UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT GULF OF MEXICO REGION

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1.	OCCURRED	
	DATE:	STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
	01-MAY-2011 TIME: 1100 HOURS	CRANE
		OTHER LIFTING DEVICE
2.	OPERATOR: Merit Energy Company, LLC	DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
	REPRESENTATIVE: Sigue, Lloyd	INCIDENT >\$25K
	TELEPHONE: (337) 262-8192	H2S/15MIN./20PPM
	CONTRACTOR:	REQUIRED MUSTER
	REPRESENTATIVE: Moneaux, Jared	SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
	TELEPHONE: (337) 892-3346	X OTHER Fire from Condensate Release
3.	OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:	6. OPERATION:
		X PRODUCTION
		DRILLING
4.	LEASE: G04453	WORKOVER
	AREA: EI LATITUDE:	COMPLETION
	BLOCK: 240 LONGITUDE:	HELICOPTER
		MOTOR VESSEL
5.	PLATFORM: A	PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
	RIG NAME:	OTHER
6.	ACTIVITY: EXPLORATION (POE)	8. CAUSE:
	DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION (DOCD/POD)	☐ EQUIPMENT FAILURE
7.	TYPE:	X HUMAN ERROR
	П	EXTERNAL DAMAGE
	HISTORIC INJURY	SLIP/TRIP/FALL WEATHER RELATED
	REQUIRED EVACUATION 1 LTA (1-3 days)	LEAK RELATED
	LTA (>3 days)	UPSET H20 TREATING
	RW/JT (1-3 days)	OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
		OTHER
	Other Injury	
	☐ FATALITY	9. WATER DEPTH: 139 FT.
	POLLUTION	10 DIGENNOE EDON GNODE 40 MT
	X FIRE	10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 42 MI.
	EXPLOSION	11 VIIID DIDIGETON
	LWC HISTORIC BLOWOUT	11. WIND DIRECTION:
	UNDERGROUND	SPEED: M.P.H.
	SURFACE	4.0 07700777
	DEVERTER	12. CURRENT DIRECTION:
	SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES	SPEED: M.P.H.
	COLLISION THISTORIC T >\$25K T <=\$25K	

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17. INVESTIGATION FINDINGS:

On 01 May 2011 at approximately 1100 hours, a contract rigger (CR) received first degree burns on his face, arms, and wrist due to a fire igniting when a plumber's plug released from a 2-inch line, causing condensate to ignite during welding operations. The CR was assisting the welder in installing a new section of 2-inch piping and flange connection. The fuel gas scrubber, compresser suction scrubbers, and the water coalescer that dumped hydrocarbons to the condensate return tank (MBJ 1802) were still connected and flowing at the time of the incident. The vessels were isolated from the condensate return tank by the closing of a manual block valve. The condensate return tank (MBJ 1802) and incoming pumps were placed out-of-service and bled down free of all pressure and fluids prior to welding operations. The block valves were not locked or flagged to indicate which block valves were in the closed position. A plumber's plug was installed in the 2-inch piping which was located directly over the welding operations. The welder and the CR were conducting welding operations on and above the pipe rack and cable tray located 13.5 feet from the deck. Fire resistant tarps were used to cover the pipe rack, cable tray, and a pipeline located 5 feet from welding operations. During welding operations, pressure and condensate accumulated upstream of the plumber's plug from a leaking block valve, causing the plug to eject from the 2-inch line. Condensate came in contact with the welding operations, igniting a flash fire that caused first degree burns to the CR's right wrist, arms, and face. The CR was flown to Abbeville General Hospital where he was treated for his injuries.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

By allowing the facility to stay online and only isolating the piping with a block valve, hydrocarbons were allowed to accumulate in the 2-inch piping upstream of the plumber's plug. A needle valve located near the condensate return tank (MBJ 1802) and upstream of the plumber's plug could have been utilized to prevent any pressure accumulation.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Prior to installing the plumber's plug, personnel failed to adequately assess the area for all possible hazards as per Merit Energy Company, LLC policies as follows:

*Welding and Burning Procedure - Welding and burning operations shall not be conducted on an OCS platform or structure until the "Welding and Burning Safety Checklist" specified in the Welding and Burning Safe Practices and Procedures Plan is completed. *Checklist of Operations Procedures Simultaneous Production and Major Construction Operations - The wellhead master valve shall be closed, and the process train depressured anytime burning and/or welding is performed in the immediate vicinity of the wellhead(s) and/or pressured equipment or piping. *Lock Out/Tag Out Plan was not utilized.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

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21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

None

N/A

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL):

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22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

The BOEMRE Lafayette District office makes no recommendations to the Regional Office of Safety Management (OSM).

- 23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: YES
- 24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

INC G-110 is issued to document that Merit Energy Company, LLC did not perform all operations in a safe and workmanlike manner. During welding operations, a contract welder was burned due to a plumber's plug being blown out of the pipe. Procedures were not addressed to prevent the accumulation of pressure or hydrocarbons. The Lock Out/Tag Out Procedure was not properly followed.

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

02-MAY-2011

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:

Tom Basey / Robert Ranney / Wade Guillotte /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED: NO

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Elliott S. Smith

APPROVED

DATE: 16-JUN-2011

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FIRE/EXPLOSION ATTACHMENT

1.	SOURCE OF IGNITION	. ₩ €	elding	opera	tions		
2.	TYPE OF FUEL:		GAS OIL DIESE CONDE	NSATE ULIC			
3.	FUEL SOURCE: Lead	king	valve	from	conden	sate	tank
4.	WERE PRECAUTIONS C KNOWN SOURCES OF I						
5.	TYPE OF FIREFIGHTI	NG E	QUIPME	NT UT:	ILIZED:	x	HANDHELD WHEELED UNIT FIXED CHEMICAL FIXED WATER NONE OTHER

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