

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE
GULF OF MEXICO REGION
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1. OCCURRED

DATE: 31-OCT-2005 TIME: 1630 HOURS

2. OPERATOR: BP Exploration & Production
Inc.

REPRESENTATIVE: Scherie Douglas

TELEPHONE: (281) 366-6843

3. LEASE: G09982

AREA: GC LATITUDE: 27.15586567

BLOCK: 826 LONGITUDE: -90.26662526

4. PLATFORM:

RIG NAME DIAMOND OCEAN CONFIDENCE

5. ACTIVITY: EXPLORATION(POE)

DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION
(DOCD/POD)

6. TYPE: FIRE

EXPLOSION

BLOWOUT

COLLISION

INJURY NO. _____

FATALITY NO. _____

POLLUTION

OTHER pollution

7. OPERATION: PRODUCTION

DRILLING

WORKOVER

COMPLETION

MOTOR VESSEL

PIPELINE SEGMENT NO. _____

OTHER _____

8. CAUSE: EQUIPMENT FAILURE

HUMAN ERROR

EXTERNAL DAMAGE

SLIP/TRIP/FALL

WEATHER RELATED

LEAK

UPSET H2O TREATING

OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID

OTHER _____

9. WATER DEPTH: 6560 FT.

10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 130 MI.

11. WIND DIRECTION: NNE

SPEED: 12 M.P.H.

12. CURRENT DIRECTION: WNW

SPEED: 1 M.P.H.

13. SEA STATE: 3 FT.

16. OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE/
SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

Randall Anderson

CITY: Houston

STATE: TX

TELEPHONE: (281) 366-4566

CONTRACTOR: Diamond Offshore Drilling,
Inc.

CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/
SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

Marshall Perez

CITY: Houston

STATE: TX

TELEPHONE: (281) 647-2200

17. DESCRIBE IN SEQUENCE HOW ACCIDENT HAPPENED:

The valve controller for the primary dump valve on the possum belly was discovered in the open position at 1245 hours on October 31, 2005. For normal oil base mud practice, the handle for the valve controller is not left on the controller. A sign which says "Do Not Operate" is usually covering the hole. But for some reason the sign was gone and the handle was in place to operate the valve. Upon further investigation, the shaker hand found the secondary barrier valve in the open position. The possum belly had no mud in the tank. The primary and secondary valves were secured at this time. The primary valve was closed while circulating the well. Circulating the well had been completed 36 hours prior to discovery of the possum belly tank being empty. The hole had been on the trip tank since circulation was completed. No level sensors are in the possum belly tank for the monitoring system.

Upon investigation, interviews of crews and analysis of logging charts, the material previously in the possum belly could not be accounted for. No one was instructed to pump out or dump the possum belly. No one has come forward and stated that they inadvertently opened the primary dump valve. There was no permit for de-isolating the primary or secondary dump valves. The secondary valve had not been added to the oil base mud check list after installation on this well. The JSA for oil base mud did not cover oil base mud check lists or locking primary or secondary barriers.

As a result of this accident, several changes have been made to prevent this from happening again in the future. The oil base mud valve list was revised and a sight survey form was made for the secondary valve to be tracked at the permit control point. A locking device was installed on the toggle to the air actuator and on the secondary barrier valve to prevent future incidents. The JSA will be revised for oil base mud or synthetic base mud loading, and for displacing the hole to oil base or synthetic base mud. The incident will be reviewed with all crews.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

The possum belly dump valves were inadvertently opened with mud in the possum belly tank. The primary and secondary dump valves were not secured for oil base mud procedures.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

When the secondary barrier was installed, the oil base mud valve checklist was not updated. Due to years of operating with synthetic drilling fluids, complacency exists with auditing the implementation of the oil base mud procedures on board the rig.

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

none

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

n/a

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL):

\$

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE NARRATIVE:

Due to the specific nature of this incident, the Houma District has no recommendations to report to the Regional Office.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: **NO**

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

none

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:

Gresham, Amy /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

PANEL FORMED: **NO**

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Michael J. Saucier

APPROVED

DATE: **21-DEC-2005**