U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

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GAS PIPELINE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
TECHNICAL PIPELINE SAFETY
STANDARDS COMMITTEE

AND

LIQUID PIPELINE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
TECHNICAL HAZARDOUS LIQUID PIPELINE
SAFETY STANDARDS COMMITTEE

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JOINT MEETING

WEDNESDAY FEBRUARY 26, 2014

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The Joint Meeting convened in the Fitzgerald Ballroom of the Westin Arlington Gateway Hotel, 801 Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia, at 9:00 a.m., Colette D. Honorable, Chair, presiding.

GAS PIPELINE ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEMBERS:

HONORABLE COLETTE D. HONORABLE, Chair

DENISE M. BEACH

J. ANDREW DRAKE

SUSAN L. FLECK

ROBERT W. HILL

RICHARD F. PEVARSKI

RICHARD H. WORSINGER

JEFF C. WRIGHT

CHAD J. ZAMARIN

LIQUID PIPELINE ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEMBERS:

MASSOUD TAHAMTANI

C. TODD DENTON

LANNY W. ARMSTRONG

TIMOTHY C. FELT

MICHELE JOY

RICHARD B. KUPREWICZ

CHARLES LESNIAK, III

RON McCLAIN

CRAIG O. PIERSON

CARL M. WEIMER

DEPARTMENT STAFF PRESENT:

CYNTHIA QUARTERMAN, PHMSA Administrator JEFF WIESE, Designated Federal Official TIM BUTTERS, PHMSA LINDA DAUGHERTY, PHMSA MIKE ISRANI, PHMSA MAX KIEBA, PHMSA

ALAN MAYBERRY, PHMSA

STEVE NANNEY, PHMSA

JAMES PATES, PHMSA

DANA REGISTER, PHMSA

CAMERON SATTERTHWAITE, PHMSA

Page 3 T-A-B-L-E O-F C-O-N-T-E-N-T-S Call to Order Jeff Wiese 4 Briefing: PHMSA Administrator Cynthia Quarterman 13 Briefing: State Pipeline Safety Priorities Colette Honorable 36 Briefing: Public Pipeline Safety Priorities 65 Carl Weimer Briefing: Hazardous Liquid Industry Priorities Tim Felt Briefing: Gas Transmission Industry Priorities Chad Zamarin 144 Briefing: Gas Distribution Industry Priorities Susan Fleck Briefing: Gas Distribution Industry Priorities Richard Worsinger 178 Briefing: Update on Congressional Mandates, NTSB, OIG and GAO Recommendations Alan Mayberry 203 Briefing: Regulatory Agenda Cameron Satterthwaite 217 Briefing: Performance Metrics Jeff Wiese 227 Alan Mayberry 234 Linda Daugherty 236 Briefing: Safety Management Systems Jordan Barab 256 Brian Salerno 286 Patrick Smyth 320 Briefing: Performance Metrics (continued) Linda Daugherty 341 Andy Black 343 Scott Currier 348 Open Discussion 354 Wrap-up and Adjourn Jeff Wiese 362

Page 4 1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 9:02 a.m. 2 MR. WIESE: Last minute 3 coordination. Thank you. 4 So I saw a few of our friends from 5 Canada and I wanted to welcome them here today 6 7 and thank them for -- this is the second polar vortex, isn't that, coming our way? 8 9 (Laughter.) MR. WIESE: So thanks again. 10 was an hour-and-forty-five-minute commute with 11 that snow. 12 13 (Laughter.) 14 MR. WIESE: I was texting Linda and praying that we had coffee here this 15 morning. 16 So any rate, hope everyone had a 17 18 good night. Thank you so much for your participation yesterday. It was very 19 interesting and the plastic vote was harder 20 than I anticipated. I talked to people 21 afterwards, including some of the 22

Page 5 1 manufacturers, and I really feel like there was a failure to communicate early on. You 2 3 know, we shouldn't have to get to that. That was a unanimous, by the way, 4 Cynthia. 5 There was a unanimous vote by the 6 time we got here, but I felt like it was a 7 I think you guys understand what 8 hard vote. 9 I'm saying, that some people took it hard. 10 And it really shouldn't work that way. So our 11 apologies for not being more cognizant in handling that earlier. 12 13 So any rate, welcome to day two of the Advisory Committee. This is the informal 14 part where I just welcome you really quickly 15 and I turn it over to my amicable and ever-16 ready and able Chair, Colette Honorable. 17 So I think I kind of went over the 18 agenda. For those of you who weren't here 19

agenda. For those of you who weren't here yesterday, I'll just make it really quick.
We've asked the administrator and representatives each of the major stakeholder

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groups today to talk a little bit about what their priorities and initiatives are for 2014. And the reason we did that; it may seem kind of, you know, I don't know, staid, but I think there's a lot going on that people are not aware of. And I also find that when we do this and we talk with each other about what we're doing, we'll say, hey, I need to follow up with them, you know, because I'm interested in that. Hopefully we'll make some connections for people here today.

set up for tomorrow's workshop on pipeline safety management systems. I reiterate again for those of you who weren't able to make it yesterday that if you can't be here, and I know that some of you can't, we'll be webcasting it and we'll also be capturing some of the panel sessions and some of the presentations and putting them up on PHMSA's YouTube channel. We'll send out all that information to you. You don't need to worry

about it. But if anyone's interested in the Web cast, just go to the phmsa.dot.gov and you'll see it up in the news. You can click on it, register and get all the data on the webcast.

so I think the only thing I want to do this morning is go over some of the basis announcements and make sure everybody -- we have some new people here. We should be clear on how to get out of here in the case that we need to. Most of you probably came up the stairways, but if you go back through these doors and turn to your left as you go out, there's a stairway that will take you right to the exit and we would assemble outside there.

Mike Israni warned me there are over -- the bathrooms are out to your right and there are doors that will take you out of here. In the case of a fire, you can take them, but don't take them unless there's a fire emergency. Mike got trapped in there --

	Page 8
1	(Laughter.)
2	MR. WIESE: and had to use his
3	cell phone to get out. So that is not a
4	general egress point.
5	So I'm trying to think. We've
6	covered the basics I think, Colette.
7	So with that, I will turn this
8	over to Colette Honorable.
9	CHAIR HONORABLE: Thank you, Jeff,
10	and good morning everyone. Thank you for your
11	attention and your participation on yesterday
12	afternoon. We had very productive meetings,
13	very efficient meetings. And we also had
14	participation by our newest member, Michele.
15	Welcome back.
16	Id' like to also acknowledge Carl
17	and Tim. Thank you for being here with us.
18	We know travel and schedules sometimes get in
19	the way.
20	PARTICIPANT: And Todd.
21	CHAIR HONORABLE: And Todd. Thank
22	you We referenced you vesterday you know?

Page 9 1 And because you were absent, you were added to a subcommittee. 2 3 MR. WIESE: That's right. That will teach you. 4 MEMBER DENTON: I volunteered. 5 6 CHAIR HONORABLE: Yes, we know. It's a joke. Todd did volunteer. And thank 7 you for doing so. 8 9 And I told Carl it just wasn't the 10 same without him on yesterday. 11 But we're delighted. We have a great agenda today and very pleased to be 12 13 joined by the PHMSA administrator, and Jeff will do the honors of introducing her. 14 Again, as you are speaking today, 15 16 please keep in mind that we are recording this committee meeting. Please raise your tent 17 cards to be recognized. And when you are, 18 please acknowledge or introduce yourselves for 19 20 the record. So with that, I'll turn it back 21 22 over to Jeff.

	Page 10
1	MR. WIESE: Great. Thanks so
2	much, Colette.
3	And there's no votes today, but
4	I'm pretty sure we have a quorum on both
5	sides. So that's a good thing. And I'm
6	pleased that so many of you took time to come
7	up with this snow coming.
8	So it's my pleasure this morning
9	to introduce Cynthia Quarterman. I think most
10	of you and certainly everyone I think on
11	and Michele even knows her, and she's a new
12	member. So I'll say I think all of you know
13	Cynthia. It's been my pleasure to work for
14	her for over four years now. Correct?
15	MS. QUARTERMAN: Yes.
16	MR. WIESE: Yes, over four years.
17	Probably feels like eight to her, only because
18	of me.
19	MS. QUARTERMAN: Twenty.
20	(Laughter.)
21	MR. WIESE: Yes, 20. Yes. And
22	she thought that we were the most fun sector

of PHMSA, but recently trains have been keeping her busy. So you may have read a few things about that. I think Cynthia has to leave here this morning shortly after her presentation to go up to the Hill and deliver testimony on that fun issue. So we're glad to have somebody distracting her for a little while besides the pipeline side.

I'll just tell a quick funny story on Cynthia. She knew me before and she still came here, so --

(Laughter.)

MR. WIESE: Yes, she's laughing really hard on this one. But I will say, and Cynthia would tell you it's true, that we've known each other for quite a while and at one point I was interested in seeing Cynthia come over here. So I met with her and she said why would you want me to come over there? And I said I need help, really.

And Cynthia has been very good to work with. She's got an incredibly good mind,

we're going on things. Cynthia has sort of driven this process now for the past three or four years where -- helpful to us. And, Rick, you'll appreciate this. Rick is always reminding me that we don't have enough resources to do our job. I couldn't agree more. But Cynthia has led the effort to really prioritize what we're doing. She's going to talk to that in a minute. You know, but I think she's also run the hoops for us in terms of resources. She's done her best to try to add resources to the Pipeline Safety Program, and I'm thankful for that.

So there's always the Congress we have to work with, and you know, that's the other side of the coin. Cynthia's also said she's happy to stick around and take questions from the Committee if you'd like.

So with that, I think I will stop and turn it over to Cynthia.

MS. QUARTERMAN: Good morning,

1 everyone. It's great to be here this morning.

I welcome your questions. I need some

3 preparation for this afternoon's hearing.

(Laughter.)

MS. QUARTERMAN: Started right now. Again, I want to thank everybody who are members of the Committees for participating giving us your time and your help to improve pipeline safety. It is extremely important to the nation and we appreciate all that you do to sacrifice time away from the office and all those emails and all the work there to come here and help move the ball forward on pipeline safety.

I have the distinguished honor of being the longest serving administrator I know of PHMSA, and it has been a great joy for me. It has been a great challenge. I think it has been probably some of the most challenging years that the Agency has had because of the series of pipeline incidents and the challenges that have faced the other half of

1 our program.

I wanted to begin by thanking

Colette and Jeff for their wonderful

introductions and for their participation. I

always look forward to spending time with

Colette. She is a joy to be with.

I'm happy to see Michele Joy join the Committee, having seen her in days past over many, many years. It's good to see her back in the pipeline safety arena and here on this Committee. We look forward to your involvement.

There are a number of members who have retired or gone on to other things. I just wanted to recognize the contributions of Gene Feigel who recently retired from the Hartford Steam Boiler and resigned in his position on the Gas Committee. He was a member of that Committee for 12 years, so that's a great loss to us. And we appreciate his service.

Jerry Rosendahl from the State

Fire Marshal and who was the director of
Pipeline Safety for Minnesota announced that
he was going to retire at the end of last
year.

Michael Bellman, the deputy
director for the City of Richmond Department
of Public Utilities retired from the Committee
as well.

And Wayne Gardner, a state commissioner with Pennsylvania, also leaves a government vacancy.

We have put forward three new nominations for the Committees. We look forward to getting those through the process. We are still looking for other members to fill the vacancies, but we want to have a full committee up and running as soon as possible.

On behalf of the President and
Secretary Foxx, I want to welcome you again
thank you to your commitment for pipeline
safety. Not many of you have had the
opportunity to meet Secretary Foxx, but I can

tell you, as with respect to Secretary LaHood, his focus, is first priority continues to be safety.

Colette has had the privilege to have him speak at her recent NARUC meeting here in Washington, D.C. I think he was very pleased to go there and speak to that audience and encourage them to continue to go forward with the call to action that Secretary LaHood started. And I think that was a great event for him.

He also very recently met with

Dave McCurdy and the members of the American

Gas Association and their board. I know he

wants to meet with every other constituent

sitting here at the table. And he's still not

a year into the job, so as you ask for

meetings with him, be a little bit patient as

he tries to maneuver around through his

schedule to get to every constituent

represented here.

I don't have to tell you that

pipelines are an important part of today's infrastructure as the domestic production of oil and gas. We are the United States leaders across the board and what you do here is extremely important in that arena. I always say to my staff PHMSA is the most important agency that nobody ever heard of. That's changing these days, I think, as the amount of oil and gas increases across the country, and not just on pipelines, but movement on trains and trucks and ships and everything else as well.

I wanted to start by just congratulating my staff for all of their hard work in 2013. They made great advancements and I just want to acknowledge a few of the things that they did during that time.

In 2013 we put forward new penalty provisions and new authority to enforce Part 194 of our regulations. We put in force new presiding official and appeal procedures to make our appeal process more open, with more

1 due process, we hope.

We developed and began proposing an integrity verification process which we hope to see move forward this year.

We drafted proposed rules that would comprehensively update both the natural gas and hazardous liquid transmission pipeline regulations. You haven't seen those yet, but be assured they are drafted and hopefully ready to go out the door sometime soon.

We've fully implemented our new
Integrity Inspection Program throughout the
United States, so we are moving forward with
a different sort of inspection going forward.

We spent a lot of time last year trying to modernize our Facility Response Plan process and streamline Oil Response Plans and our reviews. And we are in the process of getting all of those plans redacted and put on the Internet and make them fully available to the public.

We improved our Enforcement

Program. We've had a series of years where -have been the best for us in terms of getting
orders out, closing enforcement cases and
issuing civil penalties. We're very proud of
that record. I think we've had since I've
been there maybe the top three years of doing
that.

We have been working on a number of construction projects, big construction projects for pipelines across the country that have taken a great deal of our time and effort and resources to work on.

We have continued to work on our consent decree with Enbridge Pipeline Company, and our folks have spent over 300 days just working on that and the details of that.

We have increased funding to states 77 percent, \$46.5 million. We have spent a lot of time with the California Public Utility Commission and its oversight of its programs in California in the past year.

We continue to expand our

involvement with 811 through social media and other mechanisms. We're very happy. The states will hopefully be happy that we opened up a 30,000-square-foot Inspector Training and Qualification Center in Oklahoma City, which is state-of-the-art. We went out earlier this year to the opening of that, and it is a marked change from the dreary dregs of the past, and we hope that will encourage people to really take pipeline safety training seriously.

We had 96 focus research projects ongoing. And we have been able to decrease the number of fatalities and injuries from pipeline incidents in 2013. I think 2012 and 2013 were great years in terms of those statistics, so we're pleased with that.

As we look forward to 2014, I try to group -- the ABCs, I call them, of what are our priorities for the coming year? There are three areas that we focus on. First, anticipate and avert high-consequence events.

Those are the big events that capture the public imagination.

The second thing is to build a public understanding of and broadcast information on safety risks. This is the piece where we make the public prepared and we provide information for them so that they can be prepared.

The third is to catalog and curtail the highest risks. And these are things that may not lead to a high-consequence event, but that we see over and over again.

So our programs and priorities are focused on those three broad categories in the coming years and in years past.

I'm not going to try to catalog a whole list of all of our initiatives, but give you a sense of some of the things that we'll be focusing on this year. We are developing and deploying a pipeline safety workplace management strategy. That's an internal

resources inside as we hopefully continue to grow them. We have had a decent budget year this year for pipeline safety and we're looking forward to even better years in the future. And as Jeff mentioned, that's my focus, trying to grow both halves of the PHMSA portfolio.

Safety management systems, which you'll be talking about here today and tomorrow. And moving forward and trying to expand the knowledge base on those systems and encourage companies and operators to implement those systems within their companies.

We're trying to identify more
meaningful performance metrics. There have
been a number of performance metrics out about
the Pipeline Safety Program over time. I
think Alan and Linda will be talking later on
about how we move forward and come forward
with a set that we can all agree to and
measure going forward to put everybody on the

same playing field.

We have a number of ongoing congressional mandates. NTSB recommendations, OIG, GAO recommendations. We have been a good place in terms of closing the Pipeline Safety Act recommendations and we're continuing to work on all those over the next year.

We also continuing to develop what we call IMP 2.0, refining in the Integrity

Management Program in the year to come. And another of our big efforts last year and continuing into this year will be try to ensure that state program oversight is improved.

Another technical issue that we are looking at government because we have seen evidence of some problems and some recent incidents is pipeline reversals and conversions ensuring that the companies know what they'd need to do before that happens to ensure that an incident doesn't occur in the future.

1 And of course research and

development. We had a workshop a year or so ago about that. We're planning to have another one this year to continue to push the envelope on tools and looking at cracking and seam and defects and those kind of issues where we really need better tools to improve the integrity of pipelines and improve safety.

And we'll also be continuing our Competitive Academic Agreement Program.

That's what we call the CAAP program, where we're reaching out to young people and asking for their hopefully new and novel ideas about how to improve pipeline safety. We're doing that not only to bring fresh ideas into the pipeline safety arena, but also to bring fresh people in. We're hoping that, you know, we'll get new ideas and also get some of those people to come work for us or for the industries around the table.

And of course we will continue our efforts on damage prevention. April is coming

up soon and we plan to have a lot of activities associated with National Safe Digging Month.

And with that, I think that's enough for the new year to talk about right now. Thank you. And I'm happy to answer any questions folks might have about what we've done or what we're doing.

CHAIR HONORABLE: Thank you,
administrator. My goodness. I'm not sure how
you all have time to undertake all of these
efforts, but I think it's both a challenging
time and an exciting time for all of us who
work in this area.

I wanted to begin the Q & A by asking you, administrator, to speak a bit more about the training effort in Oklahoma City.

I know that you all were there recently, so I wanted to ask you to talk about that.

MS. QUARTERMAN: For those of you who are industry, you perhaps have not had the pleasure to go out to our training facility in

Oklahoma City. It had historically been on the FAA Training Grounds. There was a lot of difficulty getting into that building there.

And the facilities themselves were not great.

Dark, unpleasant, not an asset that you would use toward getting people trained.

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Right now we have a big facility that was essentially a warehouse. We have plans. We have grounds outside so that we can do some testing, corrosion testing. We have large classrooms. Maybe one day we could take this Committee there to see the facilities there. They have lots of pieces of pipe and fittings and all sorts of things. It really is a state-of-the-art facility and we're looking forward to ensuring that as we get new inspectors, all the new inspectors that we want on board, both for us and for the states, that they will be happy about the new facilities there.

CHAIR HONORABLE: Thank you. I certainly could say on behalf of inspectors

that they are excited about it. So I look forward to seeing it also.

Are there questions? I see Sue's tent card.

MEMBER FLECK: Thank you. Sue

Fleck representing the Gas Committee. I had
a question about performance metrics. That
seems to be a thing that our state regulators
are really struggling with trying to find the
right metrics to measure companies against one
another and against your previous experience.
And even within the company we struggle with
trying to find the right balance of leading
and lagging indicators.

So I'd be real curious to know what you all are going to do this year to maybe kind of try to move that forward, maybe workshops or something. It's a big issue, and I'll tell you what, it causes really a lot of angst with the utilities dealing with the regulators and trying to find the right measures to really show what we're doing and

making improvements and where we have gaps and kind of need to focus. So I'd like you to comment on that.

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MS. QUARTERMAN: Thank you. I agree with that. We have struggled internally recently. We're looking at performance of different operators and trying to measure which might be a better performing operator versus not. And as we massage that data, there are always changes that need to be made, but it is a difficult question. However, I feel great that we're going to get a result, because we have two of the smartest people that work for us, Alan and Linda, on the case. And I will let them respond how they're going to make that happen.

MR. MAYBERRY: Yes. Stay tuned for later today, but yes.

(Laughter.)

MR. MAYBERRY: But in line with that, I mean, gosh, there are so many ways to go from that with initiatives we have. You

know, there's the NTSB recommendations that relate to meaningful metrics. We have a lot of momentum behind that right now and I think you'll be seeing some things that come out of that that will clarify, you know, what are some viable measures that an operator would use to measure their performance, certainly as it relates to integrity management? But then we have the teams that Linda and I will be giving an update on later today.

MS. DAUGHERTY: Then my two cents:
This is Linda Daugherty. You know, when you
look at performance measures, you have sets of
data, but then you have to figure out if it's
actually telling you what you think it's
telling you. And we often struggle with
integrity. Is it a pipe integrity issue or is
it an operator performance issue? And how do
you mesh those to make sure you're getting a
good read on what's actually occurring and
that you don't choose the wrong metrics
because that can lead you in the wrong

direction and give you a false sense of assurance? So it's a challenging area and we're having a lot of fun with it.

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MS. FLECK: This is Sue Fleck again with the Gas Committee. I think it will drive some interesting conversations. can tell you that some metrics that measure us as a company; I'm speaking from National Grid perspective now, are rates like emergency response rates, which I think are fair kind of measures, but other ones measure incidents and don't compare them to the number of transactions. So it looks like, you know, a company has a poor performance record because we've gotten three violations. But you know, if you looked at the fact that there were 200,000 transactions and there were 3 failures, and you look at failure rates, you might have a different perspective.

So we're very concerned about the optics of performance measures and what they truly tell about an organization's performance

Page 31 and their safety culture and we will anxiously await this afternoon's presentation. Thank you, Sue. CHAIR HONORABLE: And I guess what is that those metrics should 4 be measuring? Yes. So I guess that Rick maybe had a comparable question. I'm not sure. 8 your tent card down. MR. PEVARSKI: I did. It dealt more with the training institute. And in the past TSI used to train the industry. And are

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there any plans to do that? I went through that myself. It was a wonderful course. is there any plans to do that in the future? MS. QUARTERMAN: No current plans

to do that, no.

MR. WIESE: May I add something?

CHAIR HONORABLE: Yes, Jeff?

MR. WIESE: And I agree with

Cynthia, but if you'll let me just expand on

it for a second so you better understand why.

We put through about 400 people a year between

the states and ourselves. We can't keep up with the demand on the state and the federal inspectors. Again, maybe someday as we can expand the program, but right now our priority is taking care of making sure we have the best inspectors in the field that we can, both at a state and federal level.

And then I'll say secondarily that in the past when we had offered training to the industry, we have had Capitol Hill call us and say why are you taking money away from my constituents? Basically they didn't want us training industry. They thought there were other avenues. But I think first and foremost our priority is on the state and federal inspectors, and it really has to be.

CHAIR HONORABLE: Andy?

MEMBER DRAKE: This is Andy Drake with the Gas Committee. You mentioned the pending rules on integrity management.

Certainly, as you mentioned, a lot of energy has gone into those from a lot of stakeholders

around this room. I appreciate the venues that you created and some transparency in the conversations around the mechanics of those.

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But I think, you know, the question in my mind is the timeline to roll those rules out. Maybe you could shed a little bit of light on your thoughts on timing and the issues that you have to address to get them out, especially in the wake of an election year and the fact that the reauthorization hearings are going to start here pretty shortly. And the obvious questions are going to be how are we addressing the legislative mandates that are in the current bill on a schedule that they've already laid down? I know that that's certainly a weighty question, but I'd appreciate anything that you can shed on that. I think that's certainly something a lot of us in the room are very curious about.

MS. QUARTERMAN: Well, I can tell you the process, the official process -- and,

you know, the official process doesn't always end up being the way things happen, which is that we with PHMSA are the first people to draft a rulemaking. And my staff has done that at my request.

And I have to be candid: I have been reading it. It's quite a big rule on the gas side in the midst of lots of issues related to crude trains. So whereas they met my deadline, I have not met my deadline. So I am in the process of still reading that.

Once we are comfortable with the rule internally, it then goes to the Office of the Secretary. And under the ideal situation it takes a month there before it then goes to the Office of Management and Budget where they have a designated 90-day window. But I can tell you there's a lot of back and forth throughout that whole process, so those timelines are not written in stone.

So that's what the process is, but there are lots of rules in the Department, and

we are one agency. There's a competition between agencies about what rules make it up 3 So, you know, it is a fluid process, where. but not one that I can say, okay, I'm going to 4 finish reading it by the end of this week, which is my plan, and then get it to the 6 Department so you'll see it in four months It's not going to be that 8 time. straightforward, although I would love it to be.

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CHAIR HONORABLE: Thank you. Any other questions or comments for the administrator? We don't want to keep her from her important business on the Hill.

(No audible response.)

Well, thank you CHAIR HONORABLE: so much and on behalf of the Joint Committees thank you for the work that you do. tremendous job, but we appreciate the fact that you are always accessible to us, to me personally, and the issues that we bring to you. And we look forward to continuing this

serving as president of NARUC, the National Association of Regulatory Utility

Commissioners. Long story about how we arrived at that name.

This year my theme at NARUC is

"Equip to Lead." So it's a message to

regulators to empower them. "Equip to Lead:

125 Years of Effective Regulation."

As you know, utility regulators are economic regulators. We regulate public utilities or investor-owned utilities and our mission is to ensure safe affordable reliable utility service.

This year my very top priority as president of NARUC is pipeline safety. And it's not a political ploy on my part. For those who know me, it's near and dear to my heart. And it's very important that we focus together as regulators on the issue of pipeline safety.

I'm also focused on infrastructure directly regarding resilience and reliability

issues, how we are preparing for and responding to severe weather events, cyber security issues, physical attacks, how we are working together to integrate renewables onto the grid, DIG, and also our core function of reliability. And last but not least, a focus on diversity, both fuel diversity and diversity in the truest sense of the word as we all need to prepare for training and hiring the next generation of the utility work force and ensuring that from, as I say, the C Suite to men and women who work on the lines every day making sure that they reflect the people that we serve.

mentioned, we were honored to have Secretary

Foxx to join us at my first meeting as your

president. His message was a positive one.

It was a sobering one, but a positive one

reflecting the progress that we've made,

particularly since Secretary Lahood's call to
action in 2011.

I've also had the pleasure and honor of meeting with Deputy Secretary Mendez actually before he became Deputy Secretary Mendez. And also Administrator Quarterman, I've met with her several times. And it's been important that I understand where she is headed as administrator, where PHMSA is headed and where we should be headed, both as regulators and as inspectors.

so we're focused on, with regard to pipeline safety infrastructure, understanding what the needs of industry are, because industry is on the front lines.

Industry will bring their proposals to the state commissions. We're focused on educating regulators and inspectors about this work.

And also focused on how this work plays out at our NARUC Committees, both the Committee on Gas and the Subcommittee on Pipeline Safety, which are both comprised of commissioners, and also our joint work with our Staff

Subcommittee on Pipeline Safety, which is

primarily comprised of our NAPSR colleagues.

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So with that, I'd like to present the top five priorities. These are on behalf of NAPSR, which these are also embraced by NARUC.

And I must say a word of thanks to our NAPSR friends. Many of them work on our respective staffs at the PUCs and some work independently of our work, but these are men and women who work very hard, as you know, each and every day. I often say they live, eat, drink, sleep, breathe pipeline safety. And thank goodness for it. They're very passionate about this work and they have been committed to educating us. And they've just released their second compendium of laws in our respective states and initiatives which focus to a greater degree they're more stringent than the federal code. It's a very large volume of laws and efforts and actions in our respective states, which demonstrate our commitment to pipeline safety. And we're

1 committed to doing that going forward.

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So with that, I'd like to offer the top five priorities for 2014 of both NAPSR and NARUC.

No. 1, the final rule regarding gathering lines. We support a rule outlining a clear definition of the beginning and end points of gathering lines. The current regulations leave the beginning and end point open to interpretation depending on the configuration and location of process equipment. In addition, we support a rule subjecting all gathering lines including those operating in class 1 locations to C.F.R. requirements. Requirement limitations may be applicable to the gathering lines in class 1 locations such as limiting compliance to C.F.R. Part 192(a) regarding general requirements; (i) corrosion control; (k) uprating; (1) operations; (m) maintenance; and C.F.R. Part 199, anti-drug and alcohol programs.

The second priority is regarding the final rule for IVP, or as you know it, integrity verification processes. We recommend that PHMSA provide additional guidance on certain elements contained in the developing IVP process. Operators have been engaged in the process of verifying the MAOP, or maximum allowable operating pressure, of their transmission pipelines.

On May 7, 2012 PHMSA issued

Advisory Bulletin 2012-0068 reminding

operators to verify the MAOP as required by 49

C.F.R. Parts 192.517 and 195.310. The

advisory bulletin also informed operators of

a requirement to report the miles of pipeline

for which MAOP could be verified, as well as

those pipelines that do not have verification

records on the 2012 Annual Report.

The bulletin references a previous advisory bulletin issued on January 10, 2011 that reminded operators relying on the review of the design, construction, inspection,

testing and other related data to establish the MAOP. They must ensure that the records used are reliable, traceable, verifiable and complete.

NAPSR has identified a need for PHMSA to provide timely additional guidance regarding the terms "reliable," "traceable," "verifiable," and "complete." Additional guidance is required to define the actions the operators must take and how we carry out these roles to test pipelines for which adequate records are not available. And I would daresay industry may well appreciate that clarification as well. A timeline for completing the MAOP verification testing should also be provided.

The third priority regarding the final rule for application of integrity management requirements outside of high-consequence areas, or HCAs. We support a rule regarding expansion of the transmission integrity management elements. On August 1,

2013 PHMSA issued an NPRM, which was 2013-161, seeing public comment whether applying the IMP-required elements applicable to HCAs to areas beyond the HCAs.

The Pipeline Safety Regulatory

Certainty and Job Creation Act of 2011

required the Secretary of Transportation to

evaluate and issue a report on whether IMP

requirements should be expanded. We support

extending requirements currently applicable to

the HCAs beyond the HCAs. Alternatively, we

support extending the HCA elements to all

class 3 and class 4 locations.

The fourth priority is with regard to the final rule on damage prevention. The PIPES Act of 2006 emphasized the need for consistent enforcement of damage prevention requirements and outlined the nine elements of an effective damage prevention program document.

In 2009, PHMSA initiated an NPRM, which was 2009-192, that sought to revise the

Pipeline Safety Regulations. These revisions included a number of things, but establishing criteria and procedures for determining the adequacy of state pipeline excavation damage prevention law enforcement programs. addition, establishing an administrative process for making adequacy determinations, establishing the federal requirements that PHMSA would enforce in states with inadequate excavation damage prevention law enforcement programs; and as members of this Joint Committee are well aware, we've taken up these issues here in the last year, and establishing the adjudication process for administrative enforcement proceedings against excavators where federal authority is exercised.

