieve the financial burden on the nation. Nevertheless, he cautioned that the military establishment could not hope to ensure the safety of the United States very much longer at the present rate of demobilization unless some permanent peace-time program was established at an early date. "For the moment," he said "in a wide-spread emotional crisis of the American people, demobilization has become, in effect, disintegration not only of the armed forces, but apparently of all conception of world responsibility and what it demands of us."²⁶

On 1 November 1945, Secretary of War Patterson informed Secretary of State Byrnes that, because of the "interdependence of demobilization and US foreign

policy," he felt Mr. Byrnes would be interested in current demobilization plans. At the same time he felt it desirable to know the current State Department "objectives and policies which require implementation by the War Department." By April 1946, Secretary Patterson pointed out, US forces in Europe would have been reduced to less than 400,000 men. A similar number would be deployed in the Pacific, half of them in Japan and Korea. The US Army would need extensive reorganization and training before it could again be considered an effective fighting force. "During this period," Secretary Patterson warned, "our national commitments will continue without fully trained forces to implement them."

He insisted however, that the planned size of the peacetime Army could not be realistically determined without State Department guidance on occupation requirements. "While it is realized that the determination of ultimate objectives with regard to occupied countries is complicated by many unknown and constantly changing factors," Secretary Patterson continued, "the trend of current State Department thought would be most helpful in permitting the War Department to make plans to meet those occupational requirements and to determine the interim and ultimate size of the Army." He submitted a list of pertinent questions for Secretary Byrnes, asking for answers by early November to permit the War Department to make the necessary arrangements to implement national policy after 1 March 1946.

"In summary," he concluded, "the War Department is endeavoring to underwrite at minimum cost a National insurance policy. What is needed is the State Department estimate of the nature and extent of the probable hazards against which the War Department should be prepared to provide this insurance."²⁷

The reply from Secretary Byrnes did little to clarify the problem that Secretary Patterson felt was facing his department. Nevertheless it did reveal Secretary Byrnes' concern with the rapid disappearance of US military strength. "Twice in your lifetime and mine," he wrote Mr. Patterson, "the United States has, while engaged in a World War, demonstrated that our country can build up and effectively utilize military strength at a prodigious rate, perhaps faster than any other country has ever done in history. We seem to be in a fair way of demonstrating a second time," he continued, "that our country can demobilize and tear down its military strength more rapidly than any other country in the world. I am deeply concerned at the rate at which we are losing our military strength," the Secretary of State admitted, "It is not so much that I am unduly pessimistic about the international situation with its admitted uncertainties. It is rather that I know that this is a time when our country should be united and strong in order that it may make its influence for good, for peace, and for justice effectively felt in the councils of the world and on the peace settlements."

Answering Secretary Patterson's specific questions, the Secretary of State indicated that US occupation forces would be required in Germany at least through 1 July 1947. Depending on developments within the Allied Control Council, it was possible that the military would be relieved of military government functions and that a police-type occupation force would suffice. In Japan and Korea, military forces would continue to be required as of 1 July 1947, although the requirement for them would gradually lessen in Korea.

Secretary Patterson had noted that US forces in Europe would not be capable of making a show of force to implement political policies "should a firm stand against a militant power prove desirable," and had asked if a force capable only of police duties and enforcing surrender terms would be "in consonance with foreign policy of our government." Secretary Byrnes answered this question by conceding that a large US force in Europe would give tangible evidence of US interest in Europe and would give support to the US position on political questions. But since such a force would not be available, he reminded Mr. Patterson that the important thing was that the United States have enough military strength at home and abroad to "give evidence" of US intent and determination to back up its policies anywhere the necessity arose. "Our influence and prestige throughout the world are to a large extent dependent on this. Our military potential, demonstrated in 1917-1918, was not enough to keep us out of World War II."²⁸

The concern of the nation's top military and diplomatic officials had also emerged at a SWNCC session in late November when the Secretary of War pointed out that, under current schedules of demobilization, US forces would soon be reduced to the status of a police force in occupied areas. They would be incapable of exerting "an effective influence on our over-all national policy." The Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. John J. McCloy, added that even in those areas where the United States had troops, the emphasis was on withdrawal. Once again Secretary of State Byrnes agreed that the weakened US military position placed a great handicap on his conduct of US foreign affairs. He was in favor of strong military forces. Far from slowing down the rate of demobilization, however, the War Department was preparing to carry out a plan, announced earlier by General Marshall, to ensure release of all "two-year men" by the end of the winter.²⁹

Commenting on these events Mr. Byrnes noted the ambivalence toward demobilization and dealing with the USSR. "Some of the people who yelled loudest for me to adopt a firm attitude toward Russia," he recalled, "yelled even louder for the rapid demobilization of the Army. Theodore Roosevelt once wisely said, 'Uncle Sam should speak softly and carry a big stick.' My critics wanted me to speak loudly and carry a twig."³⁰

Although Army authorities had intimated that all two-year men would be released by "late winter," early in January 1946 the War Department was forced to announce a slowdown in Army demobilization. The announcement explained that overseas troop requirements, rather than shipping, had become the governing factor in demobilization. Because of a lack of replacements to maintain overseas forces at the required levels, some 1,553,000 men originally scheduled to be returned over a three-month period would have to be returned over a six-month period. The War Department explained that this situation had resulted from a combination of factors: demobilization had exceeded all original estimates; enlistments, while breaking all previous records, had not kept pace with replacement needs; and Selective Service had furnished only 37,000 men per month instead of the needed 50,000.

This slowdown fell far short of effectively bolstering US military strength. But it was sufficient to provoke a wave of protests among US military forces around the world. In Manila several thousand soldiers staged a mass demonstration at City Hall and adopted resolutions urging that pressure be exerted on congressmen to reduce overseas commitments and speed the return home of servicemen. Similar protests were made by US troops stationed in other overseas areas.³¹

These protests by servicemen and other evidence of growing public displeasure impelled President Truman to issue a statement on 8 January 1946 in which he argued that the armed forces had been, and were being, reduced as rapidly as possible. He underscored the responsibilities that the United States had assumed throughout the world and the requirement that adequate armed forces be maintained. "Already," he pointed out, "the critical need for troops overseas has begun to slow down the Army's rate of demobilization. This is not an arbitrary action on the part of the Army. It is an inescapable need of the nation in carrying out its obligation in this difficult and critical postwar period in which we must devote all necessary strength to building a firm foundation for the future peace of the world."³²

In a meeting of his Cabinet on 11 January, President Truman expressed some concern over the demonstrations but said that he was generally satisfied that demobilization had been accomplished "efficiently and thoroughly." Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson agreed that it had certainly been done thoroughly, so thoroughly as to be embarrassing to the Department of State in its conduct of foreign affairs. Secretary Forrestal thought so too and proposed that the President brief some of the nation's leading newspapermen and radio commentators on the seriousness of America's international position, so that they could explain it to the people. Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes urged a further step. He wanted the State Department to arrange a nationwide hook up to explain the impact of demobilization on American foreign policy.³³

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, newly returned from Europe to replace General Marshall as Chief of Staff of the United States Army, appeared before members of Congress on 15 January 1946 to explain the problems of demobilization and the effects that precipitate demobilization had had on the ability of US forces to discharge their overseas duties. He was obviously concerned by the recent unruly behavior of US servicemen overseas which he described as "fireworks" and "near hysteria." The slowdown that had brought on these unprecedented protests, General Eisenhower explained, was owing not to a breakdown in the system but to the sheer necessity of keeping enough men in the Army to do the many important jobs that had to be done in Europe and in the Pacific. More than five million men had been discharged in the eight months since demobilization had begun. The Army Chief of Staff pointed out to the Congressmen, "If we were to continue shipping men home at the rate of the past few months, about April we would have nothing left but a woefully inadequate number of volunteers—we would literally have 'run out of Army.'" He told the Congressmen that there was no way in which the United States Armed Forces could accomplish the overseas mission given them by higher authority with fewer men. "Pared down to

the bone," he said, "the Army, Air, Ground and Service Troops are still just able to discharge the duties I have outlined to you."³⁴

The new Army discharge policy, announced on the same day, was based on length of service and provided that by 30 April 1946, all soldiers with 30 months service either would have been released or placed aboard ship en route home for separation. By 30 June, the same would apply to all men with two years of service. Additionally, the War Department's new policy provided for releasing all personnel for whom there was no military need. And to ensure compliance with this policy, the War Department directed major commanders to have their Inspectors General visit all installations and agencies under their control to see that individual servicemen were afforded the opportunity of explaining why they did not consider themselves essential.³⁵

In his State of the Union message to the Congress, released publicly on 21 January 1946, the President gave no indication of going to the country to slow demobilization and to bolster the sagging US military posture. He did, however, assert that "the requirement for troops in sufficient strength to carry out their missions" had replaced shipping as the governing factor in demobilization. He softened this blow to servicemen by adding that nine out of ten members of the armed forces on V-E Day would have been released by 1 July 1946. Nevertheless, the main theme of the President's message was clear in the words, "Our national safety and the security of the world will require substantial armed forces, particularly in overseas service." Whether or not the President's words had any real effect, by late February demobilization had stabilized, and public pressure on the Services had begun a steady decline.³⁶

With unsettling events occurring in the Balkans where Marshal Tito was challenging the Western powers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised President Truman on 12 March 1946 that the only US forces available to send to Europe in an emergency were those in the continental United States, with the exception of some naval forces in the Pacific. If demobilization were suspended before 1 April, US Army forces in Europe would comprise six infantry divisions, four separate regiments, four tank battalions and a constabulary force of 38,000, all in a reduced state of combat effectiveness. Another understrength infantry division could conceivably sail from the United States within 30 days. Subsequently, depending on political and military considerations, three other divisions in like condition could be sent to Europe but to do so would take all divisions from the General Reserve.

If the demobilization were not suspended, two of the available infantry divisions would be withdrawn from Europe by May. Also, about one-half of the personnel in the US General Reserve would be discharged by May making the reconstitution and shipment of additional divisions from the United States much more difficult and slow. There were 13 Army Air Force groups in the European Theater at 80 percent strength. Aircraft strength totaled 70 heavy bombers, 500 fighters and 150 transports. Because air units were understrength and manned by partially trained personnel, their effectiveness would be considerably less than that indicated by the number of assigned aircraft.

US naval forces in Europe at that time amounted to two cruisers and four destroyers. However, these could be reinforced by a striking force from the

United States of three carriers, one escort carrier, two battleships, four cruisers, and nine destroyers. By 1 June, transferring forces from the Pacific, the total could be raised to a striking force of nine carriers, ten escort carriers, six battleships, 20 cruisers, and 82 destroyers. "In Summary," the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the President,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that by extraordinary efforts reinforcements can be made available which as a demonstration are perhaps commensurate with the requirement of an emergency localized in the Venezia Giulia area. The combat effectiveness of units sent from the United States would be very low initially. Furthermore, the extraordinary efforts required would have a grave impact on the capabilities to create additional effective ground units within the United States in case of a larger emergency.³⁷

About this time, 25 March 1946, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the JPS to discontinue their study on US military capabilities that they had called for on 15 October. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized that the Secretaries of War and Navy as well as other leading officials had given voice to various "public utterances" that had served to make political authorities aware of ill effects of demobilization upon the US military posture. Although the final report was never issued, the JPS in their work on the report had, as one authority noted, developed "an indication of the almost unbelievable swift decline of American military position at a time when Soviet Russia was exhibiting an uncompromising and aggressive attitude toward her wartime allies."³⁸

Operating apparently on different assumptions, the US Navy set 1 September 1946 as the target date for completion of its demobilization, while the US Army continued its demobilization program until 30 June 1947—the date the last non-volunteer was discharged. Whatever definition was used, the Navy continued to reduce its strength during FY 1947 as did the Army. On 1 September 1946, the Navy had a strength of 572,878. By 30 June 1947, this had declined to 477,384. As of the same date the US Marine Corps had a strength of 92,222 and the US Army a strength of 989,664 officers and men.³⁹

Postwar Force Requirements

Concurrent with the dissolution of World War II military strength and the general public reaction against retention of strong armed forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff found themselves called upon for advice and recommendations as to the size and type of forces that the United States would require in the postwar era. Serious consideration of this subject by the Joint Chiefs of Staff began on 19 August 1945, when General Marshall recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the JPS collaborate with the JSSC to prepare a priority study of the matter. They would present "as early as practicable" their recommendation in general terms on the size, composition, and deployment of US forces in the next few years.⁴⁰

Two days later President Truman assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a task that included and superseded the recommendation by the Army Chief of Staff. His recommendation stemmed from an independent but much narrower approach to the subject by the Navy Department. On 18 June 1945, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal had submitted to the Director, Bureau of the Budget, Mr. Harold D. Smith, a draft of legislation to increase the permanent authorized strength of the regular Navy and Marine Corps to 659,880 men and officers. Secretary Forrestal had asked the Director if the proposed legislation was in accord with the program of the President.

After studying the matter, Mr. Smith decided he needed a decision from President Truman and on 20 August forwarded the Navy's proposal to him, suggesting that he solicit the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On the next day, President Truman directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review the Navy's proposals in relation to the overall peacetime requirements of the Armed Services and to develop a comprehensive plan for his consideration. He instructed them to perform this review "in the light of our international commitments for the postwar world, the development of new weapons, and the relative position of the Services as a result of these factors."⁴¹

The Chief of Naval Operations took this opportunity to note that the entire question, then under consideration, of the transfer of a number of reserve officers to the regular Services hinged on having a numerical basis which, in turn, depended on a "troop basis" that must be decided by the Congress and approved by the President. Since these qualified reserve officers could not afford to wait very long before returning to civil employment, "time is of the essence." Admiral King further noted that the Navy had developed its own figures which would be "useful" in the directed JCS review. He thereupon recommended that the Army develop its personnel figures quickly for use in the integrated study of postwar requirements. The JCS approved this recommendation.⁴²

In accordance with the JCS decisions, General Marshall directed a committee of US Army general officers to study urgently and to report to him on the requirements for the postwar Army. On 19 September General Marshall submitted the findings of this Army Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Committee recommended a strength of 778,548 for the postwar US Army, including an Air Force of 45 groups. At the same time the Committee endorsed the long-range objective of a 70-group Air Force, which would bring total Army manpower to 958,548. The Navy had already submitted a requirement for nearly 660,000 men and officers, resulting in an overall requirement for postwar military forces of about 1,618,000—entirely too many in General Marshall's views. "It is my firm conviction," General Marshall informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "that the maintenance of a regular establishment of this size is impractical for two reasons, regardless of other considerations: *One* is the inability to obtain the necessary volunteers; *the other* is the financial burden this would impose upon the country." He was not, therefore, willing to accept either the Army or Navy estimates of forces required.

The Army Chief of Staff did, however, agree with the portion of the Committee report that called for "consideration of the over-all organization of the armed

forces into one department." The JPS and the JSSC in reviewing postwar force requirements should, he believed, prepare their recommendations, "with a view to eliminating all duplication, under the assumption that the basis of the system will be Universal Military Training, and with careful consideration of the financial cost and the feasibility of obtaining personnel on a voluntary basis for the permanent establishments."⁴³

Admiral King differed with General Marshall. He believed that postwar requirements should be determined on the basis of such factors as US military policy, strategic concepts and overseas base requirements, not on probable costs and means of procuring personnel. These latter factors were, in his view, "for determination and limitation by the Congress and the President." Revealing the Navy's opposition to unification, Admiral King concluded "The requirements for military forces should be determined on the basis of the present organization of the armed services. . . ."

General Marshall told his colleagues that he agreed with Admiral King's suggestion regarding the bases for estimating posture requirements, but he made it clear that he stood by his earlier judgment. He was convinced that the figures for both Army and Navy were "beyond the realms of expectancy" from the standpoint of costs and acquisition of volunteers. He placed great hope in universal military training as a means of raising reserve and regular forces rapidly. To ask the Congress for such a large program for permanent personnel could jeopardize or perhaps eliminate the chances of getting universal military training approved. Nevertheless, he agreed that the JPS and JSSC should be told to plan on the basis of the factors cited by Admiral King, but only so long as they gave full consideration to universal military training and included analyses of costs and capabilities for securing personnel in their report.

He would not agree with Admiral King's provision that the report be made on the basis of current departmental organization. He conceded that some parts of the plan that the President had directed would not be affected by organizations, either unified or departmental. But whenever functions of land, sea, and air forces overlapped, the comprehensive plan would definitely be affected. However, in view of Admiral King's strong stand and in order to get on with planning, General Marshall proposed that pending resolution of the issue of the single department, the JPS and JSSC prepare their plan and estimates on the basis of two different assumptions: a single unified department; and the status quo.

Another aspect, that of introducing more officers into the regular establishment, was pressing. He proposed that the planners proceed on a priority basis to draft such a program for temporary legislation required.⁴⁴

In its report the Army Committee had noted an Army Air Forces recommendation for an air force of 70 groups. The Committee seemed a bit equivocal in its recommendation, saying that an air force of this size would be "advisable." General Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces, welcomed this support, token though it was. "The contribution which the Army Air Forces must make to the future security of the nation," he stated, "requires a peacetime force of approximately 70 groups." As a minimum and with some loss of effectiveness, 70 groups could be maintained with a personnel strength of 400,000. "In the face of

foreseeable world conditions, any greater reduction would be at the expense of national security," General Arnold warned. "The tragic possibilities inherent in long range attacks with weapons as effective as the atomic bomb require us to make plain to the Congress and the President the need for an air force mobilized in strength."

General Arnold came down clearly on General Marshall's side in stressing the need for a determination with respect to reorganization of the armed forces into a single department. "We are faced with lack of a clear delineation of the respective missions, roles and responsibilities of the Army, Army Air Forces and Navy," he wrote. "Until this delineation is made, no realistic approach to an over-all estimate can be made."⁴⁵

On 11 October 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a directive to the JPS and JSSC, incorporating the features proposed by General Marshall, but not including the requirement that the study be prepared on two organizational bases. The directive contained no mention of organizational assumptions. It did, however, instruct the planners to prepare an interim reply for the President informing him of what was being done and recommending a course of action on procuring officer personnel for the regular forces "in the near future."⁴⁶

The nature and degree of the difficulty faced by the JPS in preparing the desired plan are perhaps best expressed in the words of one of the members of the Committee who, borrowing heavily from General Arnold, noted:

In preparing this comprehensive plan and in seeking to determine peacetime personnel requirements we are faced with the lack of clear delineation of the respective missions, roles and responsibilities of the Army, the Navy and the Army Air Forces. This delineation cannot be made realistically until it is finally decided whether the Air Forces is to be a service coordinate with the Army and Navy and whether or not all three services are to be placed under a single department of armed forces. Until missions roles and responsibilities are defined, no attempted estimate will give a true picture of our overall requirements. Assumptions by our planning teams as to the nature of the permanent organization will not in themselves provide a practical basis for the resolution of conflicting views as to respective missions, roles, and responsibilities.⁴⁷

By 24 October, the JPS was forced to report to the JSSC that it had been unable to agree on an interim reply to the President as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The particular points at issue were: (1) the Army and Air Force wished to include a statement that lack of guidance on organization and universal military training had delayed completion of a personnel plan; (2) the Navy wanted to make no mention of specifics but merely to say that because "many factors" could not now be evaluated the exact strength of peacetime armed forces could not "now be predicted"; (3) The Army wished to recommend a limit of 25,000 regular officers for each service; and (4) the Navy wished to recommend 25,000 for the Army, 51,880 for the Navy, and 8,000 for the Marine Corps.⁴⁸

Meanwhile, the War Department had forwarded to the Bureau of the Budget draft legislation that would raise the number of regular officers authorized in the peacetime Army to 25,000. This draft was submitted by the Bureau of the Budget to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who concurred in the proposed bill and on 30 October

so informed the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. At the urging of the Chief of Naval Operations, on 5 November the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the JSSC to prepare for them recommendations on the procurement of officers for the regular Navy. The Bureau of the Budget had already cleared the necessary legislation on Navy officers but without the approval or disapproval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Before this action could be accomplished by the JSSC, however, the President called upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a report. On 13 November, Admiral Leahy informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "The President wants as a matter of urgency to obtain from the Joint Chiefs of Staff a recommendation as to the number of personnel needed by the Army-Navy-Air Forces in order that he may have information upon which to base action in the matter of Congressional authority and appropriations in this session of Congress."⁴⁹

The phrase "matter of urgency" and the general tone of Admiral Leahy's letter dispelled any notion of a leisurely approach to this requirement. The Joint Chiefs of Staff made no effort to develop joint figures, but instead went directly to the Services for their individual requirements. On 23 November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff replied to the President's request in a memorandum that informed him of the estimated requirements developed by the Army Air Forces and by the Navy covering the period from 31 December 1945 to the end of fiscal year 1947. By the middle of 1946, seven months hence, demobilization would have been completed. At this point another period would begin, to end only when occupation requirements had been liquidated and the armed forces reduced to their peacetime strengths and composition which "remain to be determined by the Congress and the President."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff noted for the President that "the factors affecting personnel requirements for the armed forces are reasonably clear until the fall of 1946." After that date, requirements would be affected by a number of uncertainties, including the number of occupation forces needed, the question of universal military training, and the ultimate organization of the armed services. Hence the 1947 figures should be considered tentative. By 30 June 1946, the US Army requirement would total 1,630,000, of which 400,000 would be Air Forces; the US Navy would need 1,350,500, including US Marine Corps. A sharp drop in requirements would take place in FY 1947. By 30 June 1947, the US Army requirement would be 1,344,000, again including 400,000 for the Air Forces; the US Navy and Marine Corps would need only 667,200. As the occupation of Japan and Germany was gradually shifted to civilian control and eventually terminated, the Army's requirements would drop even further, resulting in a "major reduction."⁵⁰

The President accepted these figures and incorporated them into his message to the Congress on the State of the Union and the Budget for 1947, which was released on 21 January 1946. "The War and Navy Departments," he said,

now estimate that by a year from now we still will need a strength of about 2 million including officers, for the armed forces—Army, Navy and Air. I have reviewed their estimates and believe that the safety of the Nation will require the maintenance of an armed strength of this size for the calendar year that is before us.⁵¹

On 19 February 1946, the Army Chief of Staff, General Eisenhower, informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that since 23 November, when they had sent to the President the figures and information concerning force requirements, the War Department had made intensive studies of its probable future needs. Based on information solicited from theater commanders, new studies had been prepared. The resulting estimates show an appreciable decrease below those presented to the President and are being used in connection with the current War Department budget, General Eisenhower affirmed. He recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff give these adjusted figures to President Truman.⁵²

Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent to the President on 21 February a revision of their November figures for the US Army showing a considerable reduction, particularly for the date 1 July 1947. At that point, according to the new figures, the Army would require only 670,000 men, aside from the Air Forces which remained at 400,000, giving a total Army Air Forces of 1,070,000.⁵³

The force levels proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and accepted by the President received legislative sanction in the extension of the Selective Service Act in June 1946. In approving this act the Congress decreed that the strength of the US Army would not exceed 1,550,000 on 1 July 1946, declining by 1 July 1947 to no more than 1,070,000. The US Navy would not exceed 558,000 and the US Marine Corps 108,000 by 1 July 1947. These force levels for the Services were, of course, essentially the figures that they had submitted.⁵⁴

In his budget message to the Congress in January 1949, the President proposed a further reduction to an average for 1948 of 1,070,000 for the Army, and 511,000 for the Navy and Marine Corps. These strengths were arrived at without consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁵⁵

Actual military strength on 30 June 1947 totaled only 1,559,270, divided as follows among the Services: Army (less Air Forces), 683,837; Army Air Forces, 305,827; Navy, 477,384; Marine Corps, 92,222. These figures illustrate the dramatic dissolution of US military strength that had taken place in a little less than two years. Since V-J Day, about ten and a half million men had been demobilized, as shown in the table.

Armed Forces Strength⁵⁶

	<i>30 June 1945</i>	<i>30 June 1946</i>	<i>30 June 1947</i>
Army (less AAF)	5,984,114	1,434,175	683,837
AAF	2,282,259	455,515	305,827
Navy	3,377,840	951,930	477,384
Marines	476,709	155,592	92,222
	12,120,922	2,997,212	1,559,270

Unification and Roles and Missions

Looming over these considerations of postwar forces, long-standing and persistent differences existed between the Services over roles and missions and

whether there should be a single department of national defense, or whether services would be separate and autonomous.⁵⁷

With respect to organization, the Army and the Army Air Forces wanted all Services unified under a single head, a Secretary of Defense, served by a single Chief of Staff. For its part, the Navy wanted no change in the current Departmental system, with the possible creation, if necessary, of a separate Air Force. The Navy also believed the Joint Chiefs of Staff should continue to operate as a coordinate body.

The Army's argument held that unification would eliminate duplication and promote effective control of forces in wartime. Such common functions as supply, training, intelligence, and personnel, could logically be combined at great savings under a single individual with one staff instead of, as at present, several staffs. Single strategic control of joint or combined forces had great advantages over the system used in World War II.

The Navy position was based in the assumption that, because of its size, the Army would dominate any unified Defense Department. Navy officers believed that such a system would work to the Navy's disadvantage in allocation of funds and equipment, mainly because the Army's leaders did not properly understand and appreciate the importance of sea power. Thus they believed that effective, balanced armed forces could only be created and winning strategies devised under a coordinate, not a unified, high command.

General Marshall was a leading proponent of the point of view that a timely decision must be taken as to whether or not there would be a single department. On 2 November 1943, he asked for a study of the matter in the interests of facilitating planning for the postwar period. The outgrowth of his recommendation took the form of a JCS Special Committee for Reorganization of National Defense composed of senior officers of the Services. After 18 months of deliberation, the Committee reported its findings to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in April 1945, recommending the creation of a single defense department. The finding was not unanimous, however. Admiral J. O. Richardson, USN, senior member of the Committee, signed a dissenting minority report recommending retention of the status quo.⁵⁸

Discussion of these reports within the Joint Chiefs of Staff brought out even more strongly the differences between Generals Marshall and Arnold, who generally favored a single department, and Admirals Leahy and King, who favored retention of the current organization. Further, those advocating unification disagreed in detail with the organization proposed by a majority of the Committee. Unable to arrive at a joint recommendation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 16 October 1945, decided to send the majority and minority Committee reports to the President with their individual comments. Although the argument over unification continued, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a corporate body, took no further part in the debate.⁵⁹

A related issue, the problem of roles and missions of the Services, also defied JCS efforts at solution. The Chief of Staff, US Army, introduced this matter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff early in 1946. He directed the Army Staff to prepare a plan for the permanent regular Army that would outline its strength, composition and

deployment. General Eisenhower intended that this plan complement the Navy draft legislation that had been submitted to the Bureau of the Budget earlier by Secretary of the Navy Forrestal. On 10 January 1946, General Eisenhower submitted these strength proposals, prepared by an Army Committee, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He wanted the Army and Navy plans for regular, peacetime forces coordinated and integrated by the JPS and the JSSC into a single, comprehensive, joint plan that would satisfy the requirement placed on the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the President in August.⁶⁰

Submission of this plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff brought into the open the sharp differences that had previously been skirted or avoided whenever possible. General Eisenhower had admitted that there would undoubtedly be duplications between Army force estimates in the Army plan and the Navy force estimates in the Navy plan. "Some of these duplications" he wrote,

result from separate interpretations by the services of their missions and roles, and it is therefore considered that a statement in broad outline of the missions of land, sea and air forces and the resultant responsibilities of the War and Navy Departments need to be approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a guide in the preparation of a comprehensive overall plan as directed by the President. . . .

He recommended that the JSSC be directed to prepare such a statement.⁶¹

General Carl Spaatz, new Commanding General, Army Air Forces, readily agreed to General Eisenhower's recommendations. The Navy members, Admiral Leahy and the new CNO, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, displayed reluctance to act at all. Upon being pressed, Admiral Nimitz, on 25 January, agreed to act but noted that: (1) previous efforts to resolve the issue had failed; (2) *Joint Action of the Army and Navy*, approved in 1935, was adequate as a statement of functions and as a broad outline of Service missions; (3) functions of the Services should be on the basis of present organization; (4) no time limit should be placed for completion of the statement by the JSSC; and (5) further consideration by the JSSC of the missions and roles of the Army and Navy would serve no useful purpose. On 28 January 1946, the Joint Chiefs of Staff accordingly directed the JSSC to prepare for JCS approval a broad outline statement of the mission of land, sea, and air forces.⁶²

The resulting statement was submitted by the JSSC on 20 February 1946. It reflected wide disagreement—so wide that it could hardly provide the basis for the comprehensive overall plan and statement of requirements that President Truman had called for in August 1945.⁶³ The points at issue were the control of land-based aircraft and the control of, and provision of forces for, amphibious operations—matters that had already arisen in early discussions of the problem of unification. The Navy member of the JSSC contended that his Service should control all aircraft, including those based on land, that were required for operations at sea. The other members were willing to concede the Navy's right to maintain "ship, carrier and water-based aircraft essential to fleet operation," but argued that aircraft operating from land bases should be under control of the Army Air Forces. Likewise the Army Air Forces members recognized the need

for a Marine Corps, but believed that the Army should be responsible for the "land phases" of any amphibious operations requiring "division or larger tactical units," thus restricting the Marine Corps to units of regimental size or smaller. The Navy member defended existing arrangements permitting the Marine Corps to maintain divisions.

Underlying these issues was the general question whether each Service should have under its own control all of the forces required to perform its missions. The JSSC members were agreed on the principle that "Insofar as practicable, specific missions assigned should be susceptible of accomplishment by each Force." The Navy member proposed to add to this statement the following:

Each Service should have the tools, personnel and equipment to accomplish its primary missions so that such coordination of units as may be required can be accomplished *without necessarily involving a joint effort of two or more Services.* [Emphasis supplied]

In the Army Air Forces view, on the other hand, the agreed principle

should not be carried to the extent of including in one force type units peculiar to another so that the first force can accomplish a primary mission without assistance. The armed forces can and should perfect the operation of unity of command and cooperation between forces to the extent that working together is the rule rather than the exception. The past war demonstrated the essentiality and feasibility of this. Economical spending of our resources for the attainment and support of efficient armed forces . . . demands such a concept in peace and in war.⁶⁴

When the JSSC report reached the Joint Chiefs of Staff, each Service chief upheld the position taken by his representative in the Committee. Admiral Nimitz pointed to the agreements reached during World War II that had given the Navy control of land-based antisubmarine aircraft—agreements that had worked successfully, in his view. He also cited World War II experience in attesting to the value of Marine divisions. "Had we had not Marine divisions ready," he wrote, "the Jap would not have been stopped at Guadalcanal; not without Marines would Saipan have been taken, nor Guam, nor Iwo Jima, nor finally Okinawa." As for the general problem of Service coordination, Admiral Nimitz reaffirmed his belief in the adequacy of the old *Joint Action of the Army and Navy* (JAAN), under which, he pointed out, "the Army and the Navy, including the air forces of each, attained a strength and effectiveness incomparable in history." He recommended that the JSSC report be sent back to the Committee for revision in the light of the World War II agreements for interservice cooperation and of the doctrine established in JAAN.⁶⁵

General Eisenhower rejected both the Navy views in the JSSC report and the arguments of Admiral Nimitz. The Army position, he explained, was that air, ground, and sea forces had complementary roles and must be mutually interdependent. The Navy appeared to be assuming "that a force composed of different service components cannot operate efficiently even though under unified command." He rejected the Navy's appeal to earlier practice. "Our problem," he

argued, "should be solved on the basis of what is best for national security; not by reference to documents, agreements and laws, many of which are either outmoded by modern developments or were instituted under emergency conditions." The Army Chief of Staff conceded the need for a small Marine Corps to serve in the initial phase of landing operations and to perform guard duty at home and abroad. But it followed from these limited missions that the Marine Corps should be restricted to units no larger than a regiment. General Eisenhower saw no value "in the further exchange of papers." He believed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff "should now meet for a frank exchange of views," with the objective of resolving the two major issues—the control of land-based air power and the status of the Marine Corps—either among themselves or at a higher level.⁶⁶

The Commanding General, Army Air Forces, General Spaatz, likewise defended the Army view on the points at issue in the JSSC report. He believed that further delay in settling these matters would invite "justifiable censure." He recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff arrive at an "immediate reconciliation" of their divided view or else present the matter to the President "as a subject incapable of resolution at our level."⁶⁷

Further attempts to resolve the impasse between the Services over roles and missions during 1946 proved fruitless. In May 1946, the JPS made one final effort but again ended in a "split" report, divided along Service lines. On 7 June 1946, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to suspend further consideration of the missions of the land, naval and air forces until it was decided that "Presidential or legislative action requires that consideration be revived."⁶⁸

Consideration of roles and missions was revived in mid-1947 with the passage of the National Security Act, which President Truman signed into law on 26 July. This legislation conferred legal status upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff, created a third military department, the Department of the Air Force, established the important post of Secretary of Defense, and, in theory at least, took a major step in the direction of solving the dilemma of Service roles and missions. In actual practice, however, the National Security Act did not solve this perplexing problem. Not until more than a year later, in 1948, with the Service agreements accomplished at Key West and Newport, was some measure of progress made in this area.⁶⁹

Problems of the Atomic Age

Beginning of the Atomic Age

The atomic explosion that flattened Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 marked the beginning of the end for the Japanese Empire. That same event signaled the beginning of a new and fateful age for civilization—an atomic age that would see the development of awesome weapons capable of wiping out all mankind. That this incipient danger would become a reality was recognized early by the United States; all responsible US officials, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sought from the first days of the atomic age a workable system of control that would protect man from his own destructive genius.

In the euphoric atmosphere of that early period, only a few Americans, among them the Joint Chiefs of Staff, appreciated the temporary US military advantage over the USSR. On the other hand, few Americans, even among highly placed officials, perceived at that time the extent to which US and Soviet interests were in conflict over most of the vital postwar issues. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, while aware of the need for positive controls over this awesome new weapon, sought means to protect the transient advantage that had accrued to the United States through its exclusive possession of the atomic bomb. They consistently opposed the revelation of substantive information on atomic weaponry to other nations in the absence of the most positive safeguards—safeguards which they did not believe would be forthcoming in the foreseeable future.

To military planners looking to the future, the atomic weapon, even in its rudimentary state of development, portended drastic, deep-seated changes in warfare that would inevitably affect strategies, force structures, base requirements, and weaponry. In the months immediately following the end of the war, an attempt was made to define these changes; and such strategic planning as did take place within the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization was tinged by the knowledge that changes would be forthcoming.

All members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been aware, in varying degrees, that an atomic weapon was under development. Only General Marshall had

known of, and had been involved in, efforts to develop the atomic bomb from the first stages in 1941. He had been a member of the original committee appointed by President Roosevelt to advise him on questions of policy relating to the study of nuclear fission that was then underway. Admiral Leahy had known of the project for development and manufacture of the atomic bomb under the code name "Manhattan Engineer District." He was specifically briefed on it by the project director, Major General Leslie R. Groves, in October 1944. Admiral Leahy was not impressed and remained consistently skeptical of the atomic bomb. Admiral King had been told about the atomic program by General Marshall in late 1943 but recalled in his memoirs that "so few people knew about it that it was not even discussed in the JCS meetings, although the JCS were informed when the first bomb was ready and when a spare had been manufactured." General Arnold, who had already known of the project in general terms, was thoroughly briefed by General Groves in the spring of 1944, since the United States Army Air Forces would be involved in delivery of the bomb if it was completed.

Plans for employment of the atomic bomb were not prepared or considered by the Joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff. According to General Groves one of the reasons for this was "the need to maintain complete security." An equally important reason, in General Groves' view, was "Admiral Leahy's disbelief in the weapon and its hoped-for effectiveness; this would have made action by the Joint Chiefs quite difficult."¹

The Search for International Policy: The Stimson Proposals

In his first public announcement of what he called "a harnessing of the basic power of the universe, President Truman stated on 6 August 1945:

Normally, . . . everything about the work with atomic energy would be made public.

But under present circumstances it is not intended to divulge the technical processes of production or all the military applications, pending further examination of methods of protecting us and the rest of the world from the danger of sudden destruction.

I shall recommend that the Congress of the United States consider promptly the establishment of an appropriate commission to control the production and use of atomic power within the United States. I shall give further consideration and make further recommendations to the Congress as to how atomic power can become a powerful and forceful influence towards the maintenance of world peace.²

The President followed through on his pledge to ensure secrecy on all sensitive aspects of atomic energy. On 15 August, he ordered "such steps as are necessary to prevent the release of any information in regard to the development, design or production of the atomic bomb; or in regard to its employment in military or naval warfare, except with the specific approval of the President in each instance." Two weeks later he relaxed the rules to allow identification of individ-

uals and organizations associated with the Manhattan Project, subject to War Department regulations that forbade release of valuable information to any nation that would normally have to obtain such information through espionage. He also excluded from the secrecy ban information of only general interest, the release of which would not jeopardize national security.³

The most influential government official directly concerned with atomic policy as the capability was being developed had been Secretary of War Stimson. It was he who had explained the atomic program to the new President on 25 April 1945. Until that time Mr. Truman, as Vice President, had known nothing of the Manhattan Project. During that meeting Secretary Stimson had pointed up the many problems that successful completion of the atomic project would bring. Particularly he had warned of the dangers that would confront civilization as the capability to construct atomic devices increased and spread among nations. Mr. Stimson was very concerned over what the United States should do about sharing atomic secrets with the Soviets. While he was aware of Soviet duplicity in many areas, he became more and more convinced that the United States would fare better in the long run if it shared its atomic knowledge with the Soviet Union. Finally, on 11 September 1945 in a memorandum that he read to the President, Secretary Stimson proposed that the Soviets be invited into the US-British atomic partnership "voluntarily" and "upon a basis of co-operation and trust." He admitted that the United States would be gambling upon Soviet good faith. But it was certain that sooner or later the Soviets would get control of atomic production secrets, and it was important to civilization that when they did so they were "willing and co-operative partners among the peace-loving nations of the world."

Secretary Stimson warned that establishment of relations of mutual confidence between the United States and USSR had been made much more urgent by the bomb. "Those relations," he said, "may be perhaps irretrievably embittered by the way in which we approach the solution of the bomb with Russia. For if we fail to approach them now and merely continue to negotiate with them, having this weapon rather ostentatiously on our hip, their suspicions and their distrust of our purposes and motives will increase." Mr. Stimson suggested that the President, after clearing with the British make a direct proposal to the Soviets to enter an arrangement to control and limit the use of the atomic bomb in war and so far as possible to direct and encourage development of atomic power for peaceful and humanitarian purposes.

Mr. Stimson believed that the United States should offer to stop manufacture of the atomic weapon in exchange for Soviet and British agreement not to attempt further developmental work. If the other two governments would pledge not to use the atomic bomb in wartime unless all three principals agreed, the United States might offer to "impound" its remaining arsenal of atomic weapons. Secretary Stimson evinced a complete lack of confidence in any international organization for the purposes at hand. After listening to Mr. Stimson's views, President Truman indicated his general agreement. "We must take Russia into our confidence," he observed.⁴

On the last day of his long and distinguished government service, 21 September 1945, Secretary Stimson argued eloquently to the President, members of his Cabinet and other Administration officials that the scientific facts of atomic energy could not be kept secret. The United States therefore had everything to gain and little to lose by making a direct offer of partnership to the USSR. Presidential advisers divided in their reaction. Secretary of the Navy Forrestal opposed sharing "the property of the American people" with the Soviets. Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace on the other hand was very much in favor of furnishing them with scientific data. Under Secretary of State Acheson and Under Secretary of War Patterson, who would replace Secretary Stimson, were both supporters of Mr. Stimson's ideas. After hearing additional views, the President ordered his Cabinet officers to prepare written opinions.⁵

President Truman also asked Dr. Vannevar Bush, then serving as Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, to provide him with his views. Dr. Bush immediately forwarded a memorandum essentially supporting the Stimson view. He believed that to collaborate with the USSR in this matter would lead to effective control of the atomic weapon, the alternative being an atomic bomb race. As Dr. Bush saw it, since the main secret lay in the manufacturing processes and the details of construction, there was nothing to be gained in trying to hide the scientific principles involved. The "general advantage" of cooperating with the Soviets in this matter would be an announcement to the world that the United States wished to proceed down "the path of international good will and understanding."⁶

The President also, according to his later recollection, asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their views at this time but did not receive these in time to incorporate them with the written opinions of his Cabinet members. The President had, however, as he remembered, "discussed the problems of atomic energy with Admiral Leahy, General Marshall and the other Chiefs of Staff, and their views were known to me as I studied all the memoranda I had asked for at the Cabinet meeting of September 21."⁷

In the end, despite his earlier agreement, the President did not accept Secretary Stimson's recommendations. On 3 October, in a special message to the Congress, he called for legislation to set up an Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) that would control all sources of atomic energy and all activities connected with its development and use in the United States. President Truman defined his objectives as "promotion of the national welfare, securing the national defense, safeguarding world peace and the acquisition of further knowledge concerning atomic energy." Another aspect of the problem was international control and development. Discussion of this was vital and could not await action of the new United Nations Organization. "The hope of civilization lies in international arrangements looking, if possible, to the renunciation of the use and development of the atomic bomb, and directing and encouraging the use of atomic energy and all future scientific information toward peaceful and humanitarian ends," the President declared. He meant to begin discussions with Great Britain and Canada along these lines and then to bring in other nations to see how cooperation could be achieved and rivalry obviated.⁸

JCS Views on Control of Atomic Energy

The Joint Chiefs of staff were not asked formally for their views on atomic matters until 17 October, when Admiral Leahy informed them that President Truman would "in the near future, discuss with the Prime Ministers of England and Canada international problems arising from the release of atomic energy." The President desired that the Joint Chiefs of Staff furnish him on an urgent basis with their recommendation on what military policy he should adopt with regard to the secrecy surrounding the atomic bomb. They were warned by Admiral Leahy that the projected meeting might take place within the next ten days.⁹

At the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the JSSC prepared draft letter as a suggested response to the President. As the JSSC saw the situation, the United States had three alternatives with respect to disclosure of atomic information to other nations. First, it could make information on atomic energy available to all nations without conditions. This would merely have the effect of stimulating an atomic bomb armament race. It would, on the other hand, do nothing to improve US relations with the USSR, which respected only power and regarded concessions as a sign of weakness. Secondly, the United States could entrust control of the atomic bomb to the Security Council of the United Nations. The JSSC pointed out that in this case the veto power possessed by the permanent Council members rendered that organization powerless to control the production and use of the bomb. Lacking military power, the Security Council could never enforce regulatory rules against the Soviet Union. Nor would the Soviets allow UN agencies to inspect for verification purposes. Third, the United States could keep the atomic bomb as its own secret insofar as possible. Every lesson of history pointed to this alternative as the only wise way. The secret could not be kept forever, but it should be kept as long as possible "from all other nations."¹⁰

It is not clear from the record who furnished a copy of the JSSC paper to Assistant Secretary of War Robert A. Lovett. Nevertheless, on 21 October, Mr. Lovett addressed a memorandum to General Marshall criticizing the JSSC proposals on the basis that the alternatives presented were incomplete; that the arguments were largely based on the Soviet threat; and that no distinction had been drawn between retention of technical secrets and a policy of obtaining international arrangements anticipating renunciation of the use and development of the atomic bomb.

