

**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL
OPEN SESSION OF HSAC MEETING
THURSDAY MAY 24, 2012
Meeting Minutes**

Participants: JANET NAPOLITANO, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
ALAN BERSIN, Assistant Secretary, Office of International Affairs, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
WILLIAM WEBSTER, Chair
WILLIAM BRATTON, Vice Chair
NORMAN AUGUSTINE, Member
RICHARD CANAS, Member
KENNETH CANTERBURY, Member
JAMES CARAFANO, Member
LARRY COCKELL, Member
MOHAMED ELIBIARY, Member
CLARK KENT ERVIN, Member
JIM JONES, Member
CARIE LEMACK, Member
BONNIE MICHELMAN, Member
JEFF MOSS, Member
LYDIA W. THOMAS, Member
CHUCK WEXLER, Member
JOHN WILLIAMS, Member
BECCA SHARP, Executive Director

Judge Webster Good afternoon. I would like to welcome everyone to the first public meeting of the Homeland Security Advisory Council in 2012.

My name is William Webster, and I am the Chair of the Homeland Security Advisory Council, HSAC as we call it for short. I would like to welcome our members and the guests who have joined us today.

For members of the public who are unfamiliar with the HSAC, this Council serves to provide independent advice to Secretary Janet Napolitano across the spectrum of homeland security issues.

The Secretary, Vice Chair Bill Bratton, and I are delighted to have the opportunity to host this public meeting.

On tap for today's session we will have Secretary Napolitano swearing in our

newest HSAC members and give brief remarks. We will then welcome the new members into the Council.

Next, we will hear from HSAC members and Chair of the Faith-Based Homeland Security Communications Advisory Committee, Bonnie Michelman, who will give us an update on the task force's work and recommendations. Bonnie's presentation will be followed by a deliberative session and a vote on the FBAC's recommendations.

Now I would like to turn the meeting over to Secretary Napolitano, who will commence with the swearing in of the new HSAC members. Secretary Napolitano?

Secretary Napolitano: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

New members, I would ask you to raise your right hand and repeat after me.

(Whereupon, new members were sworn.)

(Applause.)

Okay. Well, good afternoon. It is a pleasure to be here and to be with the members of the Homeland Security Advisory Council.

Welcome to our newest members, Larry Cockell, Jim Carafano, Jim Jones, and Carie Lemack. We really thank you for joining us and congratulate you on your appointment to the Council.

(Applause.)

As new members, you join an experienced, dedicated group of Council members, and I think you will add materially to the accomplishments of those whose terms have just ended and to the Council members here with us today.

As I have mentioned to you, this Council has been invaluable in providing advice on certain major areas, and I am just going to touch on them -- the Task Force on Secure Communities, the process by which we identify those in our jails and prisons who have also violated our immigration laws; the Task Force on the Southwest Border, a significant highlight being that illegal immigration numbers across the southwest border have not been this low since 1971; the Committee on Sustainability and Efficiency, which has helped us develop training programs, among other things.

The recommendations of the Community Resilience Task Force were also very helpful. Resilience is a topic that runs through so many of the things that we do but particularly our disaster response and recovery work, and the ability

to bounce back quickly and to bounce back to even a higher level.

The Homeland Security Advisory System Task Force helped us as we moved from a color-coded system, which has now gone by the wayside, to an actual threat advisory system.

And, finally, the Countering Violent Extremist Working Group addressed an important topic. Violent extremism is a concern not just in the United States but around the globe. I was in a meeting with the G-6 last week, and violent extremism, homegrown violent extremism, was a key concern of the British, of the French, of the Germans, of everyone around the table, and I have seen that in other meetings as well.

The process that you helped us work through by which we focused on policing tactics that can help us identify early on whether someone is being radicalized to the point of violence and carrying out a violent crime, using some of the same techniques that were used successfully in the United States to battle the violence associated with the cocaine epidemic: Those task force recommendations have proven invaluable, not just to implement here but to share with our colleagues around the world.

This has been a very busy few months for the Department of Homeland Security. You no doubt have seen some of our efforts in the press and some of the things that we have been dealing with in the press. But we continue to focus on countering terrorism. We continue to focus on securing the air, land, and sea borders of the United States. And we continue to focus on smart and effective immigration enforcement. We continue to focus on effective disaster response and recovery.

And then, lastly, our fastest growing mission area is in the topic of cyber security. This is an area that touches so many things from financial crimes and identity theft crimes, where we worked very closely with the FBI, among others, all the way to threats against the critical infrastructure of the United States.

So the Congress currently has legislation before them, but, really, an awful lot of work being done by the Department in the area of cybersecurity.

So with that, Council members, I know you have a full agenda this afternoon. Again, it is great to see you, and thank you for your help.

Thank you.

(Applause).

Judge Webster:

Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.

I would now like to introduce new members: Larry Cockell, James Carafano, Ambassador Jim Jones, and Carie Lemack.

