UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT GULF OF MEXICO REGION

## **ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT**

## For Public Release

| 1. | OCCURRED  |  |
|----|---|--|
|    | DATE:<br>11-APR-2013 TIME: 1930 HOURS   | STRUCTURAL DAMAGE  |
|    |   | X CRANE  |
| 2. | OPERATOR: Apache Corporation<br>REPRESENTATIVE:<br>TELEPHONE:<br>CONTRACTOR:<br>REPRESENTATIVE:<br>TELEPHONE:         | OTHER LIFTING DEVICE<br>DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.<br>INCIDENT >\$25K<br>H2S/15MIN./20PPM<br>REQUIRED MUSTER<br>SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE<br>OTHER |
| 3. | OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR<br>ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:   | 6. OPERATION:  |
| 4. | LEASE: G03733<br>AREA: MI LATITUDE:<br>BLOCK: 703 LONGITUDE:  | PRODUCTION<br>DRILLING<br>X WORKOVER<br>COMPLETION<br>HELICOPTER<br>MOTOR VESSEL   |
| 5. | PLATFORM: A<br>RIG NAME:  | <pre>PIPELINE SEGMENT NO. OTHER</pre>  |
| 6. | ACTIVITY: EXPLORATION (POE)   | 8. CAUSE:  |
|    | X DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION  | EQUIPMENT FAILURE  |
| 7. | (DOCD/POD)<br>TYPE:   | HUMAN ERROR<br>EXTERNAL DAMAGE   |
|    | HISTORIC INJURY<br>REQUIRED EVACUATION 1<br>LTA (1-3 days)<br>LTA (>3 days<br>RW/JT (1-3 days)<br>X RW/JT (>3 days) 1 | SLIP/TRIP/FALL<br>WEATHER RELATED<br>LEAK<br>UPSET H2O TREATING<br>OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID<br>OTHER   |
|    | Other Injury  | 9. WATER DEPTH: <b>128</b> FT.   |
|    | FATALITY<br>POLLUTION<br>FIRE<br>EXPLOSION  | 10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 25 MI.  |
|    | LWC HISTORIC BLOWOUT<br>UNDERGROUND<br>SURFACE  | SPEED: M.P.H.  |
|    | DEVERTER<br>SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES   | 12. CURRENT DIRECTION:<br>SPEED: M.P.H.  |
|    | COLLISION $\square$ HISTORIC $\square >$ \$25K $\square <$ =\$25K   | 13. SEA STATE: FT.   |

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## 17. INVESTIGATION FINDINGS:

While attempting to remove D-ring on four part sling load from crane hook after load was landed on deck, rigger on top of Marine Portable Transfer (MPT)tank was having trouble getting the D-ring unhooked. Coiled Tubing Unit (CTU) Supervisor was assisting by pushing up on slings. Rigger on top of MPT tank got the D-ring unhooked and dropped the D-ring over the side of tank. The D-ring caught the right index finger of the supervisor on deck between the side of tank and the D-ring. Supervisor initially stated that he was wearing the company required high-visibility impact gloves but later into the investigation changed testimony to say that he was not wearing any gloves at the time of the incident.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Crane Operator did not lower the D-ring low enough for the Riggers to unhook from maindeck.-

It was found that Crane Operator had not been involved in the Job Safety Analysis prior to the job. -No Stop Work Authority was exercised when crew knew Crane Operator had not been involved in the Job Safety Analysis review. -After the incident Company Representative did not exercise Stop Work Authority. -

No communication between rigging crew. -CTU supervisor was not wearing the proper Personal Protective Equipment at the time of incident. -

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Rigger was not aware that supervisor was below him. -Poor communication between supervisor and other crew-Crane Operator not involved in Job Safety Analysis. -Lack of supervision from Company Representative. -20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

Injured person manufactured gloves to appear that he had been wearing them and then lied to investigators about the facts.-

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL):

\$

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

Onsite supervisors should conduct proper Job Safety Analysis prior to any operations.

All personnel on board facilities should feel comfortable enough to use Stop Work

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Authority Better communication between personnel while performing job tasks if any of the personnel involved in a task are unclear about the task, Stop Work Authority should be utilized.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: YES

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

G-110 Onsite supervisors failed to conduct a proper lessee Job Safety Analysis prior to lifting operations at time of injury. Onsite supervisors failed to conduct a proper third party contractor Job Safety Analysis prior to the lifting operations at time of injury. All personnel involved with the night operations did not conduct a safety stand down after injury incident occurred. G-132 Statements and pictures were falsely and inaccurately submitted to BSEE during the start of accident investigation

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

22-APR-2013

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION 26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS: PANEL FORMED: NO Marco Deleon / Phillip Couvillion /

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

John McCarroll

APPROVED 26-NOV-2013 DATE: