# UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE GULF OF MEXICO REGION

### **ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT**

1.	OCCURRED DATE: 06-MAY-2008 TIME: 2230 HOURS	STRUCTURAL DAMAGE CRANE
2.	OPERATOR: Mariner Energy, Inc. REPRESENTATIVE: Martino, Angie TELEPHONE: (713) 954-3804 CONTRACTOR: Pride Offshore REPRESENTATIVE: Smith, Larry TELEPHONE: (713) 361-4326	OTHER LIFTING DEVICE  DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.  INCIDENT >\$25K  H2S/15MIN./20PPM  X REQUIRED MUSTER  SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE  OTHER
3.	OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:	6. OPERATION:
	LEASE: G02319  AREA: EI LATITUDE: 28.18437158  BLOCK: 342 LONGITUDE: -91.50669244  PLATFORM: C	PRODUCTION  X DRILLING  WORKOVER  COMPLETION  HELICOPTER  MOTOR VESSEL  PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
	RIG NAME: BLAKE INTERNATIONAL	OTHER
	ACTIVITY:  EXPLORATION(POE)  DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION (DOCD/POD)  TYPE:  HISTORIC INJURY  REQUIRED EVACUATION LTA (1-3 days) LTA (>3 days RW/JT (1-3 days) RW/JT (>3 days)	EQUIPMENT FAILURE HUMAN ERROR EXTERNAL DAMAGE SLIP/TRIP/FALL WEATHER RELATED LEAK UPSET H20 TREATING OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID X OTHER Unknown Shallow Gas Zone
	Other Injury  FATALITY POLLUTION	9. WATER DEPTH: 287 FT.
	FIRE EXPLOSION	10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 90 MI.  11. WIND DIRECTION: SSE
	LWC X HISTORIC BLOWOUT UNDERGROUND SURFACE X DEVERTER SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES	SPEED: 18 M.P.H.  12. CURRENT DIRECTION: NNW SPEED: 1 M.P.H.
	COLLISION HISTORIC >\$25K <=\$25K	13. SEA STATE: 5 FT.

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#### 17. DESCRIBE IN SEQUENCE HOW ACCIDENT HAPPENED:

On May 6, 2008 at 2230 hours, while drilling a 17-1/2 inch hole at 1679 feet with 9.1 ppg gel mud, the Derrick Man (DM) called out over the loud speaker system for the Driller to open the diverter valves due to the influx of gumbo (soil that becomes sticky and nonporous when wet). The Driller instructed the Assistant Driller (AD) to open the diverter valves. The diverter valves were opened for approximately 5 seconds and then closed. After closing the diverter valves, the Driller looked in the bell nipple to discover that drilling mud had already backed up to the flow line. The Driller notified the Toolpusher (TP) that the well appeared to be flowing. The TP and Company Man (CM) immediately went to the rig floor and verified that the well was flowing. The TP then diverted the well through the north and west diverter lines. The TP sounded the alarms and shut-in production operations on the platform. The TP instructed the DM to have all seawater available at the mud pits. After about 30 seconds of diverting, gas reached the surface. Approximately 100 bbls of 9.1 ppg gel mud was pumped, and a decision was then made to switch the active system to 8.6 ppg seawater pumping at 21 bbls per minute. Returns from the diverter lines ceased after pumping 125 bbls of seawater. The Crane Operator (CO) called and notified the M/V Irene B of the situation, and informed them of plans to evacuate the platform. The TP went below the rig floor to check for breaching or gas coming up around the platform, but there were no signs of breaching. Roll call was taken and the CO began to backload 34 non-essential personnel onto the boat, with 19 personnel remaining on the platform. After pumping 1800 bbls of seawater, returns were observed coming from the 26 inch x 18-5/8 inch annulus. The pumps were shut down and flow was monitored at wellhead. A slight flow was observed for 10 minutes before the flow stopped. The rig pumped an additional 200 bbls of 12.5 ppg mud, with no returns observedfrom the well or the 26 inch x 18-5/8inch annulus. Due to the sea state, the M/V Irene B brought the 34 personnel back to the rig on May 7, 2008 at 0500 hours. After daylight, an additional 25 bbls of 12.5 ppg mud was pumped down the drill pipe. A TIW valve was installed in the drill string, and the well was monitored until Schlumberger's arrival to conduct a noise and temperature log survey.

