UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE GULF OF MEXICO REGION

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

L.	OCCURRED	
	DATE:	STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
	19-FEB-2007 TIME: 2020 HOURS	CRANE
		X OTHER LIFTING DEVICE Top drive/derrick
2.	OPERATOR: Petrobras America Inc.	DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
	REPRESENTATIVE: Randall Garrett	INCIDENT >\$25K
	TELEPHONE: (713) 422-5977	H2S/15MIN./20PPM
	CONTRACTOR: Transocean Offshore	REQUIRED MUSTER
	REPRESENTATIVE: Larry Holmes	SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
	TELEPHONE: (504) 365-3208	OTHER
3.	OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR	6. OPERATION:
	ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:	
		☐ PRODUCTION
		DRILLING
1.	LEASE: G15860	WORKOVER
	AREA: GB LATITUDE:	X COMPLETION
	BLOCK: 244 LONGITUDE:	HELICOPTER
		MOTOR VESSEL
5.	PLATFORM:	PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
	RIG NAME: T.O. F100	☐ OTHER
	_	O CANGE
5.	ACTIVITY: X EXPLORATION (POE)	8. CAUSE:
	DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION	☐ EQUIPMENT FAILURE
7	(DOCD/POD) TYPE:	X HUMAN ERROR
<i>'</i> •		EXTERNAL DAMAGE
	HISTORIC INJURY	SLIP/TRIP/FALL
	X REQUIRED EVACUATION 0	WEATHER RELATED
	LTA (1-3 days)	LEAK
	x LTA (>3 days 2	UPSET H20 TREATING
	RW/JT (1-3 days)	OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID OTHER
	RW/JT (>3 days)	U OTHER
	Other Injury	9. WATER DEPTH: 2130 FT.
	FATALITY	2100 111
	POLLUTION	10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 110 MI.
	FIRE	10. Bibliated from blicket.
	EXPLOSION	11. WIND DIRECTION: E
	LWC HISTORIC BLOWOUT	
	UNDERGROUND	SPEED: 18 M.P.H.
	SURFACE	
	DEVERTER	12. CURRENT DIRECTION: WNW
	SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES	SPEED: 5 M.P.H.
	COLLISION HISTORIC >\$25K <=\$25K	13. SEA STATE: 6 FT.

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17. INVESTIGATION FINDINGS:

On 19 February 2007 at approximately 2020 hours, a fifty-three pound lifting-sub fell sixty-five feet from the derrick striking and injuring two contractors. One contractor employed by Halliburton the other by Tesco, were installing a completion assembly to a joint of 2-3/8" production tubing when the lifting-sub fell to the rig floor. The lifting sub was installed hand tight to the string of 2-3/8" production tubing, which would allow for easier removal once the tubing was set in the hole. The connection of the completion assembly to the production tubing was done while the completion assembly was sitting inside the mousehole on the rig floor. The completion assembly position in the mousehole allowed the worker easier access to handle and tighten the connection at waist height. Both contractors were unaware that the weight of the pipe, while suspended in the mousehole, allowed the lifting-sub to back out of its connection. Instead of tightening the completion assembly to the production tubing they did the opposite by tightening the production tubing to the completion assembly. This allowed the lifting-sub to back out of its connection due to the weight of the tubing suspended on the lifting sub. A friction bite occurred when the production tubing prevented the lifting-sub from rotating with the tubing as it was made up into the completion assembly. It was observed by witness that the top drive elevators were not lowered enough to clear the lifting-sub. All operations were suspended to allow for safe removal of the two injured contractors from the rig floor.

- 18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:
 - A hand tight lifting-sub backed out of its connection and fell to the rig floor.
- 19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

The driller did not lower the top drive elevators unit enough to prevent the weight of the production tubing from backing off the lifting sub which caused a friction bite that backed the lifting-sub out of its connection to the 2-3/8" production tubing.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

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ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL):

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22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

The Lafayette District makes no recommendations to the Regional Office of Safety Management.

- 23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: YES
- 24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

An "After the Fact" G-110 Incident of Noncompliance was issued on April 27, 2007 to document Petrobras America Incorported failure to properly supervise and provide for the safety and health of two well service contractors as they were installing a completion assembly to a string of 2-3/8 inch production tubing. This incident resulted in the injuy to the two well service contractors.

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

02-MAR-2007

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:

Maxie Lambert / Tom Basey / David
Suire / Johnny Serrette /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED: NO

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Elliott S. Smith

APPROVED

DATE: 27-APR-2007

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INJURY/FATALITY/WITNESS ATTACHMENT

OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE OTHER	INJURY FATALITY WITNESS	
NAME: HOME ADDRESS: CITY: WORK PHONE:	STATE: TOTAL OFFSHORE EXPERIENCE:	YEARS
EMPLOYED BY: BUSINESS ADDRESS: CITY: ZIP CODE:	STATE:	
OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE	INJURY	
X CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE OTHER	FATALITY X WITNESS	
NAME: HOME ADDRESS: CITY: WORK PHONE:	STATE: TOTAL OFFSHORE EXPERIENCE:	YEARS
EMPLOYED BY: BUSINESS ADDRESS: CITY:	STATE:	
ZIP CODE:		

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INJURY/FATALITY/WITNESS ATTACHMENT

OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE OTHER	INJURY FATALITY WITNESS	
NAME: HOME ADDRESS:		
CITY:	STATE:	
WORK PHONE:	TOTAL OFFSHORE EXPERIENCE:	YEARS
EMPLOYED BY:		
BUSINESS ADDRESS:		
CITY:	STATE:	
ZIP CODE:		

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