

The Oil Pipeline Industry Had an Idea . . .

Learning from PPTS 1999-2005

Cheryl J. Trench

President

Allegro Energy Consulting

Presented to

PHMSA's R&D Forum, 2007

Allegro Energy Consulting

RQ0Dqz"4527;4"❖ Pgy "[qtm.'P ["32245
Rj qpg<"434+9:9/8;45"❖ Hcz<"434+943;/24:
evtgpejB tepæqo


**February 7, 2007
New Orleans, LA**

© E j g t { n L O V t g p e j . 4 2 2 9

Today's Presentation

- ✱ **Why the Pipeline Performance Tracking System**
- ✱ **What have we learned?**
- ✱ **How do we learn from it?**
- ✱ **The basics of the data**
- ✱ **Some new lessons – and surprises – from the data**

The Oil Pipeline Spill Record: What the Public Sees




Source: PHMSA Form F 7000-1, from http://ops.dot.gov/stats/lq_sum.htm.
 Results for 2002 - 2005 reflect incidents reportable under criteria in place prior to February 2002, i.e.,
 50 bbls liquid, 5 bbls HVL, death, injury, fire, explosion, \$50K damages.

Small and Large Releases in PHMSA Data

- ✱ "Pipeline Statistics" page
- ✱ Only those releases that meet the pre-2002 criteria: ≥ 50 barrels, e.g.
- ✱ Larger spills haven't declined sharply in PPTS either.
- ✱ Like PPTS, PHMSA shows a decline in the smaller spills.
- ✱ Some differences in asset coverage, maintenance exclusion

Number of Incidents, 2002-2005



What is the Pipeline Performance Tracking System?


- ✱ **“PPTS”**: voluntary; open to all liquids pipeline operators
- ✱ **No membership req’d, no fee imposed**
- ✱ **Industry-run and maintained**
- ✱ **Collecting info since 1999**
- ✱ **Records spills of 5 gallons or more on land, all spills to water (compare old OPS @ 50 barrels)**
- ✱ **In 2005, PPTS participants operated about 85% of OPS miles and total barrel-miles**

1. Measure 2. Learn 3. Manage 4. Improve


Onshore Pipe Incidents, '99-'05

3-Yr Average Ending Year Shown


TOTAL, ALL CAUSES




CORROSION




THIRD PARTY




EQUIP./NON-PIPE



OPERATOR/OPER'N



MAT'L/SEAM/WELD



PPTS Participants Use PPTS

- ✱ **To measure operator/Industry performance**
- ✱ **To allocate \$**
 - ✓ Maintenance
 - ✓ IMP
 - ✓ R&D
- ✱ **To direct regulatory/advocacy effort**
- ✱ **To find new approaches to keeping people and communities safe**


Data Mining Highlights

- ✱ **Operator Advisories (www.api.org/ppts)**

- Causes/locations with a large share
- Consequences
- New perspective via PPTS
- Guidelines for reporting

- ✱ **Reports and Fact Sheets**

- ✱ **Also, Performance Excellence Team**




The data doesn't go in and not come out!



Number of Releases by Spill Size

- ✱ 4.8 per 1000 miles in 1999, 2.6 per 1000 miles in 2005, a 47% decline
- ✱ 2/3 are less than 5 barrels (but share dropping)
- ✱ 15% are 50 barrels or larger (old OPS threshold)
- ✱ Number of releases of 50 barrels or more has remained flat since 2001, while small spills declined. Spills of 5-49 barrels have also flattened.

Number per 1000 Miles, 1999-2005




Releases by Commodity; Number of Incidents per 1000 Miles



Excludes incidents on unregulated gathering systems;
 excludes releases from hurricanes Ivan, Katrina and Rita


It's About Risk: System Location, Number of Releases by Spill Size

- * **508 per year; 2/3 less than 5 barrels; 15% are 50 barrels or larger**
- * **Location: Facilities piping & equipment: 52%; Onshore pipe: 39%**
- * **Location by size: Facilities piping & equipment: 24% of 50+ bbls; Onshore pipe: 62% of 50+ bbls**





Focus on Risk, #2: System Part, By Year

- ✱ Releases from facilities piping account for 52%; from onshore pipe, 39%; from tanks and offshore pipe [and cavern], 9%.
- ✱ Thru 2003, onshore pipe releases had fallen, and facilities releases were ~flat.
- ✱ Since then, facilities down, and onshore pipe ~flat.



