NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL COMMAND INSPECTION OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS 23 to 31 January 2013



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From:	Naval Inspector General
To:	Secretary of the Navy
	Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: COMMAND INSPECTION OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS

Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 5040.3A

Encl: (1) SSP Command Inspection Report - Executive Summary
 (2) SSP Command Inspection Report

1. In accordance with reference (a), the Naval Inspector General conducted a command inspection of the Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) from 23 January to 31 January 2013.

2. Enclosure (1) provides an Executive Summary of the SSP Command Inspection Report. Enclosure (2) provides the entire inspection report. Part 1 of the report forwards our overall observations and findings. Part 2 contains eight issue papers which present specific findings and recommendations for senior Navy leadership. Part 2 also contains a corrective action summary matrix and guidance for submission of corrective action via an Implementation Status Report. Part 3 contains the summary of survey data analysis for active duty military and Department of the Navy (DON) civilian personnel and the summary of focus group data analysis for active duty military and DON civilian personnel.

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#### STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS COMMAND INSPECTION REPORT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) conducted a command inspection of Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) from 23 to 31 January 2013. The last SSP Command Inspection was in August 2005. In general, we found the SSP staff to be professional, dedicated, and well led at all levels. Staff directorates were well prepared for the inspection and most SSP programs were well administered.

Command Overview. The mission of SSP is to provide material 2. support (acquisition and fleet support) for Strategic Weapons Systems and other assigned programs, including missiles, platforms, associated equipment, security, training of personnel, and installation and direction of necessary supporting facilities; to provide strike weapon and associated payload material support (acquisition and fleet support) to other program executive officers and program managers as assigned; to manage and support Department of the Navy (DON) implementation and compliance process for current and future arms control agreements; to provide program management for Nuclear Weapons Security during weapon receipt, storage, processing, and Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) loading and unloading, as well as while on SSBNs at the waterfront and during transit to and from the dive point; to perform other functions, tasks or emerging mission as assigned by higher authority.

3. <u>Inspection Summary/Scope</u>. SSP is accomplishing its strategic deterrence mission. The command's primary focus on SWS and nuclear weapons security remains paramount, backed by 57 years of deliberate precision in adherence to mission imperatives. SSP is a complex enterprise of over 5,200 people, including a headquarters staff of over 600 personnel. It relies on continued successful missile test flights to prove weapon accuracy and reliability to meet U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) planning assumptions. Despite the fact SSP has recently relocated three times, it has sustained a track record of successful strategic systems development, production, and deployment. SSP applies an active self-assessment and improvement process to nuclear weapons safety and security, accident/incident response, reliability, and personnel policies.

a. Budget. Like the rest of the Navy, SSP is under significant budgetary pressure to define its program baseline costs, identify efficiencies, and articulate program risks. Due to their unique strategic deterrence mission, SSP cannot accept varying levels of risk (that is, apply a "risk rheostat") in ways that other Echelon II commands commonly do. Instead, they must remain focused on preventing the consequences of a nuclear weapons mishap and supporting strategic mission requirements with utmost responsibility.

(1) It is clear that SSP gets an appropriate level of oversight. That said, since the number of people across the Navy with real experience in strategic deterrence (and the actual mechanics behind it) has significantly decreased since the end of the Cold War, we are concerned that the cost of failure, and more importantly the cost of preventing failure, may not be fully taken into account during the complex and fastpaced, high-stakes resource decision-making currently in progress.

(2) As decreasing budgets force the DON to accept more risk, SSP's ability to effectively articulate the distinction between risk management and consequence management to fiscal decision makers is critical to their continued mission success. Underfunding SSP's sustainment, maintenance, and manpower requirements is an unacceptable risk, as it impacts our national nuclear weapons safety and security.

b. Web-based Survey. The inspection began with web-based personnel surveys conducted prior to our arrival. These surveys helped plan onsite focus groups and provided background information for the team to determine areas requiring further inspection. There were a total of 224 active duty military and DON civilian respondents to our online survey. The survey group was comprised of 42 military and 182 DON civilian personnel. Quality of life (QOL) was assessed using a 10-point scale (1 = 'worst' and 10 = 'best'). The SSP average Quality of Home Life (QOHL), 7.65, is higher than the NAVINSGEN QOHL average, 7.04. The SSP average Quality of Work Life (QOWL), 6.65, is comparable to the NAVINSGEN QOWL average, 6.28. c. Focus Groups. We conducted 13 focus groups with 140 participants (45 military and 95 civilians). Overall QOL scores from focus groups were verbally assessed using the same 10-point scale. The SSP average overall QOL, 7.32, is comparable to the NAVINSGEN average overall QOL, 6.95. Based on information gathered from focus groups, the top concerns were parking and commuting, followed by telework/telecommuting policy, and command leadership. Manning/manpower, workload, and lack of food choices at the Washington Navy Yard were also identified as issues.

4. <u>Good News</u>. The following areas were noted as having a positive impact on readiness and mission success:

a. Strategic Planning Process. The SSP strategic planning process aligns the command's mission, vision, goals, and cultural core values, while defining and communicating the director's priorities. Their strategic plan and associated documents are focused on SSP's mission, and effectively communicate the director's intent and priorities throughout the command. Additionally, the plan defines current program challenges, as well as a risk mitigation strategy.

b. Human Resources Service Delivery Model. The SSP Civilian Human Resources (HR) function transitioned to a new command-owned HR model on 1 April 2013. Under the new service delivery model, SSP headquarters is responsible for HR services for the entire enterprise. We found SSP ready and able to execute those responsibilities.

c. Strategic Weapons Infrastructure. Immediately prior to the SSP Command Inspection, the NAVINSGEN team conducted facility inspections of the strategic weapons infrastructure at the Strategic Weapons Facilities (SWF) at Naval Base Kitsap in Bangor, Washington, and Naval Submarine Base in Kings Bay, Georgia. Our overall assessment was that the SWFs were satisfactory to meet all mission requirements.

d. Corrective Action Response. SSP took immediate actions on the NAVINSGEN findings presented during the inspection outbrief, focusing on root cause analysis and directing corrective actions. The areas addressed by SSP's post-inspection actions are appropriately noted throughout this report. 5. <u>Areas of Concern</u>. The following programs need attention to be compliant or effective:

a. Communication. Leadership communications are a key and complex element of SSP, involving weekly e-mails from Director, SSP to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, & Acquisition) summarizing issues, providing program status, and conveying current and future events. Additional communication venues are established between Director, SSP and STRATCOM, Naval Reactors Office, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), and industry partners to ensure all stakeholders are informed. Despite the extensive senior leadership communication, both internally and externally, there is room for improving internal communications and integration across the SSP technical branches.

(1) SSP external communication is highly regulated, limiting peer-to-peer interaction and affecting the timeliness of response to external organizations, namely OPNAV staff. Since OPNAV is under budgetary pressure to reduce and control funding to all programs, SSP is required to fully justify funds provided to its program.

(2) SSP needs to fully articulate and justify requests for funding to specific requirements, so that OPNAV Undersea Warfare Division can defend SSP requirements during the requirements prioritization process.

b. Administrative Program Compliance and Oversight. NAVINSGEN inspectors found the following programs missing key elements and not compliant with governing instructions:

(1) Security. The SSP Command Security program instruction and the Emergency Action Plan are not current or in accordance with DON regulations. Many aspects of the signed security instruction do not apply to SSP's current facilities. SSP has progressed with resolving many of the security concerns revealed during SSP's self-assessment. The command security instruction and Emergency Action Plan are in draft form, being revised to comply with current security directives. NAVINSGEN recognizes SSP's ability to self-assess and proactively take steps to improve security practices. A current, revised command security program instruction will solidify the security foundation to ensure the command adheres to the governing security policies, instructions, and directives. (2) Individual Medical Readiness. Individual Medical Readiness (IMR) records reviewed during our inspection indicated that SSP headquarters and subordinate commands did not meet the mandated IMR requirements outlined in DoD and DON instructions.

(3) Command Managed Equal Opportunity. The SSP Command Managed Equal Opportunity (CMEO) program is not in compliance with the Navy Equal Opportunity Policy. Some of the discrepancies identified were: CMEO Program Manager not designated in writing and had not attended the approved CMEO Program Manager course prior to assuming duties; Equal Opportunity and Sexual Harassment command policy letters were non-existent; and no evidence of a continuity binder containing formal/informal complaints, executive summaries, and command assessments for 36 months.

(4) Equal Employment Opportunity. The SSP Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) program has been rated as noncompliant (red) on the DON EEO program scorecard. Command selfassessments of the EEO program are conducted annually at DON major and subordinate commands and submitted to the DON Office of EEO and Diversity. In FY12, SSP EEO program status report submissions identified several program element deficiencies, but did not include the required EEO plan to attain the essential elements of a model EEO program. The report did not indicate that SSP conducted an appropriate barrier analysis to determine if an SSP policy, principle or practice limits or tends to limit employment opportunities.

(5) Protecting Personally Identifiable Information. The SSP Personally Identifiable Information (PII) program lacks all elements to effectively protect PII in accordance with DON mandates. The program is missing several key elements including a Privacy Act instruction; the instruction was developed, but not implemented. SSP has since developed a plan of action with milestones to ensure compliance and that the program is rooted into the business process.

(6) Individual Augmentee. The SSP Individual Augmentee (IA) program is not tracking or providing oversight of lower echelon Command Individual Augmentee Coordinator in accordance with DON instructions. This lack of oversight has resulted in SSP not ensuring the completion of Post Deployment Health Reassessments for its lower echelon population. (7) Facilities Management Organization. Despite the technical competence and significant experience of the various SSP facilities staffs, there is internal confusion about roles and responsibilities. Because there is no single facilities management entity within the organization, communication among branches about facilities issues is often fragmented, both internally and with key players outside of SSP, such as Commander, Navy Installations Command and Naval Facilities Engineering Command.

(8) Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division, Building 1200. Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) building 1200 was constructed in 1964 and is in poor condition. NAVSEA has unsuccessfully submitted a Military Construction (MILCON) project to relocate the function and personnel to a new facility since 2001. The facility will continue to meet mission requirements for the near future, but the building's deteriorating condition will increase SSP's mission risk and NSWCDD's sustainment costs each year. The preferred solution remains a replacement facility through MILCON.

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# PART 1 OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS

## **OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS**

1. The Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) conducted a command inspection of Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) from 23 - 31 January 2013. The last SSP command inspection was in August 2005. In general, we found the SSP staff to be professional, dedicated, and well led at all levels. Staff directorates were well prepared for the inspection and most SSP programs were well administered.

2. The mission of SSP is to provide material support (acquisition and fleet support) for Strategic Weapons Systems (SWS) and other assigned programs, including missiles, platforms, associated equipment, security, training of personnel, and installation and direction of necessary supporting facilities; to provide strike weapon and associated payload material support (acquisition and fleet support) to other program executive officers and program managers as assigned; to manage and support Department of the Navy (DON) implementation and compliance process for current and future arms control agreements; to provide program management for nuclear weapons security (NWS) during weapon receipt, storage, processing, and Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) loading and unloading, as well as while on SSBNs at the waterfront and during transit to and from the dive point; to perform other functions, tasks or emerging mission as assigned by higher authority.

3. Unless otherwise noted, observations herein are as of the last day of the Command Inspection. We also cite multiple post-inspection corrective actions implemented in response to our initial findings and out-brief.

# I. MISSION PERFORMANCE

1. <u>Introduction</u>. The Mission Performance team assessed SSP's mission readiness, strategic planning process, command relationships and communications, total force management, personnel training and qualification, continuity of operations (COOP) planning, and command security programs. The Mission Performance team interviewed personnel throughout the SSP's headquarters and met with personnel from Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) Undersea Warfare Division (N97); Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), Strategic and Attack Submarines Program Office (PMS 392); Strategic Weapons Facility, Pacific (SWFPAC); Strategic Weapons Facility, Atlantic (SWFLANT), and SSP's Naval Ordnance Test Unit (NOTU).

# a. Mission Readiness

(1) SSP has a 57-year history of successful strategic systems development, production, and deployment that continues today. An established self assessment and improvement process delineated in SSPINST 3440.6B, which focuses on nuclear weapons safety and security, accident and incident response, and reliability and personnel policies. SSP's primary focus of strategic weapons systems and NWS remain paramount, and they are accomplishing their primary mission of strategic deterrence.

(2) SSP relies on continued successful missile test flights to prove weapon accuracy and reliability to meet U.S. Strategic Command planning assumptions. What is less understood is the cost of failure and the cost to prevent failure. SSP has been under significant budgetary pressure to define their program baseline costs, to identify efficiencies, and to articulate program risks. NAVINSGEN confirmed that SSP's Mission Function Task Statement meets the requirements of OPNAVINST 5400.44A, *Navy Organizational Change Manual*.

b. <u>Strategic Planning Process</u>. SSP's Strategic Plan and associated documents produced by the command are focused on SSP's mission and effectively communicate the director's intent and priorities throughout the command. SSP's planning process aligns the command's mission, vision, goals and cultural core values and defines and communicates the commander's priorities. Additionally, it defines the current challenges faced by the program and provides a strategy to mitigate SSP's current risks.

#### c. Command Relationships and Communication

(1) We observed good command relationships and communications with the Echelon III commands, such as SWFLANT, SWFPAC, and NOTU. SSP uses a variety of meeting and reporting techniques to foster open lines of communication with field activities.

(2) Despite the extensive senior leadership communication, both internally and externally, SSP has room to improve internal communications and integration across the technical branches. Additionally, external communication is highly regulated, limiting peer-to-peer interaction and affecting the timeliness of response to external organizations.

(3) Communications with OPNAV N97, Resource Sponsor. Over the past few years, OPNAV has been under budgetary pressure to reduce and control funding to all programs, including SSP. This has resulted in the requirement to fully justify funds provided to all programs. Requests for follow-up information and supporting justification takes time and appears to be an area of external communications between SSP and OPNAV N97 that can be improved upon. SSP needs to fully articulate, justify, and tie requests for funding to specific requirements so OPNAV N97 can make decisions that properly prioritize requirements and provide the most capability to the Navy while passing the rigorous scrutiny of the OPNAV Programming Division (N80) and the Office of Budget as they move forward.

(4) Since our inspection, the SSP Deputy Director and Technical Director have engaged the OPNAV N97 staff and have started to improve the lines of communication and the transparent flow of information. Several discussions among the Deputy Director, Technical Director, and OPNAV N97 revealed areas where communications could be strengthened and those were brought back and shared with the Director, Strategic Systems Programs (DIRSSP). As a result, DIRSSP has directed the Plans and Programs Director, the Comptroller, and the Nuclear Weapons Surety Director to fully cooperate with OPNAV N97 staff and to work as a team to resolve program and fiscal issues.

#### d. Total Force Management

(1) The SSP civilian human resources (HR) function transitioned to a new commandowned HR model in April 2013. Under this new HR service delivery model, SSP headquarters is responsible for providing HR services for the entire SSP enterprise. SSP worked with the DON Office of Civilian Human Resources to ensure sufficient manning needs were addressed adding seven additional billets in the proposed HR office staffing plan. Five of the additional billets are currently filled, including 3 in the local area, 1 at SWFPAC, and 1 at SWFLANT.

(2) SSP uses the Pathways Internship program to hire students and the Mechanicsburg Intern program to hire recent graduates into the SSP acquisition workforce. SSP Director of Civilian Personnel programs has access to SSP leadership and the Board of Directors when needed to address any personnel HR issues. One concern across the organization is the recent hiring freeze and its impact on filling critical positions in weapons safety and security. SSP staff also expressed concerns regarding contractors and the potential impact if contractors are lost. Per SSP leadership, contractors play a critical role in the accomplishment of the SSP mission. However, SSP budget cuts may first impact contract service support which would increase risk to their mission readiness.

### e. <u>Personnel Training/Qualifications</u>

(1) At the time of our inspection, we observed SSP's General Military Training (GMT) documented completion in Fleet Training Management Planning System (FLTMPS) at 56 percent completion rate for fiscal year (FY) 2012 mandated topics. The designated Military Training Officer is aware of the situation and is actively working towards ensuring 100 percent GMT completion for FY13.

(2) SSP has since provided NAVINSGEN an updated FLTMPS GMT attendance and completion rate of 75 percent for FY12, citing their previous failure to document GMT make-up training in FLTMPS prior to our inspection.

(3) All SSP civilian personnel receive notification of required training through the SSP newsletter. This weekly publication is distributed electronically and posted on the SSP HR portal. SSP has also developed a solid Career Development Handbook that outlines the command training policy also providing career roadmaps by occupational series, mentoring program information, and workforce and leadership development.

(4) Regarding acquisition training, SSP has 316 validated (24 military and 292 civilian) acquisition billets. The staff certification level is at 94 percent which is just below the 95 percent standard. The Continuous Learning Points completion is at 72 percent which is below the 85 percent Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act, or DAWIA, standard.

f. <u>Continuity of Operations Planning</u>. The SSP COOP program identifies and provides guidance for the deployment of twelve critical SSP command personnel to an alternate worksite in the event of an emergency or related scenario. The command has a current COOP plan, a memorandum of agreement with the alternate work site, an alert broadcast system, laminated communication cards complete with essential information, and a comprehensive ongoing training program. The COOP program, as structured, is detailed and provides for the orderly transition to maintaining and sustaining SSP's mission essential functions during an actual emergency situation. Senior command leadership has conducted a walkthrough of the COOP site; however, they have not participated in a local or Department of Defense (DoD) emergency exercise. SSP has scheduled a COOP exercise for 30 May 2013.

#### g. Command Security

(1) A previous self-assessment of SSP's Command Security program resulted in improvements including draft instructions, emergency action plans, increased security awareness, and proactive efforts to mitigate security shortfalls. At the time of the inspection, SSP's Command Security program instruction was in draft form and needed revision to conform to current security directives. Security shortfalls included lack of a functional intrusion monitoring system, lack of solid core doors on spaces designated as secure areas, lack of security-in-depth, and a lack of record keeping on past security incidents. NAVINSGEN recognizes SSP's ability to self-assess and proactively take steps to improve security practices. The need for an updated command security instruction is discussed in Part 2, Issue Paper 1, SECURITY PROGRAM AT STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS, refers (Page 25).

(2) For counter intelligence (CI) awareness, NAVINSGEN noted that annual CI training is conducted by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) in compliance with applicable directives. New hires receive security and CI awareness training during command indoctrination (INDOC).

(3) At the time of the inspection, SSP's designated NCIS agent had been assigned to SSP for about four months, splitting duties between SSP and another Echelon II command, as well as having NCIS Washington field office responsibilities. Since the inspection, NAVINSGEN learned that NCIS plans to eliminate SSP's assigned Counterintelligence Special Agent billet in summer 2013 and share CI support from existing resources in the region. SSP does not have a signed CI Support Plan (CISP) in place, though a CISP is in draft. SSP managers indicated that NCIS support to SSP was adequate; however, some SSP division-level leadership noted a lack of threat awareness for threats to the mission and functions of SSP and its subordinate commands.

(4) Given the mission of SSP and its assigned programs, NAVINSGEN provided training and assistance, increasing awareness of CI and threat support commensurate with the high priority placed on strategic weapons systems. NAVINSGEN is coordinating with NCIS National Security Directorate, Washington Field Office, and Assistant Secretary of the Navy (ASN) for Research, Development, & Acquisition (RDA) staff to address concerns with CI support for research and technology protection.

#### **II. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT/QUALITY OF LIFE/ COMMUNITY SUPPORT**

1. The Resource Management/QOL/Community Support team assessed 23 programs and functions. We found the areas listed below were compliant with Navy directives:

a. <u>Suicide Prevention</u>. The command's Suicide Prevention program is in compliance with OPNAVINST 1720.4A, *Suicide Prevention Program*. There have been no reports of suicide-related behavior at SSP.

b. <u>Voting Assistance</u>. SSP Voting Assistance program is in compliance with OPNAVINST 1742.1B, *Navy Voting Assistance Program*. The Voting Assistance Officer (VAO) tracks compliance of lower echelon commands and is proactive in disseminating program details through e-mail, command newsletters, and other means. The VAO utilizes the command check-in process to track incoming member's voting jurisdiction, including state and county. We noted this as a "best practice" for consideration by other VAOs.

#### c. Legal and Ethics

(1) NAVINSGEN inspected the SSP Legal with a primary focus on its Ethics program, to include: gifts, travel, post-government employment, Confidential and Public Financial Disclosure Reports, and training. In addition, military justice and office readiness were reviewed. Overall, the Ethics program is very well organized, efficient, and effective.

(2) General ethics information is disseminated during command INDOC and the SSP intranet. A "best practice" utilized by SSP includes a voice over ethics PowerPoint on their intranet. The PowerPoint training is directed to all new command members. SSP Legal is accessible and they are responsive to all members of the command who have ethics questions. Proactive in identifying issues, SSP Legal maintains a good relationship with their uniformed counterparts and feels they are kept adequately apprised of all military justice issues.

d. <u>Drug and Alcohol Program Advisor</u>. The Drug and Alcohol Program Advisor program is well run and well documented. The Alcohol and Drug Control Officer is working diligently to develop a network for subordinate oversight; this is near completion. The program is compliant with OPNAVINST 5350.4D, Navy Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control.

e. <u>Urinalysis Program Coordinator</u>. The Urinalysis Program Coordinator (UPC) program is well run, with good documentation, and strong subordinate command oversight. The UPC program is compliant with OPNAVINST 5350.4D, *Navy Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control*.

f. <u>Information Technology/Information Management/Information Assurance</u>. The Command Information Officer and staff are knowledgeable regarding DON Information Technology (IT) policies and procedures. The IT Management competency is compliant in policies and standards, certification and accreditation, risk management, incident response, contingency and COOP, software and hardware management, wireless/personal electronic devices, and remote access/voice product networks.

g. <u>Cyber Security Workforce</u>. This program is well run, has enterprise wide oversight, and is fully compliant with SECNAVINST 5239.3B, *Department of the Navy Information Assurance Policy*.

h. <u>Physical Readiness</u>. The SSP Physical Readiness program is in compliance with OPNAVINST 6110.1J, *Physical Readiness Program*. With no medical representative assigned, medical reports and Preventive Health Assessments (PHAs) are not fully tracked, but are collected prior to physical readiness events. Though the effective tracking of personnel PHAs is not occurring, it will be solved when SSP meets the compliance standards set forth in the Individual Medical Readiness (IMR) program.

i. <u>Command Evaluation and Review</u>. The Command Evaluation and Review program is assessed to be compliant with SECNAVINST 5000.52B, Command Evaluation program.

#### j. Managers' Internal Control Program

(1) SSP's Managers' Internal Control (MIC) program is effectively structured, implemented, and operates in accordance with DoDINST 5010.40, Managers' Internal Control Program Procedures, and with SECNAVINST 5200.35E, *Department of the Navy Managers' Internal Control Program*, to provide the Director with a reasonable assurance that the command's risk is being managed.

(2) At the time of the inspection, the only program weakness found was that the MIC coordinator is also the Deputy Command Inspector General (IG), which highlights a systemic issue across the DON. Having the MIC coordinator assigned from within the command's IG office presents a potential conflict of interest between the intent of the MIC program and internal evaluation and review the command's IG provides to the director. NAVINSGEN recommends that oversight of this program rest with SSP management and leadership.

(3) The SSP Board of Directors has taken action to move responsibility for administrating the MIC program from the SSP IG to an office under the Director, Plans and Programs. This move will avoid any possible appearance of conflict of interest and better supports the oversight role of the SSP IG.

k. <u>Command Inspection</u>. The Command Inspection program is well staffed and compliant with SECNAVINST 5040.3A, *Inspections within the Department of the Navy*. SSP does a good job inspecting Echelon III and IV commands, focusing on both process improvement and compliance. Small discrepancies noted in the utilization on the Navy IG Hotline Tracking System (NIGHTS) were corrected on the spot and the NAVINSGEN staff scheduled additional NIGHTS training for SSP IG staff.

1. <u>Government Commercial Purchase Card</u>. The SSP Government Commercial Purchase Card (GCPC) program is well managed and compliant with Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) Instruction 4200.99, *Department of the Navy Policies and Procedures for the Operation and Management of the Government-Wide Commercial Purchase Card (GCPC) Program*. SSPINST 7000.9A, of 16 April 2003, is outdated and its revision depends upon the pending release of the overarching NAVSUP instruction.

m. <u>Government Travel Charge Card</u>. The Government Travel Charge Card (GTGC) program is compliant with SECNAVINST 4650.21, *Department of the Navy Government Travel Charge Card Program*, and consistently maintains an efficient rate of 95.8 percent; far above the Navy efficient rate of 80 percent. The overall SSP rate takes into consideration both the headquarters and the field activities.

n. <u>Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System</u>. SSP contracting actions are mature and structured with proven vendors. We found no major discrepancies and minor discrepancies were corrected on the spot. The program is compliant.

o. <u>Navy Enterprise Resource</u>. SSP recently transitioned to Navy Enterprise Resource program (ERP). The SSP ERP business office manages the command's ERP transition and implementation process. SSP hired contractors with previous Navy ERP implementation knowledge and experience to mitigate the learning curve challenges. The SSP ERP team created training material to support the workforce during the transition; and the SSP ERP business office is taking advantage of the newly created Business Intelligence Center of Excellence to complete all the implementation requirements to better leverage the ERP tool and ultimately minimize command costs.

p. <u>Contracting</u>. Contracting programs are compliant. During the inspection, NAVINSGEN reviewed three active contracts. Executed contract documents can be found in the Standard Procurement System, and in paper files located in the contracts office. We found no noteworthy discrepancies. SSP began its Procurement Program Measurement and Assessment program in early February 2013, maintaining its 3-year periodicity.

q. <u>Sexual Assault Prevention and Response</u>. The Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) program at SSP headquarters is compliant. The designated SAPR holds all four SAPR program positions, but is only designated in writing as the SAPR victim advocate. Designation letters for the other three positions were completed.

2. The following areas are not compliant:

a. <u>Individual Medical Readiness</u>. The SSP IMR records reviewed during the inspection indicated that SSP headquarters and subordinate commands did not meet the mandated IMR requirements. Additionally, there is no IMR Coordinator assigned and no coordinated effort to monitor IMR throughout the SSP enterprise. The Medical Readiness Reporting System revealed that the Fully Medically Ready status for SSP headquarters is 33 percent and across the enterprise is 44 percent. Since the completion of the inspection, SSP has designated a command

member to be responsible for tracking IMR at SSP headquarters and will provide oversight for subordinate commands, establishing routine, auditable interface with those command's IMR points of contact. Part 2, Issue Paper 2, INDIVIDUAL MEDICAL READINESS, refers (Page 26).

#### b. Command Individual Augmentee Coordinator

(1) The SSP Command Individual Augmentee Coordinator (CIAC) maintains the program in compliance with OPNAVINST 1754.6, *Personal and Family Readiness Support for Individual Augmentees and Their Families*. However, this program lacks the oversight of SSP's lower echelon commands. The CIAC maintains frequent contact with their one Individual Augmentee (IA) and maintains contact with the IA's family by phone and/or e-mail. The CIAC documents these contacts appropriately in the Navy Family Accountability and Assessment System.

(2) The CIAC provides occasional, but not regularly scheduled, IA status updates to the commander and command master chief. NAVINSGEN recommended that the CIAC establish a routine reporting mechanism and consider placing an IA bulletin board or similar display in a visible public area to remind SSP Sailors of their deployed shipmate(s). Moreover, SSP has not established procedures by which the CIAC collects, tracks, or reports information about the status of subordinate command IAs and Post-Deployment Health Reassessment completion rates to the command's leadership. This lack of Echelon II command oversight is in keeping with NAVINSGEN's observations at other Echelon II headquarters. Part 2, Issue Paper 3, COMMAND INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEE COORDINATOR, refers (Page 27).

(3) Since the inspection, SSP has designated a command member to be responsible for Echelon II oversight of subordinate command CIACs and will establish routine, auditable interface with those command's CIACs.

c. <u>Command Managed Equal Opportunity</u>. SSP's Command Managed Equal Opportunity program is not compliant with OPNAVINST 5354.1F, *Navy Equal Opportunity Policy*. The issues associated with non-compliance are addressed in Part 2, Issue Paper 4, COMMAND MANAGED EQUAL OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM, refers (Page 28).

d. <u>Equal Employment Opportunity</u>. The Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) program is not compliant with DON requirements. The Command Deputy EEO Officer position that was previously assigned as an additional duty has now been filled with a full-time employee. Although the new EEO officer is working diligently to bring the program within standards, many critical elements of the program are not yet in place. A representative from the DON Office of EEO and Diversity Management has volunteered to assist the Command Deputy EEO Officer in correcting program deficiencies. Part 2, Issue Paper 5, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY, refers (Page 30).

e. <u>Personally Identifiable Information</u>. SSP Personally Identifiable Information (PII) program is not compliant. During our inspection, SSP developed a plan of action and discrepancies that could be resolved quickly were corrected. However, key program elements are missing. SSP is drafting a new instruction to replace SSPINST 5211.3D, dated 8 May 2001. The new instruction will establish policies and procedures for the privacy program. In addition, a Privacy Act Coordinator was established to provide oversight of the program. Part 2, Issue Paper 6, PROTECTING PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION refers, page 32.

#### f. Personal Property Management

(1) SSP's Personal Property Management is not compliant. Procedurally, SSP operates its Personal Property Management Office in accordance with SECNAVINST 7320.10A, *Department of the Navy Personal Property Policies and Procedures*. However, we found a mismatch between threshold property values in the instruction and property being tracked by SSP. Financial Improvement Audit Readiness (FIAR) requires 100 percent tracking of all Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) in a Government Accountability Property System of Record (APSR). SSP made a command decision to track only GFE assets above the \$100K threshold, which does not meet the FIAR 100 percent requirement. SSP placed all GFE above \$100K into ERP which is one of the DON APSR, during the conversion period at the beginning of FY13. Due to the relationships with industry partners, SSP's GFE under \$100K is tracked within the industry partners APSR. Additionally, in the past 18 months, SSP has made significant strides to maintain effective oversight and responsibility to achieve full accountability of assets, accurate financial reporting, security, and life cycle management of property. Book-to-Floor and Floor-to-Book inventories are scheduled for a three-year periodicity. More run time will be required to fully establish this process.

(2) SSP utilizes ERP as its Program of Record for Personal Property and Defense Property Accounting System for military equipment in its 22 property offices. SSP is seeking a waiver from meeting the GFE accounting requirements for FIAR by 2014. Both staffs of ASN (RD&A) and ASN for Financial Management and Comptroller (FM&C) are aware and engaged in this process.

(3) As the Navy pilot for the DON capture of GFE, SSP is continuing to engage with the Navy Office of Financial Operations (FMO) and ASN (RD&A) to adjust the requirement to capture all GFE. To place SSP GFE under \$100K into a Government APSR will require significant fiscal, personnel, and contracted resources which are not available to be applied to this effort. Furthermore, ERP does not have the capability to handle data requirements needed for 100 percent GFE accountability. SSP is working this issue with the FMO through the assertion of DON GFE, which is scheduled for 30 September 2015. SSP will be in compliance with GFE FIAR requirements through the audit assertion testing done in conjunction with FMO.

#### **III. FACILITIES AND SAFETY**

1. The Facilities and Safety team reviewed facility related functions and the Safety and Occupational Health program with findings provided below:

#### a. Facilities Management

(1) SSP has a knowledgeable staff to address facilities concerns with Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC) and Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC). However, interviews indicate there is internal confusion about roles and responsibilities among the various branches of the SSP staff regarding facilities. Communication of information across internal organizational boundaries is difficult, and multiple independent staffs with overlapping responsibilities are less efficient and duplicate effort. When dealing with external service providers, like CNIC, SSP runs the risk of sending multiple priorities. Communication about facilities issues within SSP is often fragmented, both internally and with key external players, such as CNIC and NAVFAC, because there is not a single facilities management entity within the organization responsible for new construction and sustainment, restoration, and modernization (SRM).

(2) As an example, the Strategic Weapons Facilities (SWF) in Kings Bay, Georgia and Bangor, Washington operate as factories in the field to assemble, store, checkout, on-load, and off-load missiles. These facilities report to Missile Engineering and Test Instrumentation Branch (SP27), which interface with CNIC for facilities maintenance and services issues. Separately, Facilities Acquisition, and Environmental programs (SP2016), is responsible for planning, development, and execution of all SSP field activity construction projects and environmental program coordination. Although these offices work together to address issues at the SWFs, they each have independent channels of communication with CNIC and NAVFAC.

(3) SP2016 is responsible for Military Construction (MILCON) planning and coordination with CNIC, but was unaware of the SSP leadership and the Fire Control and Guidance Branch (SP23) concerns about the Computation and Analysis building (building 1200) at the Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD). This building supports SSP's Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile and Ship, Submersible, Guided-Missile, Nuclear programs. Although this facility is a NAVSEA building, its poor condition and the need for a replacement MILCON was unknown to SSP MILCON planners.

(4) A first step in improving horizontal integration is mapping facility roles and responsibilities to indentify overlap and conflicts across the directorate. Part 2, Issue Paper 7, FACILITIES MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION, refers (Page 34).

b. <u>Strategic Weapons System Infrastructure</u>. Prior to the SSP Command Inspection, a small NAVINSGEN team conducted facility inspections of the strategic weapons infrastructure with the Missile Engineering and Test Instrumentation Branch (SP2742) facilities staff, at the SWF at Naval Base Kitsap in Bangor, Washington, and Naval Submarine Base (SUBASE) Kings Bay, Georgia. Our overall assessment was that the strategic weapons system facilities were satisfactory to meet all mission requirements, but there were potential capacity concerns at SWFPAC, which are already being addressed by SSP.

#### (1) Strategic Weapons Facility Pacific, Bangor, Washington

(a) SWFPAC is a facility with an area of approximately 700-acres, consisting of the waterfront restricted area, main limited area (MLA), production area, and convoy route that provides strategic weapons system support to the fleet. SWFPAC facilities were originally built in the 1960s to support the Polaris and then the Trident I C4 ballistic missiles, and were modified to support the Trident II D5 mission. The exceptions are Missile Assembly building (MAB)-3 and the Limited Area Production and Storage Complex (LAPSC), which were constructed specifically to support the Trident II D5 ballistic missile. The Trident II D5 program is planned through 2042 and follow-on program is planned through 2080. SWFPAC is meeting the mission with facilities in their current condition.

(b) SWFPAC production facilities have strict heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) constraints for temperature and humidity, as significant variations in humidity impacts missile life expectancy. Although typically cool in the Pacific Northwest, humidity is the primary concern for HVAC systems in buildings primarily constructed in the 1970s. MAB-1 was constructed in the 1960s and modified in 2000 for Trident II D5. MAB-3 was constructed in 2010 to support Trident II. The HVAC constraint for the MABs is a humidity range between 20 and 50 percent.

(c) Humidity control is also a critical requirement within the MLA, which includes the vertical missile packaging buildings (VMPBs), reentry body buildings, LAPSCs, Missile Motor Magazines (MMMs), and reentry magazines. The MMMs were constructed in the 1960s, and SWFPAC has submitted a special project to CNIC for FY17 consideration to replace the 63 MMM HVAC systems. At the time of our visit, all strategic weapons system facilities' HVAC systems were operational.

(d) SWFPAC operates with only one VMPB, constructed in the 1970s. Though fully operational, VMPB-3 is a potential single point failure if its support equipment (weight handling equipment) and HVAC systems are compromised. Although VMPB-2 has been decertified for use, SWFPAC continues to maintain the facility for future use should VMPB-3 experience an unexpected long-term disruption in operations. Refurbishment cost for recertification is estimated at \$3M, excluding the cost to upgrade the support equipment.

(e) Over FY13-15, CNIC has programmed more than \$17M in SWFPAC special projects for modernization of industrial control systems, HVAC repairs and energy improvements, and replacement of critical piles at Explosive Handling Wharf (EHW)-1. For FY16-17, SWFPAC has developed critical production facility repair special project packages valued at \$26.7M for CNIC funding consideration. Projects include MLA security lighting repairs, HVAC system upgrades, seismic upgrades, building reroofing, and continuing EHW-1 structure pile repairs. SWFPAC is also pursuing SSP funding for repairs to VMPB-2 for recertification.

#### (2) Strategic Weapons Facility Atlantic, Kings Bay, Georgia.

(a) SWFLANT is a facility with an area of approximately 600-acres, providing strategic weapons system support to the fleet. It was built from the ground-up beginning in 1985 and completed in 1994 to support the Trident II D5 missile. The SWFLANT facilities include administration buildings, supply warehouses, a calibration laboratory, processing buildings (including 2 MABs), 2 VMPBs, inspection buildings, missile motor magazines, and EHWs. SWFLANT is planned to support the D5 program through 2042 and a follow-on program through 2080.

(b) Unlike SWFPAC, SWFLANT does not have the same capacity concerns, since they have redundant production facilities: 2 VMPB, 2 MABs, and 2 EHWs, specifically constructed to support the Trident II D5.

(c) SWFLANT production and storage facilities have the same HVAC constraints for temperature and humidity, but unlike SWFPAC both humidity and temperature are significant concerns in southeast Georgia for HVAC systems. SWFLANT is completing an FY11 project (approximately \$2M) to replace the 1980s HVAC systems in 65 MMMs in the controlled and limited areas with an estimated completion date in FY14. SWFLANT is working with the Public Works (PWD) Kings Bay to develop projects to replace the air handler units (AHUs), chill water pumps, and fire pumps at both MABs and VMPBs. Estimated total cost for the MAB projects is \$890K.

(d) During our visit, SWFLANT was completing a project to paint and reroof both VMPBs at a total cost of approximately \$3.2M. SWFLANT is also developing a project to reroof MAB-2 at an estimated cost of \$440K.

(e) The Reentry Body Complex (RBC) has a similar function as SWFPAC's LAPSC. Although the RBC was constructed in the 1990s, the facility remains suitable for its intended purpose. SWFLANT has developed projects to repair/upgrade the building systems to include replacing AHUs, chill water pumps, fire pumps, electrical switchgear, breakers, and replacing/updating fire alarm monitors and annunciators.

(f) Overall, SWFLANT facilities are much better configured, with no single point failures, and are in better physical condition than the facilities at SWFPAC.

#### c. Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division Building 1200.

(1) During the SSP Command Inspection, NAVINSGEN conducted a facility review of NSWCDD's building 1200, which directly supports the SSP Fire Control Branch (SP23). NSWCDD's building 1200 is approximately 112K square feet and is a multi-addition facility with three main wings (A, B, and C). In 2010, Wing B was vacated due to poor facility conditions and water intrusion, and 115 personnel relocated within NSA South Potomac in Dahlgren. Wing C houses unique submarine ballistic missile launch control hardware worth approximately \$45M, which is cost and space prohibitive to relocate to other facilities at NSWCDD. SSP is concerned about relocating this function outside of Dahlgren, due to loss of strategic weapons control system personnel expertise of those who are unwilling to relocate.