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Per the PIPES Act the

establishment of a review criteria for state

excavation damage prevention law enforcement

programs is a prerequisite for federal

enforcement. Should PHMSA find it necessary

to conduct an enforcement proceeding against

an excavator in the absence of an adequate enforcement program in the state where the violation occurs, the criteria is necessary.

and the subsequent determination of the adequacy of a state excavation damage prevention law enforcement program -- say that fast three times -- is intended to encourage states to develop effective excavation damage prevention law enforcement programs and to protect the public ultimately from the risk of pipeline ruptures caused by excavation damage. This also allows for federal administrative enforcement action in states with inadequate enforcement programs.

The PIPES Act also prohibits
exemptions and One Call Programs pertaining to
municipalities and state agencies and their
contractors. State laws containing such
exemptions are no longer eligible for state
damage prevention and One Call Program.

NAPSR encourages PHMSA to issue a final rule

that clearly defines the expectations of an effective damage prevention program and define acceptable damage prevention rule exemptions such as routine farm tillage operations. And NARUC joins in this recommendation.

The last but not least priority of both NARUC and NAPSR for 2014; you can guess this one, the maintenance of effort clause.

We had to mention this, right?

The states continue to be an integral and essential partner with PHMSA in helping to maintain the nation's Pipeline Safety Program. State pipeline safety personnel comprise more than 80 percent of the total state/federal work force.

The PIPES Act of 2006 includes
maintenance of effort language under Section
60107(b) regarding payments. "After notifying
and consulting with the state authority, the
secretary," this provision reads, "may
withhold any part of a payment when the
secretary decides that the authority is not

carrying out satisfactorily a safety program or not acting satisfactorily as an agent. The secretary may pay an authority under this section only when the authority ensures the secretary that it will provide the remaining costs of a safety program and that the total state amount spent for a safety program, excluding grants of the U.S. Government, will at least equal the average amount spent for gas and hazardous liquid safety programs for the three fiscal years prior to the fiscal year in which the secretary makes the payment, except when the secretary waives this requirement."

Prior to 2006 the PHMSA Matching

Grants Program had not grown in proportion to

the needs of the state programs, and during

the preceding six years the federal level of

funding decreased from 48 percent of state

expenditures to below 40 percent. Due to

prior insufficient appropriations states were

forced to pay both their 50 percent share plus

a portion of federal share owed the states of the grant funding authorized by Congress.

The 2006 Act increased the federal share of program expenses to 80 percent of total outlay by the states. The requirement to maintain grantee spending commitments at the three previous fiscal year averages proved problematic for most states. This required states to increase the total program expenses to unobtainable levels.

The Pipeline Safety Regulatory

Certainty and Job Creation Act included a

maintenance of effort clause that allowed the

secretary to grant a waiver if a state could

demonstrate financial hardship. Many programs

requested such waivers simply because they

couldn't substantiate the type of program

growth required by the maintenance of effort

requirements in the law.

We do not believe a maintenance of effort clause is necessary. State programs are required to meet a minimum level of

inspection days per years, as well as a required staffing level; and I would add training level, to remain in compliance with grant and aid requirements. Meeting these requirements will ensure that state spending levels would remain at or near the average level for the previous years. The requirement to obtain a waiver and maintain records demonstrating how the suspension funding is spent is an unnecessary burden and provides little or no benefit to pipeline safety.

So with that, I greatly appreciate the opportunity to present the priorities of both NARUC and NAPSR and would pause for any questions or comment.

MR. WIESE: I wonder if I could just really quickly -- and I'm happy to mediate any questions you might have for Colette. And I think it's a great opportunity while we have her here to ask some, but if you'll allow me just a couple of comments up front.

I liked your words about integral and essential partner, and I think that's true. And I hope that we live up to that, you know, in our dealings with the states. And I've dealt with most of the state people for over 15 years. A lot of great friends in the state programs.

So but I would also comment a little bit about the fact -- and Colette knows this. I've always called Colette my favorite commissioner and I tease --

CHAIR HONORABLE: I can't believe you said that on the record. You're going to be in trouble now.

(Laughter.)

MR. WIESE: I tease her about this all the time, and here's why: She doesn't mind bringing things to the table. So I think you can hear that, right? But she's always been there to help, you know, try to solve the issue, too. So everyone brings things onto our table. I mean, I'm telling you, it's like

every day somebody has something they want us to do. But I've always found Colette very helpful in solving those things. So she's given me as a member of the Gas Committee at NARUC really great access to talk to regulatory utility commissioners about the importance of the call to action and other things.

So, you know, before it was a call to action, Colette would bring me into NARUC to talk to these people and try to convince them of the balance between rates, you know, and safety. And there is a balance. And the commissioners have a tough job to do in achieving that balance. So we recognize that.

But any rate, it's always been a very good and strong partnership. I wanted to thank her for that.

I see that Ron is up, so Ron?

MEMBER McCLAIN: Ron McClain with
the Oil Committee. You mentioned the fourth
priority of, you know, pressing forward on a

final rule for damage prevention. And one of the threats we see and seems to still be growing are a lot of excavations without a One Call, and a surprising number of those are by municipalities and counties who have exemptions.

And so my question is what are state regulators and -- because there's a myriad of exemptions across different states. Some almost appear nonsensical in the interest of safety. But what are states doing to improve? I mean, there are some exemptions that make sense, but you know, to completely exempt a category of excavators doesn't make a lot of sense. I'd like to hear how do your organizations work to improve on that?

CHAIR HONORABLE: Thank you, Ron.

And I must respond to something Jeff said, and something I should have said at the outset.

We greatly value the partnership that we enjoy with DOT and PHMSA and we are committed to continuing to work to strengthen it. We don't

Page 54 1 always agree on everything. I was expecting Jeff to make a comment about the 80 percent 2 3 issue that something --MR. WIESE: I let it go. 4 CHAIR HONORABLE: He let it go. 5 6 (Laughter.) CHAIR HONORABLE: We're holding 7 hands today, I see. 8 9 (Laughter.) 10 CHAIR HONORABLE: But we are 11 committed, and that's the most important thing we can do initially. If we both commit to 12 13 bring our best, to bring our brightest to the table, and we're committed to do that going 14 forward. So I wanted to say that for the 15 16 record. 17 And to Ron's question; and I'll also invite Massoud to cover anything I might 18 miss here, the states have been very committed 19 to, number one, increasing our state pipeline 20 21 safety codes to equal the federal codes with

regard to violations. And so I think Arkansas

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might have been the first state to do that,
but we're also very focused on prosecutions
and enforcement regarding violations. I can
personally tell you in Arkansas I've gone to
meet with the prosecutors, I've gone to meet
with the attorney general. We are sending the
message to them that we all need to be
committed and serious about enforcement. Also
serious about educating the public.

I have some creative ideas; I

don't want to get ahead of myself for April,

but we at NARUC encourage all of the states to

secure proclamations from their respective

governors, getting the word out about National

Safe Digging Month, doing a press release. We

make it a big deal. We want press coverage.

We want to educate people.

I won't say that I know for certain that the stats that you've referenced are true. I would acknowledge with you that we continue to see a troubling number of incidents regarding excavations. My point is

I'm not going to cast blame and say who's doing them. The point is that they're still occurring in greater numbers than they should and the onus is on all of us to aid in the prevention of that.

And so we are certainly equally concerned about it, equally committed to addressing it. And I want to, before you jump back in, Ron, ask Massoud to join me also in responding to this issue.

MEMBER TAHAMTANI: Thank you,

Madam Chairman. Ron, your specific question

was about the localities and exemptions and

the fact that they don't even call before

they're out there. That is a problem. It is

unique in every state in that there is

politics involved. In my own state it wasn't

easy to bring them under the umbrella. And

even today we can't penalize them.

And after about 15 years of seeing that the trend with respect to that group of excavators was not improving, we've been back

into the law and did the best we could, which is to put in the law that if trends for localities are not improving, that the Commission would request a formal plan to reduce damages from the city manager or the highest official of that locality and to bring them to court, to our court and put them on the stand and invite some media to see. And that's working. So that's because in Virginia by constitution we can't fine local government.

My point I guess to you and others in terms of operators is that sometimes the hands of the commissions are tied. They can't run to the legislators and say let's fix the law and remove this exemption, fix the law the other way. Politics is at work.

Utilities have a lot of data.

They know exactly who hits them and why they hit them. I think you all need to partner with each state, collect ample data. If you've got serious consequences that you have

faced already, put those on slides and go to your legislators. You've got strong lobbyists in every state. You can change the law, and sometimes a lot faster than the commissions.

I've seen that happen.

want to do the right thing as commissioners, but we can't because we're facing the political reality that you and I both know. But in those cases you have to be the driver with the data, with the consequences. No legislator wants to see safety erode. And again I've had a lot of success in getting all exemptions removed in the State of Virginia. And localities when they get the nasty letter from me, they come with their attorneys and try to contest a letter. And Mr. Pevarski can attest to that. He sits next to me most of the time during these hearings.

So again, in summary, I know that Colette and other commissioners want to do good work to remove these exemptions, but

sometimes their hands are tied and you need to help with your data to get those laws changed.

MEMBER McCLAIN: Thanks, and I
will say I had the privilege of attending one
of your courts, not as a violator, but as an
observer --

(Laughter.)

MEMBER McCLAIN: -- and I was very impressed. You know, I think Virginia very much a leader in this area.

You know, my question; maybe it translates to a comment, certainly operators can take positions lobbying for legislative change. I think it's helpful if we partner with state regulators because failing to call 811, I mean, it's not a near miss. It's a near catastrophe. And, you know, I am going to compile recent history of -- because we report every encroachment or unauthorized excavation on our pipelines to my level every week, and there's usually three or four across our oil pipeline system that we analyze. And

often one or two of those are someone who either has an exemption or thinks they have an exemption.

problem. And the inconsistency one state to another, it would be good if maybe there was a model to gain -- maybe get past the politics. And certainly I recognize there are strong lobbies on the other side who don't want the cost of doing that. But it's still common sense to call 811 regardless of who you are if you're going to excavate.

CHAIR HONORABLE: I agree, Ron.

And let me say, too, I would welcome the opportunity to visit with you more about this issue, NARUC, NAPSR and you and your team. I think that would be wonderful. And it's certainly worth the effort if at the end of the day -- similarly with the states we have been very proud that I think 13 to 15 additional states have implemented either replacement programs or accelerated programs.

	Page 61
1	If we can a year from now come back to this
2	table and see a decline in those incidents, it
3	would be well worth the effort. So I welcome
4	the opportunity to work with you on it.
5	MEMBER McCLAIN: Thank you and I
6	am glad it's a priority for the group.
7	MR. WIESE: I might just add a
8	couple of things really quickly on that and
9	maybe we'll move on. And by the way, I've
L0	looked at the agenda. I think it's too harsh.
L1	We'll maybe have one more presentation and
L2	then go to break instead of waiting.
L3	The board members of Common Ground
L 4	Alliance, you know, raise your hands.
L5	You know, I think you can see
L6	well, and Massoud, I mean, he's been
L7	MEMBER TAHAMTANI: I used to be.
L8	They fired me
L9	(Laughter.)
20	MR. WIESE: But he still comes,
21	you know? So I would tell you that it's a
22	passion of a lot of people at this table. So

we could go on on this one all morning.

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I just wanted to add the comment; and Ron knows this to be true, at PHMSA we have taken a very strong stance and we don't believe that anyone is exempt. There may be some activities that are exempt, and I sort of -- not begrudgingly, but have come around to Massoud's point of view that when you can prove it with data, you know, okay, you know, we can talk about it. But we'd like to live really against that principle that no one is exempt. You know, only certain activities. And I know in Ron's case I've heard about a lot of these incidents, and clearly the activities these people are conducting are well beyond surface tilling, you know, and agriculture.

So I think we've got a lot of work to do on that and I'm very hopeful we'll move the final rule on excavation damage enforcement someday soon. And that is really the final straw. You know, we have taken a

very decided course in getting to where we are to build strong state programs. That is the goal. And Colette and Massoud and many of the people at this table have been great partners in that exercise.

I would like to take just a moment to pause and recognize that Deputy Butters is in the house. And he snuck in when I didn't see him.

I just noticed that he had come up. And Tim Butters, as you know, former member of this Committee. So look out.

(Laughter.)

MR. WIESE: You know, we recruit from those we know. So Tim's been the deputy here and he's done a lot of great work for us in the area of emergency response, including stuff that's going on right now. We're not covering it today, but at the next meeting we'll try to get caught up on what we're doing.

But, Tim, I'd turn to you if

there's anything you want to add.

MR. BUTTERS: Thanks, Jeff and Colette. Good to see you.

Appreciate the opportunity to spend some time this morning with you. I'm really here to listen, but I know that Cynthia covered from the administrator's perspective some of our important issues. But just to reinforce the critical both Committees play with our Agency, this is where we truly hear your advice on how we need to move and some of the issues that you're facing out there. You know, we're all in this game together to prevent incidents from occurring as well as minimizing the consequences of those and the role that all of us play in all of that.

So again, you know, as you move forward we're going to continue to need your guidance. You know, as we see this unconventional energy continue to ramp up, it's going to, you know, voice new challenges with all of us, so staying ahead of that game

Page 65 1 is really going to be important. So again, appreciate the opportunity to be here and look 2 forward to talking to each of you, you know, 3 this morning. So thanks. 4 CHAIR HONORABLE: Thank you. 5 6 Great to see you, Tim. We'll continue now on our agenda 7 with a briefing on public pipeline safety 8 priorities by Carl Weimer. And he has a 9 10 beautiful PowerPoint. 11 MEMBER WEIMER: Good morning. CHAIR HONORABLE: Good morning. 12 13 MEMBER WEIMER: Yes, I'll warn you, when I got on the airplane yesterday 14 there were six slides and by the time I got 15 off five hours later it had grown to 25. 16 17 (Laughter.) MEMBER WEIMER: I thank the group 18 for the presentation, for the invitation. 19 I'm 20 here to provide a public perspective, but I certainly can't speak for the whole public. 21

You know, INGAA and AOPL and AGA have the

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benefit of getting a group together and kind of coming to a consensus of what their priorities are. I can't really speak for 200 million Americans, so I'm not even going to try. So to some degree I'll tell you what we've been hearing from the public and I'll tell you what the priorities for the Pipeline Safety Trust are, but I certainly can't speak for the whole public.

Now, let's see if I can work the
-- no, I can't. You have to point it. There
we go.

I just want to start kind of where we're at. One of the things that I think everybody agrees with is that the metric that we're looking at is zero incidents. All the industry groups have adopted that. We've certainly adopted that. So this kind of shows where we're at for zero. And as you look at it, you can see that the number of incidents, irregardless of which type of pipeline you're looking at, are really pretty low. And this

is one of the things that we try to explain to the public over and over again, that the chance of anything failing is really pretty low. You can see that we still have some work to do with all the sectors to get to zero.

Here's one of the reasons I can't speak for all the public because the public has a variety of different opinions and the Trust probably disagrees with the public as often as we disagree with the industry, depending on the issue. But certainly the public attention has been much more focused on pipelines, sometimes not really for pipeline safety reasons, for other kind of things associated with pipelines over the past few years starting with a number of incidents and then a number of other kind of corollary issues that pipelines relate to.

It's a little hard for us to set our priorities of where we should go for these because there's a number of rules and reports that PHMSA's working on that have come out of

the NTSB, Congressional mandates, Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemakings that have been put out there. So one of our highest priorities is just to get those reports and rules out on the table. You know, the Hazardous Liquid Rule has been sitting somewhere for more than three years now. So it's hard to tell whether we need to go through re-authorization to Congress to talk about that stuff or whether it's going to be reflected in those rules when they come back out of the black hole they've disappeared into. Same with the natural gas to some degree.

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But you can see kind of our laundry list of highest priorities that somewhere are within PHMSA at this point.

Gathering lines. I love going after NARUC and NAPSR when their priorities line up really closely with your priorities. And everything I heard Ms. Honorable say we agree with.

We're certainly moving towards

congressional re-authorization again, so we have a number of priorities that we're thinking about in those terms. We haven't defined these all well. Our highest one is gas gathering lines, which is the same as NAPSR and NARUC. And I'm going to talk a little bit about some of these more with some additional slides. We're also looking at the idea of mandatory fines. We don't know exactly what that means yet, but if you look at the number of significant incidents going on that are from causes that are within operator's control, the number of fines is less than the number of significant incidents. And we don't quite understand how you can have a significant incident and not have broken the rules and get a fine.

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Lots of issues around routing.

I'm going to talk about that a little bit

later in another slide. And that's whether

those Certificates of Public Convenience and

Necessity are really public convenience and

necessity or corporate convenience and necessity.

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Participant funding. This is one of the things I've learned from the Canadians I think it was in over the last few years. 2002 re-authorization PHMSA stepped forward with a Technical Assistance Grant Program to communities, which is a wonderful program that lets communities help fund some of their interests. One of the things that that was aimed at is letting communities and the public be participants in rule development, new pipeline issues, standard development and those types of things. And the TAG grant program has never been able to do that very well because the timing never lines up.

The Canadians have a participant funding mechanism. When they're moving forward on new rules or new pipelines, they directly open up funding sources to help people participate in that. And I think that's one of the things we'd like to --

either look at tweaking the TAG grant program so it can help do that or setting up a separate program. And also; and I'm going to talk about this a little bit more, to more transparency and involvement in spill planning.

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So regulatory agenda. I'm going to just go through this real quick. priority is on prevention, so we're really prioritizing those things in the regulatory agenda that get us to zero. We've already heard a talk about expanding and improving integrity management. That's one of the high things on our list. Expanding where integrity management covers, getting better tools, better response, better pigability on pipelines, the whole IVP, better records. That's been a huge issue. And then as we're going to talk about tomorrow, just better systems. Construction improvements, damage prevention. I've got some other slides on most all of these things. And certainly

information transparency and dissemination is one of our highest things.

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Construction improvements. One of the things we're trying to really wrap our head around because we get the public calling us all the time with concerns about construction and we don't really understand both how the industry is dealing with new construction and how PHMSA and the states inspect new construction. Because people send us videotapes, pictures all the time of pipeline with all kinds of problems on it and it's very difficult for us to know whether those are really problems or whether the companies are really just doing the right thing by going in and removing these pipelines and correcting those problems. And I know it was a priority of PHMSA a number of years ago to get more inspections going in the field during new construction, and that's one of the things we're trying to wrap our heads around.

Damage prevention.

Certainly the

Common Ground Alliance, one of the reasons you see the number of incidents decreasing, especially in distribution pipelines is because of all the great work the Common Ground Alliance has done. So we certainly have that as a high priority. We'd also like to see more emphasis on damage prevention when it comes to water crossings and unstable areas. There's still a lot of damage happening on unstable slopes and water crossings. And some of that is really things that are within the operator's control.

priority, just as it sounds like it is

NAPSR's, too. And I think this pretty much

lines right up with what you just heard from

Colette. We really want the definition of

gathering lines clarified. We want on-shore

gathering lines treated the same as

transmission pipelines. And we want the

incidents reported in beyond NPMS.

And you ask why that may be

important. Let me just show you. This is a small county in the middle of Pennsylvania.

This was October 2008. October 2009. These are gas wells. October 2010. October 2011.

October 2012. That's the number of walls that have gone in or been at least permitted in this small county in Pennsylvania over a four-year period. All of these wells have to be tied together with pipelines and most all of the pipelines that tie these wells together are completely and totally unregulated.

some of the pipelines are 24 to 30 inches in diameter and operate at the same pressure as these transmission pipelines. And sooner or later some of these pipelines are going to fail and the industry as a whole, whether you're an oil pipeline or a gas transmission pipeline, are going to get painted with that same failure. So we really need to move forward with some regulations on these things.

Pipeline routing reform. The

number one thing we get calls from the public are routing issues when new pipelines are coming in or pipelines are getting expanded.

That's a fairly recent picture of a backhoe working next to a house in Michigan. You can see how close that pipeline is going in next to this gentleman's living room.

issues we think need to happen. There needs to be a clear permitting system for new liquid and intrastate gas pipelines. At this point it's a patchwork. There isn't a system like there is with FERC for interstate gas. So no one really knows how it will work and oftentimes it falls on local governments that aren't very aware of this and by the time they figure it out, usually it's too late.

We need better requirements and incentives to avoid populated areas. We need regulation on land agents. Lots of companies contract out their land agent things and we hear complaints that are across the board

similar from one part of the country to another. So there's a problem there.

we think there needs to be established minimum land owner's rights when it comes to eminent domain. Some states already include, you know, the inclusion of legal fees for a contract review. When these people call us, we say you need to get a lawyer and make sure you understand what's going on. It would be good if companies are paying for that.

There needs to be a redefinition not only with FERC, but all of these processes about what really is a necessity, because oftentimes we're permitting multiple pipelines moving materials through the same areas instead of people sharing those pipelines.

Just because you have customers, doesn't mean it's a public necessity and there needs to be a real state disclosure especially on transmission pipelines.

Secondary regulatory agenda issues

for us deal with response, and we've talked about some of these for years. Automated valves, leak detection. Lots of movement right now on community training and response issues. And one of the issues that seems to be growing in the public, especially from some of the environmental groups is trying to quantify the number of leaks and what that means for climate change coming from gas pipelines.

And then there's also regulatory agenda issues for us that relate more to the regulators than to the companies. We certainly support both the federal and the state regulators getting the resources they need to do their jobs. And I think that's a problem we see all across the state.

I've already talked about nondiscretionary fines a little bit.

Measurable metrics not only for companies, but also for regulator performance.

Countering regulatory capture.

This is one of the things I get hit up from the public all the time. And regulatory capture is the thought that the public has that the regulators and the industry are too cozy. And I've heard Jeff talk about this. The only way you can really make progress is for the regulators and the industry to work together, but sometimes people that aren't as involved as we are view that as coziness.

I mean I even after our last

Technical Committee meeting had public calling
up and saying what were they thinking? Is

PHMSA tone deaf? Because who did they have
coming to us and talking to us about energy
futures? British Petroleum. That didn't set
well with public that's not paying much
attention. Who did they have coming and
talking to us about spill response planning?
Enbridge, who had just dumped a million
gallons into a river in Michigan. That seems
to be a problem.

When people saw the agenda coming

up tomorrow they saw that PG&E is here talking to us about safety culture. That just seems to be a problem from the public standpoint that's just seeing the companies' names associated with incidents and then see who's on the agenda talking to the Technical Committee. So that's one of those things where we're caught between a rock and a hard place often with the public because we understand why those people are talking, but just from an outside public standpoint it sometimes is a problem.

Greater transparency from

regulators. I'm going to talk about that a

little bit more and just the timeliness of the

rules. Why is it the rules disappear for

three or four years before they pop out

somewhere else?

Just from a Pipeline Safety Trust standpoint there's a whole bunch of things we're going to be doing. Our conference, we're expanding this year. We've actually

move to a different hotel, but it's still in

New Orleans because we've outgrown the other

one. So we're going to be at the Royal

Sonesta this year. If people haven't attended

our conference and want to know why it's

important, I think it's important because it's

one of the few conferences anywhere where

regulators, public and the industry get

together and really talk to each other. And

we see the benefits of this all the time.

people from Pennsylvania talking with industry in Michigan about programs on damage prevention. I've seen industry folks in Texas talking with people in other parts of the country that they've met at the conference and have developed a relationship to. Also as you can see from the picture there on the left, it's a real demonstration to the public of how the industry sugarcoats all of their messages.

(Laughter.)

MEMBER WEIMER: We're also moving

forward. Our landowner's guide that we put
together, "A Landowner's Guide to Pipeline
Safety," has been very popular and we're
updating that and doing a reprint of that.
And we're actually doing a new guide this year
for local government for pipelines to help
inform local government about what really do
they have the rights and responsibilities as
far as pipelines go.

We're implementing more
scorecards. I think for a number of years now
we've been doing a scorecard on transparency
of state regulators, and it's been fairly
popular. A number of states have really kind
of stepped up once we started doing this and
making a lot more information available.
Washington and Arkansas seem to be dueling for
top position on this and it's kind of traded
and Arkansas may have just at least tied or
taken over because just this week they called
and they've put a whole bunch of new stuff on
their Web site that's pretty exciting. And we

didn't show the bottom of the list. PHMSA's right up there at the top, too, if you put them in the mix. But this has been one way to talk with the state regulators about stuff that the public is interested in and get that out.

One of the things we're going to do this year is start doing some score cards. It's the whole metrics thing on pipeline operators. We want to do both a transparency thing on what pipeline operators provide on their Web sites; we haven't got into that yet, and also just a safety thing. And we've already developed some of these comparing INGAA companies and AOPL companies just for the number of incidents per mile, those types of issues.

One of the things we want to do
this year, too, because we get calls, probably
two or three a week, looking for expertise in
pipeline safety mainly from local governments
and sometimes citizens groups looking to hire

someone to explain something to them. So at some point this year we're hoping to do a broad RFQ looking for pipeline expertise, things like metallurgists, pipeline engineers, hydrologists that we can provide those names to the communities that call us, because we have a fairly small list right now of kind of independent experts that are willing to work for community groups and local government.

There's a number of things that
we're involved with that we're going to
continue to do, too. We're on almost way too
many PHMSA groups right now. The Data Quality
Groups, Public Awareness Work Group, this
Committee, the PIPA Group, which has kind of
gone underground again for the time being, and
then we've also been appointed to the
Governor's Citizens Committee on Pipeline
Safety in Washington State.

We continue to respond to the public and local government requests for assistance. We've been trying to categorize

that. And I've been just tracking my time, and since the 1st of January I've spent over 60 hours just talking with local government and public that calls. And the media. I guess I'd throw the media in there, too. The media sometimes is more than the others. So a significant amount of our time is trying to provide, you know, accurate information to those groups.

And then one of our things that our Board has been working on, their strategic plan, and they really are trying to increase our organizational capacity, because we're overwhelmed with the requests for information. So you'll see us ramping up all that social marketing. They're going to make me learn to tweet or something this year, I guess.

Increase outreach to affected communities. When you see significant incidents in communities these days, the Board really wants us to start reaching out to them instead of waiting for them to reach out to

us. We want to expand the Trust endowment. You know, we were started with a \$4 million endowment from a criminal settlement of a pipeline case. We're investigating ways to expand that endowment. We've been talking with -- the City of San Bruno is really interested in expanding our endowment if we can create a pipeline-safety-trust-type organization in California. We've been talking to PG&E about that, too. And then there are efforts going on in the Great Lakes states around that also.

We're looking at investigating organizational membership. We're not a membership organization at this point. Often people show up and say, well, your members, what are they thinking? Well, we don't have any members. But that may be a way for us to expand our capacity.

And then we're looking -- it kind of goes hand in hand with that RFQ That I talked about, developing some advisory

Committees. We want to have a Legal advisory
Committee of the lawyers around the country
that have looked at pipeline issues, pipeline
engineering expertise, that would work with us
on issues, those types of advisory committees
that can help guide us and make sure we're
using accurate information.

And that was all I had. Glad to take any questions. And I'd encourage the other public members to chime in also, because they may have some other public viewpoints on this. Thank you.

CHAIR HONORABLE: Thank you, Carl.

I'm glad you included the rankings. We're

very competitive in Arkansas.

(Laughter.)

CHAIR HONORABLE: And we mean to take down Washington State.

(Laughter.)

CHAIR HONORABLE: So you know that Phil Jones was president of NARUC immediately prior to my taking the position. And so it's

really been a point of contention and it's really strained our very good friendship.

So with that, in all seriousness, we appreciate you giving us constructive feedback about how we can improve the information that we provide to the public and ensuring that we do that in the very best way. So thank you and your colleagues.

Todd?

MEMBER DENTON: Well first of all,
Carl, I appreciate --

12 CHAIR HONORABLE: I'm sorry.

13 Introduce yourself.

MEMBER DENTON: Oh, Todd Denton,
Liquids Industry Committee.

First of all, Carl, I appreciate your role. I appreciate your organization.

I think it's served a good purpose of getting that awareness out in the public. And, you know, just last week I spoke with a new group of engineers in our company, and I always use the Bellingham example as why we do what we

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Having said that, I have to object a little bit to the hyperbole. You know, some of the pictures I'm not sure, you know, where they're from. So for example, the pipe, you know, more than likely that was cut out, rejected on construction site. The backhoe outside the living room window. You know, as we lay new pipe, we have no incentive to be in someone's back yard. We're looking for more appropriate routes. You know, I don't know if that was maybe a repair. We have more issues with neighborhoods and commercial, you know, stores being built on or near pipelines than we do with building pipelines near those places.

And then one question for you.

You had mentioned the spill planning

transparency and involvement. Can you

elaborate more on that?

MEMBER WEIMER: Sure. And most of those pictures -- actually I think the picture

at least of the backhoe outside the gentleman's window was a new pipeline installation, although I think there was constraints on where the right-of-way already existed.

From a spill response planning and transparency, our issue; and we've talked to Congress about this; we've talked to PHMSA about this, is more transparency in those spill plans being available to the public; and I understand that PHMSA is in the works of putting those up online so they will be more available, and more input from the public when those are being approved. Washington State is one of those things that do this. We'd be glad to compete with Arkansas on this issue about spill planning.

When there's a new facility
planned and up for approval, it's opened up to
the public for a comment period, and they're
made very public. At least the Department of
Ecology out there tells us that has created

and brought in new ideas that they hadn't thought about, that the industry hasn't thought about that helps strengthen some of those spill plannings. There's no such public review at the federal level.

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It's interesting, when you get the spill response plans from those states like Washington State and you compare it to what you can get from PHMSA at this point, the amount of redaction in there. It may end up being a legal it about the redaction that PHMSA's doing on their spill response plans. You can look at this whole page and then you look at the PHMSA one and it's all black ink. We don't quite understand that and we're trying to understand why some states will give you everything and then PHMSA redacts so much of it. So that's some of the transparency But it's mainly the public issues. involvement part of it that's lacking at the federal level.

CHAIR HONORABLE: Chuck and then

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MEMBER LESNIAK: I can talk loud.

You all can probably hear me. I just wanted
to say thanks to Carl.

Oh, Chuck Lesniak representing the public on the Liquids Committee.

I just wanted to say thanks to Carl and just ditto to much of what he said, but I did want to add a couple of things from my perspective as a representative of the public. Pipelines are not necessarily my background over the last 20 years. I've done a lot of environmental work, a lot of environmental regulatory work. And when I got involved in pipelines, especially national pipelines, I was pretty surprised at the minimal level of permitting and review and approval of key documents. And I think that's an issue that needs to addressed. While in a lot of ways very, very

while in a lot of ways very, very safe facilities, they have the potential for very, very high consequences. And, you know,

I'm kind of a believer in the Ronald Reagan theory of trust, but verify. And I think that there ought to be more review and approval by the Agency itself prior to new installations and start-up and major changes in operation.

