



Expeditionary Warrior 2013 Senior Leader Outbrief

6 June 2013

Wargaming Division
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory



Senior Leader Outbrief Agenda

Time	Topic	Speaker
0830-0845	Welcome Aboard	LtGen Richard P. Mills (Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration)
0845-0900	Expeditionary Warrior 2013 Overview <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ EW Series Background ➤ Game Objective ➤ Implications for Joint and Naval Force ➤ Future Maritime Operations Central Idea ➤ Game Design and Scenario 	BGen Mark "Notso" Wise (CG MCWL/Dir, Futures Directorate), Maj Jody White (OpsO, MCWL Wargaming) and Col Tim Parker (DepDir, Futures Directorate)
0900-0945	EW13 Observations and Insights	Col Parker
0945-0955	Break	--
0955-1025	EW13 Recommendations	Col Parker
1025-1030	Way Ahead/Closing Remarks	Gen James Amos (Commandant of the Marine Corps)



Opening Remarks

LtGen Richard P. Mills
Deputy Commandant for
Combat Development and Integration



BGen Mark “Notso” Wise

**Commanding General, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
Director, Futures Directorate**

The Military Problem ...



Diverse and multiple threats that demand unique capacity and better awareness



Resource constrained – we can only afford one force



Our current scale and capacity precludes flexible response to address diverse, but very capable threats



Constraints on maritime forces' scale in organization of forces and platforms



EW13 Game Objective Statement

Identify concepts, capabilities and capacity solutions required by the Marine Corps and Navy to provide forward presence, yet rapidly build forces for crisis response, for future maritime operations in 2035.

Who: 120 participants from across all five Services, Joint Staff and OSD
Representatives from 13 partner nations and industry

What: EW13 Main Event




Where: The Mason Inn Conference Center and Hotel, George Mason University

When: 25 February to 1 March 2013

Implications for Joint and Naval Force



EW13 planners linked wargame with ongoing joint and Marine Corps concepts, ideas and initiatives. Context included CCJO: JF2020, JOAC, AirSea Battle, Single Naval Battle and Littoral Maneuver.





Future Maritime Operations and EW13

Future Maritime Operations Plans for the 21st-Century Operating Environment

Return to our roots—a crisis response force of choice
by Col Thomas Connally & Maj Jeff Wong, USMCR

Picture Lagos, Nigeria, in 2035, a teeming metropolis that is home to more than 10 million people. Drawn by the promise of jobs, income, and a better quality of life by the sea, millions of Nigerians migrated from Africa's interior to its second-fastest growing city to escape a subsistence life. But when those people reached the Atlantic coast, instead of a brighter future, they stepped into a different sort of misery—a vast concrete jungle with seemingly endless slums and few opportunities for unskilled labor, with overwhelmed local authorities struggling to provide basic services and enforce the rule of law. In this place, criminals and extremists thrived, financing themselves through the drug trade and kidnappings, training and recruiting members from the disaffected populace.

2nd Lt. Connally looked out the window of a Chinook helicopter as it swept over the megacity toward the U.S. Consulate. As far as the eye could see was a hazy gray-brown expanse that reminded him of the old classic movie *Blade Runner*. As a U.S. country team military liaison officer for the past 2 years, his primary job was to serve as a conduit between the Ambassador and U.S. military personnel in the country. At times it could be hard to keep track of them all—squad-sized teams of special operations forces have been

>Col Connally is the Deputy Director, Wargaming Division, MCWL. An artillery officer, he commanded 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, during Operation Iraqi Freedom 2.0, commanded Headquarters Battalion, 2d Marine, served as Director of the Strategic Vision Group, and was an analyst at the Strategic Initiatives Group. His work as a Fellow for the Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group XXV (2005–06) was responsible for the foundation of FMO.

>Maj Wong is a planner for the title 10 Expeditionary Wargame at Wargaming Division, MCWL. A Reserve infantry officer, he also serves as Company Commander, Weapons Company, 3d Battalion, 25th Marines. He was a Platoon Commander, Company F, 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, in Iraq and Afghanistan (2003–04) and Executive Officer, Company F, 2d Battalion, 24th Marines, in Iraq (2006). He worked as a prepositioning planner at HQMC, Plans, Policies, and Operations Department.

embedded with Nigerian security forces for the past 3 years in order to advise local authorities on how to battle local thugs. Just a few days ago, a frigate-sized ship carrying a reinforced Marine infantry company arrived to conduct bilateral exercises—the frigate with the Coast Guard, the Marines doing live-fire ranges ashore with the indigenous army.