Excludes incidents on unregulated gathering systems;
 excludes releases from hurricanes Ivan, Katrina and Rita

Facilities and Onshore Pipe, by Cause, Year-by-Year



Assessing Consequences: Deaths and Injuries

	Cause	Incidents (#, '99-'05)	Empl.	Contr. (# People)	Other	Total
Fatalities	Third Party Damage	4	0	0	10	10
	Operator Error	2	0	2	0	2
	Other	1	1	0	0	1
	Total	7	1	2	10	13
Injuries	Third Party Damage	7	0	0	16	16
	Operator Error (incl. excavation)	5	4	6	0	10
	Pipe mat'l/seam	2	1	0	2	3
	Corrosion	1	0	0	1	1
	Equipment Malfunction	1	0	0	1	1
	"Other failure" in a Tank	1	1	0	0	1
	Other Cause	1	0	1	0	1
	Total	18	6	7	20	33

Where Are People Getting Hurt or Killed? Deaths and Injuries by System Part


	Cause	Incidents (#, '99-'05)	Empl.	Contr. (# People)	Other	Total
Fatalities	Facilities Piping	1	1	0	0	1
	Onshore Pipeline	6	0	2	10	12
	Grand Total	7	1	2	10	13
Injuries	Aboveground Storage Tank	1	1	0	0	1
	Cavern/belowground	1	1	0	0	1
	Facilities Piping	3	2	6	0	8
	Onshore Pipeline	13	2	1	20	23
	Grand Total	18	6	7	20	33

Why Focus on Third Party Damage?


Disproportionate share of consequences

Total incidents, '99-'05: 3,581; Total from Third Party Damage: 230

Third Party Damage Share of Incidents Involving:




Who Does the Damage?



*PPTS classifies operator excavation as Operator Error, not Third Party Damage.
Also included in "All Other" is res/comm dev. (4%), waterway activity (2%) and rail (1%)

A Closer Look at Who Does the Damage: We Do.



*PPTS classifies operator excavation as Operator Error, not Third Party Damage. Also included in "All Other" is res/comm dev. (4%), waterway activity (2%) and rail (1%)

Capitalizing on PPTS: DIRT Module

- ✱ **For releases involving mechanical damage, new navigation to *Damage Info Reporting Tool* add-on**
 - 1st/2nd party from Operator Error section
 - 3rd party from Third Party section
 - Mapped from PPTS + DIRT-only questions added
 - Mandatory for PPTS reporters
- ✱ **For incidents involving contact w/no release, or threat of contact, newly reportable in DIRT add-on**
 - Voluntary for PPTS reporters
- ✱ **API uploads to DIRT periodically**
- ✱ **Available to DIRT and for PPTS analysis/QC**
- ✱ **Minimize duplication & error opportunity**

Key Elements in PPTS Success

✱ **Commitment**

- Pipeline Leadership
- API/AOPL

✱ **Care and Feeding (API's Commitment)**

- QC: Transparency, credibility
- Program Software/Mechanics
- Data Mining Team

✱ **Learning**

- Data Mining Team
- Lectures
- Website

- ✱ **Bukky Adefemi (API)**
- ✱ **Hazem Arafa (API)**
- ✱ **Kevin Badgett (Exxon Mobil)**
- ✱ **Tom Kelly (Colonial)**
- ✱ **Frank Gonzales (Buckeye)**
- ✱ **Dave Knoelke (BP)**
- ✱ **Peter Lidiak (API)**
- ✱ **Dan Mihalik (AOPL)**
- ✱ **Debbie Price (Shell)**
- ✱ **Tom Price (ConocoPhillips)**
- ✱ **Cheryl Trench (Allegro Energy Consulting)**
- ✱ **Marc Wolgamott (Koch Pipeline)**
- ✱ **Tressa Young (Marathon)**

The Oil Pipeline Industry Had an Idea . . .

Learning from PPTS 1999-2005

Cheryl J. Trench

President

Allegro Energy Consulting

Presented to

PHMSA's R&D Forum, 2007

Allegro Energy Consulting

RQ0Dqz"4527;4"❖ Pgy "[qtm.'P ["32245
Rj qpg<"434+9:9/8;45"❖ Hcz<"434+943;/24:
evtgpejB tepæqo

**February 7, 2007
New Orleans, LA**

© E j g t { n L O V t g p e j . 4 2 2 9