UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE GULF OF MEXICO REGION

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1.	OCCURRED	Г	STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
	DATE: 23-OCT-2008 TIME: 1730 HOURS		CRANE
_			OTHER LIFTING DEVICE
2.	OPERATOR: Energy Resource Technology GOM, In	n	DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
	REPRESENTATIVE: Wendy Braddock TELEPHONE: (281) 618-0551	-	INCIDENT >\$25K
	CONTRACTOR:		H2S/15MIN./20PPM
	REPRESENTATIVE:		REQUIRED MUSTER SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
	TELEPHONE:	1	OTHER Injury to person
		Ľ	dolling injury to person
3.	OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR	6.0	PERATION:
	ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:		
			X PRODUCTION
4	I BAGE		DRILLING
±.	LEASE: G02280 AREA: SM LATITUDE:		WORKOVER
	BLOCK: 130 LONGITUDE:		COMPLETION
	BLOCK: 130 BONGITODE.		HELICOPTER MOTOR VESSEL
5	PLATFORM: A		PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
	RIG NAME:		X OTHER Pigging Operation
5 .	ACTIVITY: EXPLORATION (POE)	8. C	'AUSE:
	X DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION		X EQUIPMENT FAILURE
7	(DOCD/POD)		X HUMAN ERROR
, ·		[EXTERNAL DAMAGE
	HISTORIC INJURY	ļ	SLIP/TRIP/FALL
	X REQUIRED EVACUATION 1	-	WEATHER RELATED X LEAK
	LTA (1-3 days) LTA (>3 days	ŀ	UPSET H20 TREATING
	RW/JT (1-3 days)	l	OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
	RW/JT (>3 days)		OTHER
	Other Injury		
	T FATALITY	9.	WATER DEPTH: 215 FT.
	POLLUTION	10	DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 82 MI.
	FIRE	10.	DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 02 MI.
	EXPLOSION	11	WIND DIRECTION:
	LWC HISTORIC BLOWOUT	тт.	SPEED: M.P.H.
	UNDERGROUND		FI.E.II.
	SURFACE	12	CURRENT DIRECTION:
	DEVERTER	14.	SPEED: M.P.H.
	SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES		01 DDD. PI.F.II.
	COLLISION HISTORIC >\$25K <-\$25K	13.	SEA STATE: FT.

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17. DESCRIBE IN SEQUENCE HOW ACCIDENT HAPPENED:

On October 23, 2008, at approximately 1730 hrs, a Lead Operator (LO) sustained a break to his right arm just above his wrist during a pipeline pigging operation. All valves leading to the pig launcher were closed/isolated, and the pig launcher was depressurized in preparation for the pig's insertion. Subsequent to loading the pig into the launcher/receiver, the pig prematurely ejected backwards striking the LO on his right arm before he could remove his arm and securely close the trap door cover. The LO was evacuated by helicopter and flown to the Houma Terrebonne General Hospital for treatment. The LO was released to restricted work duty until November 10, 2008.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Pipeline system pressure slowly leaked through two closed main 8" manual isolation block valves located on the vertical run of the pig launcher. This allowed pressure to build up inside the launching/receiving trap behind the pig once it was placed in the launcher. The pig, being new, allowed for a complete seal with no blow-by. After initially bleeding down the pig launcher system, the LO failed to ensure the pig launcher remained depressurized while being isolated from all pressure sources.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Although a Job Safety Analysis (JSA) was conducted prior to the operation, the LO failed to follow the JSA guidelines secondary to the LO's upper body and right arm being exposed to pig loading operation. This bodily exposure violated the JSA recommended procedure, as well as the ERT pig launching procedure, of not standing in front of the launcher/receiver during pigging operations.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

MMS recommends the following:

- *Pig launching Standards of Operating Procedures (SOPs) should be discussed during the JSA, and followed by all personnel during the pig launching operation.
- *All safety precautions and procedures should be followed while performing pig launching operations on the depressurized/pressurized piece of equipment. As per the ERT pig launching procedures, a wooden pig loading pole or rod should be used to safely insert the pig into the launcher to prevent unnecessary personnel exposure.
- *Contingency procedures, including Stop Work Authority (SWA), should be in place to deal with faulty or inadequate safety systems or devices; e.g., leaking block valves and/or insufficient venting.

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None None

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL):

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

The MMS Lafayette District has no recommendations to the MMS Region Office of Safety Management (OSM).

- 23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: YES
- 24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

Incident of Noncompliance (INC) G-110 is issued "After the Fact" to document that Energy Resource Technology GOM (ERT) failed to protect health, safety, and the environment by not performing operations in a safe and workmanlike manner as follows:

ERT failed to ensure personnel follow all written procedures including the JSA and SOP recommendations. Specifically, the LO failed to ensure that the pig launcher sustained a zero pressure prior to loading the pig into the launcher. In addition, the LO failed to stay clear of the pig launcher while inserting the pig.

ERT is advised to submit a letter of explanation to the Lafayette District Manager addressing the above INC, and ERT's plans for eliminating future incidents of this nature.

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

27-OCT-2008

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:

Douglas Frerich / Mark Shuff / Jason Abshire /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED: NO

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Elliott S Smith

APPROVED

DATE: 22-DEC-2008

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INJURY/FATALITY/WITNESS ATTACHMENT

NAME: HOME ADDRESS: CITY: STATE: WORK PHONE: TOTAL OFFSHORE EXPERIENCE: YEARS	OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE TOTHER	INJURY FATALITY WITNESS	
CITY: STATE:			
WORK PHONE: TOTAL OFFSHORE EXPERIENCE: YEARS		STATE:	
	WORK PHONE:	TOTAL OFFSHORE EXPERIENCE:	YEARS
EMPLOYED BY:	EMPLOYED BY:		
BUSINESS ADDRESS:	BUSINESS ADDRESS:		
CITY: STATE:	CITY:	STATE:	
ZIP CODE:	ZIP CODE:		

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