More than 200 miles away, "Matt," the team leader of Operational Detachment A-3XX (ODA 3XX), winced at the risk-assessment as he and his Nigerian Army counterpart, Col Alabi, reviewed the operations matrix for the day. A couple of his aides would accompany a Nigerian counterter-

rorism unit as it patrolled a stretch of the Niger Delta, his medals would embed with an indigenous platoon to do a medical civil affairs program and gather atmospheric in a nearby village, his weapons guys would conduct crew-served weapons training, and the rest of the team would stay at the firebase to rest, refit, and synthesize intelligence gathered from his own patrols and from information provided by the country team in the capital. He knew what they knew, and soon practically everyone else—the Ambassador, the theater special operations command, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Station Chief, the Drug Enforcement Administra-

Marine Corps Gazette • May 2013

www.mco-marines.org/gazette 77

Marine Corps Gazette, May 2013

EW13 was primarily informed by ideas offered in a draft Future Maritime Operations concept paper outlining an approach to seabased operations that:

- Emphasizes existing regional networks and relationships to gain awareness that provides context about the operating environment
- Leverage / integrate forward deployed forces with other maritime, interagency, joint and partner forces to provide options for proactive, early, preventive actions
- Provides agile, scalable, task-organized forces to respond to the threat or crisis, including major combat



EW13 Assumptions and Game Design

Main Planning Conference 11-12 Dec 2012

Move 0: Steady State

- Review steady state laydown in Southeast Asia
- Develop theater strategic assumptions

Assumptions

- “Pacific Pivot”
- Plausible, but distinctly different, future
- Forces based on current trajectories in programming and resourcing
- Diminished federal budget; resource constraints

Main Event 25 Feb-1 Mar 2013

Operational Planning

- Plan 6-day campaign



Tactical Planning

- Tactical plans for time slice adjudicated by white cell



Seminar Discussion

- FMO insights: concepts, capabilities and capacity solutions



Gold Cell Discussion

- Synthesize strategic, operational and tactical discussions

Scenario



2035 Asia - Pacific Theater

- US Forces have realigned
- The Koreas have unified
 - Nuclear power
 - No longer US ally
 - No significant US permanent basing
- Chinese aggressiveness is rising
- Taiwan is peacefully resolved
- Russia and Japan are resurgent
- Japan-US new SOFA reduces US forces
- India's regional presence is growing
- Arctic is open to limited resource extraction and shipping – supporting infrastructure is increasing
- Regional economies are surging



EW13 Gamebox

2035 US Maritime Forces Command (MARITIMEFORPAC)

- Combined Marine and Navy component
- Replaces Marine Forces Pacific and Pacific Fleet
- Maritime Operations Centers are Marine integrated.
- III MEF strength increased with forces from I and II MEF



III MEF CE			
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2035 Realignment and US Basing



Kingdom of Karta

- **Government:** Monarchy (Absolute)
- **Population:** ~294,000,000
- **Economy:** 9th largest global economy (GDP: ~\$2.5trillion)
- **Capital:** Jakarta
- **Financial Center:** Kuala Lumpur
- Robust infrastructure
- Long-time US partner
- Pragmatic relationships with regional powers
- Aspirations for more regional influence
- Karta Armed Forces (KAF)
 - Moderately sized, high-end defense force
 - Royal Karta Navy, Royal Karta Marines, Royal Karta Air Force, Royal Army of Karta and Royal Karta Special Forces
 - Mission: Defend Karta's sovereignty and international interests
 - Capabilities: High-end, sophisticated military



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EW13 – 2035 Southeast Asia



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EXPEDITIONARY WARRIOR 2013



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21st Century Operating Environment*

Final Report
6 June 2013




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EW13 Observations and Insights



Topic: TSC Engagements to Enable Early Action




Observation: Expanded use of individual and small units in theater security cooperation (TSC) engagements can provide the maritime force better situational awareness, and potentially enable senior political and military leaders with options for proactive, preventive and early actions in emerging crises. Risks of early engagement must be considered.