Agreeing that keeping atomic secrets was the prudent course at the moment, Mr. Lovett stated that "the period during which secrecy will be effective should be utilized with the utmost diligence to devise sound methods for control of this great new force." United States preeminence in the atomic field was a "wasting asset," but by wise maneuvering during the next five years the United States might be able to forestall the danger that would confront it once another nation achieved atomic capability. "We appear," Mr. Lovett pointed out, "to be in a better trading position now than we will be 5 or 10 years from now and it would appear to be prudent to take such advantage of this fact as we can in order to advance our national security and improve the possibilities of world peace." Mr.

Lovett suggested to General Marshall that the JSSC letter be revised to incorporate his ideas.¹¹

General Marshall agreed with Mr. Lovett and directed the Army Staff to prepare an alternative draft letter for presentation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This was done, and on 23 October General Marshall recommended to the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they send to the President this alternative draft in lieu of the JSSC submission.

In so doing he pointed out that the JSSC had singled out the USSR and that this was "politically undesirable." The discussion of the United Nations by the JSSC could be interpreted to be pessimistic and defeatist. And it was desirable that the Joint Chiefs of Staff express a military interest in any discussions that might take place to provide for international arrangements to prevent an atomic arms race and to keep the United States from being exposed to "a form of attack against which there is no adequate defense."

Approving General Marshall's views the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the President a letter on 23 October, in which they recommended that the United States retain, for the present, "all existing secrets with respect to atomic weapons." Their justification, in summary, comprised the following conclusions:

a. Other countries could not build atomic bombs for several years. This interval was especially valuable, due to the uncertainty of East-West relationships and the opportunity afforded to consummate an arms control agreement.

b. In the absence of great-power accords upon fundamental political problems, release of information probably would precipitate an arms race.

c. Since the United States was particularly vulnerable to atomic attack, because of the country's urban concentrations, it seemed imprudent voluntarily to place such devastating weapons in other nations' hands.

d. At present, no adequate international control system existed.

e. If the UN Security Council wished to employ atomic weapons for the maintenance of peace, the United States undoubtedly would cooperate.

f. Unilateral disclosures could be regarded as a sign of weakness by other nations, and might not lessen suspicion and distrust so long as secrecy and censorship persisted elsewhere on the globe.

g. The world generally recognized that the United States harbored no aggressive designs and was, therefore, the safest possessor of the secret.

h. Since the United States was developing other advanced weapons (long-range bombers, rocket projectiles, and guided missiles) related to the techniques of atomic warfare, it would be unwise to set a precedent for sharing secrets before adequate international controls were established.

Nonetheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed that, in order to avert an arms race and lessen the prospect of atomic warfare, political initiatives "should be promptly and vigorously pressed during the probably limited period of American monopoly." Such measures might include a Presidential declaration that the United States would not employ atomic weapons except as envisaged in the UN

Charter and continuing international discussions concerning methods for restricting and outlawing atomic weapons.¹²

Tripartite Conferences

PPrime Minister Clement Attlee of Great Britain and Prime Minister Mackenzie King of Canada visited Washington and conferred with President Truman on international control of atomic energy from 10 November through 15 November 1945. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not attend these conferences, Admiral Leahy was present as one of the President's principal advisers. In their joint declaration, released on 15 November, the three leaders called for "effective reciprocal, and enforceable safeguards" as prerequisites to the dissemination of "specialized information regarding the practical application of atomic energy." Most significant of their recommendations was that the United Nations establish a commission on atomic energy that would "with the utmost dispatch" make specific proposals for: (1) extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends; (2) controlling of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes; (3) eliminating from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction; and (4) safeguarding by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions.

The proposed UN Atomic Energy Commission would work by separate stages, completing one stage successfully before the next was begun. The Western leaders felt that the Commission should first approach the problem of a wide exchange of scientists and scientific information prior to beginning study of the natural resources of raw material for atomic energy use.¹³

"Faced with the terrible realities of the application of science to destruction, every nation will realize more urgently than before the overwhelming need to maintain the rule of law among nations and to banish the scourge of war from the earth," the joint declaration concluded. "This can only be brought about by giving wholehearted support to the United Nations Organization, and by consolidating and extending its authority, thus creating conditions of mutual trust in which all peoples will be free to devote themselves to the arts of peace. It is our firm resolve to work without reservation to achieve these ends."¹⁴

A key question in the whole issue—the Soviet Union's attitude toward formation of and cooperation with a UN atomic commission—was answered in the next month. At the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in December, the USSR agreed to join in sponsoring a resolution at the first session of the General Assembly for the establishment of a United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. A text of the proposed resolution was agreed to by the Foreign Ministers. Thus Secretary Stimson's proposals that the United States deal directly with the Soviet Union rather than relying on a large international body to establish controls over atomic energy went by the board.¹⁵

Guidance for the JCS Representatives to the UN Military Staff Committee

It was anticipated that the question of a United Nations Atomic Energy Commission might be raised in the UN at an early opportunity. A UN meeting was scheduled for London in January 1946, and the JCS representatives on the Military Staff Committee of the UN Security Council were to serve as advisers to the US delegation. General Eisenhower informed the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the JCS representatives should therefore be thoroughly informed on the military implications of such a Commission and the safeguards needed to protect US military security. He recommended that the JPS, as a matter of priority, consult with General Groves and prepare recommendations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the military factors involved in creation of the UN Atomic Energy Commission. These would serve as a basis for briefing the JCS representatives. On 29 December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the JSSC, in collaboration with the JPS and after consultation with the Commanding General, Manhattan District, to submit their conclusions as to the military implications of the proposed creation of a United Nations Commission on atomic energy, and their recommendations from a military point of view as to the limitations that should be imposed on the functioning of that organization.¹⁶

The required guidance was submitted by the JSSC to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in mid-January. It was approved by them on 23 January 1946 and forwarded to the JCS Representatives at once. Copies were also furnished SWNCC.

Among the more significant conclusions in the guidance was that no realistic inspection and control system to ensure against illicit manufacture of atomic bombs had been developed. It was in the US interest to find and establish effective international means to control atomic weapons and it followed, therefore, that the work of the proposed UN Commission was of "vital interest" to US national security. Military implications of the Commission could not be precisely defined. It was certain that the US representative on the Commission should seek agreed safeguards and that the degree of his success in this should dictate the amount of atomic information that the United States disclosed. The US representative should be advised by the JCS representatives on the UN Military Staff Committee and should also have available as an assistant an individual thoroughly cognizant in atomic energy matters and with a broad military background.

The implicit limitations on functioning of the UN Commission that the Joint Chiefs of Staff set forth for guidance of their representatives were:

- a. It is essential that any action contemplated in the commission be not prejudicial to the security of the United States.
- b. Progress should not be hurried. Painstaking examination and thorough coordination of each step within the United States Government are required.
- c. A satisfactory solution from the United States' point of view of the problem of effective controls and safeguards must be arrived at before any disclosure or exchange of specialized technological information is agreed.

d. Normal reciprocal peacetime interchange of basic scientific information and the restricted interchange of scientists and students was acceptable [but only under limitations]. . . .

e. Exchange of information on raw materials should not be undertaken at the present.¹⁷

On 24 January 1946, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution establishing an Atomic Energy Commission consisting of representatives from each state on the Security Council plus Canada. The Commission would make specific proposals: (1) for extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends; (2) for control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes; (3) for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction; and (4) for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions.¹⁸

US Plans for International Control

In order to furnish guidelines for US participation in atomic negotiations, Secretary of State Byrnes had named Under Secretary Dean Acheson to head a Committee on Atomic Energy on 7 January 1946. Mr. Acheson in turn appointed a Board of Consultants chaired by Mr. David E. Lilienthal to prepare a report for his committee on international control of atomic energy. The report was forwarded to the Secretary of State on 17 March and released to the public on 28 March 1946. Informally known as "the Acheson-Lilienthal report," it proffered a series of closely connected proposals. The report recommended that no nation make atomic bombs or the materials for them. "All dangerous activities," Mr. Acheson proposed, "would be carried on—not merely inspected—by a live functioning international Authority with a real purpose in the world and capable of attracting competent personnel. This monopoly of the dangerous activities by an international Authority would still leave a large and tremendously productive field of safe activities open to individual nations, their industries and universities. . . ." The report made no mention of sanctions for violations since it was not believed that the Soviet Union would agree to such arrangements. Too, inspection should provide ample warning that violations of agreements were taking place.¹⁹

Meanwhile, on 16 March, the President, at the suggestion of Secretary Byrnes, had appointed Mr. Bernard M. Baruch as US representative to the UN Atomic Energy Commission. If it had been assumed that Mr. Baruch would follow the guidelines in the Acheson-Lilienthal report, that assumption was soon dispelled. The President had granted the elderly "adviser to Presidents" considerable latitude in how he would approach the problem. Mr. Baruch immediately intro-

duced a proposal for "swift and sure" punishment of any government that violated whatever agreement was made.²⁰

Mr. Baruch met with General Eisenhower, General Spaatz and a representative of Admiral Nimitz on 15 April in preliminary conversations aimed at determining how best the US representative to the UN Atomic Energy Commission could be furnished timely and meaningful military advice. General Eisenhower told Mr. Baruch that he believed the best arrangement would be for him to work directly with General Groves who could be available at any time and could effect coordination on a joint basis.²¹

Following this meeting, the JPS began a study to determine how Mr. Baruch's needs for military advice could be served. On 21 May, before this study was completed, Mr. Fred Searles of Mr. Baruch's staff discussed the subject with Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway and his colleagues of the Representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the UN Atomic Energy Committee.

During these conversations Mr. Searles pointed out that time was pressing for Mr. Baruch. The UN Commission was to meet in mid-June and it would be necessary for US policy to be fully developed. It was essential therefore that the view of the military be obtained. At the moment Mr. Baruch and his advisers were examining seriously a proposal to outlaw the use of the atomic bomb and, in the event a nation agreed to this and subsequently used the atomic bomb against another nation, the offender would itself be attacked, using the atomic bomb. The Baruch "group" fully realized the impossibility of enforcing such a sanction under the UN Charter because of the veto power of members of the Security Council. As an alternative measure they were considering having member nations conclude a treaty agreeing to carry out the sanctions, if necessary, outside the Security Council framework. Atomic bombs for retaliatory purposes would be stored at sites under UN control in the Azores, Cairo, Karachi, Burma, and Philippines.

Mr. Searles asked for the views of the JCS Representatives on these ideas. He was told that, until the Joint Chiefs of Staff had "defined their own stand," the Representatives were unable to offer "any advisory guidance whatever." When Mr. Searles suggested that he and the JCS Representatives meet with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington on 24 May, the Representatives countered that he would save time by seeking to talk with General Groves first. If this did not work out, Mr. Baruch should approach the Joint Chiefs of Staff directly without regard to the JCS Representatives on the Military Staff Committee.²²

The Joint Chiefs of Staff finally approved a system for furnishing advice to Mr. Baruch. They sent him a letter on 27 May designating General Groves as their representative to advise Mr. Baruch in technical matters or secrecy requirements in the field of atomic energy. He would be available to give every assistance including obtaining the coordinated views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff where desired. With respect to problems of "national security or of a broad strategic nature" the Joint Chiefs of Staff would deal directly with Mr. Baruch or through their Representatives on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations.²³

The unorthodox Mr. Baruch did not seek the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body. He sought the views of the individual members as well as of

the two major overseas commanders. On 24 May, Mr. Baruch sent letters to the JCS members, Generals Eisenhower and Spaatz and Admirals Leahy and Nimitz. He also wrote to Generals MacArthur and McNarney, theater commanders in the Far East and Europe, respectively, and to Admiral King, ex-member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Baruch explained the proposals he was considering with respect to an atomic treaty that would outlaw the use of the atomic bomb and provide for specific sanctions. His questions concerned not only the international control of atomic energy but also the possible methods of outlawing war itself. He asked how some form of automatic punishment for violators could be set up. "It seems to me that a certainty of punishment is essential," Mr. Baruch stated.²⁴

General Eisenhower, on 29 May, reminded the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the United Nations Commission on Atomic Energy was scheduled to meet on 14 June 1946. "It is, therefore, obvious that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should begin examination of Mr. Baruch's plan without delay," he stated. He recommended that the JSSC be instructed to develop the military implications of the Baruch plan as a matter of priority and to give the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendations as to military guidance that should be provided Mr. Baruch.²⁵ On 6 June, only about a week before Mr. Baruch was to present his plan to the United Nations agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved General Eisenhower's recommendation.²⁶

The next day, the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally agreed that their views on the questions raised by Mr. Baruch could be dealt with individually and that each of them would furnish his views in a separate letter. Secretary of State Byrnes, on learning of this, indicated that he would prefer to clear with President Truman before the Joint Chiefs of Staff communicated directly with Mr. Baruch. As a result, several days passed before Admiral Leahy cleared the matter with the President and the letter of each member was sent to Mr. Baruch.²⁷

In his reply to Mr. Baruch, Admiral Leahy stated that the only realistic way to prevent the use of atomic bombs was to outlaw them except when their use was authorized by a majority vote in the Security Council in retaliation for unlawful use of the bomb. The United States should not enter into a treaty limiting its production of atomic bombs until peace treaties with Germany and Japan had been ratified and until effective and workable systems of inspection and control of manufacture had been tested and developed.²⁸

Admiral Nimitz foresaw that only international control of fissionable matter, backed by completely effective international inspection would achieve the "fundamental objective" which was to outlaw the bomb. No individual nation should be allowed to possess atomic bombs. The United States should nonetheless exploit its present advantage with respect to the atomic bomb to establish satisfactory peace treaties and should not give up its advantage until this was justified by proven agreed controls. Admiral Nimitz did not believe that international agreement to take concerted action against nations that violated atomic treaties would be effective. He doubted that the American people were ready to agree to take automatic punitive measures against other nations.²⁹

General Eisenhower maintained that, because possession of the atomic bomb by the United States was a deterrent to aggression, US capability to produce or use it should not be limited. However, international control of atomic energy was

the only way to avoid an atomic war. The United States should therefore move step-by-step, to achieve such control, making effective inspection the first step. The Acheson report proposed a practical approach to this first step.³⁰

But, in any case, all this was superfluous advice. The letters from the JCS members only reached Mr. Baruch on 18 June, four days *after* he had publicly defined US policy before the UN Atomic Energy Commission. Historians of the Atomic Energy Commission later observed: "The most interesting thing about Baruch's exchanges with the military was not the views of the Joint Chiefs but their apparent isolation from decision making. Far from dictating policy, they had some difficulty in discovering what policy was."³¹

In his long-awaited address, delivered on 14 June, Mr. Baruch summoned the peoples of the world to "make a choice between the quick and the dead." He put forth to the United Nations a plan for international control of atomic energy at the source by an atomic development authority having complete managerial control of all raw materials, processes and plants. The plan also called for full promotion of the peacetime benefits of atomic energy; strategic distribution of activities, plants and stockpiles throughout the world; freedom of access into all countries for representatives of the international authority; penalties for nations violating the controls and abrogation of veto power on decisions providing for these punishments. The control system would be placed in effect gradually by stages. Only after the controls had been well tested would atomic secrets be released for disclosure. In sum, the United States intended to preserve its atomic monopoly until the international controls were positive and foolproof.³²

To the surprise of no one Mr. Andrei Gromyko, Soviet representative to the UN Atomic Energy Commission, did not accept the US proposal. Instead, he presented a plan in which each nation would be responsible for policing itself. The Soviet plan called for the immediate outlawing of all atomic weapons. Two committees would be established, one on the exchange of scientific information, the other on the control of atomic energy. Under the Soviet plan the veto would be retained and the Security Council would be responsible for punishment of violations.³³

On its own initiative the JSSC submitted a report on international control of atomic energy to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 20 July 1946. Since Mr. Baruch had already presented the US position on the subject in the UN, the JSSC recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff merely forward the report to their Representatives on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations for "information and guidance." The expressions of views by the individual JCS members, the JSSC concluded, were all that Mr. Baruch required at that time.

The JSSC report made the following points: (1) the problem of establishing effective international control of atomic energy involved to an unprecedented degree the future security of the United States and thus was one in which the armed forces were vitally concerned; (2) premature disclosure of US scientific atomic information or technical "know how" with a view to accelerating negotiations, inducing other nations to participate, or expediting their agreement, would greatly reduce the US military advantage in possessing the atomic bomb; and (3) in examining any atomic energy proposals or plans it was vital to US security

that effective liaison be maintained between Mr. Baruch and the Joint Chiefs of Staff so that proposals having national security or broad strategic implications could be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in time for thorough study and recommendation before any US positions were taken. They approved the recommendations on 1 August and forwarded their report to their Representatives on the UN Military Committee.³⁴

After debate over a six-month period, the UN Atomic Energy Commission, with Soviet and Polish representatives abstaining, approved a plan substantially the same as that submitted in June by Mr. Baruch for the United States. On 31 December 1946, the Commission reported to the UN Security Council, making the following recommendations: (1) there must be a strong and comprehensive system of control and inspection; (2) such an international system of control and inspection should be established and defined by a treaty or convention; and (3) such a treaty or convention should provide for an international control agency, no veto power over actions by the agency in fulfillment of its obligations, and unimpeded rights of access to all territory for performance of the Agency's functions.³⁵

By proposing 12 amendments to the UN Atomic Energy Commission's report, the Soviet Union, in effect, sought to substitute its original plan for the US plan. On 10 March 1947, the Security Council rejected these amendments but, because it could not resolve the Soviet-Western differences, sent the record of debate back to the UN Atomic Energy Commission, where continued disagreement over inspection prevented agreement on international control.³⁶

Military Implications of the Atomic Bomb

Concurrently with their examination of requirements for controls and secrecy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff engaged in searching studies of the military implications of the atomic weapon and how its introduction would change the face of war. General Marshall sparked these studies less than two weeks after the destruction of two major Japanese cities by atomic bombing. On 18 August, addressing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Army Chief of Staff stated:

The development of the atomic bomb presents far-reaching implications and problems. What the potentialities of this weapon are and what effect it will have on warfare are problems whose solution must be in the future. At the present time discussion is going on in press, scientific, political and public circles generally on this subject. It is desirable that a concerted viewpoint of the military on the over-all effect of this new weapon on warfare and military organization be developed as soon as possible in the light of the information now available and to the extent practicable.

At his recommendation the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed the JSSC to analyze the impact of atomic weapons upon military organization and warfare.³⁷

On 30 October 1945, the Committee submitted its conclusions. The most serious effect, it believed, lay in the dissipation of the security of the North American

continent. The ocean moat might now hide attackers and hinder defenders. Moreover, this new menace to the United States was not offset by an equally heightened threat to the USSR. While US industry and population were highly concentrated and quite vulnerable to sea-launched bombs, Soviet assets were widely dispersed and far from the ocean. If war came, bomb carriers would have to be destroyed by interceptors flying from "a system of mutually supporting advanced bases extending far out from the homeland. . . ." Accordingly, US defensive frontiers must be projected well into the Atlantic and Pacific and to the shores of the Arctic.

For the foreseeable future, atomic bombs would be available only to the great industrial nations and in very limited numbers. The United States enjoyed roughly five years' technological advantage in the nuclear field. In order to keep this lead, the Committee proposed a "firm policy" consisting of (1) US Government control of all uranium sources, (2) maximum acceleration of research and development, (3) maintenance of the highest possible degree of secrecy, and (4) accumulation of a weapon stockpile sufficient to implement strategic war plans.

Concerning possible changes in techniques of warfare, the JSSC saw the atomic bomb primarily as a strategic weapon, as yet unsuited for employment against ground and naval forces. However, its advent accentuated the value of surprise and so emphasized the need "not only of readiness for immediate defense, but also for striking first, if necessary. . . ." This principle of pre-emptive attack was a strange, new strategic concept for US military planners. Later in its analysis the JSSC repeated this thought, holding that an effective action against the source of atomic attack on the United States might require "us to 'strike first.'" The advent of atomic weapons also attested to the "cardinal importance" of dispersion of vital targets.

Displaying little forward vision, the JSSC admitted that delivering atomic weapons by "high angle guided rockets of supersonic speed" at ranges of five hundred miles was a remote possibility. But allegations that it might become feasible to deliver atomic warheads "at trans-ocean ranges" by such missiles were "not justified under conditions that can be foreseen."

Finally, with regard to military organization, possession of atomic weapons did not allow either "elimination of the conventional armaments or major modifications of the Services that employ them." The Committee contended that:

The ground forces will still have to be equipped to attack, occupy and defend territory. The air forces will still have the same roles which they had in this war. New weapons, new planes and new defenses may change their methods, but almost certainly in the direction of greater complexity and hence, greater personnel and materiel requirements. The Navy will still have to control the sea, transport and land amphibious forces and furnish air defense and air attacks.

They called for action to counter popular misconceptions that conventional forces suddenly had become obsolete. Nonetheless, the JSSC did discern new needs for (1) an "effective, centralized national intelligence service" and (2) close integration not only of the Services but also of "all related military, production and scientific effort." Dr. Bush, now Director of the Office of Scientific Research

and Development, endorsed all aspects of the report except the injunction to preserve secrecy.³⁸

In early December, General Eisenhower submitted criticisms of the JSSC paper to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He noted that it discussed neither the present US strategic superiority stemming from atomic monopoly nor its transitory nature. Additionally, the proposed policy of maximum secrecy, while prudent from the military point of view, needed reconsideration in light of the recent US-UK-Canadian agreement to share information. He recommended that the JSSC paper be noted, that copies be furnished to the Service Secretaries, but that the JSSC continue to study the matter in light of the comments that he had made.³⁹

Later in the month, on 20 December, because he foresaw developing Congressional requirements for information, General Eisenhower called for a comprehensive study of the effects of atomic energy on US military requirements and organization. He wanted a well-considered analysis that could become the basis for advice by the military to Congress and the Department of State. Admiral Nimitz suggested an alternative. He suggested that, in order to avoid duplication and delay, the JSSC simply revise its original study in light of General Eisenhower's specific criticisms. On 28 December this suggestion was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁴⁰

The revised draft statement of the effect of atomic weapons on national security and military organization was submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the JSSC on 12 January. In this modified version the injunction on secrecy had been removed and, in response to General Eisenhower's earlier criticisms, the US advantage as sole possessor of the bomb was mentioned. The main thrust of the paper, however, was that conventional forces would continue to be needed and that the atomic bomb, while it would enhance strategic capability, would not justify the elimination of the existing military forces.⁴¹

General Eisenhower disliked the newest statement on the ground that, while it seemed reasonable in its specifics, the overall impression was that of a hypersensitive defense of conventional arms and the status quo that deprecated the importance of atomic weapons. The Army Chief of Staff said that he had not detected any strong public demand for elimination of the conventional armed services. The JSSC statement, if approved, might be misinterpreted by the Congress and the public as over-reaction by the armed services to an imaginary threat of reduction of the establishment. General Eisenhower wanted a brief statement that would encompass basic implications of the bomb in the immediate future. It should indicate the relative importance of political, as opposed to military, measures in meeting the bomb threat and could show that the "military" were just as eager to prevent an atomic war as they were to win one. To assist the JSSC in its revision, General Eisenhower enclosed a draft statement prepared by the Army Staff. The statement considered two major alternatives: (1) that a satisfactory international agreement had been reached that would ban the use of the atomic bomb, or (2) that such an agreement had not been reached and the three major powers would have the bomb available to them in from 5 to 20 years. Under the first situation, nations would have to abandon all rights of national privacy in order to ensure compliance. Transgressors would have to be

promptly and severely punished by the other nations and there must be an international means for doing so. If the agreement were broken, it would mean a worldwide all out arms race with the winner assured of world supremacy. Under the second assumption, the United States must retain superiority in atomic matters. To do this she must not allow any nation to build atomic weapons, destroying their capabilities as necessary.

In conclusion, the Army Staff stated that the United States must have either a hard-boiled and enforceable world agreement against use of the atomic weapon or, with its allies, exclusive supremacy in the field. The United States was now in the best position to obtain and enforce a worldwide agreement—five years hence would be too late. In either case, certain features of the atomic bomb should be kept in mind. Defense against it would always be inadequate, but top priority should be given to effective means of stopping the carrying vehicles. The armed services must have a major part in determining how atomic energy would be applied to national defense. If there were to be atomic weapons in the world, the United States must have the best, the biggest and the most. Finally, the atomic bomb was not an all-purpose weapon; to place total reliance on it would be to court disaster.⁴²

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved General Eisenhower's recommendation and referred the statement back to the JSSC for review in light of his comments and of the draft Army statement. The JSSC completed its review on 6 February. After some revisions the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the JSSC statement on 29 March 1946. In so doing they stressed the need for statesmanlike steps to achieve an effective worldwide prohibition of atomic weapons. Militarily, however, the United States, having lost its historic advantage of time and distance, must maintain a larger percentage of all its forces in a state of preparedness. The nation possessed a 5 to 10 year technological advantage in atomic weaponry, but this superiority was certainly transitory. International control would probably not prevent an atomic war, and unless warfare itself was abolished, the United States must maintain (1) balanced combat-ready forces, capable of immediate retaliation and buttressed by well-trained reserves, (2) forward bases from which to intercept assailants and deliver counterattacks, (3) adequate mobilization plans, (4) a worldwide intelligence service, (5) continuing research of the highest quality and urgency, and (6) programs for progressive dispersal of industry.⁴³

Testing the Bomb

On 25 August 1945, in a public address, Senator Brien McMahon had suggested that captured Japanese ships be taken to sea and bombed with atomic weapons to prove "just how effective the atomic bomb is." Following further suggestions of this nature by Army Air Forces officials, General Arnold proposed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that some Japanese vessels be made available for tests using atomic bombs and other weapons. These early actions presaged the atomic tests in the Pacific in mid-1946.⁴⁴

Admiral King, Chief of Naval Operations, was among those military men seriously concerned that the introduction of atomic weapons into the US arsenal would require drastic changes in the size and nature of both ground and sea forces. Ignorance as to the true nature of the atomic weapon had led, he believed, to a great deal of dangerous "loose thinking." Admiral King considered that it was of prime importance that the salient facts about these weapons be determined as quickly as possible. On 16 October 1945, he therefore recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they broaden General Arnold's proposal to include the use of US surplus ships as targets and to conduct two tests, possibly at some location in or near the Caroline Islands in the Pacific. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this recommendation.⁴⁵

At the suggestion of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed the JPS, in consultation with General Groves (now designated Officer-in-Charge of the Atomic Bomb Project), to ready an outline of the type of tests to be conducted, the general requirements, and the information that was desired from the tests. They would also recommend the agency to implement the test, and draft an appropriate directive prior to submission of the test proposal to the President.⁴⁶

President Truman approved holding the tests and on 10 December 1945 the Secretaries of War and Navy announced that joint tests would be held to determine the effects of atomic bombs against naval vessels.⁴⁷

On 22 December, the JPS submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff an outline plan for the atomic tests, including the general requirements and test objectives. The planners recommended three tests, one involving an air burst, one with the bomb bursting at ground level or at shallow underwater depth, and a third in which the bomb would be detonated at great underwater depth (several thousand feet). Target ships representing a range of naval vessels would be used.

The Planners recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff designate a commander to head a joint task force that would operate under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The task force staff would comprise Army and Navy personnel and civilian scientists. Support of the task force would come from the War and Navy Departments, including the Manhattan District. There would also be an evaluation board, separate from the task force but similarly constituted, that would evaluate the results of the test for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁴⁸

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the JPS recommendations on 28 December and on the same day sent a memorandum to the Secretaries of War and Navy describing the test plans. They asked that the Secretaries obtain Presidential approval so that a directive could be issued to the task force commander.⁴⁹

As the Joint Chiefs of Staff had asked, Secretary Forrester and Acting Secretary of War, Kenneth C. Royall, sent to the President a joint memorandum in which they explained the JCS desire to hold atomic tests. "These tests are necessary," they stated, "in order to determine, among other things, the consequences of this powerful aerial weapon with respect to the size, composition and employment of the armed forces and should particularly facilitate an analysis of future naval design and tactics." They reminded the President that the program called for the expenditure of two or three bombs but that only three bombs had been exploded

by the United States to date. It might be necessary, because of mechanical or other failure, to use additional bombs to accomplish the test's purposes. Vessels to be used as targets would be selected from surplus US Navy vessels and possibly from among captured German and Japanese ships allocated the United States. President Truman approved the recommendations of the Secretaries on 10 January 1946.⁵⁰

Without waiting for formal approval, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had selected Vice Admiral William H. P. Blandy to head the tests as Commander, Joint Task Force One. They emphasized to Admiral Blandy that the atomic tests would be carried out under their direct supervision, that he would report to them only and that any announcements regarding the tests would so indicate. Admiral Blandy's staff would be chosen "on a coordinated basis and in a manner satisfactory to the services."⁵¹

After consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Blandy prepared a specific plan based on the broader JPS plans that had received JCS approval. He proposed that the best location for the harbor tests appeared to be the lagoon of Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands. The atoll had a population of less than 200 who could readily be relocated. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this plan on 24 January 1946. The code word CROSSROADS was assigned to designate the tests.⁵²

Because of lack of equipment to protect the atomic device from pressure at great depths, it was subsequently decided to explode only two atomic bombs, one an air burst to be dropped from a B-29 aircraft, the second a surface burst exploded from a barge. The first experiment was tentatively scheduled for 15 May 1946, the second "more tentatively" for 1 July 1946.⁵³

Opposition to holding the atomic tests came from both the United States Congress and the Soviet Union. In January 1946, Senator Scott Lucas asked in the Senate, "If we are to outlaw the use of the atomic bomb for military purposes, why should we be making plans to display atomic power as an instrument of destruction?" Two months later, in company with Senator James W. Huffman, Senator Lucas submitted a resolution seeking Presidential cancellation of the tests. Some other congressmen objected to the destruction of seaworthy ships for test purposes. The Soviets, as might have been predicted, were highly critical of the US intention to test atomic bombs, charging that the United States was not aiming to restrict the use of, but to perfect, the atomic bomb.⁵⁴

On 1 April 1946 Admiral Nimitz, disturbed by what he called "opposition which has recently arisen in the Senate, to the tests against naval vessels," asked that the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their previous recommendations that the tests be held. Admiral Leahy put this suggestion down firmly when he noted "I do not see that any useful purpose will be served by gratuitous repetition by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of their previous recommendations."⁵⁵

President Truman informed the Acting Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy on 22 March that he had decided to postpone the first of the scheduled atomic test shots from its planned date of 1 May 1946 to 1 July 1946. Noting that this action by the President had raised "some question concerning the solidarity of the military opinion as to the importance of these tests," the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 3 April recommended to the Secretaries of War and Navy that they press

President Truman to make a statement which would offset this impression. On 18 April at a news conference the President was asked whether the tests would be indefinitely postponed. He replied "The atomic bomb experiment will take place July 1st, if I remain President until that day."⁵⁶

The first of two atomic bombs tested in Operation CROSSROADS exploded on target on 1 July, local time, over Bikini Atoll. Five of the target ships were sunk and others heavily damaged.⁵⁷ On 5 July 1946, the Evaluation Board appointed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a preliminary report on the first test. After describing the damage, actual and projected, the members of the board concluded:

A vast amount of data which will prove invaluable throughout scientific and engineering fields has been made available by this test. Once more the importance of large scale research has been dramatically demonstrated. There can be no question that the effort and expense involved in this test has been amply justified both by the information secured and by greatly narrowing the range of speculation and argument. Moreover, it is clear to the Board that only by further large-scale research and development can the United States retain its present position of scientific leadership. This must be done in the interest of national safety.⁵⁸

The second test, involving a shallow underwater explosion, took place as scheduled on 25 July 1946 and produced equally spectacular and profitable results. The explosion of the bomb, suspended from a ship near the center of the target array, was estimated to have had the destructive force of 20,000 tons of TNT. Two major ships, a battleship and an aircraft carrier, were sunk immediately, as were a tank landing ship, a smaller landing craft, and an oiler. Several submerged submarines were sent to the bottom. A badly damaged Japanese battleship sank five days later.⁵⁹

Observations during both tests established the general types and effective ranges of air and shallow underwater atomic bomb bursts on naval vessels, army materiel and personnel. "From these observations," the Evaluation Board report concluded, "and from instrumental data it will now be possible to outline such changes, not only in military and naval design but also in strategy and tactics, as future events may indicate."⁶⁰ Joint Task Force One was dissolved officially on 1 November 1946, having accomplished the mission established for it in a highly satisfactory manner.

Founding an Atomic Arsenal

On 1 August 1946, following approval by Congress, President Truman signed the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. In so doing he created the Atomic Energy Commission, a body of five Commissioners appointed by him. Supporting the Commission were a nine-member General Advisory Committee charged with advising the Commission on "scientific and technical matters relating to materials,

production, and research and development," and a Military Liaison Committee, chaired by Lieutenant General Lewis H. Brereton.⁶¹

The Commission began functioning on 13 November 1946, taking over the organization and assuming custody of all laboratory facilities, weapon components and fissionable materials of the Manhattan Project. All military personnel assigned to the Manhattan Engineer District who were excepted from service with the AEC were at once assigned to duty with the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project. This joint Army-Navy atomic energy organization was established to discharge all military service functions relating to atomic energy. It operated under a Chief selected mutually by the Chief of Staff, US Army, and Chief of Naval Operations, with a Deputy Chief selected in the same manner from the opposite service. Military service functions were defined as training of special personnel, military participation in the development of atomic weapons, technical training of bomb commanders and weaponeers, and developing and effecting joint radiological safety measures.⁶²

The Atomic Energy Act stipulated that each year the President must fix the production rates for fissionable material. In February 1947, the Secretaries of War and Navy signed and forwarded for signature to Mr. David E. Lilienthal, Chairman designate of the AEC, a letter to the President informing him that the three officials would recommend to him on or before 1 March the amount of fissionable material and weapons using it to be produced during the calendar year 1947. Upon learning of this, General Eisenhower recommended that the JSSC be instructed to prepare a position for the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this matter after consulting appropriate officials in the War and Navy Departments and other agencies. This recommendation was approved on 12 February.⁶³

The JSSC report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 25 February warned that the United States must assume that in any future war it would be on the receiving end of atomic bombs. This meant that the United States must have sufficient bombs to carry out intense and sustained attacks against the enemy early in the war. Under current conditions and with current methods it would not be possible to increase production of bombs suddenly after war broke out. It was therefore vital that the United States have an adequate stockpile of atomic bombs "at an early date."

Current military studies indicated a requirement for atomic bombs that exceeded the number on hand and that could be manufactured during 1947. Even if current rates of production for fissionable material were maintained all year and the entire output used for bombs, it appeared likely that future requirements could not be met "for a number of years." Following JSSC recommendations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretaries of Navy and War in a letter on 26 February 1947 that: (1) the present supply of atomic bombs was not adequate to meet the security requirements of the United States; (2) even if the entire supply of fissionable material, including the output of present atomic energy plants during 1947, were applied it would still fall far short of the total military requirements; (3) the early production of enough fissionable material to meet US military requirements either through application of the maximum amount from current production for military use or through expansion of present

plant facilities, or both, would best serve the military defense and security interests of the United States; and (4) it was in the interest of US national security that all 1947 production of fissionable material plus that already available and excepting that needed for essential research in medicine, design, production methods, and power, be used to make atomic bombs.⁶⁴

On 27 March, the Commissioners of the AEC approved a draft letter to the President setting forth a proposed program for research and development during calendar year 1947, including the amounts of fissionable materials that would be required to support the program. The JSSC was informed of the contents of the letter. The AEC proposed that the letter be signed by its Chairman, by Admiral Leahy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by the Secretaries of War and Navy. Administrative delays occurred and the final signature (of the Secretary of War) was not obtained until after 10 April. The letter advised President Truman essentially of what the Joint Chiefs of Staff had said in their letter of 26 February. It recommended that the President approve continuation of the current production program and limitations on the allocation of fissionable materials to research and development. It did not supply numbers. Material should be kept in a form readily available for making weapons.⁶⁵

Meanwhile, on 3 April, the Commissioners of the AEC briefed the President at the White House using a short statement of the general situation rather than the letter. Mr. Truman was informed that supply of atomic weapons was "very small." No bombs were actually assembled, and the training of military assembly teams was incomplete. The President was obviously surprised and shocked. What, he asked, did the AEC propose to do?⁶⁶

The question was rhetorical; the AEC could do nothing until its members were confirmed by the Senate. Fortunately, at that point the meeting was interrupted by welcome news that prospects for Senate confirmation of the Commission members had taken a turn for the better. Actual confirmation was approved in a formal vote on the nominees on 9 April 1947.

Admiral Leahy called the Chairman of the AEC to a meeting with the President and the Service Secretaries on 16 April. At this time the President read the letter containing AEC, JCS, and Service views on atomic requirements. The Chairman, AEC, supplied actual figures orally. President Truman endorsed the views presented, including production figures. Thus empowered with Presidential blessing, the Commission, in the ensuing weeks, pressed forward by refurbishing production facilities, stimulating nuclear research, and developing new types of reactors. Late in April 1947, new high-explosive shaped charges were successfully assembled; this meant that ready weapons would soon be available in the national stockpile. The foundations for an atomic arsenal were being laid.⁶⁷

British Request for Atomic Information

In early 1947 British Prime Minister Attlee asked President Truman to redeem the debt that he believed the United States owed his country for its collabo-

ration in development of the atomic bomb. He asked that the United States furnish certain information on industrial and manufacturing aspects of atomic energy, as the British meant to build a large atomic energy plant somewhere in the British Isles. On 11 February, Secretary of State Marshall informed the Secretaries of War and Navy that the British contended that the United States had a commitment to supply the requested information. He wanted them to furnish a "considered" military opinion on how and to what extent the location of an atomic energy plant in Britain would affect the security of the United States. "I would appreciate," he stated, "a joint War and Navy Department opinion as to whether the location of a large scale atomic energy plant in the United Kingdom would be advantageous, disadvantageous, or of limited effect on the security of the United States."⁶⁸

At the recommendation of the Chief of Naval Operations, this problem was referred to the JSSC for preparation of a reply. The JSSC found a number of reasons why the United States should not support the establishment of an atomic energy plant in the British Isles. Conceding that US assistance to strengthen the British economy was of prime importance in order that Britain might be strong enough militarily to assist the United States in a mutual stand against communism, the JSSC nevertheless advised against giving secret atomic information to the British. Among their reasons were: (1) it would be very unwise to project atomic energy installations so close to potential enemy territory where they might be captured easily in event of war; (2) until sufficient atomic bombs had been stockpiled to meet US security requirements and until US proposals for international control were accepted, far greater advantage would accrue to the US security position if the maximum quantities of the available world supply of atomic raw materials were furnished the United States for production of fissionable material; and (3) to furnish the British atomic secrets would broaden the possibility of leaks. The security record of certain British scientists on atomic energy matters was not without fault.⁶⁹

On 25 February, the JSSC recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff inform the Secretaries that they were "of the opinion that the location of a large-scale atomic energy plant in the United Kingdom would be disadvantageous to the security of the United States." They furnished a draft memorandum to the Secretaries.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted the JSSC reasoning but not its memorandum. In a shorter memorandum, apparently drafted at a luncheon meeting on 26 February by the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves, they informed the Secretaries there were two arguments against locating a large scale atomic energy plant in Great Britain; (1) it would locate such a plant, and presumably large stocks of useable material, closer to a potential enemy than would be the case if it were located, for example in Canada; and (2) its construction would probably divert from US manufacturing capacity a large amount of raw material which should be used in producing US atomic weapons. "The point of overriding importance, however," the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded "is that all available ore be turned into useable fissionable material available to the United States or to potential allies in case of an emergency. Consequently, the disadvantages of having a plant constructed in Great Britain can be minimized by the earliest possible conversion

into a form useable for atomic weapons of those raw materials which are now accumulating in England."⁷⁰

Conclusions

Thus by mid-1947, in spite of a great deal of talk, no really effective measures to control the use of atomic energy had been taken internationally. The United States was still the sole possessor of an atomic capability. But it did not have enough atomic bombs to meet what was believed to be its military requirement. In briefing the President on this subject on 3 April, Mr. Lilienthal had told him that the present supply of bombs was very small. And of these few none had been assembled. During the war the highly technical operation of assembly had been taken care of by civilian teams which no longer existed. Military personnel were being trained to assemble bombs but they were not yet ready to do so. And while lip service was being given to the need for changes in military forces and strategies as a result of the appearance of the atomic bomb, no really definitive recommendations or first principles had been agreed to by planners.