And I'd like to see that going forward. I'd like to see NEPA brought into the process more. I think that is an area that's been overlooked and NEPA ought to be part of more pipeline siting and pipeline operational changes.

I'd like to see a PIPA process for siting new pipelines. We punted on that issue on the Pipeline Committee. I think it was actually in a lot of ways more critical than what we did do. And I think that to be honest the industry stonewalled us on that and I think that ought to be addressed going forward.

And the last thing is just on the timeliness of the rules. I want to add something to that. This is for me personally

and I've raised this issue before with the Committee. As a member of the public and different than probably 90 percent of the people here in the room, this is not what I do everyday, and even different from say Carl and Rick. I've got another job and a whole other life.

When I get the agenda and find out what we're going to look at five days before we meet, it's just not workable. And I think that I know the Agency is reluctant to say until they're certain what we're going to cover and tell us what we're going to cover, but my bet is that most of the industry folks here have a pretty good idea of what we're going to cover months in advance. I may be wrong about that, but maybe -- I see some heads shaking.

(Laughter.)

MEMBER LESNIAK: And so but if we could get a list of 30 days out, 45 days out tentatively this is what we intend to cover.

It's not a commitment on the part of the Agency. But so that rules that have been out there for public comment, they've been published, I could start doing my research, having my staff do some background research for me so that I can make better informed decisions. Because as it sits today, I'm very concerned that I'll have to abstain from a lot of votes just because I won't feel like I've got the background to make an knowledgeable vote, and I'd rather abstain than make an uninformed vote. And so I think that' that's important and I think goes to the timeliness of the rules. And with that, I'll stop. Thanks.

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CHAIR HONORABLE: Thanks, Chuck.

We'll take those comments in the spirit of
being somewhat responsive to some of Carl's

points about the public perspective versus an

errant rant about late agenda reception.

(Laughter.)

CHAIR HONORABLE: So with that, I

think it would be appropriate to turn it over to Jeff and he can respond both to Carl and To Chuck's points.

MR. WIESE: Thanks so much.

Actually I sympathize, and it's a fair point.

So we will endeavor to be better about getting materials out to you. I will tell you, Chuck, that honestly this meeting we had one vote, so we really work on the stuff to get to you where there's a vote in here. The rest of them are intended to be informational briefings that kind of help round out your view of everything's that's going on. So, but, you know, fair comment, you know?

And we've also tried to -- I think with your permission, by the way; except for Michele, I think, since she's new, I think we agreed last time to try to go electronic, you know, and send you things electronically.

You'll have to give us some feedback on how that's working. But any rate, again, I think that's a fair point.

so I would want to, if I can,
commend Carl for a number of reasons. You
know, I've known Carl for a long time and Carl
can -- and I think that that's amongst the
best of us. He can disagree with you and
still not dislike you, right? It's okay. I
mean, Carl and I can still go out together,
you know, and enjoy -- Carl's one of those
people who always has ideas for me to work on,
you know?

(Laughter.)

MR. WIESE: And I appreciate that.

And I think we've had a good relationship.

I also want to commend him for taking on excavation damage prevention. Carl knows I've been nagging him for years about if you really care about public safety, you have to care about excavation damage prevention.

There are more people injured or killed as a result of excavation damage, probably, than just about anything else. A lot of those people are people who work on the right-of-

way, but they're just as important as anybody else and they're members of the public. So we have to stick for those people. I know you know I'm a little passionate about that. I'll always push that angle.

But I also want to take that as a platform to say on PIPA -- you know, I know that several of you including Chuck commented on this whole business of new pipelines.

Frankly, I was there when we started PIPA, as you'll recall, Carl, but we couldn't get it going, you know, when it was too big. We pared it back. But I recall -- and Carl can help me out here, I recall that we agreed to move on to new pipelines.

So, you know, Carl gets calls all the time and a lot of you get calls. We get calls all the time, you know, and they're not issues that we're really involved in. It is a siting issue. So PIPA was intended to be helpful to communities. I think it can be, particularly if they use it. I'm with you.

I think we need to move on to new pipelines.

And we're seeing things and we're seeing legal memos sent to communities with which we disagree. People are claiming that communities are preempted by our authorities. You know, I don't agree to that. We're writing back to these communities.

We built the CATS program, as you know, for years and we have been sending CATS out for years to talk to communities. And that's our job really with the CATS talking to communities. So I would encourage people as they run into these issues to talk to us.

Last thing I would say on that
whole front, and it's just a caution to Carl,
it's my experience too that when you go out
for experts, you have to make sure you find
people who are neutral, you know, because
there are lots of experts out there with a
slanted point of view and it's not helpful.
I mean, basically everybody discredits the
work they do. If they're seen as fair and

balanced and neutral, you can get ahead and you can move on that.

Let me close out my rant by
talking about April is National Safe Digging
Month, as that was brought up by several of
our members here. We're going to be doing all
kinds of things and I commend everyone in the
room and the members to dial it up in April.
This is an opportunity to get people's
attention to something that's really
critically important and I think we can do
that. So with that, I'll stop my rant.

CHAIR HONORABLE: Thank you. I'm not sure who was next. Jeff? Let's say Jeff, Michele and then Ron.

MEMBER WRIGHT: Jeff Wright, Gas

Committee. I guess I wanted to comment on

just a couple things. I'm coming from the

natural gas pipeline perspective as the

regulator that's in charge of siting new pipes

and additions to the pipeline inventory as it

were. You know, public convenience and

necessity, interesting term. We've had to deal with it for 76 years now. The problem is we define it as our actions. It's defined in our actions. To change that, to get a definition you're talking statutory language, so we need an act of Congress. So, you know, that's kind of the way to pursue that.

That aside, what I want to talk about also is FERC has a very -- well, we don't have a safety mandate. We have a very open and transparent process. And as Jeff said, we bring in the CATS Team. We send them updates every month about what's going on at FERC. And we encourage them where they can. They send people to the scoping meetings, to all the community meetings we have so they can answer those safety questions that I know are in the forefront of everyone's mind.

That said, and this kind of goes to Chuck's question, everything we do is a federal action. It requires NEPA work. That is the bread and butter of what FERC does for

siting. So there is always a NEPA document when there is a pipeline facility that is going to be or proposed to be constructed.

I would say this, that I've never seen a pipeline as proposed go out of my

Commission as proposed. There will always be changes because of that process where we do move pipe, we move compressor stations, we do what we can to assuage all the stakeholders that are involved. I mean, it runs the gamut as you know from a landowner all the way to the pipeline company and everybody in between.

And it's been noted here the incredible run-up in gas supply that we have because of the shale that's creating an incredible demand for more pipe, which is not so much the companies want the pipe, it's the people as we turn more of our electric generation needs, especially in New England are becoming much more dependent upon natural gas. We're seeing demands by the population for more gas. So, you know, we're answering

not only landowners in the way. We're answering the individuals who need more gas service, who need more electric service.

So I'll end. I don't know if it was a rant, but just kind of an informative kind of just statement about what FERC's been doing.

CHAIR HONORABLE: Thank you, Jeff.
That was very informative.

Michele?

MEMBER JOY: Michele Joy on the hazardous liquid side. I also wanted to thank Carl for bringing forward the public view. I always find that he's very balanced and engaging and very helpful to bringing these things forward in a public discussion rather than through the media or some other forum, which really makes it very helpful.

I wanted to address one of the issues that's come up that I'd actually like to enlist perhaps NAPSR or certainly the states. In the part of the world where we

have our pipelines; and I work for Shell, we are running into big problems with water crossings and some of the issues you've identified. And one of the things we're finding; perhaps it's climate change, perhaps it's weather or something else, but many of the jurisdictions and the states are modifying how they're managing water. And they're pushing things into waterways that are now causing erosion.

So we're going out and, you know, looking at our lines. And where we're finding there's issues, we immediately apply for permits in order to rebury them or in many cases to basically replace the crossing.

Those permits take a long time. We just recently applied for one and we're told it will take over a year. So, you know, we're having to address those issues.

So both in the areas of water management, really trying to anticipate not just getting things into a waterway, but what

does that do around erosion? And it affects
the communities as well. And then once we
need to do some work on our assets, helping us
to get those permits faster so that we can
keep the service up, not have to de-rate our
pipes, not have to take other measures and
really try to fix it properly. So that's all.
Thank you.

think I would speak on behalf of the states and say we look forward to hearing more about that issue. Massoud may know more about that than I, but I certainly would be very interested to hear more about it, in particular if there are issues raised by economic regulators, but also to be a facilitator for interaction with even air and environmental regulators and other state actors.

Massoud?

MEMBER TAHAMTANI: Madam Chairman, to your point, we are very engaged in Virginia

Page 105 1 helping Colonial and others when they have issues with permitting with the local 2 government for relocation and any other 3 issues. We engage. We call the locality, 4 talk to them about pipeline safety and often 5 we don't allow the CATS to come into Virginia. 6 Nothing against Jeff. But we believe that 7 this stuff can be done at the local level. 8 9 They understand us, we understand them and 10 things happen pretty quickly. 11 MEMBER JOY: Thank you, Massoud. I found Virginia is often very, very proactive 12 13 and I think if we could get that in every state it would be very, very helpful. 14 thank you. And it sounds like Arkansas is 15 16 there as well. 17 CHAIR HONORABLE: Well, if not, 18 we'll be clipping very quickly behind Massoud's heels. 19 20 (Laughter.) 21 CHAIR HONORABLE: As usual he's at 22 the top of the stack.

Ron?

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MEMBER McCLAIN: Ron McClain,
Liquids Committee, and I'll be brief. I
certainly agree with all of the positive
things said about Carl and the Pipeline Safety
Trust, so I won't repeat all of that, but --

MEMBER WEIMER: Oh, go ahead.

(Laughter.)

MEMBER McCLAIN: Okay. I did want to comment on maybe a perception that permitting is lax or easy for pipelines. I mean, it's really the biggest regulatory uncertainty people face when trying to do new projects. And often operators spend tens of millions of dollars trying to gain permits with uncertainty through the whole process. And really, that's in an effort to build hundreds of millions, if not billions of dollars of infrastructure that benefit lots of I mean, all sorts of benefits people. Jobs. from it.

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So, you know, I think operators

would agree there needs to be some change there, but certainly not to make it longer, because often by the time you get permits the need has passed, and that's not really good for anyone. So it is an extremely rigorous difficult process. It's very, very expensive with everything thrown at you that can be.

And a lot of people who are raising those issues aren't so much concerned about pipelines as just the use of carbon fuels, which I don't necessarily think that's fair, but it's the way it works.

So it's just a comment that

permitting is extremely difficult for pipeline

constructions. It's not a slam dunk in any

sense. And so if there are ways we could

address safety better and also be more

expedient, I think you'd find a lot of

welcoming from the pipeline group.

CHAIR HONORABLE: And I think we'll conclude with Carl.

MEMBER WEIMER: Yes, I just wanted

to comment on the permitting routing issues, because I agree with what's been said. The FERC process is very well defined and people kind of understand that and they have their guides. So when you get your notice that there's a new interstate gas line coming through, you at least can learn fairly early on what the process is.

When it comes to liquid pipelines and intrastate pipelines, that process is much cloudier. And what we've seen; and Jeff alluded to it a little bit, is even companies are making it more confusing when they're telling local governments that they don't have authority where clearly local governments do.

So a lot of our point is that we really need to clarify the process so it's really clear to everybody. And hopefully that would speed the process along, too, because we certainly understand the regulatory issues that companies face trying to get something through. I mean, we've seen that just this

past week with Keystone with now all of a sudden Nebraska changing their minds about whether there's a route or not. So lots of issues. So thank you.

as usual, we are paying great attention to

Carl's presentations. And thank you for the

effort that you took to prepare it, Carl.

Thank you most of all for the work that you

do.

And I think with that, we'll be on break until 11:00.

(Whereupon, at 10:42 a.m. the above-entitled matter went off the record and resumed at 11:04 a.m.)

MR. WIESE: Before we reconvene

I'll give up a couple of my -- I only have a

couple of tricks in the bag.

The first one is close the doors because people normally -- although they're not taking the cue this time, they normally flood in.

	Page 110
1	The second one is use someone's
2	name, you know? and no one else wants that,
3	so they run to their chairs. That's how it
4	worked for Chad, so that was good.
5	So any rate, with that I'll turn
6	back to Colette.
7	CHAIR HONORABLE: Thank you. It
8	didn't work Chad's seat mates.
9	(Laughter.)
10	MR. WIESE: Yes.
11	CHAIR HONORABLE: But I'm sure
12	they will return very shortly. Without
13	further ado, we will hear a briefing from Chad
14	Zamarin on gas transmission industry
15	priorities.
16	Oh, I'm sorry. I skipped Tim.
17	Forgive me.
18	MEMBER FELT: That's what happens
19	when you
20	CHAIR HONORABLE: No. Yes. Well,
21	I went to my agenda after the break. I
22	apologize, Tim. Let me correct myself. We'll

hear a briefing on hazardous liquid industry priorities from Tim Felt.

MEMBER FELT: Thank you. Tim Felt from the liquid side. And I've got a few slides I'll go over. Just want to share some of the priorities and initiatives going on in the liquid pipeline industry. And we've kind of done a revamping and refocusing here the last couple years, and especially recently.

A little bit of history. Probably
I think it was the late '90s when the industry
leaders got together and said we need to start
getting together and as a group focus on our
efforts to improve pipeline safety. At the
time it was at the pipeline leadership level.
Teams were formed, priorities were set,
initiatives were tackled, and a lot of
progress was made. And I'll cover some of the
topics, you know, during the presentation.

But then as time went on, members changed, priorities changed and we probably got to a point where we needed to revisit and

refocus. And that's what we've been doing the last couple years. And so we've kind of reinvigorated our process, reexamined what was working, what wasn't working. I'm going to talk about it because what's come out of that is where we're at today. And actually this is I would say probably a second or third generation of our most recent process.

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What I want to talk about and the initiatives that I'll discuss are not aspirational. These aren't things we're hoping to do. I mean, you know, getting to zero leaks, maybe you say that's aspirational, but what we are doing and talking about, these are things that we're actually doing. We're committed to doing and we're actually implementing and pursuing these type of I want to distinguish that because efforts. I don't want you to hear here's things we'd like to do. It's these are things that we're actually doing.

So the operators got together and

tried to at least get some agreement on principles, and what are some of the things that we want to make sure that we're committed to? Well first of all, safety principles; I'll talk more about those, the fact that we do need to continuously improve. And we had looked at some of the trends over a number of years, and to the industry's credit, working with the regulators, the industry's got a record of improvement over a decade or so. We're proud of that. But one of the things we looked at was how the rate of improvement had slowed down, tapered off in some categories and maybe, you know, we were afraid -- or, you know, we'd get a blip. Is it a blip or is it going in the wrong direction?

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And rather than waiting for a couple more years of data, we said let's make sure we examine where we're at right now.

Things have changed. And of course when you get your numbers down, trying to keep up that rate is not as easy when you have fewer

incidents to try to improve on. But still we weren't at zero and still we thought we could do better.

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I'm going to talk a little bit about our internal reporting on performance and our strategic planning process. spend probably the bulk of the time on that just because that will talk about our initiatives. But the thing about the process I want to talk about is that when we got together a number of years ago and set priorities, we felt an urgency and a need to set these kind of priorities. And we did. And then when we started ticking them off and accomplishing some of them, we felt like, great, you know, we've accomplished something, kind of like -- I don't want to say check the box, but like, okay, this is done, move it aside.

And we didn't necessarily have, well, what are the next priorities? We didn't have a process to force us to reexamine

ourselves. And that's what we've put in now is a process where there's an annual review of what are our priorities? What have we accomplished? In fact, some of you probably in this room have been interviewed by people on our team to make sure we got; not just from the managers or from the public companies, but from the public and from the regulators, what are you seeing that's important and taking that into account as we set our priorities and our initiatives going forward.

so some of the principles that we embraced. Zero incidents. And I have to tell you honestly, when we stood up and, you know, recommitted to something like this, when you get behind -- I don't know what is on the gas side, but when you get the liquids people together and you got a lot of people together and you say, okay, we should commit to zero, you get, well, I don't know. Are we sure we want to do that? You know, that's really hard. You know, that's a pretty high

standard. So there wasn't unanimity in the beginning.

And we kept working this,
discussing it and the commitment to zero
incidents is across the industry now. It
wasn't on day one, but it is today. And I
want to reflect that because again it's not
just words on a piece of paper. It's, you
know, we're all putting our hands together and
saying we're committed to this, committed to
organize-wide programs on safety, not just at
the top level, but throughout the
organization. It's really a great thing to
see when you see people throughout an
organization that are committed to something
like this.

Which then gets into the next

point, which is on safety culture and

recognizing the role that culture plays in

preventing incidents. I think somebody said

earlier when you're looking at measures, you

need to make sure, you know, is the

performance of the asset or the performance of the people? And culture is an important part of that. And so we've recognized that.

I'll tell you out of all the things that are up here, the culture is the hardest one for us to really tackle and have a great game plan on. We've got efforts, but it's the hardest one I think to really measure your success at.

Continuous improvement. No matter how good we are, until we're at zero, and even if we were at zero, there's always things that you can improve on.

Learning from experience. I'm

going to talk about this a little bit more,

but I was at a safety meeting yesterday and a

quote that somebody put up was -- we're

getting into process safety within our

company. And it was, "A wise person learns

from their experiences. A wiser person learns

from the experiences of others." And so we're

trying to do that. It's not just learn from

the things within our company, but other

companies and other industries, no matter what that learning is.

I mean, it doesn't have to be a pipeline incident that we're learning from.

It can be the incident in the Gulf of Mexico, for example. And personally our company is getting a lot of lessons from that. And I don't know if I've spoken about it here before, but I've spoken at other places about a book that we read and we're kind of using it as a little guideline throughout the company about the Gulf incident.

Safety systems. I think we're familiar with a lot that the industry and the public and the regulators are working on. And Ron McClain is heading up that effort.

Technology. We really think that there's an opportunity there. I'll talk about that a little bit later. And then communication with stakeholders. And again, I kind of mentioned not just presentations like this, but reaching out to stakeholders

and asking for their thoughts and their opinions on things. But then it gets more into also sharing information. But a lot of times when we talk about communication, it's, okay, we're telling you this, this and this. Here's a briefing. Here's a presentation. Here's a letter. We're trying to make sure that we also listen. And I think that's a part of communication that sometimes gets lost.

So some of our efforts that are underway. So the Pipeline Safety Excellence Steering Committee, that's an effort made up of leaders, senior members of the pipeline members. It's a steering committee that really helps set those priorities, take the input and -- and I talk about setting priorities. There's a lot of things that we want to improve on.

One of the things that we found was that we -- I mean, I find this in my company. There's a lot of things I want to

improve on. But if you have too big of a plate, you're like this, a mile wide and inch deep and you don't get a lot done. But you're doing a lot of things and people are real busy, but you're not necessarily accomplishing things.

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And so one of the things that the steering committee is doing is focusing the effort. And the other thing we found ourselves, as we tried to do so many efforts, is when we find a good person -- or maybe you find this in your companies and organizations. We find a good person, put them on a team. And then we got another team. We'll put her on this team, too, and then another team. Well, maybe she can help out over here, because really, you know, they know about the other. And before you know it, you've got people that are working on teams and they're spread so thin and it's not fair to them and it's not fair to the industry, because then you're not making the progress.

So one of the things that the steering committee does is helps set those priorities. And that means we don't do everybody, but we do try to focus our efforts so we can make meaningful progress.

We have a Performance Excellence
Team, and this is probably I would say one of
our best and longest-standing teams in terms
of really accomplishing things, setting a
pace. I mean, they were the ones as a team
has their own strategic planning process
within their team, but the industry leaders
didn't. And so how come they've got a process
for setting priorities and efforts every year
and we don't? So we kind of took their
process and said will you help us go through
the same or a very similar process? And so
that's what we've done in the last couple of
years.

Pipeline Integrity Work Group.

Kind of self-explanatory, but working on ways
to improve the pipeline integrity. You've got

a lot of the experts in our industry working together, as well as people from the outside to help the Operations and Technical Group.

Actually the Pipeline Integrity Work Group is a subset of the Operations and Technical Group.

Cybernetics working on things like integrity management systems, SCADA systems, cyber security.

Our Public Awareness Group.

Again, trying to focus on how do we communicate and reach out to the public, not just in meeting the regulations and the spirit of the regulations, but actually trying to make sure that we're effective. And again, communicating. Putting out information is one thing, but making sure that you're effective in doing it is another. And so this group shares information, shares ideas, passes things back and forth, tries things, works together where they can to try to improve our efforts in this area.

1 Operator Qualification Work Group.

Obviously focused on the Operator

Qualification Program. And then, you know,
it's kind of like another catch-all. They say
we try to focus, but there are a number of
other teams that are out there. And so we've
got at any one time rather than permanent
standing teams, maybe some ad hoc teams that
are focusing on things that are not
necessarily at the highest priority, but we
don't want to lose progress in working on
them. So there's a number of these teams as
well.

Just wanted to share some of the numbers. You know, we do gather and share information as an industry. We have our own database where we kind of capture information and share it, measure ourselves. Companies are measured against each other. In some cases I know that compensation is based on how well you're performing and how you're improving in this area.

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So I won't read all the numbers necessarily, but I did want to point out that one at the top, that 99.99. I was at again a safety briefing yesterday with some of our employees and we looked at the number of barrels that we moved last year and we looked at what we lost and the number, the percentage that we came out to for our company was 99.99998 percent. And we said, you know, well, it's nice that we've got that kind of performance or reliability. There was still, you know, almost a couple of hundred barrels that we lost, most of that in one incident, most of that contained on site. But the fact is that it was a loss, and so there's still room for improvement. And again, the emphasis on getting to zero.

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You know, I read a quote somewhere else that talked about if 99.9 percent were good enough, what would that mean? So apply 99.9 percent, for example, to the airline industry and I don't think we'd be happy with

it. So we're also recognizing that even though we've made improvements and we can be proud of some of the progress -- and when you move a lot of volume and you have a little bit of a release, it can look like numbers like this. So we're talking about measures. What are the right measures? Maybe 99.999 percent is good, but when you still look at what was lost, and if you're looking for zero, then even 99.999 isn't good enough.

So from a strategy standpoint we have four major goals and under those goals we have some initiatives. I'll go through those. At a high level though it's to focus on technologies. That was mentioned a little bit earlier today. Threat identification response, the safety culture and management practices, and then boosting response capabilities. And we'll talk about each of these in turn.

So the first initiative under the first goal is basically to focus on detection

of cracks in a pipeline, improving and the smart tool capabilities. You know, I think the smart tools have come a long way over the years, but there's actually some very innovative ideas that are being pursued. And it's people on the pipeline industry side that are trying to work with the vendors to drive that performance improvement. And we're spending a lot of money and a lot of effort on this and devoting a lot of pipe and we're pretty comfortable that there's a couple of areas that we think that we'll be able to make some progress on very quickly.

And in fact, one of the things
that I didn't mention about this Steering
Committee that for all these efforts set -- I
talked about setting priorities, but it's
setting priorities, making sure there are
enough resources, but then also holding
ourselves accountable for getting results. So
what we don't want to find ourselves getting
into is let's do a lot of research and a lot

of study, but then there's nothing that comes of it. And so we're trying to change the focus more towards results that can be used, timelines that are met versus just endless programs.

Working on the recommended practice for crack detection, especially on the seam-related cracks. Again, a lot of opportunities out there, but we felt that this was one in particular that needed some focus.

The third one, or effort No. 3, to develop industry-wide guidance on implementing threat data integration programs. Last year we completed a program where we developed what we called -- it was threat matrix. So what are the possible threats that are out there? How do you detect them? What are the leading indicators? Things like that.

So we had this matrix and the team that was working on it kind of said we're done. Let's sunset the team and let's move on to something else. And this is a case where

we said, okay, that's nice. We now have information. That's great. We can share it. But let's see if we can take it a step further and actually come out with recommendations and guidance and help on how to better integrate the data. Some companies have made different progress. How do we share that information?

You know, There's a lot of experience out there and the challenge for us is getting that experience together in a way that we can provide guidance to the other companies in the industry so that we can actually make a difference and not just put out information. And that's what this one is about. It's taking information and how do we do something with it.

Deploying the newly-developed

Pipeline Safety Management System. You know,

Ron McClain has kind of been the lead

representative from the liquid side, so I'm

not going to spend a lot of time talking about

it other than from within the industry this is

an effort to try to again share information, but bring everybody up to a common minimum level at least. There are some companies that have got robust programs that have been in place for many years. There are some people that have parts of programs. So let's take the opportunity to develop a program that everybody can use at least at some minimum level, recognizing that there are small companies, medium companies and large companies and different operations.

So maybe everything that one company is doing doesn't apply to another company. And I think Ron is -- from what I understand and him working with the rest of the group, including probably a number of people in this room, are coming up with a management system that will be very helpful to everybody, beneficial to the industry and to the public as well.

I alluded to earlier the safety culture. And again, I think this is a

difficult area, but it's also one where it's hard to measure. It's easier to measure how many incidents you have. It's a little harder to measure culture, but there are things that we can do to influence culture. And a lot of that is sharing information back and forth. So we're looking at industry-wide sharing opportunities, but also how do you share and learn within a company, not just between companies?

We've got a number of efforts. We have an annual conferences where things are shared. We've got obviously teams that are working together. We have a -- I'm trying to think what they call it, but I think it's a tailgate phone call where we have -- I think the last couple that we've had somewhere in the neighborhood of 90 to 100 people participating in this. And they just dial into a number. And somebody's got a set agenda for covering specific lessons learned. It's kept within the industry so that people

can be as open as possible. And then afterwards if they want to have some follow-up discussions, they can do that.

And again, none of this is required. It's available. We try to track. Participation is a way of seeing whether it's working or not. We survey the participants afterwards. What else would you like to see? Is it working or what's not working about it?

we have what we call peer-to-peer exchanges where, for example, our company will call up another company and say do you mind if we get together and share information? And one company will go to the other company's offices. They'll decide on an agenda ahead of time. And it could be a day-and-a-half, it could be a day. And so we've gone to companies.

And I'm kind of mindful of a comment that Carl made earlier about, you know, why are you going to these companies?

You know, these are people that have had

failures. Well, sometimes those are the companies that we want to go to because they've been under the pressure and are improving a lot faster than others. So we go to people that we think are ahead of us or that have had experiences that we haven't had and we want to meet with those companies to learn from them.

an industry meeting, we'll try to foster that paring up of companies. Have you signed up yet to meet with another company? And you can have multiple of these meetings over the course of the year. And this one hasn't really gotten off the ground in a big way yet, but the companies that are doing it are getting a lot out of them. And again, you set the agenda ahead of time. So it's what do you want to learn about? And you talk to the other company and figure out what it is that you're trying to learn from them.

Developing a recommended practice

for leak detection management. Again, a challenging issue for us, but it's one that we recognize the need to improve on. And in fact, it was even the scope of what do you focus on because do you focus on the large leaks or the small leaks? At one point we did focus on -- and again, it goes back to culture. If we know better, then why do we have a leak? And if we've got the technology to identify a leak, why do we try to restart a pipeline from time to time?

And so there's all kinds of alarms and signals for different things that are happening on the pipeline. How do you focus that operator's attention to respond to the right one at the right time? And so part of it -- I mentioned the Cybernetics Group a little bit earlier. That's one of the things that they're working on. So there's a cultural aspect to it and then there's a system aspect to it that we're trying to deal with.

And then this is probably one of our latest initiatives. And actually I've got to compliment Shell for taking the lead. We had kind of set our priorities and then at the end we said, well, we need to narrow this down to just a handful. We narrowed it down to six efforts. And Shell came in maybe the next meeting and said, you know, we really need to focus on emergency response and, you know, we'd like to, you know, sponsor this effort. And all of a sudden it was like, well, yes, I personally like that and I want to join, too. And enough people thought it was important enough to put it back up on a priority list.

And this one, if you saw the plan, the detail into this plan, it's probably one of the most robust and well-developed plans that we have in terms of what are the efforts that we're going to focus on keeping track of progress being made? When this team first came forward and the industry said, yes, we want to go ahead, or the leaders said we want

to go ahead and put an effort together on emergency response, come back to us, team, with a plan and a budget so we can review it. And they did and they came back with a plan that was -- I don't remember. It was a two or three-year plan and there were a couple of really good initial steps and here was the budget.

And a couple of us asked the group and said is this a plan that you're presenting that you think is the best approach, or do you think this is a plan that you can get approved by leadership? And they said, well, when we discussed what we wanted to do, we thought we better come up with something we thought we could get approved. Wrong answer. Go back. Develop the plan again. Accelerate everything. And so we have significantly accelerated our priorities on this.

I think it was Carl that talked earlier about wanting to focus on prevention.

And so we've got a number of these efforts

inevitably until we are perfect, until we have perfect systems, perfect people and perfect work environment, there's bound to be a release somewhere. And when we have a release, it's important for us to be able to respond appropriately, quickly, thoroughly.

And that's what this one is all about.

And it's not just the industry.

It's where can we work with the responders to make sure they have the tools and training?

Where can we work together where they can understand our systems and we can understand their systems and processes?

And we had an Emergency Response
Advisory Board meeting last fall and we've got
another scheduled for earlier this year where
we were bringing in people who represented
various response groups, you know, from a wide
spectrum. Fire marshals. Boy, I wish I could
remember all the members of it, but there were
probably, oh, maybe 15 outside the industry

organizations that were present for our initial meeting and it was very helpful and enlightening to see groups working together, making suggestions in a very collaborative cooperative way.

Because ultimately we all want to the same thing. We all want zero incidents.

We want perfect safety records and we don't want to have a single drop spilled outside the pipeline in somebody's back yard or elsewhere in the community. And so we're all equally incented to make this work. And it was a very, very, very productive first meeting that we had.

So it will involve training. It will probably involve some kind of standards, the outreach. This happens to be one of my hot buttons, so I could talk about this for a little while.

(Laughter.)

21 MEMBER FELT: And I think though 22 that, just reiterating, getting to zero is a

commitment and I don't know when we'll get
there. And, you know, it might be bumpy as we
try to make progress, but what we're trying to
do is make sure that we prioritize our efforts
on things that are going to make a difference
and hold ourselves accountable for making an
impact and not just completing studies and
tasks that may or may not result in
improvement in the end.

