

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT
GULF OF MEXICO REGION

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

For Public Release

1. OCCURRED
DATE: **04-SEP-2013** TIME: **0500** HOURS

2. OPERATOR: **McMoRan Oil & Gas LLC**
REPRESENTATIVE:
TELEPHONE:
CONTRACTOR: **Morrison Energy Group, LLC**
REPRESENTATIVE:
TELEPHONE:

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR
ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

4. LEASE: **G06693**
AREA: **SM** LATITUDE:
BLOCK: **147** LONGITUDE:

5. PLATFORM: **A**
RIG NAME:

6. ACTIVITY: EXPLORATION (POE)
 DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION
(DOCD/POD)

7. TYPE:
 HISTORIC INJURY
 REQUIRED EVACUATION
 LTA (1-3 days)
 LTA (>3 days)
 RW/JT (1-3 days)
 RW/JT (>3 days)
 Other Injury
 FATALITY
 POLLUTION
 FIRE
 EXPLOSION
LWC HISTORIC BLOWOUT
 UNDERGROUND
 SURFACE
 DEVERTER
 SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES
COLLISION HISTORIC >\$25K <=\$25K

6. OPERATION:
 STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
 CRANE
 OTHER LIFTING DEVICE
 DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
 INCIDENT >\$25K
 H2S/15MIN./20PPM
 REQUIRED MUSTER
 SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
 OTHER **Equipment Damage**

8. CAUSE:
 PRODUCTION
 DRILLING
 WORKOVER
 COMPLETION
 HELICOPTER
 MOTOR VESSEL
 PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
 OTHER **P&A**

8. CAUSE:
 EQUIPMENT FAILURE
 HUMAN ERROR
 EXTERNAL DAMAGE
 SLIP/TRIP/FALL
 WEATHER RELATED
 LEAK
 UPSET H2O TREATING
 OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
 OTHER **Unsecured Equipment**

9. WATER DEPTH: **235** FT.

10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: **83** MI.

11. WIND DIRECTION:
SPEED: M.P.H.

12. CURRENT DIRECTION:
SPEED: M.P.H.

13. SEA STATE: FT.

17. INVESTIGATION FINDINGS: -

At approximately 0500 hours on 4 September 2013, hydraulic casing jack equipment was damaged during well abandonment activities at the South Marsh Island (SMI) Block 147A platform operated by McMoRan Oil & Gas LLC (McMoRan) but sold to Dynamic Offshore Resources (Dynamic Offshore).

McMoRan contracted Morrison Energy Group (Morrison) to plug and abandon Well A-6 located at the SMI-147A platform using Model 385 casing jacks with four hydraulic cylinders. The 13.375-inch (in), 13.375-in x 20-in, and the 20-in x 30-in grouted casings of Well A-6 were mechanically cut below the mud line. An internal casing spear was stabbed and secured into the 13.375-in casing by mechanically engaging spiraling type braided wires. A pup joint was assembled and fitted with a set of bottom slips along with a set of top slips installed in the hydraulic casing jacks. Morrison then began engaging the hydraulic casing jacks in an attempt to jar loose the three grouted casing strings for removal later with a barge crane.

Morrison made two attempts to pull loose the three grouted casing strings with the casing jacks at 308,000 lbs and 385,000 lbs with no success. Morrison determined that a larger amount of pull pressure would be required; however, according to Morrison's policy, the amount of pull pressure with the hydraulic casing jacks for this project was not to exceed 450,000 lbs. Nevertheless, Morrison made a third attempt to pull the grouted casing strings at 462,000 lbs without success that was above their policy of not exceed 450,000 lbs. Then the Morrison Well Site Supervisor and McMoRan Company Representative (Co-Rep) met and discussed the appropriate safe weight to pull on the casing strings in order to jar them loose. The Morrison Well Site Supervisor and the McMoRan Co-Rep inspected the beams supporting the casing jacks and decided that it was safe to pull on the three grouting casing strings with the hydraulic casing jacks at 523,600 lbs. Prior to pulling on the casing strings, the Morrison Well Site Supervisor had all employees removed from the area for safety purposes. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to jar lose the three grouted casing strings at 523,600 lbs; however, during the last pull attempt, the two support beams shifted causing the hydraulic casing jack equipment to roll over. One support beam fell over on its side and the other tipped over slightly with the hydraulic casing jacks. No one was injured nor was there any structural damage to the platform.

At approximately 1055 hours on 4 September 2013, BSEE inspectors were in the area and mobilized to the accident scene to conduct a preliminary accident investigation. BSEE inspectors interviewed personnel, gathered all available incident documentation, inspected the platform for damage, and conducted photographic documentation of the accident scene.

The Morrison Root Cause Report stated that the probable cause of the accident was attributed to personnel failing to follow company procedures for pulling casings with hydraulic casing jacks. Section 10 of Morrison's procedures for "Pulling Casing Using Casing Jack" states if the casing jacks are set up on beams, the beams are to be secured with chains. However, their investigation revealed that the beams supporting the hydraulic casing jacks were not properly secured for pulling on the three grouted casing strings above 425,000 lbs.

According to the Morrison Root Cause Report, there were two contributing causes to the accident: 1) created by man and 2) created by external factors. Created by man was attributed to the Morrison Supervisor disregarding his instructions not to exceed a pull of 450,000 lbs with the hydraulic casing jacks. Created by external factors was due to that the project was taking longer than anticipated; therefore, there was a perceived rush to get the job done.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

The Morrison Root Cause Report stated that the probable cause of the accident was attributed to personnel failing to follow company procedures for pulling casings with hydraulic casing jacks. Section 10 of Morrison's procedures for "Pulling Casing Using Casing Jack" states if the casing jacks are set up on beams, the beams are to be secured with chains. However, their investigation revealed that the beams supporting the hydraulic casing jacks were not properly secured for pulling on the three grouted casing strings above 425,000 lbs.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

According to the Morrison Root Cause Report, there were two contributing causes to the accident: 1) created by man and 2) created by external factors. Created by man was attributed to the Morrison Supervisor disregarding his instructions not to exceed a pull of 450,000 lbs with the hydraulic casing jacks. Created by external factors was due to that the project was taking longer than anticipated; therefore, there was a perceived rush to get the job done.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

Property damage was limited to the hydraulic casing jack equipment only. There was no structural damage to the SMI-147A platform from this accident.

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

Damage to the hydraulic casing jack equipment included the following: the power pack fan, radiator; the bottom basket; and the jack plate. There was no structural damage to platform.

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): \$5,336

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

The BSEE Lafayette District makes no recommendations to the Office of Safety Management.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: **YES**

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE: -

Due to the BSEE accident investigation findings, an Incident of Noncompliance (INC) was issued "After the Fact" on 20 November 2013 to document McMoran for its failure to perform operations in a safe and workmanlike manner on 4 September 2013 during well abandonment operations on Well A-6 located at the SMI-147A platform. The failure to properly secure the two beams supporting the hydraulic casing jacks resulted in one beam falling over and the hydraulic casing jacks and associated equipment tipping off the other beam causing damage to the equipment. A contributing factor to the accident was a result of personnel not following the procedures for pulling casing when using casing jacks by exceeding the recommended maximum pull amount of 450,000 pounds.

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

04-SEP-2013

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS: -

Troy Naquin / Raymond Johnson /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

PANEL FORMED: NO

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Elliott S. Smith

APPROVED

DATE: 20-NOV-2013

INJURY/FATALITY/WITNESS ATTACHMENT

OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE

INJURY

CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE

FATALITY

OTHER _____

WITNESS

NAME:

HOME ADDRESS:

CITY:

STATE:

WORK PHONE:

TOTAL OFFSHORE EXPERIENCE:

YEARS

EMPLOYED BY:

BUSINESS ADDRESS:

CITY:

STATE:

ZIP CODE:

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