

U.S. Department of Transportation **Pipeline and** Hazardous Materials Safety Administration



Quantifying Factors & Trends in Casualties due to Hazardous Materials Transportation Michael Locke, PHMSA

Society for Risk Analysis - Annual Meeting

Charleston, SC December 6, 2011





- Agency of U.S. Department of Transportation
- Created in 2005, a merger of the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) and Office of Hazardous Materials Safety (OHMS)

OHMS coordinates oversight of hazmat transportation in the U.S. and aboard U.S.-based carriers







- Regulation
- Public information and training
- Granting variations ("special permits") from regulation
- Technical review of new products (both hazmats and their packaging)
- Field inspections
- …and data evaluation and analysis





- Explosive (fireworks) or under pressure (compressed gases)
- Poisonous (ammonia, chlorine) or biohazardous (infectious agents)
- Asphyxiant (carbon dioxide)
- Corrosive (hydrochloric acid, sulfuric acid)
- Flammable (gasoline, hydrogen, lithium), and
- Radioactive materials







- Federal <u>Motor Carrier</u> Safety Administration (FMCSA)
- Federal <u>Railroad</u> Administration (FRA)
- Federal <u>Aviation</u> Administration (FAA)
- United States <u>Coast Guard</u> (USCG, within DHS)



Hazmat Safety vs. All Transportation



- In 2009 there were:
 - 33,000 deaths on highways
 - 500 deaths in air transportation
 - 400 deaths in rail transportation
 - 150 deaths in commercial water transportation

&

12 deaths due to hazmat transport across all modes





- PHMSA faces the enviable "challenge" of a strong track record
- We want to know how to direct our attention and resources to prevent future events
- Can we characterize underlying risk in a useful way?

...and how? Depends on our data capabilities





- Reorientation toward a systematic approach to identifying and mitigating or controlling hazards
 - Questions include the normative (How can we define unacceptable risk?) and positive (Can we model risk potential in such a heterogeneous, multimodal field?), as well as what we can do to correct for our data gaps



How to Approach Risk Management?



- First step reviewing history to see:
 - Where there have been consistent problems
 - Where there are trends (increasing or decreasing)
 & correlations, and
 - Where there is <u>no</u> incident history
 - If we have no data on historical consequences in HMT, the question of how to use it is moot
 - E.g., no documented casualties from radioactive materials in transportation

2		
U.S. Department of Transportation	U.S. Department of Transportation Research and Special Programs Administration	Form Approval OM8 No. 2137-0039
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration	According to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, no persons are required to respond to a collect valid OMB control number. The valid OMB control number for this information collection is 2137-0 mandatory and will take 96 minutes to complete.	039. The filling out of this information is OFFICE OF HAZARD
	INSTRUCTIONS: Submit this report to the Information Systems Manager, U.S. Department of Tran Administration, Office of Hazardous Materials Safety, DHM-63, Washington, D.C. 20590-0001. If use a seperate sheet of paper, identifying the entry number being completed. Copies of this fo the Office of Hazardous Materials Website at http://hazmat.dot.gov. If you have any questions, Information Center at 1-800-HMR-4922 (1-800-467-4922) or online at http://hazmat.dot.gov.	space provided for any item is inadequate, orm and instructions can be obtained from
	PART I - REPORT TYPE	
		stem or damage that requires repair to a system
	2. Indicate whether this is: An initial report A supplemental (follow-up)	
	PART II - GENERAL INCIDENT INFORMATION	
	3. Date of Incident: 4. Time of Incident (use 24-hour time	at
	5. Enter National Response Center Report Number (if applicable):	un
	6. If you submitted a report to another Federal DOT agency, enter the agency and report number 7. Location of Incident: City: County: State:	
	Street Address/Mile Marker/Yardname/Airport/Body of Water/River Mile	
	8. Mode of Transportation Air Highway Rai	Water
	9. Transportation Phase In Transit Loading Uni	
		loading L in Frankt Storage
	10. Carrier/Reporter Name	
	City State	ZIP Code
	Federal DOT ID Number Hazmat Registrat	tion Number
	11. Shipper/Offeror Name	
	Street	
		ZIP Code
	Waybil/Shipping Paper Hazmat Registrat	Sion Number
	12. Origin Street Gf different from shipper address) City State	ZIP Code
	13. Destination Street	
	City State	ZIP Code
	14. Proper Shipping Name of Hazardous Material:	
	15. Technical/Trade Name:	
	16. Hazardous Class/ Division:	19. Quantity Released:
	20. Was the material shipped as a hazardous waste? Yes No If yes, provide the E	
	21. Is this a Toxic by Inhalation (TIH) material? Yes No If yes, provide the H	
	22. Was the material shipped under an Exemption, Approval, or Competent Authority Certificate?	
	If yes, provide the Exemption, Approval, or CA number:	
	23. Was this an undeclared hazardous materials shipment?	Yes No
	Form DOT F 5800.1 (01-2004) Page 1	Reproduction of this form is permitted

Quantifying Factors & Trends in Casualties due to Hazmat Transportation



Reporting Casualties in HMT



- PHMSA is the only real aggregator of hazmat incident data; We collect information via Form 5800.1 on all hazmat releases in transportation
- Our data are only as good as are reported by carriers; we face multiple challenges in recordkeeping, not least that minor incidents
 - Are highly underreported, and
 - Represent a massive data-processing effort out of proportion to the risk and consequences involved
- Major incidents involving <u>deaths & injuries</u>* due to hazmat transportation in the United States are better substantiated; for convenience, these will be referred to collectively as <u>casualties</u>