Hopefully we've done that.

Hopefully we're focused on the right things,
but every year we will reassess based on the
latest information we have whether these are
the right priorities or whether we need to
drop one or add one or do some shifting. And
won't quit until we get to zero. And the nice
thing is we have a process now that holds
ourselves accountable every year to revisit
that to make sure that we get there. So,
thank you.

CHAIR HONORABLE: Tim, that was excellent. And as the old adage says:

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1	Leadership starts at the top. So you're
2	absolutely setting the proper tone and I'm
3	certain it will resonate throughout the liquid
4	industry.
5	We'll hear from a couple of you.
6	Michele?
7	MEMBER FELT: I'm getting comments
8	from my own side here.
9	(Laughter.)
10	MEMBER JOY: I just wanted to
11	clarify on one point. Tim I think did a great
12	presentation, but the lawyer in me just wanted
13	to make clear when we were talking about the
14	peer-to-peer matching, those are specifically
15	around safety issues
16	MEMBER FELT: Oh.
17	MEMBER JOY: not other issues
18	from an anti-competitive standpoint.
19	MEMBER FELT: Okay.
20	CHAIR HONORABLE: Of course.
21	MEMBER JOY: And the matching
22	takes place where we have a company that has

expressed a specific need and other companies have volunteered to be a resource around, you know, either inspection technology or emergency response or some other thing that the two companies want to work on. So I just wanted to clarify that. Thanks.

MEMBER FELT: Thank you for doing that. And that is something that we make sure that is reinforced all the time, but I hadn't mentioned that. And probably in a setting like this it's a good thing to mention. Thank you.

CHAIR HONORABLE: Well, too, it's you all should be commended because you were able to be creative and certainly observing those important tenets but finding a way to work collaboratively on issues of common concerns. So kudos to you.

Todd?

MEMBER DENTON: Todd Denton,
Liquids Committee. I thought I'd just add a
little color around the culture piece. You

know, as Tim pointed out that often is hard to measure. And maybe the frustrating part is it takes time, you know, to see the impact of that.

But I think one success that we can point to in the industry is following the Marshall, Michigan incident around rupture detection and culture in the control center, control rooms. Probably before that incident you could point to several incidents where there were restarts when there was a leak. I think since that, and that's been three-and-a-half years now; hard to believe, we have not had a major incident that I know of where there's, you know, that kind of restart volume being pumped into a leak.

So we're putting out a white paper around rupture detection, and a lot of that white paper revolves -- that best practice revolves around culture. And like I say, I think we are seeing progress there.

CHAIR HONORABLE: Thank you, Todd.

In the interest of time Rich will be our last comment here.

MEMBER WORSINGER: Rich Worsinger,
Gas Committee, and I'll be brief. I just
wanted to echo one of Tim's comments about
visiting a company that has had a failure. I
agree. That is one of the best things to do.

If we have an accident, a safety -- you know,
somebody's injured or even a near miss, what
an opportunity to look in depth what went
wrong and fix it.

and I know, Carl, you struggle with that, that when you reference that as something that raises a question. I hope you'll use that as an opportunity to point out when somebody has an incident, whether it's an accident or an incident, that's when everybody's going to put forth the effort to find out what went wrong and develop the ways to prevent it. Somebody that has a good record, it might just be that nothing's happened that they wondered where it was going

to happen. So I just wanted to echo those comments.

3 CHAIR HONORABLE: Thank you.

4 | Sure. Tim will have the last word.

MEMBER FELT: Just want to make a quick comment on that, because I share it with our people all the time. We want to be good. We don't want to be lucky. And so, sometimes you have near misses and you say, gee, if it had been a second earlier or if this had happened at a different location or scenario. Great that it wasn't worse. But I would rather be good than lucky. And so let's keep focusing on getting better, not just being lucky that it wasn't -- because you can have good luck and you can have bad luck. So just never liked to rely on luck. Thank you.

CHAIR HONORABLE: Good note to end

on. Thank you very much.

We're now prepared to hear from; I got ahead of myself earlier, a briefing on the gas transmission industry priorities from Chad

1 | Zamarin. Chad?

MEMBER ZAMARIN: Thank you. Chad
Zamarin with Columbia Pipeline Group, NiSource
Midstream.

Just to kind of kick off, one
thing I think that is useful and reminds us of
the value of these forums, you're going to
hear a lot of I think alignment with what
others have spoken to, whether it's the public
or the industry, or even the regulators. Our
goal has been to engage with the stakeholders
and try to align our efforts.

I'm going to focus on a few of many ongoing activities that are more tangible and more I think high-profile, things that you've heard, priorities at the state level.

Colette talked about priorities from the public perspective. But we implemented an action plan several years ago following the San Bruno incident. And what I'll talk about today is it's no longer an aspiration, it's no longer a set of studies. We're implementing

activities and our goal is to ensure that those continue to align and converge with the ongoing regulatory process. So we'll talk a little bit about that.

few that we'll talk about here. Extending integrity management beyond HCAs.

Demonstrating fitness of service for preregulation pipelines. That's the parallel to the IVP process that PHMSA's been working through. Shortening pipeline isolation and improving emergency response, and implementing safety management systems. So I'll focus on those, but just to note there's a lot going on, a lot more activity underway.

Also just as an opening comment, I know it's been said, this is a very large interstate gas system and we're chasing a very small number of incidents. As an operator that spends across our distribution and transmission systems over a billion dollars a year in modernizing aging infrastructure, we

problems. You know, I think the vast majority of the industry is very committed to zero incidents, but we recognize that it's hard and there are things that we need to do to find things that current capability and technology may miss.

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Just as a bit of background, I won't go through this in detail, but there's been a lot of paperwork and deliverables put out over the last 12 to 18 months. You can't see this up on the screen, but you know, you think of IMP 1.0 in the late '90s, early IMP 2.0 was already in development. The San Bruno incident occurred. accelerated and put a spotlight on a lot of those efforts. We've put out a lot of white papers that hopefully communicate what the industry is currently implementing and committed to. So if you're interested in those, INGAA's Web site has those publicly available. And I think as you'll see we're

currently in the process of implementing those activities.

Just to focus on a few and try to relate them to the mandates and I think the activities that are going on in the regulatory environment, I'll focus on the testing of untested pipelines. You know, the legislation talked about remote and auto-closing valves.

We'll talk about pipeline isolation, which we think is a bit of a broader way of addressing emergency response. And then extending integrity management beyond HCAs.

Our commitments and what we're implementing is that we will verify and ensure that the MAOP of pipelines that hadn't been subjected to a pressure test are addressed.

We've put together and we presented actually at the last meeting, kind of similar to the IVP process that PHMSA has been working through, a process that operators will go through to identify the high-priority pipelines starting with ones that are in HCAs.

But also we've shown that even beyond HCAs we want to verify MAOPs and ensure that pipelines have a valid pressure test to support their operations, or we need to develop alternative capabilities to demonstrate an equivalent level of safety. That's being implemented by our operators and we'll show what that progress looks like.

We've also committed to one-hour isolation of a pipeline in the event an incident occurs. And we'll talk about progress against that goal and commitment. And we've also committed to extending integrity management to -- it says here 90 percent of the effective population. That's by 2020. We've said that every person living within a potential impact along a pipeline deserves to have integrity management activities along that pipe.

And it's going to take time.

that's a large network to cover. There are
pipelines where it's much easier to cover much

larger areas of population. So we've said by 2020 we'll cover 90 percent of the people that live along a pipeline that could be affected by the potential impact. And by 2030 on pipelines where it's going to take advances in technology, pipelines may not have enough flow to move pigs or there may be other challenges that make it harder to extend integrity management, we're working to solve those challenges but would commit to covering those by 2030. So, you know, we've tried to establish some aggressive but achievable commitments.

Also here you'll see kind of on the far right the efforts that are ongoing.

I won't go into them in detail on this slide, but talk a little bit more specific data.

So our focus has been an aggressive pursuit of the action plan. Open and transparent. We've developed sound technical approaches. We showed the fitness for service model that we had presented at the

last meeting. We've developed enhanced anomaly response criteria and that our teams are working through. In that area we've looked at changes to the immediate response criteria and enhancing those criteria, and also standardizing on incorporating the potential for tool error into the process, a couple of areas that weren't addressed in a prescriptive manner in IMP 1.0, but you know, we think make a lot of sense for the next phase and going to be a priority for us this year. We talked about the extension of integrity management and those commitments and also safety management systems.

One of the challenges that we see, one of the concerns that we have is the regulatory process does lag. You know, we are implementing activities. We're performing projects. And our goal is that those align and converge with and the regulatory process enhances and supports those ongoing efforts. You know, one concern is that if we don't get

that right, we'll have done a lot of activity that may be at odds with where the regulatory process heads. So it's been really important for us to work together.

And I think Carl made some good points. You know, we're not trying to collude, we're not trying to nefariously influence the process. We want to make sure that the activities that are underway hit the mark and that as the regulations do come to light they converge with the activities that are underway.

Just a little bit more detail on the next couple of slides. We're putting out our initial progress report. We've established some key performance metrics. There are a lot more than this, but I've focused on these three that are kind of the high-priority items for us. And I'll talk about some actual numbers in a coming slide.

We will have an annual detailed progress report that we've planned to publish

starting in April of this year and then annually thereafter that will provide transparency into the progress that industry is making against these goals. You know, now many people are we covering more each year with integrity management assessments? How many of our pipelines have the capability of isolation within one hour? How many of our pipelines have had MAOP verified through the IVP or our current implemented process?

And if you look at a little bit more detail, this is where we stand today.

Just to put it in perspective, a lot of work already done. The last couple of years have been an acceleration of effort and much more to come. We have completed more than 70 percent of our HCA mileage as an INGAA community, taken that through our fitness for service process, the parallel to the IVP process where we've confirmed that a test exists or we have addressed that pipeline through additional testing or assessment.

As we mentioned, you know, the initial goal is to complete that for all high-consequence areas. If you recall that fitness for service process, that was the short-term goal. Our goal was to extend that to all pipelines where people could be affected, not just the current definition of the HCA.

One-hour isolation has been completed for more than 50 percent of class 3 and 4 and HCAs. This is again going to require ongoing activity. We should see that number continue to increase. But that's where we stand today.

And extending of integrity
management. You know, there was a lot of talk
in re-authorization about the amount of
pipeline that the current rule covers, but the
reality is it covers a lot of the population
and additional efforts that pipelines are
undertaking cover even more. So we're
currently addressing over 60 percent of people
that live within a potential impact of our

pipelines, not just an HCA, not just an area where there's a dense population, but people living within and along our pipelines. We're covering more than 60 percent. You saw earlier the goal by 2020 is 90 percent. So a lot of work to do, but a significant impact that's being made.

Just to summarize; I'll try to be brief, the commitment to zero is real, it's there and we're implementing I think things that we believe are going to put us on the right path. It is a marathon, not a sprint. You know, we have a lot of infrastructure, a lot of infrastructure that was built over many, many decades and it takes time. We also know that we're still seeing incidents that occur where even our best efforts aren't addressing those accidents. And, you know, what that tells us I think is that there's still more to learn.

You know, when you have such a large network and such a relatively small

number of incidents -- you hear a lot about the ones where someone ran a tool and they missed it or somebody, you know, did something that they shouldn't have done, but those are a fairly small number of occurrences. still have occurrences that even with our best efforts we weren't ahead of, and that's because, you know, we don't know yet things that we don't know or we don't have the technology or the capability that's robust enough yet to find the needle in the haystack. You know, several hundred thousand miles of pipe. You saw the numbers. A few dozen incidents a year. You know, we're committed to zero, but we've got to figure out how to find those very small occurrences.

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You know, we are really committed to the ongoing collaboration, again doing it in an open and transparent way, but ensuring that the things that we're doing converge with the regulatory process.

We certainly want to elevate the

culture of the safety management systems, that meeting that's being held tomorrow. You know, we're very supportive and a big priority for us this year is going to be how do we make that real? How do we start implementing that across all companies, start, you know, raising the bar and floating, you know, all ships to a higher standard?

And with that, I'll wrap up and take any questions, but certainly again appreciate forums like this to see and hear what others believe the priorities should be so that we can maintain alignment and make sure we're doing the right things. So thank you.

CHAIR HONORABLE: Thank you, Chad. Well done. And I agree, it's great to see the similarities among the industries, but it's also important for us to see the priorities you've placed. I think you ought to be commended, you and your INGAA colleagues.

Are there comments or questions

	Page 157
1	for Chad?
2	(No audible response.)
3	CHAIR HONORABLE: He's covered the
4	groundwork very well.
5	MEMBER ZAMARIN: Talk fast.
6	CHAIR HONORABLE: And we've seen
7	the logo a few times. I'm going to be able to
8	memorize it after a while.
9	(Laughter.)
10	MEMBER ZAMARIN: Yes, it's been
11	the same for four years.
12	CHAIR HONORABLE: It has been.
13	And Don would be very pleased. Very good.
14	Tim?
15	MEMBER BUTTERS: Just one quick
16	point. And, Tim, I appreciate you and Chad,
17	your presentation here.
18	One of the things that Tim
19	mentioned as it relates to emergency response
20	which came out at the Advisory Board meeting
21	and again, I think both API and AOPL need
22	to be recognized for their leadership and

Lanny will probably support me on this. We need to make sure that when we talk about pipeline emergency response that both liquid and gas are -- you know, we're doing kind of the same things. Because, you know, when something spills out there, whether it comes out of a pipeline or a rail car or anything else, it's the same cast of characters that are going to deal with it. And fire departments don't have a Liquid Pipeline Team and a Gas Pipeline Team and a Rail Team. It's the same group.

So as we make these programs

mature where we can develop consistency, you

know, that would be something that was

mentioned at the Advisory Board meeting as we

move forward to keep that in mind.

MEMBER ZAMARIN: Just a follow-up comment. I think it's a great point and, you know, we use forums like this, but I will say that the INGAA community has spent a lot of

time with the API and AOPL community and I
think that that sharing of our ongoing efforts
has been important. We do the same with our
distribution partners. And so it's really
been a very collaborative process.

But I think your point is well taken. We can do more. There's a lot going on that's -- and it's not just in emergency response. The technologies that Tim was talking about complement the things that we're also challenged with. So we're very focused and we'll keep our focus on sharing across our industries.

CHAIR HONORABLE: Ron?

15 MEMBER McCLAIN: This is a little

16 unrelated, but --

17 CHAIR HONORABLE: I apologize,

18 | please identify yourself.

MEMBER McCLAIN: Oh, I'm sorry.

Ron McClain with the Liquids Committee. I've had a couple of times -- you know, the SMS has been attributed, or at least partly, to my

name. And I'd just like to recognize people who are here today who have really sacrificed probably at least 2 days a month for the last 18 months. And so if I miss someone, forgive me, but it's really important.

Mark Hareth, our content editor.

I think he's here. And I'm just going to hit on the people I think that are present. If I miss one, please speak up. But Brianne

Metzer-Doran of Spectra Energy, Tracey Scott with Alliance Pipeline. I think I saw Bill Moodey out in the hall with Southwest Gas.

Jeff and Linda, Jeff Wiese and Linda

Daugherty, very helpful in the process.

Massoud, very participatory. And Kate Miller.

I mean, it's just amazing how many of our team are here. Scott Currier with AGA and INGAA, respectively. Peter Lidiak with API.

And if I missed anyone, I
apologize, but I don't want it to be just
associated with me. It's been a tremendous
group of people who have come together pretty

sacrificially prepared every meeting to do
this. So I just want to make sure I say -and there are others that we'll cover tomorrow
with recognition.

CHAIR HONORABLE: Thank you.

Seeing no other tent cards, we'll move right along. And we'll turn now to the distribution side with a briefing from Sue Fleck on the gas distribution industry priorities.

Sue, take it away.

MEMBER FLECK: Okay. Thank you very much. Again, Sue Fleck with National Grid representing the gas distribution industry. I have a lot of slides, but in deference to the time limitations, I will try to move through quickly.

AGA's goal has always been delivering natural gas safely and reliably to homes and businesses at an affordable and stable prices. I don' think there's anything new there.

I just wanted to throw this little

bit of data out there. There's approximately 300,000 miles of transmission system, but 100,000 miles roughly is actually operated by local distribution companies. It's not all managed by the pipeline. So we have a little bit of a stake in what's go on there as well.

Dast year alone the transmission operators inspected about a fifth of all of these lines, more than required by regulation in the seven-year program. And when you dive down into high-consequence areas, of which there's about 20,000, over a third of those received either a baseline assessment or a reassessment this, again a little more than is required by regulation.

Our commitment to safety is multifaceted. Much like you've heard from the
other presenters today, it's all about
regulation compliance enforcement, development
of new standards, development enhancement of
standards, data collection and analysis and
information and best practices sharing. And

I will talk a little bit about each of those as we move forward.

You did also receive a couple of handouts. The material on those handouts is going to allow you to dig in a little deeper if you want to. I will not be going into that level of detail today, but you do have that at your disposal, as well as additional information on the AGA Web site.

To get right into it, here are some of the major efforts, the major focus points for the distribution companies this year.

Around pipeline construction we're looking at expanding operator qualification, making it more effective, initiating better quality assurance programs and working on the understanding and installation of additional either remote-control valves or automated shutoff valves. So those are really on the construction side. Those are the key things that we'll be working on in the coming year.

On the operations side three priorities: Advancing integrity management where it makes sense and where it drives more Enhancing data gathering and tracking. value. See you start to see a little theme there around data and information. And supporting enforcement of the Dig Safe laws. We talked about that a lot earlier this morning. Some of the exemptions and some of the other issues are creating real heartaches for us. So anywhere we can strengthen damage prevention obviously improves the safety of our systems.

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On the safety side the focus is on knowledge sharing, stakeholder engagement with all of our stakeholders including our emergency response ones, and increasing technology deployment. Technology improvements are moving a little quicker than they have in the past, but we don't believe quick enough. We need better tools, we need better techniques and we're going to work really hard on trying to bring that forward.

In 2012 AGA's board adopted this voluntary plan to enhance safety beyond legislation and regulation. And we also want to make a point here that we recognize the significant role that state regulators play in supporting and funding these actions. So working together with our commissions, with our state safety staffs is very critical to us being successful on any of these fronts. So a big effort there.

We've talked about culture today.

I think probably every single presenter has spoken on culture today. We've adopted a culture statement that outlines our commitment to provide safety throughout our industry.

We're committed to proactively collaborating with our public official, emergency responders, excavators, consumers, safety advocates and members of the public to continue to improve on our longstanding record of providing a safe and reliable service to our customers. So a lot of stakeholders, a

lot of efforts to collaborate and it's a delicate balance. It really is. We work hard at that.

Chad mentioned investment. I want to talk about investment a little bit, too.

When you look at the AGA member companies, we've spent more than 19 billion in an average year to improve on our infrastructure and to expand delivery to additional customers.

That's a lot of money and it's driving job creation, supporting local economic development and contributing to economic recovery along with providing better safety to those people who live along our pipelines and our services.

I'm going to skip right over this because Colette did mention lots of states are accelerating investment recovery around replacing aging infrastructure. We would like to see that whole map be, you know, 100 percent, but we're making progress, steady progress all the time.

Faster modernization of the infrastructure without hurting our customers in the pocketbook too much is obviously the goal of the economic regulators as well as the distribution and transmission companies. So that map changes every day. It's getting better and better, but obviously there's still room for improvement.

Another area I'm going to touch on very briefly. This is not in that list of priorities I showed you that we're working on, but it is something else we're working on.

Cyber security is a big, it's a real, it's an ongoing threat, not just for gas utilities, but for all critical infrastructure.

What we're starting to do is
employ prudent countermeasures to help protect
the natural gas systems and its customers.

There's a lot of programs that we're working
on right now to advance security and mitigate
the threat of a cyber attack. We've created
a Downstream Natural Gas Information Sharing

and Analysis Center. We're working with the electric energy industry to share best practices and understand the threats that are common to both and try to learn from them.

We're also piloting in ways to assist smaller utility companies that don't have the big financial resources to help them deal with security threats. And we're working with DOE and DHS on strategies, activities, policies and communication. So we're really doing a lot around cyber security. It's an area that we see becoming more important as time goes forward.

One of the tools that we're using to advance our priorities is a peer-to-peer -- and this is a formal peer-to-peer review process where we partner up companies. And we do them in groups of three or four. They're like size with like kinds of issues. And we take a team of people and we travel from one company to the next to the next and do a loop. National Grid was paired up with Pacific Gas

and Electric and Atmos Energy where -- focused on specific topics.

This year's pilot included worker procedures, safety management and pipeline risk. We take a team of people. We spend three to four days in interviews from union members, supervisors, engineers, managers, directors, vice-presidents through the entire value chain, if you will, of an organization. Dig down into these issues. And then at the end of the peer review process we meet with the senior management of the company that's been reviewed and go through all of what we've learned, the good, the bad and the ugly.

And having been a part of this
process on both being an interviewer and being
interviewed I can tell you that there's a
tremendous amount of learning that occurs
during these peer review sessions. The
companies get a very nice view of everything
that they're doing well and where they need to
refocus their energies. And it's a great

opportunity to learn from others in a focused intense short period of time.

What we hope to do is wrap this session up by April. We're going to finish the pilot, this year's pilot and then we hope to make it a national program next year. So the board will be looking at the results of this year's efforts and moving forward.

Tremendous opportunity to work together to learn how to solve some problems.

And lastly, I just wanted to mention that the items that I highlighted here this morning in a very brief manner is just the tip of the iceberg. There are a lot of other actions that are being considered or being actively worked at AGA. The commitment to safety that I sent around, the one sheet, will give you a lot of that detail, but I threw a couple others up here just to kind of generate a little of interest.

We have an ongoing Best Practices
Program we've had for years that allows

companies to focus in on a specific small issue and kind of dig in on it right away real time, where the peer review is more of a stretched out process.

We have a board level Safety

Committee that pulled off an executive

leadership safety summit this year for a

couple of days. It was very well attended.

It was a huge attendance.

Safety Resource Center to share materials that we have found, technical publications, industry surveys.

We have events that allow lessons learned sharing and we've done a lot of work this year around emergency planning, including having a nationwide mock drill for our Mutual Assistance Program to see how it works. I think during Hurricane Sandy we noticed some gaps in how mutual assistance worked in getting gas company resources moved around the country to where they're needed, so we used this drill to kind of iron out what those

issues were so that we can work harder on closing those gaps.

I also passed out a one-page summary of how the drill went. You can take a look at that and we'll be providing some additional resources around that going forward and hope to continue to drill that until we make this a very finely-tuned, smoothly operating process for a company that finds themselves in a distressful situation and needs the help of resources from their colleagues.

With that, I can open it up for questions and concerns, I know I ran through that relatively quickly, but I understand we are a little bit behind on time, and you do have the handouts so you can read more detail if you wish.

CHAIR HONORABLE: Thank you, Sue.

We were trying to be mindful of the fact that

some of you might want to actually have lunch

before the afternoon session. Thank you. And

	Page 173
1	thank you for the handouts also. It's
2	interesting, too, the synergies around peer-
3	to-peer review. Linda and I were just
4	discussing the fact that maybe that's
5	something states could do. We do it
6	informally. We're always taking a look at
7	states like Virginia, Washington. What works
8	well for them, what could work well for us.
9	And clearly Arkansas is also an example in
10	some regard.
11	(Laughter.)
12	CHAIR HONORABLE: But with that,
13	why don't we open it up for any
14	questions/comments of Sue.
15	MS. DAUGHERTY: I have a really
16	quick comment.
17	CHAIR HONORABLE: They're very
18	hungry I think, Sue.
19	Linda?
20	MEMBER FLECK: I can hear the
21	grumbling.
22	MS. DAUGHERTY: I'll be super

quick. Something I found very interesting amongst all the presentations is that everyone talked about public awareness, pushing information out, educating the public, different areas and efforts. But what I think would be really intriguing is how many of those companies also are seeking information, trying to figure out what are you concerned about and how do we address it. And we'll talk a little bit more about it in performance measures later on. So what do people want to know?

MEMBER FLECK: I think that's a really great question. I know when I was listening to Carl's presentation, in my mind I'm thinking the public wants to be more engaged. It's hard to engage the public. There needs to be some better ways to do it. We're able to engage with emergency responders, city and town officials, police departments, fire departments. We can do that. We have, you know, regional meetings.

Page 175 1 We bring everybody together. We talk about issues of concern. There's great information 2 3 gathering. But the public, the non-affiliated 4 public, you know, the homeowners and the 5 abutters, very, very hard to reach them other 6 than mailings and, you know, advertisements in 7 the newspaper and things like that. 8 You don't 9 get to have a two-way conversation. It's a 10 one-way conversation. And we as an industry 11 need to figure out how to get the need back into our planning better. So if anybody has 12 13 ideas, I'm happy to listen to that. 14 CHAIR HONORABLE: Well, anyone else? 15 Rich, with your permission, I'm 16 17 not sure if Jeff visited with you, could we take yours immediately after lunch? 18 Absolutely. 19 MEMBER WORSINGER: CHAIR HONORABLE: Okay. 20 Thank you 21 for being flexible.

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And we've also visited with some

	Page 176
1	others, Linda and others who are reporting
2	just to ensure that we can get you out of here
3	by 5:00. So we'll try to condense some of the
4	reports where we are able to.
5	So it's about 10 after 12:00. Why
6	don't we recess for lunch until 1:30? And
7	that way you'll have enough time to either go
8	downstairs or go somewhere very close. So
9	we'll be adjourned for lunch until 1:30.
10	(Whereupon, the hearing was
11	recessed at 12:10 p.m. to reconvene at 1:30
12	p.m. this same day.)
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	Page 177
1	A-F-T-E-R-N-O-O-N S-E-S-S-I-O-N
2	1:34 p.m.
3	MR. WIESE: Okay. Thanks
4	everybody. Welcome back. I think I'm going
5	to turn it back over. We've switched.
6	Colette has gone off to give a presentation
7	later today, so we've switched moderators, as
8	I cautioned you up front. And as soon as I
9	hand the reigns over to Massoud, I'll do
10	whatever he says.
11	(Laughter.)
12	MR. WIESE: So until I hand those
13	over to him, it's my ball. Actually, Rich
14	Worsinger is coming up next to talk to us, and
15	then we're going to shift to the afternoon's
16	agenda. I think we can make up the time.
17	We're good, so don't worry about it. We'll
18	still get you out of here on time.
19	So with that, Massoud, I'll turn
20	to you.
21	ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: Well,
22	thank you, Jeff. My goal is to get you all

customers they serve. There are approximately

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1,000 publicly-owned distribution systems in the U.S., and we serve about 5 million customers. There are about 200 I believe that are AGA members. APGA represents 1,000 members, but they're much, much smaller. And if you do the math, that comes out to about 5,000 customers per utility.

As I mentioned, I'm with the City of Rocky Mount. Rocky Mount serves about 17,000 gas customers and we have 20 employees in our gas division. By number of customers Rocky Mount is the 43rd largest municipal public gas system which puts us in the top five percent of municipal gas systems. That means 95 percent of public gas systems are smaller than Rocky Mount. So our Engineering and Co-Compliance Department consists of one engineer. And most municipal systems they don't even have an engineer or a compliance specialist.

Most public gas systems are also

much simpler systems than interstate pipelines or large LDCs. Few, if any, public systems have what we would consider, what you would consider a real control room or controllers.

Typically the gas free flows from the transmission system to the customer with no human intervention. System pressures are typically much lower than that of a bicycle tire and our pipes are much smaller than transmission.

I provide this as a background because APGA's priorities and positions on pipeline safety issues are often driven by the significant differences in the level of risk and the resources available to a small gas distribution operator compared to large interstate oil and gas transmission companies, or even large investor-owned distribution operators.

APGA likes to remind PHMSA that the rules apply to the many small systems as well as to the big LDCs. And, Jeff, I know

you try to keep that in your mind. Please just that reminder to keep these rules into account and the impact it has on the small systems. With that being said, still our priority, our highest priority is the safe and reliable delivery of affordable natural gas at just and reasonable rates to our customers who are our owners.

recognition program. This is the first year of it and we call it SOAR, which stand for System Operational Achievement Recognition.

The goal of SOAR is to recognize public gas systems that are leaders in the safe and efficient operation of public gas systems. We evaluate their systems in four areas: system integrity, employee safety, system improvement and work force development. System integrity and system improvement include may of the basic elements of the Public Safety Management Standard and has the same purpose as PSMS.

It's to encourage operators to adopt effective

safety management programs. We believe that seeing other systems win the SOAR recognition will encourage all public gas systems to emulate the leaders and go beyond just complying with the regulations.

Next I'd like to talk about integrity verification. On specific pipeline safety issues APGA is very concerned about integrity verification. Although only about five percent of APGA members have transmission lines, and most of those lines are of much smaller diameter and lower pressure than real transmission lines, all of our members get their gas from interstate transmission operators. Most have only one pipeline supplier and only one gate state serving that entire distribution system.

Some of the integrity verification proposals could be very expensive to the transmission pipeline operators, and of course they're going to pass those costs along to the distribution systems they serve and their

customers. Some of the integrity verification proposals could require shutting down pipelines for testing that could interrupt service to the downstream distribution systems.

Because APGA members are customerowned, we are very concerned about any rule that affects the safety, reliability and the cost of providing gas to our customers, so we'll be closely watching the IVP Rules as they continue to be developed.

PHMSA recently asked for comments on going away from class location and regulating transmission based on integrity management and the HCA concept. We feel this would be a great opportunity for PHMSA to revisit the definition of transmission. The current definition of transmission includes a risk-based criteria; anything over 20 percent SMYS, but it also includes a functional criteria that any line from a storage facility to a distribution center is transmission

regardless of operating pressure or stress

level. I wish Don Stursma was here as he

could attest that there are many small low
stress lines classified in transmission back

in Iowa and just because they run from a

transmission line to a town they're classified

as transmission.

Back in 1970, when the rules first took effect being classified a transmission line really didn't have a big impact on our members because all it really required was more frequent patrolling and other inspections. But now with integrity management in effect and other rules on the horizon, being classified as transmission will have significant costs that will have little or no safety benefit for the types of lines that our APGA members operate. APGA urges PHMSA to use this opportunity to create some middle-ground definition for these types of transmission lines.