Key Points

- Embedded and rotational presence forces
- Awareness and context
- Regionalization at regimental level
- Special operations and conventional forces integration
- Force protection remains a concern



Topic: Task Organization




Observation: The ability to rapidly aggregate and disaggregate forces in a crisis requires agile, adaptive command arrangements.
... Aggregation of US maritime and joint forces with partner forces create interoperability challenges.

Key Points

- Institutional, organizational, cultural and procedural barriers
- Forward deployment of embedded/enduring presence forces is a must



Topic: Single Naval Battle and Littoral Maneuver



Observation: Single Naval Battle and littoral maneuver are not well developed or understood. Establishing a co-located, integrated Navy-Marine Corps maritime operational staff appears to be a useful first step for the conduct of a coherent naval campaign.


Key Points

- Combined USN-USMC operational Maritime Operations Center in Guam
- Rapidly changing task organizations and command relationships
- Joint aggregation protocol may facilitate in-stride aggregation at onset of crisis
- One cell did not establish subordinate unit boundaries in order to focus task groups on tasks – not battlespace

Topic: SOF-led Aggregation/Disaggregation and Operational/Support Implications



D+2, TASK GROUP BORNEO TACTICAL VIEW



D+4. and D+5. TASK GROUP BORNEO Move 3



Key Points

- Regional SOF coordination center → C2 aggregation/disaggregation
 - Organized from forward-deployed forces
 - Intent-based/adaptive organizations for rapid aggregation
- SOF C2 capabilities and limitations in support of naval campaign
- Need to examine potential C2 TSOC and JTF relationships/implications



Topic: Command & Control / Information Sharing

Observation: C2 processes, mechanisms and capabilities for “integration of U.S. maritime, joint, interagency, and partner nations” ... represent a significant challenge and will require further development in order to link current and future command relationships and architectures to desired future requirements.

Key Points

- Complexities and challenges associated with interoperability and coordination
- Automation and human-technology interface issues
- Need or willingness to use cloud-based tools for information exchange



Topic: Mobility

Observation: The future maritime force requires multiple, diverse platforms to enable operational maneuver from the sea and provide tactical mobility once ashore. A robust A2/AD environment will likely stress the ability to insert forces through aerial platforms. The use of distributed, flexible, low-signature small boats and surface connectors may facilitate operational and tactical littoral maneuver.

Key Points

- Littoral maneuver requirements → watercraft, amphibious vehicles, ground vehicles; when, why and how to expose to risk
- Non-traditional platforms, depending on the threat environment
- Faster, low-signature boats and versatile surface connectors
- Deck-space management tradeoffs
- Need exist for cheap, internally transportable vehicles for organic ground mobility

Topic: Kinetic and Non-Kinetic Fires / Cyber Operations and Airspace C2



Observations:

- ***Kinetic and non-kinetic fires → risk mitigation***
- ***Manned and unmanned systems, loitering munitions and over-the-horizon platforms***
- ***Cyber authorities → complexity and potential for friction grow as operation grows; optimal positioning of cyber operators***
- ***Airspace C2 deconfliction challenges at multiple echelons of command within contested or semi-permissive airspace***
- ***Short response time required for campaign compelled players to streamline CFACC / Air Operations Center functions for CJTF***



Topic: Sustainment

Observation: Sustainment of distributed maritime forces will require the logistics system to be flexible and capable of access to redundant sources of supply. Future efforts should examine sustainment for FMO forces in more detail and explore options to improve naval logistics integration.

Key Points

- “Dedicated” logistics may constrain flexibility
- Reliance on sources outside Marine Corps for theater-level sustainment
- Selective prepositioning
- Size, scope and character of forward bases and enabling sites
- Potential use of unmanned systems
- Trade-off between type, numbers, employment and distribution of sustainment platforms



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EW13 Recommendations



Command and Control

- **Explore non-traditional command arrangements including use of a regional Maritime Operations Center to exercise JTF operational control**
 - **Marine Corps forces that fall under operational control of a SOF command acting as JTF HQ**
- **Conduct a detailed excursion that explores the command and control challenges faced when attempting to aggregate forces in-stride for crisis response**
- **Deployable JTF-capable HQs and MCWL's Fly-in Command Element (FICE) initiative**
- **Assess the manning impacts of an integrated Navy and Marine Corps maritime component operational staff**

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance



- **Alternative tools and processes to manage and facilitate information sharing**
- **Man, train and equip to improve conventional forces' capabilities to solicit and analyze information, then distill and disseminate intelligence to provide operational context**
- **Ongoing DOD-level C2 working groups to study information sharing options across a multinational force**
 - Tiered access for CENTRIX/SIPRNET
- **Cloud-based information/intelligence networks**
- **Link existing ISR capabilities with future ISR platforms**



Maneuver

- With the Navy, examine the tradeoffs between capital ships and high-speed, low-signature platforms
- Use the Naval Services Game 2013 (NSG13) to wargame alternate methods to employ a distributed, forward-deployed MEU
- Joint aggregation protocol
- Mobility implications in a high-end A2/AD environment
- Integration of unmanned aerial capabilities into assault support
- Examine options to preserve critical but high-demand capabilities to transition forces ashore such as Assault Craft Units, Beach Groups and NECC assets (e.g., SeaBees, RIVRON)
- Explore the feasibility of affordable, internally transportable vehicles to provide ground forces with organic mobility



Fires (Kinetic and Non-Kinetic)



- Kinetic and non-kinetic fire support procedures featuring enemies, friendlies and neutrals in a small area
- Re-assess naval surface fire support requirements for next generation naval ships within an FMO context
- Human dimension considerations and challenges associated with fires approval/deconfliction in complex, dynamic environments



Sustainment

- **Naval Logistics Integration (NLI) effort:**
 - **SPMAGTF security cooperation and crisis response missions**
 - **Naval sustainment in the littorals**
 - **Logistics Combat Element / Aviation Combat Element lessons learned**
 - **Marine Corps inventory → Combat Logistics Force inventory**
- **Ship-to-shore throughput capacity**
- **Austere basing within A2/AD environment**



Force Protection

- Ships and unmanned undersea systems that minimize their exposure to A2/AD threats
- Ballistic missile defense for forward naval bases and enabling sites
- Unmanned systems and their role in force protection



Gold Cell Comments

ADM Walter Doran, USN (Ret)

LtGen Wallace “Chip” Gregson, USMC (Ret)

Conclusion



- **Declining budget environment is the new reality and will shape how we will do business within the U.S. military for years to come.**
- **Future studies and experiments must connect today's capabilities with those planned for the future in order to meet future operational requirements.**
- **The general conclusions pulled from EW13 game play must be translated into hard data that utilize modeling and simulation, as well as force development planning.**

Way Ahead



If all or parts of FMO are worthy of further pursuit, here are five recommendations for consideration:

- 1. Make a concerted effort to increase Marine presence on Naval shipping in order to enhance forward-deployed forces' operational capabilities.**
- 2. Prototype a Naval – Navy and Marine Corps – operational staff using the MOC, FICE and other initiatives in order to optimize blue-green C2 integration.**
- 3. Leverage past practices to regionalize commands at the regimental level in order to build institutional awareness of geographic areas of instability.**
- 4. Further develop concepts that should be institutionalized as part of FMO.**
- 5. During EW14, further explore FMO concepts and capabilities, and their applicability to joint concepts (e.g., JOAC, JCEO, ASB, etc.).**



Closing Remarks

Gen James Amos Commandant of the Marine Corps



QUESTIONS?



BACKUP SLIDES



Key Personnel



Cell A

Lead: Col Scott Aiken, USMC, USFFC
 Fac: Mr. Jim Trahan, SVG
 Analyst: Mr. J.D. Canty, CETO
 Planner: LtCol Ford Phillips, Ellis Grp



Cell B

Lead: CAPT Thomas Negus, USN, ESG-2
 Fac: Mr. Wes Hammond, CD&I
 Analyst: Mr. John Berry, CD&I Concepts
 Planners: LtCol John Adams and
 Mr. Doug King, Ellis Grp



Cell C

Lead: LTCOL Simon Bonavita, Aus Army
 Fac: Mr. Doug Stilwell, ONR-30
 Analyst: LtCol Mike Chambers, SIG
 Planner: Maj Rod McHaty, Ellis Grp

• Gold Cell Members

- ADM Walter Doran, USN (Ret), CDR PACFLT, CDR 7th Fleet
- LtGen Chip Gregson, USMC (Ret), Asst SecDef for Asian-Pacific Affairs, COMMARFORPAC
- LtGen Duane Theissen, USMC (Ret), COMMARFORPAC, CG III MEF

Marine Corps Wargaming

Game Director: Dr William Lademan
 Deputy Game Director: Col Tom Connally
 Lead AO: Maj Jody White


FORCES AVAILABLE FOR MARITIME TASK FORCE

Embedded Forces:

- Live, train & operate w/HNSF
- Build awareness, detect growing instability
- Totally sustained via local husbanding arrangements
- Normally OPCON to US Country Team, but may be returned to theater component command if necessary
- Examples: In-theater SOF, some naval forces

Total Fleet:

- Organized into home surge and sustaining force, scalable adaptive forces, and forward forces
- Home surge/sustaining force: Provides for homeland security; mans, trains and equips for rapid aggregation if necessary
- Personnel, equipment and sustainment coded by readiness/capability to be able to deploy scalable adaptive forces to form a maritime task force



Enduring Presence Forces:

- Via GFS or regional sub-stations, naval forces conduct TSC in a given region
- From these forward-deployed bases, naval forces would make visits of varying frequency and duration – depending on threat level

Cruising Forces:

- Operate globally and are chopped to naval component commander
- Positioned for either maritime security ops or deterrence
- Task-organized and controlled from MOC
- May conduct TSC in conjunction with embedded or enduring presence forces
- Mitigates force protection risks to which embedded and enduring presence forces may be exposed



Expeditionary Warrior Series



- Title 10 wargame conducted annually by Wargaming Division, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
- Provides Commandant of the Marine Corps with venue to address key issues relating to the future of the Corps
- Past topics:
 - 2008-2010: Seabasing
 - 2011: Joint Operational Access Concept/Enhanced MAGTF Operations
 - 2012: A2/AD Challenges



FMO: The Central Idea

To win the “come as you are fight” requires awareness, early action and agility through scale to quickly aggregate a tailored force.

- Appropriate force for proactive/preventive action enabled by awareness
- Organized from forward-deployed forces mitigating tyranny of distance
- Intent-based/adaptive organizations enabling rapid aggregation
- Agility through scalability
- Seamless global integration of U.S., maritime, interagency, joint and partner nation capabilities
- Littoral maneuver: blue to green to brown to objectives ashore
- Dedicated logistics enables flexible response of aggregated forces
- Readily available kinetic and non-kinetic fires, mitigating risk of smaller forces
- Dedicated mobility enabling tactical and operational maneuver in multiple mediums




EW13 Analysis Methodology

- Discussion and planning activities were documented by recorders and analysts within each of the three player cells.
- Facilitated discussion on fourth day of wargame enabled each cell to discuss attributes/challenges associated with tenets within FMO concept paper.
- Post-game analysis workshop conducted on week following Main Event to assess data and observations; session was enabled by computer-assisted program from HQMC/ARHM
 - Participants: CD&I Concepts Branch, HQMC SIG, CETO and Wargaming Division
 - Data analyzed by players' planning response and implications of response on concepts, capabilities and capacities
 - Impacts on warfighting functions
 - Impact on selective military missions highlighted in *CCJO: JF2020*



MCWL Campaign Plan





Wargaming Way Ahead



- Naval Services Game 2013
 - Focus: Alternate methods to employ distributed, forward-deployed ARG/MEU
 - 7-11 October 2013, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.
- EW14
 - Focus: Establish FMO's baseline capabilities
 - Projected Main Event date: February 2014
- EW15
 - Focus: Operationalize FMO concept
 - Projected Main Event date: February 2015

EW09



- Theme: Seabasing
- Purpose: Examine seabasing concept in the context of foreign internal defense (FID) and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.
 - Identified and assessed capabilities required for FID and COIN operations supported by Seabasing.
- Observations
 - Seabased forces provide the Joint Force Commander (JFC) with options to meet the challenges of FID-COIN operations supporting distributed forces in vast geographic areas of operation.
 - Seabasing can provide options and flexibility in the face of challenges to access that will continue to impede joint and combined operations in the future.
 - In a FID-COIN environment, seabasing is an enabler to the Ambassador and country team.

