

# Memorandum

U.S. Department of Transportation						
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration Central Region Office Office of Pipeline Safety						
Date:	September 30, 2010					
Subject:	Summary Incident Report Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P. (Op ID 11169) Clearbrook, MN to Deer River, MN (Unit 3083) Line 3 Crude Oil Leak November 13, 2007 SMART Activity ID 124316					
From:	James Bunn, Staff Engineer					
То:	David Barrett, Director – Central Region, PHP-300					

#### 1.0 SUMMARY

At approximately 7:00 a.m. on November 13, 2007, crude oil leaked from the Enbridge Energy Partners L.P. ("Enbridge") Line 3 Pipeline in Clearwater County, Clearbrook, MN (the "Incident"). An estimated 2 barrels (bbls) of crude oil was released from the pipeline. The Incident occurred on the pipeline right of way (ROW) near milepost number 912 (MP 912), approximately three miles southeast of the Enbridge Clearbrook Terminal. No fatalities or injuries occurred as a result of the Incident. The Incident did not occur in a high consequence area (HCA) and no water was impacted. The total cost of the Incident, pipeline repair and environmental cleanup, is estimated at \$30,680. There were no service interruptions or supply impacts as a result of the Incident.

#### 2.0 PIPELINE SYSTEM

Enbridge's Line 3 is a 34-inch diameter crude oil pipeline that runs from Gretna, Manitoba, Canada to Superior, WI. At the Incident location, the pipeline is constructed of API 5L X-52

line pipe manufactured by U.S. Steel in 1967. The pipeline is 34-inch diameter by 0.344-inch wall thickness, (double submerged arc welded) DSAW type pipe, coated with a tape type system. The line pipe was transported from the pipe mill to the construction site on rail cars.

The Line 3 maximum operating pressure (MOP) is 757 psig.

### 3.0 DISCUSSION

An Enbridge employee in route to work discovered a crude oil leak in a ditch on the south side of County Road 3. At 8:22 a.m. Enbridge Notified the Minnesota Office of Pipeline Safety (MNOPS) Duty Officer that a leak had occurred in a pasture on County Road 3, about 3 ½ miles east of Highway 92. Brian Pierzina, MNOPS Senior inspector, conducted an on-site investigation of the Incident.

In situ visual inspection of the damaged pipe joint revealed two pin-holes located in the DSAW longitudinal seam. Ultrasonic inspection of the longitudinal seam detected a fatigue crack that initiated on the pipe internal surface at the toe of the DSAW longitudinal seam. This type of defect is very similar to other defects that had been identified by Enbridge on Line 3.

In late November 2007, Enbridge ran an in-line inspection (ILI) crack detection (CD) tool from Clearbrook, MN to Superior, WI to determine if the MP 912 fatigue crack could be detected. The ILI tool did not complete the entire assessment from Clearbrook to Superior due to a mechanical failure experienced during the run. However, the MP 912 joint containing the fatigue crack was successfully inspected and the fatigue crack was identified by the ILI tool.

On November 28, 2007, Enbridge removed an eleven foot section of pipe at MP 912 that contained the fatigue crack. This section of pipe was transported to a metallurgical laboratory for further analysis. The analysis confirmed that the failure was a fatigue type failure that initiated on the pipe internal surface at the toe of the DSAW longitudinal seam. The fatigue crack was apparently initiated by cyclical loading that occurred during rail transport of the line pipe from the pipe mill to the construction site. Pressure cycling during the operational life of the pipeline caused the fatigue crack to grow to failure.

Based on this incident, Enbridge updated their crack management program for Line 3.

## 4.0 EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Enbridge employees were dispatched to the Incident site.

## 5.0 RETURN TO SERVICE

After the field investigation was complete, a four foot long Type B, tight fitting repair sleeve was installed in the area where the Incident occurred.

At the time of the Incident, Line 3 operating pressure was approximately 337 psig. Enbridge imposed a voluntary pressure reduction on Line 3 at the Clearbrook Terminal discharge. The Clearbrook Terminal maximum discharge pressure was limited to 80% of the maximum discharge pressure experienced within 15 days previous to the Incident, specifically 434 psig.

The pipeline was then returned to service at reduced pressure. As of September 30, 2010, the pressure reduction remains in place.

#### 6.0 FINDINGS

The Enbridge Line 3 MP 912 Incident was caused by a fatigue crack that initiated on the pipe internal surface at the toe of the DSAW longitudinal seam. The fatigue crack was apparently initiated by cyclic loading that occurred during rail transport of the line pipe from the pipe mill to the construction site and eventually grew to failure from pressure cycling during pipeline operation.

#### EXHIBITS

Information regarding the Incident was reported by Enbridge to the National Response Center (NRC) on November 13, 2007 in NRC Report No. 854402 (Exhibit A), and to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) in Accident Report No. 20070350 dated December 12, 2007 (Exhibit B).

Exhibit ANRC Report No. 854402Exhibit BAccident Report No. 20070350Exhibit CMetallurgical Report

EXHIBIT A NRC REPORT No. 854402 NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER 1-800-424-8802 \*\*\* For Public Use \*\*\* Information released to a third party shall comply with any applicable federal and/or state Freedom of Information and Privacy Laws

Incident Report # 854402

INCIDENT DESCRIPTION

\*Report taken at 09:33 on 13-NOV-07 Incident Type: PIPELINE Incident Cause: EQUIPMENT FAILURE Affected Area: The incident was discovered on 13-NOV-07 at 07:20 local time. Affected Medium: LAND GROUND

SUSPECTED RESPONSIBLE PARTY

Organization: ENBRIDGE ENERGY CO. SUPERIOR, WI 54880

Type of Organization: PRIVATE ENTERPRISE

County: CLEARWATER City: CLEAR BROOK State: MN

Section: 3 Township: 148N Range: 37W NEAR COUNTY 3

<u>RELEASED MATERIAL(S)</u> CHRIS Code: OIL Official Material Name: OIL: CRUDE Also Known As: Qty Released: 2 BARREL(S)

DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT CALLER IS REPORTING THAT 2 BARRELS OF CRUDE OIL RELEASED FROM A PIPELINE ONTO THE GROUND DUE TO A LEAKING PIPELINE.

INCIDENT DETAILS

Pipeline Type: TRANSMISSION DOT Regulated: YES Pipeline Above/Below Ground: BELOW Exposed or Under Water: NO Pipeline Covered: UNKNOWN

		DAMA	AGES		
Fire Involved	: NO	Fire Extinguished: UN	KNOWN		
INJURIES:	NO	Hospitalized:	Empl/Crew:	Passenger:	
FATALITIES:	NO	Empl/Crew:	Passenger:	Occupant:	
EVACUATIONS:	NO Who Evacuated:		Radius/Area:		
Damages:	NO				
_			Length of	Direction of	
<u>Closure Type</u>	Des	cription of Closure	Closure	Closure	
Air: N					
Road: N				Majo	
				Arter	
Waterway: N					
Track: N					
Passengers Tra	nsfei	rred: NO			

N

Environmental Impact: UNKNOWN Media Interest: NONE Community Impact due to Material:

REMEDIAL ACTIONS PIPELINE MAINTENANCE CREWS WERE DISPATCHED TO THE SITE, PADS WERE PUT DOWN ON THE AREA AND LINES WERE CLOSED Release Secured: YES Release Rate: Estimated Release Duration:

WEATHER

Weather: UNKNOWN, °F

ADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIED

 Federal:
 NONE

 State/Local:
 LOCAL SHERIFF'S OFFICE

 State/Local On Scene:
 State Agency Number:

 NO REPORT #

NOTIFICATIONS BY NRC ATLANTIC STRIKE TEAM (MAIN OFFICE) 13-NOV-07 09:38 USCG ICC (ICC ONI) 13-NOV-07 09:38 DOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (MAIN OFFICE) 13-NOV-07 09:38 U.S. EPA V (MAIN OFFICE) 13-NOV-07 09:40 MN DEPT OF HEALTH (MAIN OFFICE) 13-NOV-07 09:38 MN U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE (ATTN: CARL WAHL) 13-NOV-07 09:38 NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (MAIN OFFICE) 13-NOV-07 09:38 NOAA RPTS FOR MN (MAIN OFFICE) 13-NOV-07 09:38 PIPELINE & HAZMAT SAFETY ADMIN (OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY (AUTO)) 13-NOV-07 09:38 MN DEM ATTN: MS. GOELZ (MAIN OFFICE) 13-NOV-07 09:38 SURFACE TRANS SECURITY INSPECT PROG (COMMAND CENTER) 13-NOV-07 09:38

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALLER HAD NO FURTHER INFORMATION.

\*\*\* END INCIDENT REPORT # 854402 \*\*\*

EXHIBIT B ACCIDENT REPORT No. 20070350

	oort is required by 49 CFR Part 195. such violation persists except that th				
U.S. Department of Research and Speci Administration	Transportation	IDENT REPORT - PIPELINE	HAZARDOUS LIQUID SYSTEMS	Report Date No (DOT Use Only)	
INSTRUCTION	S				
Important:	information requested a	nd provide specific		e you begin. They clarify the have a copy of the instructions, <u>http://ops.dot.gov</u> .	
PART A – GEN	IERAL REPORT INFORMATIC	Check one or mo	eport Supplemental	Report Final Report	
1. a. Operator's 2. b. If Operator	s OPS 5-digit Identification Nur or does not own the pipeline, er	nber (if known) /	/		
	Operator				
d. Operator	street address				
e. Operator	address City, County, S	tate and Zip Code			
COMPLETE TH	IF THE SPILL IS SMALL, THA	AT IS, THE AMOUNT IS IE SPILL IS TO WATEF	AT LEAST 5 GALLONS BUT R AS DESCRIBED IN 49 CFR	IS LESS THAN 5 BARRELS, §195.52(A)(4) OR IS OTHERWISE	
2. Time and da	ate of the accident				
<u>/</u>	/ /_/ /_/ 	<u> </u>	5. Losses (Estimated)		
		ay year		sses reimbursed by operator:	
3. Location of accident (If offshore, do not complete a through d. See Part C.1)					
				bonse phase \$	
	Longitude	:specific location)	Cost of environmental r	émediation \$	
			Other Costs	\$	
D City, a	and County or Parish	\	(describe)		
c			Operator Losses:		
State	and Zip Code		Value of product lost	\$	
	t/valve station or survey station or survey station or survey station		Value of operator prope	erty damage \$	
(whic			Other Costs	\$	
		-(0)	(describe)		
4. Telephone re	eport		Total Costs	\$	
/ NRC Report N	Jumber / / /	day year			
6. Commodity S	Spilled Yes No te Parts a through c where app			c. Estimated amount of commodity	
	commodity spilled			involved : Barrels	
b. Classificaț	tion of commodity spilled:			Gallons (check only if spill is	
CO <sub>2</sub> or oth	ner flammable of toxic fluid which ner non-flammable, non-toxic fl diesel, fuel oil or other petroleu	uid which is a gas at an	bient conditions	less than one barrel) Amounts: Spilled :	
				Recovered:	
CAUSES FOR	SMALL SPILLS ONLY (5 gal	lons to under 5 barrels	s) : (For large spills [	5 barrels or greater] see Part H)	
Corrosion	Natural Forces	Excavation Damag		e Force Damage	
	nd/or Weld Failures	Equipment	Incorrect Ope	•	
	PARER AND AUTHORIZED S				
			-		
(type or print) Pre	parer's Name and Title			Area Code and Telephone Number	
Preparer's E-mail	Address			Area Code and Facsimile Number	
Authorized Signat	ure	(type or print) Name a	nd Title Date	Area Code and Telephone Number	
	7000-1 (01-2001)			Page 1 of 4	

**OPS Data Facsimile** 

PART C – ORIGIN OF THE ACCIDENT (Check all that apply)	
<ol> <li>Additional location information         <ul> <li>a. Line segment name or ID</li> <li>b. Accident on Federal land other than Outer Continental Shelf Yes No</li> <li>c. Is pipeline interstate? Yes No</li> </ul> </li> </ol>	Offshore: Yes No <i>(complete d if offshore)</i> d. Area Block # State // or Outer Continental Shelf
<ol> <li>Location of system involved (<i>check all that apply</i>)</li> <li>Operator's Property</li> <li>Pipeline Right of Way</li> <li>High Consequence Area (HCA)?</li> <li>Describe HCA</li> </ol>	a. Type of leak or rupture Leak: Pinhole Connection Failure <i>(complete sec. H5)</i> Puncture, diameter <i>(inches)</i> Rupture: Circumferential – Separation
3. Part of system involved in accident Above Ground Storage Tank Cavern or other below ground storage facility Pump/meter station; terminal/tank farm piping and equipment, including sumps Other Specify:	Longitudinal – Tear/Crack, length <i>(inches)</i> Propagation Length, total, both sides <i>(feet)</i> N/A Other b.Type of block valve used for isolation of immediate section: Upstream: Manual Automatic Remote Control
Onshore <b>pipeline</b> , including valve sites Offshore <b>pipeline</b> , including platforms	Downstream: Check Valve Manual Automatic Remote Control Check Valve
If failure occurred on <b>Pipeline</b> , complete items a - g: 4. Failure occurred on Body of Pipe Pipe Seam Scraper Trap Pump Sump Joint Component Valve Metering Facility Repair Sleeve Welded Fitting Bolted Fitting Girth Weld Other (specify) Year the component that failed was installed: // 5. Maximum operating pressure (MOP) a. Estimated pressure at point and time of accident: 	c. Length of segment isolatedft d. Distance between valvesft e. Is segment configured for internal inspection tools? Yes No f. Had there been an in-line inspection device run at the point of failure? Yes No Don't Know Not Possible due to physical constraints in the system g. If Yes, type of device run ( <i>check all that apply</i> ) High Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run: Low Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run: UT tool Year run: Geometry tool Year run: Crack tool Year run: Hard Spot tool Year run: Other tool Year run:
PART D – MATERIAL SPECIFICATION         1. Nominal pipe size (NPS)       /	PART E – ENVIRONMENT           1. Area of accident         In open ditch
2. Wall thickness 3. Specification in. 4. Seam type 5. Valve type	Under pavement     Above ground       _/     Underground     Under water       Inside/under building     Other
6. Manufactured by in year /	2. Depth of cover: inches
PART F - CONSEQUENCES         1. Consequences (check and complete all that apply)         a.       Fatalities         Number of operator employees:	c. Product ignited Yes No d. Explosion Yes No e. Evacuation (general public only) // people Reason for Evacuation: Precautionary by company Evacuation required or initiated by public official f. Elapsed time until area was made safe: // hr. // min.
<ul> <li>2. Environmental Impact         <ul> <li>a. Wildlife Impact: Fish/aquatic Yes No Birds Yes No Terrestrial Yes No</li> <li>b. Soil Contamination Yes No</li> <li>If Yes, estimated number of cubic yards:</li></ul></li></ul>	e. Water Contamination: Yes No ( <i>If Yes, provide the following</i> ) Amount in water barrels Ocean/Seawater No Yes Surface No Yes Groundwater No Yes Drinking water No Yes ( <i>If Yes, check below.</i> ) Private well Public water intake r Soil Vegetation Wildlife

Form RSPA F 7000-1 (01-2001)