* in this case: major injuries, requiring admittance and stay in the hospital for at least one night and/or the loss of a minimum of three days from work




Historical Record: Casualty Overview



- Over 25 years (1985-2009), we have documented
 - 421 fatalities and
 - 921 injuries

due to hazmat released in transportation, which collectively occurred in


- 830 incidents
- These have not demonstrated a clear year-to-year pattern







Logarithmic Scatterplot of Casualties per D&I Incident, 1985-2009









- Certain aspects of an incident are categorical and more easily recorded:
 - Mode (road, rail, air, water)
 - Phase (loading, in transit, storage, unloading)
 - Shipment size (bulk / non-bulk)
 - The occurrence of certain events
 - Fire, explosion, gas dispersion
 - Who is affected (hazmat workers, the general public, emergency responders)

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


Incidents by Mode, 1985-2009






■ HIGHWAY ■ RAILWAY ■ AIR ■ WATER



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D&I Incidents by Transportation Phase, as Percent of Annual Total, 1990-2009





Number of Fatalities by Mode and Phase, 1990-2009

	IN TRANSIT	IN TRANSIT STORAGE	LOADING	UNLOADING	Grand Total
AIR	110				110
HIGHWAY	184	4	5	31	224
RAILWAY	17			4	21
WATER	3				3
Grand Total	314	4	5	35	358


Number of Major Injuries by Mode and Phase (1990-2009)

	IN TRANSIT	IN TRANSIT STORAGE	LOADING	UNLOADING	Grand Total
AIR	5		3	5	13
HIGHWAY	178	25	52	245	500
RAILWAY	205	7	3	20	235
WATER	3				3
Grand Total	391	32	58	270	751






Number of <u>All Reported</u> Incidents by Packaging Size (Bulk vs. Non-Bulk), Raw Numbers, 1985-2009



BULK NON-BULK


Number of <u>D&I</u> Incidents by Packaging Size (Bulk vs. Non-Bulk), Raw Numbers, 1985-2009




BULK NON-BULK

Annual Percent of All Reported Incidents by Packaging Size (Bulk vs. Non-Bulk), 1985-2009

BULK NON-BULK



Annual Percent of D&I Incidents by Packaging Size (Bulk vs. Non-Bulk), 1985-2009






Number of D&I incidents with and without Fire And Explosion with Respect to All Reported Incidents, 1985-2009





Presence of Ignition Events	D&I Incidents	All Reported Incidents	D&I Incidents as % of All Reported Incidents
Neither	513	330,172	0.20%
Explosion, No Fire	21	232	9.10%
Both	110	270	40.70%
Fire, No Explosion	186	1,202	15.50%
Total	830	331,876	0.30%

D&I Incidents by Ignition Indicators, 1985-2009




All Incidents by Ignition Indicators, 1985-2009







TRUE FALSE

Highway D&I Incidents




Railway D&I Incidents





Hazmat Hospitalizations by Victim Type and Year, 1990-2009








Some aspects present added challenges:


- Commodity (multiple items may be present)
- Packaging (not recorded consistently)
- Cause of failure
 - the reporting system has undergone multiple revisions over the years and
 - the options presented for reporting allow for great subjectivity

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Top 5 Commodity Classes Involved in Casualty Incidents, 1985-2009







Total Number of Fatalities


Hospitalized Injuries




Highway D&I Incidents by Number Involving <u>CTMVs</u>, Other Bulk, and Non-bulk Packaging, 1985-2009



CTMV Incidents One-CTMV Bulk Incidents All Non-bulk Incidents




Railway D&I Incidents by Number Involving <u>Tank Cars</u>, Other Bulk, and Non-bulk Packaging, 1985-2009




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Crash and Rollover Incidents and Their Proportion of All D&I Incidents, 1985-2009





Human Error Related Incidents and Their Proportion of All D&I Incidents, 1985-2009








- All numbers up to this point have been gross figures
- Does it make sense to approach them in terms of exposure (by volume or distance moved), economic activity, population affected, or number of safety personnel?








Courtesy of Rick Kowalewski, PHMSA







Data Sources: Census Bureau, Energy Information Administration, PHMSA Annual Report Data, BTS ton-mile estimates, PHMSA Incident Data - as of Sep. 13, 2010

Courtesy of Rick Kowalewski, PHMSA



Challenges in Determining Trends



- Is using a "recency bias" reasonable?
 - Whatever happened last year is probably more relevant than what happened 20 years ago—but we want to escape the trap of reactionary thinking
- Can't rely on past incidents alone to tell future. Seeking info from:
 - PHMSA offices (special permits, approvals, field inspections, technical staff)
 - Outside experts







- The Red Queen and the Whack-a-Mole: Our regulatory regime is evolving—usually in response to past events—but *new technologies* and *latent risks* make it difficult to guess where to turn next; we can't know what will lead to the next ValuJet
- Even if we could account for a certain likelihood and magnitude of LPHC / black swans (as well as an estimate of the more predictably regular events), our area of responsibility is broad and our office is small—how can we use info to actually affect risk?



Next Step: Building RM Framework



- Finding best practices for developing a model
- Avoiding pitfalls of relying on bad or irrelevant data
- Making normative decisions (e.g., Can we weigh certain events more heavily?)
- Identifying collaboration opportunities
 - Currently developing an RFI

Questions? Comments?

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http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/hazmat/risk