Larry Cockell is the Chief Security Officer of Time Warner, Inc. In this position, Mr. Cockell oversees and coordinates security policies and operations on a worldwide basis. Previously, Mr. Cockell served as Deputy Director of the U.S. Secret Service, where he spent 20 years with the agency.

James Carafano is the Assistant Director of The Heritage Foundation's Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, and a Senior Research Fellow for defense and homeland security issues. Mr. Carafano served 25 years in the U.S. Army rising to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and was head speechwriter for the Army Chief of Staff, the service's highest ranking officer.

Ambassador Jim Jones. Ambassador James Jones provides business development advice and consulting for clients primarily in Mexico and Latin America. Ambassador Jones served as U.S. Ambassador to Mexico from 1993 to 1997.

Carie Lemack. Ms. Lemack is a co-founder of Global Survivors Network, GSN, a global organization for victims of terror to speak out against terrorism and radicalism.

Vice Chair Bratton, Bill, do you have any remarks that you would like to make at this time?

Chief Bratton:

Well, certainly, I would like to welcome the new members to the Committee.

It is a Committee that I have proudly been a part of now for several years, and the Secretary relies very significantly on the reports that she commissions from this group. And I think you will find that your time and participation will be of significant value to her, to the Department of Homeland Security, and to the country.

So I would just like to offer my personal welcome to you, and thanks for your willingness to serve.

Judge Webster:

Thank you, Bill. The Vice Chairman speaks for all of us in that respect, in welcoming you.

Now it is my great pleasure to introduce HSAC member and Co-Chair of the Faith-based Homeland Security and Communications Advisory Committee, Bonnie Michelman. Bonnie?

Bonnie Michelman: Thank you very much.

Judge Webster: I just want to mention that you are currently Director of Police, Security, and Outside Services at Massachusetts General Hospital in Boston, Massachusetts. And she will now give us a presentation regarding the faith-based task force recommendations. And thank you, Bonnie, for the tremendous work that you do with the task force. And the floor is yours.

Bonnie Michelman: Well, it has been a pleasure having an opportunity to co-chair and lead what I think has been an instrumental task force. And I want to make a special mention of thanking Becca Sharp and Mike Miron, in particular, who have been an unbelievable support to us, as well as Will Smith and Tony Berry and other staff from Rebecca.

We have gotten 27 of what I think are the best people, the best leaders, representing different cultures, religions, and philosophies, to come together as individuals, but leave as friends, to really look at how to think about minimizing our risk, our threat, and how to better work with the DHS.

We have had the wonderful value of Becca and Mike's support, advocacy, guidance and structure, which has been instrumental, and we thank you very much for allowing us to meet together twice.

Our tasking was very simple from the Secretary. She tasked us to explore current and potential security information-sharing opportunities and methods between DHS and the many, multiple, myriad of faith-based organizations.

And one of the things we really couldn't do is figure out exactly how many there were, but we decided it didn't really matter since there were so many commonalities between them.

We looked at this from lots of diverse types of risks: man-made risks but also natural risks, vulnerability, terrorism, and activist activities. So we were trying to look at how to keep these faith-based organizations having better safety and security through a variety of ways, regardless what the cause was.

In terms of the tasking, we looked at structural organization of the relationship, the communication, and the initiatives between DHS and the faith-based organizations; how DHS could better support FBOs and help FBOs more effectively receive and appropriately disseminate information. It was very important that it was two-directional, not just one way communication.

We also realized that faith-based organizations are truly the microcosm of communities, and that if they were not appropriately educated on how to protect themselves and be appropriately safeguarded it would be like missing a

major part of our communities.

Deepening our partnerships, we wanted to ensure, as per the request of the Secretary, that the roles that the faith-based organizations play are important in the way information is shared, what mechanisms would best facilitate this, and we discussed a lot of options.

And our report has stayed in a fairly global perspective, so we have not put intangible methodologies for most of the things we are going to recommend. That is for a later date.

We did talk about what roles fusion centers and other intelligence centers can play in time-sensitive threats that are particularly relevant to faith-based organizations. We met by conference call numerous times, and we had two in-person meetings here in Washington between the months of January 2012 and May of 2012.

And, again, we could not have had 27 brighter, more interested, more eager, and more honest people on that task force. It was really fantastic.

Besides me and Sheriff Baca, who were lucky enough to lead this, our Co-Vice Chairs were John Hodson of the Mormon Church, he is the Director, and Paul Goldenberg, the Executive Director of SCN.

The value statement I will read verbatim, because I think it is important enough to do so. "The members of the faith-based organizations that serve on the Department of Homeland Security Advisory Council's Faith-based Advisory Council strongly and uniformly denounce violence against any other faith-based organizations, to include their houses of worship and those who worship. When any threats target one member of the faith-based community, they target all of us, and will be met with stiff resistance in their attempt to divide us against hate."

So from the beginning we talked about this in light of what would be beneficial to every group, not just one group, and that made a huge difference.

Our guiding principles were very easy but important. We wanted to ensure much more augmented outreach and training in order to achieve social cohesion between the FBOs, not just between the FBOs and DHS, but between the FBOs themselves. And that has begun, but, really, we need to see that trajectory be on the right course.

We need to ensure that our base efforts are based on mutual respect, transparency, and trust. And that really was true in this committee. It was a feisty committee; there was a lot of disagreement, but always appropriate, respectful, and extremely well-intentioned.

We are determined to diminish the chasms between groups in order to achieve safety and security for all. We expect these recommendations to benefit all faith-based organizations.

We expect to provide safe places of worship for constituencies of those houses of worship or educational organizations, and the protection of assets for all faiths, which will protect our country, preserve our freedoms within our religious communities, and diminish our risks. And we really talked about this from a proactive perspective and the diverse risks we face, not just international terrorism, but homegrown work as well.

And, finally, we talked about building better collaboration between state, local, and tribal governments, and FBOs. It is almost analogous to some of the fiefdoms that have had to be broken down over the last 20 years between public and private law enforcement in order to achieve better safety for all, really breaking down those fiefdoms and getting people to trust each other and work together.

Our findings came in really four different categories -- threat assessment being one, communication being two, outreach and education being three, and best practices being four.

We recognize the importance of sharing homeland security information with FBOs. That was probably the singular most important theme we kept talking about.

The members felt that the Secretary and the Department recognize and need to ensure a more formal two-way security information process to ensure that the FBOs' infrastructure is resilient, protected, and they are being a strategic and valuable partner to security awareness, prevention, planning operations, and response. And that formal relationship is not only required but desired by both groups.

So I think again, perhaps in years gone past, there would have been some concerns, more suspect or cynical ideology around this, but both groups now see a need; DHS certainly needs this, and FBOs want this as well. So we talked about a more structured way to build that communication.

Other general findings focus on improved relationships. FBOs recognize the importance of DHS in assisting them to ensuring their infrastructure is resilient and protected. And, again, these faith-based organizations are part of communities, and we all know that the private sector protects about 85 percent of our country's infrastructure. So these faith-based organizations are simply part of that.

They understand they are located in communities and have a unique and critical role in a sort of a hometown security strategy, which our Secretary and government have been striving toward.

We also realized a lot of faith-based organizations simply do not understand the homeland security structure or what DHS can offer to support them. And so it is very important that we educate them on the multitude and myriad of resources around them.

We talked about faith-based organizational capacity, and that faith-based organizations have different capacities to implement two-way security information-sharing, and that the FBOs recognize and agree on the value of DHS information-sharing and collaboration, even if some of those methodologies may be different or distinct to them or to their groups.

I won't go through all the findings, but I think overriding was our emphasis and impetus on civil rights and civil liberties, that we will work with FBOs to work diligently to ensure civil liberties are preserved in their engagement with DHS and other federal agencies, and that FBOs will preserve principles of individual religious freedoms during any and all discussion with DHS and other federal agencies.

It also became apparent that the partnership with law enforcement needed to be not only augmented but consistently sustained because the importance of it was critical in keeping faith-based organizations safe. Entrusting and educating law enforcement partners about faith-based communities and unique nuances of those communities was critical in order for law enforcement partners to be able to properly do their job and help safeguard those organizations. The criticality of this relationship can't be overstated.

So our recommendation was, again, that we should identify and work with DHS should identify and work with faith-based organizations to establish a two-way process for sharing homeland security information, and DHS should designate points of contact to handle engagement with faith-based organization. This was a theme that was talked about in great detail, points of contact to interact with faith-based communities.

So we are recommending a senior-level full-time position be added with access to senior DHS leadership within the DHS headquarters, whose primary responsibility is not only sharing but obtaining homeland security and threat information issues that are relevant to the faith-based community.

DHS should assign points of contact in each fusion center and other intelligence agencies to work with their state and faith-based communities.

A third recommendation was that DHS should support additional

infrastructure to share security information, when appropriate, with FBOs.

An example that we had of this -- and Mohamed Elbiary was luckily on our committee -- he was the only person from the HSAC outside of the chairs, and it was very helpful -- was that he worked with CEN, the Christian Emergency Network, and SCN, to create a secure portal for DHS and faith-based organizations to share information on the Homeland Security Information Network. That was a pilot program but has been very well received. So we looked at different pilot programs that have or could be put in place to help with this overarching recommendation.

Our fourth recommendation is that DHS should include faith-based organizations in a much more active and formal way in current and future planning documents.

Examples for this would be that FBOs should be included in the communication and implementation plans of the National Terrorism Advisory System in order to ensure communities remain engaged and informed about potential terrorist acts or threats, and that DHS should ensure that the FBOs' information-sharing component is placed in the PPD-8, specifically in the resilience, prevention, and protection sections under current revision status of the national response framework.

So, again, the needs and the vulnerabilities of the faith-based organizations are seen loud and clear through a variety of other formalized ways.

Our fifth recommendation is about outreach. DHS should increase its outreach to all faith-based communities and organizations at the local level to inform and educate individuals and communities about DHS, its mission, and its resources in order to support the security needs of the FBOs.

There was a great deal of conversation about how this could be done. We didn't come up with the exact methodology; that was not our role. But we simply talked about the need that if our faith-based organizations are more educated, those people who may be leaders of those organizations, who may be in charge of security for those organizations, who may simply be the chaplain of those organizations, that there would be a far better way to centralize and assimilate and collect information that would be able to allow us to be proactive.

We thought it was very important to leverage existing relationships between state and local law enforcement, as well as local government officials in this outreach, in order to streamline communications. Coordinating much more with fusion centers and infrastructure protection's protective service -- protective security advisors, pardon me, we thought was very important, so that those fusion center analysts and those protective security advisors

understand the nuances of what these faith-based organizations may need, or what they may be concerned about, or what may be a special event that could warrant an attack of some sort.

DHS should demonstrate that this initiative is a priority by allocating appropriate funds. I am going to pass through that quickly, but it is important.

Our sixth recommendation is that DHS should support collaborative forums to highlight the effectiveness of multi-lateral engagements and build trust between FBOs and public safety officials. This was a theme that came up quite often in a variety of ways. And as someone who has worked on this before, I can tell you that the need for public safety official involvement is critical in order to achieve the success that we want.

DHS should participate in community FBO activities which build trust and highlight cooperation and link different faith-based organizations in these activities, because some will not know how to even reach out to each other or may not think to do so.

DHS should facilitate an introduction to national and local incident emergency responders and local elected officials to advance FBOs' own readiness and security infrastructure. And often local elected officials may not understand some of the risks and nuances that these FBOs face. These would include, certainly, emergency management organizations as well: state ones, FEMA, et cetera.

We decided that it would be very useful if DHS would create messaging campaigns on FBO partnerships, which include public service announcements highlighting collaboration with state and local law enforcement.

You know, a good example is the "If You See Something, Say Something" kinds of campaigns, things that will make people think and it will become very apparent to people that our faith-based organizations have some issues, need to be protected, and it becomes more of a grander scale, a broader scheme of protection from a lot of people.

DHS should assist FBOs in assessing international threat information as well as domestic threat information with respect to the relevance to their domestic constituencies. So we are hoping that even when a threat is internationally based, someone will be able to help FBOs translate that threat to the need for readiness domestically from their own constituencies and their own organization.

Our eighth recommendation is that DHS should continue the operation of the Homeland Security Advisory Council's Faith-based Advisory Council and provide it with additional taskings focused on FBOs' security needs.

We looked at this a lot, and we felt that there was so much left to do. And in order to promote action, create, and implement some tangible ways to move forward with this, it would be very valuable if this group could stay together and work on some of these endeavors and look at options for implementation.

Number 9, we hope that DHS will continue to develop and support DHS faith-based pilot projects, such as the DHS pilot projects with the Office of Infrastructure Protection and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and to be creative about those.

Our tenth recommendation is that DHS, through the FEMA grants process, should continue to support and increase federal, state, and local grant funding. This continuation will bolster faith-based organizations' homeland security information-sharing, resilience efforts, risk prevention and mitigation, and infrastructure protection, through risk assessments, through education, et cetera. This is very important in order to sustain the current success.

We also recommend that DHS should train and monitor these protective security advisors to engage them and work closely in a formal way with faith-based communities on infrastructure protection and training; so almost a "train the trainer" if you will approach.

And there is a variety of sub-recommendations for those officials training PSAs in cultural awareness, religious nuances, reporting procedures, and recognizing special times of vulnerability for different religious groups. DHS is providing a comprehensive security response to FBOs, such as providing infrastructure resilience assessments for houses of worship, information on significant events, and cyber security information.

And DHS should work with its federal partners to create a fusion center manual for collaborating with FBOs that further integrates federal, state, and local law enforcement best practices, and provides additional funding for PSA support and training in these areas.

The final few recommendations are that DHS should work with fusion centers and faith-based organizations to educate one another on their respective roles and responsibilities.

We have seen, even in the ESF -- emergency support functions -- that at times the analysts and fusion centers don't understand the particular nuances of security for different industry sectors. We want to make sure that there is a very common understanding and appreciation for what the concerns are from the faith-based organizations and communications.

DHS, in partnership with local law enforcement, should train interested faith-

based organizations on suspicious activity reporting and how to utilize campaigns such as "If You See Something, Say Something" to empower and encourage suspicious activity reporting.

These are programs that have been designed with a great deal of time and effort, and they are extremely superb programs, and we feel that on some of these things the wheel does not need to be reinvented, and that faith-based organizations can use what has been put in place already by DHS to build and continue on that work.

DHS should work with FBOs to share best practices to assist them in developing security manuals or security guidelines or security webinars for houses of worship, for religious schools, and for faith-based activities. The focus needs to revolve around looking at the tangible and intangible assets, and what the "vulnerability of the day" is. DHS should train FBOs to identify and utilize the basic National Incident Management System, NIMS, for protection and prevention response because it is a system we know and use and it works.

We recommend that DHS provide an annual FBO award for security best practices. As someone who knew Rick Rescorla, I couldn't have been happier to hear about the resiliency award the Secretary just created in his memory.

DHS should include representatives of FBOs in the planning for the national fusion center annual training and other appropriate venues to initiate action around the mutual needs of FBOs and fusion centers.

On page 20 you will see some recommendations for faith-based organizations to ensure effective two-way information systems. I will let you read those on your own in the interest of time. They really reiterate a lot of what I have said.

I will conclude by saying that, for me, co-chairing this was one of the most amazing experiences I have ever had, because seeing 27 very motivated, very bright people who have done amazing things in their own communities come together, and over four short months really bond as friends, as colleagues, and really be as interested in safeguarding each other's community as they were of safeguarding their own, was quite a fulfilling experience. And I know that it will continue.

I know we will solidify, hopefully, these recommendations, sustain them, and make sure that they are successful and that our faith-based organizations will have improved security, great success, and the ability to continue to do the things that they so well do.

I would like to thank the members of the Faith-Based Security and Communications Advisory Committee. You can see a list of who they were.

We had high-level representation from every culture and religious group, or just about every one, that exists in the country. People could not have been more transparent, more honest, more respectful, more giving of themselves and their ideas, and offering whatever their community could do to help.

So that is my report. Thank you.

Judge Webster: Thank you very much, Bonnie, for your report and for the work that went into the production of that report. It was a very fine effort.

Does anyone here have any questions for Bonnie prior to moving forward?
Jeff?

Member Moss: It sounded like there is perhaps some collaboration between faith-based organizations, though. Is there anything that everyone sort of agrees to disagree on?

Member Michelman: One of the things that there was some dissention around had to do with some methodologies involving two-way or bi-directional communication, and whether it would be open source architecture or open architecture.

Member Moss: So what if there is disagreement about what to share and what not to share and how to share it?

Member Michelman: There was some discussion about the extent of redacting or what to share and what not to share, but there isn't any major theme that evolved that I could say there was tremendous dissention about.

We actually had disagreement about several issues, and through a lot of conversations and the in-person meetings, which were invaluable. I think we came to some compromise or consensus that felt very comfortable for all.

Member Moss: Thank You.

Judge Webster: Are there any other questions or comments?

(No response.)

We will now move into a deliberative session to discuss adopting the aforementioned recommendations. Would anyone care to comment on the recommendations prior to our vote?

Member Wexler: I think we've done an excellent job. Remarkable.

Judge Webster: All right. Thank you. Well, I think we are ready now to vote on the recommendations. All those in favor please say aye.

(Chorus of ayes.)

Any opposed?

(No audible response.)

The recommendations are unanimously adopted for presentation to the Secretary.

All right. I think we are ready for the next item. Alan? I would now like to introduce Assistant Secretary of International Affairs and the Chief Diplomatic Officer of the DHS, Alan Bersin, to speak to us about international partnerships.

Asst. Secretary Bersin: Thank you, Judge, and it is a pleasure to be here, and let me add my sense of gratitude for the time you put into this and for the contribution you make to the enterprise. It is much appreciated, and I wanted to underline that from my perspective.

When history is written about what Janet Napolitano has accomplished in DHS -- and I hasten to add this is not an official statement but a personal one -- it seems to me that there are five major hallmark accomplishments. One is reconstructing FEMA and restoring FEMA to the role as demonstrated during the Gulf oil spill.

The second is the work done on the southwest border to restore the rule of law and to continue the work that had begun two administrations back and has been a bi-partisan project of the American people for the last 20 years.

Third is aviation security, and the extent to which both with regard to travel, passengers and cargo, there is a system in place now that, frankly, was precipitated by events, but is now a sound regime for aviation security at the passenger and cargo level.

The fourth I would assess at introducing a prioritization and a risk management basis to the work of TSA, and to ICE with regard to the handling of interior enforcement.

And the fifth and the one which Becca invited me to speak about, which I am engaged in now, is international involvement of DHS.

There are 2,800 DHS personnel abroad; 1,450 are there on a permanent basis, and 1,300 on a TDY or temporary duty status. With that number, DHS turns out, somewhat paradoxically at least to some, to be the third largest civilian agency presence abroad after the Justice Department and the State Department.

How could that be? What is the relationship between international policy and a homeland security department? How do you relate defending the homeland to transnational or international presence?

The answer is really a function of globalization, this instantaneous and continuous flow of people, goods, ideas, capital, labor, 24/7 throughout the year. The fact is that while we maintain a Westphalian or nation state system, in virtually every area of human endeavor we have moved away from governing by nation states to having regimes that are transnational by definition and international in nature.

That is the beginning of it. Globalization has led us to look at borders which define a homeland as not simply lines on a map, not simply the divisions between nations or empires, not simply lines that separate sovereignties, but, rather, as in keeping with the globalization, the nature of contemporary globalization.

Borders are as much flows of goods and people. So I would like to point out from my previous job as CBP Commissioner that every day, 365 days a year, CBP officers process one million passengers into the United States, and 60,000 containers: truck containers, sea containers and air cargo.

Every single day 270,000 private vehicles enter the United States, coming in from Canada, and coming in from Mexico. Every single day on the northern border alone 350,000 people go back and forth. So this is a massive set of flows. And while we are familiar with them in the land/water context, because of the proximity of Mexico and Canada, in fact \$1-1 1/2 trillion of exports -- \$1.8 trillion to be precise -- of exports leaving the United States, and \$2 trillion in imports coming into the United States, are, together with the 370 million people who come into the United States, are part of these globalization -- these global flows of goods and people.

And borders really must take that into account, and Homeland Security must take that into account. During the Secretary's term, two events brought that home very dramatically. The first, of course, was the underwear bomber incident, the effort to blow up a Northwest airliner over Detroit.

It turns out that CBP people, officers, were prepared to actually take Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, and they would have put him in secondary. He had been flagged by the Advance Passenger Information System as someone that we have an interest in interviewing.

Of course, as we realized in the aftermath of that incident, had he succeeded in the terrorist incident, we never would have caught him prior to the act, we never would have interviewed him in secondary, and he would have

accomplished a terrorist act. So we went from looking at admissibility decisions to looking to these security decisions, and then it became very clear that for purposes of aviation travel, borders in that case began at Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam where Abdulmutallab boarded the Northwest Airline flight.

We then needed to construct a system of aviation security that actually kept people -- dangerous people-- from boarding flights far from the land borders, far from the ports of entry, far from the lines on a map that define our homeland.

What we realized was that ports of entry -- seaports, airports, and landports, 330 of them in the United States -- were actually not the first line of defense but the last line of defense, and that we needed to move our activities abroad in order to actually protect the homeland.

The same thing happened again barely a year later, in October 2010, when Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula attempted to blow up two cargo planes, having put PETN explosives into printer cartridges, addressed the packages to Chicago, and then sent them into the global supply chain.

We realized that, in fact, we needed to look at cargo being loaded in maritime containers or in air cargo back at the point of origin as early in time as we could and as far geographically away from the ports of entry. And that really was not the first time we realized that we needed an international function, but it underlined the extent to which homeland security is basically a transnational activity.

And out of that grew the Secretary's very active role abroad. In fact, she just may have mentioned to you during her appearance today that she has just gotten back from the Middle East, from Jordan and Israel. She is continuing to build these partnerships because, in fact, we cannot operate outside of our sovereignty without engaging in deep partnerships, both with other governments and also with the private sector.

So in the aftermath of the Abdulmutallab plot and the Yemen cargo plot, we saw the development of unprecedented partnerships. The first thing that happened was that TSA and CBP formed a partnership of the kind that, frankly, in two terms of service in government I have not seen before. These two domestic agencies collaborated genuinely to create a system of vetting passengers in a way that would permit us to do it in an early time and to do it effectively and to cover all passengers embarked to the United States.

Similarly, after the Yemen cargo plot, TSA and CBP engaged in an outreach to the private sector that, again, I think was fairly unprecedented. There was an effort made to avoid the usual response that comes after a crisis, which is

that either we wait for the report of a Commission or we wait for the report of a legislative committee. Instead, TSA and CBP engaged with the express carriers -- UPS, FedEx, DHL, and TNT -- which account for 70 percent of the air cargo that is involved in global flows, and instead of actually dictating or giving a proposal to the private sector and waiting for a response, they engaged the private sector immediately in order to develop an approach to handle the air cargo situation.

They have developed something called the Air Cargo Advance Screening System, which has revolutionized -- and I use that word advisedly -- it revolutionized the way in which air cargo is actually vetted.

The job now is to actually go out and work with other governments to be able to extend it from the original countries to which it applied to now, Europe and I believe Australia, New Zealand, and the many countries in the Middle East and Asia.

So international partnerships with this view of the border, which if you accept the homeland security function as keeping dangerous people and dangerous things away from the homeland, enlisting time and space in support of that mission means doing much of the work abroad doing virtually all of it before the cargo or the passenger arrives at the port of entry at the line which defines the homeland.

The Secretary has led partnerships in a variety of ways. We have CBP officers stationed in I believe 12 airports in nine countries in the Immigration Advisory Program. In this program, CBP officers, working with Immigration and police authorities of foreign countries, are actually in the departure lounge for last point of departure air flights to the United States looking at passengers, reviewing manifests, and ensuring we are providing another layer of security.

The Cargo Security Initiative has CBP officers in 59 ports in 35 countries who are actually looking with foreign customs agents at containers that are being placed onto vessels bound for the United States.

TSA is engaged in numerous partnerships with air cargo and air travel ministries and agencies all over the world, from Singapore to Panama to Frankfurt, Germany. ICE has critical relationships with national police agencies in 85 countries, helping to create vetted units that can engage in investigations that deal with visa security matters, cargo security matters, intellectual property violations, or customs fraud.

So, ladies and gentlemen, I think we can begin to see the outlines of an international function for Homeland Security that bears directly on the homeland security and on the homeland security agenda.

Under the Secretary's leadership, we began work that had been started impressively by Secretaries Ridge and Chertoff and our predecessors in office, which is to actually start to develop a doctrine of security that takes into account that we cannot look at every passenger, and we cannot open every trunk of every car, and we cannot deal with every car in precisely the same way.

So, over time what has emerged is a regime of threat assessment, risk management, traffic segmentation, and a feedback loop of information-sharing that is really the way in which I believe most nations of the world who engage in this seriously look at the job of homeland security.

We have done a lot of that domestically in concert with the European Union. I believe that most of the G-8, indeed most of the G-20, countries would accept that statement of how security can best be managed, given the fact of global flows of such continuous and massive proportions. You cannot look at every single cargo and every single passenger.

So homeland security, in terms of transnational partnerships, I think is here to stay, and we will be strengthening those partnerships and working with you to devise ways in which we can strengthen them.

Let me examine, lastly, the relationship with Mexico and Canada, which is a very special one because it is indeed the only two land borders that we have. We share 5,500 miles of boarder with Canada, 1,900 miles of border with Mexico, and the North American phenomenon, in terms of these flows, are still significant, although these flows come not by air and sea for the most part but by land, across our northern and southern borders.

But the flows here are huge as well -- 350,000 people coming south from Canada and going north on the northern border, almost 400,000 people a day on the southern border with Mexico, back and forth.

Our two -- three -- two out of the three largest trade partners -- import and export -- are Canada and Mexico. Canada is our largest, with a billion and a half dollars a day in cargo crossing the our northern border one way or the other every day. The Mexican border has just under a billion dollars and rapidly coming over a billion dollars a day in terms of commercial exchange in the North American context.

As we go further, we will see this regularization of flows as being absolutely critical to economic competitiveness of North America and the economic prosperity of our country.

The interesting thing about Canada and Mexico, unlike our relationship with anyone else, is that it is not domestic because we are separate sovereignties.

But it is not quite international in the way in which we deal with France or Japan, let alone Sudan or Kenya or Venezuela or Peru, but, rather, it is a combination of the two.

Bayless Manning came up with a term that is very -- at least I find very useful in looking at our relationship with Canada and Mexico. He defined our relationships with our two land neighbors as "intermestic."

(Laughter.)

And I think there is something to that. They partake -- it is not classically international, but it is not -- we still are sovereign nations.

Something that President Obama has accomplished in his term that is fully underway is to redefine our relationships with those two land border neighbors of ours in ways that are quite dramatic.

So in May 2010, with President Calderon, President Obama entered into the Declaration of the 21st Century Border that had economic and fiscal, as well as security, involvements that actually set the stage in Merida. 2.0 called for the massive relationship we have in both dealing with organized crime in Mexico and its impact in the United States, but also in terms of trade, which I will come back to.

Similarly, Prime Minister Harper and President Obama, in 2011, issued the Beyond the Border Vision Statement, which is a departure for both countries in the way in which we look at our common border in the north. The Beyond the Border Action Plan for the first time talks in terms of perimeter security, and in terms of needing to look at security and economic competitiveness from a North American perspective rather than a bilateral perspective.

And that has set the stage for some fairly dramatic program changes that are contemplated in an action plan that was approved by the President and the Prime Minister in December 2011. In fact, it built, as most things in history do, on concrete accomplishments that have taken place in the past.

The difference with Beyond the Border, and with the 21st Century Border Declaration, is that they are being managed at the highest levels of government, coordinated by the Privy Council for the Prime Minister and the National Security Council for the United States, and by the Mexico Los Pinos, La Presidencia, and by the national security staff with regard to Mexico.

There are deadlines. There are agendas. There is an accountability mechanism in place that is a dramatic change from the way in which we have done business in the past. It takes into account this notion of flows and the notion that we need to look at our borders, particularly our land borders, as not

beginning at the 49th parallel or at the Rio Grande, but actually being able to work with Canada and Mexico to deal with flows of goods and people, licit and illicit, that are currently underway.

