



**NYSEARCH**

# ***NYSEARCH Modeling of Pipeline Interacting Threats***

***PHMSA Workshop on Improving Risk Models  
Rosemont, IL – August 6-7, 2014***

***David Merte, P.E.  
NYSEARCH/Northeast Gas Association***

# Kiefner Original Risk Model

- Evaluates 9 primary threat interactions
  - Time dependent, independent and stable
- Quantifies consequence
  - Threat exposure, mitigation and resistance
- Utilizes operator specific data
  - Provides feedback mechanisms
- Incorporates SME and regulatory input
  - Valuable collaboration
  - New interacting threat risk model

# New Kiefner IT Model Goals

- Identify interacting threats
  - Kiefner Failure Database
  - SMEs from NYSEARCH Funder Advisory Group
  - Industry papers, past experience
  - PHMSA 'Reportable Incidents Database'
- Develop rationale/technical support for selected interactions
- Develop method for quantifying interacting risks
- Modify software for calculating interacting risks

# Defining Interacting Threats

$$P_{(\text{Threat 1 \& Threat 2})} > P_{\text{Threat 1}} + P_{\text{Threat 2}}$$

- 10% of DOT incident data analyzed - 2 or more interacting threats
- 16% of all interacting threat incidents- original Kiefner model interacting threats (SSC & EM/girth welds)
- 30 additional threat interactions identified- relative risk algorithms (9 and 21 threat matrices)

# Algorithm Development

- Normalize coefficients
- Compare # failures due to threat interaction to # failures due to one threat
  - Driving threat
  - Variable threat (increased failure frequency)
  - More rapid degradation, increased stress or load, reduced tolerance to flaw or loading

$$R_{\text{INTERACTING}} = R_{\text{PRIMARY}} + \sum P_i * (R_{\text{PRIMARY}} + R_{\text{VARIABLE}})$$

$P_i$  = increased likelihood of failure for a pair of threats

# Threat Matrix Example

ORIGINAL SCORE	
EC	115
IC	40
SCC	25
DP	40
DPS	135
DFW	10
DGW	60
CD	10
MCRE	5
TSBPC	5
GF	5
SPPF	5
IO	60
TP	295
PDP	50
V	5
EM	40
HRF	25
LIGHT	5
CW	5



INTERACTION COMPONENT
42.77
11
0
0
0
0
0
0
2.78
9.04
0
0
0
19.71
9.08
7.05
0
36.99
44.33
2.19
0



INTERACTING SCORE
157.77
51
25
40
135
10
60
12.78
14.04
5
5
5
79.71
304.08
57.05
5
76.99
69.33
7.19
5

**TOTAL 940**

**1124.94**

# Threat Matrix Example (cont'd)

	ORIGINAL SCORE	INTERACTING SCORE	% CHANGE
<b>EC</b>	<b>115</b>	<b>157.77</b>	<b>37%</b>
IC	40	51	28%
SCC	25	25	0%
DP	40	40	0%
DPS	135	135	0%
DFW	10	10	0%
DGW	60	60	0%
CD	10	12.78	28%
MCRE	5	14.04	181%
TSBPC	5	5	0%
GF	5	5	0%
SPPF	5	5	0%
IO	60	79.71	33%
TP	295	304.08	3%
PDP	50	57.05	14%
V	5	5	0%
EM	40	76.99	92%
HRF	25	69.33	177%
LIGHT	5	7.19	44%
CW	5	5	0%



**TOTAL 940**

**1124.94**

**20%**

# New Model Advantages


- Prior to implementation of IMP risk models, Operators:
  - Collected limited interactive threat data
  - Conducted independent system analysis on threat interactions
  - Experienced difficulty quantifying and integrating interactive threat risk scores into model
- Upon new Kiefner IT model implementation, IT risk scores are data quantified and easily integrated into an Operator's risk model



# Operator Implementation

- Operators have two options for updating their risk models to include pipeline interacting threats:
- Updated NYSEARCH/Kiefner risk model (e.g. National Grid, National Fuel, Central Hudson)
- Interacting threats risk model incorporated into quantitative model (spreadsheet) (e.g. PG&E, Con Edison, Questar)

# Operator Implementation Example



- One large operator's change in risk model segment risk ranking
- ( $\approx 27,000$  segments)

# Related Operator Activities

- Identify interactive threats in all root cause incident analysis
- Conduct periodic reviews of algorithm coefficients
  - based on operator experience
- Provide feedback for future model enhancement

THANK YOU

Inquiries to [dmerte@northeastgas.org](mailto:dmerte@northeastgas.org)