

5.5-mile radius of the center of the airport, extending clockwise from a 305° bearing to a 118° bearing from the airport; within 4.5 miles northwest 6.5 miles southeast of a 052° bearing and a 232° bearing from a point 40°05'06" N., 75°21'24" W., extending from 5.5 miles northeast to 11.5 miles southwest of said point; within 5 miles each side of a 254° bearing from a point 40°05'06" N., 75°21'24" W., extending from said point to 6.5 miles west of said point; within 5 miles each side of 231° bearing from the Ambler, Pa. RBN 40°07'33" N., 75°17'08" W., extending from the RBN to 6.5 miles southwest of the RBN; within a 9-mile radius of the center, 40°12'00" N., 75°08'55" W. of Willow Grove NAS, Willow Grove, Pa.; within 5 miles each side of the Willow Grove TACAN 136° radial, extending from the 9-mile radius area to 11.5 miles southeast of the TACAN; within 5 miles each side of the Willow Grove TACAN 325° radial, extending from the 9-mile radius area to 13.5 miles northwest of the TACAN; within an 8.5-mile radius of the center, 40°12'15" N., 75°04'30" W. of Warminster NAF, Warminster, Pa. extending clockwise from a 025° bearing to a 254° bearing from the airport; within a 9-mile radius of the center of the airport, extending clockwise from a 254° bearing to a 025° bearing from the airport; within 4 miles each side of a 262° bearing from the Willow Grove RBN, extending from the RBN to 8.5 miles west of the RBN; within 1.5 miles each side of the Yardley VORTAC 244° radial, extending from the 8.5-mile radius area centered on Warminster NAF to the VORTAC; within 5 miles each side of the Warminster TACAN 259° radial, extending from the TACAN to 9.5 miles west of the TACAN; within 4.5 miles each side of the Warminster TACAN 083° radial, extending from the TACAN to 9 miles east of the TACAN; within a 5-mile radius of the center, 40°13'15" N., 75°12'45" W. of Turner Field, Prospectville, Pa.; within 8 miles southwest and 3.5 miles northeast of the North Philadelphia VOR 312° radial, extending from 20 miles northwest of the VOR to 31.5 miles northwest of the VOR; within 5 miles each side of the North Philadelphia VOR 312° radial, extending from 20 miles northwest of the VOR to 26 miles northwest of the VOR; within 2.5 miles each side of the North Philadelphia VOR 312° radial extending from 18 miles northwest of the VOR to 20 miles northwest of the VOR; within a 5-mile radius of the center, 40°11'18" N., 74°53'54" W. of Buehl Field, Langhorne, Pa., extending clockwise from a 032° bearing to a 254° bearing from the airport; within a 6.5-mile radius of the center of the airport, extending clockwise from a 254° bearing to a 320° bearing from the airport; within a 6-mile radius of the center of the airport, extending clockwise from a 320° bearing to a 033° bearing from the airport; within 2 miles each side of the North Philadelphia VOR 038° radial, extending from the 5-mile radius to the North Philadelphia VOR.

4. Amend § 71.181 of Part 71 of the Federal Aviation Regulations by revoking the Langhorne, Pa. Transition Area.

This amendment is proposed under section 307(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 [72 Stat. 749; 49 U.S.C. 1348] and section 6(c) of the Department of Transportation Act [49 U.S.C. 1655(c)].

Issued in Jamaica, N.Y., on June 14, 1974.

JAMES BISPO,
Deputy Director, Eastern Region.
[FR Doc.74-14856 Filed 6-27-74; 8:45 am]

National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration

[49 CFR Part 575]

[Docket No. 25; Notice 12]

UNIFORM TIRE QUALITY GRADING;
CORRECTION

In FR Doc. 74-3697, appearing at page 20808 in the issue of June 14, 1974, make the following corrections:

§ 575.104 [Amended]

In paragraph (d) (2) (iii) (B), appearing in the first column on page 20811, the number "525" should read "500."

In the third column on page 20811, the first subparagraph (ix) (in paragraph (e) (2)) is a typographical error and should be deleted.

In the third column on page 20811, in paragraph (e) (2) (ix) (A) the initials NRTSA should read NHTSA.

(Secs. 103, 112, 119, 201, 203, Pub. L. 83-563, 80 Stat. 718 (16 U.S.C. 1392, 1401, 1407, 1421, 1423); delegations of authority at 49 CFR 1.51 and 49 CFR 501.8)

Issued on June 25, 1974.

ROBERT L. CARTER,
Associate Administrator,
Motor Vehicle Programs.