(2) NAVSEA and NSWCDD are responsible for maintaining building 1200, with its approximately 220 staff of the Strategic and Weapon Systems Department, which supports SSP's Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile program. Due to the deteriorating condition of the facility, NAVSEA has annually submitted a MILCON project to replace the facility since 2001. Anticipating the MILCON would find strong early support, NSWCDD limited further investment in building 1200. As the project slipped from year to year, NSWCDD reconsidered its investment strategy and began sustaining the building at a higher level. Since 2007, NSWCDD has invested over \$4.2M in building 1200 repairs, and for FY13, its sustainment represents 30 percent of NSWCDD's total facility sustainment budget.

(3) The administrative areas of the building (Wing A) are in 'below average' condition, while the laboratory/computational spaces in Wing C are in better overall condition. There are no immediate life/safety hazards, and the facility is meeting operational requirements. Frequent air quality tests by NSWCDD Safety have identified no mold hazards in the occupied spaces.

(4) The MILCON project is currently programmed for FY15 in the OPNAV Sponsor Program Proposal. However, NSWCDD is developing a back-up project to renovate the vacant Wing B at an estimated total cost of \$9M over FY14-16. This renovation would generate 'swing space' to allow relocation of Wing A personnel to Wing B for additional building 1200 renovations. In FY13, NSWCDD intends to use approximately \$500K for design efforts. Additional repairs to this substandard structure risk the MILCON project's justification and provide only a marginal solution to the long term requirement.


(5) The facility will continue to meet mission requirements for the near future, but the building's deteriorating condition will increase SSP mission risk and NSWCDD sustainment costs each year. The preferred solution remains a replacement facility through MILCON. Part 2, Issue Paper 8, NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER DAHLGREN DIVISION BUILDING 1200, refers (Page 36).

d. <u>Facility Sustainment and Preventative Maintenance</u>. Both the NAVINSGEN Risk and Opportunity Assessment (ROA) and other SSP command documents expressed a concern about facility sustainment funding provided by CNIC through the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Facility Sustainment Model (FSM). SSP believes that the FSM leaves the SWF unique special weapons safety and security requirements under-funded to their true sustainment needs, which increases concerns about SSP's ability to support our nation's strategic deterrent forces and the long-term sustainability of the strategic deterrent program's ability to respond to changing national priorities.

(1) SSP also expressed a parallel concern regarding the lack of preventative maintenance service under CNIC. When comparing FSM to an approach where facilities are considered as a component of the weapons system, the most efficient approach is usually one that exercises an intensive preventive maintenance program to eliminate un-programmed downtime. SSP perceives that CNIC has a "fix when broken" facility maintenance strategy that can result in unacceptable safety and security risks to SSP operations and costly operational downtime. However, during our program review, both SWF sites' Base Operating Support (BOS) contracts

include preventive maintenance (PM) of critical equipment, and additional incentives for PM are included in both installations' contract renewals. Although there have been some initial BOS contract start-up problems at SUBASE Kings Bay, SWFLANT has been working closely with PWD Kings Bay and NAVFAC Southeast to resolve the contract issues.

(a) Strategic Weapons Facility Pacific Sustainment. As shown in Figure 3, SSP funded SWFPAC Facility SRM from FY00-03 at an average of approximately \$3.5M per year. In FY04, SSP transferred \$4.85M in a budget-based transfer to CNIC for SWFPAC facilities maintenance. Since the transfer to CNIC, the average facility sustainment, including special projects (restoration and modernization funds), has been approximately \$6.8M per year.



#### SWFPAC O&MN FUNDING

Figure 3. SWFPAC Facilities Operation and Maintenance, Navy (O&MN)Funding (FY00-10)\*

\*NOTES:

<sup>1.</sup> CNIC sustainment funding data (FY04-10) is provided by SWFPAC in coordination with NBK PWD.

FY04-07 amounts are estimated.


<sup>2.</sup> Pre-CNIC (FY00-03) O&MN Funding is from SSP's records (SP13) and includes recurring Maintenance (M1), Major Repairs (M2), & Minor Construction less than \$15K (R1/R2).

<sup>3.</sup> Starting point (\$4.851M) is amount of SWFPAC's FY04 budget-based transfer to CNIC.

<sup>4.</sup> Annual inflation percentage increase is from Unified Facilities Criteria 3-701, the Facilities Pricing Guide, "O&M OSD inflation rate"

(b) Strategic Weapons Facility Atlantic Sustainment. As shown in Figure 4, SSP funded SWFLANT facility SRM from FY01-03 at an average of approximately \$5.7M per year. In FY04, SSP transferred \$6.01M in a budget-based transfer to CNIC for SWFLANT facilities. Since the transfer to CNIC, the average facility sustainment, including special projects (restoration and modernization funds) and United Kingdom Trident program funding, has been approximately \$16.1M per year.

(2) A review of CNIC SRM funding of the SWFs indicates SSP enjoys a facilities funding level that exceeds sustainment funding provided to the rest of the Navy, and a higher level of investment, including inflation, than when SSP was responsible for their own facilities. Despite the contention that SSP facilities are not treated as part of the overall system for strategic deterrence, these data indicate due regard for SSP's critical mission and close coordination among the SWFs and local CNIC regional, installation, and public works leadership to address any SSP facility concerns.



#### SWFLANT O&MN FUNDING

Figure 4. SWFLANT Facilities O&MN Funding (FY01-11)<sup>\*</sup>; FY11 Special Projects \$34.5M

<sup>\*</sup>NOTES:

<sup>1.</sup> CNIC Sustainment funding data (FY04 to FY11) is from SUBASE Kings Bay PWD. Beginning in FY09, software changes at PW have caused a loss in the visibility of ST funding for SWFLANT, and so ST funding can only be estimated based upon percentages in the model.

<sup>2.</sup> Pre-CNIC (FY01-03) O&MN Funding is from SWFLANT's records and includes Recurring Maintenance (M1), Major Repairs (M2) & Minor Construction (R1/R2).

<sup>3.</sup> Starting point (\$6.01M) is amount of SWFLANT's FY04 Budget Based Transfer to CNIC. Annual inflation percentage increase is from the latest version of Unified Facilities Criteria 3-701-01 Facilities Pricing Guide, "Operation and Maintenance Escalation Rates."

e. <u>Safety and Occupational Health</u>. Overall, SSP has robust safety oversight throughout its mission areas. The safety organization, similar to the facilities staff, is also more complex than we've observed at other Echelon II commands, due to SSP's unique mission requirements. Safety responsibilities are split across 3 divisions and 4 branches: SP01F - Occupational Safety and Health, reporting to the Deputy Director (SP01); SP20124 - Life Cycle Safety Support, and SP2016 - MILCON and Explosives Safety Ashore, reporting to the Chief Engineer (SP201), and SP311 - Nuclear Weapons Safety Policy, reporting to Nuclear Weapons Surety, Policy and Compliance (SP31) branch.

(1) Safety and Occupational Health Management. OPNAVINST 5100.23G CH-1, *Navy Safety and Occupational Health Program Manual*, requires Echelon II commands to establish a comprehensive Safety and Occupational Health (SOH) program and designate a competent safety manager position as a key advisor to the director for establishing a safe and healthy workplace. In this role, the safety manager provides oversight of subordinate commands, leads in the development of the organization's safety policy and culture, and provides input to the director on mishap trends and mishap prevention. SSP's Safety and Occupational Health Manager billet (SP01F) was established as primary duty in 2012, so key elements of that program are still being developed.

(a) The safety manager has regular communications with the Echelon III SOH organizations and visits them on a semi-annual or annual basis. All Echelon III safety managers are fully qualified to perform their duties.

(b) We identified some minor deficiencies in training records and provided assistance during the inspection. For example, supervisors were not documenting monthly or annual safety training; there was no database to monitor results (e.g., Enterprise Safety Application Management System (ESAMS), etc.), per OPNAVINST 5100.23G, Chapter 6; and SSP was not recording initial or annual ergonomics training, per OPNAVINST 5100.23G, Chap 23.

(2) Technical Programs Safety

(a) Weapons Safety Section. Weapons Safety Section (SP20124) is responsible for assuring system safety including conventional and nuclear weapons safety, and establishes safety requirements in the basic technical requirements documents. They implement safety requirements by developing technical system safety policies, conducting or directing system safety engineering reviews and monitoring the design of the weapon system to assure operational safety, including nuclear safety. SP20124 also formulates scope and policy on safety for the ballistic missile submarine-based SWS and future submarine platforms and is also responsible for radiation safety programs, conventional explosives safety, weight handling equipment and crane safety, and hazardous material safety.

(b) Facilities Acquisition and Environmental Programs Section. Facilities Acquisition and Environmental Programs Section (SP2016), in its safety role, provides policy, technical direction, and oversight for conventional facilities explosives safety and directs the identification and validation of total program requirements for conventional explosives safety. Their responsibilities also include coordination with Naval Ordnance Safety and Support Activity, the DoD Explosives Safety Board, lightning protection, and grounding.

(3) <u>Nuclear Weapons Safety Policy</u>. Nuclear Weapons Safety Policy (SP311) provides safety direction and guidance to Navy nuclear weapons capable units and verifies implementation, and reviews SWS compliance with DoD Nuclear Weapons Safety Standards.

(a) SP311 is also responsible for the Nuclear Weapons Radiological Controls (RADCON) program. The RADCON program responsibility was transferred from NAVSEA 04N in 2010, via SECNAVINST 8120.1, *Department of the Navy Nuclear Weapons Responsibilities and Authorities*. Subsequently, a staff member was hired to manage this program in January 2012. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCSI) Instruction 263.05, *Nuclear Weapons Technical Instruction*, requires periodic inspections of shore facilities with nuclear weapons. OPNAVINST 5040.6H, *Department of the Navy Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspections and Nuclear Weapons Readiness Certification*, requires shore facility inspections for RADCON.

(b) The program responsibilities are delineated in SSP Instruction, SSP OD 69206, *Nuclear Weapons Radiological Controls Program*, revision 1, dated 28 May 2012. Revision 2 of this instruction is in process. The RADCON program is appropriately manned and has an appropriate budget. The field sites are thoroughly inspected on a routine basis (15-18 month periodicity), and there is a strong line of communication between the program office and the site nuclear weapon RADCON officers (NWRCO). There are monthly meetings within SSP that encompass all areas of safety, and all relevant issues from these meetings are provided to the Navy Nuclear Weapons Senior Leaders Oversight Council, which is chaired by the Director, Navy Staff.

(c) SP311 will soon assume responsibility for the management of nuclear weapons accident response. One billet has been approved for this responsibility, but the budget constraints do not allow for a hire. SSP is preparing for the possibility that this added responsibility will require future support of contractors, as well as the single civil service billet.

(4) Safety Program Integration. SSP is making a concerted effort to integrate all aspects of the safety program. They are in the process of combining four stand-alone safety instructions, SSPINST 5100.6A, *Safety Program*; SSPINST 5100.1D, *System Safety Program Requirements*; SSPINST 5100.14, *Hazard/Environmental Impact Management System*; and SSP 8110.2A, Nuclear Safety Oversight Panel, into a single safety instruction under the SSPINST 5100.6 (series). Following consolidation into SSPINST 5100.6, the other three instructions will be cancelled. SSP is also establishing a Command Safety Working Group, consisting of safety management from each of the divisions, to improve the integration across its safety organization. SSP leadership should continue to track these positive steps for safety program integration.

#### IV. BRILLIANT ON THE BASICS/GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE

1. The Brilliant on the Basics programs were reviewed and behavior associated with good order and discipline was closely observed. Overall, we observed command morale and QOL were satisfactory and professional military appearance was generally good. Programs reviewed include Career Development Board (CDB), Command Sponsorship, and INDOC.

a. <u>Career Development</u>. Sailors are receiving their required CDB and timely submission of Perform to Serve (PTS) requests. The Command Career Counselor (CCC) has completed formal training, is providing oversight to subordinate CCCs by making command visits and conducting subordinate program assessments as required. The CCC is in the process of building a very solid program; however, the following issues were discovered during the inspection:

(1) No documentation of monthly or quarterly training. A schedule was developed and training will begin 8 May 2013 by video teleconference.

(2) No documentation of training provided to Echelon III CCCs within the first 90 days of assignment to include, Career Information Management System (CIMS) analytics, CIMS online, Navy Retention Monitoring System (NRMS), Fleet Rating Identification Engine, and PTS reporting.

(3) In accordance with OPNAVINST 1040.11D, the CCC is required to ensure the Sponsorship and INDOC programs are effective. Lack of required training coupled with the status of the Sponsorship and INDOC programs render this program not in compliance with OPNAVINST 1040.11D, *Navy Enlisted Retention and Career Development Program*.

b. <u>Command Sponsorship</u>. The Command Sponsorship program is not in compliance with OPNAVINST 1740.3C, *Command Sponsor and INDOC Programs*. Specifically:

(1) Fleet and Family Support Center "sponsorship" training was not conducted for any assigned sponsor.