Acquisition of Postwar Bases

The Origins of Postwar Base Planning

Central to any strategic planning for the defense of the United States and its allies in event of another world war was the establishment of a system of bases to support military operations. In a conventional situation, strategic plans would have been developed and approved and the bases to support these plans would have been identified prior to negotiations for their acquisition. Several factors, among them JCS failure to approve joint strategic plans and the rapidly changing international political scene, worked to prevent this conventional approach. Instead, the Joint Chiefs of Staff developed base requirements using a very broad strategic appreciation of what might be needed and, for political considerations, practicing the “art of the possible.”

Planning for postwar military base needs began while World War II was still in progress. In late November 1943, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, responding to a directive from President Roosevelt, drew up a list of air bases that the United States would need in the postwar period. The end of the war was nearly two years away, and it was not possible for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to forecast precisely all such air base requirements. For their purposes, they divided the postwar period into three major phases: (1) after defeat of Germany but prior to the defeat of Japan; (2) after hostilities had ended but before the United Nations Organization had formally established worldwide order; and (3) after worldwide order had been established under the United Nations Organization. “In general,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the President, “the requirements for bases during the third period must evolve from experience obtained during the second period and in the light of international developments.” They therefore proposed a system of bases for the first and second periods only. Maps showing the location and purpose of each base were given the President. Bases for the second period were proposed at 33 area sites in the Atlantic, Latin America, Canada, Greenland, and Iceland. In the Pacific Ocean and along the coastal region of Asia 39 area sites for bases were proposed.

The President approved the findings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, on 7 January 1944, sent the Secretary of State the study that they had presented him along with the listing of bases. He instructed Secretary Hull, "as a matter of high priority," to initiate negotiations with the appropriate governments to acquire permanent or long-term benefit of the bases, facilities, and rights required, "at the earliest possible moment."¹

Little positive accomplishment resulted from this initiative, however, owing to greater priorities involved with fighting the war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff developed no further overall study of the base problem during the remainder of the war in Europe, although they considered individual base problems as they arose.

The SWNCC discussed the problems of bases, however, and on 3 March 1945 agreed that the War and Navy Departments should be more closely involved with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in developing plans for postwar bases. It was agreed that a newly formed Air Coordinating Committee should be involved, since negotiations for commercial air rights abroad would "necessarily" bear a close relationship to US military base requirements. There had also been created an interdepartmental committee chaired by Mr. John D. Hickerson, the State Department representative, charged with preparing for negotiations for those bases that the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated were essential. The War and Navy representatives on this Committee acted in this regard on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff rather than of their own departments.²

The Original JCS Postwar Base Plan

In May 1945, the Chief of Staff US Army proposed that a new overall study of US requirements for postwar bases be undertaken in light of the existing situation. "This study," General Marshall stated, "should consider our needs to satisfy the following requirements: (1) bases required by conditions under which the United States will find itself at war with a major power or powers; and (2) bases required by the United States as a participant in a peace enforced by the major powers, possibly through participation in a world security organization."

General Marshall wanted this study to place the bases in the order of priority in which they were required. He wanted the "maxima and minima" of requirements to be obtained through negotiation for US bases set up on foreign territory. These should be reviewed to determine whether or not it might be better for the United States to try to acquire some of these territories. "The study," he said, "should investigate the military benefits, including economies, that might accrue to the Americas as a result of acquisition of European-owned territories within or adjacent to the Western Hemisphere. The desirability of trusteeships should be explored." On 24 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved General Marshall's recommendation that such a study be prepared by the JPS and submitted to them through the JSSC.³

While work on this study was in progress, the Secretary of the Joint Staff, Brigadier General A. G. McFarland, informed Admiral Leahy that "No authoritative

or tentative joint statement of the base requirements for the naval, air, or ground forces of the United States has been prepared. Moreover, there is no authoritative or tentative joint statement of national policy upon which base requirements may be determined." While the JCS study approved by President Roosevelt in early 1944 had been used as a guide in considering requirements for ground, naval, and air bases, the relationship of that study to ground and naval forces had never been clearly established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁴

A few days later, Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew addressed the Secretaries of War and Navy on the matter of postwar bases. On 7 July, Mr. Grew made reference to President Roosevelt's approval of the JCS study and the requirements that had been established thereby. He observed, however, that the signing of the UN Charter on 26 June and the conditions found in Germany by US occupation forces might have some effect upon postwar base requirements. He wondered whether, in the circumstances, the Joint Chiefs of Staff might consider it advisable "at this time to review their estimate of United States post-war base requirements."⁵

The Under Secretary's views were passed on to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On 21 July they asked SWNCC to inform the Department of State that an estimate of postwar base requirements was currently under preparation. "Any revisions of the November 1943 estimates will be communicated to State," they advised the SWNCC. And they suggested that negotiations for base rights already in progress continue.⁶

Apparently not taking into consideration the complexity and scope of the review of base requirements then underway in the JPS, the Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. Robert A. Lovett, complained to the Deputy Chief of Staff, US Army, at the slowness with which the study was proceeding. His main concern was that the lack of a JCS decision on this matter was hampering the work of the Department of State:

It is not possible for the State Department, of course, to negotiate for such rights until it knows exactly what is desired and for obvious reasons, our bargaining position deteriorates as time goes on. In the meantime, we are obliged to maintain control of many foreign bases which we may ultimately have no use for. This involves not only additional expenditures of manpower and money but also impairs the disposal value of such installations or equipment thereon that eventually may become excess and, in addition, is raising political difficulties in England, France, and elsewhere.⁷

Mr. Lovett notwithstanding, it was not until 27 September, that the JPS submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff their report on US requirements for military base areas and base rights in the postwar period, in which the JSSC had concurred. The system that was outlined in detail in the report had been judged adequate only if the following conditions pertained:

1. All Japanese Mandated Islands and Central Pacific Islands detached from Japan, including the Bonins and the Ryukyus, would be available, preferably through the assumption of full sovereignty, otherwise through trusteeship agreements designating these islands as strategic areas.

2. Military base rights and air transit privileges in South and Central America and Mexico would be obtained as required in implementation of the Act of Chapultepec.

3. Military base rights and air transit privileges required in Canada would be obtained in extension of present United States-Canadian agreements or under satisfactory substitutes therefor.

4. Bases additional to those shown would be available when needed by US forces for the discharge of their obligations to the United Nations Organization.⁸

The JPS report took into full consideration the strategic concept developed and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, the Planners presented no strategic plan to support the lists of bases that were the core of the report. They did, for purposes of priority, place each of the requested bases in a specific category as follows:

Primary Base Areas were those areas strategically located and adequately developed, that would comprise the foundation of the base system that was essential to the security of the United States, its possessions, the Western Hemisphere, and the Philippines. They were also needed for projection of military operations. The JPS recommended that the Panama Canal Zone, Hawaiian Islands, Mariana Islands, Philippine Islands, Southwestern Alaska-Aleutian area, Newfoundland, Puerto Rico-Virgin Islands, and Azores be included in this top category.⁹

Secondary Base Areas were those areas necessary to protect primary bases and to allow access to them. They would also allow projection of military operations by the United States. Within this second category, the JPS nominated the following: Fairbanks-Nome-Central and Western Alaska; Midway Island; Johnson Island; Wake Island; Marcus Island; Bonin-Volcano Islands; Ryukyu Islands; Truk Island; Kwajalein Island; Manus; American Samoa; Galapagos Islands; Canton Island; Bermuda; Iceland; Greenland; Cape Verde Islands; Ascension Island; Guantanamo, Cuba; Trinidad; airfields in the Republic of Panama; and the Natal-Recife area of Brazil.

Subsidiary Base Areas were areas required for increasing the flexibility of the system of primary and secondary bases, using either existing or limited future facilities, not necessarily operated at full capacity. This category comprised: Annette and Yakutat, Alaska; Yap-Ulithi; Eniwetok; Tarawa; Majuro; Palmyra; Palau; Formosa; Funafuti; Talara, Peru; Canary Islands; Georgetown, British Guiana; Belem, Brazil; St. Thomas; Antigua; St. Lucia; and Bahamas.

Minor Base Areas were defined as those at which few, if any, US operating personnel would normally be maintained. The base sites would not be developed but at these sites transient privileges and varying military rights were desired so that they would be available, if needed, to increase the flexibility of the overall base system. Twenty-three areas were listed in this category ranging from Central and South Pacific Islands, through locations in Alaska and Canada, South and Central America, and North Africa.

A second section of the JPS report contained a suggested letter to the Secretary of State and an appended list of bases and areas for which diplomatic negotiations would be required in order to obtain the necessary rights. Obviously,

base areas located on US territory or under prior control of the United States were not involved. The JPS had devised a second system of categories to be used in negotiating for bases not under US control, designating base areas as "essential," "required," or "desired" to indicate generally the suggested priority for negotiations. In each instance the JPS had indicated the type of usage for which the area was desired, the sovereignty of the area involved and the maximum and minimum rights desired. Lastly, the JPS had forwarded a suggested letter to the Air Coordinating Committee showing a list of base areas required for air purposes only.

After reading and analyzing the report by the JPS, General Marshall informed his fellow members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that there was a danger of misinterpretation as to the strategic significance conferred upon some of the base areas by virtue of the classification in which they were placed. He pointed out that for financial or political reasons, some of the places which were very important strategically might receive very little attention or see little, if any, US military activity during peacetime. This did not mean they were any less important strategically, and should certainly not influence US efforts to make arrangements for their use in an emergency. However, the nature and extent of development of some sites and the number of US personnel placed there during peacetime should be based on much further study. To this extent it should be agreed and understood that the present study had no significance in making these determinations. General Marshall, for these reasons, proposed emendation of the wording of the various classifications since the present wordings might prove too restrictive in some cases. He noted that the importance of some of the sites was not a direct guide to the desirable expenditures or the active use to which the site was to be put in peace or war. "It is not unlikely," the Chief of Staff stated, "that the assurance of denial of some areas to a possible opponent will fulfill our initial strategic requirement in that area."

General Marshall also proposed adding a paragraph that would encourage the State Department to consider seriously making arrangements by which certain other nations would maintain required installations in some areas in return for some form of payment by the United States. This, he believed, would be one practical way around the political complications in keeping US troops on foreign soil and would perhaps cut the costs in money and manpower to the United States.

Admiral Leahy limited his comments to the JCS remarks on the Japanese Mandated Islands. He believed that these islands should be brought under exclusive US strategic control, but thought that the report should not attempt to specify how this would be done.¹⁰

The relative importance of some of the bases on the JPS list raised differences among the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral King wanted the Azores downgraded from a Primary Base Area to a Secondary Base Area. General Marshall, on the other hand, insisted that the Azores was sufficiently important to rank as a Primary Area. With respect to negotiations for Formosa and Rabaul, however, he recommended lowering both from the "required" category to the "desired" category. General Arnold, with a view toward enhancing the role of air power,

insisted that Iceland, Greenland, and the Ryukyus be elevated to the status of Primary Base Areas; Dakar should be raised from "required" to "essential" for negotiating purposes. He opposed lowering Formosa from "required" to "desired" and, at the same time, insisted that the Azores remain a Primary Base Area. "I consider that we should keep the strategic concept clearly before us. . . ." General Arnold stated. "We must be in a position to deliver damaging counter-blows, possibly within a matter of 24 hours, to any source of influence controlling aggression against us and, at the same time, we must have adequate forward bases for warning and interception of initial enemy assaults."¹¹

Admiral King, on 19 October, agreed to place the Ryukyus in the Primary category. His criteria for Primary Base Area were that the area form the foundation of the base system; that it be under US sovereignty or exclusively under US strategic control; that it be adequately defended or capable of immediate defense; and that it be physically adequate to the mounting and support of a sizable task force, either land, sea, or air, or a combination thereof. While the Ryukyus qualified under these criteria, Greenland did not. Iceland and Dakar occupied particularly strategic locations for offensive air operations. Nevertheless, Admiral King did not favor granting them Primary status, because such a move would do nothing to enhance their real value and could possibly have unfavorable results politically, particularly abroad.¹²

On 23 October 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reached agreement on a revision of the JPS report, which they approved as JCS 570/40. As suggested by General Marshall, the definitions of the four categories were changed to reflect more accurately the meanings desired. These were:

a. Primary Base Areas: strategically located, comprising the foundation of a base system essential to the security of the United States, its possessions, the Western Hemisphere, and the Philippines and for the projection of military operations.

b. Secondary Base Areas: essential for the protection of and/or for access to primary bases, and for the projection of military operations;

c. Subsidiary Base Areas: required for increasing the flexibility of the system of primary and secondary bases.

d. Minor Base Areas: sites at which transit privileges and varying military rights are required, if not already obtained, in order to ensure availability as required further to increase flexibility of the base system.

The Azores remained as a Primary Base Area. The Ryukyus and Iceland had been added to the Primary list.¹³

The prime rationale underlying the JCS analysis of the base requirements to support strategic war plans that had not yet been agreed upon was, as expressed in JCS 1518, that the United States must be capable of applying armed force at a distance. This called for a widespread system of bases beyond which lay "the United States strategic frontier." From this frontier overt hostile acts might be countered by the threat of force or by effective use of force. Within this frontier, the US military predominance must be kept inviolate.

To support this strategy the United States must establish a base system that would allow rapid development in any direction and permit adequate and

immediate logistic support. The base system must be sufficiently strong and deep to keep an enemy from entering vital areas. It must provide enough bases to permit adequate dispersion and alternate locations as well as rapid expansion.

The JPS had taken into full account the World War II experience and, more importantly, the capabilities of weapons already in existence or being developed. "In future wars," they pointed out, "devastating attacks by air, sea, or by long-range missiles may be launched from great distances." Since the United Nations would be ineffective in preventing a world war if relationships between any two of the great powers broke down, "The only course of action which can be counted upon to achieve a favorable decision will comprise timely offensive action directed at the source of the enemy's ability and will to continue hostilities." While it was granted that it might be "some years" before such a base system would be needed to strike back at a potential enemy, once a threat materialized it would be too late to establish an optimum base system. Too, it could by then be politically infeasible to gain access to bases under another nation's control or sovereignty. The best time for securing the necessary base rights was now.¹⁴

On 25 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded to the SWNCC a draft memorandum for the Secretary of State containing a list of those bases and base sites for which diplomatic negotiations in the near future would be required. In deference, apparently, to Under Secretary of State Grew, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated they had completed their examination of requirements for bases and base rights in response to his suggestion of 7 July. Because of the political complications and difficulties of keeping US personnel and installations in a foreign nation's territory during peacetime and not less because of the expense in men and money, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that they "believed" that the State Department should seriously consider arrangements where in foreign nations would maintain certain required installations and be reimbursed by the United States.¹⁵

There were a number of important bases and base areas on territory not belonging to the United States that were not on this list. Some were omitted because no special negotiations would be needed to obtain their use. The bases that were under lease to the United States by the United Kingdom in exchange for the transfer of US destroyers were in this category as were bases in the Philippine Islands for which current US-Philippine agreements would suffice. Control over others should be obtained by separate action. The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered that all Japanese Mandated Islands, as well as the Central Pacific Islands detached from Japan during World War II, should be brought "under exclusive United States strategic control." Rights in South America, involving numerous airfields, would undoubtedly be obtained in implementing the Act of Chapultepec and the joint US-Brazil Agreement. (See Chapter 8.) The Joint Chiefs of Staff also assumed that the military base rights and air transit privileges that would be needed in Canada would be obtained in extension of US-Canadian agreements or through some "satisfactory substitute." (See Chapter 8.)

As justification for their requirements, the Joint Chiefs of Staff underscored the importance of a system of bases, saying:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the comprehensive base system which will result from obtaining the desired rights is not only an inescapable requirement for United States security in the event of a failure of the United Nations Organization to preserve world peace but that the provision of this system of bases will contribute materially to the effectiveness of that organization in maintaining peace throughout the world.

They then formally requested the Department of State to try to obtain base rights in 9 "essential" and 25 "required" base areas. They described Iceland, Greenland, and the Azores as "essential," but relegated Dakar and Formosa to the lesser "required" category. The JCS requirements were stated as:

1. *Essential:*

Galapagos Islands	Panama Republic	Azores Islands
Admiralty Islands (Manus)	Canton Islands	Cape Verde Islands
Iceland	Greenland	Ascension Islands

2. *Required* (if reasonably obtainable by negotiation, but not absolutely essential to the base system):

a. In North America: Edmonton-White Horse route to Alaska; Fort Chimo-Frobisher Bay route to Greenland; Goose Bay (Labrador).

b. In South America: Salinas (Ecuador); Talara (Peru); Batista Field and St. Julian-LaFe (Cuba); Curacao and Surinam (Dutch Guiana).

c. In the Pacific Ocean: Clipperton Island; Christmas Island; Upolu Island (Samoa); Bora Bora (Tuamotu Island); Funafuti (Ellice Island); Viti Levu (Fiji Islands); Tarawa (Gilbert Islands); Espiritu Santo (New Hebrides); Noumea (New Caledonia); Guadalcanal-Tulagi (Solomon Islands); Biak (New Guinea); and Morotai (Indonesia).

d. In Africa: Canary Islands; Casablanca-Port Lyautey (Morocco); Dakar (Senegal); and Monrovia (Liberia).¹⁶

In order to supplement the system, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also sought far-flung rights of transit and technical stop at locations not covered in their basic paper on bases, JCS 570/40. These they defined as "the long-term right to operate military aircraft into, over, and away from a designated territory, and to land at one or more specific airfields or seaplane landing areas therein to refuel, effect repairs, or avoid unfavorable weather conditions, without restrictions except as mutually agreed. . . ." They also thought that the United States should receive the right to install and operate necessary communications, navigation and weather reporting facilities. These rights would (1) supply internal flexibility within the base system, (2) provide major alternative routes from one part of the system to another, and (3) facilitate US military action beyond the limits of the base system. For example, a North Africa-Middle East-India-Indochina route would permit movement from the eastern to the western flank of the base system without passing through the Western Hemisphere. There were further benefits: additional sites might more easily be gained at a later time; air crews would become familiar with operating conditions; and superior surveillance, communications and liaison facilities could be maintained. Accordingly, in February 1946, the Joint Chiefs

of Staff asked the State Department to negotiate for transit rights at sites within the following countries:

1. Western Hemisphere Routes: Mexico-Nicaragua-Guatemala-French Guiana; and Mexico-Marquesas and Cook Islands.
2. Eastern Hemisphere Route: Algeria-Libya-Egypt-Saudi Arabia-India-Burma-Thailand-Indochina.¹⁷

Retention of Certain World War II Bases

During World War II, the United States had stationed military forces and had built and maintained military installations on the soil of many sovereign nations. These arrangements had been necessary to the prosecution of the war and had been formalized in various agreements worked out between the United States and the nations in question. In nearly every case there was some provision in the agreement for the withdrawal of US forces at a specified time after the hostilities had ended. These provisions ranged from "immediately on conclusion of hostilities" to "one year after the date of the peace treaty." While the United States had not yet established a date for the end of the war, most nations looked on the date of acceptance of Japan's surrender, 2 September 1945, as the date. By the spring of 1946 it had become evident that many nations were expecting the United States shortly to withdraw its forces from their soil and to turn installations over to them in accord with wartime agreements.¹⁸

Because of this the Joint Staff Planners, on their own initiative, developed a report on the problem in order that the Joint Chiefs of Staff might notify the Secretaries of War, Navy, and State of the military considerations at issue and petition advice as to what the US governmental policy toward such withdrawals would be. The Department of State was the US agency responsible for negotiation of these matters. The policy in regard to withdrawal of US forces would have to be decided on a governmental level and must take into consideration all aspects, particularly including the military considerations which the JPS set forth.

On 9 April 1946, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the JPS report. On the following day, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a memorandum to SWNCC setting forth their views. They acknowledged the moral responsibility to abide by agreements insofar as withdrawal of forces was concerned. Both the Army and the Navy were already withdrawing large numbers of men from overseas bases where no further military need existed.

There were locations, however, on the territory of various foreign nations where withdrawal or giving up facilities would work to the disadvantage of the United States.

In order to discharge its occupation responsibilities, the United States would need to keep air bases and ports on the lines of communication to Japan and Germany. Some US forces must be stationed at intermediary points on these lines of communication (LOCs) as a military necessity. With respect to the US long-term

requirements for base rights set forth in JCS 570/40, to withdraw US forces from "essential" or "required" bases would weaken US security and endanger obtaining long-term base rights at those locations. Lastly, with respect to the negotiations for long-term US military rights for air transit and technical stop for military aircraft the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that US personnel responsible for weather reporting, navigational aids and communications should be left on location until the local governments or commercial interests were prepared to replace them with qualified personnel.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff then recommended that prior to the agreed dates for withdrawal, the Secretary of State complete, where practicable, negotiations for long-term rights. If long-term rights could not be negotiated before the expiration of present agreements, the Secretary of State should conclude interim arrangements for US forces to remain at those locations required to support occupational forces, or where the continued presence of US troops was needed to further negotiations for long-term military rights. Where no long-term rights were indicated, but where there was a need to support occupational forces, they asked that the Secretary of State conclude short-term arrangements for the maintenance of US troops. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also wanted the Secretary of State to furnish the Secretaries of War and Navy a list of those locations from which US forces could be withdrawn at any time without adversely affecting negotiations for long-term rights.¹⁹

Base Requirements Are Scaled Down

In March 1946, Admiral Nimitz had asked his JCS colleagues to reassess base requirements where negotiations would be needed. In his view the JCS base requirements were excessive, and the rationale in support of them failed to establish sufficiently the order of importance. As a result, diplomatic efforts at negotiation could not be properly apportioned. Among French possessions, for example, Casablanca would be far more valuable than Dakar. In the South Pacific, anchorage and air transit rights in Espiritu Santo and New Caledonia should suffice to protect the lines of communication with Australia and Indonesia. Also, since the need for an alternate air route appeared remote, he saw no need for rights in Clipperton Island and Bora Bora. On 22 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the JPS to review JCS 570/40 and related papers in order to reduce stated requirements for military rights to "the absolute minimum."²⁰

On 15 May 1946, the JPS presented a report, concurred in by the JSSC, that was a critical review of the previous paper on base requirements. As in the earlier document, the strategic concept set forth in JCS 1518 had been used as a basic guide. But the JPS now stressed the feasibility of attaining its goals in view of the growing desire among the many nations involved to reassert their sovereignty and to remove foreign soldiers from their soil. This meant that the United States was going to have an increasingly difficult time acquiring military rights. Carried to its logical conclusion, this pointed to a policy of asking only for those military

rights and bases that were absolutely essential to US security. As a result, and because the United States really did not need "exclusive" rights, the JPS recommended eliminating the term which, in fact, implied that some degree of sovereignty or extra-territoriality was a military requirement.²¹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the report of the JPS and on 4 June requested the SWNCC to inform the Secretary of State of its recommendations. They pointed out that while their earlier memorandum had used the term "base" to identify those areas where military rights were desired, this did not mean that the US wanted necessarily to garrison these areas or to station planes or ships in foreign territory in peacetime or even in wartime. Whether or not the United States exercised these "rights" would depend upon such factors as current strategic concepts, new weapons, the international situation, and the resources available to the armed forces of the United States.

With regard to actual base requirements, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said they now found they could reduce their list to 30 locations. This figure, arrived at by eliminating a number of locations in the South Pacific, the Caribbean and Africa, included only six that were essential: Iceland, Greenland, the Azores, Casablanca-Port Lyautey (or in lieu of this area, the Canary Islands), the Galapagos Islands, and Panamanian airfields. Of these locations, Iceland, Greenland, and the Azores were listed as of "primary importance."

The remaining 24 locations, while not absolutely essential to the base system, were "required if reasonably obtainable." Three of these were in dispute, with the United States and Great Britain both claiming sovereignty over them. These islands were Canton, Christmas and Funafuti. Aside from these, the Joint Chiefs of Staff grouped the "required" areas in order of importance as follows: Group I—the Admiralty Islands (Manus), Ascension Island, Dakar (or Cape Verde Islands if rights at Dakar unobtainable), and Goose Bay; Group II—Monrovia, Surinam, Curacao-Aruba, Batista Field in Cuba, St. Julian-LaFe, Talara, and Salinas; Group III—Viti Levu, Guadalcanal-Tulagi, Tarawa, Upolu, Espiritu Santo, Biak-Woendi, Morotai, and New Caledonia. The foreign nations with which the United States must negotiate for the area rights outlined above were: Australia, Great Britain, France, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Denmark, Ecuador, the Netherlands, Peru, Cuba, Liberia, and Newfoundland.

The entire requirements list remained predicated on the same assumptions as before: base rights in the Philippines would be as required by the United States; rights in Canada would result from agreements under the Joint Canadian-US Basic Defense Plan; rights in Mexico, and Central and South America would be obtained as required in implementation of the Act of Chapultepec; the United States would have strategic control over all Japanese Mandated Islands and Central Pacific Islands detached from Japan, including the Bonins and the Ryukyus.²² The SWNCC approved the JCS request by informal action on 14 June. Soon afterward, the Joint Chiefs of Staff withdrew their request for transit rights in the Marquesas and Cook Islands, saying that the need for a complete air route through the eastern portion of the South Pacific now seemed very remote.²³

Former Japanese Mandates

The system of required bases and base rights that had been proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in JCS 570/40 had as a keystone an assumption that "All Japanese Mandated Islands detached from Japan, including the Bonins and the Ryukyus will be brought under exclusive United States strategic control." Originally, this "strategic control" had been qualified by the JPS with the statement "preferably through the assumption of full sovereignty, otherwise through trusteeship arrangements designating these islands as strategic areas." Because of objections by Admiral Leahy, however, these qualifying words had been stricken and had not appeared in the final paper approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.²⁴

The Japanese Mandates had originated in 1919 with the Treaty of Versailles by which Germany renounced rights and titles over all her overseas possessions in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Subsequently, the League of Nations Covenant provided that the tutelage of the peoples in these possessions would be exercised by advanced nations as Mandatories on behalf of the League; the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, including the United States, agreed to grant Japan a mandate for Germany's former islands north of the equator. The Council of the League of Nations confirmed a mandate charter to Japan on 17 December 1920. The United States, on 11 February 1922, recognized Japan as Mandatory subject to specified conditions.²⁵

The Mandated Islands numbered in the hundreds. Their total land area was only about 850 square miles, but they stretched over a vast area of the Pacific Ocean. In the hands of a hostile power in the postwar era, air and naval bases on the islands could be a serious threat to the security of the United States position in the Pacific.²⁶

Revealing their viewpoint on the Mandated Islands, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had stated in January 1944:

As evidenced in the present war, the Japanese Mandated Islands bear a vital relation to the defense of the United States. Their assured possession and control by the U.S. are essential to our security. The Japanese Mandated Islands should be placed under the sole sovereignty of the U.S. Their conquest is being effected by the forces of the United States and there appears to be no valid reason why their future status should be the subject of discussion with any other nation.²⁷

However, the desire of the major wartime allies to create an international organization for maintaining peace and security made the disposition of these Japanese territories a subject for international discussion. US proposals for a United Nations, given to US, British, and Chinese representatives on 18 July 1944, included a provision for establishing trusteeship over territory taken from present enemy states and former League of Nations Mandates.²⁸

The Joint Chiefs of Staff feared that premature discussion of postwar territorial dispositions might dissuade the Soviet Union from entering the war against Japan. On 3 August 1944, they accordingly advised the Secretary of State that: "From the military point of view, it is highly desirable that discussions concerning . . . territorial trusteeships and territorial settlements, particularly as

they may adversely affect our relations with Russia, be delayed until after the defeat of Japan.²⁹

In accordance with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the question of trusteeships was not included in the agenda for the Dumbarton Oaks conversations on the proposed United Nations. However, delegates of other nations raised the subject, asking why it had not been included, and proposing an exchange of views. In these circumstances, the Secretary of State, realizing that trusteeships would have to be discussed at the general conference called to draft a charter for the United Nations, sent letters to the Secretaries of War and Navy inviting them and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to participate in preparing for it.³⁰

The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied that they had no objection to the proposed discussion of international trusteeships so long as: (1) full consideration was given to the defense needs of the United States; (2) there was no discussion of the disposition of territory under the sovereignty of the United States, or of any Japanese territory occupied by US forces; and (3) no agreement would be considered that would eventually grant to any foreign power claim to any control of the Japanese Mandated Islands north of the equator.³¹

At the Yalta Conference, on 11 February 1945, the five nations that were to have permanent seats in the Security Council of the United Nations agreed that they would consult prior to the forthcoming United Nations Conference in San Francisco on providing machinery in the Charter for dealing with territorial trusteeships that would apply only to: (1) existing mandates of the League of Nations; (2) territory taken away from the enemy through this war; and (3) any other territory voluntarily placed under trusteeship. These nations further agreed that there would be no discussion of specific trusteeships during the United Nations Conference or before. At the conference only machinery and principles of trusteeship would be developed. Later discussions would be held to determine which territories would actually be placed under trusteeship.³²

Preparation of a US position for the United Nations Conference began shortly thereafter by representatives of the State, War, Navy, and Interior Departments. Completion of this position was delayed, however, by disagreements among the participating departments. By 9 April, they had reached such an impasse that the Secretary of State presented the situation to President Roosevelt, saying "no position can or should be taken until the Secretaries of State, War and Navy have thrashed this matter out with you in your presence. . . ."³³

Secretary Stettinius explained to President Roosevelt that the Secretaries of War and Navy, agreeing with the JCS views, wanted the United States to retain complete control over certain strategic areas in the Pacific. They further wanted the United States to make this fact "unequivocally" clear to other nations before any discussions of the matter with those nations. The Departments of State and Interior, while agreeing that strategic positions should be retained, strongly favored trusteeship for Japanese Mandated Islands on the basis of agreements on a US plan to be negotiated with the Principal Allies and Associated Powers of World War I in whom title had been vested by the Treaty of Versailles. These powers were the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. The last two powers had forfeited their rights as a result of the present war, leaving only

three nations concerned with the Pacific Islands in question. The Department of State felt that the United States could reach agreement with Great Britain and France on its trusteeship plan, which would give the United States adequate control over these islands.

The President, who was on holiday at Warm Springs, Georgia, replied to the Secretary of State in a message sent from Warm Springs on 10 April: "Your message on International Trusteeship is approved in principle. I will see your representative and that of the Army and Navy on the 19th. That will be time enough." President Roosevelt's death on 12 April prevented this meeting and left the question of trusteeship for resolution by his successor.³⁴

The Secretary of State lost no time, following the accession of the new President, in briefing him on the trusteeship problem. In a memorandum to President Truman on 13 April, Mr. Stettinius sketched the background and asked him to meet with himself, Secretaries Stimson, Forrestal, and possibly Secretary of the Interior Ickes to discuss trusteeship "at the earliest possible opportunity." He did not take a position for or against the military view.³⁵

At a meeting of the US delegation to the San Francisco Conference, held in Washington, DC, prior to the conference, the trusteeship issue was discussed at length by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy and their principal assistants. As a result, the three Departments agreed upon a policy directive for the Delegation that was in effect a United States policy on trusteeship. The Secretaries presented it to President Truman on 18 April 1945, asking that he approve it. The recommended policy read in part:

The United States Government considers that it would be entirely practicable to devise a trusteeship system which would apply only to such territories in the following categories as may, by trusteeship arrangements, be placed thereunder, namely: (a) territories now held under mandate; (b) territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of this war; and (c) territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration. It shall be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which of the specific territories within the foregoing categories shall be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.

The system would provide, by agreements, for (1) the maintenance of United States military and strategic rights, (2) such control as will be necessary to assure general peace and security in the Pacific Ocean area as well as elsewhere in the world, and (3) the advancement of the social, economic, and political welfare of the inhabitants of the dependent territories.³⁶

President Truman approved this directive upon receiving it. In his memoirs the President explained his reasons for approving it. He pointed out that the State Department and the Military Departments differed on the question of trusteeship. "I sustained the Army and Navy Chiefs on the major issue of the security of the bases," he recalled. "But I also saw the validity of the ideal for which the State Department was contending—that the United Nations should not be barred from the local territories beyond the bases. . . . The United States, he continued, "would never emulate the policy of Japan in the areas that were given

her under mandate by the League of Nations. . . . My attitude was always that while it was necessary for us to control certain islands in the Pacific until peace was established, these territories should not be closed to the rest of the world."³⁷

On 26 June 1945, the Charter of the United Nations was signed by representatives of 50 nations at the San Francisco Conference. The United States ratified the Charter on 8 August 1945. With regard to trusteeship, the Charter stated that such territories as the Japanese Mandated Islands would be placed under a UN trusteeship with "one or more states, or the Organization itself" acting as the administering authority. Certain trusteeships, however, were to be designated as "strategic areas" and administered under special agreements approved by the Security Council.³⁸

It was obvious that the United States intended to work within the aegis of the United Nations in the matter of the Mandated Islands. The exact direction of the US initiative, however, was not apparent, in spite of the President's approval of a policy.

Statements by President Truman served to obscure rather than clarify the US position on the Japanese Mandated Islands. In his Navy Day speech on 27 October 1945, the President had stated, "We have assured the world time and time again . . . that we do not seek for ourselves one inch of territory in any place in the world. Outside of the right to establish necessary bases for our own protection, we look for nothing which belongs to any other power." Again, at a press conference on 15 January 1946, the President stated that the United States would insist that it be sole trustee of enemy Pacific Islands conquered by US forces and considered vital to US security. Other former enemy islands now held by the United States but not considered vital would be placed under United Nations Organization Trusteeship, to be ruled by a group of countries named by the United Nations.³⁹

Just prior to the opening of the United Nations General Assembly meeting, Secretary of State Byrnes, who was in London, cabled President Truman asking his permission to make a public statement, if necessary, to the effect that the United States considered that Japanese Mandated Islands should be placed under a UN trusteeship. The President approved making such a statement but only if it were absolutely necessary. The statement was never made.⁴⁰

The confusion over the US position on UN trusteeships was made evident in several ways. From London, Secretary of State Byrnes, after ascertaining through discussions with the Military Staff representatives that they had no firm military position, wired the Under Secretary of State on 16 January to ask the War and Navy Departments for their recommendations as to "strategic area trusteeships." The Assistant Secretary of the Navy noted on 17 January that newspaper articles from London indicated "uncertainty among United States representatives" as to what the US position on future status of the Pacific Islands should be. He suggested that the SWNCC meet on an urgent basis to determine the governmental position and what guidance should be given to US representatives in London.⁴¹

When this problem was presented to the JSSC, that Committee merely proposed a return to the wording proposed by the JPS in September 1945 that would have qualified strategic control as "preferably through the assumption of full

sovereignty, otherwise through trusteeship agreements designating these islands as strategic areas. . . ."⁴²

Admiral Nimitz, however, proposed, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved, a more precise statement of policy. On 22 January 1946 they informed the Secretary of State, through the SWNCC that: (1) it was essential to US national defense that the United States have strategic control of the Japanese Mandated Islands by assumption of full US sovereignty, and that the United States have strategic control of the Nansei Shoto, Nanpo Shoto, and Marcus Island through trusteeship agreements designating those islands as strategic areas; and (2) they assumed there would be no question of trusteeships raised or considered for Pacific islands that were under the sovereignty of the United States on 6 December 1941.⁴³

These views were furnished to Secretary Byrnes in London along with a caveat that President Truman wanted to avoid any public statement on the matter if it were possible. He desired to work out a plan whereby the US security interests would be adequately protected.

No decisions on the Japanese Mandated Islands were taken at the General Assembly meeting before the body went into recess from mid-February until late October 1946. The issue was still very much alive within the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however. On 24 May 1946, the JPS and the JSSC presented a new report on strategic areas and trusteeships in the Pacific to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Committees arrived at several conclusions, the thrust of which was that vital US security interests required retention by the United States of "exclusive and unlimited" strategic control of the Japanese Mandated Islands, Marcus Island, and parts of the Nansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto. With respect to the Mandated Islands, the United States must have "unlimited and exclusive sovereignty."⁴⁴

This report found its way into the hands of Assistant Secretary of War Howard C. Petersen, who found some of its rationale faulty and unconvincing. Mr. Petersen addressed a strong memorandum, in which the Secretary of War concurred, to General Eisenhower criticizing the findings of the Committee. Among the salient points that he made, Mr. Petersen cited "very strong reasons" why President Truman might feel compelled to apply the "trusteeship concept" rather than US sovereignty to the Japanese Mandated Islands. He stated:

The United States has repeatedly renounced any desire for territorial aggrandizement. Our representatives took the leading role in pressing for the inclusion of the trusteeship system in the United Nations Charter. . . . The attitude of the United States toward Pacific territories has a considerable bearing upon our over-all relations with the Soviet Union and the British Commonwealth of Nations. The facts that we are now in possession of the islands in question, that our [approval] will be essential to any trusteeship agreement (or amendment thereof), and that we exercise a veto power in the Security Council provide the basis for obtaining the freedom of action we would need within a trusteeship agreement.⁴⁵

Admiral Leahy, after seeing these comments, informed the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the decision by the President with respect to trusteeship for the Japanese Mandated Islands was a "political problem," beyond the

cognizance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Since this was so, the JSSC should give no further consideration to the matter. "It is my opinion," Admiral Leahy noted, "that the military considerations which are within the cognizance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are accurately stated in JCS 1619/1 and that political implications are a proper subject for consideration by the President, the Cabinet, the Department of State, and the Congress."⁴⁶

In spite of Admiral Leahy's urging, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not remain aloof from the problem for long. On 27 June, the Department of State passed to them for review and comment "from the military point of view" a proposed policy that would place the Japanese Mandated Islands and Marcus Island, the Bonin, Ryukyu, and Volcano Islands under the trusteeship system of the United Nations as soon as possible. The United States would be designated as administering authority.⁴⁷

The Joint Chiefs of Staff responded swiftly and forcefully to the Department of State proposal, with a memorandum to SWNCC asking that the Secretary of State inform the President of their views that vital US security interests called for permanent retention by the United States of "exclusive strategic control" of the Mandated Islands, Marcus Island, and of areas of Nansei Shoto-Nanpo Shoto. The United States should have exclusive sovereignty over the Mandated Islands. With respect to the others mentioned, only a trusteeship with the following provisions would prevent the impairment of the security of the United States and its possessions: (a) the United States must be the sole administering authority; (b) the whole trusteeship must be designated a "strategic area" as defined in the UN Charter; (c) there would be no limitation on use of the area for US security purposes; and (d) the United States could, if it desired, prevent any outside agency from inspecting areas under military use.⁴⁸

Secretary of State Byrnes forwarded the JCS views to the President. At the same time, he sent President Truman a State Department document containing an opinion that the Ryukyu Islands were minor islands that should be kept by Japan and demilitarized. This failure to appreciate the military value of the Ryukyus, particularly the main island of Okinawa, prompted the Joint Chiefs of Staff to address the President directly with a letter of protest. They advised President Truman that Okinawa was a "key base of primary importance." In a war with the USSR, Soviet forces would inevitably drive southward into Manchuria and North China. Apart from Japan, Okinawa was the only base from which US power could be projected into that region. "The area around the Yellow Sea," the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, "is the best, if not the only, hope for a bastion against Soviet progress to the southward which could within two decades extend to the Malay barrier by war or even by measures short of war." Under US control, the island offered "a springboard from which to exercise some stabilizing influence. . . ." In neutral or unfriendly hands, conversely, "it constitutes the open door to achieving or at least disputing control of the northwestern Pacific." The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted Okinawa and small adjacent islands to be placed under trusteeship and designated as a strategic area; the remainder of the Nanpo Shoto "might well be returned to Japanese sovereignty and demilitarized." At all events, they asked that action await a complete presentation to the President.⁴⁹

Subsequently, the SWNCC developed terms of a draft trusteeship agreement under which the United States would be designated as the administering authority, wielding "full powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction" and possessing the right to establish bases and station armed forces in the trust territories. Although these articles were drawn up for application to the Japanese mandates, they presumably could be adapted to any area. The JSSC found this draft acceptable and proposed that it be tested through an agreement embracing the Ryukyus alone. The JSSC found also, however, that there would very likely have to be negotiations and compromise which might jeopardize US security interests. Also, trusteeship was an untested, unproven mechanism by which to institute and ensure strategic control. The Acting Army Chief of Staff, General Thomas T. Handy, in General Eisenhower's absence criticized the JSSC proposed memorandum commenting on the SWNCC proposal. It was, in his view, inadequate in that it did not emphasize sufficiently the need for US exclusive and permanent control of the Japanese Mandates. Nor did it point out the great need for assurances that the terms of the draft agreement were the minimum that could be accepted and that any agreement signed would be permanent. General Spaatz seconded this position. Admiral Nimitz likewise concurred but again pressed his preference for full sovereignty so that the problem might be permanently settled, "The cost of lives, time, and treasure," he wrote, "paid by the United States in World War II to secure control of the Pacific Ocean is a direct measure of the vital need to establish and maintain unquestioned US control of this area." Admiral Leahy shared this attitude.⁵⁰

Since the Army-Navy split involved shading rather than substance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff readily reached common ground. On 18 October, they advised SWNCC:

From the military point of view, it is essential that the United States obtain exclusive and permanent control of the former Japanese Mandated Islands, Marcus Island, certain islands of the Nansei-Shoto area (including Okinawa) and certain islands of the Nanpo-Shoto area (including Iwo Jima). If such control through the untested, and thus uncertain, mechanism of trusteeship will be as adequate, effective and permanent as the terms of the draft agreement would seem to indicate, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that from a military point of view the draft as it stands would satisfy United States security interests.