**OPS Data Facsimile** 

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PART G – LEAK DETECTION	I INFORMATION				
1. Computer based leak detect	tion capability in place?	Yes No			
2. Was the release initially det	ected by? (check one):	CPM/SCADA-based	CPM/SCADA-based system with leak detection		
		Static shut-in test or other pressure or leak test			
		Local operating perso	onnel, procedures or equipment		
		Remote operating per	rsonnel, including controllers		
		Air patrol or ground s	-		
		A third party	Other (specify)		
3. Estimated leak duration d	avs hours		····· (-p····)/		
		ara 25 numbered equa	es in this Part H. Check the box cor	rooponding to the	
PART H – APPARENT CAUS	E primary cause of th	e accident. Check one o	circle in each of the supplemental c See the instructions for guidance.		
H1 - CORROSION	1 0	Visual Examination	c. Cause of Corros		
1. External Corrosion	Bare Coated	Localized Pitting General Corrosion	Galvanic Stray Current	Atmospheric Microbiological	
		Other	Cathodic Prot	ection Disrupted	
2. Internal Corrosion			Stress Corros Selective Sea		
(Complete items a – e			Other		
where applicable.)	d. Was corroded part of pipe	eline considered to be un	nder cathodic protection prior to disc	covering accident?	
	No Yes, Year Pro	otection Started: /			
	e. Was pipe previously dam				
H2 – NATURAL FORCES	No Yes => Estima	ated time prior to accider	nt: <u>/ / yèars / /</u> mo	nths Unknown	
3. Earth Movement	=> Earthquake	Subsidence Land	Islide Øther	>	
4. Lightning					
5. Heavy Rains/Floods	=> Washouts	Flotation Muds	slide Scouring Other		
6. Temperature					
		Those theave	Current Control Current		
7. High Winds					
H3 — EXCAVATION DAMAG	)E				
	Damage (including their conti	ractors/Not Third Party)			
9. Third Party (complet			$\searrow$		
a. Excavator group	)				
	neral Public Governmen	$\sim \sim $	than Operator/subcontractor		
b. Type: Road	d Work Pipeline Wa	(), (), ()	ewer Phone/Cable		
Land	lowner-not farming related		ailroad		
Othe	er liquid or gas transmission pi	peline operator or their c	ontractor		
	ical Operations Othe	)			
	$\sim$ $\sim$ $\sim$ $\sim$				
c. Excavation was:		strata (boring, directional		, .	
d. Excavation was an ongoing activity (Month or longer) Yes No If Yes, Date of last contact //					
e. Did operator get prior notification of excavation activity?					
Yes; Date	received: <u>/</u> mo. <u>/</u>	<u>/</u> day  /	/ yr. No		
Notification rece	eived from: One Call Sy	stem Excavator	Contractor Landowner		
f. Was pipeline marked as result of location request for excavation? No Yes (If Yes, check applicable items i - iv)					
i. Temporary markings: Flags Stakes Paint ii. Permanent markings:					
iii. Marks were (check one) : Accurate Not Accurate					
iv. Were marks made within required time? Yes No					
H4 – OTHER OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE         10.       Fire/Explosion as primary cause of failure         =>       Fire/Explosion cause:					
11. Car, truck or other ve	ehicle not relating to excavatio	n activity damaging pipe	)		
12. Rupture of Previous	-				
13. Vandalism					
Form RSPA F 7000-1 (01-20	01)			Page 3 of 4	

H5 – MATERIAL AND/OR WELD FAILURES							
Materia 14.	Body of Pipe	=>	Dent	Gouge	Bend	Arc Burn	Other
15.	Component	=>	Valve	Fitting	Vessel	Extruded Outlet	Other
16.	Joint	=>	Gasket	O-Ring	Threads		Other
				-			
<b>Weld</b> 17.	Butt	=>	Pipe	Fabrication			Other
18.	Fillet	=>	Branch	Hot Tap	Fitting	Repair Sleeve	Other
19.	Pipe Seam	=>	LF ERW HF ERW	DSAW SAW	Seamless Spiral	Flash Weld	Other
Comple	ete a-g if you	indicate	e <b>any</b> cause i	n part H5.	_		
	. Type of failure: Constructic Material De	on Defect	-	/orkmanship	Procedure not follo	owed Poor Construct	ction Procedures
b c	. Was failure du	ie to pipe	damage sustair pressure tested	ned in transportation before accident oc	n to the constructio curred? Yes	n or fabrication site? Y , complete d-g No	es No
d	. Date of test:	/		/ <u>/</u> mo. /		$( \int ( \int$	
	. Test medium: Time held at te			ert Gas Other	$\sim$		
		•		<u>/</u> nr. ident:	$\bigvee (0)$	PSIG	
H6 – EQU							
20. Ma	Ifunction of Con	trol/Relief	Equipment =	=> Control-val	ve Instrume	entation SCADA	Communications
				Block valve	e Relief va	alve Power failure	Other
21. Thr	reads Stripped, I	Broken Pi	ipe Coupling	> Nipples	Valve Threads	Dresser Couplings	Other
22. Sea	al Failure			=> Gasket	O-Ring	Seal/Pump Packing	Other
H7 – INCO	DRRECT OPER	ATION		$\sum \sum$			
23. Inc a. Type:	orrect Operatior Inadeq Other/	uate Proc	edures In	adequate Safety Pr	actices Failu	re to Follow Procedures	
b. Numb	er of employees	s involved	who failed a po	st-accident test: d	rug test: /	/ alcohol test /	/
H8 – OTH	-						
	scellaneous, des known	$\langle \rangle / \langle -$					
PART I – I	Investigation			RS CONTRIBUTIN		ntal report when investigation (Attach additional she	i i

# EXHIBIT C METALLURGICAL REPORT

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# Metallurgical Analysis of November 13, 2007 Leak on Line 3 at US MP 912.3188

Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P. Final Report - 813 7608 1 May 22, 2008

