UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE
GULF OF MEXICO REGION

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1. OCCURRED
   DATE: **10-JUL-2008** TIME: **1015** HOURS

2. OPERATOR: **Apache Corporation**
   REPRESENTATIVE: **Wetzel, Gary**
   TELEPHONE: **(337) 354-8130**
   CONTRACTOR:
   REPRESENTATIVE: **Geibel, Eric**
   TELEPHONE: **(985) 384-0633**

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

4. LEASE: **00247**
   AREA: **WC** LATITUDE:
   BLOCK: **102** LONGITUDE:

5. PLATFORM: **G-AUX**
   RIG NAME:

6. ACTIVITY:
- [ ] EXPLORATION(POE)
- [X] DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION (DOCD/POD)

7. TYPE:
- [ ] HISTORIC INJURY
  - [X] REQUIRED EVACUATION **1**
  - [ ] LTA (1-3 days)
  - [X] LTA (>3 days **1**
  - [ ] RW/JT (1-3 days)
  - [ ] RW/JT (>3 days)
  - [ ] Other Injury
- [ ] FATALITY
- [ ] POLLUTION
- [X] FIRE
- [ ] EXPLOSION

LWC
- [ ] HISTORIC BLOWOUT
- [ ] UNDERGROUND
- [ ] SURFACE
- [ ] DEVERTER
- [ ] SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

COLLISION [ ] HISTORIC [ ] >$25K [ ] <=$25K

- [ ] STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
- [ ] CRANE
- [ ] OTHER LIFTING DEVICE
- [ ] DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
- [ ] INCIDENT >$25K
- [ ] H2S/15MIN./20PPM
- [ ] REQUIRED MUSTER
- [ ] SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
- [ ] OTHER

6. OPERATION:
- [ ] PRODUCTION
- [ ] DRILLING
- [ ] WORKOVER
- [ ] COMPLETION
- [ ] HELICOPTER
- [ ] MOTOR VESSEL
- [ ] PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
- [X] OTHER **Construction**

8. CAUSE:
- [ ] EQUIPMENT FAILURE
- [X] HUMAN ERROR
- [ ] EXTERNAL DAMAGE
- [ ] SLIP/TRIP/FALL
- [ ] WEATHER RELATED
- [ ] LEAK
- [ ] UPSET H2O TREATING
- [ ] OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
- [ ] OTHER _____

9. WATER DEPTH: **42** FT.

10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: **14** MI.

11. WIND DIRECTION: **SE**
    SPEED: **15** M.P.H.

12. CURRENT DIRECTION:
    SPEED: M.P.H.

13. SEA STATE: **5** FT.

17. DESCRIBE IN SEQUENCE HOW ACCIDENT HAPPENED:

On the morning of July 10, 2008, the welder/fitter utilized a cutting torch to cut a section of handrail located next to a pneumatic wash-down pump on the top deck of the G-Aux platform. The welder/fitter's helper noticed a section of synthetic (poly-flow) tubing connected to the handrail, and held it away from the flame as the welder/fitter cut the handrail's lower post. After completing the cut, the welder/fitter turned off the torch and removed his gloves. At that moment, hot slag from the metal being cut burned through the poly-flow tubing which contained process fuel gas to operate the pneumatic wash-down pump. A flame of approximately 8" in length emanated from the poly-flow resulting in a second degree burn to the back of the welder/fitter's right hand and fingers. The flame was extinguished with a hand held fire extinguisher, and the supply gas valve was closed to isolate the flow of fuel gas from the tubing.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

1. Hot slag from the metal being cut burned through the synthetic tubing (poly-flow) and ignited the process fuel gas.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

1. No production personnel on the platform at the time of the incident
2. Construction crew not familiar with equipment in the area they were working.
3. Flammable material containing process fuel gas for the wash-down pump was not blocked off, bled down and removed from the area before hot work began.
4. Construction crew was working in an area not permitted on the "hot work permit". The hot work permit was issued for hot work that would be conducted on the jacket walkway/boat landing level only (plus 10 level), not on the top deck where the incident occurred.
5. The welder/fitter removed his PPE (gloves) before securing the area.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

1. No production operators were onboard at the time of the incident since it was production's crew change day.
2. The construction crew was directly supervised by an onsite construction superintendent and 3rd party construction consultant (PIC); both of which were not in the immediate area at the time of the incident.
3. Personnel were reminded to adhere to the JSA and hot work permits, and issue new permits while conducting site specific JSA's as the scope and/or location of the work changes.
4. Personnel were also reminded to utilize stop work authority should anyone recognize any hazards involved with the task at hand.
5. The operator should ensure that onsite supervisors clearly communicate and properly document specific job duties assigned to each third party crew onboard the facility.

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

None

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

N/A

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): **$**

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

The district has no recommendations for MMS.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: **YES**

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

G-112 (C) Failure to remove a fire hazard in a hot work area resulted in a Loss Time Accident (LTA) injury.
*** Flammable synthetic material (poly-flow) containing process fuel gas to power the wash-down pump was not blocked off, bled down and removed from the area before hot work began.**
*** Construction crew was working in an area not permitted on the "hot work permit". The hot work permit was issued for hot work that would be conducted on the jacket walkway/boat landing level only (plus 10 level), not on the top deck where the incident occurred.**

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

31-JUL-2008

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:

Scott Mouton / Wayne Webster /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED: **NO**

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Larry Williamson

APPROVED

DATE: **25-AUG-2008**

INJURY/FATALITY/WITNESS ATTACHMENT

☐ OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE	☒ INJURY
☐ CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE	☐ FATALITY
☒ OTHER **Construction**	☐ WITNESS

NAME:

HOME ADDRESS:

CITY: STATE:

WORK PHONE: TOTAL OFFSHORE EXPERIENCE: YEARS

EMPLOYED BY:

BUSINESS ADDRESS:

CITY: STATE:

ZIP CODE: