



CYBER SECURITY DIVISION  
2013 PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS'



# Secure Location Provenance for Mobile Devices

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Homeland  
Security

Science and Technology

# Team Profile

**SECuRE** and Trustworthy computing Lab (**SECRETLab**)  
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*Assistant Professor, UAB*

Post Doc. Fellow: Md Munirul Haque, Ph.D.

Ph.D. Students:  
Shams Zawoad  
Rasib Khan, M.Sc.




# Customer Need

## Why do we need Location Proof / Provenance?

Ever wondered **where** your food comes from, or whether your medicine came through the proper **supply channels**?

**Proof of location history** is needed for many applications

- Supply chain integrity preservation
- Secure travel log maintenance
- Alibi preservation for investigation
- Location based benefit claims
- Corporate traveling
- Personal record keeping



# Approach


We present a system for distributed location proofs and provenance for mobile devices, with following properties:

- **Securely generated** location proofs
- **Decentralized** solution for easy deployment
- **User-centric** solution to allow maximum user-control
- **Privacy protection** for user information containment
- **Collusion-resistant** and **tamper-evident** to ensure validity of information
- **Order preserving** provenance records




# Approach *(cont.)*

- **Three-party model** for generating location proofs
  - **User** – requests proof
  - **Location Authority** – issues proof
  - **Witness** – endorses proof
- Three-way mutual validation
- Threshold based admission and acceptance
- **Chronological chaining** of proofs
- **Auditor** – validates proof presented by user






# Approach *(cont.)*



List of received location proofs



Export proof for submitting to auditor

## Prototype Application Screenshots

# Approach *(cont.)*

## Location Provenance


Location provenance provide a verifiable location chronology for the mobile device.

Our location provenance schemes provide the following guarantees:


- **False history** cannot be implanted by user or anyone else
- Hash-chains protect chronology
- Memory efficiency achieved via Bloom filters
- Users are capable of selectively proving **any arbitrary subset** of their location history, at any chosen granularity. This protects **user privacy** and allows the user to **control** what is revealed.




# Approach *(cont.)*




(a) User Application



(b) Witness and Location Authority



(c) Comparison between ALP & PLP



(d) Average Time Required for Different Steps of the Protocol



# Benefits

- **Decentralized** model allows easy deployment for location proof generation
- Ownership of proof item and provenance chain is strictly **user-centric**, and Users can protect their privacy as they are **in control** of what gets recorded and revealed.
- More **efficient** than existing location proof systems (proved experimentally)
- Cryptographic ID ensures **privacy**
- Three-way mutual validation ensures the protocol to be **collusion-resistant**
  - (proved theoretically)
- Threshold based admission/acceptance of signatures **detects relay/proxy attacks**
  - (proved through experimental simulation)
- Hash-chains and Bloom filters allow memory efficient **chronological provenance** chains

# Competition

## Current technologies are

- GPS-based
- Self-reported (e.g. Facebook)
- Automatic provider-oriented reporting (e.g. Google)
- Centralized architecture (e.g. [1] Dunne et al. 2008)

## Research Gaps

- **No competitor** supports the unique features we provide (provenance, collusion-resistance, verifiability)
- Current state-of-the art
  - Lacks security (e.g. misreport, masquerade, collude)
  - Lacks control (provider-oriented, privacy issues)
  - Lacks scalability (centralization bottleneck, establishment issues)
- We introduce **new capability** that will **advance the state-of-the-art** significantly

[1] DUNNE, C. R., C ANDEBAT, T., AND GRAY, D. 2008. A three-party architecture and protocol that supports users with multiple identities for use with location based services. In Proceedings of the 5th International conference on Pervasive services. ICPS '08. ACM, 1–10.

# Current Status

- **Completion of Phase 1** (a and b), January 2013
  - System model and goals
  - Attack model and possible attacks
  - Architectural definitions
- **Completion of Phase 2** (a and b), July 2013
  - System Components
  - Proof components
  - Design and security analysis of the scheme
  - Prototype development (please visit demonstration booth)
  - Extended experimental results and evaluation
- Currently in **Phase 3**.
- **Milestones** 1 to 5 have been reached.
- **Privacy Threshold Analysis** has been performed to determine the impact on user privacy. Our project passed the analysis was found to **comply with DHS/S&T/PIA-02**.
- **Prototypes**: Android applications for users, and location server prototypes have been created and limited testing has been performed.
- **Technical progress reports**: November 2012, January 2013, March 2013, July 2013

**Please visit our prototype demo this afternoon.**

# Next Steps

- **Things to do:**
  - Optimize efficiency for location provenance chain creation and storage
  - Random identity generation for users
  - User-centric granular exposure of information
  - Larger scale testing with many mobile devices
  - Financial modeling and strategic planning for location provenance solution deployment
  - Completion of the final prototype
- **Release plan:** Make the app available on **Android App Store/Google Play**, and release server code/app code in **open source**.

# Contact Information

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