

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE
GULF OF MEXICO REGION
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1. OCCURRED

DATE: **21-JUL-2005** TIME: **0001** HOURS

2. OPERATOR: **Apache Corporation**

REPRESENTATIVE: **Norman Porsche**

TELEPHONE: **(337) 232-8282**

3. LEASE: **G11221**

AREA: **MU** LATITUDE: **27.57715773**

BLOCK: **787** LONGITUDE: **-96.70798222**

4. PLATFORM: **A**

RIG NAME

5. ACTIVITY: EXPLORATION (POE)

DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION
(DOCD/POD)

6. TYPE: FIRE

EXPLOSION

BLOWOUT

COLLISION

INJURY NO. 0

FATALITY NO. 0

POLLUTION

OTHER

7. OPERATION: PRODUCTION

DRILLING

WORKOVER

COMPLETION

MOTOR VESSEL

PIPELINE SEGMENT NO. _____

OTHER _____

8. CAUSE: EQUIPMENT FAILURE

HUMAN ERROR

EXTERNAL DAMAGE

SLIP/TRIP/FALL

WEATHER RELATED

LEAK

UPSET H2O TREATING

OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID

OTHER **Unknown**

9. WATER DEPTH: **151** FT.

10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: **26** MI.

11. WIND DIRECTION:

SPEED: **23** M.P.H.

12. CURRENT DIRECTION:

SPEED: M.P.H.

13. SEA STATE: FT.

16. OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE/
SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

None on site at time

CITY: STATE:

TELEPHONE:

CONTRACTOR: **ISLAND OPERATORS CO. INC.**

CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/
SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

CITY: STATE:

TELEPHONE: **(337) 735-6058**

17. DESCRIBE IN SEQUENCE HOW ACCIDENT HAPPENED:

The two operators arrived on the platform on the morning of Wednesday July 20, 2005. They had evacuated due to Hurricane Dennis. At approximately 6:00 pm the level safety low (LSL) on the surge side of the re-boiler initiated an alarm. The operator shut down the glycol unit using the computer. He did not physically go down to the unit. He was going to investigate the problem in the morning. At midnight the operators got an alarm (PSD Solenoid.) They went down to the production deck and saw a fire on the re-boiler. The insulation was on fire. They attempted to extinguish the fire with a 150#, 250# and 2 30# dry chemical extinguishers. The dry chemical was not effective. They hit the ESD on the platform and called Harbor Island Dispatch to report fire at 12:15 am. They prepared to abandon the platform. They donned life jackets, launched the life float and proceeded to the boat landing. The Coast Guard arrived at 2:00 am to pick them up. At approximately 3:00 am, a motor vessel arrived on location to extinguish the fire with a water cannon. The fire was extinguished at approximately 3:45 am.

The operator has a dry chemical departure, issued in 1993, which allows the manned structure to use fire extinguishers as their primary firefighting source rather than having a firewater unit on board.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

The probable cause of the accident is unknown.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

A contributing cause of the incident is the lack of concern the operator had in regards to the process alarm on the glycol unit. Had the operator physically gone to investigate the cause of the alarm, he may have discovered something out of the ordinary, which in turn could have prevented the resulting fire.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

There is a hole in the nipple to the PSV. This hole would have been hidden by insulation. The shell of the re-boiler had just been inspected in June of this year. There was no liquid level in the vessel upon checking after the fire.

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

The glycol reboiler.

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

Unit was burned and insulation needed to be replaced.

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): **\$200,000**

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE NARRATIVE:

The investigating engineer recommends that policy should be implemented regarding inspecting nipples that are under insulation on glycol reboiler units; therefore, not visible. A Safety Alert could be established to alert companies about the need for periodic inspection of glycol systems. An NTL could be issued requiring periodic inspections of glycol systems.

The operator will be required to submit a risk assessment based on the guidelines offered in NTL 2001 G-09 to demonstrate the current fire protection is still adequate.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: **NO**

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

22-JUL-2005

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:

Jim Hail / Kathleen Crumrine /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

PANEL FORMED: **NO**

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Ed Smith

APPROVED

DATE: **12-JAN-2006**