Accordingly, they asked for assurances (1) that these terms would not be diluted and (2) that the permanency of US strategic control would not be reduced "either directly or indirectly by subsequent action."⁵¹

In a last effort to make sure that their superiors knew exactly where they stood with respect to the islands of the Pacific that they considered so essential to US security, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 21 October, forwarded to the President, and to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, a report containing a complete background on these island groups and their strategic significance. The conclusions of this report were as follows:

17. Exclusive and permanent control of the Nansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto would be desirable in order to insure our future security. However, such control attained under trusteeship is acceptable where populations and land areas are of consequence (Nansei Shoto) or where the security stake is not so vital (Nanpo Shoto) as in the Mandates.

18. The Japanese Mandated Islands are a distinct and indissoluble strategic entity. Their control in their entirety is necessary not only to afford sites for bases for our own use but also to enable us to deny the entire area to a potential enemy. As future economy of funds tends to prevent adequate maintenance of Pacific bases, the denial aspect will assume increasing importance.

19. The subject islands have a vital strategic relationship to the security of the United States as was fully shown in the last war. This relationship will be even more vital in the future in view of rapid advances in the science of aeronautics, the advent of new weapons, and the magnitude of the potential danger which would confront us with an East Asia, comprising one-half of the world's population, dominated by the Soviets.

20. Exclusive and permanent control of the Mandated Islands is essential both to our future security and to the avoidance of again having to make an otherwise needless sacrifice of American lives. There is no assurance at present that adequate control can be guaranteed indefinitely through the mechanism of trusteeship. There is nothing in the record of history that affords us sound ground for assuming that we can fully rely upon our maintenance of exclusive and permanent control of the Mandated Islands by any form of trusteeship.

21. Finally, from the military point of view, the Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot agree to, nor accept any responsibility for, a modification of their position in this matter that will, in their opinion, jeopardize the security of the United States. It should be noted, in this connection that throughout history the safe guarding of the national security has been the most fundamental political objective of the foreign policy of every state.⁵²

The President did not completely accept the JCS views on exclusive and permanent control of the Mandated Islands. In a statement issued on 6 November 1946, he declared, "The United States is prepared to place under trusteeship, with the United States as the administering authority, the Japanese Mandated Islands and any Japanese Islands for which it assumes responsibilities as a result of the Second World War." At the same time, the President transmitted to members of the UN Security Council the draft of an agreement for the Japanese Mandated Islands. This agreement was accepted by the United Nations and approved on 2 April 1947. It designated the islands as a "strategic area" under the trusteeship system established in the UN Charter. The United States was designated as the administering authority with full powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory, including authorization to: (1) establish naval, military, and air bases and to erect fortifications in the trust territory; (2) station and employ armed forces in the territory; and (3) make use of volunteer forces, facilities and assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the obligations towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the administering authority, as

well as for the local defense and the maintenance of law and order within the trust territory.⁵³

The Congress of the United States approved the Trusteeship Agreement and the President signed the joint resolution authorizing approval on 19 July 1947. The agreement took effect as of that date.⁵⁴

The United States did not achieve the complete sovereignty over the Japanese Mandated Islands that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had originally insisted was vital to its security. But the United States did acquire a degree of control over the islands that proved adequate to the needs of US defenses in the postwar years.

Planning and Acquisition of Philippine Bases

Although no detailed postwar strategic defense plans for the Pacific had been made, there was no question that one of the main requirements for US operations in the western Pacific would be bases and military rights in the Philippine Islands. This had been amply demonstrated only recently. As in the case of the Japanese Mandated Islands, the US statement of requirements for bases around the world had been developed on an assumption that ample bases and military rights would be available to the United States in the Philippines. This assumption came into some question during the postwar period. Anticipating the independence of the Philippine Islands, scheduled for the summer of 1946, President Truman and President Sergio Osmena of the Philippine Islands had, in May 1945, signed an agreement that stated in part, "The principle is agreed that the fullest and closest military cooperation will be observed between the U.S. and the Philippine Government and the military plans of the U.S. and the Philippine Governments will be closely integrated in order to insure the full and mutual protection of the U.S. and the Philippines." It could, on the basis of this agreement, have been anticipated that the United States would encounter little difficulty in procuring bases in the Philippines to support its strategic plans.⁵⁵

Following signing of this agreement, the War and Navy Departments each appointed boards of officers to survey the Philippines and recommend the military bases that the United States should have there. These reports were submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After studying the recommendations of the two boards, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the Secretary of State, through the SWNCC, a list of bases and facilities for which negotiations should be carried out with the Philippine Government.

Their request, dated 28 March 1946, asked that the Secretary of State negotiate with the Philippine Government to attain a US base system in the Philippine Islands comprising two infantry division bases, four major air bases, two navy bases, 17 satellite air fields, 13 sea coast defense sites, 20 radar and communications sites and miscellaneous small areas for ports, and depots.⁵⁶

Negotiations began in June 1946, shortly before the Philippines was granted complete independence by the United States on 4 July 1946. US negotiators presented a draft base agreement for consideration. Unfortunately, these negotia-

tions, between US Ambassador Paul McNutt and newly elected Philippine President Manuel Roxas, became the subject of considerable controversy when some of the US requirements became known to the Philippine public. Certain elements of the requests, particularly the presence of large numbers of American servicemen in the Manila area and the question of legal jurisdiction over these servicemen, aroused vociferous objections among the Philippine people.

Finally, in late November 1946, with no progress in sight, General Eisenhower informed the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the War Department was seriously concerned because of the prolonged and "potentially recriminatory" negotiations. As a result, the US Army had been considering withdrawal from the Philippines and had already modified its strategic concept for use of Philippine bases. Nevertheless, complete withdrawal was out of the question for both political and psychological reasons. United States-Philippine relations were important to the security of the entire area, and General Eisenhower wished to do what he could to keep these relations good. Base rights that did not entail the full cooperation of the Philippine people would have a very limited value. General Eisenhower proposed, because of the popular opposition to the presence of US forces, to withdraw all US Army forces from the Philippines "on a schedule which would permit an orderly closing out of the Army interests in that area." In reaching this decision, the War Department had taken into consideration the fact that the Philippine Government might want some US forces left behind for reasons of political and military security. If the Roxas government pressed the issue, the War Department was amenable to leaving a composite air group and a small ground force detachment in the Philippines.⁵⁷

Secretary of War Patterson informed the Secretary of State that he agreed fully with General Eisenhower's views and his plans for withdrawal of forces. The War Department could ill afford to spend the funds to build bases outside the Manila area as would be necessary if forces remained, owing to Philippine insistence that all US forces "be removed from the Manila area." "I also point out," Secretary Patterson told Secretary Byrnes, "that it is of prime importance that the War Department responsibilities should not be greater than our means in manpower and money. Our commitments in occupied areas, Japan and Germany, to say nothing of Korea, Austria and Italy are of a character that will take practically all of our resources at present and for the foreseeable future. These commitments are of predominant importance. We cannot afford, in my opinion, to waste our strength by maintenance of a force of any considerable size in the Philippines."⁵⁸

Admiral Nimitz informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, despite the Army's plans, the need for US naval forces to operate in the western Pacific would continue indefinitely. Mobile support of Navy operations might be feasible in war, but in peacetime the Navy needed dependable land bases in the Philippines. Reduce to a minimum, the Navy requirement was for the following: (1) a naval operating base at Subic Bay, Luzon; (2) a naval air station at Sangley Point, Luzon; (3) rights to use a base area at Leyte-Samar and the Tawi Tawi anchorage when needed; and (4) construction rights for naval air bases at Mactan and Appari. "It is my intention to inactivate and disestablish all other Naval bases in the Philippines," Admiral Nimitz informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁵⁹

On 4 December 1946, the Secretary of State forwarded General Eisenhower's memorandum to President Truman. This memorandum had been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and sent to Secretary Byrnes through the SWNCC, along with Admiral Nimitz's views.

President Truman authorized the withdrawal of all Army forces save one composite air group with a "very small" ground detachment. Soon afterward, the War Department suspended all permanent base construction. On 14 March 1947, the two governments concluded an agreement allowing the United States to lease Fort Stotsenberg, Camp John Hay, Clark Air Base, and Cavite and Subic Bay naval bases for a period of 99 years.⁶⁰

By the end of 1947, by virtue of the negotiated agreement with the Philippines and through acquisition of control over former Japanese islands, the United States had gained the right to maintain a network of bases in the central and western Pacific that would serve it well in the next two decades. Elsewhere the plans for bases proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not yet been fulfilled for various reasons. New conditions and altered requirements, unforeseen in 1947, were to change the base picture considerably. The emergence of NATO, the outbreak of the Korean War, and certainly technological breakthroughs, all had their effect on the military planning and base requirements of the United States in the years ahead. By 1951 the results of much difficult negotiation by the Department of State were mainly evident in agreements reached in that year with Canada (facilities in Newfoundland-Labrador), Portugal (facilities in the Azores), Denmark (defense of Greenland), and Taiwan (use of facilities).⁶¹

Defense of the Western Hemisphere

Defense of the continental United States was far more important to US security than defense of any other area of the world, no matter how strategic. Yet the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared no plans for a defensive war on the soil of the continental United States. Rather, they concentrated on the defense of the entire Western Hemisphere, comprising not only the United States but the sea approaches leading to its shores and those neighboring nations whose soil and air space provided corridors of approach and potential bases from which an enemy could launch attacks on the United States. It obviously behooved the United States to gain the cooperation and support of these nations to as great an extent as feasible. This involved negotiations and planning with Canada to the north and with the nations of Latin America to the south.

Chapultepec and Rio de Janeiro: Framework for Military Cooperation with Latin America

During World War II most Latin American countries had cooperated with the Allied Powers and had declared war on the Axis. The United States had stationed forces and missions in some of these nations and had been granted air and naval base privileges and transit rights by 16 of them. Brazil had sent forces to Europe, and Mexican air forces had been committed to the war against Japan when the war ended. The United States had entered into Lend-Lease agreements with 18 American Republics (all except Argentina and Panama). Of \$426 million authorized for these countries in weapons and materiel, about \$270 million worth had been delivered by the closing months of the war. In addition, a number of agencies had been established to foster military cooperation between the United States and Latin America: The Inter-American Defense Board; the Joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission; and the Joint Brazil-United States Defense Commission.¹

Nevertheless the diverse, politically unstable, and often unpredictable republics of Latin America were in no sense unified for a combined defense. At the beginning of World War II most of these countries had been depending upon European nations for their military advice and equipment. Many of their military leaders were, if not avowed Fascists, at least imbued with Fascist ideals. Despite the willingness of these nations, once the war began, to denounce their former associations, this orientation had made it difficult for them to work together with other more democratically inclined countries in defense of the Western Hemisphere. In a later analysis of this situation, an NSC study observed, "In World War II the United States was required to divert from the main offensive effort to the security of the Caribbean, Central and South American areas a force at one time totaling about 130,000 men with their equipment. Because of antiquated military methods, European military influences, lack of modern equipment and know-how, the Latin American countries, with only one major exception, were unable to make any contribution to western Hemisphere defense."²

The Joint Chiefs of Staff first commented on postwar US objectives in Latin America on 6 February 1945. They did so in response to a request from the Secretary of State for views on the subject for use in preparing an agenda for an upcoming conference of American nations in Mexico City.³

In their reply, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out the importance of arrangements for the common defense of the Western Hemisphere as part of a worldwide security system. They supported such a system, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, but nonetheless they wanted "the Inter-American defensive structure . . . preserved" within it. Then in the event the world security system proved ineffective or if it disintegrated, the security of the Hemisphere would still be provided for. ". . . It is to the interest not only of the United States but to the mutual interest of all the American republics," the Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained, "to adopt and maintain those military measures that are requisite to ensure their common defense." Noting the wartime military measures that were desirable and should be kept in effect, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also listed the military objectives that would be advantageous to the United States and all other American republics in the postwar period. They suggested that if possible the foundations to achieve these objectives could be profitably laid "now" and discussed in general terms at the forthcoming conference. These objectives were as follows: (1) standardization in organization, equipment, and training of the armed forces of the hemisphere; (2) maintenance and improvement of air and naval bases essential for hemisphere security; (3) reciprocal use of naval and air bases of strategic importance; and (4) US assistance in training armed forces of the other American republics.

Discussions of these military goals at the forthcoming Mexican conference should be aimed at reaching agreements on principles only. These should be discussed in a general manner, not applied to particular states. Because bilateral conversations at the military staff level were already being conducted by the United States with some of the Latin American countries, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended avoiding the particular subjects of these conversations at the conference. "Specifically," they stated, "discussions should avoid the extent to which

other American republics will be expected to contribute to hemisphere defense, and the character and amount of military equipment to be supplied to each by the United States.”

Concluding, the Joint Chiefs of Staff cautioned against discussing base rights in Latin America because in the light of the postwar international situation, it may be found advisable to seek additional rights.”⁴

The JCS letter was referred to an ad hoc committee of SWNCC charged with assisting the Department of State to prepare US positions for the upcoming conference. On 17 February, the Chairman of SWNCC advised the Secretary of State that, since the conferees did not plan to give formal attention to military details, the US delegates should refrain from discussing the JCS views with other delegates. He therefore forwarded the JCS letter to the Secretary of State with the recommendation that it be given the US delegates for their use.⁵

The “Inter-American Conference on Problems of Peace and War” met in Mexico City from 23 February through 8 March 1945. Its most significant accomplishment was the Act of Chapultepec (named for the meeting place, Chapultepec Castle), whose key provision stated:

Every attack of a State against the integrity or the inviolability of territory, or against the sovereignty or political independence of an American state, shall . . . be considered as an act of aggression against the other States which sign this declaration. In any case, invasion by armed forces of one State into the territory of another, trespassing boundaries established by treaty and demarcated in accordance therewith, shall constitute an act of aggression.

The Act pointedly recommended that the American Republics consider replacing it with a treaty that would state that threats of acts of aggression would be met with combined action by all or some of the signatories. The States would consult among themselves to determine what steps would be taken.⁶ The Conference also adopted a resolution recommending that the American Republics establish a permanent agency to foster cooperation among them in defending the Western Hemisphere. This new agency was to replace the InterAmerican Defense Board, which was to continue to operate until the new agency was created.⁷

At the UN conference in San Francisco the nations that had met at Mexico City agreed that a follow-up conference would be held at Rio de Janeiro to develop and consummate the treaty that was called for in the Act of Chapultepec. The Brazilian Government proposed a date of 20 October 1945 for the conference and this was tentatively agreed. At the staff level, US State Department action officers began developing proposals and positions to be presented at the conference.⁸ Some US governmental officials engaged in these preparations expressed the opinion that the United States should advocate limiting the Act of Chapultepec to the peaceful settlement of disputes. Lieutenant General Stanley D. Embick of the JSSC objected strongly to this view, telling the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 6 September 1945 that such limitation would “preclude the American Republics from taking any other collective action in this Hemisphere, even to the extent of the severance of diplomatic relations, until a dispute develops to the stage of an armed attack.” It would repudiate for no reason the Pan-American

defense structure. It would further impair the Monroe Doctrine and relinquish hemispheric autonomy. General Embick wanted the Joint Chiefs of Staff to inform the President and the Secretary of State of the "cardinal military implications" of this problem.⁹

General Marshall passed General Embick's views on to his fellow members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, telling them that he concurred with those views and recommending that they be passed to the Secretaries of War and Navy. Using as a basis a memorandum that General Embick had prepared for them, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Service Secretaries on 18 September of the cardinal importance of a full implementation of the Act of Chapultepec. They recommended that their views be transmitted to the President and the Secretary of State. "If the Pan-American structure is not to be employed in the enforced settlement of Hemisphere disputes," the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote, "and their settlement devolve solely upon the World Order, the door will be opened for demands by non-American nations for base privileges in Latin America to enable them to participate in enforcement measures." Too, recent developments in modern weapons had rendered the solidarity of the hemisphere and its united support of the Monroe Doctrine "far more essential" than before.¹⁰

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were also active in planning for the new inter-American military agency called for in Resolution IV of the Chapultepec Conference. On 6 November 1945, the Joint Army and Navy Advisory Board on the American Republics (JANABAR) submitted proposals to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the establishment of an "inter-American military agency" that would "provide machinery for reaching inter-American agreements as to the size of armed forces each of the American republics should maintain."¹¹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the SWNCC on 25 January 1946 that the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy approve the JANABAR report, amended by General Eisenhower's suggestion to limit delegates to not more than three from each country, "as a basis for negotiations with authorities of other American Republics for creation of an inter-American military agency, to provide the military staff component of the machinery requisite for the functioning of the American Republics as a regional agency in conformity with the United Nations Organization." They recommended further that the United States seek adoption of a resolution that would create such an agency at the conference in Rio de Janeiro.¹²

Prospects for an early convening of the Rio Conference, however, had suffered a severe setback because of action by Argentina. Openly sympathetic to the Axis cause, Argentina had not cooperated willingly with the allies during World War II. In addition, Argentina's Government was dictatorial and in many respects its policies were antithetical to those of other countries of the hemisphere. At the conclusion of the Mexico City conference, which Argentina had not attended, the other nations expressed regret at her absence. They approved a statement recognizing that Argentina was an integral part of the Union of American Republics and expressed the hope that Argentina might adhere to the declaration of the conference. On 14 March 1945, Argentina notified the other American states that it "adheres to the Final Act of the Conference." On 27 March 1945,

with the outcome of the war clearly in sight, Argentina reluctantly declared war against the Axis powers.¹³

In September, the Argentine Government, led by Colonel Juan Peron whom the American ambassador labeled "a Fascist-minded dictator," intensified a policy of repression against democratic elements in Argentina. These actions clearly violated the principles enunciated at Chapultepec, to which the Argentine Government had adhered on 14 March 1945. In addition, Colonel Peron, despite the Axis collapse and surrender, continued to give aid, comfort and refuge to Nazi elements. These actions were extremely distasteful to the United States as well as other American nations.¹⁴

On 30 September, owing to Argentinian actions, President Truman approved steps to postpone the Rio Conference. Explaining this action to other Latin American nations, United States spokesmen followed the line that the treaty provided for in the Act of Chapultepec could not logically be negotiated with the Argentine Government while it defied the principles set forth in that treaty regarding human rights.¹⁵

One of Argentina's neighbors, Uruguay, was particularly disturbed by Argentina's conduct and on 21 November circulated to the other American nations, including the United States, a long memorandum proposing a "multilateral pronouncement" that would in effect denounce Argentina. This initiative was received with varying degrees of coolness by the other nations. The United States, while favoring the Uruguayan view generally, did not subscribe to the pronouncement, which was never made.¹⁶

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not completely in accord with the national policy of opposition to the Peron Government of Argentina and prevention of the convening of the Rio Conference. In commenting to the SWNCC on a US foreign policy statement at the behest of the Department of State in February 1946, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that many Latin American nations did not share the Uruguayan view of Argentina. To continue to subscribe to that view could "jeopardize the early and successful negotiation of the treaty proposed by the Act of Chapultepec. . . . The full and free participation of Argentina in the Latin Security Organization, and the preservation of peace among the nations of South America," they continued, "are believed to be of sufficient importance to warrant the suggestion by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that our policy toward Argentina be directed in such a manner that the willing partnership of the Argentine people is both established and made capable of early and complete realization."

Reflecting their strong concern over the growing Soviet military threat and the lack of adequate means for defense of the Western Hemisphere, the Joint Chiefs of Staff called for more positive action to ensure a real military capability in Latin America. They warned that, "The ultimate security of the United States has become far more dependent than heretofore upon the maintenance of the strategic unity of the Western Hemisphere" because of Soviet domination of the Eurasian continent and the development of long-range aircraft and the atomic bomb. They pointed out that the Monroe Doctrine had grown out of the need for maintaining the military integrity of the Western Hemisphere toward a non-American power. It had been the US policy for over a century. But the need was

now far more impelling and the stakes much higher. "In brief," the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated, "the Western Hemisphere is a distinct military entity, the integrity of which is a fundamental postulate of our own security in the event of another World War."

Among the steps that the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered "essential" was the early accomplishment of a regional security pact with the Latin American nations. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed the United States should sponsor resolutions leading to the establishment of an Inter-American Military Agency, agreements for mutual use of military bases, particularly air bases, and agreements on the development of sources of critical strategic materials.

Bilateral staff conversations had already resulted in arrangements for joint action between the United States and certain Latin American nations. These arrangements, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted, should be reviewed by the Inter-American Military Agency, when and if established, so they might be incorporated into broader military agreements for continental defense.¹⁷

On 3 April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff addressed the SWNCC again on the need for building up an adequate hemispheric defense system. They said that, in view of the current unsettled world conditions, they considered that from the military point of view "it is of cardinal importance to the security of the United States . . . that complete unity with respect to the defense of the Western Hemisphere be achieved among the nations concerned at the earliest possible date. . . ." Toward this end they thereupon repeated recommendations they had made earlier for:

a. As a matter of prime importance, the conclusion of arrangements among all American Republics for the common defense of the Western Hemisphere.

b. Establishment of an inter-American military council.

c. Establishment of United States military and naval training missions.

d. Enactment of legislation authorizing the United States to enter into agreements with other American states to provide for the following with respect to those states: (1) transfer of United States military and naval equipment and supplies, including disposal of surpluses, consistent with the military and national interest of the United States; (2) instruction and training of selected military and naval personnel in service schools of the United States armed forces; (3) United States assistance in the repair, maintenance, and rehabilitation of military and naval equipment; and (4) United States technical assistance for improvement and establishment of military and naval facilities.

e. Conclusion of agreements referred to in *d.* above.¹⁸

All of these recommendations were eventually accepted and action taken to put them into effect. This did not occur immediately, however. It was more than a year later before the US Department of State announced that the United States was at last satisfied that Argentina had complied with the anti-Nazi provisions of the Act of Chapultepec, and that it was now willing to begin discussions regarding a defense pact. The necessary arrangements were carried out and on

15 August 1947 delegates from all Latin American nations, excepting Nicaragua which was not invited because of a change of government "under abnormal circumstances," met with US representatives at Quintadinha, Brazil, in Rio de Janeiro state. The conference lasted until 2 September 1947. The only purpose for the conference was "the preparation of an inter-American treaty of reciprocal assistance to give permanent form to the principles embodied in the Act of Chapultepec." Since this meant that the conference agenda could be limited to only one topic and because the many months of postponement had given plenty of opportunity for preparation, the work of the conference went well and the result was auspicious. At the conclusion of the conference all nations present signed an Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance as envisioned in the Act of Chapultepec.¹⁹

In presenting this treaty to President Truman for his approval in December 1947, with a view to his sending it to the US Senate for its advice and consent, Acting Secretary of State Lovett particularly noted the obligations set forth in Article 3 of the treaty. These echoed the Act of Chapultepec and foreshadowed the wording of the North Atlantic Treaty that was to be signed more than a year later by the western European nations and the United States. Article 3 stated:

1. The high Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. On the request of the State or States directly attacked and until the decision of the Organ of Consultation of the Inter-American System, each one of the Contracting Parties may determine the immediate measures which it may individually take in fulfillment of the obligation contained in the preceding paragraph and in accordance with the principle of continental solidarity. The Organ of Consultation shall meet without delay for the purpose of examining those measures and agreeing upon the measures of a collective character that should be taken.

Acting Secretary Lovett pointed out to the President that aside from the collective measures that might be agreed upon in consultation, each nation by signing the treaty had obligated itself to take some positive action to meet an armed attack. No longer was it merely a matter of the right to take action, it was an obligation. The provision for immediate assistance applied to all cases of armed attack against the territory of an American State, and this embraced the American continents and Greenland "adjacent waters and polar regions immediately to the north and south of the American continents." Regardless of where such an attack occurred in these regions the nations were obligated to consult immediately and to agree upon collective measures.

In deciding on what collective measures to take against an aggressor, the countries that had signed the treaty had agreed in advance to observe the decisions taken by a two-thirds majority. Only in the decision whether or not to participate in measures involving the use of armed force would the nation make an individual judgment. This meant that a small minority of the nations could not

paralyze the operation of the treaty. "There is every reason to believe," the Acting Secretary concluded, "that the treaty affords an adequate guarantee of the peace and security of this Hemisphere, thereby assuring so far as possible a necessary condition to the continued advancement of the economic, political, and social ideals of the peoples of the American States."²⁰

Military Assistance for Latin America

The Joint Chiefs of Staff first addressed the question of postwar military aid to Latin America on 23 April 1945 in response to a request from the SWNCC. That body had pointed out on 9 March that some Latin American countries had requested US help in building military and commercial airfields, some of them outside areas that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had selected for construction of military fields. The SWNCC therefore asked to be "advised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military viewpoint, of the degree of assistance that the United States should render the various countries not included in the areas already designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the *quid pro quo*, if any, which should be requested by the United States in return for such assistance."²¹

In reply to this query, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 23 April 1945, recommended to the Secretaries of War and Navy certain principles to be followed in dealing with the nations of Latin America in the matter of air fields. They sent their recommendations, asking that they be relayed to the Secretary of State. The Joint Chiefs of Staff explained that, "The extent of United States assistance to be furnished Latin American Republics in the construction of airfields and the benefits to be sought in return for such assistance will develop as a natural corollary of the combined planning envisaged for hemisphere defense and cannot wisely be independently determined on a unilateral basis." This did not mean, however, that the United States could not send material assistance through channels that already existed if it were considered advisable. Technical advisory assistance could be granted using the existing US missions or commissions. In return it would be advisable to consider any *quid pro quo* authorized only on receipt of specific requests for assistance. "The military benefit to be derived from development of commercial airfields will automatically accrue and, in view of the Act of Chapultepec, becomes of increased interest to the Joint Chiefs of Staff."²²

At the time Germany surrendered, ending the war in Europe, US policy in the matter of furnishing postwar military aid to the Latin American Republics was nebulous and unclear. Military supplies and training had been furnished them during the war but on a relatively low priority basis. The question became even more complicated when on 5 July 1945 President Truman signed a directive cutting off Lend-Lease for the Latin American countries. The only feasible means left by which the United States now could legally transfer military equipment to them was under the Surplus War Property Act, approved on 3 October 1944 as Public Law 457. On 16 July 1945 the Department of State suggested that this act be used pending passage by Congress of specific legislation.²³

In the meantime, at the military staff level, representatives of the United States and of several Latin American countries continued the bilateral discussions begun during the war, developing military requirements that might be fulfilled for these nations by the United States. These discussions had the effect of heightening the necessity for development of an overall policy governing provision of military aid. The State, War, and Navy Departments collaborated in June 1945 in the development of a statement of policy, setting forth US objectives, intentions, and principles relative to the furnishing of military aid to the nations of Latin America. This statement was examined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in early July, and they raised no objection to its adoption.²⁴

The statement was sent to the President at Potsdam. By memorandum dated 29 July 1945 he approved it and directed that Lend-Lease and general military policy relating to Latin America be handled in accordance therewith. "With the prospective conclusion of the present war," the statement of policy said, "it has been established as a matter of inter-American policy in the Act of Chapultepec that the American republics will hereafter engage in close military collaboration for the military defense of the Hemisphere against any threat that may arise in the future." On the basis of this policy, it was clear that the United States must "take measures to prevent such a situation as confronted it at the outset of this war again arising to hamper and jeopardize the common defense."

To this end, the military establishments of the American republics should be organized and equipped in accordance with common tables of organization and equipment. Training should be based on common military doctrine and military methods, and practices should follow common lines of procedure. The United States was clearly the leader in the Western Hemisphere. As such, it should act to persuade the other nations involved to agree to adopt US military doctrine, tactics, techniques, practices and equipment, and weapons. This could involve, in the long run, the sending of US military missions of trainers and advisers to Latin American nations. All nations in Latin America would plan jointly for hemisphere defense. The United States would furnish them weapons, ammunition, and equipment.

Political and economic considerations "affecting the broad foreign policy of the United States" would, of course, have to be taken into account in carrying out the specific policy toward Latin American military establishments. The general principles that could guide the United States in all aspects of this policy were:

(1) The cooperation of the United States will not be extended to any other American republic so as to provide it with a military establishment that is beyond its economic means to support.

(2) Training and equipment shall not be made available by the United States to the armed forces of any other American republics where there is good reason to believe that they may be used for aggression or in order to threaten aggression, against one of its neighboring American republics, thus prejudicing the primary objectives of inter-American unity.

(3) In accordance with the democratic principles that the United States represents and upholds throughout the world, and on which its moral credit is largely

based, every effort shall be made to insure that the training and equipment afforded by the United States to the armed forces of the other American republics shall not be used in order to deprive the peoples of the other American republics of their democratic rights and liberties.

It was clear that not only military policy but foreign policy were to be heavily involved in military aid to other American republics. Consequently, "... all plans shall be made and all measures in the carrying out of this program shall be taken with the approval of the War and Navy Departments in respect to defense policy, and with the approval of the Department of State in respect to foreign policy."

The desirability of enabling legislation was fully realized by the Departments and they agreed to seek it at the earliest possible date. The lack of such legislation should not be allowed to delay the program, however. To do so might lead some Latin American nations to accept military aid from other nations, "thus creating obstacles to the realization of the defense program envisaged by the United States." "It is agreed, the statement concluded, "that the State, War and Navy Departments will avail themselves so far as possible of the provisions of the Surplus War Property Act and other applicable laws in carrying out the policy and program herein outlined, pending the provision of specific legislation for that purpose."²⁵

The first comprehensive plan for furnishing military aid to Latin America was produced by JANABAR, which referred it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 15 September 1945. The plan was based on an analysis of the results of the exploratory bilateral staff conversations between the United States and Latin American countries.²⁶ After studying the results, JANABAR informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that these results indicated that all countries concerned had agreed in principle to the following:

- a. To organize and equip their armed forces according to US methods and standards.
- b. To adopt US training principles and methods.
- c. To accept US military and naval missions concurrently with or prior to receipt of initial equipment.
- d. To exchange equipment of foreign manufacture for US equipment.
- e. To send officer and enlisted students to US service schools.

JANABAR then presented plans for the armed forces of each nation with whom conversations had been held. These plans included the size of the armed establishment, the proposed military budgets and the equipment that should be furnished over a period of years.

The JSSC, after studying the report and its plan, recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff forward it to the Secretaries of War and Navy with a proposal that it be approved and forwarded to the Secretary of State.²⁷

The Chief of Naval Operations took exception to the JANABAR recommendations. He was not convinced that approval would be in the best interests of the United States. He noted, for example, that the naval vessels being recommended for transfer to Latin American nations were "more appropriate for offense than for defense." They would be more likely to cause friction between nations than to promote hemisphere defense. He also felt that the air and ground forces recommended by JANABAR should be scrutinized closely. The proposals in general would give the United States almost complete control over the military forces of other American Republics. Nor was Admiral King convinced that the nations concerned could support the forces that were being recommended for them. Lastly, he was suspicious that too much weight was being given the argument that Latin American nations would obtain weapons from other sources if not from the United States. "... We should not," he argued, "be pushed into sponsoring unsound armed expansion by threats to deal in other munitions markets."²⁸

General Marshall brushed aside Admiral King's main objections by pointing out that the general military policy for collaboration between the United States and its southern neighbors had been established by the President in approving SWNCC 4/10. This meant that the Department of State would assure that no shipment of military equipment would strain the national economy of the country concerned. "As the equipment will be delivered over a long period of time," he noted, "there will be ample opportunity to review the situation at intervals to determine whether any further shipments are economically justified."

Since negotiations had already been concluded, any more delay in putting the agreed portions into effect could jeopardize the whole program for military collaboration. General Marshall wanted to proceed immediately with all but the Navy program to which Admiral King objected. He proposed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff so recommend to the Secretaries of War and Navy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with him and on 19 November forwarded a memorandum to the Secretaries to that effect.²⁹

On 20 November, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, sitting as the Committee of Three, agreed to refer the entire matter of military aid to Latin America to SWNCC for further study. Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, although he had been a party to this decision, had serious reservations about it, which he communicated to the Secretary of State on 7 December 1945. Mr. Patterson pointed out that the other countries were losing faith in US promises, and this was entirely owing to footdragging on the part of the State Department. "All preparatory steps necessary to carry out the program approved by the President in SWNCC 4/10 have been taken by the War Department," Secretary Patterson reminded Secretary Byrnes. By letters of 4 September and 30 October 1945 to the State Department, the War Department had proposed small interim allocations of equipment to be disposed of to Latin American countries under surplus property procedures. No reply had been received from the State Department to either of these communications. Further, the Latin American Subcommittee of SWNCC had prepared a draft of a proposed law that could facilitate the program. State Department personnel were delaying this draft and SWNCC had not yet seen it. "I am convinced," the Secretary of War told the Secretary of State, "that further

delay is inadvisable and earnestly request that you give the entire matter your personal attention."³⁰

In reply, Acting Secretary of State Acheson explained the reluctance within the State Department to ship arms to Latin America. Because there was great political instability in most of the nations concerned, it was judged necessary, he explained, to proceed conservatively and with the greatest care. To furnish arms might lead to suspicions and jealousies among the various countries or might allow dictators to suppress democratic opposition. These things in turn could react most unfavorably on US relations with some countries and cause them to stop supporting the United States in world affairs. Too, US public opinion could be adversely affected. "I make this point," Mr. Acheson explained, "in order to emphasize the extreme concern which the Department experiences in regard to increasing the armaments in the hands of many of the other American Republics, for any serious deterioration in the political relations between these countries and the United States would, of course, seriously jeopardize the objective of national security which the War and Navy Departments and the State Department are jointly trying to achieve."

However, in view of the desire of the War and Navy Departments to achieve the aims of the President's programs, the State Department was willing to compromise. Mr. Acheson asked that in order to receive weapons a Latin nation must promise to standardize its organization, training, and equipment in accordance with US standards and not to acquire additional arms from other sources. He also wanted legislation that would provide that each country would turn in equivalent amounts of non-American weapons for similar numbers of American weapons provided. This would prevent a nation from building up a double supply of weapons. Subject to these qualifications, Secretary Acheson agreed to approve the proposed interim allocation of equipment but asked that deliveries be withheld from countries where political conditions made any shipment of US arms "highly undesirable" at the time. The nations concerned were Argentina, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Bolivia and Paraguay should receive reduced amounts. Acting Secretary of War Kenneth Royal agreed to the three qualifications that Mr. Acheson had asked for and agreed to withhold shipments as requested.³¹

This interim effort, as well as a long-range program of aid for Latin America, was discussed by Messrs. Acheson, Royall, Assistant Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan, and Director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion (OWMR) John W. Snyder on 22 January 1946. There was agreement that the short-term effort could technically be carried out under the Surplus Property Act, but since the Act was not intended for such uses, the program should first be discussed with the President and Congressional leaders.

With respect to a long-range program, Acting Secretary of State Acheson observed that many things had changed since the President had approved the general policy on aid to Latin America in July 1945. He referred to the development of atomic weapons, for example. The political situation in Latin America had also changed. Political unrest increased the chances of US arms being misused by military forces in overthrowing governments and establishing military

control. He noted that the strategic value of the long-range program might not be worth the cost. The Department of State had concluded that a reexamination of the program was necessary. Those present did not object to such a reexamination, only suggesting that it be done without delay.³²

On 25 April, SWNCC approved the draft legislation proposed by its Latin American subcommittee. It would legalize furnishing military assistance, in the form of equipment and training, to the governments of the other American states.³³ President Truman submitted this legislation to the Congress on 6 May 1946, in the form of a bill, HR 6326, to authorize measures to support training, organization and equipping of the armed forces of these states by the United States. Pointing to the Act of Chapultepec and the proposed treaty based on that Act, the President called it highly desirable that Congress authorize measures to achieve standardization of military organization, training methods, and equipment. The bill under consideration would allow not only additional training activities but would authorize the President to transfer military and naval equipment to the governments of other American states by sale or other method. "The bill," President Truman informed Congress, "has been drawn up primarily to enable the American nations to carry out their obligations to cooperate in the maintenance of inter-American peace and security under the Charter and the Act of Chapultepec which is intended to be supplanted by a permanent Inter-American Treaty."

The President made it clear that the United States did not intend to generate an arms race in Latin America and that it would not engage in "the indiscriminate or unrestricted distribution of armaments. . . . It is incumbent upon this government," he stated, "to see that military developments in which we have a part are guided toward the maintenance of peace and security and that military and naval establishments are not encouraged beyond what security considerations require. . . . The execution of the program . . . will also be guided by a determination to guard against placing weapons of war in the hands of any groups who may use them to oppose the peaceful and democratic principles to which the United States and other American nations have so often subscribed."³⁴

HR 6326, known as the Inter-American Military Cooperation Act, was presented to Congress too late in the session. The 79th Congress adjourned without taking action on the bill. Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden, who as Ambassador to Argentina had been highly critical of the aid program to Latin America, opposed a reintroduction of the bill to the Congress. Mr. Braden reminded the Secretary of State in late 1946 that: (1) the interim program was beyond the economic capabilities of Latin American nations and would, if carried out, substantially increase Latin American armaments; (2) responsible opposition in the United States and in Latin America to the arms program was increasing; and (3) the United States had taken a leading role in the United Nations seeking adoption of a disarmament program. He estimated that the program under HR 6326 would approach one billion dollars—"an arms sale of unparalleled magnitude in time of peace and infinitely beyond the economic resources of Latin America."³⁵

Under Secretary of State Acheson accepted these views and, on 19 March 1947, pointed out to Secretary of War Patterson that only five countries in Latin America had sufficient financial resources to enable them to pay "without major difficulty" for the programs proposed by the War and Navy Departments. All of the other American Republics, including Brazil and Mexico, would face "major economic problems" if they attempted to spend on armaments over the next ten years what the War and Navy Departments had recommended. "Encouragement of expenditures on arms by the Latin American countries runs directly counter to our basic economic and political policies which aim to encourage an improvement in the living standards and economic welfare in those countries," Secretary Acheson asserted.³⁶

Both Secretary of War Patterson and Secretary of Navy Forrestal rejected Acting Secretary Acheson's arguments against furnishing arms to Latin America, and both urged introduction of legislation for this purpose to the 80th Congress. They felt that the United States was already committed to military aid to Latin American countries and that this aid could be wisely and judiciously controlled by the United States. At a meeting on 1 May 1947, it was agreed that all three Departments concerned would support the reintroduction into Congress of the Inter-American Military Cooperation Act. The Act was introduced to the 80th Congress but was not enacted.³⁷

US-Canadian Cooperation in Postwar Defense

The defense of the northern Western Hemisphere, essentially the North American Continent, presented completely different problems for the United States. The US partner in this venture, fortunately a strong, willing, and cooperative partner, was Canada. Canada was not a member of the Pan American Union nor had she signed the Act of Chapultepec. US military relations with Canada had been formulated under a different set of circumstances and on different bases than those with Latin American nations. During World War II, US-Canadian relations, particularly in defense of the North American continent, had been close and harmonious. The legal basis for joint military action and cooperation between the United States and Canada during World War II derived from a statement issued jointly by President Roosevelt and Canadian Prime Minister MacKenzie King on 18 August 1940 at Ogdensburg, New York. Known as the "Ogdensburg Agreement," this statement declared:

The Prime Minister and the President have discussed the mutual problems of defense in relation to the safety of Canada and the United States.

It has been agreed that a permanent Joint Board on Defense shall be set up at once by the two countries.

This Permanent Joint Board on Defense shall commence immediate studies relating to sea, land and air problems, including personnel and materiel.

It will consider in the broad sense the defense of the north half of the Western Hemisphere.

The Permanent Joint Board on Defense will consist of four or five members from each country, most of them from the services. It will meet shortly.³⁸

The first meetings of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD) were held on 27 and 28 August 1940. The board was organized with two national sections, each with its own civilian chairman and with its own physically separate administrative machinery. Each section reported to the highest level of its government. The Chairman of the US section, Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia of New York, presented the PJBD's formal recommendations to the President of the United States directly.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had no direct relationship with the PJBD, and there was little contact between them during World War II. By the time the Joint Chiefs of Staff had begun to function in 1942 the joint US-Canadian defense plans had already been completed and placed in effect. In those cases where relationships between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and PJBD occurred there was no coordination problem. The Army and Navy members of the PJBD also functioned on, or in close liaison with, the planning staffs of their respective Services, of which the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were Chiefs. This was sufficient to assure adequate coordination and integration of any staff work between the PJBD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.³⁹

During the war the PJBD met frequently, alternating between meeting sites in Canada and the United States. While it considered a wide range of matters, these centered on the joint defense of the two nations. The board's recommendations were put into effect either through an exchange of notes at the diplomatic level or by direct coordination between the military departments of the two governments "effected by the respective military members of the board."