#### 18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

The probable cause of the incident is Mariner drilling into an unknown shallow gas zone.

#### 19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Drilled the 13-3/8 inch surface casing hole section with a 17-1/2 inch bit and a mud weight of 9.1 ppg gel mud, allowed too large a gas influx into the well bore while imposing additional hydrostatic pressure on the 18-5/8 inch conductor shoe.

#### 20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

After receiving approval to cement the open hole section below the 18-5/8 inch conductor casing, Mariner submitted an Application to Bypass the well bore which included drilling a 12-1/4 inch pilot hole section with 9.5 ppg mud to the surface casing point (Original hole was drilled with a 17-1/2 inch bit and 9.1 ppg mud). Once reaching the surface casing point and circulating bottoms up, a 17-1/2 inch hole opener would be run, and the hole conditioned to run the 13-3/8 inch casing. Additionally, in Mariner's submitted Application to Bypass, the Directional Plan for Well C-17 was revised to avoid the area of concern. The Application to Bypass was approved, the well successfully drilled, and 13-3/8 inch

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casing was run and cemented.

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21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

None

NA

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL):

\$

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

The Lafayette District has no recommendations to the regional office.

- 23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: NO
- 24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

NA

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

07-MAY-2008

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:

Marty Rinaudo / Johnny Serrette /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED: NO

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Elliott S. Smith

APPROVED

DATE: 19-AUG-2008

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## **BLOWOUT ATTACHMENT**

1. WELL NAME: C017 WELL NO.	.: 177104162500	D LEASE:	G02319		
2. OPERATION: X DRILLING	COMPLETI	ON			
□ WORKOVER	☐ PRODUCTI	ON			
2	U VRG				
3. SIMULTANEOUS OPERATIONS IN PROGRESS?		DDG			
4. FLUID TYPE: WATER BASE MUD	WEIGHT: 9.1		T.).		
5. BOP STACK CONFIGURATION:		SIZE:	IN		
		PRESS RATING:	PSI		
6. BOP STACK - LAST TEST DATE PRIOR TO INC	CIDENT:	PRESSURE:	PSI		
7. LAST CASING STRING SET: FT	SIZE:	IN			
8. SIZE OF DRILLING/WORKOVER STRING IN HOL	E:	5 IN			
9. KICK SIZE: BBLS					
10. FLUID KILL WEIGHT: 12.5 PPG					
11. INITIAL S.I.C.P.: PSI					
12. S.I.D.P./W.S.P.: PSI					
13. PRIOR HOLE PROBLEMS? NO					
14. WELL CONTROL EQUIPMENT INITIALLY ACTIVATED:					
ANNULAR BO SCSSV					
☐ PIPE ☐ SSV					
BLIND X OTHER Divert	ter System				
BLIND SHEA					
15. EVACUATION: YES					
16. DIVERTER SYSTEM VALVE SIZE: 10.25	21. SS	SSV TYPE:			
LINE SIZE: 10					
SINGLE S	D.	ATE LAST TESTED:			
TO DUAL SPO		REE: ON OFF X	[]		
18. BOTTOM HOLE ASSEMBLY:		URFACE SAFETY	_		
Steerable BHA		QUIPMENT IN SERVICE	? NO		
	24. W	ELL TD: T	VD MD		
10		PEN PERF?			
19. DRILLING DEPTH: TVD	MD				
20. DATE LAST FORMATION INTEGRITY TEST:					
	1				

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