

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT
GULF OF MEXICO REGION

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

For Public Release

1. OCCURRED

DATE: **13-DEC-2013** TIME: **0420** HOURS

2. OPERATOR: **Chevron U.S.A. Inc.**
REPRESENTATIVE:
TELEPHONE:
CONTRACTOR:
REPRESENTATIVE:
TELEPHONE:

- STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
- CRANE
- OTHER LIFTING DEVICE
- DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
- INCIDENT >\$25K
- H2S/15MIN./20PPM
- REQUIRED MUSTER
- SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
- OTHER

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR
ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

6. OPERATION:

4. LEASE: **G06358**
AREA: **GB** LATITUDE:
BLOCK: **189** LONGITUDE:

- PRODUCTION
- DRILLING
- WORKOVER
- COMPLETION
- HELICOPTER
- MOTOR VESSEL
- PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
- OTHER

5. PLATFORM: **A (Tick)**
RIG NAME:

6. ACTIVITY: EXPLORATION (POE)
 DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION
(DOCD/POD)

8. CAUSE:

7. TYPE:

- HISTORIC INJURY
 - REQUIRED EVACUATION
 - LTA (1-3 days)
 - LTA (>3 days)
 - RW/JT (1-3 days)
 - RW/JT (>3 days)
 - Other Injury

- EQUIPMENT FAILURE
- HUMAN ERROR
- EXTERNAL DAMAGE
- SLIP/TRIP/FALL
- WEATHER RELATED
- LEAK
- UPSET H2O TREATING
- OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
- OTHER

- FATALITY
- POLLUTION
- FIRE
- EXPLOSION

- LWC HISTORIC BLOWOUT
- UNDERGROUND
 - SURFACE
 - DEVERTER
 - SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

COLLISION HISTORIC >\$25K <=\$25K

9. WATER DEPTH: **720** FT.
10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: **130** MI.
11. WIND DIRECTION: **NE**
SPEED: **10** M.P.H.
12. CURRENT DIRECTION:
SPEED: M.P.H.
13. SEA STATE: **3** FT.

17. INVESTIGATION FINDINGS:-

On December 13, 2013, Chevron U.S.A (CUSA) Garden Banks 189 production platform facility experienced a pollution event. During routine lifting operations, a transporter (i.e. tank) containing 500 gallons of aviation fuel was inadvertently toppled on the back deck of a motor vessel (MV) which resulted in pollution of offshore waters. On the day of the incident, a third party contract Crane Operator (CO) was transferring cargo from a MV onto the fixed production facility. After multiple successful lifts were made the CO attempted to hoist a generator which snagged the fuel tank on one of the lifting pad-eyes upon cabling up. It was immediately noticed and an all stop was initiated. Upon setting the load(s) back onto the heaving MV, the tank landed on only two legs and simultaneously toppled onto its side. As a result, the tank's lid and associated retainer ring became detached from the tank, spilling approximately 390 gallons of aviation fuel onto the deck of the MV and ultimately into the Gulf waters.

On December 17, 2013 the BSEE Lake Charles District conducted an investigation into the pollution incident which included a visit to CUSA's shore base facility. An evaluation of the tank and all associated components involved in the incident was performed and did not reveal any obvious defects. While on location, an audit of other like in kind tanks was also performed and inconsistencies with regards to the tightness of some of the retainer ring fastening bolts were noted. Additionally, the investigation team learned that the aviation fuel tanks are filled via a hose connection at the base of the tank and the fill procedure only required a visual check of the tank lid. Furthermore, prior to making the lifts, a crane pre-use inspection was completed by the qualified CO, personnel on the facility as well as on the MV independently completed a job safety analysis (JSA), and then all parties involved in the lifting activities participated in a joint safety meeting to discuss the planned lifts. Other documents completed as part of the planned lifting activities included a hand safety checklist and a permit to work. In addition, the BSEE investigation team determined that CUSA followed their current safe work practices with regards to crane hoisting operations and placement of cargo on the marine transport vessels.

Further investigation efforts revealed that CUSA has all aviation fuel tanks inspected every 2 years by a third party company. CUSA's root cause analysis (RCA) report states that the lid is designed to remain intact in the case of the tank being toppled. It was also noted that these specially designed tanks must meet drop test criteria prior to becoming certified (this was a certified tank and had met the inspection frequency requirements). Based on our review of the MV's deck layout diagram which depicts the location of the cargo on the deck, it appeared that there was ample available deck space which could have allowed for greater distances between the various loads. Spreading the loads further from one another may have prevented the loads from making contact during the dynamic lifting activities.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

During dynamic lifting operations from a MV to the production facility, a tank containing 500 gallons of aviation fuel was snagged by a generator being hoisted by the platform facility crane. As a result, the tank was toppled onto its side. As the tank hit the deck of the MV, the force of the liquid in the tank caused the lid and associated retainer ring assembly to detach from the tank. Ultimately, approximately 390 gallons of aviation fuel spilled onto the deck of the vessel and into the offshore waters.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

- * The deck arrangement did not allow adequate distance between loads to alleviate loads contacting one another during lifting operations
- * Prior to shipment, the tank lid's fastening components and tightness of the lid retainer ring assembly were not inspected

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL):

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: **YES**

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

E-100 During a dynamic lift of a generator from a motor vessel to the platform; a transport tank containing aviation fuel was toppled on the deck of the vessel which resulted in an unauthorized discharge of pollutants into the offshore waters. Chevron did not take the necessary measures to prevent the discharge of pollutants into offshore waters.

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

17-DEC-2013

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:

John Portie / Cody LeBlanc / Darron Miller / Marcus Mouton /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

PANEL FORMED: **NO**

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Larry Williamson

APPROVED

DATE: **16-APR-2014**