The main wartime fruit of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense was the Joint Canada-United States Basic Defense Plan No. 2 (short title ABC-22). Approved by the United States on 29 August 1941 and by Canada on 15 October 1941, the plan covered protection of coastal approaches, sea lanes, and communications and defense of Alaska, Canada, Newfoundland, and the northern United States. It also provided for mutual use of certain military facilities of the two nations as necessary.⁴⁰

At a meeting on 4-5 September 1945, the PJBD agreed that there did not appear to be any special problem with respect to postwar military collaboration between the United States and Canada, since the Ogdensburg Agreement had deliberately inserted the word "Permanent" into the board's title. Board members agreed that there was every reason why the two countries should continue their collaboration in defense matters. They agreed, also, that ABC-22 should be revised to accommodate the postwar situation.

Shortly thereafter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also concluded, independently, that ABC-22 needed to be revised. This conclusion resulted from their continuing examination of postwar base requirements. As part of this reexamination the JPS on their own initiative undertook to study the military implications of

US-Canadian defense agreements in relation to military bases and rights. In so doing they advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the United States and Canada would probably continue their wartime collaboration in matters of defense and, because the main defense plan, ABC-22, was more or less designed for the war just concluded, it needed revising.⁴¹

On 19 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted the JPS recommendation and requested the Secretaries of War and Navy to instruct the US Army and Navy members of the PJBD to begin conversations with their Canadian counterparts that would lead to the revision of ABC-22. The purpose of this revision would be to provide "in the light of changed world conditions" a continuing basis for joint action of the military forces of United States and Canada in maintaining the security of Alaska, Canada, Labrador, Newfoundland, and the northern United States.⁴²

Having thus started the machinery for continued joint planning through the proper channels, the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereupon furnished the senior US members of the board a statement of the "pertinent elements of the U.S. strategic policy currently accepted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as essential to the security of the United States . . ." as they affected the defense of the northern Western Hemisphere. The possession of the atomic bomb by the United States, Great Britain and Canada, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out, would not change the balance of power among the nations of the world. Nor would development of the atomic bomb by other nations have any effect on this balance. Nevertheless, the appearance of these new and revolutionary weapons made it all the more necessary that prospective enemies of the Western Hemisphere be kept at the greatest possible distance and, conversely, that friendly bases be set up as far as possible from friendly vital areas so that operations could be projected nearer the enemy.

Attainment of these objectives would require forces and installations deployed in an outer perimeter of bases from which enemy attacks and missiles could be intercepted, far-ranging surveillance and reconnaissance could be carried out, and decisive counteractions could be launched. In addition, peripheral bases should be integrated into the system in order to provide security in depth, to protect LOCs and to give logistic support of operations. Of special concern with regard to the defense of the northern Western Hemisphere were the Arctic air approaches as well as the sea and air approaches to the continent from both oceans.

In peacetime the United States and Canada should maintain well-trained, equipped and organized striking forces, including forces specially equipped for massed exploitation of new weapons, ready to move promptly in support of strategic plans that would be prepared well in advance and continuously revised.

At signs of strained relations with a foreign power or powers, reconnaissance and surveillance actions would be increased; changes would be made in the defense category of threatened areas; forces, including striking forces, would be positioned; warning orders would be issued and, probably, the machinery for mobilization of reserve forces and industry would be activated.

When the war started, forces would carry out operations already set forth in warning orders. The overall concept would require a series of rapid and effective

initial operations, exploiting special weapons and airborne and seaborne striking forces to destroy or disrupt the more dangerous enemy means of action or counter-actions and to blockade, bombard and destroy his war-making capacity. Early destruction of enemy naval forces and shipping would prevent the enemy from supporting his overseas bases or landing forces in the Western Hemisphere. Friendly forces would seize or occupy more advanced bases needed for the continued campaign or to protect vital areas. As reserve industrial and military means became available all effort would be augmented.⁴³

On 2 November 1945, the Secretaries of War and Navy instructed the senior US service members of the US section of the PJBD to begin necessary conversations with their Canadian counterparts that would lead to the revision of ABC-22. Before beginning this task, however, the members of the PJBD concluded that they needed to refine their organization by establishing a service-level body to deal with purely military problems. The Board, responsible directly to the President and the Prime Minister, was suitable for policy formulation, but a body tied more closely to the military departments was called for to coordinate military activities. The PJBD therefore recommended that a new Joint Military Cooperation Committee be formed. The Committee would consist primarily of senior military representatives from both nations, including representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Senior diplomatic officials from each country would also serve.⁴⁴

The US element of the new Committee would be charged with several tasks: (1) joint preparation with Canadian counterparts of a Canada-United States Security Plan; (2) joint preparation with the Canadians of recommendations on the nature and scope of active cooperative measures to be adopted by the armed services of the two countries and as to the practical methods and machinery for carrying them out; and (3) unilateral preparation of national US measures to be followed in cooperative defense actions. The finished Security Plan was to be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.

On 28 February 1946, the Service Secretaries asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to detail representatives as part of the US section of the new Committee. After deliberation on the matter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretaries of the Services and the US Service members of the PJBD on 30 March 1946 that they were of the opinion that the responsibility for preparation of a revised ABC-22 should remain primarily with the military members of the PJBD. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed, however, to provide additional members for the proposed Committee "on a flexible basis." They had already directed the JPS to provide the necessary assistance and representation to the Committee. "In view of the probable ramifications of the revised ABC-22," the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated, "it would appear desirable that all the various agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be available for technical advice to the Committee on request, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore offer such service when and as required."⁴⁵

The new Committee recommended by the PJBD was also approved by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and was formed immediately thereafter. It was named "The Joint Canadian-U.S. Military Cooperation Committee." At meetings in Washington in late May, the Committee produced two reports of some signifi-

cance to the planning effort. The first of these was an Appreciation of the Requirements for Canadian-US Basic Security; the second an Outline of a Joint Canadian-US Basic Security Plan. On 29 May 1946, both of these documents were forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their comment.⁴⁶

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with the analysis contained in the Appreciation of Requirements, deeming it suitable as a basis for the Basic Security Plan. They also considered that the Outline of the Basic Security Plan would serve in the initial steps of the preparation of the final complete plan. They so informed the Senior members of the Committee on 2 July. They drew attention, however, to the fact that the outline plan did not provide specifically for intelligence coverage. They assumed this would be done. They also indicated that the completed detailed Security Plan should be submitted to them before any final action was taken on it.⁴⁷

During the month of June, while the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been examining the outline plan, the Military Cooperation Committee had completed and approved at its level the actual Basic Security Plan. This was forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 3 July. They approved it and so informed the Senior US Members of the Committee on 13 August 1946.

The Basic Security Plan was intended to furnish a means of coordinated or joint action by Canadian and US forces in defending Canada, Newfoundland, and the United States, including Alaska, and the protection of vital sea and air LOCs. The concept of the new plan differed from previous plans as a result of technical and scientific progress that had virtually eliminated the previous immunity of North America from heavy attack by a hostile power. The principal advances in weaponry had increased the range and destructive power of weapons that could be brought to bear against North America. To counter these advances, cooperative actions by US and Canadian armed forces would be required to protect vital areas against air attack, to defend essential installations, and to protect lines of communication within Canada and the United States.

Under the plan, eight joint tasks were established and the division of responsibility for each set forth between the United States and Canada. These joint tasks were defined as follows:

Joint Task One. Protect vital areas of Canada and the United States from air attack.

Joint Task Two. Defend the northern area of Canada and Labrador and protect the land, sea, and air communications associated therewith.

Joint Task Three. Defend Alaska and protect the land, sea, and air communications associated therewith.

Joint Task Four. Defend Newfoundland (excluding Labrador) and protect the land, sea, and air communications associated therewith.

Joint Task Five. Defend eastern Canada and the northeastern portion of the United States and protect the land, sea, and air communications associated therewith.

Joint Task Six. Defend western Canada and the northwestern portion of the United States and protect the land, sea, and air communication associated therewith.

Joint Task Seven. Protect overseas shipping in the northwestern Atlantic.

Joint Task Eight. Protect overseas shipping in the northern Pacific.

The joint plan pointed out certain important preparatory measures that needed to be taken immediately by the two nations. These were: (1) investigation and establishment of the essential elements of a common system of air defense; (2) preparation of aerial photographs, maps and charts; (3) testing of equipment, clothing and supplies under Arctic conditions and collection of scientific data in Arctic regions; (4) familiarization of appropriate personnel of the armed forces of both countries in military operations under Arctic conditions; and (5) collection of strategic information necessary for military operations in Canada, Newfoundland and Alaska. The plan spelled out broad provisions for coordination of command, for cooperation and liaison between commanders, availability of bases and facilities on a mutual basis.⁴⁸

The Permanent Joint Board also developed an agreed statement of principles for continuing collaboration in defense matters between the United States and Canada. This statement, which President Truman approved, contained the following recommendation:

In order to make more effective provision for the security of the northern part of the Western Hemisphere, Canada and the United States should provide for close cooperation between their Armed Forces in all matters relating thereto, and in particular, through the following measures: (a) Interchange of personnel between the Armed Forces of both countries in such numbers and upon such terms as may be agreed upon from time to time by the respective military, naval, and air authorities. (b) Adoption, as far as practicable, of common designs and standards in arms, equipment, organization, methods of training and new developments to be encouraged, due recognition being given by each country to the special circumstances prevailing therein. (c) Cooperation and exchange of observers in connection with exercises and with the development and tests of material of common interest to the armed services to be encouraged. (d) Reciprocal provision of its military, naval, and air facilities by each country to the Armed Forces of the other country; each country continuing to provide reciprocally for transit through its territory and territorial waters of military aircraft and public vessels of the other country. (e) Allocation of responsibility to each country for mapping and surveying its own territory and providing maps to the other country in accordance with agreed needs.⁴⁹

Canada also approved the statement of principles, and on 12 February 1947 the two nations announced that their respective governments had authorized "limited defense collaboration" based on interchange of personnel; cooperation in maneuver exercises and development and tests of new materiel; encouragement of standardization; reciprocal availability of military facilities; and no impairment of control by each country over all activities in its own territory.⁵⁰

Planning the Defense of Alaska

The defense of Alaska was covered in the Canadian-American Defense Plan as Joint Task Three. Nevertheless, the United States had also prepared some plans unilaterally for the military development of that vital territory. In the

strategic concept developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Alaska was to be developed, maintained, and garrisoned as a primary base in a system of strategically located bases. This system was intended to support a wide reconnaissance and surveillance capability, provide maximum security to vital installations, protect the main LOCs and enable the United States rapidly to throw its military power against its potential enemies.

On 14 January 1946, an outline plan for the military development of Alaska was forwarded by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretaries of War and Navy. Looking at the situation realistically, JCS planners admitted that the only possible foe who would attack the United States through Alaska was the USSR. And at the time a war between the United States and the Soviet Union seemed "fairly remote." Further, the Soviets had very little capability for a major attack against Alaska for at least the next five years, and they were unlikely to try such an operation even during the next decade. The USSR lacked an adequate strategic air force and an effective navy or amphibious capability. It did not therefore appear necessary during the next five years to station air or ground combat forces in Alaska except for training, acclimatization, or experimental purposes. Limited reconnaissance and surveillance and local defense of selected bases, however, might require some troops.

The essential task in the JCS view, was to use the time available to build up the area by constructing permanent bases and facilities, so that in any future war Alaska could support the necessary offensives. "This development," the Joint Chiefs of Staff told the Secretaries of War and Navy, "should be initiated at once, bearing in mind the fact that the strategic importance of this region with respect to trans-polar attack by and defense against aircraft and special weapons vis-à-vis the United States and the strategic heart of the USSR or any European power will increase with the development of these weapons."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that in peacetime Alaska be garrisoned only by forces for command, limited operations and maintenance; training forces rotated between other areas; and construction and development forces. An estimate of the strength and composition of peacetime and wartime forces that would be needed in Alaska was appended to the plan.⁵¹

Conclusion

United States political and military efforts to strengthen the defenses of the Western Hemisphere during the period from the end of World War II until late 1947 involved the consummation of diplomatic agreements, planning for the establishment of military bases, contingency planning, and bilateral consultation and agreements between the United States and certain other American Republics on the furnishing of military aid. Although Soviet actions had not posed any real threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere by late 1947, that possibility had had to be considered. Also to be considered in regard to the southern portion of the Hemisphere were the ever present danger of an outbreak of fighting between

or among two or more nations of Latin America and the instability of the governments in many of them. No such problems were perceived in the northern half of the Hemisphere.

The most tangible measures toward setting up a workable defense system in the southern portion had been the pact concluded at Rio de Janeiro and the bilateral provisions that were in train for furnishing US peacetime military aid to various Latin American countries. In the north, of course, the updating of existing defensive plans and the establishment of the Joint Canadian-US Military Cooperation Committee contributed to the defense readiness.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had been closely involved in all these efforts. They had planned for establishment of bases and made recommendations to higher authorities on base acquisition. They had participated in development of US positions and had strongly supported both the Act of Chapultepec and the Rio defense pact. Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had taken part in the actions to strengthen the armed forces of the Latin American nations through furnishing of military aid. With respect to the northern half of the hemisphere, they had supported the planning efforts there and the reorganization of the US-Canadian machinery for collaboration.

Standoff in China

Among the many complex issues raised in the Far East by the collapse of the Japanese Empire, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were most apprehensive over the future of China. Without a stable and unified Chinese nation favorably disposed toward the United States, American interests in every part of Asia would be compromised. To that end, the United States devoted considerable money and effort in the postwar years.¹

A World War II victor in name only, China emerged from the war torn by the fierce fighting, economically destitute and politically bankrupt. She was at the same time wracked by a deadly internal struggle for power that threatened to destroy her. The US dilemma, once the war had ended, was to cure China's most serious ills, that she might become a strong, friendly, democratic nation, without either driving her into the communist orbit or becoming her guardian by default.

US Wartime China Policy

Prior to World War II, US policy toward China had been based on two fundamental principles: noninterference in Chinese affairs and support of Chinese unity and territorial integrity. When Japan attacked China in the late 1930s these traditional policy concepts had to be "adapted to a new and unprecedented situation." Although its sympathies lay entirely with China, not until 1941, when the Lend-Lease Act made it technically possible, did the United States begin furnishing military aid to China. President Roosevelt in deciding on this aid had two motives—to thwart Japanese conquest of China and, at the longer range, to lay the foundation of a strong China that would contribute to the stability of the entire Far East. After Pearl Harbor, the United States sharply increased its aid to China, solely to bring about the defeat of Japan. This program of aid was inhibited by higher priority demands for US resources and by the great physical diffi-

culties of access to China. Nevertheless, substantial amounts of supplies and armaments were furnished to China during World War II.²

The sheer physical problem of bringing supplies from the United States and delivering them to China was sufficiently difficult on the basis of distance alone. Added to that, however, the Japanese controlled all sea traffic on the Chinese Coast, forcing the United States to fly material over the Himalayan "Hump" at great expense and risk. The hazardous and costly building of the so-called "Stilwell Road" from northwest India into China for overland deliveries added to the limited quantities and types of supplies delivered. Mishandling and inept distribution of these supplies by the Chinese detracted from the effectiveness of US military aid. Nevertheless almost \$870 million worth of lend-lease supplies were delivered to China by the United States during World War II.

Much of the military aid that the United States furnished to China during the war was in a form that made determination of monetary cost almost impossible. This aid comprised the air transport operations over the "Hump"; air operations against Japan in, near, and from China; building the "Stilwell Road" from Assam to China and related military operations in Burma; provision of military personnel to train Chinese troops and advise in the use of weapons and tactics; and the support of these activities by an organization that extended half-way round the world to the United States.³

The United States had advised Chiang Kai-shek to reduce his 327 divisions to only 84, and had offered to train and equip 39 of them. This was in the "understanding" stage when the war ended. No commitment on either the size of or support for a postwar Chinese Air Force or Navy had been made by the United States.⁴

The main opposition to the existing Nationalist Government headed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek came from the Communist Party, supported by strong military forces. While both the Nationalists and the Communists had fought against the Japanese invader, they had not cooperated. Each fought independently of the other. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's forces defended southwestern China. Communist forces under Chairman Mao Tse-tung controlled much rural territory in northwestern China. Japanese forces possessed all the ports and most of the principal cities of China.

The United States had taken sides in that it did not deal with the Chinese Communists but instead furnished advice and assistance to the Nationalist Government. During the war US advisers and other US observers had found this government weak not only militarily and economically, but politically and in morale. Many of these officials found that the Nationalist Government was corrupt, lacked popular support and relied unduly upon the United States to win the war for China.

At the official levels, wartime dealings between Washington and Chungking, the Nationalist capital, proved difficult and fractious. The mission of General Joseph W. Stilwell, conceived with high hopes in 1942, became mired in mutual disillusion and recrimination. Chiang was bitterly disappointed by the slow trickle of American aid; General Stilwell was disgusted by and openly critical of the incompetence and rampant corruption of the Nationalist Government and

the Kuomintang Party. A crisis arose in September 1944 when, after the Nationalists suffered a series of painful defeats at Japanese hands, President Roosevelt urgently petitioned Chiang to place General Stilwell in unrestricted command of all his armies. The Generalissimo spurned this suggestion and demanded instead that General Stilwell be recalled. President Roosevelt acquiesced; Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer became Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo and Commanding General, US Forces, China Theater. The military emergency passed, but relations between the two governments were permanently chilled.

The main US headquarters in China when the war ended was United States Forces, China Theater, of which Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer was Commanding General (CG, USFCT). General Wedemeyer's command comprised Army Air Forces, Theater Troops, and Services of Supply. He had no control over a number of other US military organizations in China. These latter included the Air Transport Command and the XXth Bomber Command under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The US Navy Group China, which reported to the US Navy Department until late in the war, came under General Wedemeyer's "command and operational control" on 6 April 1945. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) reported to Washington as did the Joint Intelligence Collection Agency. United States Army officers served with all branches of the service of the Chinese Army. They served as advisers at the high levels and as observers on the low levels. As of V-J Day there were approximately 60,000 US troops in China.⁵

Preparing a Postwar Policy

With the war in Europe drawing to an end in the spring of 1945, the attention of US military planners focused more closely upon the Far East. The question of what would happen to China once the Japanese were defeated became more and more urgent. Other factors aside, China's sheer size, its tremendous population and its dominant location on the Asian land mass rendered it of first rank importance to any US Far Eastern policy during the postwar period. US assistance to the Chinese during the war, while significant, had not been decisive in the war against Japan. Its value had been diminished through misuse by the Chinese Government. And there were no indications that the defeat of Japan would bring any real change so that postwar aid to China would be any more effective as an instrument of US foreign policy in the Far East.

US Army Air Force officials triggered a move to spell out more precisely US objectives in China when, on 21 March 1945, they pressed for the establishment of a large postwar Chinese Air Force. Addressing the Chief of Staff, US Army, the Commanding General, US Army Air Forces, proposed that the United States support a postwar Chinese Air Force of 42 groups, equipped with 1,922 aircraft and supported by a training unit of 1,895 US personnel. General Arnold feared that, if the United States failed to furnish support, other nations would supply this assistance, and US influence would diminish.⁶

Assistant Secretary of War Lovett sent this recommendation to the SWNCC asking that it establish a US policy toward postwar China. SWNCC referred the problem to its subcommittee for the Far East and asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to arrange for collaboration with that subcommittee.

On 3 April 1945, the Department of State forwarded to the SWNCC a statement of US postwar policy toward China. According to the Department of State, the United States needed a strong China that would be a stabilizing factor in the Far East, an essential for peace and security in the area. The US political objective was creation of a "strong, stable and united China" with a representative government capable of functioning efficiently. The United States favored no political faction but did continue to support Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Within the framework of that support the United States sought a unified and effective Chinese Government, and should the present regime "disintegrate" it would "re-examine our position in the light of the manifested wishes of the Chinese people." It would "regard sympathetically any broadly representative government or movement which gave promise of achieving unity and of contributing to the peace and security in eastern Asia."

The Department of State paper characterized Chiang Kai-shek's government as unrepresentative, inefficient, and corrupt and charged that there was widespread dissatisfaction in China. The opposition to the present government included the Chinese Communist Party, which was described as a dynamic force controlling considerable areas. Dissident opposition was increasing and the United States should be "realistically alert" to the possibility of Chiang's overthrow or the outbreak of civil war.

While development of effective, modern military forces was "implicit" in the creation of a strong, united China, the Department of State realized that the postwar Chinese economy would be too weak to sustain such forces without US aid. Any US postwar aid to China should be aimed mainly at building a well-balanced economy. Neither the United Kingdom nor the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would choose to support Chiang Kai-shek, and the United States need fear no competition from these quarters. The Department of State recommended that the United States make no specific commitments to Chiang Kai-shek on postwar air forces. The question could be reconsidered when it had been determined by the United States that: (1) internal political unity and stability had been achieved in China; (2) the Chinese Government had obtained the support of the Chinese people; and (3) the Chinese economy, with assistance from the United States and other countries, had been sufficiently developed to support a modern army and air force.⁷

The SWNCC Subcommittee for the Far East agreed with the Department of State and in its recommendations to SWNCC concluded that the United States should avoid any commitment to assist the Chinese to build up a postwar army or air force until cognizant US Government agencies had determined that the Chinese Government had fulfilled "certain necessary political and economic conditions." Other conclusions by the Subcommittee were that the United States should be guided in its provision of postwar military assistance by US arms control policies and that there was no legislative authority for transferring arms or

munitions to another country, except in return for payment of some sort, when these were to be used solely to augment postwar military forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff perceived no objection to the subcommittee report "from the military point of view" although they did suggest minor changes in wording. They also agreed with the recommendations in the State Department policy paper. The SWNCC approved the report and the policy toward China contained therein on 28 May 1945.⁸

Problems of Peace: Securing Control of China for Chiang Kai-shek

On 10 August 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent General Wedemeyer a basic directive to become effective upon Japan's capitulation. All of its provisions, they admonished, applied only insofar as they did not "prejudice the basic U.S. principle that the United States will not support the Central Government of China in fratricidal war." They then instructed him as follows:

2. It is not proposed to involve U.S. ground forces in a major land campaign in any part of the China Theater. However, U.S. Pacific theater forces are preparing to secure control of key ports and communication points. . . .

3. . . . [M]ilitary assistance will be continued for the present for the purpose of supporting Chinese military operations essential to the reoccupation by Central Government forces of all areas in the China Theater now held by the Japanese. . . .

4. . . . U.S. forces will turn over points in China liberated by them to agencies and forces accredited by the Central Government of China. . . .

5. It is desired that, insofar as permitted by military consideration, the surrender of Japanese forces in China, whether complete or piecemeal, will be to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek or his representatives.

6. You will assist the Central Government in the rapid transport of Chinese Central Government forces to key areas in China. . . .⁹

It was obvious from the terms of this directive that Washington authorities appreciated the practical difficulties in repatriating the millions of Japanese soldiers and civilians scattered throughout China. The sheer logistics of this operation would have made it extremely difficult even under optimum conditions. But with bitter enmity increasing between the Nationalist Government and the communists and with Chiang Kai-shek's almost complete lack of transport and other necessary resources, evacuating and repatriating surrendered Japanese from China promised to become impossible for him without US assistance. The United States therefore had decided to help by moving Nationalist forces in US transport and by using US forces to keep open the necessary ports and key areas for evacu-

ation. How to do these things without becoming embroiled in the Nationalist-Communist struggle presented some delicate considerations.

However, General Wedemeyer, in Chungking, feared that the complexities of the Chinese situation were not properly appreciated in Washington. Writing to the War Department on 12 August, he warned of the "explosive and portentous possibilities in China when Japan surrenders." There was danger that Japan's China Expeditionary Army of approximately two million men might continue resistance. Also, he feared that the Chinese Communists might launch a civil war. They were already trying to take the surrender of Japanese garrisons and to capture "the very same key and strategic points and areas recognized as vital by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, who selected the majority of such points and areas for projected American occupation." Hence General Wedemeyer urged that Japanese commanders in China be ordered to surrender solely to Central Government representatives. Also, he asked that at least 3½ US divisions be sent at once to occupy Shanghai, Taku and Canton.¹⁰

Meanwhile, actions of the Soviet Union in and toward China were complicating somewhat an already complicated situation. Although potentially dangerous, these actions created no real immediate crisis and the Soviet threat remained in the theoretical stage. At Yalta, the USSR had agreed to join the war against Japan in exchange for a lease on Port Arthur, preeminence in the port of Dairen, joint Sino-Soviet operation of Manchurian railroads, and possession of the Kurile Islands and Lower Sakhalin. In Moscow, on 14 August, Premier Stalin and Ambassador T. V. Soong signed a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance in which China accepted the Yalta decisions and the USSR agreed to give its moral and material support entirely to the Nationalist Government.¹¹

During the last days of the war, the Red Army swept across Manchuria. Addressing the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 14 August, General Wedemeyer reported an "extreme danger" that the Soviets would transfer surrendered arms and equipment to the Chinese Communists. He compared Asia to "an enormous pot, seething and boiling, the fumes of which may readily snuff out the advancement made by Allied sacrifices. . . ." The Generalissimo alone could impose "a modicum of stability during this period of uncertainty." Again General Wedemeyer called for "iron-clad stipulations" that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's representatives must receive all surrenders, save in the immediate areas of Soviet-Japanese combat. This was the policy adopted. General Order No. 1, issued on 15 August by President Truman to General MacArthur, instructed Japanese units in Manchuria to surrender to the Soviet High Command and those in China proper to yield to the Generalissimo.¹²

General Wedemeyer, meanwhile, became concerned over one element of his directive of 10 August. On 19 August, in a long message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff he pointed out that his directive forbade him to "prejudice the basic U.S. principle that the United States will not support the Central Government of China in a fratricidal war." To follow this instruction literally would eliminate support to Nationalist forces, which he was required to give by other portions of the directive. Communist forces, surrounded or controlled important key areas containing Japanese who, in the terms of his directive, must surrender to Nation-

alist forces charged with repatriating the Japanese. The only way the Nationalists could reach these areas in time was to use US aircraft, ships, and trucks. The Communists had already sworn to prevent Nationalist troops from reaching these key areas. Even though the United States was acting in good faith in transporting Nationalist forces, this act would be viewed by the Communists as "a deceptive maneuver designed primarily to cope with the Communists."

To illustrate his point General Wedemeyer described an imminent situation. Within a few days he meant to use US planes to airlift two US-equipped Nationalist armies accompanied by US personnel into the Nanking-Shanghai area to open and secure the port of Shanghai. They might soon be fighting the communists and General Wedemeyer foresaw that "I may be inadvertently affording direct U.S. assistance to the Central Government in subduing Communists armed forces." Similar situations would be bound to arise in many other areas.

Lacking specific guidance, General Wedemeyer had instructed US liaison personnel to withdraw from any clashes between opposing Chinese forces as quickly as they could. They would use such force as necessary to protect themselves. "I intend to employ U.S. combat air forces or other appropriate means at my disposal to carry out my mission and to protect American lives and property that may be endangered," he wrote. After securing State Department concurrence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved these decisions.¹³

The JCS directive to General Wedemeyer had informed him that US Pacific Theater forces were preparing to occupy key ports and "communication points" in China. On 19 August, representatives of CINCPAC, Seventh Fleet and CG, USFCT, met to coordinate plans for operations in China by US forces. As a result, CINCPAC assigned the III Marine Amphibious Corps to General Wedemeyer's command with a decision that it would land in China on 30 September. The mission of these US forces would be to assist the Nationalist Government in reoccupying North China and repatriating the Japanese. The 1st and 6th Marine divisions began landing at Tientsin and Tsingtao on 30 September. More than 50,000 Marines, including air elements, were involved. Although the United States meant to keep these Marines as far as possible out of the growing confrontation between the Nationalist Government and the Communists, the very nature of their mission brought strong Communist charges of interference and growing enmity toward the United States. Congressional protests that the introduction of these US forces unnecessarily risked US participation in an internecine struggle were also generated by the landing of the Marines in North China.¹⁴

Manchuria presented a different and potentially greater problem. The Soviets had promised to depart within three months after the war ended. Yet, unless Chiang's troops were in position prior to Soviet evacuation, the Chinese Communists probably would win control. Accordingly, on 10 September Ambassador Soong passed to Acting Secretary of State Acheson the Generalissimo's request that US vessels transport Nationalist divisions northward from Canton to Dairen.¹⁵

Admiral Leahy requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to draft a reply. The Joint Military Transportation Committee advised against any firm commitment until General Wedemeyer and Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet, submitted their recommendations concerning occupation plans and

shipping availability. Admiral Leahy was not satisfied; he felt that "an urgent necessity exists to get Chinese Government troops into Manchuria in time to replace the Soviet troops." Fortuitously, on 17 September, General Wedemeyer presented the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a plan for transporting five Nationalist "armies" to Dairen, Tsingtao, and Formosa.¹⁶ He strongly urged that shipping be made available, warning that delay probably would deliver these areas into Chinese Communist control.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied at once, informing General Wedemeyer that "It is U.S. policy to assist the Chinese Government in the establishment of essential Chinese troops in liberated areas, particularly Manchuria, as rapidly as possible." He was directed to carry out his plans using shipping under his control.¹⁷

Developing a US Policy on Aid to China

Aside from its residual commitments under Lend Lease and the "understanding" to train and equip a 39-division army, the United States, at the time of Japan's surrender, had no military aid commitments to China. The policy paper approved by SWNCC on 28 May 1945 specifically recommended against any commitment to China until that nation fulfilled to the satisfaction of cognizant US agencies "certain necessary political and economic conditions." This, of course, was to prove manifestly impossible under existing chaotic conditions brought on by the destructive civil war, soon to burst forth full scale.

Almost concurrently with the end of the war, the Assistant Secretary of War circulated to the SWNCC a study pointing out the urgent need for decision on what was to be done for China militarily in the postwar period. Among those questions that needed answers were: (1) what would be done about the 39-division army; (2) what kind of air force, if any, would the United States support; (3) what was to be done about establishing a military mission to China; and (4) what was to be done about surplus military equipment in the China Theater? For the solution of immediate military problems and for proper planning of future aid to the Chinese Government, the Assistant Secretary pointed out, a policy decision was needed "to establish to what extent, under what conditions, and with what stipulations, if any, should military assistance, including military lend lease or similar financial arrangement, be continued to the Chinese government."¹⁸

Before the SWNCC could frame a suitable reply to the question raised by the Assistant Secretary, an initiative by the Chinese Government produced some important interim answers. The Chinese Ambassador, Dr. T. V. Soong, had been actively seeking a US commitment to aid China's military forces in the postwar period. He had already seen the President and had been told that the proper departments were studying the problem of postwar aid to China. Dr. Soong had asked specifically that the United States agree to support a 90-division army on the grounds that the 39 divisions presently agreed to were insufficient.¹⁹

The Secretaries of State, War, and Navy forwarded a memorandum to President Truman on 13 September containing their recommendations on China pol-

icy. They noted that, while under suitable arrangements, it would be in the best interests of the United States to furnish assistance to China in maintaining her armed forces, such aid was not meant for use in "fratricidal war or for the support by force of undemocratic administration." It would be necessary to obtain the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the exact amount of assistance that was justified, but it was their feeling at present that China should try to maintain only small, well-trained and well-equipped forces with adequate transportation. They recommended that the President tell Dr. Soong that the United States would complete the 39-division program if arrangements for payment by China were made. Too, certain naval vessels, mainly river and coastal craft, would be given China. An air force would be supported though its size and composition had not been determined. Chiang had asked for and the President had agreed in principle to send a US advisory mission to China. But the exact size and character of this mission would have to await determination following decisions on the size of Chinese forces that the mission would support.²⁰

President Truman accepted these recommendations by the Secretaries and on 14 September 1945 passed them on orally to Dr. Soong, thus committing the United States to provide China with the specific military support that they had outlined. In so doing, the President made clear that the United States stood ready to help in development of Chinese forces of moderate size "for the maintenance of internal peace and security and the assumption of adequate control over the liberated areas of China, including Manchuria and Formosa." He also cautioned Dr. Soong that the United States military assistance would not be diverted "for use in fratricidal warfare or to support undemocratic administration."²¹ The President's assurances and caveats to Dr. Soong constituted a firm statement of US policy with respect to military aid to China.

Two weeks later, in a paper reminiscent in some respects of their 28 May policy paper,²² the Far East Subcommittee of the SWNCC attempted to consolidate the main elements of the new Presidential statement of policy and to expand in some areas those points that were implicit but not well defined in that statement. The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested several modifications that would impart greater flexibility. First, they thought that the subcommittee's political criteria were unduly rigid. The Central Government was undemocratic and unlikely to change its authoritarian cast in the near future. The US aim, therefore, should be defined as achievement of a regime resting only "in so far as practicable" upon the popular will. Second, they recommended that a threat to withhold assistance from "an undemocratic administration" be softened to "an administration not acceptable to the United States." These changes were accepted. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also strove—without success—to include a provision that the Chinese must not accept military advice and assistance from other nations without prior consultation with the United States.²³

On 22 October, the SWNCC approved this amended statement and forwarded it to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy for guidance and, as appropriate, for implementation. The statement recommended, in effect, that the policies endorsed by the President be continued. These policies, as restated by the SWNCC, were as follows: (1) support and assist the Nationalist Government of

China in development along lines compatible with basic US objectives in the Far East; (2) assist and advise China in developing modern ground, sea, and air forces designed only to maintain internal peace and security in China, including liberated areas of Manchuria and Formosa, and to fulfill Chinese occupation obligations in Korea and Japan; (3) discontinue US assistance to Chinese armed forces after notifying the Nationalist Government, if at any time it was clearly established that these armed forces were being used to support an administration "not in conformity with the general policies of the United States, to engage in fratricidal war, or to constitute a threat of aggression"; and (4) regulate the furnishing of US economic, military or other assistance to China by the extent to which political stability was being achieved under a "unified, fully representative government."

To effectuate these policies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be made responsible for surveying and reporting upon the needs of China's armed forces. They would recommend to the Secretaries of the military departments the nature and extent of US assistance needed in the development and maintenance of these armed forces. In a like manner the Secretary of State would arrange for a continuing survey to determine political conditions as related to extending military aid. These factors, too, would be periodically examined to see if further military assistance were justified under the policy. The United States and China should execute a firm agreement setting out all terms and conditions of military aid.²⁴

On the same day that the SWNCC made its recommendation, the JPS presented the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a detailed study of the Chinese forces problem. General Wedemeyer, who on 17 October had talked with the officers of the JPS, had noted that at one point in the war the Chinese had been supporting 347 divisions, none of which could stand up to the Japanese enemy. By this date, however, the number had been reduced to 250. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, in his last statement on the matter on 5 October, had called for 120 divisions: 30 organized and equipped at US levels, 60 to be equipped and organized at lesser (Alpha) levels, and 30 (non-Alpha) organized and equipped on an even more austere basis. He also wanted an air force of 40 groups. In General Wedemeyer's view the Nationalist Government could not support more than 50 divisions and about 12 air groups.²⁵

Acting on the advice of the JPS, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed on 23 October that a US military advisory group must be established in China without delay to appraise and review Chinese requirements for military aid and to submit these to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval. Pending establishment of this group, the United States should complete the 39-division program (approximately 563,000 men) and maintain these divisions logistically for a period of time yet to be determined, complete Chinese air force build-up to about 13 groups and continue the existing program for Chinese naval units. Ultimately, the Chinese might be furnished 50 divisions, 18 air groups and a navy "adequate to police . . . coast and inland waterways." These views were sent to the SWNCC at once.²⁶

Providing a US Military Advisory Group

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had been considering the problems involved in sending a US Advisory Group to China for some months, a move that was far less simple than it might have seemed. On 31 August 1945, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, in conversations with Ambassador Hurley and General Wedemeyer, had asked for a group of US military personnel to advise and assist the Chinese armed forces. The substance of this request, which, at Chiang Kai-shek's urging, was transmitted to President Truman by Ambassador Hurley on 1 September, was for a "military advisory group" rather than a military mission, to be retained initially for a period of five years, at the end of which its continuation would be considered by both governments. The group would assist and advise the Chinese Government in the creation of modern military forces, air, ground, and naval. It would be divided into five sub-groups (headquarters, ground, air, naval, and logistical). In a separate recommendation two weeks later, Generalissimo Chiang suggested for the mission a strength of about 3,500 officers and men, exclusive of naval personnel.²⁷

The President's commitments to Dr. Soong on 14 September and Generalissimo Chiang's call for a US advisory mission gave impetus to a study within the War Department on the creation of such a body. On 5 October 1945, General Marshall forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a plan for a US military advisory group to China that would replace the Headquarters, US Forces, China Theater. Temporary authority existed to create and dispatch such a group under the President's War Powers Act, but to continue this mission into the postwar period would require Congressional authority.

The War Department plan that General Marshall forwarded, with the suggestion that it be referred to the JPS for study and recommendation, provided for a group of about 3,300 men and officers, excluding a naval contingent, to be headed by a lieutenant general. He would be authorized to deal directly with the head of the Chinese Government. The group, which would remain in China for an initial period of five years, would be composed of ground, air, and naval elements and would have a separate element for supply. The chief of the division would be the US representative in China. He would be responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and all US personnel assigned to the mission would be under his "command and control."²⁸

The Chief of Naval Operations objected strongly to the War Department plan on the ground that the suggested organization was more suitable to a joint operation under a supreme commander than an advisory group. This body, he said, should not be responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff but to the War and Navy Departments. He did not want the chief of the mission to exercise "command and control." Restrictions placed on liaison and communication between the groups of the mission and their Chinese counterparts were "unacceptable." He forwarded a Navy version in which there would be a completely self-contained US Naval Advisory Group, reporting directly to the Navy Department. The two advisory groups would be unified under the US Military Advisory Group consisting of the heads of the respective groups and presided over by the senior

head. All matters of joint interest would be handled through or by this top level organization which would determine joint matters of policy and procedure affecting the organization as a whole.²⁹

The Navy point of view prevailed, and on 22 October the JPS presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a plan for a US Military Advisory Group very similar to that proposed by Admiral King. There would be separate Army and Navy advisory groups, with the heads of each authorized direct access to the head of the Chinese Government. A chairman designated to head the US Military Advisory Group would serve as "a unified channel of communication" with the head of government on matters of "joint concern." Estimated personnel strength approached 3,900 men and officers. In return for sending this group, the United States would require some extraordinary concessions from China. They ranged from exclusive US jurisdiction over all military members of the advisory group and over all American nationals employed by or accompanying the group, to a promise not to accept any military advisory group, mission, or representatives from any other nation without consulting with the United States. As another example, China would not tax in any way the supplies imported for use of the group, and it would exempt all US military cargo from inspection. All in all, the JPS plan proposed 24 important concessions by China in return for the advisory group.³⁰

On 23 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the plan recommended by the JPS and forwarded it to the SWNCC on the next day. In so doing they proposed that a US Military Advisory Group be established in China "at an early date" in order to forestall the Chinese seeking military assistance from some other source. They requested that the Department of State begin necessary negotiations with the Chinese Government.³¹

An amplification of this original plan for an advisory group, containing a delineation of functions among the subgroups, a definition of joint functions, and a procedure for handling joint matters, was forwarded to the Service Secretaries by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 20 December 1945. They suggested that this amplification be adopted as the basic directive to be sent the chiefs of the various Service subgroups of the advisory group.³²

The Secretary of War approved the JCS plan for establishing a US Military Advisory Group in China. Secretary of State Byrnes, on the other hand, opposed it on the grounds that too many men and officers would be involved. The group, he said, which would be roughly equal to the number of British officers in the peace-time Indian Army, "would permeate throughout the Chinese Army on an operational level." Additionally, Secretary Byrnes objected that the plan entailed excessive concessions by the Chinese Government. It was very possible that other nations would view the plan as a projection of US power into the Asian continent rather than simply a means of aiding China to modernize its army. "I question whether, international relations and other matters considered, the program . . . would actually contribute towards our security and world peace or towards political unity, and peace and prosperity in China," he concluded on 5 January 1946.³³

Although they were inclined to reject the Secretary of State's arguments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the interests of getting advisers into China as soon as possible, informed SWNCC on 13 February that an initial authorization of 750 Army personnel and 165 naval personnel, a total of 915, would be adequate pending further developments. "The ultimate size and organization of the Advisory Group can be re-examined when the pattern of political and military organization of China is more clear," they added.³⁴

The SWNCC approved the JCS proposal and asked the Secretary of State to request the President to direct the Secretaries of State and the Services to take necessary action to establish a military advisory group for China as recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.³⁵ President Truman signed the requested directive on 25 February 1946, instructing the Secretaries of War and Navy to establish jointly a US Military Advisory Group to China. It would not exceed 1,000 in strength except as the President might authorize in view of later developments. The object of the advisory group was "to assist and advise the Chinese Government in the development of modern armed forces for the fulfillment of those obligations which may devolve upon China under her international agreements, including the United Nations Organization, for the establishment of adequate control over liberated areas in China, including Manchuria and Formosa, and for the maintenance of internal peace and security."³⁶

Increasing US Involvement in China

By the time President Truman signed this order, events in China had given clear evidence that the "establishment of adequate control over liberated areas of China" would be a very difficult task. When General Wedemeyer visited Washington in mid-October 1945, President Truman told him that he had resolved to continue full support of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his government and to stiffen US policy toward the Russians in the Far East. Already the administration had agreed to transport four Nationalist armies northward by air and five armies by sea.³⁷

The Communists had signaled their resentment over this aid to Chiang Kai-shek by attacking a US Marine convoy and wounding several Marines. Other dangerous incidents that could have resulted in fighting between US and Chinese Communist forces had also been fomented by the Communists. The very presence of US forces escalated the risks of deeper involvement and was a cause of growing concern to US military and political authorities. On 20 October, before the Marines had been in North China for a full month, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked General Wedemeyer to propose a schedule for inactivation of the China theater and for the evacuation of the US Marines.³⁸

Answering six days later, General Wedemeyer advised that the Marines' retention in areas of possible conflict would, if battles erupted, undoubtedly involve US personnel and result in the loss of American lives. He recommended that their withdrawal begin on 15 November. By that time, Nationalist forces in

North China would be sufficiently strong to assume responsibilities borne by the Japanese Army. General Wedemeyer also proposed that the China Theater be inactivated on 1 January 1946.³⁹

Before approving these actions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt obliged to seek advice from the State Department. They observed that the main tasks shouldered by the Nationalist Government were not, as originally supposed, those of disarming and repatriating the Japanese. Instead, the Generalissimo's soldiers were trying to secure liberated areas against usurpation by the Chinese Communists. If the threat of civil strife still lingered when US Marines were withdrawn, stability might only be attained through intervention of the Soviet Union or use of Japanese forces by the Central Government. Either of these developments could jeopardize the attainment of US objectives. It seemed undesirable, in any case, to deactivate the China Theater before a US Military Advisory Group became established. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked for political guidance on the following subjects:

a. Would the United States continue to extend military assistance to the Nationalist Government until conditions in North China and Manchuria became reasonably stabilized?

b. When would negotiations for the establishment of a Military Advisory Group be completed?

c. Should the Marines be withdrawn beginning 15 November, or should they remain until the situation became clearer?⁴⁰

News from China meanwhile grew increasingly alarming. Against General Wedemeyer's advice, Chiang Kai-shek moved his troops into Manchuria and called for additional US assistance. Communist guerrillas attacked US Marines and minor firefights ensued. As a result of these developments, which could become "increasingly serious," General Wedemeyer on 16 December recommended to General Marshall that US Marines be evacuated from China immediately.⁴¹

Secretary Byrnes had other ideas. He wanted the Marines to remain in China for the present to help disarm and repatriate Japanese forces. In a message to General Wedemeyer on 19 November the new Army Chief of Staff, General Eisenhower, informed him of Secretary Byrnes' views and pointed out that while the United States did not wish to support Chiang's government directly against the communists, it must nevertheless risk doing so in favor of the basic objectives of getting the Japanese out of North China. However, the Department of State had decided that the United States would transport no more Chinese armies into Manchuria and would not support Chiang against the Communists except as necessary to get the Japanese out.

At Secretary Byrnes' request, General Eisenhower then posed questions to General Wedemeyer. Could the Chinese Government clear the Japanese from North China and Manchuria without US assistance? Did the Chinese Government intend to deport Japanese civilians who had been left in North China and Manchuria by the Russians? How much assistance, including shipping, must the United States furnish to expedite the deportation of the Japanese and how would this affect plans for inactivating the China theater?⁴²

Prior to seeing this message, General Wedemeyer on his own initiative sent to General Eisenhower a resumé and some conclusions and recommendations that he hoped would help solve some of the problems in China. The US Minister to China, Mr. Walter Robertson, concurred with his views. In this message on 20 November, General Wedemeyer stated that the Generalissimo could control South China, provided he inaugurated internal reforms and accepted assistance from foreign administrators and technicians. However, Chiang Kai-shek could not pacify Manchuria and North China for months and perhaps years unless he achieved an accommodation with the Soviet as well as the Chinese Communists. General Wedemeyer considered that the chances for a Communist-Kuomintang understanding were remote. Moreover, the Red Army was collaborating with the Communists and obstructing Central Government troops.

In these circumstances, General Wedemeyer acknowledged that "China is incapable of repatriating the millions of enemy troops and civilians within her borders and also solving her political and economic problems." The United States, then, could either forsake an ally or enter a civil war. Personally, General Wedemeyer retained confidence in China's ability to solve her problems; he proposed to provide the Central Government with moral encouragement and material aid but to avoid military participation "unless world peace is definitely jeopardized thereby." Specifically, General Wedemeyer recommended: (1) that he be relieved immediately from the position of Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo; (2) that his decision to evacuate all US forces either be approved, or that his directive be amended to justify their retention; and (3) that consummation of plans for a Military Advisory Group be withheld until appropriate political and military stabilization had been accomplished.⁴³

Three days later, on 23 November, General Wedemeyer replied to the questions that General Eisenhower had passed on to him on 19 November at the behest of the State Department. Whether or not the US Marines should remain in China was a matter that "should be contingent upon projected United States policy," General Wedemeyer believed. He noted that the Japanese could have been readily removed if the Chinese Communists had not interfered. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had diverted his forces to oppose the Communists and was using Japanese troops to protect vital installations and lines of communication. The Communists, for their part, appeared determined to seize Japanese arms, manufacture incidents involving Americans, and secure control of strategic areas. Thus, if the Marines remained, it seemed "absolutely impossible" to avoid US involvement in civil war and direct support of the Nationalists against the Communists. If they withdrew, on the other hand, the Japanese might turn into "an arrogant, independent armed force" and the Communists would portray evacuation as a "complete victory for their invidious propaganda program and acts of intimidation." General Wedemeyer ended his message by shunting the dilemma back to the State Department:

Frankly the State Department must in my opinion assume full responsibility for the acts of armed forces faithfully employed in the implementation of United States policies. . . . If the unification of China and Manchuria under Chinese

National Forces is to be a United States policy, involvement in fratricidal warfare and possibly in war with the Soviet Union must be accepted and would definitely require United States forces far beyond those presently available in the Theater.⁴⁴

The War and Navy Departments still hoped to steer a course safely between evacuation and intervention. On 26 November, Secretaries Patterson and Forrestal told Secretary Byrnes that they firmly believed "the most important military element in the Far East favorable to the U.S. is a unified China, including Manchuria, friendly to the U.S. This is the best assurance against turmoil and outbreak of war in the Far East." Only the Nationalist Government could unite China within the near future. Should the United States decline to take definitive action on its behalf, "there is only slight possibility that China will emerge from chaos." If the United States intended to take positive measures, however, major assistance in repatriating the Japanese was plainly essential. Necessarily, US forces "might be associated with and might at times become involved in internal strife." From these premises, the two secretaries drew several conclusions:

1. The China problem must be solved primarily on the basis of political considerations rather than immediate military necessity.
2. General Wedemeyer's directive should be amended to permit the continued commitment of US Marines in North China "for the present" and to allow their assistance to the Nationalist Government in repatriating the Japanese. The possibility that such action would involve "at least incidental aid to the Nationalist Government in the controversy with the Communists" should be frankly accepted.
3. There being no military justification for General Wedemeyer's continuation as Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo, a political determination on this subject should be rendered by the Secretary of State.
4. A Military Advisory Group should be created without delay, provided US policy contemplated retaining the Marines and actively supporting the Nationalist Government in its quest for unity. Establishment should be deferred, however, if US policy was to be characterized by either "wait-and-see" or withdrawal of support.
5. The United States should consider approaching other great powers, particularly the USSR, in the hope of solving such problems as control of Manchuria by political means.
6. The State Department should provide a definitive policy statement pertaining to the next several years.⁴⁵

Meeting on the morning of 27 November, Messrs. Byrnes, Acheson, Forrestal, and Patterson explored this explosive situation. Mr. Acheson wanted to know whether more Nationalist troops could be supported logistically in North China. He also asked what Chiang Kai-shek's attitude would be toward evacuation of the Japanese if this meant that the Communist forces would move into evacuated areas and seize some Japanese arms. Evacuation of all Japanese soldiers and civilians from North China, he noted, could take four months or longer. Secretary Forrestal stated that the United States could not "yank the Marines out of Northern China now" nor did he believe that the US public adequately understood the

true situation in China. The Secretary of the Navy suggested that the problem might be discussed "realistically" with Soviet officials or that the United States might attempt to involve the new United Nations organization in the situation.

Further discussion among these officials brought out that the Soviet Union had promised both the President and the Nationalists that it would support only the Nationalist Government and had assured Chiang Kai-shek that it would not permit "armed Communists" to enter Manchuria. There seemed little value, however, in discussing with the Soviet Government matters in which it could only be asked to carry out its promises. Secretary Byrnes commented that the "wise course" might be creation of Kuomintang-Communist coalition, perhaps coercing Chiang Kai-shek into this arrangement if necessary. Mr. Acheson remarked that the State Department was trying to prepare a three-tiered policy: (1) moving more Nationalist armies northward; (2) arranging truces in areas evacuated by the Japanese; and (3) seeking a political settlement between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists. Secretary Byrnes said that, if such an approach proved possible, Ambassador Patrick Hurley (then in Washington) should carry it to China for "urgent presentation" to the Generalissimo.

A few hours later, Ambassador Hurley astounded the administration by announcing his resignation. The Ambassador bitterly assailed "the Hydra-headed direction and confusion of our foreign policy," which he attributed to Foreign Service officers' affinity for both communism and imperialism.⁴⁶

The crystallization of US-China policy continued to be a laborious process—agonizingly slow, from the JCS standpoint. Admiral Leahy, for example, privately complained that lack of formal guidance and dependence upon newspaper reports "makes it practically impossible for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to issue workable directive to commanders in the field." On 30 November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised CG, USFCT, CINCAFPAC, and CINCPAC, that the State Department was pondering a policy directive specifying that the United States would retain the marines for the time being, assist in repatriation, and furnish the Central Government with military supplies and means for moving additional troops into North China. The message concluded by asking for their comments.⁴⁷

General Wedemeyer replied on 4 December citing several significant unanswered questions and ambiguities and asking that he be given guidance on them, even though he realized that the policy described for him was only "under consideration." It appeared to him that the policy being considered would make Japanese evacuation primarily a US responsibility. Apparently the United States was prepared to accept that, in the process, it would have to become involved in fighting between the Nationalists and Communists and very possibly would strain its relations with the Soviet Union. He had a better idea. "I should like to suggest," he informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "that the US policy might properly visualize the early and orderly repatriation of Japanese throughout the China Theater and the concurrent establishment of trusteeship by China, France, US, Britain, and USSR over Manchuria and Korea. I believe from a long-range viewpoint, the establishment of a trusteeship in those areas will contribute to stabilization in the Far East. . . ." This would have the effect, regardless of whether or not there was a revolution in China, of preserving world peace. . . ." We would

create an Allied buffer area and tend to eliminate the danger of serious conflagration in the Far East. Further, from the US viewpoint this would be a sound approach to preclude the possible establishment of USSR puppet states in Manchuria and Korea." The Joint Chiefs of Staff merely answered that firm instructions must await a policy determination by the State Department.⁴⁸

On 7 December, General MacArthur, with the concurrence of CG, USFCT, and CINCPAC, gave the Joint Chiefs of Staff an assessment of transportation requirements in China. Chiang Kai-shek wanted to send six more armies (approximately 200,000 men) by sea to North China. Additionally, 500,000 Japanese soldiers and civilians could be brought to Chinese ports for shipment every month. On 7 December, these three senior commanders in the Japan-China area sent the Joint Chiefs of Staff a schedule for completing these tasks. They suggested that this assistance "be made available as [a] basis for negotiation by the American Ambassador to bring together and effect a compromise between the major opposing groups. . . ." The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in turn, transmitted this proposal to President Truman.⁴⁹

On 11 December, President Truman approved the schedule for transportation on Chinese armies forwarded to him by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Later that same day, the President conferred with General Marshall, Secretary Byrnes and Admiral Leahy. General Marshall observed that, if Chiang Kai-shek failed to make reasonable concessions and the United States then abandoned him, China would remain weak and divided and the USSR might win control of Manchuria—all of which would mean "loss of the major purpose of our war in the Pacific." He asked whether, in order to keep this from happening, it were intended for him to proceed with assistance to Chiang Kai-shek in moving more troops into North China. President Truman and Secretary Byrnes agreed that he should do so in order to complete the evacuation of Japanese from that area.⁵⁰

General Marshall's Mission to China

In the three months since V-J Day, the rivalry between the Communists and Kuomintang for control of China had intensified at an alarming rate. President Truman and his advisers, however, remained committed to achievement of a "strong united and democratic China." To advance the attainment of this goal, the President on 27 November 1945, announced the appointment of General of the Army George C. Marshall as his Special Representative to China with the personal rank of Ambassador.⁵¹

The President's instructions to General Marshall, issued on 15 December, affirmed that the administration would seek: a cessation of hostilities and a national conference of major political parties. The United States would "continue to recognize the National Government of China and cooperate with it in international affairs and specifically in eliminating the Japanese influence in China." Marines would remain in North China for that purpose. For the same reason, the United States would give military supplies to the Central Government and trans-

port Nationalist troops into liberated areas—including Manchuria but excluding places where their introduction might prejudice military truces and political negotiations. Beyond these “incidental effects,” the United States would not try through military intervention to influence the course of any internal strife. Necessarily, major responsibility for peacemaking rested with the Chinese themselves. Creation of a “broadly representative government” would compel the Communists to eliminate their autonomous army and require the Kuomintang to end its “one-party” rule. As China progressed toward peace and unity, the United States stood ready to supply a military advisory group and to assist the Nationalist Government in economic rehabilitation.

Complementary instructions were sent to General Wedemeyer by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In outlining his authorities and responsibilities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, in part, “US assistance . . . may include the transport of Chinese National Government troops to Manchuria. . . . Further US transportation of Chinese troops to North China . . . will not be undertaken except upon specific instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In carrying out movement, North China ports will not be used except as necessary for the movement of troops and supplies into Manchuria.”⁵²

General Marshall arrived in China on 20 December 1945. He began at once efforts to bring together the Nationalist and Communist leaders, and to convince them to heal the breach between them and to work together for the betterment of all China.⁵³ In spite of General Marshall’s best efforts, fighting between Nationalist and Communist forces broke out again in Manchuria. The conflict was abetted by the major powers on both sides: The United States transported six Nationalist armies to Manchuria; the Soviet Union turned over captured Japanese arms and equipment to the Communists.

Hoping to induce the Soviets to remove their forces from Manchuria, General Marshall and General Wedemeyer urged an early inactivation of the China Theater. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to closing the theater on 1 May. Also, since Japanese repatriation was practically completed, the marines in North China began withdrawing. Their numbers fell to 22,000 by September 1946. The Soviets departed from Manchuria during May.⁵⁴

Enjoying a three-to-one superiority over the Communists, Chiang’s armies then scored impressive advances; Kuomintang leaders concluded that they could crush the Communists completely. On 29 July 1946, at General Marshall’s instigation, the US Government imposed an embargo upon arms shipments to China. This sanction was meant to pressure Chiang Kai-shek into cooperation with the US plans but it did not sway him. Fighting soon spread throughout North China, and signs of economic disintegration appeared. In spite of apparent successes, Nationalist forces became badly overextended; General Marshall vainly warned Chiang Kai-shek that continued conflict might cause the collapse of the Nationalist Government.⁵⁵

By the autumn of 1946, General Marshall had come to realize the futility of his efforts. As early as 5 October he had proposed to President Truman that the mission be terminated. He ended mediation efforts in November but remained in China for the time being. President Truman nominated him to be Secretary of

State on 7 January 1947, and he left China the next day. He announced upon leaving that his mission had failed because "sincere efforts to achieve settlement have been frustrated time and again by extremist elements in both sides." Still, he hoped that a taking of power by Communist and Kuomintang liberals (under Chiang's leadership) might yet prove to be China's "salvation."⁵⁶

Secretary Acheson, later analyzing the failure of the United States to achieve its primary objective of a stable government, noted that the objective was unrealizable because neither the Nationalists nor the Communists desired it. The Communists refused to accept conditions that would limit their freedom to "communize" all of China while the Nationalists "cherished the illusion, in spite of repeated advice to the contrary from our military representatives, that they could destroy the Communists by force of arms." The second US objective, defined by Secretary Acheson as "assisting the National Government to establish its authority over as wide areas of China as possible" failed of achievement because Nationalist military strength was "illusory and . . . their victories were built on sand."

At a later date, during his testimony at the hearings on the relief of General MacArthur, General Marshall placed most of the blame for the failure of his mission on the Communists. They had, he said, made bitter attacks against the United States and against him personally. This made it "inconceivable" that any useful mediation could be accomplished. "There was no longer, at that time . . .," he stated, "a possibility in the immediate future of dealing on a practical basis with the Communist regime."⁵⁷

Search for a New China Policy

Even before General Marshall's recall, the first proposal was put forward for reevaluating the policy of reconciliation that he had been unsuccessful in carrying out. The growing possibility that General Marshall's mission might end in failure alarmed the Joint Staff Planners. Exacerbating their concern, Soviet Premier Stalin had recently called publicly for the withdrawal of US forces from China, and the US press had been suggesting pessimistically that the United States should get out of Chinese affairs. Fearful that the United States might adopt such an unfortunate course, the JPS, collaborating with the JSSC, presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a somber report on 17 October 1946 warning of the dangers of failure in China. In so doing, the committee called for a complete review of US policy toward China, thus becoming the first US agency to do so.

The members of the two JCS committees argued that the USSR was determined to extend its control and influence whenever possible. The military security problems being raised by Soviet actions in China were roughly parallel to those that had been raised by their actions in Turkey. Chinese communism was proving merely to be a tool of Soviet policy. If the United States withdrew from Chinese affairs, the Nationalist Government might well succumb to Soviet power, which then would spread towards Indochina, Malaysia and India. Soviet

superiority in the Far East, coupled with "almost overwhelming" strength in Europe and the Middle East, could then seriously threaten US military security. This being so, a "fundamental element" of US policy should be "to assure that China will not drift under Soviet control." If mediation efforts collapsed, therefore, the United States should resolve (1) to support the Nationalist Government "by all means short of actual armed intervention in internal strife" and (2) to retain American forces in China until their removal would not imperil US objectives. Furthermore, the American public should be awakened to the fundamental issues at stake.⁵⁸

After examining this staff submission, Admiral Leahy rejected it on the grounds that it covered "almost exclusively matters of political policy that are not within the cognizance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." They possessed "no authority or right," he declared, to communicate with the Secretaries "on any subject that is not exclusively military in its character and purpose." Even if a military justification could be found, Admiral Leahy did not believe that "any useful purpose would be served" by broaching the matter "at the present time."⁵⁹

This proved to be a decisive rebuff. On 31 October, Admiral Nimitz recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff attempt no further action. However, since they might later find it right and proper to address the secretaries on non-military matters, he suggested that they refrain from endorsing Admiral Leahy's argument. On 6 December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed simply to note the staff submission.⁶⁰

President Truman, however, reaffirmed his faith in the current policy toward China in a major policy address on 18 December. He reviewed the course of US policy toward China and, while finding the policy correct, admitted that it had to this point failed. China, he charged, "... has a clear responsibility to the other United Nations to eliminate armed conflict within its territory as constituting a threat to world stability and peace." The United States did not intend to become involved in the fighting between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists. "We are pledged not to interfere in the internal affairs of China," the President declared. "While avoiding involvement in their civil strife, we will persevere with our policy of helping the Chinese people to bring about peace and economic recovery in their country."⁶¹

With the advent of a new Secretary of State and at his direction, the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, had his staff draw up a detailed analysis of the current US policy on China with emphasis on tactics being used. On 7 February 1947 the Director, Mr. John Carter Vincent, sent this analysis to Secretary Marshall. Mr. Vincent discussed the ways in which US aid to China could spur reform and democratization in the Chinese Government. In the economic field, the character of the projects proposed by the Chinese would determine US readiness to supply assistance; sincerity of purpose ought to outweigh actual achievements. As for arms and ammunition, Chiang already had a supply sufficient to withstand a general Communist offensive in the "unlikely" event one was made. The United States probably would prove unwilling to provide the Generalissimo with enough equipment and support to enable him to destroy the Communists. Conversely, limited assistance might encourage the

Central Government to continue an inconclusive war which could cause its collapse. In fact, premature action on military assistance might prevent any possibility of genuine reform. It seemed preferable, therefore, to let Nationalists and Communists "reach some kind of solution or equilibrium without outside interference."⁶²

On 11 February 1947, Secretary of State Marshall sent Mr. Vincent's memorandum to Secretaries Forrestal and Patterson along with eight recommendations for US policy developed by the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. These recommendations were that:

(1) We continue to encourage China to achieve unity by democratic methods of consultation and agreement.

(2) We maintain a constructive and sympathetic (as distinguished from exacting) attitude in determining the extent to which conditions in China should improve as a prerequisite to giving economic assistance.

(3) We withhold military aid to China in any form which would contribute to or encourage civil war.

(4) We maintain a modest Military Advisory Group in China and to this end support in Congress the general Military and Naval Missions Bill.

(5) We defer action on a Military Advisory Group Bill.

(6) In any legislation authorizing the supply of military equipment to China, the Secretary of State has final decision with regard to the time, type and quantity of disposals of such equipment.

(7) We continue to withhold for the present delivery of additional military-type equipment under the 8 $\frac{1}{3}$ Air Group Program.

(8) We approve the transfer to China of the 159 mercantile ships, subject to determination of China's ability to operate them effectively.⁶³

On the following day the Secretaries of War and Navy met with Secretary Marshall to discuss the policy review. Neither of the Service Secretaries had had sufficient time to study the State Department paper and stated that they wished to study it in more detail with their staffs. Secretary Marshall, speaking on the basis of his experience as a mediator, gave the opinion that the only possible solution in China was to throw out the "reactionary clique" within the Nationalist Government and to introduce liberals from both the Kuomintang and Communist parties.⁶⁴

Later in the month both Service Secretaries commented to General Marshall on the paper. Secretary Forrestal did not address the points in the paper but instead suggested to the Secretary of State that the United States send to China a panel of experts in business and industry. "I believe it would be helpful to your general objective of making it plain to the Chinese that we are willing to be of help to them but not as a source of charity which turns to the particular piratical

group that you found leeching the economic health and prosperity of China," Mr. Forrestal told General Marshall.⁶⁵

Secretary of War Patterson had more detailed and substantive comments. He agreed that a "democratic multiparty government" was eminently desirable and hoped that such a regime eventually would emerge. Nonetheless, he doubted that the Communists would join any liberal coalition unless they could thereby control or destroy the Nationalist Government. There were, after all, basic differences between the Chinese Communists and any noncommunist party. Thus a resolve to withhold economic assistance pending political progress might be "tantamount to a decision that we will do nothing about the problem in the foreseeable future." Moreover, the Secretary said that it seemed exceedingly difficult to distinguish between forms of military aid that would and would not contribute to civil war. Specifically, he insisted that there be no repetition of the "impossible situation" confronting General Wedemeyer in 1945, when he was instructed to assist the Nationalist reoccupation of North China but avoid entanglement in internal strife.⁶⁶

The primary objective should be the preservation of Chiang Kai-shek's regime. "I do not believe that the US should be prepared to accept with equanimity the military collapse of the Nationalist Government," Secretary Patterson stated. "In the event of such a collapse the Chinese Communist Party, as the only strong and disciplined group in China, would be in a strong position to seize control of the entire country, with or without Russian support. I believe that this is an aspect of the problem which should be considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the light of the strategic situation in the Far East, and particularly in Manchuria."

Turning to the problems of furnishing military aid to the Nationalist Government, Secretary Patterson pointed out that the provision of such aid in limited amounts had been US policy toward China since V-J Day. The actual delivery of aid could not be achieved, however, because of the embargo on arms shipments, unfavorable conditions in China, legal and financial problems, lack of transportation, insufficient stocks, and deterioration in storage. Further delays in delivery would only make matters worse as deterioration of stockpiles accelerated and both men and money became even more scarce. If it were decided to reinstate military supply to China, unless special funds were made available, the United States might find itself in a very embarrassing position through inability to deliver the goods. "... It is essential," Patterson concluded, "that the War Department be informed as soon as possible of (a) the extent to which these programs are to be carried out, and (b) the timing of such implementation as will be required. Unfavorable public and Congressional reaction may be expected if this equipment steadily deteriorates, or if a great expenditure of funds and manpower is required to maintain or replace it."⁶⁷

In his answer, Secretary Marshall drew heavily upon Mr. Vincent's memorandum of 7 February. He agreed that attainment of unity seemed doubtful, but argued that obstacles did not invalidate the need to encourage unification and democratization. Concerning economic assistance, the Secretary reiterated that some reform was an essential prerequisite. He stipulated, however, that "sincer-

ity of purpose" would be awarded greater weight than actual achievements. Turning to military aid, Secretary Marshall promised to end the embargo if the Nationalist began to suffer such "military anemia" that a successful Communist offensive became possible. Although this appeared unlikely, developments required "most careful day-to-day watching." Actually, he preferred to let the two factions fight to a stalemate without outside interference. If the United States found evidence of Soviet materiel support for the Communists, of course, an immediate reassessment would become imperative. Presently, however, the Secretary saw no justification for ending the embargo:

There is a strong doubt in my mind that, even if the United States were willing to give a large amount of munitions and support to the Chinese Government, it would be able within a reasonable time to crush the Communist Armies and Party. Limited amounts of munitions would encourage the Koumintang military leaders to continue their inconclusive war which, for economic reasons, will lead, I fear, to the disintegration of the National Government.

If we let down the bars now on munitions shipments to China, it would be very difficult to control the flow not only from the United States but also from other countries [i.e., the USSR]. Moreover, those reactionaries in the Chinese Government who have been counting on substantial American support regardless of their actions and party corruption would have cause to conclude that they were right. Premature action on any proposal for military aid to China might thus prevent any chance of genuine reform in the Government which, in the last analysis, is the only practical method of combating the challenge of the Communists.

Nonetheless, Secretary Marshall agreed—and SWNCC directed—that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should study the matter of furnishing US equipment and the chances of a Nationalist collapse and a Communist takeover in China.⁶⁸

While a JCS paper was being prepared, the military outlook changed markedly. During the spring of 1947, the Communists launched a series of successful offensives in Manchuria. US observers noted that Nationalist morale was crumbling badly. Inflation continued uncontrolled. Students organized massive strikes against the Nationalist Government. On 26 May, the United States ended its embargo; Secretary Marshall approved the transfer of small arms ammunition and transport planes and spare parts authorized under the 8½ Group Program. On 7 June 1947, Ambassador John Leighton Stuart advised Washington that the Nationalists confronted "probability of a military debacle of large proportions" in northeast China.⁶⁹

The JCS Memorandum of 9 June 1947

Amid this tense atmosphere, on 9 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted their recommendations to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. In the main, the Joint Chiefs of Staff relied on the arguments that had been developed in the October staff paper withheld by them because of Admiral Leahy's

objections.⁷⁰ They asserted that Soviet policies were aimed at expanding Soviet control and influence wherever it could be done in Europe, in the Middle East and in China. The principal difference between the situation that existed in China and that prevailing in the Middle East was that in China there was no united national government, such as Turkey, on which effective resistance to Soviet moves to expand could be based.

The Soviets obviously had prepared a long-range program which included replacing US influence in China with their own and seizing control of the "great resources and industrial potential" of Manchuria. They intended to achieve this latter goal by integrating Manchuria into the Siberian economy. Should they succeed it could mean economic ruin and collapse for the Nationalist Government.

There were those who portrayed the Chinese Communists as "basically different" from other communists. This was really not so. The Chinese Communists, the Joint Chiefs of Staff charged, "as all others, are Moscow inspired and thus motivated by the same basic totalitarian and anti-democratic principles as are the communists parties in other countries of the world." They were, accordingly, "tools of Soviet policy."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff blamed Soviet actions in Manchuria for the success of the Chinese Communists there. The Soviets had timed their withdrawal to allow the Communists to supply themselves freely from the surrendered Japanese equipment "abandoned" by the Soviets. They had conversely used every means to thwart the Nationalist Government forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that China had become one of the "great powers" principally through US support and insistence. A continuation of the current situation, with the Communists in armed opposition to the established Nationalist Government, could prevent China from carrying out its commitments to the United Nations. Should the Communists prevail over the Nationalists, it would have the effect of removing from the UN Security Council a vote "friendly to the United States" and replacing it with a vote controlled by the USSR.

The United States could assist and strengthen the Chinese Nationalist Government or it could wash its hands entirely of China and allow the Soviets to take over. This latter eventuality was anathema to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who pointed out that "the military security of the United States will be threatened if there is any further spread of Soviet influence and power in the Far East. Early countermeasures are called for if this danger of Soviet expansion is to be halted. With a disarmed and occupied Japan, the only Asiatic government at present capable of even a show of resistance to Soviet expansion in Asia is the Chinese Nationalist Government."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff criticized US aid policy to China since the end of the war as "piecemeal and uncoordinated." In fact, they felt that US policy towards China had had no firm objectives other than the hope of influencing the Nationalists and Communists to reach a peaceful solution of "their irreconcilable differences." It was their opinion that even small amounts of US military assistance to the Nationalists would strengthen their morale and at the same time weaken that of the Communists. It would probably enable the Nationalists to establish control over areas now held by the Communists. "... From the military point of view,"

the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued, "carefully planned, selective and well supervised assistance to the National Government, under conditions which will assure that this assistance will not be misused, will definitely contribute to United States security interests. Such assistance," they continued, "should facilitate the military development which appears essential for the unification and stabilization of China. It should enable China more effectively to resist Soviet expansionist efforts in the Far East and will thus contribute to the military security of the United States. In addition, it should be a stabilizing factor throughout the Far East."

Referring to the policy recently proposed by President Truman and approved by the Congress for aid to Greece and Turkey, later to become known as the Truman Doctrine, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that to be effective from the military point of view this policy must be "applied with consistency in all areas of the world threatened by Soviet expansion." Should US action in Greece and Turkey temporarily deter the Soviets in those areas, they might accelerate their expansion in the Far East, thus hoping to gain control of areas which would out-flank the Near and Middle East.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff then presented the SWNCC with the major conclusions that they had reached as a result of the current study of the Chinese problem. These were:

- a. The United States must seek to prevent the growth of any single power or coalition to a position of such strength as to constitute a threat to the Western Hemisphere. A Soviet position of dominance over Asia, Western Europe, or both, would constitute a major threat to United States security.
- b. United States security interests require that China be kept free from Soviet domination; otherwise all of Asia will in all probability pass into the sphere of the USSR.
- c. It is to United States military interests that the nations of Eurasia oppose Soviet expansion.
- d. Soviet expansionist aims and long-range objectives are being furthered in China by the military operations of the Chinese Communists.
- e. Soviet expansionist aims in China, furthered by operations of Chinese communists, are clearly incompatible with United States security.
- f. With a disarmed and occupied Japan, the only Asiatic government at present capable of even a show of resistance to communist expansion in Asia is the Chinese National Government.
- g. Unless the Chinese National Government is given military assistance sufficient to resist effectively communist expansion in China that government will probably collapse, thus terminating the only single and unified opposition to Soviet expansionist aims in Asia.

h. United States commitments to the United Nations in which China at United States insistence is one of the designated five great powers, require our support of the National Government's efforts to gain control over Manchuria; otherwise China's military potential of raw materials essential to her future development into a great power will be lost to her.

i. Time works to the advantage of the USSR in China. The continuation of chaos can be expected eventually to result in the fall of the Chinese National Government. United States assistance, including military aid, is necessary at an early date if any degree of stabilization for China is to be attained.

j. United States assistance to those nations on the periphery of Soviet controlled areas in Eurasia should be given in accordance with an overall plan. This plan should take into account the necessity for the maintenance of the Chinese National Government's resistance to the communists and should eventually provide sufficient assistance to that Government to eliminate all communist armed opposition, the latter in accordance with the priorities established by the over-all plan.⁷¹

Simultaneously, in a separate memorandum to his JCS colleagues, Admiral Nimitz stressed the need for swift action. "An essential feature," he said, "is the immediacy with which this course of action must be implemented. The rate of deterioration is now so rapid that delay may defeat any program." He proposed another JSSC study to describe "the conditions now developing" and to submit "concise recommendations from the military point of view as to actions required." Late in June, the committee produced a paper proposing speedy provision of ammunition and cessation of US troop withdrawals. These proposals were over taken by subsequent decisions.⁷²

JCS arguments had failed to convince the State Department. Mr. Vincent, for instance, still believed that direct and substantial military assistance would lead inevitably to intervention in the civil war, provoke a similar Soviet intrusion on the communist side, prove inconclusive unless US personnel took charge of operations and administration, and arouse great opposition among the Chinese people. At a meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy on 26 June, Secretary Marshall asserted that military aid posed a real dilemma. By rearming the Nationalists, the United States would be taking an indirect part in the civil war, yet by failing to do so, it would be favoring the Communists. Nonetheless, the Secretaries of War and Navy advocated positive action. Secretary Forrestal supported arms shipments, declaring that the United States should not be too concerned over possible Soviet reaction. Secretary Patterson concurred, contending that this assistance amounted only to supporting a recognized government, not necessarily taking part in the Chinese civil war.⁷³

Secretary Marshall admitted that the dilemma of what to do about China was urgent and needed a practical solution soon. On 2 July he informed Under Secretary of State Lovett that the US military leaders strongly favored giving China military and economic aid. He felt that the military reasoning on this matter was "somewhat impracticable." Nevertheless, there was a critical situation in China, and the United States must reconsider its policy to see what changes were

needed, particularly in a substantial program of aid. In extension of this view Secretary Marshall, on July 1947, recommended to President Truman that General Wedemeyer, former CG USFCT, return to China on a fact-finding mission. President Truman accepted this suggestion and on 9 July issued instructions to General Wedemeyer to proceed to China immediately "for the purpose of making an appraisal of the political, economic, psychological, and military situations—current and projected."⁷⁴

The JCS Contribution to US-China Policy

The role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in development of US policy toward China had, up to the point of General Wedemeyer's investigative tour, been less than influential. This can be attributed partly to the reluctance of Admiral Leahy to allow the Joint Chiefs of Staff to become embroiled in what he conceived to be a political matter. The Joint Chiefs both as individuals and as a corporate body were not really inclined to intrude in matters that might be beyond their competence or purview. In this regard they reacted to instruction to advise on force levels but made no effort to force the issue of whether or not the marines should remain in China—an issue that had more political than military ramifications. Nevertheless as the hour grew late, the Joint Chiefs of Staff overcame their inhibitions and in their 9 June memorandum to the SWNCC made little or no distinction between military and political advice.

Again, because divergent State Department views prevailed at the highest level, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had little influence on US policy toward China. The advice that they had given, when reduced to its essentials had amounted to an admonition "Help Chiang Kai-Shek help himself." Whether Chiang Kai-shek could instill the necessary efficiency in his corrupt and cumbersome regime so as to make effective use of any aid supplied by the United States was a question that only time could answer.

Principal Civilian and Military Officers

President and Commander in Chief

Franklin D. Roosevelt 04 Mar 33–12 Apr 45
Harry S Truman 12 Apr 45–20 Jan 53

Secretary of State

James F. Byrnes 03 Jul 45–20 Jan 47
George C. Marshall 21 Jan 47–20 Jan 49

Secretary of War

Henry L. Stimson 10 Jul 40–21 Sep 45
Robert P. Patterson 27 Sep 45–18 Jul 47

Secretary of the Navy

James V. Forrestal 19 May 44–17 Sep 47

Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief

Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy 20 Jul 42–21 Mar 49

Chief of Staff, US Army

General of the Army George C. Marshall 09 Feb 42–18 Nov 45
General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower 19 Nov 45–07 Feb 48

Chief of Naval Operations

Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King 12 Mar 42–15 Dec 45
Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz 15 Dec 45–15 Dec 47

Commanding General, US Army Air Forces

General of the Army Henry H. Arnold 09 Feb 42–28 Feb 46
General Carl Spaatz 01 Mar 46–25 Sep 47

Glossary

ABC-22	Joint Canada-United States Basic Defense Plan No. 2
AEC	Atomic Energy Commission
AMG	Allied Military Government
CCS	Combined Chiefs of Staff
CG, AAF	Commanding General, Army Air Forces
CG, USFCT	Commanding General, United States Forces, China Theater
CG, USFET	Commanding General, United States Forces, European Theater
CINCAFPAC	Commander in Chief US Army Forces, Pacific
CINCAL	Commander in Chief, Alaska
CINCFE	Commander in Chief, Far East
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet (prior to 1 January 1947)
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific (from 1 January 1947)
CINCPACFLT	Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CINCPOA	Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas
CINCSWPA	Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COMINCH	Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (abolished 10 October 1945)
CSA	Chief of Staff, Army
JAAN	Joint Action of the Army and Navy
JAB	Joint Advisory Board on American Republics
JANABAR	Joint Army and Navy Advisory Board on the American Republics
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee
JLC	Joint Logistics Committee
JLPC	Joint Logistics Plans Committee
JPS	Joint Staff Planners
JPWC	Joint Post War Committee
JSSC	Joint Strategic Survey Committee
JWPC	Joint War Plans Committee
LOC	Lines of Communication

Glossary

OJCS	Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
OWMR	Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion
PJBD	Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada- United States
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SACMED	Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean
SCAEF	Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force
SWNCC	State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
WDGS	War Department General Staff

Bibliographical Note

This history is based on official documents contained in the master record files of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. All of the documents used have been declassified. In no instance has it been necessary to withhold information or to avoid the use of a particular file because of classification. In the period covered by this volume JCS records were arranged under a case file system originated in 1942. This system is identified by the prefix CCS (Combined Chiefs of Staff) attached to each file folder title. The file location is included as the last item in footnotes unless inappropriate. If several documents are cited, all those contained in a single footnote "sentence" are to be found in the records file given at the end of the sentence. Successive references to a file are indicated by "same file" rather than "Ibid."

A wisely selected collection of primary source documents that is especially valuable to historians of this period is the excellent series of official volumes published by the Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, for the years 1945 through 1947. This series presents, by world area, key political and diplomatic documents as well as military documents bearing on foreign relations problems. Additionally, the Department of State *Bulletin*, published monthly and other special publications of the Department of State, to include the so-called "China White Paper" and volumes dealing with the United Nations and with German occupation policy have been consulted. Primary source material has also been obtained from the *Public Papers Of The Presidents, Harry S Truman*, for the years 1945, 1946 and 1947.

The author has been fortunate in having available a substantial body of autobiographical literature in the form of memoirs and recollections published by key participants in the events described in the history. Of especial value have been personal accounts by the following: Winston Churchill, Harry S Truman, William D. Leahy, James F. Byrnes, Dean Acheson, Ernest J. King, Henry L. Stimson, David E. Lilienthal and Arthur Krock. Three published biographies or edited diaries have furnished additional material of a secondary nature; these are James MacGregor Burns' biography of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Margaret Truman's reminiscences of her father, Harry S Truman, and Walter Millis' edited version of the diaries of James Forrestal.

Selected histories published by US Government agencies have been used to obtain accurate, detailed information of a specialized nature. These include volumes by Ray S. Cline (high command in Washington), Kent Roberts Greenfield,

Robert H. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William I. Keast (US Army ground forces); Maurice Matloff (WW II strategy); Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild (Western Hemisphere defense); T. H. Vail Motter (aid to Russia through Iran); Stanley W. Dziuban (US-Canada military relations); and Charles Romanus and Riley Sunderland (China theater). All these volumes were published in the Department of the Army "Green" series, *United States Army in World War II*. Statistics on US air power were obtained from the USAF History edited by Dr. Alfred Goldberg. In two substantial volumes, historians of the Atomic Energy Commission, Richard G. Hewlett, Oscar E. Anderson, and Francis Duncan have presented a definitive account of the US atomic energy programs during World War II and in the immediate postwar years. These volumes have been most helpful in supplementing the official records. The volume prepared by the US Marine Corps historians, Henry I. Shaw and Benis M. Frank, dealing with US Marine Corps operations in postwar China has furnished much valuable information for this history. Finally, two volumes prepared by historians of the JCS Historical Division have been most helpful: Vernon E. Davis' work on JCS organizational development and Kenneth W. Condit's history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the period 1947-1949.

Works by private scholars have also been consulted. General surveys of the period include works by the following authors: John L. Gaddis, John C. Campbell, William Hardy McNeill, John Russell Deane, and Herbert Feis. A more extensive list of authors has been relied upon for information on narrower, specialized areas of interest in the period of this history as follows: Leslie R. Groves (US WW II atomic programs); Lawrence J. Legere (unification of US armed forces); John Sparrow (demobilization of the US Army); Paul Y. Hammond (occupation of Germany); Samuel P. Huntington (1946 London Conference); George Lenczowski (Soviet/Western powers in Iran); Nasrollah Fatemi (Iranian oil); Joseph M. Jones (Marshall Plan); W. A. Shurcliff (US atomic tests); Edward Hirsch (Inter-American defense); J. Lloyd Mecham (Inter-American security); Arthur N. Young (US aid to China); and Tang Tsou (US policy toward China).

Notes

Chapter 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1945

1. Establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS activities during World War II, and the evolution of the JCS organization are described in detail in Vernon E. Davis, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II, Organizational Development*, vols. I and II. (Cited hereafter as Davis, *Organizational Development*.)
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had at one point in 1943 submitted to President Roosevelt a proposed charter that would have defined their duties, responsibilities and functions. The President had returned it to Admiral Leahy saying that to issue an executive order approving such a charter seemed to him "superfluous." Indeed he considered it might have a restrictive effect. Ray S. Cline, *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division* (1951), p. 99.
3. The title COMINCH, US Fleet, had been abolished on 10 October 1945 at the insistence of Admiral King and COMINCH duties taken over by CNO.
4. For further information on the postwar evolution and functioning of the organization, see JCS Hist Div, "Major Changes in the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1977."
5. Davis, *Organizational Development*, vol. I, p. 260.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
7. Davis, *Organizational Development*, vol. II, p. 444.
8. John L. Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947* (1972), p. 199.
9. Committee on Naval Affairs, US Senate, "Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for National Security," 22 Oct 45, Senate Cmte Print, 79th Cong, 1st sess, pp. 75-76.
10. Davis, *Organizational Development*, vol. I, pp. 221, 236-239.
11. Dept of State, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945*, (Washington 1949), pp. 347-348; Cline, *Washington Command Post*, pp. 326-327.
12. SM-4338-45 to SWNCC, 30 Nov 45, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 2.
13. JCS 1567/18, 29 Dec 45, same file.