Next I'd like to talk about excess

flow valves. We're very interested in the rulemaking expanding the excess flow valve mandate to multi-family residential and commercial customers. Installing EFVs on single residential services has worked very well and it's been relatively problem-free. However, occasionally we do have a customer that adds a high-demand appliance like a gasfired generator or a tank-less water heater and don't notify us, and the EFV is not sized for that additional load and of course when that appliance operates, the EFV closes.

And I just want to pause for a second here to point out what that means.

That EFV closes. That means that customer then, that individual customer is without gas. That means the LDC has to go out there and excavate where that excess flow valve is at the main. Is this an emergency? That means you can not wait the two or three days for the Call Before You Dig Rules? Probably not. But that means that customer is without gas for

those two to three days. That's why it's so important to make sure we get this rule right so that we don't interrupt the gas supply unnecessarily to those individual customers. We're going to be interested to see how this proposed rule addresses sizing the EFVs for commercial loads considering how they change much more frequently.

Picture the strip mall that has a shoe store and the only gas load they have is maybe a hot water heater. They don't do well. Go out of business. The EFV of course was sized for just that hot water heater. They go out of business and the next thing that comes in is maybe a Chinese restaurant that has gasfired woks, use a lot of gas. That EFV was not sized for that load. They're going to go fire up their kitchen equipment and that's going to shut down the gas supply to that customer.

Next I'd like to talk about PSMS. We are also closely following the development

recommended practice. We understand that it is just a recommended practice, and we've been assured by PHMSA's leaders that they will never make it mandatory, but we have to assume that eventually it will be made mandatory, and if not by PHMSA, then maybe by individual states. Managing safety at a municipal gas system like Rocky Mount where everyone works out of the same building does not require the same level of formality as managing safety in an interstate pipeline or even a large LDC.

As I stated at our August Advisory
Committee meeting, APGA felt our concerns were
not being given due consideration, but I'm
pleased with the changes the working group has
made since August and I'd like to thank Ron
McClain and the other working group members
for listening and addressing our concerns.

Next I'd like to shift gears and talk about the Security Integrity Foundation.

Back in 2005 APGA formed the Security and

Integrity Foundation to assist small gas
distribution operators to comply with the
increasing federal regulation. As I mentioned
earlier, interstate pipelines or large LDCs
have the technical staff to address
compliance. Small public gas systems do not.

We thank PHMSA for supporting SIF financially through the cooperative agreements and through PHMSA's staff serving on the various advisory groups. We'd also like to thank the various state regulators for their support and service on the SIF board and the various advisory groups.

qualification training and our evaluation to many small utilities and master meter operators who otherwise couldn't afford the time and money to send personnel to off-site training. This training has been provided regionally across the country and at minimal cost to the operators. To date SIF has qualified nearly 5,000 employees of small gas

systems. The SIF plans to continue offering the OQ training regionally to assist the small operators.

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To assist small operators in complying with Distribution Integrity Management Program requirements a program called SHRIMP was developed. SHRIMP stands for Simple Handy Risk-Based Integrity Management Plan, and sure most of you are familiar with it. Over 1,600 systems have used SHRIMP programs to develop their DIMP This to me is great because if programs. there are 1,000 public systems and there are 200 IOUs, that means there's another 400 master meter operators who is a group that's typically difficult to get a hold of and work with that have used SHRIMP.

We are continuing upgrading SHRIMP as new information comes out on high-risk materials and the SIF is currently developing smartphone and tablet apps to document the installation, inspection, and maintenance

activities, storing the data in the cloud and allowing users to view the data on Google Maps.

Many municipal systems, especially the smaller ones, do not have GIS systems or computer record keeping systems. As I'm sure you can imagine, extensive geographic models are not needed for systems with a few hundred or even a few thousand customers. We believe the smartphone apps that SIF is developing will give these smaller LDCs the advantage of GIS at a fraction of the cost.

And last I'd like to talk about the Carolinas Public Gas Association. Back home in North Carolina we've been quite busy also. My good friend Tommy Miller and I recognized that North and South Carolina were the only states in the Southeast that did not have a gas association. Tommy heads up the Department of Public Utilities for Orangeburg, South Carolina is a former chairman of APGA. We worked with the other public gas systems in

	Page 191
1	North and South Carolina and in October 2012
2	we formed the Carolinas Public Gas
3	Association. Its members are the 22 publicly-
4	owned natural gas systems in North and South
5	Carolina.
6	Carolina Public Gas Association's
7	purpose is simple: to enhance the performance,
8	safety, competitiveness and public awareness
9	of our members, and we'll be holding our
10	spring board meeting in a few short weeks.
11	Our agenda includes an update from our state
12	regulators, Vernon Gainey for South Carolina
13	and John Hall for North Carolina, as well as

That, Mr. Chairman, concludes my presentation.

an update from our Operator's Committee on

our association members.

coordination of compliance and training among

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ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: Thank

you, Rich. Any questions on the presentation?

Ron?

MEMBER McCLAIN: Just a brief

comment. Thank you for recognizing the team
was responsive to small operators. You know,
I think every stakeholder had their say and we
tried to integrate changes into the document.
I don't know that we every gained agreement
that it would never be a mandatory document.
I mean, never is a long time. I think the
team feels that even with a short document it
requires a pretty massive culture change at
times. And so there will be time for industry
to figure out what the document means. How do
I comply?

And with continuous improvement, you know, you're on a journey. It's not are you here or there. It's where are you on the journey. And even within a company, certain facilities may be at a different places on the journey. So I do think we've tried to really make it flexible, scalable, suitable for people with evolved systems and starting from scratch.

I hope operators will embrace SMS

without regulatory reference, but I don't know
that we ever secured a promise that it would

never be referenced in code. But it would be

4 good I think to have operators embrace it.

5 And if you claim to be compliant with it,

6 there's a lot of "shalls" in the document.

7 ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: Thank

8 you, Ron. Andy?

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MEMBER DRAKE: I'll defer to Jeff because his comment may be in response to Ron's. And then I'll follow up.

MR. WIESE: Well, and I just want to second a little bit of that, but I also want to say that I think all parties adjusted their positions while were together, including APGA.

So one thing I encourage you to do is listen tomorrow to a gentleman who's going to be presenting to us, Armando Martinez. He is from Miami Air. It's a very small airline. He's a real passionate advocate on safety management systems. He makes a really good

case for how it makes money for him, you know? And he said it's not about just complying with regulations. I would tell you that in the SMS debate I hope we will eventually convince everyone that it's about you shouldn't have to be made to do things, you know? It's really we will try to show you enough evidence of why it can be positive for you and why it can work to your advantage, protecting the public at the same time it helps the company maintain its operational reliability, you know, help their bottom line. So I do hope to convince you guys.

As to the matter of whether it becomes a requirement or not, I mean, we debated that back and forth for a very long time and I don't think anyone's made up their mind on it, and it may or may not be.

Wait for this afternoon. We have some panelists coming in that have required safety management systems. But I think Ron wants to counteract all that antidote, but --

MEMBER McCLAIN: Well, we do think there's a great prize in improved safety and industry performance if people will embrace and follow these principles. So, and I do think there's a bottom line benefit for companies and certainly our company has seen that as we've embraced some -- we call it an operations management system, and maybe touch on that tomorrow.

MEMBER WORSINGER: And now let me just respond to that, that APGA and its members also embrace safety and we're looking and again appreciate the changes that were recognized in the process.

I just want to again point out,

Rocky Mount, we have 20 employees. We have

two gas crews, two supervisors, two workers.

That's six people. Every morning they sit at

the picnic table that's in the gas shed and

talk about what job they're going to. And at

the end of the day that's where they end up.

Communication amongst that small group -- and

there are smaller groups out there also where you only have two or three employees in the entire gas division or utility. Communicating to them, you don't need to put a bureaucratic process in place.

We just need to have that same goal and let us work with you to see how that goal is best reached by the small operators.

We thought one way to do it is through our System Operational Achievement Recognition Award, which has many of the same elements.

ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: Andy, I lost control over the meeting for just a couple minutes there. That's not going to happen again. You're next.

(Laughter.)

MEMBER DRAKE: I am quite confident that you have not lost control.

(Laughter.)

MEMBER DRAKE: This is Andy Drake with the Gas Committee. I just wanted to take a moment to kind of back away and look at all

the presentations for a minute and pick up on something I think that Ron has pointed to here, and that is, you know, zero is a common goal. I think everybody's sharing that.

That's good. We're all in here and we all share that. I haven't heard anybody say anything different than that. I think that's good alignment. You know, I think it's going to take our collective and coordinated efforts to achieve that.

To me the other thing that I'm hearing is this is a long and challenging road. We're not going to get to zero tonight. We're not going to fix everything everywhere all the time right away. We've got to make some really good choices, some informed choices and set some priorities that we all understand and can communicate to all the stakeholders why those choices were made and that we're all on sync that those are the logical next tranche of things to be doing.

I think it's a deliberate process

around safety management systems. I think
there's a lot of common elements in there.
That conversation on safety management systems
-- and I think this is the point I want to
bring up to this Committee: To date I think
the conversation in the safety management
systems has been focused on how operators will
use safety management systems. That's
appropriate.

I mean, you know, we operate the assets. We're touching them physically.

That's very, very important. We've been using management systems for years. You know, we're actively participating on the Committee. I think it's done a great job of clarifying and getting some continuity across a broad base.

We see it as actually a competitive advantage for us. That's why we embrace it. You know, we do it better, faster, smarter than those around us, more deliberate, more intentional.

It's just good business. And I think that's what's coming out of this.

But I think the thing that's striking me here is, Tim, you mentioned earlier that there's a process that we use.

And I think the interesting thing that I want to dissect for a minute is who is we? And I think a lot of the context is we, the operators, use. And I think I'd like to challenge this group, the we needs to be this group also. It should be a both/and proposition.

The weight of using SMS protocols on how to advance safety and get to zero can't rest completely on the operators, because that's how you get dislocations where the public feels left out of the deal. And the regulators have a different agenda. And all of a sudden we come colliding together and everybody's got all these different priorities and we're all riding different horses in different directions. And guess what, all the public gets out of it is you guys look like chaos. I mean, this doesn't make any sense to

us. And it didn't feel like we were a part of the train ride anyway.

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And I think this Committee provides a unique venue where all the stakeholders are brought together. And I think that deliberate venue that you've created here should help arrest some of the concerns about coziness. There is a need for all the stakeholders to be together and maybe some conversation with the public about this process and how it works, and why it was formed, and how that's shaped, but there is a process that this group uses to evaluate intentionally the risks on the deck to set those priorities to make sure we're in sync so that when we go back to our collective stakeholders, we may not be in agreement, but at least we understand why. Why were these choices made?

And I think that helps bind us together. When we look at other industries as we were looking at safety management systems

in other industries, you see that it didn't just fall to the operators of the airlines. It didn't just fall to the operators of the hospitals. It didn't just fall to the chemical manufacturers. They had a role to play, but there was a collective industry effort that was coordinated and synchronized to advance to zero as a bigger group.

And I think that both/and
proposition is kind of what I'd just like to
float out to this group, is you're sort of
almost there, you know? We're here. We're
talking about metrics. We're kind of talking
about the right things. But then we go apart.
We never really close the deal intentionally
on what are the priorities? What's the plan?
Why are we making these trades and choices?
And getting sync about them. And I think a
little bit more deliberate effort by this
group to do that serves this getting to zero
effort on a bigger scale and it helps even the
operators kind of synchronize their plans as

they get back into their role of marshaling SMS within their companies.

I just wanted to float that out there, just kind of an observation. I think it's very timely coming into tomorrow's conversation, but I don't want to hear it as supplanting the goals and directions of SMS.

It's more of an augmenting. I think it's a both/and, not an either/or. Thanks.

ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: Good.

Back to Rich. You said something, Rich, about when the EFV is activated and you need to go dig it up to find it. Then you'll have to call and wait three days. If in your state that's not considered an emergency ticket, then there's something wrong. Essential public service is discontinued to a house, you need to be able to dig it up in three hours.

Just a comment.

All right. We're caught up with the agenda. It's about lunch time, but you've had your lunch.

Move onto

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(Laughter.)

the next item, which is Mr. Mayberry. And
he's going to give us a briefing on all the
things that PHMSA and him have to put up with
from NTSB, OIG, GAO, congressional people. I

7 feel sorry for both of you.

MR. MAYBERRY: Yes, thank you.

ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI:

ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: So with

10 that, go ahead.

MR. MAYBERRY: Appreciate the condolences, Mr. Chairman, and it shouldn't take more than about an hour, hour-and-a-half, I think, max, top end.

(Laughter.)

MR. MAYBERRY: But, no, I'm actually going to try to shave some time off the 15 minutes I have. And just to let you know, just to clarify, when you ask me how I'm doing on what's going on, when I say, oh, not much, you know, don't take that too seriously though, because I think you'll see in the

slides I'm going to go through here real quickly there's a lot going on. There's a lot of good work being done by our staff with whom I'm very appreciative. But, yes, we're not standing still. That's the message here. And I know many of you have been involved in some of these mandates and dealing with the recommendations that we have.

You know, there's a summary. It's the congressional mandates of which we have 48 NTSB recs, the OIG recs. And I think the GAO recs I really don't go into, but for the record I'll have this for your perusal at a later time.

I need to apologize. Going to mandates, I've got a version here that's -well, no, okay. That's an okay version. I
thought I had a different internally-tracked
version. I fooled myself. But there is color
coding here. Green means good, complete or on
track and yellow means in progress. And then
red means late or we're not going to meet the

1 date.

just going to summarize. The first one there was Statutory Mandate No. 2, administrative enforcement civil penalty. It's just the general category. That was in section 2. There are three of those that we have satisfied already. This one in particular under our administrative section deals with our new civil penalty authority.

Dropping down to the bottom there.

And I'll be glad to answer any questions you have off-line or, you know, if we have time at the end. Section 5, that last one, IMP expansion and classification replacement. I really won't go into that. We talked about that yesterday and we have the work shop coming up in April.

Again, with the IMP expansion section 5, this one actually -- I didn't really talk about it yesterday, but it deals with looking at the seven-year reassessment

interval for gas and establishing standards for exceeding that by six months. And we're considering that for rulemaking.

Moving on to leak detection.

That's one that's near and dear to a lot of people. Section 8, you know, if appropriate, based on our study that we completed, you know, that's right above there in section 8(a), draft regulations that deal with leak detection, you know, regulations for liquid pipelines. We have a rulemaking in progress on that.

The second one on administrative enforcement down there, the other blue one, section 10. that deals with our 194 regulation, the spill response and to actually add language that allows us to enforce that section. That's complete.

Moving on to -- like I said, there are 48 of them. The last, the third of the administrative ones dealt with the develop the presiding official, which we've stood that up

to change how our due process is handled and having one dedicated person to being a presiding official. And that's been implemented for a time now.

Gathering lines. We have a report. Section 21 required us to write a report. We've finished that report. It's in concurrence, and that's going to be shipped to the Hill after it gets through our internal concurrence process.

You know, basically that wanted us to look at the sufficiency of current regulations, to look at exemptions and look at the economic impacts of pulling gathering lines into regulations. And we do have a report on that one. It's in concurrence.

Let's see. Lastly, just our R&D report that we transmit to Congress every two years. That's been completed. And that just discusses the results of our R&D program that we do as sort of an accountability report to the Congress that is currently -- it's been

written. It's just in our final concurrence process.

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Now moving on to the NTSB. We have a number of open recommendations. Many of them you're quite familiar with, but there are some older ones I just wanted to highlight. The 04-1, that actually came out of the Cohasset failure a number of years ago, back in 2004. It had to do with putting pipe into service that couldn't be verified that it was transported in accordance with the API standard. They want us to remove that exemption. That's in the Gas Rule and we've got that in a proposed rule, but NTSB is going to wait until that rule is final, until we get closure on that.

out in the same failure. It was related to truck transportation and the development of a standard, which has been developed. It's part of our incorporation by reference rulemaking business, so that one's still open but

acceptable. But we're planning to incorporate that by reference.

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And then coming out of the top one there, out of the Carmichael, Mississippi failure, had to do with performing a seam study and implementing the results of that study. Just to put it simply, we've had two phases. We completed phase one. We just started phase two a little bit ago. That's a study that's costing us a little over \$4 That's probably one of the more million. expensive R&D projects we've done. I don't know of any that are higher. Just stay tuned on phase two. But that one remains open, acceptable.

Then down there at the bottom, 11-8, has to do with operators providing system-specific information to emergency response agencies. As many of you know, we stood up a Public Awareness Working Group and also an Emergency Response Working Group. We're going to look at the results of those groups to

develop our action plan going forward, whether or not there will be rulemaking involved, or an alternative action that will hopefully address that recommendation there. I know we've got many from industry and the public involved in that initiative.

And then 11-9 related to control room. This also, like the one before that, came out of the Marshall, Michigan spill. And this requires -- I'm sorry, this one came out of the, sorry, San Bruno, requiring control room operators to call 911. And we have rulemaking on this that we hope to propose. We did issue an advisory bulletin that we hoped that would deal with this, but NTSB was looking for a little bit more substantive requirements, so we're looking to address it possibly through regulation to deal with that.

Then 11-10, also out of San Bruno, related to control rooms. This has to do with leak detection on control rooms. And we have an R&D project underway with that right now

Page 211 1 that remains open, acceptable. I'm summarizing these, so if you 2 3 have any questions, please feel free to chime in. And then 11-11 -- yes? 4 MEMBER KUPREWICZ: Could you go 5 back to -- yes, to 01. So where do we stand 6 on the first phase? You guys have got the 7 report. Has it been made public? 8 9 MR. MAYBERRY: We've got the 10 report. It's public. MEMBER KUPREWICZ: 11 Okay. Yes. MR. MAYBERRY: And then we're in 12 13 phase 2 right now. ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: 14 Alan, let me ask a question, too. You have a lot of 15 16 these things that are open, acceptable 17 response, recommend closure, but not closed yet. Are you just waiting for NTSB to close 18 it? 19 20 MR. MAYBERRY: We tried. Yes, we 21 sent a letter to NTSB last April with the

status of all these, and we were looking to

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possibly get closure on these based on the action to date. Rulemaking is in progress, for instance, for the truck standard. Issuing an advisory bulletin about calling 911. But they really want to see final rules. Because it wasn't a "should," it was "require." And, you know, there's no in between on that in the advisory bulletin. We don't regulate, as we know, by advisory bulletin.

Okay. I did 11. And 11-16,
assist the California CPUC in conducting a
compressive audit. We have done that. We
were hoping to get closure on that as well.
We probably would have, but the CPUC also has
the counterpart to this recommendation that's
still open with them. So when they get
closure for that, we will hopefully be okay to
get closure on this one.

We've spent a lot of time in

California on a number of issues. I know we

had our state audit this year and had actually
an enhanced audit and spent just a good bit of

time there. Lot of good work that's been done there, too.

Marshall, Michigan incident and this has to do with issuing an advisory bulletin describing the circumstances and the deficiencies we observed related to that incident there. And, specifically, this one relates to integrity management. There's another one I'll talk about in a minute that's also an advisory bulletin. That one has been written. It's in final concurrence.

Then 12-9 also from that -- I'm sorry. I was dropping down to 12-10, the other advisory bulletin we issued on January 28th. And this is related to spill response plans. It was to advise operators to -- first off, of the circumstances around the incident in Marshall and then to look at their facility response plan and update the plan as necessary. So that was that one.

And then related to the OIG, we've

actually, on this, actually of the nine recommendations that were issued after the hazardous liquid audit, there are three that are open. Just one here for particular interest is update the IM requirements, mandate for baseline and recurring assessments for non-line pipe facilities. So we're looking at that right now as far as with the cost benefit analysis. Again, that's non-line pipe facilities.

That's one of the issues they had noted is, you know, we do a pretty good job related to line pipe, but they had noticed, and some of us have discussed in this room, kind of an uptick in our spills in non-pipe facilities. So that was what they were looking for us to do there, again under assessment.

And really we have some responses to the GAO that we're responding to recommendations there. They're in concurrence, but I really didn't target those

Page 215 1 to really go over, because there's really not much to say about those. With that, I think 2 hopefully I made up a little bit of time. 3 ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: 4 questions for Alan? Any comments? 5 6 MR. WIESE: I have a question for Alan. 7 8 ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: Go ahead. 9 MR. WIESE: Where are you, Alan, 10 on that -- no. 11 (Laughter.) MR. WIESE: Just for the 12 13 Committee's benefit, and particularly for newer members, I'd like to point out that, 14 prior to Deep Water Horizon, we had completed 15 almost all statutory mandates, we had no GAO 16 17 or IG open recommendations, and we had six NTSB recommendations, all of which were 18 successfully underway. And the NTSB was 19 20 happy. So apparently things were working 21 really well at that point, and they went downhill for the better part of a year. 22

I just point this out to say, this is what happens in re-authorization, when you have a spate of accidents right before the hearings.

And so it's not that we wouldn't have worked on a lot of these things anyway, you know, but as Rick is constantly reminding me, and I do fully agree and understand, you know, these become priorities. I mean, you have to take care of them. That's all there is to it. There's a lot of other important work, you know, that doesn't happen because these -- but they have to be taken care of.

So I just wanted to give you some assurance that we'll provide you -- you know, so you'll have the materials yourself to look at later, because that was -- Alan had to do it in whirlwind fashion here. But, you know, we're set on trying to clear up that record again before re-authorization. It will be a bit of a challenge for reasons maybe Cameron will go into in his next presentation. So thanks.

ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: Thank
you, Jeff.

The next presentation is by

Cameron on PHMSA's regulatory agenda. And

next to Cheryl, we appreciate everything that

Cameron's done supporting the Committee the

last couple days.

MR. SATTERTHWAITE: Oh, no, not a problem. Thank you. Cameron, Regulations

Office. This presentation is pretty close to the presentation that was done in December, and we'll just kind of go through it.

A lot of what the administrator spoke about earlier is really caught in this slide. This happens to our rules, as far as significant rules versus non-significant rules and so forth. The majority of our rules are significant at this time, and as a result they have to go through a little more scrutiny, as they have to go through not only our office, but they have to go up to OST and OMB before getting out to the Federal Register. And as

Cynthia said earlier, it's supposed to be estimated about a month in OST, three months in OMB, but sometimes things don't happen like you intend for them or they plan for, for a variety of reasons. For our rules that are not significant, normally just goes straight from PHMSA right to the Federal Register. And it's been a long time since we've seen that.

The determination of what is significant versus non-significant is not made by PHMSA. So basically it is made by OMB.

And, at this point, we pretty much issue what we believe it to be and we try to give supporting evidence behind that, but at the end of the day they make that determination.

I'm just going to go through a couple rules. As was noted earlier, Haz Liquid Rule has disappeared for quite a while and it is out of our office. You know, hopefully it will come along soon.

(Laughter.)

MR. SATTERTHWAITE: The Gas Rule.

As Cynthia talked about, she's in the process of reviewing that before it goes up to OST and the OMB process, so that is in progress right now. And of course it will be dealing with expansion of IM beyond HCAs, assessment methods, valve spacing and so forth. The integrity verification process is on a different slide, but basically we may be considering that in the same rule.

The Excavation Damage Provision

Rule is also past our office and into the

OST/OMB cycle. And of course you all voted on
that about in December of 2012. So it is in
the process.

Miscellaneous Rule as well, which was voted on back in 2012. It's out of our office and it also is in the OST/OMB process. And that we're going to be addressing, you know, leak surveys and ethanol regulations, pipe transportation, things such as that.

EFVs as well is out of our office and is in the OST/OMB process at this point in

time. And of course we're looking at going beyond single-family residences, and getting into multi-family residences, and commercial buildings, and so forth. So hopefully, you know, when that publishes sometime, sometime soon hopefully, we'll definitely welcome the discussion that will result.

Standards Update Rule, which was voted upon at the last meeting, back in December, and we just finished wrapping up.
We'll get started on drafting that final rule.
So of course that's still within PHMSA.

This is the Operations and

Qualifications Cost Recovery, aka

Miscellaneous 2 Rule. And that one is also in

development, in the later stages of

development within PHMSA at this point. And

then that we plan on addressing incident

reporting, cost recovery and getting into the

renewal process for special permits.

Plastic Pipe Rule. You know, that is in the middle stages of development and

Page 221 1 we're basically looking at getting into, authorizing the use of PA12 within the 2 3 regulations and also getting into design factors and tracking and traceability and so 4 forth. 5 Also we're starting work on the 6 Rupture Detection and Valve Rule. Of course 7 that was based on, you know, a couple of 8 9 mandates that were mentioned earlier, and of 10 course refers to the reports and GAO, portions 11 of that were part of that as well. And that's it. That's all I have. 12 13 So, back to you, Mr. Chairman. ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: 14 15 you, Cameron. 16 Any questions for Cameron? 17 (No audible response.) 18 ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: Anybody who is awake? 19 20 MR. SATTERTHWAITE: I'm not taking 21 any -- no, I'm just --(Laughter.) 22

1 ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: Cameron. All right. You have a question? 2 3 MEMBER DENTON: Todd Denton, Liquids. Never thought I would say this, but 4 you know, I think we support getting these 5 out. You know, we don't know, we may not 6 necessarily agree with everything that comes 7 8 out, but uncertainty doesn't help anyone. And 9 I know you guys are doing everything you can, 10 but we do support getting these out as quickly 11 as we can. ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: Any other 12 13 comments such as Todd's? That was very good. MEMBER JOY: Michele Joy, Liquids. 14 Also support what Todd said. I also have a 15 question on, I think you called Miscellaneous 16 17 2? There was a lot of big stuff in there. 18 when do we expect to see that? Well, for that 19 MR. SATTERTHWAITE: 20 rule, right now it's in the later stages of 21 going through reviews, and with PHMSA

management at this point. So it's in the

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	Page 223
1	later stages of that. And right now it's
2	probably going to be a significant rule, so it
3	will probably go into the OST and OMB loop.
4	That could be like one month in OST,
5	estimated, three months in OMB estimated. And
6	so it might be a while.
7	MEMBER JOY: So this is just to
8	get the NPRM out?
9	MR. SATTERTHWAITE: Yes, this is
10	just for the NPRM.
11	MEMBER JOY: And there was no
12	ANPRM?
13	MR. SATTERTHWAITE: There was no
14	ANPRM for this rule.
15	MEMBER JOY: Okay. So we'll just
16	watch with baited breath. Okay. Thank you.
17	MR. SATTERTHWAITE: No problem.
18	ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: Andy, you
19	had a comment?
20	MEMBER DRAKE: Andy Drake with the
21	Gas Group. I'd just like to echo Todd's
22	point. I think it's an odd position for us to

Thank

be in. And that was the essence of the question to Cynthia earlier, is we are in a place where I think it's helpful to call the constituents, particularly the public and the legislature, to see some of their requirements met and some rules that are tangible come out where they can see them.

A lot of work has gone into it, and I would hate to see our credibility compromised after all this effort to get basically no points on the score board. So we are in the same place, and we would like to see those moved forward, at least get into a public place where we can have conversations about them out loud with everybody.

you, Andy. Any other comments? Chad?

MEMBER ZAMARIN: Thanks. Chad

Zamarin, Gas Committee. Just a question. You

know, I appreciate there's a lot of

transparency being provided around the PHMSA

process, but we hear a lot about things

ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI:

stalling at OMB. Is there a way for us to understand better their process? Should they be coming to these meetings and talking to us, so that they can understand the urgency and support that we all have for moving these things forward? Is that a possibility?

(Laughter.)

MR. WIESE: You know, we'd be glad to relay the Committee's request. I can't, and I don't want to sit here and pin it on OMB. I mean, the way I'd like to phrase this is we are working about as hard as we can to get all of those rules through. I do find it odd when the industry asks for the regulations. And I note the difference. You say we're ready to have the conversation, right? So I get it. And I think you've all been around the track a few times and you know happens in re-authorization.

So we'd be glad to relay, you know, your concerns. And it's not necessarily just, you know, at OMB. I mean, there is a

bottleneck in the system, you know, and it happens everywhere you go. I think we delivered a huge rule to Cynthia on the Gas Rule and she's, you know, digesting every page of it.

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So, but I will say this, so the gas guys at least will hopefully back me up on this, we were very transparent about the development of all that stuff. You know, we had a lot of public dialogue about these things. I don't think there's any real mystery to what we we're going to propose. You know, how it ends up in the final, you know, I can't say, but you know, you understand, I think. We would really like to get the conversation underway. But a lot of good work has been done by the PHMSA staff. I'd be remiss if I didn't defend them and say that they've worked really hard, you know, to get stuff out.

So any rate, we'll move it as fast as we can. And I promise you we're on that

1 job. Thank you, though.

ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: All right. Thank you very much. The next presenters are Linda and Alan to speak about performance metrics.

MR. WIESE: They've asked me to do a segue.

ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: Jeff's going to sort of start the conversation.

MR. WIESE: So we're back, Carl.

We're going to talk about performance metrics

now. So we've had a lot of conversations, and

I'm very thankful for them with Carl, but

we've also had a lot of conversations with all

facets really of the Advisory Committee. And

talking about this, Sue was talking this

morning about the challenge of performance

metrics. I think until you dive into it you

don't fully understand.

You know, I would say a couple things. One is: there is no metric that's definitive and gives all the answers. It can

lead you to ask questions, but no metric by itself, you know, is definitive. You know, a company can have, you know, an unpredictable, you know, extremely low-probability, high-consequence event. And apparently the performance is met, but they might have a really long track record.

So here's what I'd like to say, and I know Andy for sure, and Rick, and a few others know that when we were doing integrity management, remember, well over a decade ago we focused on performance metrics. So we have had performance metrics on our Web site for well over a decade on this stuff.

I'm going to spin through these really fast, because I think the important stuff is what's under development now. I'm here just to make a point to you that we have been focused on metrics for well over a decade, but we haven't done a very good job of serving them up to people. You've seen, with all the work that we have, we tend to solve a

problem, put it up on the Web site and then move on to the next problem. Right? And I think we're going to try to do a little drop back and look at that again real quickly.

But, for people who don't know
this, there is a ton of information on our Web
site, anything from accident/incident to
infrastructure information. We were really
very early on in the transparency agenda
moving all of our enforcement actions up onto
the Web. So, you know, Carl, you might, you
know, know other groups. I'm not aware of
that many groups who are as aggressive on
enforcement transparency as we are.

All of the integrity management stuff is up there. You can get to this aggregated nationally. You can get it at a state level. You can get it broken down to individual operators. There are raw data which you can download. In fact, that's where we started. I think, Carl, when I first got to know you, you had to download this huge

Excel file, and we'd say good luck. You know, hope your Excel skills are better than ours, and have at it.