EW10



- Theme: Seabasing
- Purpose:
 - Refine seabasing solutions to address gaps in policy and interoperability in the use of the seabase as an operational enabler.
 - Generate insights into required seabased capabilities and capacities that can inform programmatic and doctrinal efforts.
 - Identify key issues that specifically require seabasing experimentation and exercises to validate.
- Observations
 - Overcoming access-denial has given way to the need for seabasing support to the more likely scenarios such as TSC, FHA/DR, NEO and STABOPS.
 - Seabasing is evolving to become more about operating concepts than it is about hardware or ships.
 - Not an all-or-nothing proposition; growing recognition of the need for balance between land- and seabased ops.

EW11



- Theme: Joint Operational Access Concept and Enhanced MAGTF Operations
- Purpose:
 - JOAC: Examine the central idea and operational methodology for countering anti-access military challenges contained in the JOAC, and the Marine Corps' role as an expeditionary force in readiness in this environment.
 - EMO: Explore notional operating parameters in order to inform development of EMO; assess ability of 2024 MEU to support; and establish a baseline scenario to support EMO experimentation plan.
- JOAC Observations
 - Increase engagement by the MAGTF in shaping the battlespace.
 - Maritime mine threat will continue to have significant impact; partner nation assets may be required to address.
 - Overcoming A2/AD capabilities using combat power could be time and combat power intensive.
 - Air Force can complement MAGTF ops using kinetic/non-kinetic fires and full-spectrum ISR support.
- EMO Observations
 - Examine capability of USMC/USN C2 organizations and ability to facilitate seabased extended range operations.
 - Integration of USMC/SOF operations.

EW12



- Theme: Overcoming A2/AD Challenges
- Purpose: Explore operational challenges, potential shortfalls and naval integration opportunities for JOAC, Air-Sea Battle and conceptual initiatives resulting from Amphibious Capabilities Working Group.
- Observations
 - Need to reconcile USN and USMC operational doctrines in order to achieve coherence needed for joint operational access and the conduct of Single Naval Battle.
 - Aggregation of myriad capabilities, battlespace organization and command relationships in a dynamic A2/AD environment require further exploration.
 - Interoperability challenges exist between the Navy, Marine Corps and SOF. COMRELS among Marine forces, naval component commanders and SOF commanders must be clarified.
 - Interoperability challenges – USMC, USN and SOF.
 - Airspace C2 and joint effects integration need further study.
 - Information sharing.
 - Capacity shortfalls: Surface connectors, support personnel and lift.
 - Uncertainty regarding cyber capabilities and authorities.



EW13 – Topic: Airspace C2



Observation: *Airspace command and control of manned and unmanned systems, coupled with the likely need for deconfliction with surveillance platforms as well as long-range and loitering munitions, will likely challenge the future joint and maritime force. These challenges will be particularly acute when attempting to synchronize operations at multiple echelons of command within contested or semi-permissive airspace.*

Key Points

- Given the extremely short response time required, players were compelled to streamline coordination with the CFACC to exercise theater-level C2.
- Players stressed that the Air Operations Center did not necessarily need to be in the JOA to support the campaign.
- Within FMO campaign, there was confusion about local control of aircraft.
- Airspace management issues within EW13 could highlight doctrinal gaps defining responsibilities over littorals, airspace, blue water and land.
- The use of surface fires (naval/ground) will complicate deconfliction efforts.

EW13 – Topic: Space and Cyberspace



Observation: Players examined the role of cyber authorities in the context of early action, the interrelationship between cyber and information operations and the impacts on cyber authorities, and the use of embedded and forward deployed cyber forces. In general, players stated that cyber activities will become more complex within the context of an FMO approach that utilizes early action to address a budding crisis.

Key Points

- Potential friction with other interagency activities
- Complexity grows as operation grows
- Players debated on degree and level of cyber capabilities forward deployed with JTF.