Chapter 2. Between War and Peace

1. These JCS views were sent to the Secretary of State on 16 May 1944 in response to his request that they comment on "two dispatches concerning British proposals for the disposition of Italian overseas territories." Ltr, JCS to SecState, 16 May 44 (derived from JCS 838/1); Memo, SecState to ADM Leahy, 26 Apr 44, w/encl, Memo, SecState to President, "Disposition of Italian Overseas Territories," Encl and Att to JCS 838, 27 Apr 44; CCS 387.6 (4-26-44).
2. Memo, JCS to SecState, n.d., Encl to Ltr, JCS to Sec State, 3 Aug 44, Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter cited as *Foreign Relations* with approp. yr. and vol.), 1944, vol. I, *General* (1966), pp. 699-703.
3. For further information on communist tactics in these countries, see JCS 1350 (Ann to App A), 30 Apr 45; JCS Info Memo 391, 7 May 45; CCS 334 (9-13-44) sec 3; *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. IV (1968), pp. 135-419, 798-952; vol. V (1967), pp. 110-436, 464-666.
4. Prime Minister Churchill did not consider these arrangements "a rigid system of spheres of influence," but spoke of them as "immediate war time arrangements." Winston Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy* (1953), pp 72-81, 227-243; *Foreign Relations, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), 1945*, vol. I (1960), pp. 262-263.
5. Dept of State, *Post War Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945* (1949), pp. 344-346. *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945* (1955), pp. 214-226.
6. JCS Info Memo 374, 5 Feb 45, CCS 000.1 USSR (10-2-44) sec 2.
7. SM-2622 to SWNCC, 23 Jul 45 (derived from JCS 1443/2), CCS 092 Spitsbergen (7-13-45) sec 1. Also reproduced in *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. V (1967), pp. 92-97. The Soviet Union did not press its demands for these islands and the matter was eventually dropped.
8. James MacGregor Burns, *Roosevelt, The Soldier of Freedom, 1940-1945* (1970), pp. 564-573.

Notes to Pages 12–21

9. *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945* (1955), pp. 232–233 (Maps), 973–974; Dept of State, *The Treaty of Versailles and After—Annotations of the Text of the Treaty* (1947), pp. 793–794. The agreement on the Curzon Line at Yalta in effect legitimized Soviet seizure in 1939 of eastern territories that had been ceded to Poland as part of the Russian-Polish armistice in 1920. The line was named after Lord Curzon, the British diplomat responsible for this 1920 arrangement.

10. For complete text of Declaration on Liberated Europe see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, pp. 971–973.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 984.

12. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 4 Mar 45, pp. 321–326.

13. James F. Byrnes, *Frankly Speaking* (1947), pp. 21–45.

14. John C. Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs, 1945–1947* (1947), p. 57.

15. For text of letters between Churchill and Roosevelt, see *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. V (1967), pp. 505–506, 599–610.

16. *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. V, pp. 123–158. Msg, Churchill to Roosevelt, 13 Mar 45; *ibid.*, pp. 158–160.

17. Msg, Roosevelt to Stalin, *ibid.*, pp. 194–196.

18. Ltr, Stalin to Roosevelt, *ibid.*, pp. 201–204.

19. Msg, Roosevelt to Churchill, 11 Apr 45, *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. V, p. 210.

20. Msg, Moscow 115 to State, 13 Apr 45, *ibid.*, pp. 825–827.

21. Bohlen memorandum of White House Meeting, 23 April 1945, *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. V, pp. 252–255; Harry S Truman, *Year of Decisions* (1955), pp. 75–76.

22. *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. V, pp. 256–259.

23. Truman, *Year of Decisions*, p. 82.

24. “German Act of Surrender, May 8, 1945,” in *Documents on Germany, 1944–1961*. Printed for S. Com on Foreign Relations, 87th Cong, 1st sess, pp. 11–12. William Hardy McNeil, *America, Britain and Russia, 1941–1946* (1953), pp. 573–574. See John Russell Dean, *The Strange Alliance* (1947), pp. 162–181 for background on the difficulties of arranging surrender of Germany to the three allies.

25. “Protocol and Proceedings of the Yalta Conference,” “Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany . . .” in *Documents on Germany 1944–1961*, pp. 8–9, 12–13.

26. *Documents on Germany, 1944–1961*, pp. 1–12.

27. “Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany Nov 14, 1944, as amended,” *Documents on Germany, 1944–1961*, pp. 5–8.

28. Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs, 1945–1947*, p. 165. JCS 1067/6, 26 Apr 45, as amended by JCS 1067/8, 10 May 45, CCS 383.21 Germany (2–2–44) sec 4.

29. Dept of State, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939–1945*, p. 370. Earl F. Ziemke, *The US Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944–1946* (1975), pp. 98–106, 208–214. Paul Y. Hammond, “Directives for the Occupation of Germany: The Washington Controversy,” in *American Civil-Military Decisions* (1963), pp. 311–464. Dept of State, *Germany, 1947–1949, The Story in Documents* (1950), pp. 21–33.

30. *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. III, (1968), pp. 5–6, 153, 195; *Foreign Relations, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam) 1945*, vol. I (1960), pp. 350–351.

31. *Foreign Relations, Conference of Berlin, (Potsdam) 1945*, vol. II (1960), pp. 368, 393, 699.

32. For text of agreement on occupation and for map showing zones, see Dept of State, *Treaties and Other International Acts Series*, No. 1600.

33. Ltr, Churchill to Truman, 11 May 1945, *Foreign Relations, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam) 1945*, vol. I, pp. 6–7.

34. Ltr, Churchill to Truman, 12 May 1945, *Foreign Relations, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam) 1945*, vol. I, pp. 8–9.

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 64–81.

36. Msg, AFHQ to War Dept, NAF 872, 2 Mar 45, CM IN 2427, CCS 383.21 Italy (10–18–44) sec 1.

37. Msg, AFHQ to War Dept, NAF 932, 26 Apr 45, CM IN 24833, same file.

38. Msg, AFHQ to War Dept, NAF 914, 7 Apr 45, CM IN 6356; CCS 147/4, 16 Apr 45; Memo BG Cornwall-Jones to SJCS, same subj, 23 Apr 45; SM-1385 to BG Cornwall-Jones, 23 Apr 45; CCS 383.21 Italy (10–18–44) sec 1. *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. IV, pp. 1125–1127.

39. Memo, BG Lincoln to ADM Duncan, 28 Apr 45; SM-1483–45 to CAPT McDill, 28 Apr 45; Msg CCS to AFHQ, FAN 536, 28 Apr 45, WARX 74445; same file. *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. IV, pp. 1125–1127.

40. *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. IV, pp. 1127–1132.

41. *Ibid.*, pp. 1133–1148. Msg, AFHQ to War Dept, NAF 943, 2 May 45, CM IN 1671; Msg, AFHQ to War Dept, NAF 946, 4 May 45, CM IN 3546; Msg, AFHQ to War Dept, F70414, 4 May 45, CM IN 3513; CCS 383.21 Italy (10–18–44) sec 1.

42. Msg, AFHQ to War Dept NAF 948, 5 May 45, CM IN 4892; Msg, CCS to SACMED, FAN 547, 7 May 45, WARX 78673; CCS 383.21 Italy (10–18–44) sec 1. *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. IV, pp. 1142–1144.
43. Msg, AFHQ to War Dept, NAF 957, 10 May 45, CM IN 9442, CCS 383.21 Italy (10–18–44) sec 1.
44. Memo, ActgSecState to Pres Truman, 10 May 45, *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. IV, pp. 1151–1153.
45. Memo, CSA to ADM Leahy, 11 May 45, Army File, OPD 014.1, section II, case 25/31. *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. IV, p. 1155.
46. *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. IV, p. 1155. Msg, Pres to Prime Minister, No. 34, 11 May 45, Leahy Files, Folder 98 (printed in *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. IV, pp. 1156–1157, but with the omission of the last two sentences quoted above). “Memo by the US Chiefs of Staff,” 11 May 45, Encl to Memo, BG Lincoln to BG McFarland et al., 12 May 45; Msg, CCS to AFHQ, FAN 554, 12 May 45, WARX 81318; CCS 383.21 Italy (10–18–44) sec 1.
47. Msg, Prime Minister to Pres, No. 41, 11 May 45; Msg, Prime Minister to Pres, No. 44, 12 May 45; note by ADM Leahy attached; Leahy Files Folder 98. Also in Winston S. Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy* (1953), pp. 571–574. In a separate cable, the President told the Prime Minister that he considered it “impossible to make a conjecture as to what the Soviets may do when . . . the great part of [our] armies . . . are fighting in the Orient against Japan.” Msg, Pres to Prime Minister, No. 39, 14 May 45, Leahy Files, Folder 98. *Foreign Relations, Conference of Berlin, (Potsdam) 1945*, vol. I, p. 11.
48. Msg, AFHQ to War Dept., NAF 967, 14 May 45, CM IN 133055, CCS 383.21 Italy (10–18–44) sec 2. *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. IV, pp. 1161–1162, 1165–1167.
49. Truman, *Year of Decisions*, pp. 249–250.
50. Msg, Churchill to Truman, 19 May 45, *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. IV, pp. 1167–1168.
51. Msg, SHAEF to AFHQ, SCAF 397, 18 May 45, CM IN 17197; Msg, CCS to SHAEF, WAR 85319 (FAC 224, FAN 563), 20 May 45; CCS 383.21 Italy (10–18–44) sec 1. Msg, CCS to AFHQ, FAN 564, 21 May 45, WARX 85593; Leahy Files, Folder 76.
52. *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. IV, pp. 1170–1173. Msg, AFHQ to War Dept, NAF 983, 23 May 45, CM IN 22028, CCS 383.21 Italy (10–18–44) sec 2.
53. “Memo by the British Representatives,” 24 May 45, Encl to SM–1865–45 to JCS, 24 May 45; Memo, SecWar and SecNav to SecState, 23 May 45; Memo, ActgSecState to SecWar, 30 May 45, Encl to Memo, SWNCC to JCS, 20 May 45; CCS 383.21 Italy (10–18–44) sec 2. *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. IV, pp. 1176–1177.
54. Msg, Prime Minister to Pres, No. 64, 1 Jun 45, Leahy Files, Folder 98. Available records do not include a reply by the President. *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. IV, pp. 1176–1177, 1182–1183. Ltr, LTG W. D. Morgan to Secy, CCS “Agreement with Yugoslavs,” 21 Jun 45, CCS 383.21 Italy (10–18–44) sec 3.
55. *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. I, pp. 614–712. Dept of State, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939–1945*, pp. 582, 595, 611, 677, 679, 681.
56. *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. I, pp. 763–964.
57. Final Communiqué and Protocol of Proceedings, *Foreign Relations, The Conferences of Malta and Yalta, 1945*, pp. 968–977.
58. For details of the Conference and the resulting UN Charter and related matters see *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. I, passim.
59. Msgs, Churchill to Truman, 6 May 45; Truman to Churchill, 9 May 45, *Foreign Relations, 1945, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. I (1960) pp. 1–4.
60. *Foreign Relations, 1945, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. I, pp. 13–31.
61. *Ibid.*, pp. 24–62.
62. Dept of State Memos of Conversations on Stalin-Hopkins conversations, 26 May–6 Jun 45, *Foreign Relations, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam) 1945*, vol. I, pp. 24–60. Herbert Feis, *Between War and Peace* (1960), pp. 78–123, 139–151. *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. III, pp. 333–335.
63. Herbert Feis, *From Trust to Terror* (1970), pp. 291–295; *Foreign Relations, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam) 1945*, vol. I, pp. 1017–1018.
64. JCS 1418, 10 Jul 45; JCS 1418/1, 12 Jul 45; Record of JCS Actions at 196th Mtg, Item No. 5, 17 Jul 45; SM–2610 to SWNCC, 17 Jul 45; CCS 092 (7–10–45).
65. SM–2610 to SWNCC, 17 Jul 45, CCS 092 (7–10–45).
66. *Foreign Relations, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam) 1945*, vol. II, p. 1423, fn 1.
67. Unless otherwise cited, this section is based on *Foreign Relations, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam) 1945*, vols. I and II; Feis, *From Trust to Terror*, pp. 295–301; John L. Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947* (1972), pp. 240–242.
68. Msg, SHAEF to War Dept, SCAF 471, 3 Jul 45, CM IN 2876, App B to JCS 1426; JCS 1426, 20 Jul 45, and Dec On, 21 Jul 45; Memo, CSA to ADM Leahy, 22 Jul 45; CCS 334 Danube Navigation Agency (7–3–45). On 24 July, the CCS commended this plan to the US State Department and the UK Foreign Office. CCS 896/1, 24 Jul 45, same file.
69. *Foreign Relations, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam) 1945*, vol. II, pp. 654–658.

70. Campbell, *The United States and World Affairs, 1945–1947*, p. 60.
71. Feis, *From Trust to Terror*, pp. 36–37.
72. William D. Leahy, *I Was There* (1950), p. 383.
73. Development of the atomic bomb is treated in Chapter VI.

Chapter 3. US-Soviet Confrontation Intensifies: September 1945–March 1947

1. James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (1947), p. 92.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 97–98.
3. Mr. John Foster Dulles observed to Secretary of State Byrnes that the Soviet proposal would publicly humiliate France and China “for no ostensible reason other than that they had been on our side.” Memo, Dulles to SecState, 30 Sep 45. “London Council of Foreign Ministers,” vol. II, Part II, in Part VIII A, John Foster Dulles Papers (Princeton University).
4. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense* (1961) p. 34. Pertinent correspondence and records of individual meetings of the London Conference are set forth in *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. II, pp. 99–559.
5. JCS 1545, 9 Oct 45, and Decision Note On, 16 Oct 45, CCS 092 USSR (3–27–41) sec 1.
6. Msg, WDGs to SCAEF, WAR 16162, 13 Jun 45; Msg, SCAEF to War Dept, S 91011, CM IN 15356, 16 Jun 45; Msg, JCS to CG, USFET, WAR 26489, 3 Jul 45; Msg, CG, USFET, to War Dept, S 20565, CM IN 28883, 30 Aug 45; Msg, WDGs to CG, USFET, WAR 58601, 31 Aug 45; Msg, CG, USFET, to War Dept, S 21287, CM IN 3464, 3 Sep 45; CCS 370.02 Czechoslovakia (6–13–45). *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. IV, pp. 455–457, 464–466, 473–474, 477–479, 481–485.
7. Ltr, ActgSecState to SecWar, 17 Sep 45, App to JCS 1409/1, 17 Sep 45, CCS 370 Czechoslovakia (6–13–45). *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. IV, pp. 493–494.
8. SM–3682–45 to SWNCC, 6 Oct 45 (derived from JCS 1409/2), CCS 370.2 Czechoslovakia (6–13–45). See Chapter 5 for discussion of demobilization problems.
9. *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. IV, pp. 496–502.
10. *Ibid.*, vol. IV, pp. 502–503, 506–509.
11. “Address on Foreign Policy at the Navy Day Celebration in New York City,” 27 Oct 45, *Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry S Truman, 1945* (1961), pp. 431–438.
12. Extracts from Dept of State Memo, “Foreign Policy of the United States,” 1 Dec 45, Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946*, vol. I, *General; The United Nations* (1972), pp. 1134–1139.
13. Since this was not a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers and at the desire of the Big Three Powers, the Foreign Ministers of France and China were not present at the Moscow Conference. The correspondence and records of the Moscow Conference are reproduced in *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. II, pp. 560–826. See also, Feis, *From Trust to Terror*, p. 53.
14. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, p. 122. For more on creation of United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, see Chapter VI.
15. *Yearbook Of The United Nations, 1946–1947* (1947), pp. 328–336.
16. George Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran, 1918–1948* (1949), pp. 193–215.
17. Lenczowski, *Russian and the West in Iran, 1918–1948*, pp. 216–220. The US stationed service troops but no combat forces in Iran during WW II.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 284–289.
19. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 94.
20. Msg, Chargé in the Soviet Union to SecState, 12 Feb 46, *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. VI (1969), pp. 694–696. Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (1969), pp. 150–151. Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (1951), pp. 134–135. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, p. 255.
21. Msg, State 284 to Moscow, 3 Feb 46, *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. VI, p. 696, fn 44.
22. Msg, Moscow 511 to State, 22 Feb 46; *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. VI, pp. 696–709. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 151; Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 135–140. Evidence that the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw Kennan’s 8,000 word cable is available in the presence of a copy of the cable in JCS official files, CCS 092 USSR (3–27–45) sec 5.
23. SM–5062–46 to SWNCC, 21 Feb 46 (derived from JCS 1592/2); CCS 092 United States (12–21–45). Printed in *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. I (1972), pp. 1165–1166.
24. SM–5244–46 to SWNCC, 13 Mar 46 (derived from Encl B to JCS 1641/3); Memo, ActgState Mbr, SWNCC to JCS, 1 Apr 46, Encl to JCS 1641/4, 6 Apr 46; CCS 092 United States 12–21–45). Printed in *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. I, pp. 1167–1171.

25. Mr. Churchill's speech is reproduced in *Vital Speeches of The Day*, 15 May 1946, pp. 239–333.
26. Although President Truman denied prior knowledge of the contents of the speech, there is some evidence that he had read a copy of Churchill's final draft in advance. Churchill had read drafts to Secretary Byrnes and Admiral Leahy. Feis, *From Trust to Terror*, pp. 76–78; ADM William D. Leahy, *Diary*, 3 Mar 46, copy in National Archives.
27. Feis, *From Trust to Terror*, p. 79.
28. State Dept *Bulletin*, 10 Mar 46, p. 358.
29. Leahy, *Diary*, 3 Mar 46. JCS 1545/1, 9 Mar 46 and Dec On, 25 Mar 46, CCS 092 USSR (3–27–45) sec 5.
30. Msgs, State 385 to Moscow, 5 Mar 46, Moscow 682 to State, 6 Mar 46, *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. VII (1969), pp. 340–342, 348; Feis, *From Trust to Terror*, pp. 81–87; Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 94–96. Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran*, pp. 296–302.
31. Msg, State 425 to Moscow, 8 Mar 46, *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. VII, p. 348.
32. Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran*, pp. 298–299. Nasrollah Fatemi, "Oil Diplomacy" (1954), pp. 315–316. The Iranian Parliament never ratified the agreement establishing an Iranian-Soviet oil company.
33. JCS 1656, 15 Apr 46, CCS 092 (3–27–45) sec 6.
34. JCS 1656, 15 Apr 46; SM-5519-46 to SWNCC, 16 Apr 46 (derived from JCS 1656); CCS 092 USSR (3–27–45) sec 6.
35. Report by Secretary of State, Dept of State *Bulletin*, 28 Jul 1946, pp. 167–172.
36. JCS 1383/17, 14 Jul 46; JCS 1383/18, 16 Jul 46; SM-6447-46 to SWNCC, 5 Aug 46 (derived from JCS 1383/21), CCS 383.21 Italy (10–18–44) sec 9. *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. IV, pp. 822–827.
37. Msg, War Dept to CG, USFET, WARX 98317, 22 Aug 46; Msgs, ADM Leahy to Pres, White 34 and 35, 22 Aug 46; Msg, Pres to ADM Leahy, Blue 45, 22 Aug 46; Msg, War Dept to CG, USFET, WARX 81705, 27 Sep 46; Leahy Files, Folder 76. Msgs, Paris 4172 to State, 22 Aug 46; State SECDEL 730 to Paris, 22 Aug 46, *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. VI, pp. 927–928.
38. Venezia Giulia continued to be a source of friction. Anglo-American troops (one UK Brigade and one US regimental combat team) remained there until 1954, when Italy and Yugoslavia finally signed an agreement granting Trieste to Italy.
39. Ltr, Clark M. Clifford to ADM Leahy, 18 Jul 46, Encl B to JCS 1696, CCS 092 USSR (3–27–45) sec 9.
40. Memo, JCS to President, "Presidential Request for Certain Facts and Information Regarding the Soviet Union," 27 Jul 46 (derived from JCS 1696), CCS 092 USSR (3–57–45) sec 9.
41. The portion of the JCS report to the President dealing with a recommended US military policy is covered in Chapter 5.
42. The final report is printed verbatim in Arthur Krock, *Memoirs: Sixty Years on the Firing Line* (1968), pp. 419–428. Margaret Truman, *Harry S Truman* (1973) p. 347.
43. *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. VII, pp. 799–820.
44. Ltr, SecState to JCS, 6 Mar 46, Encl to JCS 1641, CCS 092 USSR (3–27–45) sec 5.
45. Ltr, JCS to SecState, 13 Mar 46 (derived from JCS 1641/3), same file, sec 6.
46. *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. VII, pp. 827–829, 836–838.
47. Feis, *From Trust to Terror*, pp. 181–182; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 195–196; Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 97; Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, p. 192.
48. Msg, State 4122, SecDel 676 to Paris, 15 Aug 46, *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. VII, pp. 840–842.
49. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, p. 192; Feis, *From Trust to Terror*, p. 182.
50. Note, ActgSecState to Soviet Chargé, 19 Aug 46, *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. VII, pp. 847–848. On 1 October US warships were placed permanently in the Mediterranean Sea. This task force was later designated the Sixth Fleet. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, p. 211.
51. Memo, JCS to Secs War and Navy, Encl to JCS 1704/2, 24 Aug 46, CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 1. Printed in *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. VII, pp. 857–858.
52. Ltr, ActgSecState to SecState, 12 Sep 46, *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. VII, pp. 209–213.
53. SC/R-184, 5 Feb 46; SWNCC 202/2, 21 Mar 46; *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. I, pp. 1141–1142, 1145–1160, fn 63, p. 1145.
54. Ltr, ActgSecState to SecState, 12 Feb 46, *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. VII, pp. 209–213.
55. Ltr, SecState to ActgSecState, 24 Sep 46, *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. VII, pp. 223–224, fn 76. The importance of this Byrnes statement can be judged from the contemporary comment of Mr. John D. Hickerson, Acting Director of the Office of European Affairs, Department of State. On 28 September Hickerson pointed out to Under Secretary Acheson that the Byrnes telegram was "of fundamental importance." "We are," Hickerson observed, "considering carefully this telegram from the Secretary in connection with our economic relations with all the countries of Europe."

56. Memo, Dir, NEA, to SecState, 21 Oct 46, *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. VII, pp. 893–897; fn 12, p. 894.

57. Memo, State Dept to SWNCC, 26 Sep 46, *ibid.*, pp. 515–516.

58. SM–6874–46 to SWNCC, 11 Oct 46 (derived from JCS 1714/3), CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 1. Printed in Memo, SWNCC to MGEN J. N. Hilldring, 12 Oct 46, SWN–4818, *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. VII, pp. 529–532.

59. For further information on the US wartime missions to Iran see T. H. Vail Motter, *The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia* (1952), pp. 473–477.

60. Memo, AsstSecState for Occupied Areas to USec State, 29 Oct 46, *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. VII, p. 255.

61. Memo, Dir, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson), to USecState, 18 Oct 46, w/att Memo, “Implementation of United States Policy Toward Iran,” same date, *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. VII, pp. 533–536, and fn 1, p. 535.

62. Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran*, p. 302.

63. *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. VII, pp. 240–245, 255, 278.

64. *Time*, 10 Feb 47, p. 30; 17 Feb 47, p. 30; 24 Feb 47, p. 30.

65. *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. V (1971) pp. 16–37.

66. Joseph M. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks* (1955), pp. 130–135. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 218–219. Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, p. 245. *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. V, pp. 41–42, 44–45.

67. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, pp. 135–138. *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. V, pp. 48–60. Available records do not contain GEN Eisenhower’s memorandum. In his memoirs, President Truman states that GEN Eisenhower “furnished a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff supporting the conclusion reached from a military point of view.” He is apparently referring to the JCS memorandum of 13 March described below. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 100.

68. *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. V, pp. 60–62. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 219. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, pp. 138–142.

69. It is noteworthy that nowhere in this address did the President specifically mention the Soviet Union. The forthcoming Foreign Ministers’ Conference at Moscow probably prompted Mr. Truman to avoid any direct attack. *Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S Truman 1947* (1963), pp. 176–180. Preparation of the President’s speech is described in Jones, *op cit.*, pp. 149–163, Truman, *op. cit.*, pp. 104–105, and *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. V, pp. 98–99, 121–123. During April–June, the British Government loaned the Greeks \$24 million in order to maintain their armed forces until US assistance became effective.

70. Memo, JCS to SecWar and SecNav, “Military Assistance to Turkey,” 13 Mar 47 (derived from JCS 1704/2), CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 2. *Foreign Relations, 1947*, pp. 110–114. The Joint Staff Planners also believed that, if war began, establishment of Allied forces in the Middle East offered the most promising initial course of action.

71. *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, pp. 254–255. *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. V, pp. 197–220. For subsequent developments, see Kenneth W. Condit, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 1947–1949*, Ch. 2.

Chapter 4. US Military Policy: Strategic Planning and Command Arrangements

1. App B, JCS 570, 570/1 and 570/2, successive drafts, 6 Nov 43, 15 Nov 43, and 10 Jan 44 respectively, all in CCS 360 (1–9–42) sec 2. See Chapter 7 for complete details of JSSC report and JCS further action on air base requirements.

2. Memo (Draft) Encl to JPS PM–44, “Preparation and Processing of Papers Relating to Certain Post-War Military Matters,” 8 Aug 45, CCS 381 (5–31–45) sec 1.

3. JPS PM–62, 17 Aug 45, CCS 381 (5–31–45) sec 1.

4. JCS 1496, 30 Aug 45, CCS 381 (5–13–45) sec 1; JCS 1496/3, 20 Sep 45, CCS 381 (5–13–45) sec 2.

5. Minutes, 167th Mtg, SecState Staff Cmte, 13 Nov 45; Memo, SC–169B, “Action on Joint Chiefs of Staff Statement of United States Military Policy,” 16 Nov 45, Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946*, vol. I, pp. 1118–1128. The State Department criticisms were not forwarded beyond the Department.

6. SWNCC 282, 27 Mar 46, *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. I, pp. 1160–1165; fn 69, p. 1160.

7. JCS 1518, 9 Oct 45, and Dec On, 10 Oct 45; Memo, ADM Leahy for SecWar and SecNav, “Strategic concept and plan for the employment of United States armed forces,” 9 Oct 45; Memo, SecWar to JCS, 12 Oct 45, encl to JCS 1518/3, same date; Memo, SecNav to JCS, 17 Oct 45, encl to JCS 1518/4, same date; CCS 381 (5–13–45) sec 2. This inclination toward a pre-emptive strike was carried no further and does not appear in later JCS strategic recommendations.

8. Minutes, JPS 240th Meeting, 6 Mar 1946, CCS 381 (5–13–45) sec 2.
9. That this paper, although not presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was consonant with their views, is evident in the fact that the portion dealing with the Middle East is very similar in content, and in at least one paragraph identical in wording, to the rationale forwarded by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State on 13 March 1946 relative to their appraisal of Soviet demands on Turkey. See Chapter 3.
10. JPS 789, 2 Mar 46; JPS 789/1, 13 Apr 46; CCS 381 USSR (3–2–46) sec 1.
11. See Chapter 3 for details of this Department of State analysis.
12. JCS 1641/5, 11 Apr 46, and Dec Amending JCS 1641/5, 20 Apr 46, CCS 092 USSR (3–27–45) sec 6.
13. JPS 789/1, 13 Apr 46, CCS 381 USSR (3–2–46) sec 1.
14. JWPC 432/3, 27 Apr 46, CCS 381 USSR (3–2–46) sec 2.
15. Minutes, JPS 249th Meeting, 8 May 46, CCS 381 USSR (3–2–46) sec 1; 252d Meeting, 18 Jun 46, same file, sec 2; 256th Meeting, 8 Jul 46, same file, sec 3.
16. These PINCHER studies are described or are contained in CCS 381 USSR (3–2–46) sec 3, Pt 1, sec 4, sec 5, and sec 6. See particularly JWPC 496, 16 Jul 47, “Global Planning Estimate,” same file, sec 6.
17. JWPC 496, 16 Jul 47; PM-573 to JWPC, 29 Aug 47; same file, sec 6. See Kenneth W. Condit, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Vol. II, 1947–1949*, Chapter 9, for details of guidance provided the JWPC at this time and of the subsequent planning efforts.
18. JCS 1696, 25 Jul 46, Encl A, CCS 092 USSR (3–27–45) sec 9. See Chapter 3 for more information on the JCS report to the President.
19. JWPC 486/1, 18 Dec 46, CCS 004.04 (11–4–46) sec 1.
20. PM-480, JPS to JLC, 10 Feb 47, CCS 004.04 (11–4–46) sec 3. PINCHER, because it dealt only with the initial phases of war and contained no force requirements, was obviously unsuitable as a basis for mobilization planning.
21. JCS 1725/1, 13 Feb 47, CCS 004.04 (11–4–46) sec 3. The disagreements over roles and missions are covered in Ch. 5.
22. Dec On JCS 1725/1, 1 May 47, CCS 004.04 (11–4–46) sec 3.
23. JCS 1259/7, 23 Mar 46, CCS 323.361 (2–26–45) sec 3.
24. JCS 1259/6, 1 Feb 46, CCS 323.361 (2–26–45) sec 3.
25. SM-4902, 1 Feb 46, Minutes, JPS 242d Mtg, 3–20–46; CCS 323.361 (2–26–45) sec 3.
26. JCS 1259/7, 23 Mar 46, same file.
27. JCS 1259/8, 20 Apr 46, same file.
28. JCS 1259/9, 5 Jul 46; JCS 1259/10, 11 Jul 46; same file.
29. JCS 1259/12, 17 Sep 46, CCS 381 (1–24–42) sec 3. Between 1925 and mid-1927, the War and Navy Departments had developed, laboriously, a pamphlet intended to cover the broader aspects of joint action. Two major problems beset the Services in this effort: (1) the definitions and functions of the major components of the armed forces; and (2) principles of command in joint operations. Eventually these problems were resolved to the satisfaction of both Services, and *Joint Action of the Army and Navy* was published. This pamphlet dealt primarily with coordination in the field, given a joint plan from the Washington level. It was revised from time to time; a general revision appeared in 1935. Davis, *Organizational Development*, vol. I, p. 22. Legere, *Unification of the Armed Forces*, pp. 83–84.
30. JCS 1259/13, 21 Sep 46, CCS 381 (1–24–42) sec 3.
31. JCS 1259/14, 23 Sep 46; Memorandum for Record, “Unified Command Structure, JCS 1259/12 and 1259/13,” undated (20 Sep 46); same file.
32. JCS 1259/17, 7 Oct 46, CCS 381 (1–24–42) sec 3.
33. JCS 1259/14, 23 Sep 46; JCS 1259/15, 27 Sep 46, same file, sec 3; JCS 1259/18, 22 Oct 46, same file, sec 4.
34. JCS 1259/21, 14 Nov 46; JCS 1259/23, 22 Nov 46; same file, sec 4.
35. Strategic Air Command (SAC) was established on 21 March 1946 as one of the AAF’s three major combat commands.
36. JCS 1259/20, 4 Nov 46; JCS 1259/22, 18 Nov 46; JCS 1259/24, 26 Nov 46; CCS 381 (1–24–42) sec 4.
37. JCS 1259/25, 4 Dec 46, same file.
38. In 1945, the Marianas-based B-29s of Twentieth Air Force, and later of US Army Strategic Air Forces, were controlled not by Admiral Nimitz on Guam but by General Arnold in Washington.
39. JCS 1259/26, 5 Dec 46, CCS 381 (1–24–42) sec 4.
40. Memo, JCS to Pres, 12 Dec 46 (derived from JCS 1259/27), same file.
41. Directive, JCS to CINCUSARPAC et al; 16 Dec 46, same file, sec 5.
42. On 12 July 1946 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had directed the JPS to complete recommendations for the deployment of US forces in the Pacific after the occupation in Japan and Korea ended. JCS

1259/11, 12 Jul 46, CCS 323.361 (2–26–45) sec 3. This is the only instance of deployment planning directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this period.

43. JCS 1259/36, 2 Apr 47, and Dec On, 17 Apr 47; Memo, JCS to Secs War and Navy, “Strategic Estimate and Deployment in the Pacific,” 17 Apr 47 (derived from JCS 1259/36), CCS 323.361 (2–26–45) sec 9.

44. Memo, JCS to Secs War and Navy, 17 Apr 47 (derived from JCS 1259/36), CCS 323.361 (2–26–45) sec 9.

Chapter 5. Postwar Military Forces: Planning and Problems

1. Statistical data has been derived from the following sources: Kent R. Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops* (1947), pp. 191–194; Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, William R. Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops* (1948), pp. 489–493; Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944* (1959), App. E, p. 555; Alfred Goldberg, ed., *A History of the United States Air Force, 1907–1957* (1957), pp. 105, 112; OSD (Comp), Progress Reports and Statistics, 28 Nov 56, quoted in “US Defense Policies Since World War II,” H. Doc. 100, 85th Cong, 1st sess, p. 78; *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, FY 1946*, p. 25.

2. Major John Sparrow, *History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army*, DA Pamphlet 20–210 (1952) (hereafter cited as Sparrow, *Demobilization in the Army*), p. 263; *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army, 1948*, pp. 292, 294; *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, FY 1947*, pp. 10, 26.

3. Except as otherwise noted, this section is based on Major William P. Moody, USAF, “Mobilization and Demobilization of Military Manpower,” Chapter VIII, JCS Historical Division (1954) as revised by Mr. Vernon E. Davis.

4. JCS 431/1, 21 Sep 43; Amendment to JCS 431/1, 28 Sep 43; CCS 370.01 (7–30–43) sec 1.

5. Encl B to JCS 431/1, 21 Sep 43, same file.

6. Sparrow, *Demobilization in the Army*, pp. 302–310.

7. CCS 776/3, 9 Feb 45, CCS 381 (1–19–45) sec 2. JCS 431/2, 21 Sep 43, CCS 370.01 (7–30–43) sec 1. Also in Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1945*, vol. III, *Conferences of Malta and Yalta* (1965), pp. 827–833.

8. JCS 521/12, 29 Mar 45, CCS 381 (2–8–43) sec 8.

9. JCS 521/15, 11 Apr 45; JCS 521/16, 11 Apr 45; same file, sec 9.

10. Sparrow, *Demobilization in the Army*, pp. 306–310. Hearings, *Demobilization of the Armed Forces*, S. Cmte on Military Affairs, 79th Cong, 1st sess, p. 34.

11. Remarks by CSA to Members of Congress, 20 Sep 45, CCS 370.01 (8–25–45) sec 1. Figures for the Navy are not available.

12. SM–2778 to ADM King and GEN Arnold, 7 Aug 45; Dec On JCS 1450, 12 Aug 45; same file.

13. Memo, JCS to Pres, 14 Aug 45 (derived from JCS 1465), CCS 370 (7–9–45) sec 1. *NY Times*, 15 Aug 45, p. 2; 2 Sep 45, p. 4. More than a year later the President proclaimed the official termination of hostilities in World War II as being effective at noon, 31 December 1946.

14. Ltr, Rep John M. Vorys to JCS, 25 Aug 45, Encl to JCS 1486, 27 Aug 45, CCS 370.01 (8–25–45) sec 1.

15. JCS 1486/1, 31 Aug 45; Ltr, JCS to Vorys, 11 Sep 45, Encl to JCS 1486/2, 12 Sep 45; same file.

16. JCS 1504, 8 Sep 45 w/note on action taken, 14 Sep 45; JCS 1497, 30 Aug 45; CCS 370 (7–9–45) sec 1. Upon approval, the operative portions of these two papers were issued as JCS Policy Memo 26, 14 Sep 45, and JCS Policy Memo 27, 21 Sep 45; same file, sec 2.

17. JCS 521/19, 27 Sep 45, CCS 381 (2–8–43) sec 10.

18. Many examples of the type of statement, letter and editorial that characterized the public, media and Congressional actions to bring about a speedier demobilization may be found in Sparrow, *Demobilization in the Army*, Chapter III.

19. Hearings, *Demobilization of the Armed Forces*, S. Cmte on Military Affairs, 79th Cong, 1st sess, p. 44. JPS 734/1, 4 Sep 45; JCS 521/19, 27 Sep 45; CCS 381 (2–8–43) sec 10. From 31 August through 30 September 1945 Army strength declined by 458,890. *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army, 1948*, p. 296.

20. JCS 521/19, 27 Sep 45, CCS 381 (2–8–43) sec 10. Hearings, *Demobilization of the Armed Forces*, S. Cmte on Military Affairs, 79th Cong, 1st sess, pp. 96, 174, 179.

21. JCS 521/20, 6 Feb 46, CCS 381 (2–8–43) sec 10.

22. For details of Soviet moves in Eastern Europe and elsewhere and of US concern generated by those actions see Chapters 2 and 3 passim.

23. JCS 1545, 9 Oct 45, and Dec On, 16 Oct 45; SM–3716, 10 Oct 45; CCS 092 USSR (3–27–45) sec 1.

24. The study in question was never completed. The JCS cancelled the study directive on 21 March 1946. Dec On JCS 1545/2, 25 Mar 46, same file. Sparrow, *Demobilization in the Army*, pp. 266–273.

25. Herbert Feis, *The China Tangle* (1953), pp. 422–423 citing memo of meeting of Byrnes, Patterson and Forrestal, 16 Oct 45; Walter Millis, (ed.), *The Forrestal Diaries* (1951), p. 102.

26. “Vital Speeches,” 15 Nov 45, pp. 76–78.

27. Memo, SecWar to SecState, 1 Nov 45, Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946*, vol. I, *General, The United Nations* (1972), pp. 1111–1112.

28. Ltr, SecState to SecWar, 29 Nov 45, *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. I, pp. 1128–1133.

29. Feis, *The China Tangle*, pp. 422–423. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 108, 110. Sparrow, *Demobilization in the Army*, p. 332.

30. James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (1947), p. 256.

31. Sparrow, *Demobilization in the Army*, pp. 152–153, 161–164, 235, 320–322.

32. *Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry S Truman, 1946*, (1962), p. 15.

33. Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, p. 129. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, pp. 255–256.

34. Statement by Gen of the Army Eisenhower to members of Congress, 15 Jan 46, CCS 370 (7–9–45) sec 2.

35. Sparrow, *Demobilization in the Army*, pp. 244–246.

36. *Public Papers, Truman, 1946*, p. 47.

37. JCS 1643, 10 Mar 46, and Dec On, 12 Mar 46, CCS 370 (3–8–46).

38. Sparrow, *Demobilization in the Army*, p. 281.

39. *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy FY 1947*, pp. 26–27; Sparrow, *Demobilization in the Army*, p. 263.

40. JCS 1487, 19 Aug 45, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 1.

41. JCS 1482, w/Encl B and App to Encl B, 23 Aug 1945, CCS 320.2 (7–25–42) sec 5.

42. JCS 1478/1, 25 Aug 45, and Dec On, 30 Aug 45, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 1.

43. JCS 1520, 19 Sep 45, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 1.

44. JCS 1478/2, 25 Sep 45, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 1.

45. JCS 1478/4, 2 Oct 45, same file.

46. JCS 1478/3, 28 Sep 45, and Dec On, 11 Oct 45, same file.

47. JPS 743/2, 19 Oct 45, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 1.

48. Memo, JPS PM–121 to JSSC, 25 Oct 45, CCS 370 (8–19–41) sec 1.

49. JCS 1520/1, 26 Oct 45; JCS 1520/2, 26 Oct 45; Ltr, SJCS to Asst Dir BoB, 30 Oct 45; JCS 1478/5, 7 Nov 45, and Dec On, 16 Nov 45; SM–4066 to Marshall, King, Arnold, 12 Nov 45; same file.

50. JCS 1478/6, 21 Nov 45, and Dec On, 24 Nov 45, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 2.

51. *Public Papers, Truman, 1946*, pp. 46–47, 75–78.

52. JCS 1478/7, 19 Feb 46, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 3.

53. Memorandum for the President, sgd Leahy, 21 Feb 46, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 3.

54. *United States Statutes at Large*, 79th Cong, 2d sess, 1946, vol. 60, p. 341. A year later the President and Congress concluded that the draft was no longer necessary and allowed the Selective Service Act to lapse.

55. “Annual Budget Message to the Congress,” 10 Jan 47, *Public Papers, Truman, 1947*, p. 64.

56. *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army, 1947*, p. 296. *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, FY 1947*, pp. 10, 26. *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, FY 1946*, p. 25.

57. For a detailed account of this controversy, see Lawrence J. Legere, “Unification of the Armed Forces,” Ph.D Thesis, Harvard University (1950), Chapters IV and V.

58. JCS 560, 2 Nov 43, CCS 040 (11–2–43) sec 1; JCS 749/12, 11 Apr 45, same file, sec 2.

59. JCS 749/25, 9 Oct 45; JCS 749/26, 10 Oct 45; JCS 749/27, 15 Oct 45; JCS 749/28, 16 Oct 45; Memo JCS to Pres, 17 Oct 45 (derived from JCS 749/29), 17 Oct 45; same file, sec 3.

60. For Secretary Forrestal’s draft legislation see above, p. 110–111 and fn 39.

61. JCS 1520/3, 10 Jan 46, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 2.

62. Memos by CSA, 24 Jan 46, and CNO, 25 Jan 46, Encls to SM–4828 to JCS, 25 Jan 46; Dec On, JCS 1520/3, 28 Jan 46, same file.