(2) Sponsor critiques were not completed by new personnel and command leadership was unable to assess sponsorship program strengths and weaknesses. Consequently, the requirement to retain sponsor critiques on file for one year has not been met.

(3) Command sponsor coordinator's contact information is not registered with Navy Personnel Command.

(4) The NAVINSGEN Command Master Chief (CMC) provided onsite training to the sponsor coordinator to correct these deficiencies and improve program effectiveness.

c. <u>Command Indoctrination</u>. Command INDOC is not in compliance with OPNAVINST 1740.3C, *Command Sponsor and Indoctrination Programs*. Specifically:

(1) Military new gains are not completing INDOC within 30 days of reporting.

(2) Navy Pride and Professionalism training not conducted, as required.

(3) Attendees did not receive INDOC critique sheets, preventing senior leadership from assessing the program's strengths and weaknesses.

(4) Follow-up with SSP's CMC is ongoing to ensure these programs meet the requirements of applicable instructions. Since our inspection, four sponsors have been trained, INDOC/sponsor critiques have been reviewed by command leadership and a training plan has been produced by the CCC to start subordinate CCC training on retention program matters.

2. Since our inspection, SSP established a quarterly plan for training lower echelon CCCs and a plan for direct oversight of lower echelon CCC programs. Under the guidance of the CMC, SSP will conduct an annual self-assessment, reporting the status of these programs to the Director.

# V. AREAS/PROGRAMS ASSESSED

# **Mission Performance**

- Mission Readiness
- Strategic Planning Process
- Command Relationships and Communications
- Total Force Management
- Personnel Training/Qualification
- Continuity of Operations Plan
- Command Security

# <u>Resource Management/Quality of Life/Community Support</u>

- Suicide Prevention
- Voting Assistance
- Legal and Ethics
- Drug and Alcohol Program Advisor
- Urinalysis Program Coordinator
- Information Technology/Information Management/Information Assurance
- Cyber Security Work Force
- Physical Readiness
- Command Evaluation and Review
- Managers' Internal Control
- Command Inspection
- Government Commercial Purchase Card
- Government Travel Charge Card Program Contracting
- Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System
- Navy Enterprise Resources
- Contracting
- Individual Medical Readiness
- Command Individual Augmentee Coordinator
- Command Managed Equal Opportunity
- Equal Employment Opportunity
- Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
- Personally Identifiable Information
- Personal Property Management

# **Facilities and Safety**

- Facilities Management
- Strategic Weapons System Infrastructure
- Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division Building 1200
- Safety and Occupational Health

# Brilliant on the Basics/Good Order and Discipline

- Career Development
- Command Sponsorship
- Command Indoctrination

# PART 2

# **ISSUE PAPERS**

# ISSUE PAPER ACTION SUMMARY MATRIX ACTION COMMAND INITIAL RESPONSE DUE TO NAVINSGEN 13 SEPTEMBER 2013

	ISSUE PAPER	SSP	NAVFAC	NSWCDD	NSWC
1	SECURITY PROGRAM AT STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAM	X			
2	INDIVIDUAL MEDICAL READINESS	X			
3	COMMAND INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEE COORDINATOR				
	COMMAND MANAGED EQUAL OPPORTUNITY	X			
4	PROGRAM	X			
5	EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY PROTECTING PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE	X			
6	INFORMATION STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAM FACILITIES	X			
7	MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION	X			
8	NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER DAHLGREN DIVISION, BUILDING 1200	X	X	X	X

# **SUMMARY OF ACTIONS**

If you are an **Action Officer** for a staff listed below, please submit Implementation Status Reports (ISRs) as specified for each applicable recommendation, along with supporting documentation, such as plans of action and milestones and implementing directives.

1. **Submit initial ISRs using OPNAV Form 5040/2 no later than <u>13 September 2013</u>. Each ISR should include an e-mail address for the action officer, where available. Electronic ISR submission to NAVIGInspections@navy.mil is preferred. An electronic version of OPNAV Form 5040/2 may be downloaded from the NAVINSGEN website at www.ig.navy.mil in the Downloads and Publications Folder, titled Forms Folder, Implementation Status Report.** 

2. Submit quarterly ISRs, including "no change" reports until the recommendation is closed by NAVINSGEN. When a long-term action is dependent upon prior completion of another action, the status report should indicate the governing action and its estimated completion date. Further status reports may be deferred, with NAVINSGEN concurrence.

3. When action addressees consider required action accomplished, the status report submitted should contain the statement, "Action is considered complete." However, **NAVINSGEN** approval must be obtained before the designated action addressee is released from further reporting responsibilities on the recommendation.

4. NAVINSGEN point of contact for ISRs i (b) (7)(C)

COMMAND	RECOMMENDATION NUMBER(S) XXX-13
SSP	001 - 017
NAVFAC	018
NSWC	018
NSWCDD	018-019

# **ISSUE PAPER 1**

### SUBJECT: SECURITY PROGRAM AT STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAM

# <u>REFERENCE</u>: (a) SECNAV M-5510.36 (b) SECNAV M-5510.30

<u>PROBLEM</u>: The Command Security program instruction and the Emergency Action Plan at Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) are not current or in accordance with references (a) and (b). Many aspects of the signed security instruction do not apply to SSP's current facilities.

<u>BACKGROUND</u>: SSP's signed Command Security program instruction is dated 2003 and was written to apply security practices to SSP's former work spaces. SSP has since moved to building 200 on the Washington Navy Yard in 2011. SSP conducted a self-assessment, which included the review of the Command Security Program. At the time of the inspection, SSP's Command Security Manager (CSM) had been on board eight months. During the command self-assessment and follow-up evaluation conducted by the CSM, SSP noted shortfalls in security standards, including gaps in physical and information security, lack of a functioning intrusion monitoring system, lack of solid core doors on spaces designated as secure areas, lack of record-keeping on security incidents, and a need to draft a new instruction and Emergency Action Plan in order to improve overall security awareness and practices. SSP developed a plan of action to address these issues.

<u>DISCUSSION</u>: SSP has progressed with resolving many of the security concerns revealed during SSP's self-assessment. The command security instruction and Emergency Action Plan are in draft form, being revised to comply with current security directives. NAVINSGEN recognizes SSP's ability to self-assess and proactively take steps to improve security practices. A current, revised command security program instruction will solidify the security foundation to ensure the command adheres to the governing security policies, instructions, and directives.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

001-13. That SSP update and publish the command security program instruction and Emergency Action Plan and conduct necessary training for every employee on the new security policy.

#### NAVINSGEN POINT OF CONTACT:



### SUBJECT: INDIVIDUAL MEDICAL READINESS

#### <u>REFERENCE</u>: (a) DoDINST 6025.19, Individual Medical Readiness

- (b) SECNAVINST 6120.3, Periodic Health Assessment for Individual Medical Readiness
- (c) NAVADMIN 233/07, Individual Medical Readiness
- (d) OPNAVINST 6120.3, Preventive Health Assessment

<u>PROBLEM</u>: Per references (a) through (d), Individual Medical Readiness (IMR) records reviewed during our inspection indicated that Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) headquarters and subordinate commands did not meet the mandated IMR requirements.

#### BACKGROUND

1. IMR assesses an individual service member's or larger activity's readiness level measured against established metrics applied to key elements of health and fitness that are used to determine "deployability" in support of contingency operations. Readiness is checked by completing Periodic Health Assessments (PHAs) that measure an individual's status based on an absence of deployment limiting conditions. Areas monitored include dental classification, immunization completion, physical fitness and a series of laboratory based measures to determine general health status.

2. Medical readiness is measured by the following criteria: Fully Medically Ready (FMR) - current in all categories, including dental; Partially Medically Ready - lacking one or more easily obtainable elements such as an immunization; Not Medically Ready - existence of a chronic or prolonged deployment limiting condition; and Medically Indeterminate - unable to establish a health status due to missing records or an overdue PHA.

3. Per reference (a), the minimum goal for overall medical readiness is that 75 percent of service members are FMR, with the goal being 100 percent.

<u>DISCUSSION</u>: There is no IMR coordinator assigned at SSP and no coordinated effort to monitor IMR throughout the SSP enterprise. The Medical Readiness Reporting System revealed that the FMR status for SSP headquarters was 33 percent and across the enterprise it was 44 percent.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

002-13. That Director, SSP ensures headquarters command and subordinate command oversight of IMR is initiated and the minimum FMR standards as established in reference (a) are met.

NAVINSGEN POINT OF CONTACT:



#### SUBJECT: COMMAND INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEE COORDINATOR

### <u>REFERENCE</u>: (a) OPNAVINST 6100.3, of 12 Jan 2009 (b) OPNAVINST 1754.6, of 7 April 2009 (c) CNO INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTATION GRAM R 020107Z APR 09

<u>PROBLEM</u>: Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) is not tracking or providing oversight of lower echelon Command Individual Augmentee Coordinator (CIAC) programs in accordance with references (a) through (c); and therefore, is not ensuring the completion of Post Deployment Health Reassessments (PDHRAs) for its lower echelon population.

**BACKGROUND:** SSP's CIAC maintains the program in compliance with OPNAVINST 1754.6. However, the coordinator was not responsible for lower echelon CIAC activities and is unaware of the status of SSP claimancy CIAC programs outside of the headquarters command.

#### DISCUSSION

1. Senior leadership is left unaware of how many SSP lower echelon personnel are returning from deployment or may have previously deployed and have not completed a the Post Deployment Health Assessment (PDHA). Per reference (a), the PDHA is performed at the end of the deployment either in theater or at the demobilization site. The PDHRA is performed via computer 90 to 180 days after returning from deployment. Performing the PDHRA is a requirement for the member. Tracking the performance and completion of the PDHRA is the commander's responsibility.

2. The PDHA and PDHRA is a critical part of the medical record. In the short term, it can identify service members with deployment-related physical and mental health issues that otherwise may not be present when filing. In the long term, it can document health issues that may not require care until an undetermined future date, possibly after retirement or discharge. To ignore this tool is to discard an opportunity to protect the health of our service members now and in to the future.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

003-13. That SSP leadership assign oversight responsibility of lower echelon commands CIAC programs to the SSP CIAC.

004-13. That SSP leadership develop a procedure for the CIAC coordinator to report claimancy programmatic status to leadership.

NAVINSGEN POINT OF CONTACT:



### SUBJECT: COMMAND MANAGED EQUAL OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM

<u>REFERENCE</u>: (a) OPNAVINST 5354.1F, CH-1, Navy Equal Opportunity Policy, of 20 Sep 11

<u>PROBLEM</u>: The Command Managed Equal Opportunity (CMEO) program at Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) does not comply with all requirements of reference (a).

<u>BACKGROUND</u>: Reference (a) requires commanders, commanding officers, and officers-incharge to promote a positive command climate through personal example; create, shape, and maintain a positive equal opportunity (EO) environment through policy, communication, training, education, enforcement, and assessment; and ensure that unlawful discrimination is absent in administrative and disciplinary proceedings. Specific responsibilities of the CMEO Program Managers include:

- a. Serve as the coordinator for the command climate assessment.
- b. Ensure formal complaints are submitted with established guidance and timelines
- c. Maintain CMEO record files for three years.
- d. Periodically evaluate CMEO program.
- e. Ensure command's EO program complies with all items cited in the CMEO checklist.
- f. Perform other EO-related duties as mandated by the commander.

<u>DISCUSSION</u>: The SSP CMEO program was not compliant at the time of the inspection. The following discrepancies were found:

a. There was no evidence of a continuity binder containing: Formal/informal complaints, executive summaries and command assessments for 36 months, command training team and command assessment team documentation, EO/sexual harassment (SH) message serial log

b. The CMEO Program Manager was not designated in writing and had not attended the approved CMEO Program Manager course prior to assuming his duties.

c. EO and SH command policy letters were non-existent.

d. EO posters were displayed in command common areas but lacked points of contact information (this item was corrected on the spot).

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

005-13. That SSP look into feasibility in funding an EO Advisor billet to, at a minimum, monitor headquarters and subordinate command EO climate assessments and ensure SSP reviews and maintains executive summaries for historical files for at least 3 years, per reference (a).

006-13. That SSP ensures its EO program complies with all items cited in the CMEO Checklist, enclosure (3) of reference (a).

NAVINSGEN POINT OF CONTACT:



#### SUBJECT: EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

<u>REFERENCE</u>: (a) Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Management Directive 715 (b) Civilian Human Resources Manual, Subchapter 1603

<u>PROBLEM</u>: The Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) program status has been rated non-complaint (red) on the Department of the Navy (DON) EEO program scorecard.

<u>BACKGROUND</u>: An assessment of the EEO program is conducted annually at DON major commands and subordinate activities to ensure compliance with references (a) and (b). Command self-assessments are submitted to the DON Office of EEO and Diversity in the form of an annual EEO program status report. Command self-assessments are composed of two elements. The first element measures the command's EEO program against the six essential elements of a model EEO program, which include:

- a. Demonstrated commitment from agency leadership.
- b. Integration of EEO into the agency's strategic mission.
- c. Management and program accountability.
- d. Proactive prevention of unlawful discrimination.
- e. Efficiency.
- f. Responsiveness and legal compliance.

