

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT
GULF OF MEXICO REGION

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1. OCCURRED

DATE: **29-MAR-2011** TIME: **0400** HOURS

2. OPERATOR: **Chevron U.S.A. Inc.**
REPRESENTATIVE: **Sanchez, Maritza**
TELEPHONE: **(832) 854-7788**
CONTRACTOR: **Transocean Offshore**
REPRESENTATIVE: **Owens, Robert**
TELEPHONE: **(832) 587-6880**

- STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
- CRANE
- OTHER LIFTING DEVICE
- DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
- INCIDENT >\$25K
- H2S/15MIN./20PPM
- REQUIRED MUSTER
- SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
- OTHER **Loss of Station**

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR
ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

6. OPERATION:

4. LEASE: **G16770**
AREA: **GC** LATITUDE:
BLOCK: **641** LONGITUDE:

- PRODUCTION
- DRILLING
- WORKOVER
- COMPLETION
- HELICOPTER
- MOTOR VESSEL
- PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
- OTHER

5. PLATFORM:
RIG NAME: **T.O. DISCOVERER CLEAR LEADER**

6. ACTIVITY: EXPLORATION (POE)
 DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION
(DOCD/POD)

8. CAUSE:

7. TYPE:
 HISTORIC INJURY
 REQUIRED EVACUATION
 LTA (1-3 days)
 LTA (>3 days)
 RW/JT (1-3 days)
 RW/JT (>3 days)
 Other Injury

- EQUIPMENT FAILURE
- HUMAN ERROR
- EXTERNAL DAMAGE
- SLIP/TRIP/FALL
- WEATHER RELATED
- LEAK
- UPSET H2O TREATING
- OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
- OTHER _____

FATALITY
 POLLUTION
 FIRE
 EXPLOSION

9. WATER DEPTH: **4291** FT.

LWC HISTORIC BLOWOUT
 UNDERGROUND
 SURFACE
 DEVERTER
 SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: **120** MI.

11. WIND DIRECTION: **E**
SPEED: **12** M.P.H.

12. CURRENT DIRECTION: **S**
SPEED: **0** M.P.H.

COLLISION HISTORIC >\$25K <=\$25K 13. SEA STATE: **3** FT.

17. INVESTIGATION FINDINGS:

At 0400 hours on the 29th of March 2011, the Discoverer Clear Leader suffered an electrical failure. The failure was associated with a voltage spike of the Motor Side B Power Stack, causing Thruster 2 to be disabled by the electrical protection circuits. Due to the sudden instability, the Power Management System functioned as designed by shutting down power to the remaining Thrusters 1,3,4,5 and 6. This lack of power to all thrusters allowed the rig to drift 5 feet off of station. After approximately 50 seconds the Power Management System brought Thrusters 1,3,4,5 and 6 back online. Upon observing the Yellow Alert the crew responded per the procedure and closed the Middle Pipe Rams in preparation for a potential disconnect.

The ship response to the failure was within Failure Mode and Effects Study (FMEA) predictions. No regulatory body participation was necessary, and the vessel DP class was not affected.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

A voltage spike of the Motor Side B Power Stack resulted in Thruster shut down.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Investigation is still pending; however, the Transistor Drive Circuit Card in the Circuit Concentration Bay is believed to be the have caused the Motor Side B Power Stack voltage spike.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

N/A

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

None

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

N/A

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL):

\$

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

The BOEMRE Houma District makes no recommendations to the Agency.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: NO

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

N/A

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:
Robert Nelson /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
PANEL FORMED: **NO**

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Bryan A. Domangue

APPROVED

DATE: **06-JUL-2011**