63. See above, p. 104–105.

64. JCS 1478/7, 20 Feb 46, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 3. A minor issue involved land-based military air transport, which the Army Air Forces wished to control in its entirety; the Navy view was that the AAF should be responsible only for those routes common to both Services, leaving the Navy free to control its individual air routes.

65. JCS 1478/9, 6 Mar 46, same file.

66. JCS 1478/11, 16 Mar 46, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 3.

67. JCS 1478/10, 15 Mar 46, same file.

68. JCS 1478/18, 17 May 46; JCS 1478/19, 23 May 46, w/Jt Sec notation of action taken; same file, sec 5.

69. For details of the National Security Act and the Key West and Newport Agreements see Kenneth W. Condit, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Policy, 1947–1949*, Ch. 5.

Chapter 6. Problems of the Atomic Age

1. Leslie R. Groves, *Now It Can Be Told* (1963), pp. 23, 253, 271–272; William D. Leahy, *I Was There* (1950), pp. 269, 612–619; Ernest J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, *Fleet Admiral King, a Naval Record* (1952), pp. 620–621. The definitive account of the wartime development of the atomic bomb by the US Army is to be found in Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., *The New World, A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission* (1972). A more personal account of the same program is in Groves, *Now It Can Be Told*.

2. This statement had been drafted before the President left for Potsdam. Secretary Stimson was authorized to release it when the bomb was dropped. President Truman was returning from Potsdam aboard the USS AUGUSTA at the time his statement was released in Washington. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Harry S Truman, 1945* (1961), pp. 199–200.

3. Memos, Pres to SecState et al., 15 and 30 Aug 45, CCS 471.6 (8–15–45) sec 1.

4. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (1947), pp. 634–646. Harry S Truman, *Year of Decisions* (1955), pp. 524–525. Hewlett and Anderson, *The New World*, p. 419.

5. Hewlett and Anderson, *The New World*, pp. 420–421; Truman, *Year of Decisions*, pp. 525–527.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 527.

7. Truman, *Year of Decisions*, p. 527. There is no information in the official records on the President's conversations with the individual members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on atomic matters nor on what the views of these men were. It is almost certain that individually and collectively they opposed Secretary Stimson's proposals.

8. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Harry S Truman, 1945* (1961), pp. 362–366. In his memoirs, President Truman reveals the rather remarkable fact that he had decided to call for an agency to control atomic energy on 19 September, three days before he asked for the views of his cabinet members on the matter. Truman, *Year of Decisions*, p. 529.

9. Memo, Leahy to JCS, 17 Oct 45, Encl to SM–3803, 18 Oct 45, CCS 471.6 (8–15–45) sec 1.

10. JCS 1471/2, 19 Oct 45, same file.

11. Memo for AsstSec, WDGS, "Military Policy as to Secrecy Regarding Atomic Bomb," 22 Oct 45, w/encls, same file. This is an unusual incident since civilian Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries of Military Departments do not normally see JCS papers.

12. JCS 1471/4, 23 Oct 45; Memo, JCS to Pres, 23 Oct 45 (derived from JCS 1471/4); CCS 471.6 (8–15–45) sec 1.

13. Truman, *Year of Decisions*, pp. 542–543; *Public Papers, Truman, 1945*, pp. 472–495; Hewlett and Anderson, *The New World*, pp. 455–477. The last named source provides the background of British and Canadian concern that led to the meeting.

14. *Public Papers, Truman, 1945*, p. 475.

15. *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946–47* (1947), pp. 66–69. Communique, Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946*, vol. II, *Council of Foreign Ministers*, pp. 822–824.

16. JCS 1567/11, 18 Dec 45, CCS 092 (4–14–45) sec 3.

17. JCS 1567/26, 12 Jan 46, and Dec On, 23 Jan 46, CCS 092 (4–14–45) sec 4.

18. *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946–1947* (1947) pp. 64–66.

19. Department of State *Bulletin*, 7 Apr 46, pp. 553–560. Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (1969), pp. 151–156. Hewlett and Anderson, *The New World*, pp. 531–554. Both the Committee and the Board of Consultants consisted of prestigious individuals. The Committee was comprised of Dr. Vannevar Bush, President of the Carnegie Institution and former Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development; Dr. James B. Conant, President of Harvard University; General Leslie R. Groves, Commandant of the Manhattan Project; and John J. McCloy, former Assistant Secretary of War. The Board of Consultants had as its members Mr. Lilienthal, Chairman of the TVA; Chester I. Barnard, President of New Jersey Bell Telephone Company; Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, formerly Director of the Los Alamos Atomic Laboratory; Dr. Charles A. Thomas, Vice President of Monsanto Chemical Company; and Harry A. Winne, Vice President of General Electric Company.

20. Hewlett and Anderson, *The New World*, pp. 571–576.

21. JCS 1669, 14 May 46, CCS 092 (4–14–45) sec 2.

22. JCS 1669/2, 25 May 46, CCS 092 (4–14–45) sec 2.

23. Ltr, JCS to Baruch, 27 May 46 (derived from JCS 1669), same file.

24. Ltr, Baruch to Nimitz, 24 May 46, same file. Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946*, vol. I, *General; The United Nations* (1972), fn 4, p. 852.
25. JCS 1669/3, 29 May 46, CCS 092 (4–14–45) sec 2.
26. Dec On JCS 1669/3, 7 Jun 46, same file.
27. Memorandum for Record, sgd, A.J. MacFarland, 17 Jun 46, same file, sec 3.
28. Ltr, COS to CINC of Army and Navy to US Rep AEC, 11 Jun 46; *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. I, pp. 851–853.
29. Ltr, CNO to US Rep AEC, 11 Jun 46, *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. I, pp. 853–854.
30. Ltr, CSA to US Rep. AEC, 14 Jun 46, *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. I, pp. 854–856.
31. Ltr, SJCS to Mr. Bernard Baruch (w/5 encls), 15 Jun 46; Memo for Record by SJCS, 17 Jun 46; Memo, CAPT Knoll to SJCS, 18 Jun 46; CCS 092 (4–14–45) sec 3. Hewlett and Anderson, *The New World*, pp. 575–576.
32. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 23 Jun 46, pp. 4–14.
33. Dept of State, *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1956*, vol. I, 1945–1956 (1960), pp. 17–34.
34. JCS 1669/6, 20 Jul 46, and Dec On, 1 Aug 46, CCS 471.6 (8–15–45) sec 3.
35. Hewlett and Anderson, *The New World*, pp. 576–619; First Rept., UN Atomic Energy Commission, 31 Dec 46, *Documents on Disarmament*, vol. I, pp. 50–57.
36. “Soviet Proposal . . .” “Second Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission . . .” *Documents on Disarmament*, vol. I, pp. 61–62, 93–152. Brookings Institution, *Major Problems in US Foreign Policy, 1947*, p. 244. This issue has never been resolved.
37. JCS 1477, 18 Aug 45, and Dec On, 23 Aug 45; JCS 1477/1, 30 Oct 45; CCS 471.6 (8–15–45) sec 1.
38. JCS 1477/1, 30 Oct 45, CCS 471.6 (8–15–45) sec 1.
39. JCS 1477/2, 6 Dec 45, same file.
40. JCS 1477/3, 20 Dec 45; JCS 1477/4, 24 Dec 45; same file.
41. JCS 1477/5, 12 Jan 46, same file.
42. JCS 1477/6, 21 Jan 46, w/Dec On, 29 Jan 46; CCS 471.6 (8–15–45) sec 2.
43. JCS 1477/7, 6 Feb 46; JCS 1477/10, 31 Mar 46; same file.
44. W. A. Shurcliff, *Bombs at Bikini, The Official Report of Operations CROSSROADS* (1947), pp. 11–12. JCS 1490/3, 18 Sep 45, CCS 471.6 (10–16–45) sec 2.
45. JCS 1552, 16 Oct 45; JCS 1552/1, 31 Oct 45 w/note of action taken; same file.
46. JCS 1552/1, 31 Oct 45, w/note of action taken; same file.
47. JCS 1552/5, 22 Dec 45, CCS 471.6 (10–16–45) sec 1.
48. *Ibid.*
49. JCS 1552/6, 29 Dec 45; Memo, JCS for SecWar and SecNavy, “Tests of the Effects of Atomic Explosives,” 28 Dec 45; same file.
50. Memorandum for the President from SecNavy and SecWar, 8 Jan 46, w/handwritten approval by President Truman on photostatic copy in CCS 471.6 (10–16–45) sec 2.
51. JCS 1552/5, 22 Dec 45 and Dec On 6 Feb 46; SM-4700 to VADM Blandy, 11 Jan 46; same file.
52. App E to JCS 1552/7, 10 Jan 46; Memo, CDR, JTF 1, to JCS, 21 Jan 46, Encl to JCS 1552/8, 21 Jan 46; Dec On JCS 1552/8, 24 Jan 46; same file, sec 3.
53. Memo, CDR, JTF 1, to Sec, JCS, “Canadian Participation in Operation CROSSROADS” originated by BG T. J. Betts, JTF 1, J-2, 1 Feb 46; same file, sec 3.
54. Hewlett and Anderson, *The New World*, p. 581.
55. Encl to SM-5413, 1 Apr 46 to Admiral Leahy et al., w/handwritten notation in pencil by Admiral Leahy, CCS 471.6 (10–16–45) sec 5.
56. JCS 1552/35, 2 Apr 46, same file, sec 5. The President gave as his reason for postponement that too many Congressmen would be absent from Washington to observe the tests during a period of heavy legislative schedule. Memo, JCS to SecWar and SecNav, “Military Opinion as to the Importance of the Atomic Bomb Test,” 3 Apr 46, same file. *Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry S Truman, 1946*, pp. 172, fn 1, 210.
57. Shurcliff, *Bombs at Bikini*, Ch. 7.
58. JCS 1691, 7 Jul 46, CCS 471.6 (10–16–45) sec 8.
59. Preliminary statement by the Evaluation Board on Test B, in Shurcliff, *Bombs at Bikini*, pp. 196–197.
60. Observations and Conclusions, both tests, *ibid.*, p. 199.
61. The stormy legislative history of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 is set forth in Hewlett and Anderson, *The New World*, Chapters 12–14. See Chapter 17 for organization of the Commission.
62. Hewlett and Anderson, *The New World*, pp. 651–654. Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, *Atomic Shield* (1969), p. xiii. Ltr, SecWar and SecNavy to CS USA and CNO, “Armed Forces Special Weapons Project,” 29 Jan 47, CCS 471.6 (8–15–45) sec 4.

63. JCS 1745, 3 Feb 47; SM–7587 to JSSC, 12 Feb 77; CCS 471.6 (10–16–45) sec 5.
64. JCS 1745/1, 25 Feb 47; Memo, JCS to SecWar and SecNav, 26 Feb 47; same file.
65. JCS 1745/2, 1 Apr 47; Buck slip attached to final copy of letter; CCS 471.6 (8–15–45) sec 4. Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, p. 47. Ultimately, about two-thirds of the fissionable material used for research and development was kept in a form readily available for fabrication into weapon parts.
66. Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, p. 47. David E. Lilienthal, *The Atomic Energy Years* (1964), p. 165.
67. Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, pp. 58–64.
68. Ltr. Secstate to SecNav et al., 11 Feb 47, App to JCS 1748, 13 Feb 47, CCS 471.6 (8–15–45) sec 4.
69. JCS 1748/1, 25 Feb 47, same file.
70. Memo, JCS for SecWar and SecNav, “Effect on United States Security of Atomic Energy Plants Located in the United Kingdom,” 1 Mar 47, same file.

Chapter 7. Acquisition of Postwar Bases

1. JCS 570/2 with Encls, 10 Jan 44, CCS 360 (12–9–42) sec 2.
2. Minutes of SWNCC 13th Mtg, 3 Mar 45, CCS 360 (12–9–42) sec 4.
3. JCS 570/17, 14 May 45, w/Dec On, 24 May 45, same file, sec 5.
4. SM–2365 to ADM Leahy, 2 Jul 45, same file, sec 6.
5. Ltr, USecState to SecWar, 7 Jul 45, CCS 360 (12–9–42) sec 6.
6. SM–2665 to SWNCC, 21 Jul 45, same file.
7. Memo, AsstSecWar to DepCSA, 24 Aug 45, Encl to JCS 570/28, same file, sec 7. General Marshall ordered this memo circulated for information to the JPS, JSSC and JPWC.
8. JCS 570/34, 24 Sep 45, CCS 360 (12–9–42) sec 8. Provisions of the Act of Chapultepec are discussed in Chapter 8.
9. See Chapter 5 for details of JCS 1518 and the JCS strategic concept. In a later paper (JCS 570/62), the JPS stated that “the strategic concept as expressed in JCS 1518 has been used as the basic guide for determining requirements.”
10. JCS 570/36, 8 Oct 45, CCS 360 (12–9–42) sec 9.
11. JCS 570/37, 10 Oct 45, same file.
12. JCS 570/39, 19 Oct 45, same file.
13. JCS 570/38, 12 Oct 45; JCS 570/39, 19 Oct 45; JCS 570/40, 25 Oct 45; CCS 360 (12–9–42) sec 9.
14. Encl C, JCS 570/40, 25 Oct 45, same file.
15. What action, if any, the State Department took on this suggestion cannot be determined from available files.
16. SM–3892–45 to SWNCC, 24 Oct 45 (derived from JCS 570/40); CCS 360 (12–9–42) sec 9. Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946*, vol. I, *General: The United Nations* (1972) pp. 1112–1117.
17. SM–4962–46 to SWNCC, 8 Feb 46 (derived from JCS 570/52), CCS 360 (12–9–42) sec 14. *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. I, pp. 1142–1145.
18. JCS 1648, 24 Mar 46, CCS 360 (12–9–42) sec 17.
19. SM–4581–46 to SWNCC, 10 Apr 46 (derived from JCS 1648), same file, sec 18. *Foreign Relations, 1946*, pp. 1171–1174.
20. JCS 570/58, 22 Mar 46; N/H of JCS 570/58, 23 Mar 46; CCS 360 (12–9–42) sec 17.
21. JCS 570/62, 14 May 46, same file, sec 19. The JPS recommended eliminating earlier requests for “Exclusive” US base rights in Iceland, Greenland, Panama, Galapagos, Canton, Funafuti, Christmas, Clipperton, and Formosa.
22. SM–5932–46 to SWNCC (derived from JCS 570/62), 4 Jun 46, same file, sec 19. Also printed in *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. I, pp. 1174–1177.
23. *Foreign Relations 1946*, vol. I, p. 1174, fn 78. SM–6177–46 to SWNCC (derived from JCS 570/67), 3 Jul 46, CCS 360 (12–9–42) sec 19.
24. JCS 570/34, 27 Sep 45, CCS 360 (12–9–42) sec 8; SM–3699–45 to JCS, 8 Oct 45; JCS 570/40, 25 Oct 45; same file, sec 9.
25. JCS 1619/5, 27 Jun 46, App A, same file, sec 24.
26. Harry S Truman, *Year of Decisions* (1955), p. 274.
27. JCS 656/1, 8 Jan 44, CCS 093 (1–8–44) sec 1.
28. “United States Tentative Proposals for a General International Organization.” 18 Jul 44, Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944*, vol. I, *General* (1966), pp. 653–659.
29. Ltr, JCS to SecState, 3 Aug 44, *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. I, pp. 659–703.

30. Ltr, SecState to SecWar, 30 Dec 44, *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. I, pp. 922–923.
31. SWNCC 27/1, Memo, Chairman, SWNCC to SecState, International Trusteeship, 26 Feb 45, Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945*, vol. I, *General: The United Nations* (1967) pp. 93–95. See also JCS 973, 28 Jul 44; JCS 973/1, 3 Aug 44; JCS 973/3, 5 Jan 45; JCS 973/4, 9 Jan 45; CCS 092 (7–27–44).
32. Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945* (1955), p. 944.
33. SWNCC 27/1, 26 Feb 45; Telegram, SecState to President Roosevelt, “International Trusteeships,” 9 Apr 45; *Foreign Relations 1945*, vol. I, 93–95, 211–214.
34. *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. I, fn 52, p. 211.
35. Memo, SecState for President Truman, “United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco Conference,” 13 Apr 45, *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. I, pp. 281–283.
36. Memo, Secs State, War and Navy to Pres Truman, 18 Apr 45, *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. I, pp. 350–351.
37. Truman, *Year of Decisions*, pp. 274–275.
38. *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946–1947* (1947), pp. 831–850, pp. 868–869.
39. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S Truman, 1945* (1961), p. 432. *Public Papers, Truman, 1946* (1962), pp. 20–21.
40. JPS 785/3, 10 May 46, App B, CCS 360 (12–9–42) sec 18.
41. Msg, Military Staff Repts 161606 NCR 9944 to JCS, 16 Jan 46; App to JCS 570/48, 17 Jan 46; Memo, Asst SecNav to SWNCC, Encl to SWNCC 249, 17 Jan 46; same file, sec 13.
42. JCS 570/48, 17 Jan 46, same file. For the September action by the JPS, see above, p. 141–142.
43. SM–4777–46 to ADM Leahy, CSA, and CG, USAAF, 19 Jan 46; SM–4792–46 to SWNCC, 21 Jan 46; JCS 570/50, 21 Jan 46; SWNCC 249/1, 22 Jan 46, same file, sec 13. Shoto is a Japanese word meaning “chain of islands.” The Nanpo Shoto is such a chain, extending 750 miles in a southerly direction from Tokyo Bay. Three major island groups are in the chain: the Izu Shoto, the Bonin Islands and the Volcano Islands. The most famous island in these groups is Iwo Jima, part of the Volcanos. The Nansei Shoto is another such chain. It extends in an arc from the Japanese home island of Kyushu nearly to Formosa (Taiwan). The major group within this chain is the Ryukyus Islands, of which the most important and largest is Okinawa.
44. JCS 1619/1, 24 May 1946, CS 360 (12–9–42) sec 21.
45. JCS 1619/2, 8 Jun 46, same file, sec 22.
46. JCS 1619/3, 24 Jun 46, same file, sec 23.
47. JCS 1619/5, 27 Jun 46, same file, sec 24.
48. JCS 1619/6, 28 Jun 46, same file, sec 24.
49. Memo, JCS to Pres, 10 Sep 46 (derived from JCS 1619/9), CCS 360 (12–9–42) sec 27.
50. SWN–4759, 19 Sep 46, Encl to JCS 1619/10; JCS 1619/13, 2 Oct 46; JCS 1619/14, 10 Oct 46; JCS 1619/16, 16 Oct 46; JCS 1619/17, 16 Oct 46; Memo, ADM Leahy to JCS, 18 Oct 46; same file, sec 28.
51. SM–6901–46 to SWNCC, 18 Oct 46 (derived from JCS 1619/18); JCS 1619/19, 19 Oct 46; SWNCC 59/7, 19 Oct 46; same file.
52. JCS 1619/19, 19 Oct 46, w/notation thereon, 21 Oct 46, and Encl, CCS 360 (12–9–42) sec 27.
53. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 17 Nov 46, pp. 889–891.
54. *Public Papers of the Presidents, Truman, 1947*, pp. 346–347.
55. JCS 1519/1, 6 Oct 45, App B, CCS 686.9 Philippine Islands (11–7–43) sec 2.
56. JCS 1027/6, 8 Mar 46, same file. SM–5388–46 to SWNCC, 28 Mar 46, same file, sec 4.
57. JCS 1027/8, 23 Nov 46, same file.
58. Ltr, SecWar to SecState, 29 Nov 46; Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946*, vol. VIII, *The Far East* (1971), pp. 934–935.
59. SWNCC 340/1, 11 Dec 46, App to Encl B, CCS 686.9 Philippine Islands (11–7–43) sec 4.
60. N/H to JCS 1027/8, 9 Jan 47, same file. *Ibid.*, pp. 935, 940–941. For subsequent developments, see Condit, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1947–1949*, Chapter 14.
61. *Treaties in Force, January 1, 1972*, Dept of State Publication 8682, n.d.

Chapter 8. Defense of the Western Hemisphere

1. Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense* (1960), recounts in detail the planning and cooperation by Latin American nations during World War II. A summary of lend-lease is in SWNCC 4, 15 Feb 45, Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945*, vol. IX, *The American Republics* (1969), p. 231.

2. NSC 56/2, 18 May 1950, Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950*, vol. I, *National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy* (1977), pp. 628–637.

3. Ltr, SecState to SecWar, 18 Jan 45, Encl to JCS 1233; Memo, SWNCC to JCS, 19 Jan 45, Encl to JCS 1233/1; CCS 092 (1–18–45).

4. Ltr, JCS to SecWar, et al., 6 Feb 45, Encl to JCS 1233/2, 31 Jan 45, CCS 092 (1–18–45).

5. Memos, Chm, SWNCC, to SecState, 11 and 17 Feb 46, Encls to JCS 1233/3 and 1233/4, CCS 092 (1–18–45).

6. The Chapultepec Conference is well documented in *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. IX, pp. 1–153. The full text of the Act of Chapultepec is reproduced in Dept of State *Bulletin*, 4 Mar 1945, pp. 339–340. The following nations signed the Act of Chapultepec: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, United States, and Venezuela. Argentina and El Salvador did not attend the Conference. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Nov 17–24, 1945*, p. 7565.

7. Resolution IV, InterAmerican Conference on Problems of War and Peace, 8 Mar 45, Edward Hirsch, “The Inter-American Defense Board” (1965), pp. 11–14, typescript in Army Library, the Pentagon.

8. Msg, State 2143 to Brazil, 4 Sep 45; Msg, State 1304 to Argentina, 19 Sep 45; MemCon by Actg SecState 29 Sep 45; *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. IX, pp. 154–159.

9. JCS 1507, 6 Sep 45, CCS 092 (9–10–45) sec 1.

10. Memo, JCS to SecsWar and Navy, 19 Sep 45, Encl to JCS 1507/2, same file.

11. JCS 629/15, 6 Nov 45, CCS 400.3295 (12–16–43) sec 3. JANABAR was a direct descendant of the Joint Advisory Board on American Republics (JAB) that had been chartered, at General Marshall's insistence, in December 1940. This body, consisting of three Army members and two Navy members, was charged with handling all Latin American munitions requests transmitted to the Department of State and with drafting a detailed program for aid to Latin America. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had no direct responsibility for or supervisory authority over JANABAR. Conn and Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense*, pp. 215–216.

12. JCS 629/17, 19 Dec 45; JCS 629/18, 7 Jan 46; JCS 629/19, 23 Jan 46; SM–4824 to SWNCC, 25 Jan 46 (derived from JCS 629/20); CCS 400.3295 (12–16–43) sec 3.

13. Dept of State Memo, no subj, no addressee, 2 Jan 45. Msgs, Buenos Aires 13, 110, 111, 542 and 570 to State, 4, 18, and 19 Jan, 16 and 27 Mar 45. Ltr, Argentine Chargé to Dir General, Pan American Union, 28 Mar 45; *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. IX, pp. 366–372.

14. Msgs, Buenos Aires 2097 and 2306 to State, 7 and 27 Sep 45, *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. IX, pp. 409–414.

15. *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. IX, pp. 159–166.

16. Various documents reproduced in *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. IX, pp. 185–221 describe the Uruguayan proposal and the reactions by other Latin American nations.

17. SM–5062 to SWNCC, 21 Feb 46, CCS 092 United States (12–21–45). Other aspects of the proposed State Department foreign policy statements are discussed in Chapter 2.

18. SM–5438 to SWNCC, 3 Apr 46, CCS 092 (1–18–45) sec 2.

19. J. Lloyd Mechem, *The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889–1960*, (1961) pp. 280–286. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 21 Sep 1947, pp. 565–572 contains the text of the treaty.

20. Ltr, ActgSecState to Pres Truman, 1 Dec 1947, Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947*, vol. VIII, *The American Republics* (1972), pp. 90–93.

21. Memo, SWNCC to JCS, 9 Mar 45, Encl to JCS 570/11, 14 Mar 45, CCS 360 (12–9–42) sec 4.

22. Memo for SecWar and SecNavy, “Air bases in Latin America,” 12 Apr 45 (derived from JCS 570/13), 14 Apr 45, CCS 360 (12–9–42) sec 5.

23. Circular Telegram, State to US Reps in Certain American Republics, 16 Jul 45, *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. IX, pp. 243–244, and see also fn. 25, p. 243 and fn. 27, p. 244.

24. JCS 629/12, 7 Jul 45; SWNCC 4/10, 7 Jul 1945; CCS 400.3295 (12–16–43) sec 3.

25. SWNCC 4/10, 7 Jul 45, CCS 400.3295 (12–16–43) sec 3; also in *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. IX, pp. 251–254. President Truman's memo of approval was circulated as SWNCC 4/12, 13 Aug 45, same file.

26. The only Latin American nations that had not held such conversations with US representatives were Argentina, Colombia, and Panama. JANABAR had formulated and furnished to the Army and Navy staff officers involved instructions and guidance for these conversations.

27. JCS 629/13, 15 Sep 45, CCS 400.3295 (12–16–43) sec 3. The two Appendices “A” and “B” that contain the JANABAR plans are not on file and have not been located elsewhere. The file contains a note that these were “Circulated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff only.”

28. JCS 629/14, 30 Oct 35, same file.

29. JCS 629/16, 10 Nov 45; Memo, JCS to SecWar and SecNavy, 19 Nov 45 (derived from JCS 629/16); same file.

30. Ltr, SecWar to SecState, 7 Dec 45, *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. IX, pp. 258–259.

31. Ltr, ActgSecState to SecWar, 19 Dec 45; Ltr, ActgSecWar to SecState, 31 Dec 45; *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. IX, pp. 261–264.
32. Memorandum of Meeting, 22 Jan 46, Dept of State *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946*, vol. XI, *The American Republics* (1969) pp. 90–91.
33. SWNCC 246/6, 25 Apr 46; SWN-4206, 26 Apr 46; CCS 092 (1–18–45) sec 2.
34. Ltr, the President to the Congress, released to the Press by the White House, 6 May 1946, Dept of State *Bulletin*, 19 May 1946, pp. 859–860.
35. Memo, AsstSecState to SecState, “HR 6326-Latin American Arms Program,” 16 Dec 46, *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. XI, pp. 108–109.
36. Memo, ActgSecState to SecWar, 19 Mar 47, Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947*, vol. VIII, *The American Republics* (1972), pp. 104–106. The ten year program to which Mr. Acheson refers is undoubtedly the one proposed by JANABAR and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then passed on to SWNCC in November and December 1945.
37. Memos, SecWar to ActgSecState, 27 Mar 47; SecNavy to ActgSecState, 13 Mar 47; Memo, SecWar to ActgSecState, 17 Apr 47; Minutes, Mtg of Secs War, Navy and State, 1 May 47; ActgSecState to SecDef, 1 Dec 47; *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. VIII, pp. 106–115, 129. The first grant aid to Latin American nations was authorized by the Mutual Security Act of 1951, PL 165, 82d Congress.
38. App C to JCS 1541, 6 Oct 45, CCS 092 (9–10–45) sec 1. Also reproduced in Stanley W. Dziuban, *Military Relations Between the United States and Canada, 1939–1945* (1959), p. 24.
39. Dziuban, *Military Relations Between the United States and Canada*, pp. 35–46.
40. App C to JCS 1541, 6 Oct 45, CCS 092 (9–10–45) sec 1.
41. JCS 1541, 6 Oct 45, same file. JCS action on base rights are discussed in Chapter 4.
42. Memo, JCS to Secs War and Navy, “Military Implications of U.S.–Canadian Defense Agreement” 19 Oct 45 (derived from JCS 1541), CCS 092 (9–10–45) sec 1.
43. SM-3835 for Senior US Army and Navy Members, PJBD “Military Implications of US-Canadian Defense Agreement,” 19 Oct 45, same file.
44. JCS 1541/1, 2 Nov 45, CCS 092 (9–10–45) sec 1; Annex to App B, JPS 788/4, 16 Mar 46, same file, sec 3; Dziuban, *Military Relations Between the United States and Canada*, p. 336.
45. App B to JPS 788/4, 16 Mar 46; Memo, JCS to Service Secretaries and US Members, PJBD, 30 Mar 46, (derived from JCS 1541/5), 21 Mar 46; CCS 092 (9–10–45) sec 1.
46. Memo, PJBD to JCS, 29 May 1946, Encl to JCS 1541/6, 29 May 46, same file, sec 4.
47. Memo, JCS to Sr. US Army and Navy Members, Joint Canadian-US Military Cooperation Committee, 2 Jul 46, (derived from JCS 1541/7), 22 Jun 46, same file, sec 5.
48. Memo, Sr. US Army and Navy Members, Joint Canadian-US Military Cooperation Committee to JCS, Encl to JCS 1541/8, 10 Jul 46; Memo, JCS to Sr. US Army and Navy Members, Joint Canadian-US Military Cooperation Committee, Encl to 1541/9, 13 Aug 46; same file, sec 5.
49. App B and App C to JCS 1541/6, same file.
50. Dziuban, *Military Relations Between United States and Canada*, pp. 337–338.
51. JCS 1295/2, 21 Dec 45, and Dec On, 15 Jan 46; CCS 660.2 Alaska (3–23–45) sec 3.

Chapter 9. Standoff in China

1. The JCS were also concerned over the plight of Korea. Their participation in the formulation and conduct of policy toward that country is treated in James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, vol. III, *The Korean War*. The occupation of Japan, while of major concern to the US Government, was a matter in which JCS participation was inconsequential.
2. Dept of State, *United States Relations With China* (1949) (hereafter, *China White Paper*), pp. iii–xvii, 26, 31–33. At the request of President Roosevelt, the US Congress, on 7 February 1942 appropriated \$500 million for “financial aid” to China. These funds were used by the Chinese Government mainly to purchase gold for sale in China as an anti-inflationary measure and to support the issue of government bonds in denominations of US dollars. Military aid to China was granted through the Lend-Lease agreement signed on 2 June 1942.
3. Arthur N. Young, *China and the Helping Hand, 1939–1945* (1963), pp. 402–403.
4. Tang Tsou, *America’s Failure in China, 1941–1950* (1963), p. 86.
5. Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Time Runs Out In CBI*, (1959) pp. 15, 18–20. *China White Paper*, p. 338. The China Theater had been created on 24 October 1944 when the Joint Chiefs of Staff had ordered the division of the former China, Burma and India Theater into two separate theaters. Lieutenant General Daniel I. Sultan took over as Commanding General, US Forces, India-Burma Theater. Msg, JCS to CG, USFC, WARX 64424, 6 Apr 45, CCS 323.361 (10–23–44) sec 1.

6. Memo, CG, AAF, to CSA, 21 Mar 45, Ann to App D to Encl B to JCS 1330, CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 1.
7. Rpt by SWNCC Coordinating SubCom for FE, n.d., “Post-War Military Policies with Respect to China”; and State Dept paper, same subj, 3 Apr 45, Encl B and App C to JCS 1330, CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 1.
8. SM-1721-45 to SWNCC, 15 May 45 (derived from JCS 1330/1); Memo, SWNCC to SecWar et al., 29 May 45, Encl to SWNCC 83/1; same file.
9. Msg, JCS to CG, USFCT, et al., WARX 47513, 10 Aug 45, Encl to JCS 1458, CCS 323.361 (10–23–44) sec 1. Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945*, vol. VII, *The Far East, China* (1969), pp. 527–528. GEN Wedemeyer was ordered to execute this directive on 14 August. Msg, JCS to CG, USFCT, et al., WARX 49573, 14 Aug 45, same file.
10. Msg, CG, USFCT, to War Dept, CFBX 4352, 12 Aug 45, CM IN 12388, Leahy Files, 12. It is not clear from official files whether GEN Wedemeyer had received WARX 47513 at the time he sent this message.
11. Msg, Moscow 141040 to State, 14 Aug 45; Dept of State, *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. VII, pp. 971–973.
12. Msg, CG, USFCT, to War Dept, CFBX 4580, 14 Aug 45, CM IN 14100, Leahy Files, 12. Dept of State, *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. VII, pp. 530–531. On 17 August, Communist General Chu Teh did demand that his forces accept surrenders in Communist-controlled areas. Following instructions approved by SWNCC, GEN Wedemeyer replied that the Great Powers had decided otherwise. Msg, CG, USFCT, to War Dept, CFBX 4095, 17 Aug 45, CM IN 17041; SM-2964 to SWNCC, 21 Aug 45, Encl to JCS 1458/4; Memo, Secy, SWNCC, to SJCS, 22 Aug 45, Encl to JCS 1458/5; Msg, JCS to CG, USFCT, WAR 45718, 24 Aug 45; CCS 323.361 (10–23–44) sec 1. Dept of State, *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. VII, pp. 519–521.
13. Msg, CG, USFCT, to War Dept, CGBX 5179, 19 Aug 45, CM IN 18728; SM-2964 to SWNCC, 21 Aug 45; Msg, JCS to CG, USFCT, WAR 52560, 21 Aug 45; CCS 323.361 (10–23–44) sec 1.
14. For an account of Marine Corps activities in North China, see Benis M. Frank and Henry I. Shaw, *History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II: Victory and Occupation* (1968); pp. 521–650.
15. Memo, ActgSecState to Pres, “Transportation of Chinese Troops to Manchuria,” 12 Sep 45, Encl B to JCS 1515, CCS 540 (9–13–45).
16. An “army” totalled approximately 30,000 men.
17. Memo, ADM Leahy to JCS, 13 Sep 45; JCS 1515, 15 Sep 45; Memo, ADM Leahy to JCS, 15 Sep 45; Msg, CG, USFCT, to War Dept, CFBX 8412, 17 Sep 45; Msg, JCS to CG, USFCT, WARX 66085, 18 Sep 45, Encl to JCS 1515/1; same file.
18. SWNCC 83/2/D, 4 Sep 45, CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 1.
19. SWNCC 24th Mtg, 9–12–45, “Military Assistance to China,” same file.
20. Memo, ActgSecState for Pres, “Military Equipment and Advice for China,” 13 Sep 45, Encl to SWNCC 83/3, 17 Sep 45, same file. Also printed in *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. VII, pp. 559–562.
21. “. . . Oral Statement of Dr. Soong . . .,” *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. VII, pp. 561–562; Encl to JWPC 412/1, 2 Oct 45; CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 2.
22. See above, pp. 186–187.
23. SWNCC 83/4, 26 Sep 45, Encl to JCS 1330/3, 27 Sep 45, same file. SM–3785–45 to SWNCC, 16 Oct 45 (derived from JCS 1330/7), same file, sec 2.
24. SWNCC 83/6, 22 Oct 45, Dept of State, *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. VII, pp. 583–590.
25. SWNCC 83/6, 22 Oct 45, Encl to JCS 1330/13, same file, sec 3; JPS 222d Mtg, 17 Oct 45, same file, sec 2; JCS 1330/9, 22 Oct 45, CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 2.
26. JCS 1330/9, 22 Oct 45; SM–3884–45 to SWNCC, 24 Oct 45; same file.
27. Appendix B to JCS 1330/45, 5 Oct 45, CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 2.
28. JCS 1330/4, 5 Oct 45, CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 2.
29. JCS 1330/5, 11 Oct 45, same file.
30. Dec On JCS 1330/5, 11 Oct 45; JCS 1330/10, 22 Oct 45; CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 2.
31. Dec On JCS 1330/10, 23 Oct 45; SM–3889 to SWNCC, 24 Oct 45; same file.
32. Memo for SecWar and SecNav, “U.S. Military Advisory Group to China,” 20 Dec 45, same file, sec 4.
33. App to JCS 1330/18, 5 Jan 46, CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 4.
34. SM–4992 to SWNCC, 13 Feb 46, (derived from JCS 1330/19), same file, sec 5.
35. SWN–3881 to Secy, JCS, same subj, 15 Feb 46, same file.
36. Msg, WARCO WARX 98446 to CG, USFCT, et al., 25 Feb 46, same file, sec 5.
37. Ltr, LTG Wedemeyer to ADM Leahy, 27 Oct 45, Leahy Files, Folder 11. Memo, ADM Leahy to JCS, 4 Oct 45; Memo, ADM Leahy to Ambassador of China, 5 Oct 45; CCS 540 (9–13–45).

38. See Frank and Shaw, *Marine Corps Operations in World War II*, p. 558, pp. 556–567 for an account of communist harassment of US Marines. Msg, JCS to CG, USFCT, WARX 77563, 20 Oct 45, CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 2.

39. Msg, CG, USFCT, to CSA, CFB 12638, 26 Oct 45, CM IN 12147; Msg CG, USFCT, to CSA, CFB 12794, 27 Oct 45, CM IN 12976; same file, sec 3.

40. SM–4045–45 to SWNCC, 9 Nov 45 (derived from JCS 1330/14), same file. GEN Wedemeyer was apprised of this action in Msg, JCS to CG, USFCT, WARX 82254, 9 Nov 45, same file.

41. Msg, CG, USFCT, to CSA US Army, CFBX 14735, 16 Nov 45, Dept of State, *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VII, pp. 635–636.

42. Msg, CSA WAR 84094 to CG, USFCT, 19 Nov 45, Dept of State, *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VII, pp. 644–645.

43. Msg, CG, USFCT, to CSA, CFBX 15120, 20 Nov 45, Dept of State, *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VII, 650–660.

44. Msg, CG, USFCT, CFB 15452 to CSA, 23 Nov 45, Dept of State, *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VII, pp. 662–665. President Truman in his memoirs explained the background of this unique action of using Japanese forces as security guards for several months after Japan surrendered. “This operation,” he recalled, “of using the Japanese to hold off the Communists was a joint decision of the State and Defense Departments which I approved.” Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 62–63.

45. GEN Wedemeyer’s cable arrived after the drafting of this paper had been completed. Consequently, the Secretaries further counseled that his message “emphasizes the need for some international understanding as to the disposition of Manchuria and perhaps also North China.” Otherwise, US evacuation would deliver these areas into Soviet control. Memo, Service Secretaries to SecState, 26 Nov 45, Dept of State, *Foreign Relations* 1945, vol. VII, pp. 670–678. This paper was passed to GEN Wedemeyer in Msg, CSA to CG, USFCT, 85326, 26 Nov 45, CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 3.

46. Minutes, Meeting of SecWar, SecNav, SecState, 27 Nov 45, Dept of State, *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VII, pp. 684–686; Ltr, Hurley to Pres Truman, 26 Nov 45, *ibid.*, pp. 722–726.

47. *Leahy Diary*, 11 Dec 45. Msg, JCS to CG, USFCT, WARX 86183, 30 Nov 45, App B to JCS 1586, CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 3.

48. Msg, CG, USFCT, to JCS, CFBX 16459, 4 Dec 45, CM IN 1061; Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, WAR 87134, 6 Dec 45; CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 3.

49. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 071303Z Dec 45, CM IN 2099, App C to JCS 1586, 9 Dec 45, and Dec On, 11 Dec 45, same file.

50. MemCon by GEN Marshall, 11 Dec 45, Dept of State, *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VII, pp. 767–769.

51. *China White Paper*, p. 132.

52. Memo, BG Lincoln to SJCS, 10 Dec 45, w/encls, CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 4. Ltr, Pres Truman to GEN Marshall, 15 Dec 45, Dept of State, *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VII, pp. 770–773. Msg, JCS to CG, USFCT, et al., WAR 88636, 14 Dec 45 (derived from JCS 1586/1), same file, sec 3. Although preoccupied by the necessity for testifying at the “Pearl Harbor” investigations during the preparation of his instructions, GEN Marshall did participate closely in this preparation. He had a central role in the discussion of successive drafts of those instructions prepared by State Department personnel. He took part in the presentation of the final product to the President. For details of this matter as well as of questions raised with respect to General Marshall’s directives during the MacArthur hearings in 1951 see: Monograph, Vernon E. Davis, “The Marshall Mission to China,” JCS Hist Div, 12 Mar 1957, copy in JCS Hist Div files.

53. The details of the Marshall Mission may be read in *China White Paper*, pp. 132–229 and in Dept of State, *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. X, pp. 1–723.

54. Msgs, CG, USFCT, to War Dept, GOLD 231, 23 Feb 46, CM IN 5154; CG, USFCT, to CSA, CFBX 25154, 8 Mar 46, CM IN 1921; JCS to CG, USFCT, et al., WARX 82100, 26 Mar 46; CCS 452 China (4–3–45), sec 5. GEN Wedemeyer returned to the United States in April; LTG Alvan C. Gillem, USA, became Commanding General of US Forces in China.

55. Testifying in February 1948 as to the reason for the embargo, GEN Marshall stated that “the embargo was placed . . . by me, because at that time the situation was threatening to break down entirely. The fighting in North China had been held pretty largely in abeyance . . . except in Manchuria where a new focus of fighting had developed. In the endeavour to mediate this, and prevent its spreading all over North China, we were put in the position of acting in a mediatory position on the one hand and shipping in military supplies on the other. At that time the Chinese Government had sufficient munitions for their armies and there was no embarrassment to them.” *China White Paper*, p. 355.

56. *China White Paper*, pp. 201–220. Dept of State, *Bulletin*, 19 Jan 47, pp. 83–85.

57. *China White Paper*, pp. xi–xiii. Hearings, *Military Situation in the Far East*, S. Cmtes on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, 82d Cong, 1st sess, pt I, p. 466.

58. JCS 1721, 17 Oct 46, CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 7, pt. 1.
59. JCS 1721/1, 23 Oct 46, CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 7, pt. 1.
60. Memo, CNO to JCS, 31 Oct 46, JCS 1721/2, 7 Dec 46, same file.
61. *China White Paper*, pp. 689–694.
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