The second element provides a snapshot of the status of the command efforts to identify and eliminate any barriers to EEO.

2. Per reference (b), DON major commands and subordinate activities shall conduct regular internal assessments to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of their Title VII and Rehabilitation Act programs and to ascertain command and activity efforts in identifying and removing barriers to equal opportunity in the workplace. As part of the assessment, commands are to analyze the workforce to assess progress towards the model workplace goal of equal participation at all levels of the workforce and identify areas where barriers may exclude certain groups.

#### DISCUSSION

1. In fiscal year (FY) 2012, SSP EEO program status report submissions identified several program element deficiencies but did not include the required EEO plan to attain the essential elements of a model EEO program. The report did not indicate that SSP conducted an appropriate barrier analysis to determine if an SSP policy, principle or practice limits or tends to limit employment opportunities. Based on the SSP submission to the Office of EEO and Diversity Management, triggers are present, but there is no evidence investigations were conducted or planned.

2. Interviews with SSP personnel confirmed that minimal barrier analysis was conducted in FY12.

3. Prior to FY11 some barrier analysis was conducted. However, SSP did not submit a timely assessment to the DON Office of EEO and Diversity Management, as required by reference (b), resulting in an EEO scorecard rating of non-compliant (red).

4. In 2011 and 2012, SSP encountered an increase in EEO complaints. The vast majority of complaints were filed by SSP headquarters employees. However, SSP's EEO specialist is located in Kings Bay, Georgia. The distance from SSP headquarters and the Command Deputy Equal Employment Opportunity Officer (CDEEOO) creates difficulties for the EEO specialist to fully engage in all aspects of the command EEO program, including in-person interviews/counseling for a complainant. Furthermore, the new SSP EEO specialist is not recognized as possessing credentialing/experience as an EEO Specialist and no information was provided to the Office of Civilian Human Resources that indicates the individual has ever been an EEO specialist.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

007-13. That SSP CDEEOO consults and collaborates with the DON Office of EEO and Diversity Management to ensure the SSP EEO program is complaint with DON policy.

008-13. That SSP revise staffing to have an EEO specialist located at SSP headquarters. Having an on-site EEO specialist at SSP headquarters will allow for in-person counseling.

009-13. That SSP ensure the new EEO specialist possesses or receives required training and is provided closer supervision while learning EEO functions.

NAVINSGEN POINT OF CONTACT:



#### SUBJECT: PROTECTING PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION

- <u>REFERENCE</u>: (a) SECNAVINST 5211.5E, Department of the Navy Privacy Program
  - (b) Department of the Navy Personally Identifiable Information Annual Training Policy, 042232ZOct07
  - (c) Loss of Personally Identifiable Information Reporting Process, 291652ZFeb08
  - (d) Department of the Navy Social Security Number Reduction Plan, 192101ZJul10
  - (e) Department of the Navy Fax Policy, 171625ZFEB12

<u>PROBLEM</u>: The Personally Identifiable Information (PII) program at Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) lacks all elements to effectively protect PII in accordance with Department of the Navy (DON) mandates.

<u>BACKGROUND</u>: References (a) thru (e) outline specific guidance for Echelon II commanding officers to ensure privacy management practices and procedures are employed to safeguard PII. Areas noted during the inspection include:

- 1. Designating a privacy officer.
- 2. Biannual spot checks are performed.
- 3. Annual PII training conducted and tracked.
- 4. Breach reporting is being performed.
- 5. Command privacy act team & impact assessment.
- 6. Information security and Social Security Number (SSN) reduction plan.

<u>DISCUSSION</u>: SSP's PII program is in its infancy and key elements are missing. During our inspection, SSP developed a plan of action and discrepancies that could be resolved quickly were corrected. The PII program is missing the following elements:

- 1. Privacy Act (PA) instruction is developed but not implemented.
- 2. There is no PA team to address issues and ensure compliance across the command.
- 3. There is no oversight or spot checks on file from headquarters or subordinate commands.
- 4. One breach in the past 12 months was not reported to the DON PII point of contact.
- 5. There is no local breach policy on file.

6. A comprehensive information technology plan has not been coordinated.

7. Currently the PA coordinator position is a collateral duty and resides in the human resource area, but will need additional resources and time dedicated until the program is fully compliant.

8. A plan of action with milestones has been developed to ensure compliance and that the program is rooted into the business process.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

010-13. That SSP leadership provide support and training to the newly developed position for this to be a successful command program.

011-13. Director, SSP provide command policy for PII to provide headquarters and subordinate guidance on PII.

012-13. That SSP PA coordinator develop a privacy action team to integrate this program across branches and directorates. Ensure lower echelon commands have a team and provide oversight and guidance.

013-13. That SSP PA coordinator develop a command information security and SSN reduction plan with milestones.

014-13. That SSP PA coordinator conduct, record, and track bimonthly spot checks and provide oversight to subordinate echelons to conduct, record, and track bimonthly spot checks.

015-13. That SSP PA coordinator track, conduct, and maintain PII awareness training for the command and provide oversight to subordinate commands.

016-13. That SSP provide a breach policy to identify command procedures for reporting PII breaches.

### NAVINSGEN POINT OF CONTACT:



#### SUBJECT: FACILITIES MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION

<u>REFERENCE</u>: (a) SSPINST 5430.2, Strategic Systems Programs Organization Manual (Draft)

<u>PROBLEM</u>: Despite the technical competence and significant experience of the various Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) facilities staffs, there is internal confusion about roles and responsibilities.

#### BACKGROUND

1. The draft SSP Standard Organization and Regulations Manual (SORM) assigns facilities management responsibilities to multiple branches under the Office of the Chief Engineer (SP201). The Chief Engineer is the senior technical authority responsible for weapons system top-level documentation. His duties and responsibilities include exercising authority over fleet and shore SSP activities to ensure operations and maintenance are conducted in accordance with approved procedures and managing facility acquisition programs to ensure availability of shore based facilities support. The Chief Engineer directly supervises at least two different units with facilities management responsibilities, including the Facilities Acquisition and Environmental Programs Manager (SP2016), and Missile Engineering and Test Instrumentation Branch, Operations Section, Facilities Unit (SP2742).

2. SP2016 is responsible for the planning, development, and execution of all SSP and SSP field activity facility construction projects. This position also oversees environmental compliance and facilities explosives safety measures.

3. SP2742 is responsible for planning, budgeting, directing, and technical management of all Strategic Weapons Facility (SWF) and Naval Ordnance Test Unit operations, support systems and infrastructure, and directs engineering analyses that specify requirements for new or modified facilities or facility capabilities necessary to support evolving Strategic Weapons Systems (SWS) and programs. SP2742 also prepares, reviews, and approves all technical and engineering portions of program plans, budget submissions, procurement requests, and numerous tasking documents issued to assembly facilities, SSP support sites, and contractors, and conducts analyses to estimate requirements to support major new facilities programs.

#### DISCUSSION

1. SSP has an effective facility management program with knowledgeable staffs to address facility concerns with Commander Navy Installations Command (CNIC) and Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC). However, despite the technical competence and significant experience of the various SSP facilities staffs, there is internal confusion about roles and responsibilities among the facilities staffs. Diffusion of information across organizational boundaries is difficult, and multiple independent staffs with overlapping responsibilities are less efficient and duplicate effort. When dealing with service providers, like CNIC, multiple SSP facilities organizations may provide independent or even conflicting priorities.

2. As an example, SWFs in Kings Bay, Georgia and Bangor, Washington operate as factories in the field to assemble, store, checkout, on-load, and offload missiles. These facilities fall under SP27, Missile Engineering and Test Instrumentation Branch, which interfaces with CNIC for facilities maintenance and services issues. Separately, SP2016, Facilities Acquisition and Environmental Programs, is responsible for planning, development, and execution of all SSP field activity construction projects. Although the SP2016 and SP27 offices work together to address issues at the SWFs, they each have independent channels of communication with CNIC and NAVFAC.

3. SP2016 is responsible for Military Construction (MILCON) planning and coordination with CNIC, but was unaware of the SSP leadership and the Fire Control and Guidance Branch's (SP23) concerns about the Computation and Analysis building (building 1200) at the Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division. This building supports SSP's Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile and Ship, Submersible, Guided-Missile, Nuclear programs. Although this facility is a Naval Sea Systems Command building, its poor condition and need for a replacement MILCON was unknown to the SSP MILCON planners.

4. Because there is no single facilities management entity within the organization, communication among branches about facilities issues is often fragmented both internally and with key players outside of SSP, such as CNIC and NAVFAC.

### **RECOMMENDATION:**

017-13. That SSP map roles and responsibilities of the various facilities staffs to identify overlap and conflicts across the staff, particularly with coordination external to the command, and streamline the organization to improve facilities communication.

### NAVINSGEN POINT OF CONTACT:



#### SUBJECT: NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER DAHLGREN DIVISION BUILDING 1200

<u>PROBLEM</u>: Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) building 1200 was constructed in 1964 and is in poor condition. Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) has unsuccessfully submitted a Military Construction (MILCON) project to relocate the function and personnel to a new facility since 2001.

#### BACKGROUND:

1. NSWCDD building 1200 supports the Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) Fire Control Branch (SP23). Building 1200 is a multi-addition facility with three main wings (A, B, and C). In 2010, Wing B was vacated due to poor facility conditions and water intrusion, and 115 personnel relocated within NSA South Potomac in Dahlgren. Wing C houses unique submarine ballistic missile launch control hardware worth approximately \$45M, which is cost and space prohibitive to relocate to other facilities at NSWCDD.

2. NAVSEA owns and maintains building 1200, and is responsible for approximately 220 staff of Strategic and Weapon Systems Department, which supports the SSP Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile program.

3. Due to the deteriorating condition of the facility, NAVSEA submitted a MILCON project to replace the facility in 2001. Anticipating the MILCON would find strong early support, NSWCDD limited further investment in building 1200. As the project slipped from year to year, NSWCDD reconsidered its investment strategy and began sustaining the building at a higher level. Since 2007, NSWCDD has invested over \$4.2M in building 1200 repairs, and for FY13, its sustainment represents 30 percent of NSWCDD's total facility sustainment budget.

#### **DISCUSSION**

1. The administrative areas of building 1200 (Wing A) are in 'below average' condition, while the laboratory/computational spaces in Wing C are in better overall condition. There are no immediate life/safety hazards, and the facility is meeting operational requirements. Frequent air quality tests by NSWCDD Safety have identified no mold hazards in the occupied spaces.

2. The MILCON project is currently programmed for FY15 in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations' Sponsor Program Proposal. However, NSWCDD is developing a back-up project to renovate the vacant Wing B at an estimated total cost of \$9M over FY14-16. This renovation would generate 'swing space' to allow the relocation of Wing A personnel to Wing B for additional building 1200 renovations. In FY13, NSWCDD intends to use approximately \$500K for design efforts. Additional repairs to this substandard structure risk the MILCON project's justification and provide only a marginal solution to the long-term requirement.

3. The facility will continue to meet mission requirements for the near future, but the building's deteriorating condition will increase SSP's mission risk and NSWCDD's sustainment costs each year. The preferred solution remains a replacement facility through MILCON.

#### **<u>RECOMMENDATIONS</u>**:

018-13. That Naval Surface Warfare Center and NSWCDD, in coordination with Naval Facilities Engineering Command, continue with the FY13 design project to renovate Wing B, as a contingency plan in the event that the FY15 MILCON project is deferred.

019-13. That NSWCDD reviews the sustainment investment plan following design completion in FY14 to minimize potential negative impact to pending FY15 MILCON approval.

NAVINSGEN POINT OF CONTACT:



# PART 3 DATA ANALYSIS

#### APPENDIX A

#### SUMMARY OF PERSONNEL SURVEY DATA ANALYSIS

1. <u>Method</u>. In support of the Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) Command Inspection held from 23 - 31 January 2013, the Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) conducted an online survey of active duty military and Department of the Navy (DON) civilian personnel from 26 November to 10 December 2012. The 224 survey respondents consisted of 42 active duty military (39 males, 17 percent; 3 females, 1 percent) and 182 DON civilian personnel (125 males, 56 percent; 57 females, 26 percent). The sample is representative of the reported SSP population.

2. <u>Quality of Life</u>. Quality of life (QOL) is assessed using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is worst and 10 is best. The SSP average quality of *home* life (QOHL) rating is 7.65 (sample standard deviation (SD) = 1.86), which is higher than the NAVINSGEN average, 7.04. The SSP average quality of *work* life (QOWL) rating is 6.65 (SD = 2.42), which is comparable to the NAVINSGEN average, 6.28.

a. We asked both military and civilians to identify up to three factors that have a positive or negative impact on their QOHL and QOWL.

(1) <u>Positive Factors</u>. The top three factors having a positive impact on QOWL for SSP survey respondents are job satisfaction, leadership support, and command climate.