Then we started putting up summary tables and graphs. And I think I speak for Alan and Linda in spades, when I say we were very frustrated at the ability to analyze data and get information out. There's tons of data. Information is harder to come by.

So I'm just going to do this really quickly. On the left-hand side, you'll see on our Web site, these are what the pages are called. The kinds of information you get for the hazardous liquid, gas gathering, gas transmission or gas distribution. Again, I kind of made the point earlier at a higher level. You know, go on, you can find about cast iron inventories in all the states, all the federal enforcement, all accident/incidents sliced several different ways on that.

Let's see, the other things that

I've missed here. EFVs installed. I know you can get leaks. We'll be talking a lot more, by the way, I think as we go forward about methane emission reduction. And so the leak data becomes really important as we get into that.

I think I've already covered those two things. So, I'm going to serve it up to my colleagues here in just a second, but we took an initial shot inside of the program.

We're not Web designers, I will say. It must be obvious to all.

(Laughter.)

MR. WIESE: So but we try to do a lot of things ourselves. So we thought, hey, why don't we organize the data better and make it easier for people to get at it. And this was our initial shot. I had hoped to have Jeannie Shiffer, who kind of runs a lot of the media and external intergovernmental affairs things here, but she's in the Bakken right now with a bunch of other people from PHMSA. So

Jeannie would say, oh, that was dumb. She didn't like what we did. And that's exactly how she'd tell me.

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So she's got some ideas and she wanted me to just throw them out for you, just for comment. Feel free to comment. much more interested in a graphical presentation where you can come in and say, hey, what are you interested in? That yellow box that's hard to see, it says U.S. Are you interested in the U.S. data? Pick your state. The table that comes up to the next I have expanded version of. It would show you by --I will correct fiscal year. I don't think many people besides the U.S. Government operate in this whacked fiscal year basis that we're in. But a lot of ways of arraying data for different kinds of operators.

So we're going to undertake an effort with Jeannie's help to try to make the current data that we have more useful to people. I will, you know, hasten add -- and

here's by the way, she said for those of you like Jeff who are not graphically-oriented, here's a table you could use, you know, to get at the same kind of data.

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So we'll make a better effort to use what we have and make it easier for you to get to, but I think we really would welcome your ideas. Jeannie tends to look at what she calls the Web analytics. When people come into the PHMSA Web site, what are they hitting? What are they looking for? She uses that to drive it. And I think we have debated that extensively with her, and I'll say I don't know if that's driven by current events, you know, and how long of a period of time are you looking over, and all that. welcome your thoughts on how to make the data that we have more readily available to people. And I think we can do a better job of it.

I just want to close by saying there is a scad of data out there. There's not enough analysis. And I think you'll hear

a little bit more about analysis as I hand it over to my colleagues here. So, Alan?

MR. MAYBERRY: Thank you, Jeff.

Now, Jeff led you into, you know, how we're looking to improve the access to the data that we currently collect, and really develop a one-stop-shop front end, if you will, that makes it more conveniently accessible. Because one of the complaints we've had, among others, is that, you know, it just takes too many clicks to find the data. So hopefully that will address that.

Meanwhile, we've set up teams,

Linda dealing with the Liquid Team and I'm

leading the effort with the Gas Team, to

identify a few key metrics that really

represent the industry, the performance of the

industry. Because, an example here is, you

know, currently -- and we've heard this

before, there's just a few metrics that we've

put out there that we, PHMSA, or others in the

industry perhaps, use when we go and present

to different groups on pipeline incidents, pipeline incidents that have involved fatalities or injuries.

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In this case there are two that I have identified under that first major bullet, or the second one, the liquid pipeline accidents with environmental impact. are two key metrics that we actually have right now that are internal to PHMSA. They're also public, by the way, internal to DOT. that's how we're measured, or one of the measures that we're rated against, as far as the performance of our job, if you will. you know, those are only two measures, and it's really not reflective of the industry as a whole. So we set off to stand up these two teams to identify 6 to 12 pipeline performance measures that are reflective of the industry, of the performance.

And this is a review, by the way.

We did provide an update. I think I provided
an update at the last meeting, shortly after

we kicked off. And we had a little bit of a hiccup because I think one of our meetings happened during the furlough. We had just been furloughed when the meeting was stood up. And we have since had one meeting with the Gas Committee, and then have since had like a couple of conference calls as well.

But anyway, the bottom bullet there is kind of the punch line of what we're trying to get out of our initial effort here with standing up the teams. Now I'll turn it over to Linda to talk about the Liquid Team.

MS. DAUGHERTY: You know, I'm going to back up for just a second. I want to emphasize something that Alan mentioned that may need some additional emphasis.

Those two bullets, the accident/incidents resulting in fatality or serious injury, and liquid pipeline accidents with environmental impact, you know, he mentioned those are on our DOT score card, and we're held responsible, our performance. He

means we're literally held responsible. Our performance appraisals are dependent on improving results on those two. So we have a very personal interest. I know a lot of companies do that. We also do that in our agency.

group. We've had a couple of discussions, and our general approach is to start with identifying the big questions. You know, Alan mentioned that we're looking at 6 to 12 performance indicators, and our real goal is to get these agreed to prior to reauthorization. And the reason why we need to do this is because I can't tell you how many conferences we have all been to where I'll get up, and I'll say this is what the data is and this is what it tells about the pipeline infrastructure.

And then Peter Lidiak or Andy will get up and he'll say, no, no, no, that's not quite right. This is what the data is and

this is how the infrastructure is doing. And then Carl blows us both out of the water, because he'll stand up just right off the bat and he'll say you both are wrong because here is the correct data and here's what it says.

And we oftentimes use the same data and come up with totally different results. And it all depends on how you present it, and how you analyze it, and what particular metrics you're looking at.

So this attempt is to try to get the different stakeholders together in groups and let's talk through these things about what is really important.

So on the Liquid Team, the first thing we're trying to do is identify what the big questions are. What are the questions we need to answer, and then figure out what measures would answer those questions. And I'll give you some examples here in a little bit of what I'm talking about. The third part is once we identify what measures we need, we

have to determine do we already have the data?

And we may well have the data, because we collect a lot of information.

And then the fourth is is it a good quality data? Do we need to go back and check it? Is it available to everyone? One of the key points of these measures is we want that data to be available so Carl can sit in his office in Washington and pull the information the same as Massoud can pull it, or Andy Black can pull it. We're all accessing the same set of information so we have the same read.

And then the last part is, you know, we have to make sure that if we don't have the data, we get it or we fix the quality and that the teams are consistent. And, you know, while we're running two teams separately, there's always the danger of running off in different directions. So we need to check in occasionally with each other, and make sure that if we end up with a metric

that refers to serious incidents the Gas Team doesn't use significant incidents without a good explanation or reason. So we're trying to run in parallel together.

MR. MAYBERRY: Okay. Related to the Gas Team -- and by the way, the teams include a cross-section of the stakeholder community. I know Carl's been involved in both committees, but we have representatives from the gas operators and then our team, the Gas Team is chaired by myself and Christina Sames. We have a charter that we developed the first day we had a conference call.

But anyway, we're looking at metrics and measures -- when we're looking at metrics and developing these key measures -- by the way, we did mention this. I wanted to reiterate that these are measures that we're planning to put on our Web site and make very public, so that when you go to our Web site you'll readily see them. And we're also not just looking at operator measures, we're also

looking at measuring the regulator. So, you know, obviously it would look at the operator performance, performance of the infrastructure, and then also regulations and then our oversight.

Initially, our approach was to evaluate some key measures and define them based on the data we currently collect. And we looked at the data that we currently collect in our first two meetings or so, and I'll have examples of those coming up.

And then we plan to coordinate
between the Liquid Team and our team to just
make sure we have a consistent picture.

Obviously there are going to be differences
between the two teams a little bit because,
you know, liquid and gas pipelines aren't
exactly the same. You don't have spills on
gas pipelines. There are just some necessary
differences between the two.

And also, by the way, while we're laying out the measures that we currently have

identifying gaps for future information collection. And we're not just -- well, it's a brainstorming session to look at the measures that we currently have, the next process or the next iteration would be to match them up against our objectives, you know, of we as a regulator and then perhaps the public operators, the various objectives to see which ones -- a subset of all what we measure are relevant. And then also where are the gaps? You know, where do we need to build new measures?

I did mention -- already said post publicly. I think this is a repeat. We have representation. And then a slightly different approach, where the Liquid Team looked at, started with some questions up front and then going to match metrics to that. We're looking at metrics that we currently have, matching that to what our objectives are and then looking at gaps. At the end, we're going to

end up in the same place with slightly different approaches.

And then, like the last bullet says, we're looking at data we currently measure. And by the way, this isn't just data that PHMSA collects. We also are looking at possibly other data sources as well. It wouldn't be limited to the Government data. It could also include operator data, or data collected by advocacy groups.

MS. DAUGHERTY: So that comes back to me. And on the Liquid Team, I mentioned some of these big questions. So we started talking about what would the public or various stakeholders want to know? So some of the basic questions. You know, what is the impact of liquid pipelines on people and the environment? And then what kind of measure might be used to, you know, evaluate that? How many times have liquid pipelines impacted people and the environment, you know? Okay. What about how the pipeline industry is

managing integrity? Are they doing a good job or not? You know, what is being done to reduce pipeline risk? And so you get the idea.

Some of these questions are trying to figure out people want to know. We talked about that earlier. Sometimes we push information because we think, well, here's what we've got. Here's the information relayed. We're trying to figure out what do people need to know to improve confidence, or maybe not that, maybe just get an accurate assessment of the health of our infrastructure.

Some of the questions. You know, is there a different risk associated with different types of hazardous liquids? You know, what kind of oversight? And Alan mentioned that.

One of the issues that came out
was kind of funny. If the number of
inspections is not an indicator of performance

-- because someone says if I have a big system, I get inspected a lot more, so therefore there's a greater likelihood I'm going to have an enforcement action. Because it might be something minor, but I'll have a greater number of them. Is that an indicator of performance? I don't know. Is enforcement an indicator of performance? If a company is inspected more often, they may have more exposure enforcement items. So something to think about.

My last slide on the big
questions; I mentioned it earlier this
morning, is pipeline performance more or less
important than operator performance, how the
operator manages risks? That's not an easy
question to answer, and it's probably a
combination of the two. But then when you
start looking at management of risk, how does
that reflect on a company or the national
safety culture, as far as the pipeline safety
culture? And we'll talk about safety culture

tomorrow, or this afternoon actually.

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Then also we're looking at data quality. If we have bad data quality, does that really reflect what's going on in the infrastructure? You know, how do we make sure that we're reflecting the truth of the matter?

MR. MAYBERRY: Okay. Back to the And with apologies to the team, Gas Team. actually these next couple of slides we actually didn't cover when I went over my presentation with the group a couple weeks ago, but what I thought I would do would be to, sort of, advance the conversation of what I think we're going to be talking about at our next meeting. In fact, I know we will. will be on our agenda because we are trying to whittle down the list, if you will, to a subset of what we measure. And a little bit later -- I'm kind of approaching this backwards, but I'm going to show here some measures, potentially, that we could be talking about. It's really to seed the

1 conversation.

Obviously these would match up against our mission, support our mission, but they also, Sue, to your point earlier today, we're looking to add context to these two. I mean that's key. You know, yes, it's nice to know numbers of accidents, but that's really without context. It's just a raw number. But to know like at a rate or, you know, per distance, I think that does have meaning to it.

So here are just a few to seed the conversation, like if your objective is maintaining pipeline integrity, which obviously it is, we might have a measure of leaks per mile, or incidents per mile, or repairs per mile. You know, currently we have operators report anomalies, their repairs, their immediate repairs, their 180-day repairs. But, you know, if you take that a little bit further and add context to it, you know, consider the length of the system, then

that would really give you a rate and be maybe a more meaningful measure.

Then an objective of protecting human safety and the environment. Incidents with impact on the public for a mile, or incidents with environmental impact per mile, again with context. Then with the objective of protecting high-consequence areas, you know, incidents in HCAs or per HCA mile.

Again, we're matching these with objectives which actually, you know, support our mission of protecting the public and protecting the environment.

Again, some more examples here.

Complying with the regulations. And kind of tiptoeing into this one, you know, Linda brought up some good points about this.

Violations per inspection. You know, this is just an example. We're scratching our heads with this one a good bit because, you know, no two violations are the same. You know, I would view a violation, say related to markers

differently than a violation related to integrity management. So that's something we're going to have to work on. I know our inspection program now has some ability to rate the issue, as far as what we call area findings related to the violation, but that's something we'll look at, too.

There's another one there just related to maintaining safety of the infrastructure and just -- you know, we already have miles of cast iron, wrought iron, bare steel. You know, in the next few slides, in our initial meeting we did lay out -- oh, is it -- I'm out of time? Okay. No? Sorry.

(Laughter.)

MR. MAYBERRY: I knew I was getting close. Okay. And I won't go through these, but this is what we currently collect, or what we talked about; I'm sorry, at our initial meeting, but it's based on what we currently collect.

We spent a good bit of time

related to in-line inspections. You know, currently we track inspection methods.

There's really not a way to track like completion of baseline assessments. We spent a good bit of time with that. We may tinker with that a little bit more as far as the difference between assessments and in-line inspections. You know, in-line inspection is a subset of assessments. It's in the assessment methods. So that's one area we're looking at. And then just some others. I think I've already mentioned that.

Also, with the gas side we're looking at transmission and distribution. So related to the distribution side here's what we currently measure. And again, at our next meeting we're going to be looking at developing a subset of this using perhaps that format I showed you with the table, matching these up with objectives to determine, you know, which ones are best, which ones should we end up with that meet those objectives?

These are kind of the bonus slides for you today, but they're just some other ideas to consider. Again, metrics with context. I think some of these are similar. I apologize. Linda and I had separate presentations and we kind of force-fit them together today. So these are some examples of measures that we could have.

MS. DAUGHERTY: We're going to spring something on Alan here. We're going to take a break from our presentation. We have some more to cover. What we want to do is finish our presentation, then we have members of the teams that are going to speak for just a few minutes. But we have someone on a very tight time frame that we need to shift to a different topic, give them an opportunity to talk, and then we'll come back to this later. So with apologies to everyone, we're going to shift on you really quick. Okay?

MR. WIESE: Can I ask really

If I may, can I ask,

quickly? Forgive me.

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1	anyone who's presenting, are you on a really
2	tight timeline?
3	(No audible response.)
4	MR. WIESE: Okay. The reason I'm
5	asking this, at least of the panelists needs
6	to get back to D.C. pretty quickly. But
7	they've taken time out to come here and help
8	us with the SMS. I'd like to be respectful.
9	If the Committee will indulge us, we'll just
10	take a time out on the performance measures,
11	come back, and wrap it up at the end, and
12	shift to the agenda item here at the end of
13	the day. Acceptable?
14	(No audible response.)
15	MR. WIESE: Very good. So just
16	give us a second to get organized with the
17	panel and that's what we'll do. Massoud will
18	entertain you with stories and jokes.
19	(Laughter.)
20	ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: This is
21	not a break, Mr. Pevarski.
22	(Laughter.)

ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: If you are taking an official break, come back in three minutes.

(Whereupon, at 2:49 p.m. off the record until 2:52 p.m.)

MR. WIESE: All right. If we could get going again, appreciate it. Very good. We're getting them trained. They know that the next thing up is I start using names, you know?

Very good. Well, listen, as

people are getting settled back in, I have the

pleasure of introducing a panel of people that

we've cajoled into coming over to talk to you.

Been familiar with both of -- all of the

panelists actually for quite a while. Our

lines of business intersect quite a bit. But

I'm also very familiar with the fact that

they've been engaged with safety management

systems for some time in their current jobs

and in previous jobs.

Part of our reason for bringing

them up today, Ron and I and the other members of the SMS Committee who are here, including Massoud, were constantly juggling what do we have time for tomorrow? And we decided that, as a nice segue to tomorrow, we'd invite some people up with a lot of experience on SMS just to share their experiences with you, so you'd understand that you're not alone in this journey. There are other people going.

So with that, what I intend to do is sort of one at a time we'll bring people up and talk really quickly. I'll give a short bio. We'll pause at the end of their presentation for any quick questions you might have of them. I know Jordan needs to be back in D.C. at 4:00, which is why I've begged your indulgence and adjust this a little bit.

So with no further ado, I'll introduce Jordan Barab. Jordan is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health. I think he's been on that job since 2009. Been involved in OSHA matters

for a long time, but one of the things I think you'll find particularly interesting was Jordan also worked for the U.S. Chemical Safety Board. In fact, Bill Hoyle said to say hello. So we worked with Bill. And Bill is nominally a member of our Committee, although he can't make many meetings, he keeps commenting on all these things.

So Jordan has a long history in working with process safety management. And many of these are operators. About a third of operators, third government, third public.

Many of the operators are quite familiar with PSM, but I was afraid that others might not be. So I've asked Jordan to really talk about their experience with that.

So with that, I'll turn to Jordan.

MR. BARAB: All right. Thank you very much and I want to thank you for your indulgence. I'm sorry. I've got some tight deadlines, but I hope to stay here for as much of the panel as I can. I've got about a dozen

slides. I'm going to go through them fairly quickly, because I'd like to leave some time for discussion and questions afterwards.

And again, we're talking today
about our Process Safety Management Standard.
This is basically what we call management
systems. And I know that's what you're
discussing here. And it's not unique in its
form. It's similar to other management
systems. And again, we focus on design,
execution and then evaluation. And then based
on that evaluation, correcting what we found.

All of our management systems, and again, this is much broader than just PSM, have the same six elements, and that is, you know, what you can see listed there. We focus quite a bit on worker participation. We found particularly in the cases of, you know, when we're dealing with large chemical plants and refineries that worker participation, having avenues for making sure that workers have some input into not only, you know, any kind of

designing/redesigning the system, but obviously also in terms of identifying hazards and how to address those hazards is extremely important. And then skipping to the end, which is program evaluation and improvement, you know, we try to make this as much of a continuous improvement process as possible.

A little history. PSM became effective in 1992. It came out of, you know, essentially Bhopal, but there were also a number of domestic issues that came up in the early '90s and late '80s in terms of explosions in refineries. There was a big one at Union Carbide in Institute, West Virginia and another large explosion that killed I think 20-something workers at Phillips in Pasadena, Texas.

We were basically under a congressional mandate, we as well as the EPA, to develop this Process Safety Management Standard. On the EPA side it was called the Risk Management Program, which deals more with

community impact, as opposed to ours, which deals with kind of on-plant and worker impact.

Again, we set up a management framework to prevent incidents but also minimize the consequences of any incidents that occur.

We basically, more or less,
divided it into three kind of categories. The
category in green are considered system
design. Again, we mentioned employee
participation. Process safety information.
We need to make sure that all the information
relevant to the process is accessible and is
used.

One of the most important parts is process hazard analysis, where again you're basically -- and we leave this very loose, this whole standard really is performance-based rather than specification-based. In other words, we give some very broad outlines in terms of what a process hazard analysis is and then allow the plant to do its own process hazard analysis. So again, analyzing those

1 hazards is really one of the keys here.

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The orange or the red is system execution. Again, operating procedures, training, contractor safety. Contractor safety was a particularly important issue that came out of the Phillips 66 explosion because we had done a commission and independent study that found the contractors did not receive the same kind of training that the regular plant employees did. These days an increasingly larger and larger percentage of employees that are under these plants are contractors, so we do focus quite a bit on making sure that they receive the same kind of training and that they're operating under the same procedures.

Pre-start-up safety review
extremely important. A large number of the
incidents we identify happen during start-ups
after turnarounds.

Mechanical integrity, again another important issue which we focus on because especially with refineries in the

United States many of them are very old.

Basically the equipment is wearing out. We try to discourage running equipment until it fails. So mechanical integrity is very important.

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Hot work permits. Management of Again, you know, that's basically change. what you take into consideration in terms of the changes in the process when something at the plant changes. And this is something we are probably -- at the urging of the Chemical Safety Board that came out of the 2005 explosion at BP in Texas City, Texas. looking at not just management of change in terms of changing processes or changing equipment or possibly changing chemicals that are used in the plant, but also more or less system changes, management changes. In other words, are you cutting your staffing there and what does that imply for the safety of the process? Are people receiving less training or more training? So we're really trying to

look more at the procedural and some of the staffing issues that can also impact safety at the plant.

Incident investigation, again very important. It's something that is very general right now.

Emergency response and compliance audits. And I'll talk a little bit more about some of these as we move through.

Again, this is a performance standard. All right? So we intentionally make it very flexible. We try to make it comprehensive to basically cover everything in the plant.

Adaptive. Again, the frequently allows the plants to adapt.

And again creative. We consider that the people operating the plant know best how to operate the plant, so we try to leave as much room there for their creativity.

Enforcement is probably the biggest issue here. You know, OSHA has

between, federal OSHA and the state plants, about 2,000 inspectors across the country to address about 8 million work places. So needless to say, we can't get to every work place. I think the figures are more than about on average once every 130 years.

Needless to say, PSM enforcement, when you're talking about a massive chemical complex or a massive refinery, are extremely resource-intensive if you're going to do, you know, again a full inspection. And consequently we don't do a whole to of full inspections.

Pre-2005; that was when again the BP explosion occurred that kill 15 workers in Texas City, we would basically do inspections mostly only based on complaints or if there were major incidents. What we found and, you know, with the help of the Chemical Safety Board, what they found in their investigation is that OSHA did not investigate very many refineries. And the refineries that we did investigate were not done very thoroughly.

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After the BP incident and the investigation we decided that we really needed to do more focused inspections, so we needed to do more comprehensive inspections. what we decided to do was move to what we -we have is our National Emphasis Programs. when OSHA decides that a certain sector or process or industry needs extra attention, we will issue what's called a National Emphasis Program that basically determines how many inspections have to be made by each of our regions.

What we decided to do at that point was basically inspect at least part of every refinery in the country over the next several years. And we issued an NEP in 2007 that again required inspections of just about every refinery in the country. I say just about because we also have a program called our Voluntary Protection Program which is kind of our best of the best and they are exempt from NEP inspections.

1 First of all, we trained our

inspectors, more of them and better in process

3 safety management. We gave them a number of

4 rotating questions they needed to ask. What

5 they would usually do is focus on one unit in

6 every refinery, because it was really

7 | impossible to do all units of all refineries.

interesting. We did a midpoint evaluation in this and we actually -- you know, we looked

And the results of this were

at, evaluated what problems we were finding,

the areas we were finding the most problems.

And we actually sent that out to all the

14 refineries in the refineries in the country

and told them this is where we're finding

16 problems. We haven't visited half of you yet,

but this what we're really going to be looking

18 for.

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And as we progressed through the

20 process we found then that there was no

21 | improvement. Even though we basically told

22 them what we were going to be focusing on,

they still really hadn't addressed those issues. I mean, to a certain extent it was a very valuable experience for us and we hope for them, but it was a sharp learning curve I think for them.

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We also found that especially the associations that represent refineries and the petro-chemical industry would boast about how safe their facilities were and they based those claims on their injury and illness numbers, which we colloquially call slips, trips and falls, which have very little predictive value when it comes to whether or not the plant is going to blow up or not, which is really more determined by other indicators that come out of the process safety process, things that I think you'll probably be discussing here. In fact, I think the previous panel was discussing indicators, and those are the kind of things that we're going to have to focus on more as well. The slips, trips and falls, illness and illness

statistics really don't tell us a whole lot.

In any case, the refinery NEP was concluded in 2011. We then moved -- which we're in the process of now of a chemical facility NEP. This is to a certain extent more difficult because there are many more chemical facilities around the country than there are refineries. They come in all shapes and sizes from the very small kind of batch operation to very large chemical facilities.

But we are in the process of doing that right now. Obviously we're not going to get to every facility in the country.

I want to end by just discussing; and I don't know if this has been discussed at all, but Executive Order 13650, which came out of the West Texas explosion, the fertilizer explosion that killed 15 people, mostly emergency responders and wiped out half the town. On August 1st, the President issued an executive order addressing hazard safety and security in chemical facilities around the

country. And it's kind of co-chaired by EPA,

DHS and the Department of Labor, specifically

OSHA.

And we are really trying to look at the whole horizon -- on-shore, not offshore, horizon of chemical safety and security around the country and what needs to be done to improve that. And it includes communication between the agencies, communication between facilities and communities. It addresses data collection, data transfer, data sharing, which is difficult. It talks about kind of enforcement issues in terms of agency cooperation around enforcement and addresses policy and regulatory issues.

And for us that means looking again at our Process safety Management Standard, which is now 20-something years old and is in dire need of modernization. So we have begun the process. We issued a request for information, RFI, a couple of months ago.

The comment period is still open. I think we're actually going to extend the comment period on that until the end of March. And if any of you are interested, you can go onto the OSHA Web site. There are a bunch of rotating boxes. One of them deals with this executive order and you can find our RFI on there and comment on it, if you'd like to.

But we're trying to deal with a number of issues that have arisen, you know, OVER the last 20 years, some things including emergency response, for example. Between EPA and OSHA there's a lot of information out there about what is present and what the hazards are in different facilities, but there's no requirement really for a facility to actually coordinate operationally with the emergency response people. And so that's something we're looking at.

PSM doesn't really cover reactive chemicals, and those have been a problem in a number of cases, number of explosions. We

have certain exemptions there that may have made sense 20 years ago but don't make sense right now. One of them is, for example, a retail exemption, which means if a facility actually -- if more than 50 percent of its income comes from sales, commercial sales, then it's not covered. And that has run into all kinds of problems. And a number of other issues, that we're going to be addressing through that in terms of modernizing it.

We're trying to do this in coordination with EPA, which again has this Risk Management Program and is very much parallel to OSHA's

It takes us quite a while, quite a bit longer I think than almost any other agency in the Federal Government to issue a standard. The GAO predicted about seven years. I think that's optimistic. And I was also amused at the question about whether we can get OMB to speed things up a little bit. We'd love to jump on that band wagon.

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(Laughter.)

MR. BARAB: But things are relatively slow and we're trying to figure out how to speed this up a little bit and try to get some real results here. Because we do have a lot of the information and I think most of the industry has not only kind of signed onto the whole process safety management concept, but actually, you know, the better part of the industry is way ahead of us and I think there are a lot of practices out there that we can model our future efforts on. So I will stop here and I'd be

glad to take any questions.

ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: Any questions?

MR. WIESE: I just have a comment because I'd like to encourage people. If you haven't seen the RFI, I would encourage you to take a look at it. Particularly I know that the members of the SMS Committee who are here and others were interested in that topic will

see, you know, that we've begun to address some of those subjects within the draft Pipeline Safety Management System.

First of all, I want to thank you for the presentation, but I also think that we're learning a lot from you and hopefully, you know, we'll continue to learn from everyone. That's why we bring people in. And I think it's an attribute of a positive safety culture, which is one of the other things we're wrestling with is how do we learn? You know, I loved Tim's comment earlier today. I guess I'd heard that before, too. He said, what was it, something like, you know, the smart person learns from their mistakes, or whatever, but the wise person learns from other people's mistakes.

(Laugher.)

MR. WIESE: So we would like to, you know, continue to learn, you know, as you go through this process. We would invite a dialogue. I'll send you all the information

about the work shop tomorrow and we hope to have all that up on YouTube. But Bill Hoyle has been very useful. He's been feeding us a lot of -- I think that you know Bill pretty well.

MR. BARAB: Oh, yes. Yes, yes.

MR. WIESE: And Bill has a lot of

8 opinions.

MR. BARAB: Yes.

MR. WIESE: But he's been very helpful in terms of, you know, saying you guys are really ignoring something you need to pay attention to.

But I would like to commend the RFI to people. You may even be interested in commenting on that. But for the SMS in particular it's very important.

MR. BARAB: Yes, and I want to,
you know, double that as well. You know, when
you look at the map of chemical regulation in
this country and all the different agencies
that are involved in different pieces of it,

they all seem to have different systems for regulating and overseeing. So we have a lot to learn obviously from what other agencies are doing and trying to do as well. And we'd be glad to help out any other agencies in those areas where we may be ahead.

MR. WIESE: I'll ask you one other one, if I can. If you could swing a little bit at safety culture, what are doing in regards to safety culture and how does that factor into your SMS?

MR. BARAB: Yes, that's hard. I mean it's hard to of kind regulate and we're, you know, for better for worse a regulatory and enforcement agency. It's difficult to define. It's, you know, like they used to say about pornography. You know, it's hard to define, but you know it when you see it. And for safety culture it's the same kind of thing.

With BP, you know, we looked at that. We went back when I was with the

"we" looked at BP and it was very clearly not a good safety culture there. Safety was not first. I mean, everybody says after an incident safety is our highest priority and you start looking at it and it's rarely the case. So there were a number of indicators there that showed that they had a very poor safety culture in terms of the fact that, you know, safety was not first. It was production.

You know, I talked a little bit about worker participation, how that was discouraged there overtly. Not just covertly, but really overtly discouraged. You know, improvements, continuous improvement was discouraged. Just about everything we have in here was discouraged.

And obviously the opposite of that is encouraging all these things, and that's a safety culture. That's why when we do a program standard like this we kind of try to

identify the attributes of a good safety culture and, to the extent we can within a regulatory process, build that in.

When it comes to management commitment, good management commitment is obviously essential for safety culture. Good worker participation is essential. Going around to the other end, evaluating and then applying what you've learned through that evaluation in the spirit of continuous improvement, all of these things are essential elements of safety culture. So to that extent you can kind of build it into your process, but really has to kind of come from the top and it's got to be, you know, kind of infused throughout the organization. And sometimes that's very hard to kind of require there.

MS. DAUGHERTY: Relating to the metrics, so obviously very interested in that. And you mentioned that metrics for slips, trips and falls are not necessarily indicative of expected good performance on process

safety. Have you been able to identify any good metrics that relate to process safety?

MR. BARAB: Yes, that's been a difficult issue. I mean, you know, leading versus lagging indicators. I'm sure you all have discussed that. We try to go more to leading indicators. That's not always easy to do and, you know, sometimes you want to look at lagging indicators because obviously some lagging indicators like number of explosions, number of releases will tell you something even though they're lagging indicators.

So we're looking at where there are lagging indicators we want to make sure they're the right ones. And then again, if it's just number of releases, number of incidents, that type of thing and making sure then that those are evaluated and analyzed. The one good thing -- well, not the one good thing, but one of the good things the Chemical Safety Board does is root cause analysis, and that really a much superior process to our

process, for example, where we're basically looking at violations of our law, which is not always the same thing as a root cause analysis.

