

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT
GULF OF MEXICO REGION

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1. OCCURRED

DATE: 09-NOV-2010 TIME: 0600 HOURS

2. OPERATOR:

Apache Corporation

REPRESENTATIVE: Broussard, Wade

TELEPHONE: (337) 354-8005

CONTRACTOR: Wood Group Production Services

REPRESENTATIVE: William Bradford

TELEPHONE: (337) 210-8510

- STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
- CRANE
- OTHER LIFTING DEVICE
- DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
- INCIDENT >\$25K
- H2S/15MIN./20PPM
- REQUIRED MUSTER
- SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
- OTHER Compressor building fire

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR
ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

6. OPERATION:

4. LEASE: G02968

AREA: MC LATITUDE: 28.642636
BLOCK: 311 LONGITUDE: -89.794241

- PRODUCTION
- DRILLING
- WORKOVER
- COMPLETION
- HELICOPTER
- MOTOR VESSEL
- PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
- OTHER

5. PLATFORM: A

RIG NAME:

6. ACTIVITY:

- EXPLORATION (POE)
- DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION (DOCD/POD)

8. CAUSE:

- EQUIPMENT FAILURE
- HUMAN ERROR
- EXTERNAL DAMAGE
- SLIP/TRIP/FALL
- WEATHER RELATED
- LEAK
- UPSET H2O TREATING
- OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
- OTHER _____

7. TYPE:

- HISTORIC INJURY
 - REQUIRED EVACUATION
 - LTA (1-3 days)
 - LTA (>3 days)
 - RW/JT (1-3 days)
 - RW/JT (>3 days)
 - Other Injury

- FATALITY
- POLLUTION
- FIRE
- EXPLOSION

- LWC
- HISTORIC BLOWOUT
 - UNDERGROUND
 - SURFACE
 - DEVERTER
 - SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

9. WATER DEPTH: 428 FT.
10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 60 MI.
11. WIND DIRECTION:
SPEED: 0 M.P.H.
12. CURRENT DIRECTION:
SPEED: 0 M.P.H.
13. SEA STATE: 0 FT.

COLLISION HISTORIC >\$25K <=\$25K

17. INVESTIGATION FINDINGS:

On 9 November 2010 at 06:00 hours, a small fire occurred in the compressor building on Mississippi Canyon (MC) 311 Platform A. Platform operators conducting routine rounds heard a loud noise and proceeded to investigate. They observed small flames in the compressor building and immediately activated the platform's ESD system and shut-in the platform. Although the flames on the compressor immediately went out subsequent to activating the ESD system, a 30 pound handheld fire extinguisher was used to extinguish smoldering wall insulation that had ignited.

Prior to the incident, the platform was shut-in while the operators replaced a rod bearing on the compressor. After replacing the rod bearing and reassembling the compressor, the platform was place back on line. The compressor ran for approximately 7 ½ hours before the fuel valve stuck open allowing exhaust gas to be pushed back into the fuel line. The fuel line coupling separated at the union due to excessive heat and vibration. The minor damage consisting of burned wires for spark plugs and a burned four foot section of wall insulation.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

After repairing the compressor, it ran for approximately 7 ½ hours before the fuel valve stuck open allowing exhaust gas to be pushed back into the fuel line. The fuel line coupling separated at the union due to excessive heat and vibration, resulting in ignition of the fuel line contents.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

The fuel line consisted of hard piping in lieu of a flex hose.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

The compressor has exhaust temperature shut-downs for each cylinder, but the exhaust gas and fuel continued out the exhaust and fuel valves.

Operator's Corrective Action:

- 1) Installed a fuel valve temperature monitoring system that will shut down the compressor if the fuel valve's temperature reaches 200 degrees F.
- 2) Replaced hard piping with a flex hose to account for vibrations.

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

Wiring for spark plugs.
Wall insulation

Burned

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): \$10,000

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE NARRATIVE:

The New Orleans District recommends to the Regional Office of Safety Management (OSM) that they issue a safety alert that operators should look into how vibration could affect compressor efficiency/safety.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: NO

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

23-NOV-2010

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:

Keith Barrios /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

PANEL FORMED: NO

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

DAVID TROCQUET

APPROVED

DATE: 08-FEB-2011

FIRE/EXPLOSION ATTACHMENT

1. SOURCE OF IGNITION: **Exhaust gas entered gas line.**

2. TYPE OF FUEL: GAS
 OIL
 DIESEL
 CONDENSATE
 HYDRAULIC
 OTHER

3. FUEL SOURCE: **Gas line on compressor.**

4. WERE PRECAUTIONS OR ACTIONS TAKEN TO ISOLATE
KNOWN SOURCES OF IGNITION PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT ? **NO**

5. TYPE OF FIREFIGHTING EQUIPMENT UTILIZED: HANDHELD
 WHEELED UNIT
 FIXED CHEMICAL
 FIXED WATER
 NONE
 OTHER

INJURY/FATALITY/WITNESS ATTACHMENT

OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE

INJURY

CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE

FATALITY

OTHER _____

WITNESS

NAME:

HOME ADDRESS:

CITY:

STATE:

WORK PHONE:

TOTAL OFFSHORE EXPERIENCE:

YEARS

EMPLOYED BY:

BUSINESS ADDRESS:

CITY:

STATE:

ZIP CODE:

OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE

INJURY

CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE

FATALITY

OTHER _____

WITNESS

NAME:

HOME ADDRESS:

CITY:

STATE:

WORK PHONE:

TOTAL OFFSHORE EXPERIENCE:

YEARS

EMPLOYED BY:

BUSINESS ADDRESS:

CITY:

STATE:

ZIP CODE:

INJURY/FATALITY/WITNESS ATTACHMENT

OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE

INJURY

CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE

FATALITY

OTHER _____

WITNESS

NAME :

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STATE :

WORK PHONE :

TOTAL OFFSHORE EXPERIENCE :

YEARS

EMPLOYED BY :

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