So to use a phrase that I want to use from Paul Valery, the French poet, "The challenge of our times," he says, "is that the future is not what it used to be." And it genuinely is the challenge of our times, both the danger but also the opportunity, for us to look at borders and to look at homeland security. And under the Secretary's leadership we have made international partnerships an absolutely critical dimension of the work.

Thank you, Your Honor.

Judge Webster: Thank you very much, Alan. Are there any questions or comments for Secretary Bersin? John?

Member Magaw: Mr. Secretary, one of the things on your "to do" list, but one of the things that we will have to consider sooner or later, and that is over-flights, because intelligence tells us that that is going to be important. Where is that on your "to do" list?

Asst. Secretary Bersin: We have cooperation with regard to the over-flight situation. TSA will manage that regularly, in consultation with FAA, CBP and foreign governments. And much of the work that is being done by TSA abroad, some of it in Canada, is involved in dealing with the issue of over-flights.

There is a fairly good regime in place that is genuinely well respected. We have had some well publicized incidents where there have been over-flights that have conflicted with passenger security, and those planes have been compelled to land.

Member Magaw: So that program is in operation?

Asst. Secretary Bersin: Yes. There is –

Member Magaw: Is that for cargo also?

Asst. Secretary Bersin: I will have to confirm that. I think - with regard to over-flights, TSA is in the midst of finishing up the work for 100 percent cargo screening, and so I don't think we are at the point where we could say, as we can with all passengers coming to the United States, that we are checking every passenger who is on board a flight to the United States, there has been advance passenger information on it, and an assessment made.

I don't believe that we are there yet with cargo. But I know we are moving to that point. We will be meeting the requirements in short order.

Judge Webster: Thank you. Clark?

Member Ervin: I am hugely supportive, as you know, Alan, of what you are doing in the international area, and I really commend you for it. Could you tell us a little bit more about the Visa Security Officers Program which you mentioned in passing and the extent to which you project that it will be further deployed?

Asst. Secretary Bersin: Yes. The Immigration Advisory Program, actually in the Western hemisphere it is referred to as the Joint Security Program, the JSP.

Outside of the Western hemisphere it is called the Immigration Advisory Program, which is actually an interesting topic to see the preference that different countries in different areas of the world have for different titles.

It would be interesting to unpack that a bit, but yes, the concept is that by having our CBP officers working with Immigration agents in the departure lounges of foreign airports, we can enhance the security of the United States. We can further improve our security by analyzing the Advance Passenger Information System, and by being available to question passengers in these foreign countries.

There have been hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of people who have been prevented from boarding planes. We rely on partnerships with our allies and our friends abroad.

We have also had, as you know, Clark, the partnerships with the airlines, who are very cooperative. They have not only a security interest for their passengers and their aircraft, but they also want to avoid the situation where someone boards a plane, comes to the United States, and is not admitted, because that then becomes the fiscal responsibility of the airline to return the person.

So this is a win-win-win process and program that we expect to see expanded in many airports over the coming years.

Member Ervin: But, really, the Visa Security Officers Program is actually where DHS—

Asst. Secretary Bersin: This is the DHS. So the Visa Security is the typically the ICE agent who will be stationed in a foreign post in a foreign country and will be in a position to review visa applications with State Department personnel, and investigate any questions, so that we add a layer of security before the visa is actually granted.

When you combine that capacity with the CBP National Targeting Center vetting capacity, where these records existed which we can take as we do with advance passenger information, and we compare the manifest with many

databases.

So, too, we can do that in the visa context, and do, then, reserving the ICE Visa Security Officers Program for special investigations in which they can be stationed abroad, actually consult with national police abroad, consult criminal records abroad, and be able to advise the State Department with regard to the issuance of visas.

The third rung, just to complete the cycle, is of course the Visa Waiver Program, which has been extended to I believe 32 countries now, but involves a fairly complete vetting and security regime.

Judge Webster:

All right. Well, this is concluding a very busy day.

And thank all of you for your participation and service to the Department, and to the nation as members of the Secretary's Homeland Security Advisory Council.

I do want to take a moment to say special thanks to TSA, and especially to Beth Jones and the media team, Michael Leonard and David Errol, for putting on a great meeting, and providing us a great venue for our sessions today. It has been a full day, and we have packed a lot into it.

At this time, we will officially bring the public session to a close. Members of the public who would like to provide comment to the Homeland Security Advisory Council may do so by writing to Homeland Security Advisory Council, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C. 20528. And you can also email us at hsac -- all lower case -- hsac@dhs.gov.

HSAC information and meeting minutes may be found at www.dhs.gov/HSAC in caps. Our meeting notices are posted in the Federal Register in compliance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act.

And so with that, and with thanks, this meeting is adjourned.