[FR Doc.74-14858 Filed 6-27-74; 8:45 am]

Office of Pipeline Safety

[49 CFR Part 192]

[Docket No. OPS-29; Notice No. 74-4]

RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY THE NA-
TIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY
BOARD

Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

This advance notice of proposed rulemaking invites public comment on a report issued recently by the National Transportation Safety Board. It is Report Number NTSB-PAR-74-3, entitled Pipeline Accident Report—Missouri Public Service Company, Clinton, Missouri, December 9, 1972. The 27-page report is available to the public through the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22151.

The report describes and analyzes a gas explosion and fire which occurred in downtown Clinton at 6:06 p.m. on Saturday, December 9, 1972. Eight people were killed and seven were injured as a result of the accident. Missouri Public Service Company personnel had arrived at the site of the leak 50 minutes before the explosion; they did not stop the flow of gas to the leak site until 1 hour and 40 minutes after the explosion.

The Board found that the probable cause of the accident "was the ignition of gas that had leaked from a cast iron main cracked by a combination of soil stresses and railroad vibration, which applied a bending force to the pipe in an area weakened by graphitization." The Board found that contributing factors "were the failure of the gas company to shut off the flow of gas to the leak site

and the inadequate efforts of the gas-company personnel to prevent the ignition of the leaking gas detected in the building."

The Board concluded the report by recommending that:

1. The Office of Pipeline Safety of the Department of Transportation:

(a) Revise 49 CFR 192.741 to require pipeline operators to telemeter gas pressure or flow data in such a way as to insure prompt warnings of significant system failures shown by pressure or flow changes. The type and location of the data points should be considered on an individual basis and should include single-fed systems serving substantial numbers of customers.

(b) Define what constitutes an emergency and provide clarification of the requirements of emergency procedures under 49 CFR 192.615, Emergency plans.

(c) Require that designated emergency valves be the valves closed initially when a section of main is required to be isolated in an emergency.

2. The American Society of Mechanical Engineers Gas Piping Standards Committee:

(a) Develop guidelines for the use of telemetering on gas distribution systems so that system failures can be promptly detected.

(b) Expand the guidelines on the prevention of accidental ignition, to provide for more comprehensive guidance to pipeline operators when gas is detected in buildings and structures. The guidelines should include such subjects as ventilation of structures, prohibition of electrical switch operation, and occupant evacuation. This work should be coordinated with the guidelines currently being developed concerning the action to be taken by the first gas company employee arriving at the scene of an emergency.

3. The Missouri Public Service Company:

(a) Expand its emergency procedures to include the actions to be taken in all types of emergencies.

(b) Install telemetering equipment at the Clinton and other town border stations, so that system failures can be promptly detected.

(c) Expand its formal training program to provide employees who respond to reported leaks with the knowledge and techniques required to assist them in handling emergency situations.

(d) Take remedial action to reduce the possibility of breakage of cast-iron mains. This action should include replacement of those sections of cast-iron main susceptible to failure.

(e) Develop a sectionalizing program of its high-pressure distribution system so that preplanned procedures are available to isolate any section of its system in an emergency.

(f) Train and equip all appropriate radio-equipped field personnel (including electric servicemen) to locate and operate main line valves in emergencies.

(g) Provide valve location and other necessary information to dispatchers in radio contact with servicemen, supervisors, and repair crews, so that emergency efforts can be expeditiously coordinated.

The Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) is considering each of the recommendations addressed to it by the Board. To make a proper evaluation on all of these proposals—to define the safety problems raised by the Board's report and to weigh the technical feasibility and economic practicability of the Board's recommendations—OPS needs more information than is presently available. OPS is issuing this advance notice of proposed rule making as a means of getting the information it needs and will take any action that is deemed appropriate.

OPS has a policy of seeking information from all knowledgeable sources so that its regulations will be founded on a broad base of facts. This policy provides for industry, other Federal and State agencies, and the general public to participate in the identification and definition of safety problems, the development and evaluation of alternative solutions of those problems, and the choice of the proper solution for each problem. An advance notice of proposed rulemaking, inviting public participation at any early stage in the consideration of a regulatory proposal, is an application of this policy.

While it is primarily interested in the three recommendations addressed to it, OPS is also interested in comment on the recommendations addressed to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers and the Missouri Public Service Company, since they relate to the overall OPS safety responsibility. Each person should feel free to comment on all aspects of the recommendations, but OPS particularly invites comment on (1) definition of each of the safety problems which are implicit in the recommendations, (2) applicability and effectiveness of the present regulations in relation to those problems, (3) other ways (both regulatory and nonregulatory) in which each of the safety problems might be solved, and (4) analysis of the technical feasibility and economic practicability of each of the possible solutions.