(2) <u>Negative Factors</u>. The top three factors having a negative impact on QOWL for SSP survey respondents were parking, advancement opportunities, and leadership support. Respondents entered 54 other responses; a majority of these responses (31) were related to travel between home and work.

b. We asked active duty military members questions regarding physical readiness, performance counseling, and the voter assistance program.

c. We asked civilians questions regarding their position description, performance counseling, human resource service center, and human resource office.

d. We asked both military and civilian personnel questions regarding working hours, resources, facilities, communication, travel, safety, training, command climate, and leadership.

e. We asked additional questions regarding their supervisory training and responsibilities to survey respondents who indicated that they are supervisors.


f. We asked open-ended questions regarding various topics such as, supplies purchased with personal money, facilities in need of repair, and any additional comments or concerns regarding QOL.

#### APPENDIX B

#### SUMMARY OF FOCUS GROUP DATA ANALYSIS

1. <u>Method</u>. On 23 January 2013, the NAVINSGEN conducted a total of 13 focus groups, 5 with various groupings of military ranks, and 8 with various groupings of civilian grades. A total of 140 focus group participants, 45 military and 95 civilians, produced a variety of participant-generated QOHL and QOWL discussion topics. The sample slightly over-represented military members to accommodate the various rank groupings.

2. <u>Overall Quality of Life</u>. Overall QOL is verbally assessed in focus groups using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is worst and 10 is best. The distribution of QOL ratings is displayed in Figure 1. The SSP average overall QOL score from the 13 focus groups is 7.32 (SD = 1.59), which is comparable to the NAVINSGEN average, 6.95 (SD = 1.71).




#### **OVERALL QUALITY OF LIFE RATINGS**

Figure 1. Distribution of focus groups overall QOL ratings, where the x-axis lists the rating scale and the y-axis represents the number of responses (percentages are shown along the x-axis within each bar). The most frequent rating, 8, is shown in red.

3. <u>Quality of Life Topics</u>. The top 5 QOL topics discussed during the active duty military and DON civilian personnel focus groups are shown in Figure 2. QOL topics are listed on the left side of the graph. The gray portion of each bar represents the number of civilian focus groups in which the topic was indicated and discussed, and the navy blue portion of each bar represents the number of military focus groups in which the topic was indicated and discussed.

a. Parking was the most frequent QOL issue discussed during the focus groups. Eight out of the 13 focus groups indicated parking as an issue. In general, focus group participants expressed that the transition from Crystal City to the Washington Navy Yard (WNY) negatively impacted their parking. Empty red spaces, other unavailable parking resources, and off-base

parking costs were all sources of consternation. A majority of comments on this topic noted difficulty in finding parking spaces after 0700 or 0800.



#### **TOP 5 QUALITY OF LIFE ISSUES**

Figure. 2. Top 5 QOL issues discussed during the 8 civilian and 5 active duty military focus groups.

b. Commute was the second most frequent QOL issue discussed during the focus groups. Seven out of the 13 focus groups indicated commute as an issue. In general, focus group participants indicated that the transition from Crystal City to the WNY negatively impacted their commute. Most commutes are now longer. Some participants noted that it is difficult to walk from the metro station to the WNY and that the shuttle system requires too long of a wait. One participant even suggested that the current shuttle system should have a stop at the metro. Other participants noted that the current bridge construction blocks base entry at O Street and that some gates are not open, thus forming heavier traffic lanes.

c. Telework/telecommuting and leadership were discussed as a QOL issue in six of the focus groups.

(1) <u>Telework/Telecommuting</u>. Focus group participants indicated that they can be "more productive working at home, 9-10 hrs/day without interruption." One participant declared that "answering e-mails, etc., can all be done at home," and then asked, "If it's [teleworking] good enough for bad [weather] days, then why not other days?" Participants also felt that telework discretion is not consistent across the command and, in some cases, that there is an expectation to be at their desk. Military focus group participants noted that there is no telework policy for active duty military.

(2) <u>Leadership</u>. Focus group participants were both supportive and critical of leadership. In general, focus group participants indicated that the leadership is "better than it was a few years ago." Some participants felt that "the front office promotes quality of life, but it stops at the branch/head supervisor level." A possible explanation for this sentiment is that external agency taskers add to the level of work. "Leadership is busy responding to outside influences vice responding to internal issues. Can't say no, they make it work" (cf. manning/manpower and taskings). Some participants felt that they are micromanaged - unable to make decisions that are well within their field of expertise.

d. Manning/manpower, food, and workload were discussed as a QOL issues in five of the focus groups.

(1) <u>Manning/Manpower</u>. The primary theme within focus group discussions related to manning/manpower was the impact of having a reduced workforce despite the growing requirements/administrative demands (cf. workload). Some participants opined that the junior workforce doesn't have the requisite experience to prepare them for the future. One participant felt that there is decreased nuclear weapons system experience in the fleet.

(2) <u>Food</u>. In general, focus group participants indicated that the food choices at the WNY are not very good, and that it is difficult to get food on base - essentially impossible off-base, and return to work within 30 minutes.

(3) <u>Workload</u>. Focus group participants generally felt that the current manning restriction increases workload (greater than 8 hour workdays). One participant noted that, "We cannot effectively execute primary responsibilities [because] Echelon II is doing the work of Echelon I."

e. The remaining topics, taskings; organizational structure; communication; funding; meaningful work; and professional development; were identified and discussed as QOL issues in three of the focus groups.

(1) <u>Taskings</u>. A common theme in many of our Command Inspection focus groups is the feeling that work is dominated by responding to and completing external data calls, which was also expressed at SSP. Some of the SSP focus group participants felt that "many external data calls come from those who do not understand the subject."

(2) <u>Organizational Structure</u>. The overall assessment of the Board of Directors was fairly positive. However, some of the focus group participants felt that the organization is too "stove-piped," which makes it more difficult to work on projects that span across programs.

(3) <u>Facilities</u>. Focus group participants generally indicated that the building is too cold. Many participants were disappointed that the cleaning crew comes only once per week. One participant suggested that bathrooms and showers should be cleaned daily - other focus group participants concurred, and that the problem is a combination of the cleaning crew and members of the command who do not clean up their mess.

(4) <u>Communication</u>. Focus group participants were appreciative of the flow of information from the front office; newsletters, e-mail, and open door policy.

(5) <u>Funding</u>. Focus group participants generally felt that the current budget climate makes it difficult to secure the mission, and that inadequate funding compromises innovation and safety.

(6) <u>Meaningful Work</u>. Three civilian focus groups indicated meaningfulness of work as a QOL issue. "There has not been a new problem in 20 years. We are resolving the same old issues." This sentiment may impact the command's ability to attract new employees (cf. manning/manpower).

(7) <u>Professional Development</u>. Three military focus groups indicated professional development as a QOL issue. The following two quotes adequately summarize beliefs/perceptions regarding a potential negative impact on QOL: "There are no opportunities for Sailors to lead at this command." "Sea duty is a lot of responsibility; here, not much." One member noted a potential positive impact on professional development: "Shore duty allows time for graduate education."

**1.** On a scale from 1 (worst) to 10 (best), please rate your current Quality of Home Life (QOHL). QOHL is the degree to which you enjoy where you live and the opportunities available for housing, recreation, etc.

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
1			0.9%	2
2			2.7%	6
3			1.3%	3
4			1.8%	4
5			4.9%	11
6			7.6%	17
7			13.8%	31
8			33.9%	76
9			21.4%	48
10			11.6%	26
		Mean		7.647
		Standard Deviation		1.864
		Total F	Responses	224

(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

2. Please indicate up to three main factors that have a **positive** impact on your QOHL: (Choose three or less)

Response	Chart				Frequency	Count
Quality of home					65.2%	146
Quality of the school for dependent children					26.3%	59
Quality of the childcare available					4.5%	10
Shopping & dining opportunities					46.0%	103
Recreational opportunities					43.3%	97
Access to spouse employment					15.6%	35
Access to medical/dental care					27.7%	62
Cost of living					26.8%	60
Other					9.8%	22
Total Res					esponses	224

(Respondents were allowed to choose **multiple** responses)

3. Please indicate up to three main factors that have a **negative** impact on your QOHL: (Choose three or less) (Respondents were allowed to choose **multiple** responses)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Quality of home		14.3%	32
Quality of the school for dependent children		5.8%	13
Quality of the childcare available		5.4%	12
Shopping & dining opportunities		12.1%	27
Recreational opportunities		11.2%	25
Access to spouse employment		12.5%	28
Access to medical/dental care		12.9%	29
Cost of living		72.3%	162
Other		38.8%	87
	224		

**4.** On a scale from 1 (worst) to 10 (best), please rate your Quality of Work Life (QOWL). QOWL is the degree to which you enjoy where you work and available opportunities for professional growth. (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
1			2.7%	6
2			4.0%	9
3			3.6%	8
4			5.4%	12
5			12.5%	28
6			11.6%	26
7			17.0%	38
8			25.4%	57
9			10.7%	24
10			7.1%	16
		Mean		6.652
		Standa	ard Deviation	2.206
		Total F	Responses	224

# **5.** Please indicate up to three main factors that have a **positive** impact on your QOWL: (Choose three or less) (Respondents were allowed to choose **multiple** responses)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Job satisfaction			61.2%	137
Leadership support			40.2%	90
Leadership opportunities			18.8%	42
Length of workday			21.0%	47
Advancement opportunities			10.3%	23
Training opportunities			21.0%	47
Awards and recognition			8.9%	20
Perform to Serve (PTS)			0.9%	2
Command climate			31.3%	70
Quality of the workplace facilities			20.1%	45
Parking			9.4%	21
Frequency of deployments/Individual Augmentations (e.g. IAMM or GSA)			0.9%	2
Other			8.9%	20
		Total I	Responses	224

# 6. Please indicate up to three main factors that have a **negative** impact on your OOWL: (Choose three or less) (Respondents were allowed to choose **multiple** responses)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Job satisfaction			17.9%	40
Leadership support			25.4%	57
Leadership opportunities			15.6%	35
Length of workday			17.9%	40
Advancement opportunities			30.8%	69
Training opportunities			2.2%	5
Awards and recognition			15.6%	35
Perform to Serve (PTS)			1.3%	3
Command climate			17.9%	40
Quality of the workplace facilities			18.8%	42
Parking			41.5%	93
Frequency of deployments/Individual Augmentations (e.g. IAMM or GSA)			0.9%	2
Other			24.1%	54
		Total F	Responses	224

### 7. Gender:

(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Male			73.2%	164
Female			26.8%	60
		Total F	Responses	224

### 8. I am:

(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Military			18.8%	42
Civilian			81.3%	182
Contractor			0.0%	0
		Total F	esponses	224

### 9. Rank:

(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
E1 - E4			0.0%	0
E5 - E6			5.0%	2
E7 - E9			30.0%	12
CWO2 - CWO5			2.5%	1
01 - 03			20.0%	8
04 - 05			27.5%	11
O6 & Above			15.0%	6
Tota			esponses	40

**10.** My command gives me sufficient time <u>during working hours</u> to participate in a physical readiness exercise program.

(Respondents could only choose a single response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree			45.0%	18
Agree			37.5%	15
Neither Agree nor Disagree			10.0%	4
Disagree			2.5%	1
Strongly Disagree			5.0%	2
		Total R	Responses	40

# **11.** My supervisor conducts semiannual performance counseling with me. (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Yes			95.0%	38
No			5.0%	2
		Total Re	esponses	40

**12.** During my semiannual performance my supervisor provides me with feedback that enables me to improve my performance prior to my annual performance appraisal (EVAL/FITREP).