Leading indicators, we're looking more at, you know, close calls, near misses, that kind of things. And that again is -- it's interesting. It's difficult. You try to get the facilities themselves to look at those, which they can do. It's more difficult though. And Jeff was talking about learning from other people's mistakes. They don't want to advertise their mistakes very much. And it's one of these things.

There are some areas in the country that require that. Contra Costa

County has a law that actually requires, you know, posting of near misses and releases, even releases that don't cause any injuries or really any major exposures. And those can give you, you know, some pretty good indicators, I think, in terms of the overall

1 safety of the plant.

But, you know, the down side of that is of course the people who are best at reporting tend to be labeled as the worst behavior, because you know, the ones that are cheating and are hiding stuff actually end up looking better on paper. So you do run into those kinds of problems enforcing that kind of openness.

So anyway, it's something we're looking at, something we very much want and put on as part of our process safety management RFI, but you know, it's not easy. And it's a good question. We'd actually like to learn, you know, from what you all are trying to figure out as well here.

ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: Sue, go ahead.

MEMBER FLECK: Sue Fleck
representing the Gas Committee. Could you
please clarify when he comments are due back?
The notice says March 10th.

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MR. BARAB: Yes.

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if there may be an extension on that or --

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MR. BARAB: We're going to

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probably extend that to the end of March.

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MEMBER FLECK: Okay.

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MR. BARAB: The reason is that --

MEMBER FLECK: And I'm wondering

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MEMBER FLECK: Thank you.

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MR. BARAB: -- there's kind of a

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parallel process as part of the executive

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order where we were required as of a couple of

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months ago to issue a number of regulatory and

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the executive order and get comment on those

regulatory process policy options as part of

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before we prepare a report for the President.

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And the deadline on that is the end of March,

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so we decided it made more sense probably to

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coordinate those. So I think what we're going

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to do -- in fact, I've got to go back and

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figure out if this is happening, but is extend

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the RFI comment period to the end of March as

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well.

1 MEMBER FLECK: Thank you.

MR. BARAB: And the RFI, it's a very early part of the regulatory process, so we aren't nearly as strict on deadlines in terms of sending information as we would be when we get the proposal or the final stage. So if you have comments, you're going to be a little late on it, you know, don't worry too much about it. We'd much rather have late comments than no comments at all.

ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: Rick?

on the Liquid Committee representing the public. Just to reinforce the slips, trips and falls, in the four decades I've been involved in process safety management processes in both chemical refining as well as pipeline, even though it's not a regulatory requirement, I would say there's absolutely no correlation between lost work day injuries. And I want to reinforce those comments.

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In fact, what we find is

investigations; not at the regulatory level
for other reasons, that if anybody's trying to
draw a correlation, you have a serious problem
both in your process safety management
approach and probably in your integrity
management approach. They're just two
different animals. And while I understand
some of the management may try to think there
is a correlation there, that's a clear
indication from our observation; trying to be
a neutral party here, not a judgmental party,
that they just don't get it. The culture
doesn't get it.

So you don't want to be doing that. And it's an easy trap to fall into.

I'd advise people just to kind of, you know, think if them as two different boxes and move on. Sorry for that lengthy comment.

MR. BARAB: Yes. No, I couldn't agree with that more. In fact, I spoke a few years ago after -- I think it was right after the Anacortes explosion that killed I think

seven workers in Washington State at one of the Petroleum Industry Associations who just as that explosion happened issued a press release saying this is one of the safest industries in the country based on again, you know, their injury statistics. And I mean, I kind of lost it a little bit. I said you cannot be issuing this kind of stuff based on basically faulty information while people are literally burying their husbands and sons.

And they know it. I mean, that's what kind of pisses me off. I mean, they know there's no relationship there, but it sounds good again in the sound bites.

MR. WIESE: Well, Jordan, I think that that resolves the questions. You're welcome to stay as long as you want, but I wanted to close that section out by saying I appreciate the work that you and Dr. Michaels are doing and your staff. Been actually pretty good partners. I remember Dr. Michaels drug Linda down to Texas.

Page 283 1 MR. BARAB: Yes. MR. WIESE: You had the risk-based 2 regulation. Some of the members of this 3 Committee have been working with us for 15 4 years on risk-based regulation. 5 MR. BARAB: Yes. 6 MR. WIESE: And it is a double-7 edged sword, as you know --8 9 MR. BARAB: Yes. 10 MR. WIESE: -- you know, probably 11 better than most. MR. BARAB: Yes, yes. 12 13 MR. WIESE: You know, it is probably the way to go, you know, but there 14 15 are a lot of challenges --16 MR. BARAB: Yes. MR. WIESE: -- with doing risk-17 based regulations. So I think the one thing 18 we agreed on there, and hopefully we're off 19 20 the record, right? 21 (Laughter.) MR. WIESE: No. Well, I think it 22

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was OMB who asked to start coming to our meetings and we said no. You know, said no thanks.

(Laughter.)

MR. WIESE: And all the agencies would clam up.

MR. BARAB: Yes.

MR. WIESE: But we were trying to learn from one another. So really thank you for your leadership on that. But also for the work that you're doing with us now. We've got a motion of support from the Committee yesterday to create a Midstream Working Group where we'll be looking at OSHA and our jurisdiction, where they match up against each other in the midstream sector. And with the onset of all the shale plays in the U.S. this is getting to be a bigger and bigger issue. So really thank you for your support on that one.

So barring any other questions, I think we'll move on and move next to Brian

Salerno. I'm pleased to introduce Brian. He was sworn in as the Director of the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement on August 26th, 2013. I'm reading his standard bio, but I know for a fact, and it's not in here, he was actually actively engaged with BSEE for some time before that in helping Jim Watson kind of get, you know, together what he wanted to do at that time.

Jim will be speaking to us tomorrow morning, so you can talk to him about that.

But for those of you who are not that familiar with BSEE; I actually have a soft spot in my heart for it since I worked for the predecessor agency for 15 years when it was MMS, but basically taking care of all regulatory oversight and enforcement on offshore operations on the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf.

Prior to this appointment Brian served in the U.S. Coast Guard as the Deputy

Commandant for Operations, had a pretty
extensive profile of things there. He
attained the rank of vice-admiral within the
Coast Guard, which is pretty serious. And a
2000 graduate of the U.S. Army War College
with a master's in strategic studies. Also a
graduate of the Naval War College Non-Resident
Program, and holds a master's degree in
management from Johns Hopkins.

So with that, I hope you'll help me welcome Brian to the Committee.

Thank you, Brian.

MR. SALERNO: Well, thanks, Jeff.

Good afternoon everybody. Well, it's great to
be here. Thanks for the invitation and I was
very interested in what Jordan had to say.

I'm going to repeat some of the themes that he
has raised, because I think when you talk
about safety culture, safety management, a lot
of these themes do -- I mean, they're fairly
common across industries.

I'm also glad to be on the panel

Page 287 1 with my friend Patrick, my neighbor, colleague and counterpart to the north. And I just want 2 to thank him for his graciousness and not 3 rubbing in the U.S. defeat last week. 4 (Laughter.) 5 The men's hockey, 6 MR. SALERNO: and even more so that he didn't rub in the 7 8 fact that we are now obligated to keep Justin 9 Bieber. 10 (Laughter.) 11

MR. SALERNO: Or maybe he just hasn't had the chance to yet. I don't know.

(Laughter.)

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MR. SALERNO: But and I'm sure a lot of what I'll say, you know, Patrick has some, you know, similar thoughts but from a slightly different perspective.

I do want to share some concepts
and thoughts as to why safety culture has
become such a compelling topic of conversation
within the offshore oil and gas industry, as
well as a topic of great discussion about

regulators. And I mean that not only within the U.S., but internationally. It's really become a subject of great prominence.

The safety culture and safety
management systems are in many ways changing
the relationship between the industry and the
regulator, and even the way we carry out our
regulatory duties. And I would predict that
it's going to continue to change that
relationship and our methodologies as we go
forward.

Now, I won't get into the weeds.

I want to try to keep this at a pretty high

level, but I think you'll see there are

parallels, you know, to what you do in your

own industries and what is taking place in the

offshore. And for those of you who do have,

you know, or oversee pipelines that are

connected to offshore infrastructure, you

know, there may be more of a direct connection

there as we approach safety. And I think part

of the value of talking in a FACA committee

1 such as this.

so traditionally, you know, regulators have typically taken the approach of, you know, they establish regulations for the industry to follow. You know, there's generally an inspections component, a process whereby the regulator verifies the compliance with those regulations. And we've all seen that. It's very familiar.

This is a notional chart, but
we've seen, you know, many of us that, you
know, when companies are coming due for
inspection, you know, the dig out the
regulations. A safety person does a pre-exam.
You know, a lot of things that may have
slipped into non-compliance or on the deferred
maintenance list, you know, they get some
attention. They get fixed before the
inspector shows up and you get the facility
ready for inspection. So you have that steep,
you know, uptick here in this chart, you know,
leading up to inspection. Getting ready.

You know, it's a little bit like if I invited you to dinner at my house, I'd be doing that, you know, trying to get the dishes washed in the sink and the dirty laundry, you know, just to make it look presentable. And you'd show up and you'd think everything looked pretty good. And that's often what happens in an inspection. You know, everything looks pretty good.

But unless the company has a commitment to maintain that level of safety, you know, things tend to degrade. You know, something would break down, it goes on the deferred maintenance list and it slowly starts to taper off, you know, and you see this type of a curve here.

So can we conclude after we do an inspection that the operation is safe? Maybe in some cases you can, but I think it's probably not a wise thing to do, you know, in general terms. You need really more information to go on to conclude that the

operation is safe. It doesn't tell you in that snapshot inspection how a company really does its business, how employees and how managers behave when no one else is watching. And that's really I think what it comes down to. That's what a safety culture is. What do you do when no one's looking over your shoulder?

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So if safety is not, you know, part of the normal routine, compliance tapers off and potentially, you know, high-risk behavior, including decision making, you know, can occur on what might otherwise be thought of as a compliant facility. And in the worst cases, you know, it could result in deaths, injuries, environmental damage. And from a company's perspective pretty serious economic loss. And for years we've seen this type of cyclical rhythm, you know, in compliance, you know, where it peaks and then tapers off. And it has not served the interests of safety very It gave a false sense of security to well.

the regulator and in many cases even to senior company management.

It also results, I think, in a misplaced burden of responsibility. You know, who's ultimately responsible for managing safety and maintaining safety? Is it the regulator that periodically does these spot checks or is it the operator, you know, who's there every day and has intimate knowledge of his own plant, people and processes?

A compliance-based verification approach also feeds into, you know, a term that I've heard used called an affirmative defense mentality. You know, in other words, I passed the inspection. All the boxes are checked. I'm in compliance. I'm safe to operate. You know, you put the burden on the regulator to find something and if the regulator doesn't find it, you know, well it's not my fault.

So many people started looking at, you know, how do you level this out? How do

you have that straight line across the top
where you maintain safety and you shave off
the peaks and valleys? And to make a very
long story short, the prevailing view is that
the only way to do that is to maintain that
steady state, and the appropriate level is to
really define that burden of responsibility.
In effect, it's to shift the emphasis to the
operator for managing safety at all times, at
all levels, not just in preparation for the
regulatory compliance checks.

And along with that goes an adjustment to the way regulators interact with the industry, the way regulations are constructed and the type of compliance verification procedures that are put in place. In effect, it's more of a performance-based system that will get you there rather than a purely prescriptive based checklist approach.

In the offshore industry a lot of this restructuring of that relationship really began in the U.K., the United Kingdom, and it

occurred after a very serious accident. This was the Piper Alpha accident in 1988. There over 160 fatalities. It was a fire an explosion. A very, very serious event. Many more were injured in that event and it really caused, you know, a very serious look into how safety is managed in the offshore environment. And the North Sea of course is pretty extreme environmental conditions to begin with.

short, they decided to move towards a safety case approach, and I'm sure many of you have heard that term. And essentially what it does is the operator identifies all the risks and their procedures and their safeguards. They are reviewed and developed in conjunction with labor and with the Government. The regulator, you know, ultimately if they're satisfied, would accept the operator's plan and then that operator is obligated to conduct business in accordance with the plan. It has all the safety features woven into the fabric of the

safety case and the operator assumes responsibility.

It sounds pretty good, and a lot of companies have done that, but it doesn't necessarily apply in every jurisdiction around the world. In the U.S., for example, we haven't gone with the safety case approach, but we've borrowed from it and we've, you know, adopted some of its principles in an effort to achieve very much the same effect.

regulatory structure. We still have inspectors. We still go out and we make sure that there's compliance with regulation, but we've also added to that a performance-based system which we call SEMS. It's an acronym. It stands for the Safety and Environmental Management System. SEMS. So what we've done in the U.S. essentially is a hybrid. We retained the traditional regulatory approach plus the SEMS performance-based system.

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SEMS has about 13 different

elements in it. It's actually a requirement.

A company now is required to have a SEMS plan.

This is an outgrowth of the Gulf oil spill,

the Macondo oil spill. As you recall, you

know, there were a lot of studies. There was

a presidential commission that looked at that.

There was the National Academy of Engineers,

National Academy of Sciences. There were

probably a dozen different studies done, and

many of them really focused on performance
based regulatory approaches as an answer, as

a way ahead in this.

So we've adopted a lot of that and whereby prior to the oil spill SEMS was a voluntary system, after the spill a regulation went into effect, made it mandatory. So we don't tell people, you know, what constitutes their safety plan. We defined elements that they need to address. It's up to them to address it in a way that makes sense for their operations and then to operate in accordance with that. So you've got the baseline

compliance and then SEMS on top. And there's about 13 different elements that we require them to include in their plan.

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Last year we took two actions, and this kind of gets into the whole, you know, how do you regulate a culture? Well, I don't know that you can. I don't think it's possible, as Jordan was saying, but you can try to influence the way people operate and the way they think. And our beginning approach to that was to issue a safety culture policy. It was really just a set of guiding principles that would help, we hope, influence the way industry makes their decisions. won't try to go through all of it, but you can see in general it's an attempt to reflect a pattern of thinking and behaving that emphasizes safety above, you know, other considerations.

Now in reality there's always going to be that trade-off between safety and cost and schedule. I mean, that's the tension

point and, you know, every company has to manage that. But from our perspective, if there's a serious issue and it's in tension with cost and schedule, you know, our preference would be that the company would err on the side of safety. And we continue to preach that in the hopes that, you know, industry will start to internalize many of those values, and I think many of them have.

The second action we took was actually to improve our SEMS plan. And I mentioned we've got 13 different elements.

It's a bit of an eye chart. I'm not going to read them all, but it has some of the kinds of things that Jordan was mentioning. You know, it has hazard analysis and it has, you know, safe work practices and training and change management and those types of things. So those are the elements that are required to be included in a plan.

But what SEMS II did was really emphasize the ability of workers to exercise

stop work authority. You know, so it put some responsibility on the workers themselves and it created the expectation that companies will respect that relationship with their workers. It also added in a much more robust audit program. So there's a third-party audit requirement that, you know, every so often, every three years the company gets audited on a certain percentage of its facilities to see how they're truly operating under their SEMS plan. And then that of course is submitted to the Government.

By the way, safety management is by no means unique to drilling, as was already mentioned. My Coast Guard background, I can tell you I had a lot of exposure to the shipping industry and shipping has also been doing this type of thing for a number of years, and for the same reasons. Shipping also is a very international industry, like drilling, and as a result there's actually been an international code for safety

management. And all ships that come to the
United States are required to comply with that
safety management code. And if they don't
comply, I mean, they're subject to sanctions.
They could be detained in port and so forth.
And in fact that has happened quite a bit.
When I was in the Coast Guard one of the
leading reasons we detained ships was because
many of them were not following their own
safety plans. They had lack of familiarity
with it.

smooth transition in every industry. In shipping, you know, quite honestly, it was in danger of becoming a paperwork exercise. And it was through a concerted effort by the regulator to hold people accountable, you know, to their plans, follow their plans that a significant change in behavior started to take place. So again, you influence by the way you regulate.

Our experience in the offshore is

far more recent and I would say that, too, is a bit of a mixed bag at this point. You know, some companies are very committed. They have the resources, they have the desire. Many of them do not want to be in the newspapers unless it's for some really good reason. They don't want to be in there because something went terribly wrong. And they're committed to making sure that things don't go wrong.

But then there are others that really just don't get it. And we've had a few cases even within the last year of serious accidents, including fatalities, which should not have happened, a complete breakdown in safety, an absence of safety culture and people died needlessly. So there are some that don't get it. And there are some that still feel that they're operating in that affirmative defense model. Just tell me what I need to do to operate, which is not a safety culture.

That doesn't mean that the safety

culture concept is wrong. It does mean that
we need to do a better job in how we oversee
activities in the industry, how we adjust our
regulatory practices to reinforce a safety
conscious behavior and to dis-incentivize very
perfunctory behavior on the part of the
industry.

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So one of the things we're trying to do within BSEE is to institute a risk-based inspection process, you know, so that where companies have demonstrated a commitment to safety, have very strong performance records, we would exercise a much lighter degree of regulatory oversight in contrast to companies that just don't get it and almost by definition pose a higher risk. They would tend to see us much more frequently. And that of course goes to even the way we enforce. When we encounter a defect, for example, if the company is taking corrective action under its own plan, our view is they ought not to be cited for non-compliance. We'll give them

credit for operating under their plan, for doing the right thing. We'll still follow up, but we want to incentivize and encourage the use of them operating under their plan.

we're making progress, but
we're not there yet. I think moving ahead,
you know, we can do a better job of
quantifying risk. We're doing a lot of work
with some of the national laboratories on risk
bow ties and, you know, on barriers. There's
a lot we're borrowing from the chemical
industry as you look at barriers, you know,
people, process and plant. Pretty good break
down on criteria. So we're doing a lot of
work there.

There's also a lot more we can do in the offshore on process safety or system safety. You know, it is one thing to look at slips, trips and falls, lost time accidents and so forth. I mean, that's important and I'm not going to minimize that because, I mean, that affects real people and we've put

a lot of emphasis on reducing that. But we also have to pay attention to the low probability, high-consequence events which can have widespread effects on life, on the environment and from a company perspective, you know, a huge effect on their liabilities.

You know, the Deep Water Horizon, the Gulf oil spill, is a good example of that. There was really poor risk management, cutting corners on critical processes, misinterpreting information, you know, all of which contributed to a disaster that, you know, occurred on what was seemingly a compliant operation. So it's a very real problem. So building process risk into our SEMS plan, our SEMS system is I think the next step in the evolution of safety in the offshore.

And I'll finish up on final thought. One area that is of interest to me and why I'm very interested in talking with this Committee is the extent to which multiple regulators can or should adapt compatible

approaches to safety management, you know, especially when the industries that they regulate sometimes have to operate under multiple regulatory regimes. This is most apparent in the offshore environment between my organization, BSEE, and my former organization, the Coast Guard. You know, together with the Coast Guard we've worked to harmonize two very different safety management systems. You know, we have SEMS within BSEE. The Coast Guard has a safety management system which applies to vessels. And it seems like it ought to be pretty easy to blend those two together. And actually it was kind of hard.

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There were differences in terminologies and reporting requirements, and even in the target audience, but the goals were very similar. And as I talked with the industry, they said why can't you guys as regulators, you know, get it together? You know, we're all after the same thing here, but you're making it hard for us and you're

forcing us to adjudicate between two regulators. And I have to admit they had a point.

So even going back and trying to harmonize that between two regulators, it's not quite there, but it's almost there, and it's been, you know, I think a worthwhile process that would benefit the industry in the end.

But there may also be an opportunity to do something similar with offshore pipelines, you know, with PHMSA. You know, BSEE has some regulatory responsibilities over offshore pipelines; PHMSA I think has more, but they all connect together. And we're both talking about safety management system. So potentially, you know, we can do a better job of harmonizing our regulatory approach in a safety management perspective. And the practical value of that, you know, I think is fairly clear.

You know, a pipeline failure

offshore that results in an oil spill or a gas release is going to bring a lot of regulators together in a hurry in a response mode, as well as the affected industries and naturally we'd much rather prevent that than have to respond to it. But a key to preventing it is having the right systems in place to spot a potential problem before it occurs.

So, you know, I guess my pitch is that, you know, a safety management system where companies take ownership of the risks, they identify their vulnerabilities, they actively manage them, employees are empowered to act on behalf of safety and they're rewarded for doing so, in short, where a real safety culture exists, you know, when all of that is present, I think we're collectively better able to avoid the kinds of things that none of us wants to see.

So, I'll stop there and take any questions.

ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: Thank you

Page 308 1 very much. Great presentation. Any questions? Andy? 2 This is Andy Drake 3 MEMBER DRAKE: with the Gas Committee. Could you back up 4 to --5 MR. SALERNO: Oh, sure. 6 7 The other way? 8 MEMBER DRAKE: I was trying to 9 catch you before you shut it down. 10 MR. SALERNO: Okay. 11 MEMBER DRAKE: To the slide that had the core values and behaviors. I think it 12 13 was great. MR. SALERNO: This one here? 14 15 Okay. 16 MEMBER DRAKE: Yes. There's a 17 thought there that I want to tease out a little bit; and that is, you know, I think we 18 all agree, and have many unfortunate incidents 19 that show people that were having slips, trips 20 21 and accidents metrics and doing well in those programs and extrapolated that to their asset 22

1 integrities. And that was not appropriate.

MR. SALERNO: Yes.

MEMBER DRAKE: But I like the way you've worded this, because I think the question I have is although it's not appropriate to extend performance in one to the other, do you see that the behaviors and the values and the characteristics of good safety performance; physically, personnel and asset, are similar? I mean, when you look at that statement, you could apply that to people or plants.

MR. SALERNO: Right.

MEMBER DRAKE: Do you see the behaviors and characteristics are sort of the same, that there's some commonality of zero on this front and how to get there as there is on zero on this front and how to get there? You have to be careful about how they extend performance in one to the other.

MR. SALERNO: Yes, and in fact that's why I kind like, you know, that risk

bow tie approach where you have a risk event in the barriers. And the way the chemical industry has done it, you know, they'll have people, they'll have plant, you know, which is the physical assets, and they'll have process. And all of those three interrelate. And I think you really have to look at it, you know, through that lens. They all contribute to, you know, preventing the unwanted risk event. They're all essential. If any of them fails, you know, obviously you're closer to that risk event. But, yes, I think it permeates.

Culture has to start at the top of an organization. It can't be more than just a wink and a nod. It has to be something serious. There has to be I think a sense from the employee's perspective, that if they report something, their job's not in jeopardy, you know, that they're actually going to be rewarded for looking after the company. You know, they're looking after their colleagues, their coworkers, they're preventing something

very expensive and unwanted from happening.

And that takes some time to develop and it's a real mental shift for a lot of people. But again, some companies are already there and I think they've achieved the benefits of that. And that's what we want to incentivize. You can't regulate that kind of thinking. You can't force people to think a certain way you can, you know, maybe I think incentivize it.

One of the things we're trying to do as well along those lines; and Jordan mentioned the near miss reporting, a lot of companies on their own are studying that within their own operations and getting a better idea of what are the kinds of things that almost happened, you know, and how close did we come to, you know, something bad? As a regulator I don't have a window into that right now, but I'm trying to get it.

Actually we signed an agreement with the Bureau of Transportation Statistics

as one of those entities that can collect information and then make it anonymous, you know, so it can kind of give us a little more of a picture of what's taking place. rolled out yet. We're still working the details, but it's been very effective in other industries. The aviation industry, very effective in collecting that type of information, creating a picture of, gee, what almost happened? And very, very powerful in improving safety. And I think we can do that in the offshore and I think it could be done in almost any industrial setting, but there has to be the confidence in the system, you know, so that people can report it without any fear of, you know, being exposed or any penalty.

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But again, it all feeds that culture of safety, that almost obligation to do something at all levels, whether you're a worker, mid-manager or senior manager if, you know, there is an unsafe activity taking

	Page 313
1	place, or conditions, unsafe conditions.
2	I hope I answered your question.
3	I get a little long-winded at times.
4	ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: Well,
5	actually Andy requires that kind of answer
6	from time to time.
7	(Laughter.)
8	ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: Great
9	job.
10	Any other questions?
11	(No audible response.)
12	ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: All
13	right. Jeff, back to you.
14	MR. WIESE: Just a couple of quick
15	comments if I can. Hopefully you can
16	understand why we invited Brian to come talk
17	to you, because we've actually been having
18	very similar conversations and I think we
19	wanted you to understand that it's not unique
20	in our world. And Patrick I think will show
21	you again. Patrick we've had a 8 or 10-year
22	relationship with, and so I think we think

very similarly. But we've gotten to know

Brian and I think you can see the leadership

that he brings to BSEE is very similar in many

regards to the things that we've been talking

about.

If you'll allow me, I would like to pick up on a couple things: First of all, we welcome the partnership. So I think we're more than happy. In fact, I look forward to it. So as you know, I love the offshore stuff and I really enjoy the pipeline thing, so this will give me an opportunity to marry those up.

But I did want to pick up on a couple of things you brought out, if you'll allow me. Actually I said something recently on a panel with Gaetan Caron and it was picked up in the media and it became a subject of discussion in our Agency, but both you and Jordan have hit on it, and I bet Patrick would as well. What I said to the group of NARUC people and the public is that I'd like to make clear that nobody at the table operates

pipelines. You know, we're commissioners and regulators. We do not operate pipelines. Yet every time there's a failure, the regulator really takes a pounding. And I know that you know that in spades.

So it starts bringing on the question of responsibility. Where is the responsibility for safety? The regulators' traditional job has been really about, as you said, prescribing things, checking for compliance. But you know, fortunately we're better off than Jordan; and don't get any ideas on that once every 100 years or whatever inspection.

(Laughter.)

MR. WIESE: But, you know, the point I want to say is our resources are only sufficient to allow us to sample what an operator is doing in a slice in time. It's that simple. You know, so that alone is not enough to equate to safety. I think that's what takes us in the direction of safety

1 management systems shifting responsibility.

It works for them.

I think most of the good operators welcome it, you know, and they take it. And many of them can embrace it. And it's like Andy said, actually you can make money at it, you know?

So I just think that it's worth keeping that discussion alive, that, you know, our responsibility while many want to prescribe it to compliance, I think we would agree, all of us, that that doesn't equate to safety. You know, that's at a minimum federal code. Some people hate hearing that, but it doesn't equate to safety. There's more to safety than just minimal compliance with a code that had to go through a regulatory Gordian knot.

And somebody was talking about OMB earlier. Dr. Michaels has shared with us the challenges he's had in getting changes to PSM out. And I think you've been luckier. Your stuff has moved, but you probably had a

1 | freight train right behind yours. I guess.

(Laughter.)

MR. WIESE: So at any rate, I just wanted to close mostly by thanking you. I knew what you would bring to the discussion and I very much appreciate it. I think this Committee is going to be actively engaged in those matters and we'll look forward to an ongoing relationship with you. So thank you so much.

Okay. So with that, we'll turn right now to one of our colleagues from north of the border. And Brian stole all of our jokes about hockey and everything else.

(Laughter.)

MR. WIESE: So we're going to let those drop. Besides we've worn out every joke in this 8 or 10-year relationship with the NEB by now.

I'd like to introduce Patrick by saying first of all when the idea of meeting with the NEB first came up -- and, gosh, I

don't even really know how that happened,
whether you initiated or we did -- but
irrelevant, I initially thought, well, this is
good government. You know, we ought to just
get together and chat. And I was thinking,
well, they can report back, well, we met with
our colleagues on the other side of the
border. That would make sense. But the
conversation was extremely good. You know, I
think we really liked it.

Actually, you know, Brian, it was modeled off of the International Regulators

Forum and I know that you both participated in that, where regulators get together and talk about what's the role of the regulator and all these various things. So that relationship has evolved over the course of, you know, nearly a decade. I think we readily exchange information on accidents with operators who operate on both sides of the border. We welcome your gesture. You know, the offshore/on-shore and all North American

alignments makes sense for everyone, you know?

And so we'll continue to work with you and

with the NEB towards that goal.

But by way of introduction,

Patrick is the business leaders of the

Operations Business Unit, Chief Conservation

Officer at the Canadian National Energy Board.

He's been there since May of 2011, had a

number of other postings on there. He's also

worked for the Province of British Columbia.

And one of your colleagues at NEB must have

swapped places.

MR. SMYTH: Yes.

MR. WIESE: Yes, you threw him out and sent him over to B.C. and took his place.

But I would just say that he's got a lot of responsibilities that align with ours very closely. Some of them go beyond ours.

They have a larger environmental mission, for example, than we do. He may be more involved in security matters than we will. We were heavily involved in those prior to 9/11, and

then the stand-up of DHS here sort of resolved a lot of that.

I think I'll conclude with that,
but saying that I really want to thank
Patrick. He's come to talk about safety
management systems today, but he's also
talking about safety culture tomorrow. So
these two are very tightly intertwined, as we know.

So thank you, Patrick.

MR. SMYTH: All right. Thanks,

Jeff. And, yes, I agree we've got a great

relationship with PHMSA. It helps us out an

awful lot and I hope that we're able to help

PHMSA out. And we're just embarking on what

I hope will be a similar relationship with

BSEE. It's a year ago that we signed our MOU

and I'm up here with one of my colleagues, Jim

Fox, who's sitting over here. And Jim and I

are going to have our first annual meeting

with BSEE tomorrow to talk about the MOU and

what the relationship could look like going

forward. So I think good things are happening on all fronts for us and it's great to have what I consider partners like these two organizations to share information with.

It's appropriate that I go last because I've got a few more slides and I'm bringing it up a little bit. And I'm going to tell a little bit of a story around what our regulatory framework looks like and how the requirements for management systems are entrenched within that regulation, and a little bit of our research into why it's important to have robust management systems. And as far as safety culture, I'll talk a little bit about that, but I'm going to keep my powder dry because we have a presentation that I'll offer up tomorrow specifically on safety culture.

So with that, I'll talk a little bit about the role of the National Energy
Board. We are the organization established by the Parliament of Canada in 1959 to regulate

the construction and operation of interprovincial and international pipelines, as well as international and designated interprovincial power lines.

