

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT
GULF OF MEXICO REGION

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

For Public Release

1. OCCURRED

DATE: 05-FEB-2016 TIME: 0640 HOURS

2. OPERATOR: Fieldwood SD Offshore LLC
REPRESENTATIVE:
TELEPHONE:
CONTRACTOR: Fluid Crane and Construction
REPRESENTATIVE:
TELEPHONE:

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR
ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

4. LEASE:

AREA: EB LATITUDE:
BLOCK: 160 LONGITUDE:

5. PLATFORM: A-Cerveza
RIG NAME:

6. ACTIVITY: EXPLORATION(POE)
 DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION
(DOCD/POD)

7. TYPE:

HISTORIC INJURY
 REQUIRED EVACUATION
 LTA (1-3 days)
 LTA (>3 days)
 RW/JT (1-3 days)
 RW/JT (>3 days)
 Other Injury

FATALITY
 POLLUTION
 FIRE
 EXPLOSION

LWC HISTORIC BLOWOUT
 UNDERGROUND
 SURFACE
 DEVERTER
 SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

COLLISION HISTORIC >\$25K <=\$25K

STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
 CRANE
 OTHER LIFTING DEVICE
 DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
 INCIDENT >\$25K
 H2S/15MIN./20PPM
 REQUIRED MUSTER
 SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
 OTHER

6. OPERATION:

PRODUCTION
 DRILLING
 WORKOVER
 COMPLETION
 HELICOPTER
 MOTOR VESSEL
 PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
 OTHER Decommissioning P&A

8. CAUSE:

EQUIPMENT FAILURE
 HUMAN ERROR
 EXTERNAL DAMAGE
 SLIP/TRIP/FALL
 WEATHER RELATED
 LEAK
 UPSET H2O TREATING
 OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
 OTHER _____

9. WATER DEPTH: 935 FT.

10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 87 MI.

11. WIND DIRECTION: NE
SPEED: 5 M.P.H.

12. CURRENT DIRECTION: N
SPEED: 2 M.P.H.

13. SEA STATE: FT.

On February 5, 2016, the Crane Operator was performing his daily pre-use inspection on the temporary crane that had been installed. While checking the anti-two block safety system (Cranesmart) for the main block, the system failed to deactivate. The Crane Mechanic on board the platform advised the Crane Operator to lower the boom to see if the system's activation signal would clear. By putting the Cranesmart in bypass, the boom descended, and while being lowered the auxiliary wedge socket assembly and ball and hook made contact with the boom tip causing the load cell, ball and hook to fall into the Gulf of Mexico.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Crane Operator failed to ensure the auxiliary line was played out so the wedge socket and ball would not come in contact with the boom tip while lowering the crane boom.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

None

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

Wedge socket, load cell, ball, hook

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

Parting of the auxiliary line.

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): \$1,648

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECCURANCE NARRATIVE:

Lake Jackson District has no recommendations at this time.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: YES

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

On February 5, 2016, the Crane Operator was performing his daily pre-use on the temporary crane that had been installed. While checking the anti-two block safety system (Cranesmart) for the main block the system failed to deactivate. The Crane Mechanic onboard the platform advised the Crane Operator to lower the boom to see if the system's activation signal would clear. By putting the Cranesmart in bypass, the boom descended and while being lowered, the auxiliary wedge socket assembly and

ball and hook made contact with the boom tip causing the load cell, ball and hook to fall into the Gulf of Mexico.

At the time of the investigation, it was found the lessee failed to perform all operations in a safe and workmanlike manner and provide for the preservation and conservation of property and the environment in the following way:

1. Lessee failed to ensure platform personnel operated the temporary crane safely to prevent damage to equipment.

2. Crane Operator failed to ensure the auxiliary line was played out so the wedge socket and ball would not come in contact with the boom tip while lowering the crane boom. This caused the auxiliary line to part, dropping the swedge socket, load cell, ball and hook into the Gulf of Mexico.

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

10-FEB-2016

For Public Release

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:

James Holmes / John Orsini / Edward Keown /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

PANEL FORMED: NO

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

John McCarroll

APPROVED

DATE: 22-JUN-2016