(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree			55.0%	22
Agree			30.0%	12
Neither Agree nor Disagree / Not Applicable			7.5%	3
Disagree			2.5%	1
Strongly Disagree			5.0%	2
Total Responses			40	

# **13.** In general, how have you or those you supervise been affected by Perform to Serve (PTS)?

(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Positively		10.0%	4
Neither positively nor Negatively / Not Applicable		90.0%	36
Negatively		0.0%	0
	Total I	Responses	40

### **14.** I know who my command Voting Assistance Officer is.

(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Yes			70.0%	28
No			30.0%	12
		Total F	Responses	40

### **15.** I voted in the last election.

(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Yes			77.5%	31
No			22.5%	9
		Total F	Responses	40

# **16.** Why did you not vote in the last election? (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
I choose not to			44.4%	4
I didn't know how to			11.1%	1
Other			44.4%	4
		Total R	esponses	9

### 17. Grade:

(Respondents could only choose a single response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
GS 1 - 8			3.4%	6
GS 9 - 12			16.3%	29
GS 13 - 14			61.8%	110
GS 15			15.7%	28
ST			0.0%	0
SES			2.2%	4
WD/WG/WS/WL			0.0%	0
NAF			0.0%	0
Other			0.6%	1
		Total R	esponses	178

**18.** My position description is current and accurately describes my functions, tasks, and responsibilities.

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree			19.1%	34
Agree			51.1%	91
Neither Agree nor Disagree			11.8%	21
Disagree			9.6%	17
Strongly Disagree			6.7%	12
Don't Know			1.7%	3
		Total	Responses	178

(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

**19.** My supervisor establishes my critical elements and conducts at least one performance progress review during the annual performance rating cycle. (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree			39.9%	71
Agree			46.1%	82
Neither Agree nor Disagree			9.0%	16
Disagree			3.9%	7
Strongly Disagree			1.1%	2
		Total R	Responses	178

**20.** The Human Resource Service Center provides timely, accurate responses to my queries.

(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree			7.3%	13
Agree			31.5%	56
Neither Agree nor Disagree			48.3%	86
Disagree			9.0%	16
Strongly Disagree			3.9%	7
		Total F	esponses	178

# **21.** My (local) Human Resources Office provides timely, accurate responses to my queries.

(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree			11.2%	20
Agree			35.4%	63
Neither Agree nor Disagree			38.2%	68
Disagree			7.9%	14
Strongly Disagree			7.3%	13
		Total R	esponses	178

**22.** I have the tools and resources needed to do my job properly. (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		18.9%	41
Agree		60.8%	132
Neither Agree nor Disagree		8.8%	19
Disagree		9.2%	20
Strongly Disagree		2.3%	5
	•	Total Responses	217

# **23.** I have adequate leadership guidance to perform my job successfully. (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart			Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree				26.3%	57
Agree				46.5%	101
Neither Agree nor Disagree				12.9%	28
Disagree				9.2%	20
Strongly Disagree				5.1%	11
			Total F	esponses	217

**24.** My current workday is \_\_hours. (Actual time spent at work not including commute time.)

(Respondents could only choose a single response)
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Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
6-8			21.7%	47
9-10			65.9%	143
11-12			11.5%	25
13-14			0.9%	2
15+			0.0%	0
Tota		Total F	Responses	217

# **25.** My current work week is normally \_days. (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
4		4.1%	9
5		92.2%	200
6		3.2%	7
7		0.5%	1
		al Responses	217

#### **26.** My job is important and makes a contribution to my command. (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree			37.8%	82
Agree			48.4%	105
Neither Agree nor Disagree			11.5%	25
Disagree			1.8%	4
Strongly Disagree			0.5%	1
Total R		Responses	217	

**27.** My command/organization is properly resourced (e.g., people, tools, training, supplies, etc.) to conduct its mission.

(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Yes			49.8%	108
No			37.3%	81
Don't Know			12.9%	28
		Tota	I Responses	217

**28.** You indicated that your command was not properly resourced, what resources are lacking? (Choose all that apply)

(Respondents were	allowed to	choose	multiple responses)	

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
People		84.0%	68
Tools/Equipment		12.3%	10
Training		25.9%	21
IT Resources		12.3%	10
Spare Parts		2.5%	2
Supplies		8.6%	7
Other		16.0%	13
	Т	otal Responses	81

**29.** Have you ever purchased mission-related work supplies, tools, parts or equipment with your own money?

(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count	
Yes			27.9%	60	
No				72.1%	155
			Total F	Responses	215

**31.** Approximately, how many miles per month do you use your personal vehicle for mission related travel? (Not including travel for TAD/TDY.)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
0			59.3%	127
1-10			10.7%	23
11-20			11.2%	24
21-30			6.1%	13
more than 30			12.6%	27
Total Responses			214	

(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

**32.** You indicated you use your vehicle for mission related travel; are you reimbursed for this travel?

(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart			Frequency	Count
Yes				41.1%	37
No				58.9%	53
Not Answered					15
	Total R		Responses	105	

# **33.** I am satisfied with the overall quality of my workplace facilities. (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree			15.5%	33
Agree			59.2%	126
Neither Agree Nor Disagree			13.6%	29
Disagree			8.9%	19
Strongly Disagree			2.8%	6
		Total R	Responses	213

### **35.** My organization has an effective safety program.

5 0		
(Respondents could	only choose a	<b>single</b> response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree			16.0%	34
Agree			52.6%	112
Neither Agree nor Disagree			29.1%	62
Disagree			1.9%	4
Strongly Disagree			0.5%	1
	Total R		Responses	213

# **36.** I know how to report an unsafe or unhealthy work condition. (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		19.7%	42
Agree		60.6%	129
Neither Agree nor Disagree		10.3%	22
Disagree		9.4%	20
Strongly Disagree		0.0%	0
	Total	Responses	213

# **37.** Reported unsafe or unhealthy work conditions are corrected promptly. (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart			Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree				13.1%	28
Agree				35.7%	76
Neither Agree nor Disagree				43.7%	93
Disagree				5.6%	12
Strongly Disagree				1.9%	4
			Total F	Responses	213

#### **38.** I know who to contact at my command regarding safety questions or concerns. (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Yes			85.0%	181
No			15.0%	32
	т	otal R	esponses	213

# **39.** I know what Operational Risk Management (ORM) is? (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart			Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree				33.8%	72
Agree				39.9%	85
Neither Agree nor Disagree				10.8%	23
Disagree				14.1%	30
Strongly Disagree				1.4%	3
Tota		Total R	Responses	213	

# **40.** I know when to apply the principles of Operational Risk Management (ORM). (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart			Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree				32.4%	69
Agree				37.6%	80
Neither Agree nor Disagree				14.1%	30
Disagree				12.2%	26
Strongly Disagree				3.8%	8
		Total Responses			213

# **41.** My job affords me a reasonable amount of quality time with my family. (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart			Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree				20.9%	44
Agree				47.4%	100
Neither Agree nor Disagree				14.2%	30
Disagree				14.7%	31
Strongly Disagree				2.8%	6
			Total R	esponses	211

# **42.** Morale at my command has a positive impact on my QOWL. (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree			18.0%	38
Agree			52.6%	111
Neither Agree nor Disagree			15.2%	32
Disagree			10.9%	23
Strongly Disagree			3.3%	7
		Total R	Responses	211

### **43.** Communication down the chain of command is effective.

(Respondents could only choose a single response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count		
Strongly Agree					16.6%	35
Agree					40.3%	85
Neither Agree nor Disagree					19.4%	41
Disagree					16.1%	34
Strongly Disagree					7.6%	16
		Total Responses			Responses	211

### **44.** Communication up the chain of command is effective.

(Respondents could only choose a	single response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		13.3%	28
Agree		48.8%	103
Neither Agree nor Disagree		21.3%	45
Disagree		11.8%	25
Strongly Disagree		4.7%	10
	211		

# **45.** My superiors treat me with respect and consideration. (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		36.5%	77
Agree		46.0%	97
Neither Agree nor Disagree		9.0%	19
Disagree		4.3%	9
Strongly Disagree		4.3%	9
	211		

# **46.** My performance evaluations have been fair. (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart			Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree				35.1%	74
Agree				46.9%	99
Neither Agree nor Disagree				10.4%	22
Disagree				5.2%	11
Strongly Disagree				2.4%	5
			Total R	esponses	211

# **47.** The awards and recognition program is fair and equitable. (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	,		Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree				14.7%	31
Agree				33.2%	70
Neither Agree nor Disagree				33.6%	71
Disagree				14.2%	30
Strongly Disagree				4.3%	9
			Total R	esponses	211

# **48.** Military and civilian personnel work well together at my command. (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart			Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree				32.7%	69
Agree				52.1%	110
Neither Agree nor Disagree				10.9%	23
Disagree				3.3%	7
Strongly Disagree				0.9%	2
			Total R	esponses	211

# **49.** My command's Equal Opportunity Program (EO - to include Equal Employment Opportunity & Command Managed Equal Opportunity) is effective. (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree			13.3%	28
Agree			44.1%	93
Neither Agree nor Disagree			35.5%	75
Disagree			2.4%	5
Strongly Disagree			4.7%	10
		Total R	esponses	211

# **50.** I know who to contact with an EEO/EO question or complaint. (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree			19.4%	41
Agree			61.1%	129
Neither Agree nor Disagree			10.9%	23
Disagree			5.7%	12
Strongly Disagree			2.8%	6
		Total F	esponses	211

# **51.** I am aware of or know how to find my local IG Hotline number. (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart			Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree				25.1%	53
Agree				58.8%	124
Neither Agree nor Disagree				9.0%	19
Disagree				5.2%	11
Strongly Disagree				1.9%	4
			Total R	Responses	211

### 52. A grievance/complaint in my command will be handled in a fair, timely, and just manner.

(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree			24.6%	52
Agree			34.1%	72
Neither Agree nor Disagree			32.7%	69
Disagree			4.3%	9
Strongly Disagree			4.3%	9
		Total R	esponses	211

# **53.** My command adequately protects my Personally Identifiable Information (PII). (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart			Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree				25.6%	54
Agree				55.5%	117
Neither Agree nor Disagree / Don't Know				15.2%	32
Disagree				2.8%	6
Strongly Disagree				0.9%	2
			Total R	esponses	211

# **54.** My command conducted a command climate assessment within the past 2 years. (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Yes			64.9%	137
No			0.5%	1
Don't Know			34.6%	73
		Total F	Responses	211

**55.** My command's leadership provided feedback to command personnel on the results of our command climate assessment.

(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Yes			62.6%	132
No			1.4%	3
Don't Know			36.0%	76
		Total R	esponses	211

# **56.** My Command implemented an action plan to resolve command climate issues. (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Yes			39.3%	83
No			3.8%	8
Don't Know			56.9%	120
		Total F	Responses	211

# **57.** Fraternization is occurring at my command/organization. (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree			3.3%	7
Agree			6.6%	14
Neither Agree nor Disagree / Don't Know			50.7%	107
Disagree			25.6%	54
Strongly Disagree			13.7%	29
		Total F	Responses	211

# **58.** Favoritism is occurring at my command/organization. (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree			10.0%	21
Agree			16.6%	35
Neither Agree nor Disagree / Don't Know			38.9%	82
Disagree			25.1%	53
Strongly Disagree			9.5%	20
		Total R	esponses	211

#### **59.** Gender/sex discrimination is occurring at my command/organization. (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart				Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree					4.7%	10
Agree					2.4%	5
Neither Agree nor Disagree / Don't Know					35.1%	74
Disagree					34.1%	72
Strongly Disagree					23.7%	50
Total F				esponses	211	

# **60.** Sexual harassment is occurring at my command/organization. (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart			Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree				1.4%	3
Agree				0.5%	1
Neither Agree nor Disagree / Don't Know				34.6%	73
Disagree				34.6%	73
Strongly Disagree				28.9%	61
Total				Responses	211

# **61.** Race discrimination is occurring at my command/organization. (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart			Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree				6.6%	14
Agree				2.4%	5
Neither Agree nor Disagree / Don't Know				27.5%	58
Disagree				35.1%	74
Strongly Disagree				28.4%	60
Total F				esponses	211

# **62.** Hazing is occurring at my command/organization. (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count	
Strongly Agree				0.5%	1
Agree				0.0%	0
Neither Agree nor Disagree / Don't Know				28.9%	61
Disagree				32.7%	69
Strongly Disagree				37.9%	80
Total R			Responses	211	

# **63.** Do you supervise Department of the Navy (DON) civilians? (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	· · · ·		Frequency	Count
Yes				24.6%	52
No				75.4%	159
			Total Responses		211

# **64.** How many DON civilians do you supervise? (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Less than 5			50.9%	27
5 - 10 civilians			26.4%	14
11 - 20 civilians			9.4%	5
More than 21 civilians			13.2%	7
	Total Responses			

# **65.** When did you receive civilian supervisory training? (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart				Frequency	Count
Never					13.5%	7
Within the last 12 months					26.9%	14
Between 1 and 4 years					42.3%	22
More than 4 years ago					17.3%	9
Not Answered						1
Total Responses					53	

# **66.** Have you been a selecting official for a DON civilian vacancy? (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart			Frequency	Count
Yes				22.3%	47
No				77.7%	164
	1		Total Responses		211

**67.** The DON civilian recruitment process is responsive to my command's civilian personnel requirements.

(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree			3.8%	8
Agree			24.2%	51
Neither Agree nor Disagree / Don't Know			51.7%	109
Disagree			16.6%	35
Strongly Disagree			3.8%	8
		Total F	Responses	211

# **68.** How would you rate your access to the Internet from work? (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Unlimited access to all required websites for information/work purposes			79.6%	168
Limited access to all required websites for information/work purposes (i.e., in port, only a few workstations, etc.)			19.4%	41
No access			0.9%	2
		Total R	Responses	211

**69.** Does your command routinely conduct required training (e.g., anti-terrorism, DOD Information Assurance, personal financial management, personal occupational safety & health, etc.)?

(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Yes			100.0%	211
No			0.0%	0
	esponses	211		

## 70. Do you have adequate time at work to complete required General Military Training via Navy Knowledge Online (NKO) training? (Respondents could only choose a single response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Yes		90.5%	191
No		9.5%	20
	Total	Responses	211

### 71. Are you able to access NKO at work?

(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Yes			98.6%	208
No			1.4%	3
То		Total Responses		211

# **72.** How often do you use NKO? (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Daily			0.5%	1
Weekly			7.1%	15
Monthly			38.4%	81
Only when I can't find information elsewhere or only when absolutely necessary			48.8%	103
Never			5.2%	11
		Total R	esponses	211

# **73.** How easy is it to find information you are looking for on NKO? (Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart		Frequency	Count
Very easy			1.9%	4
Easy			25.6%	54
Neither easy or difficult			39.8%	84
Difficult			27.5%	58
Very Difficult			5.2%	11
		Total R	esponses	211