UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE GULF OF MEXICO REGION

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

	OCCURRED DATE: 30-MAY-2008 TIME: 1400 HOURS OPERATOR: El Paso E&P Company, L.P. REPRESENTATIVE: Atwood, Beth TELEPHONE: (713) 420-6288	STRUCTURAL DAMAGE X CRANE OTHER LIFTING DEVICE DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS. INCIDENT >\$25K H2S/15MIN./20PPM
	CONTRACTOR: REPRESENTATIVE: TELEPHONE:	REQUIRED MUSTER SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE OTHER
3.	OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:	6. OPERATION: PRODUCTION
4.	LEASE: G02910 AREA: EI LATITUDE: BLOCK: 327 LONGITUDE:	DRILLING WORKOVER COMPLETION HELICOPTER MOTOR VESSEL
5.	PLATFORM: A RIG NAME:	PIPELINE SEGMENT NO. X OTHER Mechanical Failure
6.	ACTIVITY: EXPLORATION(POE) X DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION (DOCD/POD)	8. CAUSE: EQUIPMENT FAILURE
7.	TYPE: HISTORIC INJURY REQUIRED EVACUATION LTA (1-3 days) LTA (>3 days RW/JT (1-3 days) RW/JT (>3 days)	HUMAN ERROR EXTERNAL DAMAGE SLIP/TRIP/FALL WEATHER RELATED LEAK UPSET H20 TREATING OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID X OTHER Mechanical Failure
	Other Injury FATALITY	9. WATER DEPTH: 262 FT.
	POLLUTION FIRE	10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 78 MI.
	LWC HISTORIC BLOWOUT UNDERGROUND SURFACE	11. WIND DIRECTION: SSE SPEED: 12 M.P.H.
	DEVERTER SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES	12. CURRENT DIRECTION: SSE SPEED: 1 M.P.H.
	COLLISION HISTORIC >\$25K <=\$25K	13 SEA STATE: 5 FT

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17. DESCRIBE IN SEQUENCE HOW ACCIDENT HAPPENED:

On May 30, 2008 at approximately 1400 hours, a Nabors Offshore crane operator noticed a loss of engine RPM while operating the boom control from the cab of the platform's production crane. The crane operator then ceased all operations, rendered the crane out-of-service, and notified the facility Person-In-Charge (PIC) of the incident. The PIC then notified the Acme Hydraulic's field crane service mechanic who was presently on location finalizing paperwork associated with said crane. During the crane's reassessment, the mechanic removed the boom winch hydraulic motor from the drum assembly, while the hydraulic hoses remained connected to the hydraulic motor. Subsequent to the mechanic having the operator activate the crane's boom lever, the boom initiated an uncontrollable descent while unspooling cable from the boom winch. The boom's descent came to a stop only after all of the cable became unspooled. In addition, the wedge socket, located on the inside portion of the cable drum, prevented the boom from descending to the water. During its descent, however, the boom struck a diesel generator's exhaust stack prior to coming to a complete halt. The boom was positioned at a minus 10 degree angle when the mechanic and platform personnel were able to secure the boom to a side structural beam of the platform. All operations were suspended, and assessment of the incident was initiated.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Due to a hydraulic valve internal leak, insufficient hydraulic fluid pressure resulted in the boom winch not being properly engaged.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

The boom was not secured to a boom rest or any support structure during the repair process.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

Attachment 1-MMS Crane/Other Material-Handling Equipment Form.

Attachment 2-El Paso Employee Statements

Attachment 3-Nabors Offshore Crane Operator Certification Card.

Attachment 4-El Paso Crane Operator Assessment Form.

Attachment 5-Nabors Offshore, Crane Daily Pre-Use, Week of:5/28/2008 to 6/3/2008 and 5/21/2008 to 5/27/2008.

Attachment 6-Nabors Offshore, Weekly Crane Report 5/21/2008 and Weekly Crane Report 5/28/2008.

Attachment 7-Field photos of incident

Attachment 8-El Paso Incident Investigation Summary Report.

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21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

1-Crane auxillary ball

1-Lost overboard, not retrieved

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL):

\$400

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

MMS recommendation:

Prior to conducting crane boom maintenance/repairs, ensure that the boom is properly secured in a boom rest or stationary support structure that would prevent movement of the boom. Securing the boom is an essential first step to any boom maintenance/repair.

The Lafayette District has no recommendations to the Office of Safety Management (OSM).

- 23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: NO
- 24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:
- 25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

04-JUN-2008

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:

Johnny D. Serrette / Jason A. Abshire / Tom Basey /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED: NO

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Elliott S.Smith

APPROVED

DATE: 01-JUL-2008

21-JUL-2008

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INJURY/FATALITY/WITNESS ATTACHMENT

OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE OTHER Crane Operator	INJURY FATALITY WITNESS
NAME: HOME ADDRESS: CITY: WORK PHONE: EMPLOYED BY: BUSINESS ADDRESS:	STATE: TOTAL OFFSHORE EXPERIENCE: 3.25 YEARS
CITY: ZIP CODE:	STATE:
OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE OTHER Crane Mechanic NAME: HOME ADDRESS: CITY: WORK PHONE:	INJURY FATALITY WITNESS STATE: TOTAL OFFSHORE EXPERIENCE: 1.5 YEARS
EMPLOYED BY: BUSINESS ADDRESS: CITY: ZIP CODE:	STATE:

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