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About 20 or 25 years ago we assumed the responsibility of regulating oil and gas exploration and production in Canada's north and certain offshore areas that aren't covered by offshore accords. We also regulate the export and import of oil, gas, natural gas, liquids, and electricity, and then finally pipeline traffic, tolls, and tariffs. We do regulate through the entire life cycle of a project, so our first interaction with companies will be prior to receiving the application and then we'll regulate right through to abandonment. I like to equate it to kind of a combination of what you see with FERC, PHMSA, and BSEE down here. A lot of stuff going on with 450 people based out of Calgary.

So here's what our world looks

like north of the border. This is the pipeline network and it goes from the Pacific Coast to the Atlantic Coast. There's one pipeline right now that comes down from the Northwest Territories. And there are a number of other pipelines on the drawing board. National Energy Board Panel late last year released its decision on a proposed northern gateway project from Edmonton to the Pacific Coast. And that's now with the government of Canada to make their decision. And in front of us are a couple of significant projects in Enbridge's Line 9 reversal, Energy East for TransCanada, and Kinder Morgan's twinning of the Trans Mountain Pipeline that goes from Edmonton down through the Rockies to the Vancouver area.

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So with respect to the regulation of pipelines, specifically their construction, operation and eventual abandonment, the NEB has in place a comprehensive suite of enabling legislation, regulation and national

above on this slide. And if you bear with me, as I go through this there's a lot of detail in some of the analysis we've done. And I am going to be referring to the notes on my slides here.

regulatory framework, you'll see that we start by defining the safety and security, environmental protection and economic efficiency outcomes to be achieved. For the most part this approach provides regulated companies with the flexibility to determine the means to achieve the outcomes. This approach encourages innovation and the use of most appropriate technology. Companies must persuade us that they have selected the appropriate means to achieve those outcomes.

And I've got an example and it comes out of the Canada Oil and Gas Drilling and Production Regulation, Section 19. The operator shall take all reasonable precautions

to ensure safety and environmental protection.

So with that, the company needs to provide evidence to us that what they've selected or what they're proposing to do meets the objective that we've set in regulation.

systematic approach to managing risk. It includes several management system frameworks. All have common elements such as leadership commitment, communication with personnel at all levels, comprehensive identification of hazards, risk assessments, proactive reporting of near misses and incidents, as well as continual improvement. Continual improvement is critical and must make reference to the day-to-day operations and standardized consistent documented and robust management of safety, security and environmental protection during all regulated activities.

So here's where I want to tell a little bit of a story, and it's some analysis that we've done. And we started looking at

the evolution of safety as it relates to major hazard industries, be it pipeline, be it offshore, be it on-shore oil and gas exploration.

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So in between points 1 and 2, and point 1 is on the left-hand side of the slide, was the stage where people kept making mistakes. Concept is you can't fire them all, so it resulted in a supervise them approach. At stage 2 in the middle safety departments were created. Siloed safety professionals tried to supervise errors out of the system. Later they tried to advance human factors And finally on the right-hand side awareness. at stage 3 these professionals realized that there were deeper lying conditions that set the individuals up to commit errors. were active and latent threats in the system that created conditions for errors and accidents to occur. Soon these professionals found themselves in the board room as advocates trying to argue for bigger budgets,

more resources, greater power to effect change beyond their predefined safety scope.

Over time there was success as the evidence mounted through accident investigation findings. Systems thinking introduced a more holistic approach to safety once it was demonstrated that often management unwittingly created the conditions for an accident to occur. Safety became everyone's business, not just that of the safety manager and team. Executives became engaged as they were made aware of the potential impact of their decisions, particularly those related to the allocation of human and financial resources.

This forms part of the culture shift that accompanies a management systems approach to safety, which leads us to the latest step change in safety management, the understanding of culture indicators, et cetera. At our board, and I know with other regulators, we are in the early days of this

very discussions, the relationships between management systems and safety culture.

So I ask the question. Is this just a theory or do we have evidence that this holistic approach can effectively advance safety, security and environmental protection?

James Reason, a psychologist who studies human error and accident causation, notes that there are different types of accidents, individual and organizational.

Organizational accidents are rare yet catastrophic, have widespread consequences on uninvolved populations, assets and the environment or current systems that have been built with multiple defenses, have multiple causes involving many people, include judgment and decision making errors and have impacts that endure long after the event itself.

Reason notes that organizational accidents are a result of advancements in technology which have radically altered the relationship between systems and the humans

working with them. And while these types of accidents are difficult to predict, there are patterns that can be detected in their root causes and so there are lessons to be learned.

Management systems as a means of addressing risk is one such development.

And here's the evidence. The NEB recently commissioned a study that compared investigation reports from several major hazard accidents. A cross-section of industries were included in the study and the results provide great awareness to the question why management systems?

So we look at the Ocean Ranger offshore platform sinking, Chernobyl nuclear power plant radiation release, the Piper Alpha offshore platform explosion and fire, the Westray mine explosion, Esso Longford gas processing plant explosion in Australia, the Columbia Space Shuttle breakup upon entry, the Texas City Refinery explosion, and finally the Deep Water Horizon accident.

In this graph a red X indicates
that the investigation report identified a
related deficiency to the management system
element. A green thumbs up indicates that
investigators found the element to be
adequate, in other words, not a causal factor.
Not addressed in text indicates that the
investigation report was silent on the subject
and no judgment could be made on its
effectiveness.

Here we see a very clear pattern emerge. Safety policy and commitment statements were present in each of the management systems, however hazard identification, risk assessments and the related controls were deficient in the majority of the scenarios.

Looking at the implementation of the management system we see that very few elements were present or effectively executed in order to create barriers to negative consequences. Management of change was noted

as a causal factor in all incidents that considered this particular factor.

Communication, documentation and document control as well as operational control -- that's procedures to address normal and abnormal conditions -- were consistently noted as inadequate.

Finally, when we look at the checking and review elements which are critical to ensuring continual improvement within the system, we see another clear pattern emerge. Inspections and monitoring, corrective and preventative actions to address identified deficiencies, records management and management review were consistently noted as being causal factors. The effectiveness and the internal auditing were noted in four of the eight incidents with three reports remaining silent on the subject.

The overall findings of the NEB

Commission report indicate that when

organizational accidents occur there is often

a noted disconnect between the company's vision and policies, in other words, what they say, and their planning, implementation, monitoring and review, in other words, what they do. The authors of the report also acknowledge that it is critical that organizations capture their contractors' activities in their Safety Management Program. in addition, accidents and near misses, or what we like to call near hits, contain vital information about active and latent threats to safety. This learning must be acted upon and communicated in order to effectively manage safety.

So here we look at what we've got in place at the National Energy Board. So looking at the NEB we have management system requirements under all of our enabling legislation. Under the Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act we have the Drilling and Production Regulations which require operators who apply for authorizations to demonstrate

that they have a management system in place in order to even qualify for an authorization, that they have a safety plan and environment protection plan that makes reference to the management system and demonstrates how it will be applied to the proposed work or activity.

Under the National Energy Board

Act we have the On-Shore Pipeline Regulations

1999, or OPR-99, which includes outcome-based

provisions for safety, integrity and

environmental protection programs. The

Canadian Standards Association, CSA-Z662,

called Oil and Gas Pipeline Systems, was

incorporated by reference in the OPR. This

included a requirement for a safety and loss

management system.

While the OPR-99 was effective, it didn't include a couple of key areas of regulation, that being security and emergency management. In the spirit of continuing improvement the board moved forward in 2011 with a proposed regulatory change to build on

1 and address some gaps within the OPR-99.

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Last year the new OPR was promulgated. It contains a full spectrum of plan, do, check, act cycle. It's tailored to the NEB mandate for pipeline regulation, ensures linkage between the company's policies and their planning, implementation, monitoring, and review. It applies to all OPR program areas including integrity, safety, security, environmental protection and emergency management. And it also includes safety culture provisions for an accountable officer to be appointed who's responsible for the management system, also a requirement for an annual report on performance on the management system and a policy and process for internal reporting of hazards.

So I'll end with this slide, and this is where I would normally lead into the safety culture discussion. This slide is important because, as our chair says, it's all connected. You need to have a management

Page 335 1 system and within that management system you need to have the concept of safety culture 2 intertwine there. And of course if you don't 3 have leadership, you're going to fail. 4 like this diagram. And, Jeff, I know you've 5 seen it a couple times. We've used it in 6 Calgary and we'll continue to use it to 7 8 demonstrate how everything needs to be working 9 together. 10 So, Jeff, I'll leave it at that. 11 ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: Thank you, Patrick. 12 13 Any questions for Patrick? You're saving it all for tomorrow, 14 is that what you're doing? Tomorrow's going 15 to be a late presentation, Patrick, right? 16 17 MR. SMYTH: I'll try. ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: 18 It may be just you and me in the room. 19 20 (Laughter.) 21 ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: Go ahead. MR. WIESE: Well, first of all, 22

thank you, Patrick. And thank you again,
Brian. Because I think as you see, these
discussions I think are going to be more and
more sort of a facet of our landscape in this
Committee. We have our Management System
Standard draft, which I've sent to both of you
again, for the purposes I think, Brian, that
you brought up, you know, better alignment
makes sense for everyone concerned.

But Gaetan Caron had an interesting comment at -- and he's the chair of the NEB. He sits on the NARUC Gas

Committee with me and we did a panel recently. I loved his quote. I'm not sure I'll get it quite right. But we were talking about safety culture and what's the role of the regulator? And that's been actively debated within our Committee, you know? And to this day I'm not sure that I have a good answer to the question. You remember Gaetan's quote?

MR. SMYTH: Yes, I actually have it here. And he referenced it again at a

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meeting I attended with him in Montreal just at the beginning of this week. He says we're not quite sure how we're going to move forward with the concept of safety culture, and he equated it to a bit like that dog chasing the car. It's succeeds by grabbing the rear bumper, but what does it do with the car next? So we haven't figured it out. We're chasing the bumper. We think we've almost got it.

We're trying to figure out so what does it look like after we've got the bumper?

MR. WIESE: Yes. But I'll say that your graphic does make a lot of sense. I think we all understand that you can have the best safety management system in the world, but without an appropriate safety culture it will fail, you know? But if you just build the safety culture, you know, and work on those issues, it's probably not going to succeed. So it does take kind of an interaction of all these things.

I hope that the Committee and the

Page 338 1 public who attend the work shop tomorrow will see a lot of this discussion that's coming 2 So I really look forward to that and 3 forward. I know Patrick is going to be talking about 4 safety culture more there. Jim Watson will be 5 kicking us off. And I'm pretty sure that 6 7 he'll be addressing all of these things. Although I gave Jim, you know, carte blanche 8 9 to cover what he wanted, I've known him long 10 enough to know that he'll hit it, he'll hit 11 the target. So I just wanted to thank you both 12 13 for taking time out of your schedules, I know you're both busy, to come and join us. And 14 hopefully we can continue that dialogue. 15 16 very good. 17 MR. SMYTH: Thank you for asking 18 me. 19

MR. WIESE: Yes, absolutely.

ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: I think,

Andy, you had question?

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MEMBER DRAKE: I was just going to

see if we could get copies of your

presentation materials, both of you. I think

it would just be good for reference material.

I think there's a lot of thinking that's going

to go on on this issue.

MR. WIESE: Actually, all the

presentations will be posted to the docket, but if you'd like, we can email them out to the Advisory Committee members.

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(Off the record comments)

MR. SMYTH: With the deck that I just went through you're going to get the added bonus of I think about a dozen slides beyond this that talk about the safety culture work we're doing. Yes, so it's a good thing.

Before I wrap up, Jeff, I just want to say that it's not the Canadian thing to do to rub salt in the wound, Brian.

(Laughter.)

MR. WIESE: There we go.

MR. SMYTH: But I will mention

that in addition to Brian -- to Justin Bieber

	Page 340
1	having to stay down here and to Canadian men
2	winning gold, the Canadian women went gold as
3	well.
4	(Laughter.)
5	ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: All
6	right.
7	MR. WIESE: We won't talk about
8	medal counts though.
9	(Laughter.)
LO	ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: Thank
L1	you, Patrick.
L2	MR. WIESE: So I think we're going
L3	to continue on with our performance measures
L4	thing. We decided in the interest of time and
L5	with your permission you know, we
L6	interrupted Alan and Linda before. We'll give
L7	them an opportunity to talk. Performance
L8	metrics are obviously part of this whole
L9	system that we're having to talk about, so
20	with your permission we'll continue with that
21	and I'll turn them and let them run that.
22	ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: You know,

Page 341 1 if it were up to me I would have given you two breaks by now. 2 3 (Laughter.) ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: But PHMSA 4 is just a tough hardworking -- who's up? Alan 5 and Linda? 6 We'll be 7 MS. DAUGHERTY: Yes. short. 8 9 So where we were, we were talking 10 about some of the items that we had up on this 11 list. You know, we talked about, you know, the Liquid and the Gas Team. The things that 12 13 we have here on PHMSA's score card Alan was mentioning, these are items that PHMSA has 14 15 looked at. What we've done is we've gone 16 through our data to say if we need to evaluate 17 operators and try to figure out how one operator compares to the norm of similarly 18 situated operators. In other words, large 19 20 operators versus large operators, small versus 21 small. Here are some of the things that 22

we've put on. Not going to go through them, but they'll be in your slides. The Data Teams can mull over them. We've presented them to the Data Teams. They can just say, hey, is this useful or is this not good information? There's a whole lot of stuff in here we are currently using and refining.

The next step is, you know, you've heard Alan and I talk. We've talked about all the different things we're doing and how we're trying to get the Data Teams together. We've asked a few folks representing different sectors to hum a few bars on what they see.

And we're just talking a short amount of time.

So I know everybody's ready for their break or ready to go end the day. So without further ado I'm going to spool up Andy Black to speak on behalf of Liquids.

MR. BLACK: First, selfintroduction. I'm Andy Black with AOPL, the
Association of Oil Pipe Lines. We represent
the owners and operators of liquids pipelines

as does API and my colleague Peter Lidiak.

There's an expression on Capitol

Hill that is used to describe situations like

this when members of Congress are eyeing

flights and their interest in debate starts to

wane, and that expression is that the smell of

jet fuel is intoxicating.

(Laughter.)

MR. BLACK: I smell jet fuel here, so I will not take that long.

We think this is a great idea.

AOPL and API have long maintained metrics for assessing how the industry has done and how operators individually are doing and we think the idea of PHMSA to pursue a consensus set of metrics is a great idea. We've been using our own metrics on an ad hoc basis with stakeholder and presentations of the Pipeline Safety Trust and other places. We've recently standardized that. When Tim Felt walked you through some of the reporting that we're doing, there's a commitment now to do annual

reporting on how the industry is doing year over year.

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The two metrics that we have generally used in those settings are releases per miles of pipe or releases nominally and volumes. And I think that's consistent with the theme that Linda is talking about. have a pipeline performance tracking system for the liquids industry that collects information about incidents in addition to what is reported to PHMSA. It collects a little more information that our teams have been mining through a data mining team to try to identify some learnings and leading indicators and identify where safety is not improving as fast on a subset of issues as it is on other sets of issues. We've used that type of analysis of data in our strategic planning. Those seven initiatives that Tim Felt outlined are partly informed by where we want to improve safety where it again is not improving at the pace of other things.

1 We believe that in this

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3 performance. In a group we have suggested two

conversation the metrics should be about

4 general goals of metrics in accessing

5 performance. The first is to identify the

6 success of operators and of the industry in

7 integrity management. And the second is to

8 measure the effects of pipeline releases upon

9 people, property and the environment.

For the first goal of assessing the success of integrity management programs we have suggested in the early discussions of this liquids consensus metrics discussion the following. That we use PHMSA data on the right-of-way and assess failures attributed to integrity-related failure causes per mile. So that's failures of corrosion and of pipe material and weld, again per mile so that PHMSA can assess how the industry has done over time on managing integrity-related failure causes.

That second goal I mentioned is to

assess the effects of pipeline releases upon people, property and the environment. And the metric that we have suggested in the early stages of this group is to use the PHMSA definition of significant releases and identify releases per miles of pipe.

Now I'd like to spend just a quick moment on what PHMSA includes in its definition of significant releases. It's any incident involving a fatality or an injury requiring hospitalization, any release on the liquid side involving an explosion or fire, any release of 5 barrels of a highly-volatile liquid, of 50 barrels of any other liquid, and any release involving a total cost of \$50,000 measured in 1984 dollars. We want to use significant releases because they're more significant than all other releases.

When we continue this discussion, we'd advocate perhaps a revision of significant, not so that we have fewer identified, but that we're focusing on the

types of releases that really matter. I said
5 barrels of highly-volatile liquid, 50
barrels of other liquids. Perhaps that number
should be higher. That's a conversation that
we look forward to having within this group.

And one criteria for a significant release is \$50,000 of total costs measured in 1984 dollars. We're not really sure that's the right way to measure the effect upon people, property and the environment when that includes clean-up costs. And you might have releases in area A reach that threshold but not in area B.

opportunity to discuss this. Those are two we're ready to discuss more. We hope that in a future meeting we bring to you a consensus that we've identified with Carl and other members of the public and PHMSA, because we think this is a good effort. Working on metrics measuring the industry and operators over time is something that we believe in.

Page 348 1 MS. DAUGHERTY: Thank you. Thank you. MR. BLACK: 2 3 MS. DAUGHERTY: Thank you, Andy. Very nicely done. 4 And our next speaker is? 5 MR. MAYBERRY: Yes, thanks, Andy. 6 For the Gas Team I'd ask Scott Currier to come 7 talk to us. 8 9 Scott is a member of the team and 10 he'll just give some comments from his 11 perspective representing the operators. MR. CURRIER: Yes, so I got an 12 13 advanced copy of this slide deck and I think there's only 30 slides in it, so I think 14 there's only me and two slides between you and 15 16 getting out of here. So I'll hopefully make 17 it short here. My name is Scott Currier. 18 with INGAA. We have about 24 member companies 19 20 representing about 200,000 interstate natural 21 gas pipeline miles. And just wanted to echo

the comments that were said here previously my

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1 Andy, Linda and Alan.

applaud PHMSA for putting together this team to focus on the data quality. It last came up at a work shop that was held last January, the Data Quality Workshop I believe it was called, where Christina Sames of the AGA called for these committees to be put together to really focus on the quality of the data we're currently collecting and to really standardize on the analysis and what the data was telling us and agree on common messaging.

So I think I'd like to recognize her for bringing that to everyone's attention and applaud PHMSA for putting together this team, even though unfortunately the first time we met, we showed up that morning and PHMSA was nowhere to be found because they were on furlough.

(Laughter.)

MR. CURRIER: But needless to say, you know, we got some stuff during that

meeting, but the next one was much more productive.

I think Linda said two key points here that I'd like to reemphasize; and that's, you know, focusing on on leading and lagging indicators both and that, you know, at this Data Quality Work Shop that was held last January the various stakeholders showed up, plotted the same data on different graphs. And, you know, I think one of the things we want to do is drive common messaging and agree with, you know, Carl, PHMSA and all the other interested stakeholders on what the data is actually telling us.

And I think one of the primary focuses of this effort is to really first ask, you know, what are we trying to find out and then tell us, you know, what kind of data do we need to tell us that versus taking the data we already have, plotting it and then trying to gather from it conclusions that it might not willingly lend us to.

One of the other things that I believe is really important to the Gas Data Quality Action Team is the quality of the data going into all these metrics. I know that's something that maybe wasn't discussed here quite yet, but I wanted to spend a minute talking about it.

There are a lot of instructions that accompany these annual report forms and incident report forms and sometimes I think the operators filling it out have the best intention trying to fill out the most accurate data they possibly can, but sometimes the instructions, you know, can be interpreted one or multiple different ways. So I think that's an effort that the Committee here is going to take up in reviewing that data to make sure we're getting quality data as it's very important when we end up rolling all this data up into the performance metrics.

And then one last thing that I wanted to talk about is, you know, you saw a

much of metrics flashing up on the screen there and I think they're all very important and they're a starting point for this group. They might change over time, but one of the things that I think this Committee, this Gas Data Quality Team is going to look at is, you know, prior to actually plotting the data what are the conclusions we're going to gather from it so we don't plot it and then we try to force fit our opinions on what it's telling us? So I look forward to those discussions with Carl, PHMSA and others so that we can really narrow down on our messaging to determine the state of pipeline safety.

I know there's one thing in particular that from, you know, time to time there's always these underlying messages to the data that gets plotted. You know, one such nuance is significant incidents where the definition of those has changed over time. So when you see these spikes and valleys in the data it's really hard to trend. So I think

Page 353 1 I'd really like the team to focus on that and review sort of what it means when we end up 2 3 plotting it and maybe put some messaging to it. 4 5 So that's all I had. Appreciate 6 you guys. 7 MR. MAYBERRY: With that, I know 8 we're getting close on time, Carl, I don't 9 know if you wanted to weigh in or -- okay. 10 All right. 11 ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: Somebody find Jeff? 12 13 PARTICIPANT: Yes, he'll be right back. 14 15 ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: Or I'll finish it off without him. 16 17 PARTICIPANT: He wanted to close it out. 18 ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: 19 Yes. So. 20 no questions for these fine two teams that are 21 headed by two fine people that will have a product to us no later than the end of the 22

1 year?

You all didn't give us a deadline

here. I knew I'd get somebody to start

talking.

MEMBER FLECK: One just quick general question while we're waiting for someone to return.

(Laughter.)

MEMBER FLECK: Actually I was really fascinated by all the discussions on performance measures, and there's one that has me concerned and there's one that's had me concerned for a long time, and that's any measure around the number of violations a company receives from their regulators. And I think what you need to do is really think hard about materiality, about comparisons, one company against another.

Some states do an extensive amount of analysis and create violations for one-hundred of a pound excursion over MAOP, missing a date, an inspection date by one day.

In Hurricane Sandy, you know, we missed a day because the hurricane hit. You know, those kind of things. But if you just print those measures, you know, number of violations on an external Web site and the public looks at it and they see 1,000 violations and they don't understand the context and materiality behind it, they can become unnecessarily anxious and upset.

And I think that's one that's going to need more art than science and I wish you luck in figuring it out, because that's a tricky one that you're going to have to deal with. And Massoud knows what I'm talking about. If you look at the enforcement across the various states, it is far from even. And we don't even define a leak the same way, so we don't define a violation the same way. It's a really tricky one and I'm very concerned about it, as are a lot of companies in the states that do have the extensive inspection and writing violations.

Page 356 1 ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: Thank you, Sue. 2 Jeff? 3 MR. WIESE: Well, Carl, I was 4 counting on you for enough time to get out. 5 Since this guy is such a task master, we can't 6 even get a body break. 7 So be that as it may, there are 8 9 other ones that I would point out here, and 10 Carl and we have debated this time and time 11 again, how many violations you have per inspection. And the public and even the other 12 13 entities in Government who look at our regulations always want to ask how many more 14 inspections are you going to do? And I go, 15 well, you know, it is not that simple. 16 17 You know, we had about a dozen different kinds of inspections. Oftentimes 18 they were layered in by statutory 19 20 requirements. We built a program. We

executed it. We went out and we went around.

Now what we're doing is an integrated

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inspection. And I think you heard comments about risk-based inspections coming out of people. You heard I think things that take us -- and it's useful to have a conversation on that topic. Craig Pierson is going through one of our integrated inspections right now, so I'm sure that he would have some interesting comments. I don't know, have any of you guys had an II yet? You have?

PARTICIPANT: We had one last year and we're getting another inspection this year.

MR. WIESE: Oh, okay. But integrated inspection -- so for what defense I'll make there, is to say that the integrated is an attempt to stop coming out to see you six times for different kinds of things.

We're trying to come out and see people for the reasons that we need to be there. Right? And it's a really useful conversation to have because it relies on the data, it relies on performance metrics, you know, and we don't

have enough resources to go everywhere.

You know, we used to run our inspection program that we would try to inspect everyone every two years. Well, first of all, it was hard to do. And secondly, Congress kept layering in new requirements. So eventually we've integrated these things. But I think we have a long ways to, but I think it's the right direction. But it's not as easy as people think and we can't even get people to agree on risk ranking of the code, you know? You know, what violation is worse than another one? Oh, my God. You know, we had knock-down drag-outs even inside the House on that thing.

So any rate, I'll just say we have a lot of work to do on performance metrics.

It's a pretty difficult subject, but it's really important. And close to my friend Ron by saying it's very much part of the SMS, you know? And I think that that's a related conversation.

	Page 359
1	ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: Well,
2	Jeff I hope you don't mind that I gave Alan
3	and Linda a deadline of the end of the year
4	to
5	MR. WIESE: You gave them that
6	long?
7	(Laughter.)
8	MS. DAUGHERTY: I like this.
9	MR. WIESE: Was there money that
10	changed hands here or what?
11	MR. MAYBERRY: We were going to
12	say April and he gave us
13	MR. WIESE: Oh, great.
14	(Laughter.)
15	ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: End of
16	the year.
17	MR. WIESE: And they say you're
18	tough. You know, where is that?
19	ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: Not when
20	I'm close to D.C.
21	With that, I think we've completed
22	the agenda and I'm going to turn it over to

1 Jeff for some closing remarks.

2 MR. WIESE: Okay. As usual, I

3 don't have --

ACTING CHAIR TAHAMTANI: I'm sorry, I thought we were done.

MEMBER KUPREWICZ: Yes, I'm going to hold everybody for a couple comments here. Rick Kuprewicz representing the public on the Liquid Committee.

First of all, in terms of
transparency of data and the progress that has
been made over the last 10 years you have an
excellent story to tell here. Okay? Are you
there? No. You've come quantum leap from a
public perspective, and Carl can speak for,
you know, his organization, but input I'm
getting from various representatives of the
public. So if you look at the studies that
have been made, it's a very good story, so you
want to carry that into the next reauthorization as a possible suggestion. All
right?

2 fairly complete. Now, complete doesn't mean

So it says you need to get this

a lot of people getting apprehensive. I would

perfect. All right? And you're going to hear

5 use as an example the much effort that went

6 into the performance metrics for the DIMP

7 regulation. And from what I've seen and

8 various testimonies and various different

9 companies associated with DIMP, you know,

10 they're not perfect metrics, but they really

11 are showing that people are getting it. So

12 kind of keep it at that higher level. You

want to be able to get that to the public in

14 some manner that they can figure out.

And the comment about minimizing
the number of clicks, I'm fairly conversant in
Web stuff and all that and I'm looking for
stuff and I can't find it. And I have to go

19 call Carl and say do you guys know how to get

20 there, because I don't? And so there is a way

21 to improve that.

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So don't look at perfection on

Okay.

this. Continually move on the transparency issue. It's an excellent story on a lot of stuff that everybody's complaining about, but you've made a good stride here. So build off that success and don't look for perfection.

And with that, I'll shut up.

MR. WIESE: Yes, I'll pay you later, Rick? Okay.

(Laughter.)

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that one.

MEMBER KUPREWICZ: Fifty bucks.

MR. WIESE: Fifty bucks. Remember, they've frozen our pay for threeplus years now, so we'll have to negotiate

So with your permission, I really don't have much to add. I mostly wanted to thank you and wish you well and safe travels back to your homes. I really enjoy -- you know, I'll tell a quick story by saying when I first joined OPS and I went through several of the Advisory Committee meetings, I remember thinking -- I'll use different terms, but what

1 a pain. You know, what a pain.

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(Laughter.)

MR. WIESE: Because I had to do a lot of work to prepare for it. The beauty of it now is other people do the work and I just show up at the meeting.

(Laughter.)

MR. WIESE: No. No. Just kidding. I really have come to appreciate the Advisory Committee. We build a consensus here, and sometimes it's not pretty like the plastic vote. You know, that was rough and I never like to cause, you know, that kind of anxiety. For some of the people I think you missed some of this, but there were some tense moments. And we had some side conversations and I think we did the right thing, you know, but certainly not all parties walked away from that one happy campers. So don't like to do that. Like to do the work in advance so that when we get there it's not that kind of a fight, but I appreciate that.

And as I talked to some of the members about that fight they openly said that they were conflicted, you know, and they couldn't have voted to support the party who lost in this particular case, but you know, were quite torn. So I realize it's not an easy task sometimes. It's not black and white, the stuff that we do. And I very much appreciate it.

So I'll close with commending
those of you who can and reminding you that
we'll have a full day work shop tomorrow
starting at 8:00 a.m. I think in this same
room, although we'll be set up differently.
I do encourage you to come. If you can't
come, there's a Web cast and we'll also be
doing YouTube portions for some of the panels.
So I think with that I'll wish you
well and thank you again.

MR. SATTERTHWAITE: Oh, just real quick.

MR. WIESE: Sure.

Page 365 1 MR. SATTERTHWAITE: Actually they're going to move us down a couple of 2 3 rooms. MR. WIESE: Oh, we are? 4 Okay. MR. SATTERTHWAITE: So we'll be on 5 the end. 6 7 MR. WIESE: Good. 8 MR. SATTERTHWAITE: So they did do 9 that. It was like a last-minute thing. 10 MR. WIESE: Okay. 11 Another thing MR. SATTERTHWAITE: on the presentations. We'll go first probably 12 13 on the meeting page for members of the public. And it will be in the docket and it will be on 14 our Web site. And I'll try to send something 15 to the members as well. If you have any 16 17 questions as far as like the electronic -- you know the briefing sheet or anything like that, 18 feel free to give me a call or send an email. 19 20 We were trying to figure out we want to do 21 that. Feel free to send any comments that you I don't know if we're going to do any 22 have.

Page 366 other type of survey on that. But that was all I had.

MR. WIESE: Okay. And I also want to thank Cameron. I mean Cameron picked up several jobs here unexpectedly due to people being ill. We had two people in that group go out.

So I did see, by the way, the cervical fusions that John had. There was an X-ray of those. Quite interesting to take a look at that.

But I thank you very much, Cameron.

I think I did make sort of a general offer to the group that we'll just send out to them the PowerPoints, whatnot.

Andy or somebody had asked for that, so we'll try to do that.

MR. SATTERTHWAITE: Also wanted to just add in there Cheryl did a great job just setting things up, because it was easy to pick up. So she did a good job, as she always

	Page 367
1	does, even though she wasn't here to get the
2	credit, but I do want to give her the credit.
3	A lot of work she did communicating with you
4	all throughout the year and things such as.
5	And if there are any errors or anything like
6	that in your name tags or anything, feel free
7	to give us a call and we'll work on it to get
8	it better than we have. So that's all.
9	MR. WIESE: All right. Thanks,
10	Cameron. Thank you again.
11	All right. Safe travels.
12	(Whereupon, the meeting was
13	adjourned at 4:36 p.m.)
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