This notice is not a proposal to change the regulations. Its only function is to generate information to use in evaluating the Board's recommendations. If the evaluation leads to the conclusion that the regulations should be amended, OPS will publish a notice of proposed rulemaking setting forth the proposed changes and inviting comment on those proposals. If the evaluation leads to the conclusion that the regulations should not be amended, OPS will take such other action on each of the recommendations as may be appropriate, such as issuing advisory material or rejecting the recommendation.

OPS invites interested persons to furnish the requested information by submitting written comments on Report Number NTSB-PAR-74-3, with particular attention to the recommenda-

tions. Comments should identify the notice number and be submitted in duplicate to the Director, Office of Pipeline Safety, Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C. 20590. All comments received by September 2, 1974, will be considered by the Director before taking final action on the notice. As they are received, comments will be placed in the public docket and thereafter will be available for examination by interested persons.

This advance notice of proposed rulemaking is issued under the authority of section 3 of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 (49 U.S.C. 1672), (18 U.S.C. 831-835), section 6(e)(4) of the Department of Transportation Act (49 U.S.C. 1655(e)(4)), § 1.58(d) of the regulations of the Office of the Secretary of Transportation (49 CFR 1.58(d)), and the redelegation of authority to the Director, Office of Pipeline Safety, set forth in Appendix A to Part 1 of the regulations of the Office of the Secretary of Transportation (49 CFR Part 1).

Issued in Washington, D.C., on June 21, 1974.

JOSEPH C. CALDWELL,
Director,
Office of Pipeline Safety.

[FR Doc. 74-14783 Filed 6-27-74; 8:45 am]

CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION

[16 CFR Ch. II]

SWIMMING POOL WATER SLIDES

Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

The Consumer Product Safety Commission has preliminarily determined (1) that hazards associated with swimming pool water slides present unreasonable risks of death or injury and (2) that one or more consumer product safety standards are necessary to eliminate or reduce those unreasonable risks of injury.

On May 30, 1973, the National Swimming Pool Institute and the Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corporation petitioned the Consumer Product Safety Commission, pursuant to section 10 of the Consumer Product Safety Act (Pub. Law 92-573, 86 Stat. 1212-1215; 15 U.S.C. 2059), to commence a proceeding for the development of a consumer product safety standard for swimming pool water slides.

The Commission was also in receipt of NEISS data indicating that there were a substantial number of injuries associated with swimming pools in general. It was estimated that during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973, approximately 42,000 persons in the United States suffered injuries associated with swimming pools serious enough to require emergency room treatment. In-ground swimming pools and associated equipment were ranked number 16 on the Commission's Consumer product hazard index. Above ground swimming pools and associated equipment were ranked number 60. Accordingly, the Commission will in the future be addressing swimming pool hazards other than those associated with slides. However, since the data indicated that some

of the most severe injuries incurred within the swimming pool environment were associated with swimming pool water slides, the Commission on October 9, 1973, on the basis of outside reports of injuries received by the Commission, and tests conducted at Nova University (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.) and the University of Utah, granted the petition requesting the Commission to commence a proceeding to develop a consumer product safety standard for swimming pool water slides. In addition, the Commission is also considering a variety of approaches in an attempt to reduce injuries associated with swimming pools and related products.

Copies of the petition, the briefing package prepared for the Commission by its staff in connection with the petition, and the information referred to above are available for public inspection in the Office of the Secretary.

Accordingly, pursuant to section 7 of the Consumer Product Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 2056), this notice commences a proceeding for the development of a consumer product safety standard applicable to swimming pool water slides.

The Commission recognizes that swimming pool water slides could be regulated under the provisions of the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (15 U.S.C. 1201 et seq.) which give the Commission authority over toys and other articles intended for use by children. In this regard section 30(d) of the Consumer Product Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 2079(d)) provides that a risk of injury which is associated with consumer products and which could be eliminated or reduced to a sufficient extent by action taken under the Federal Hazardous Substances Act may be regulated by the Commission only in accordance with the provisions of that act. However, injury reports concerning swimming pool water slides indicate that many of the most severe injuries associated with swimming pool water slides have been sustained by adults. While regulations adopted pursuant to the Federal Hazardous Substances Act might be adequate to eliminate or reduce injuries associated with swimming pool water slides incurred by children, the Commission does not believe that the scope of regulations developed under that act would be broad enough to adequately protect adults. The Commission reaches this conclusion because such factors as the weight of adults, their velocity when entering a pool and their entry angle into the pool necessitate considerations different than those used for children. Accordingly, the Commission finds that the development of a mandatory standard under the Consumer Product Safety Act is necessary to eliminate or reduce to a sufficient extent the risk of injuries associated with swimming pool water slides sustained by both children and adults.

The development period for this standard shall end on November 25, 1974. The Commission, however, may extend the development time if it finds for good cause that a different period of time is appropriate. Any such extension will be announced by a notice in the FEDERAL REGISTER.