IN REPLY REFER TO:
5040
Ser N3/1431
22 Dec 14

From: Naval Inspector General
To: Distribution

Subj: COMMAND INSPECTION OF THE UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY,
       18 September – 1 October 2014

Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 5040.3A
       (b) SECNAVINST 5430.57G

1. The Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) conducts command
inspections of echelon 2 commands to provide the Secretary of
the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations with a firsthand
assessment of Departmental risks and major issues relevant to
policy, management, and direction as directed by reference (a).
Reference (b) tasks NAVINSGEN with conducting inspections and
surveys, making appropriate evaluations and recommendations
concerning operating forces afloat and ashore, Department of the
Navy components and functions, and Navy programs which impact
readiness or quality of life for military and civilian naval
personnel.

2. NAVINSGEN conducted a Command Inspection of the United
States Naval Academy (USNA) 18 September to 1 October 2014.
This report documents our findings.

3. This report contains an Executive Summary, our observations
and findings, and documented deficiencies noted during the
inspection. Issue papers are included that highlight
significant concerns that either point to a potentially broader
Navy issue or, in our opinion, require coordination among
multiple commands to fully address. Finally, a summary of
survey and focus group data, as well as a complete listing of
survey frequency data, is included.

4. During our visit we assessed overall mission readiness (per
OPNAVINST 5450.330A (Missions, Functions and Tasks of the United
States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland), Title 10, U.S.C.
Chapter 603 (U.S. Naval Academy), and DoDD 1322.22 (Service
Academies). We assessed academic standing and preparations for
USNA's 2016 Middle States Commission on Higher Education (MSCHE)
accreditation, compliance with Navy administrative programs,
facilities, safety, occupational health and environmental
compliance, security programs, USNA Inspector General

performance, and foundational Sailor programs under the purview of senior enlisted leadership. Additionally, we conducted surveys and focus group discussions to assess the quality of work life (QOWL) for Navy and Marine Corps military and civilian personnel. Midshipmen were included in focus group discussions but were not surveyed.

5. Our overall assessment is that USNA is fulfilling its mission to develop midshipmen morally, mentally and physically and to imbue them with the highest ideals of duty, honor and loyalty in order to graduate leaders who are dedicated to a career of Naval Service and have potential for future development in mind and character to assume the highest responsibilities of command, citizenship and government.

6. In the course of our inspection, we identified deficiencies in Yard Patrol (YP) Craft support, execution of travel gifts, civilian employee performance management, Information Technology procurement, Safety and Occupational Health (SOH), Security Programs, Industrial Security, Operations Security, Cybersecurity and Technology, Personal Property Management (PPM), Individual Medical Readiness, Navy Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention (NADAP) Program, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program, Voting Assistance Program, Suicide Prevention, and travel voucher liquidation.

7. Corrective actions

    a. We identified 56 deficiencies during our inspection that require USNA's corrective action. Correction of each deficiency, and a description of action(s) taken, should be reported via letter by USNA no later than 1 April 2015. Deficiencies not corrected by this date or requiring longer-term solutions should be updated quarterly until completed. Additionally, NAVINSGEN provided USNA with 37 separate recommendations for consideration, relating to Formal Program of Assessment, Naval Academy Athletic Association (NAAA) and Athletics Compliance, Travel Gifts, Full Time Equivalent (FTE) Civilian Manning, Civilian Employee Performance Management, Admissions, Honor Concept/System, Naval Academy Preparatory School (NAPS), USNA Faculty Handbook, Military Orientation for Faculty, Hearing Conservation Program, Tagout Program, Command Security Program, Industrial Security, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response, Voting Assistance Program, and Suicide Prevention. Follow up reporting on these recommendations is not requested.

Subj: COMMAND INSPECTION OF UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY

   b. This report includes nine issue papers that require actions by USNA; Program Executive Office, Ships (Support Ships, Boats and Craft) (PMS 325); Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Director, Surface Warfare (OPNAV N96); Department of the Navy Assistant for Administration (DON/AA); Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFF); Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Manpower, Personnel, Education, and Training (OPNAV N1); Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Director, Shore Readiness Division (OPNAV N46); Commander, Navy Installation Command (CNIC); Commander, Naval Safety Center (COMMNAVSAFECEN); and Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Security Training, Assistance and Assessment Team (NCIS STAAT). Appendix A: Issue Papers (page 37 of this report) provides detailed guidance on how to report completion of recommendations identified in the issue papers.

8. My point of contact is (b)(6)&(b)(7)(c) Inspections Division. (b)(6)&(b)(7)(c) can be reached at (202) 433-(b)(6)&(b) DSN 288-(b)(6)&(b), or via e-mail at (b)(6)&(b)(7)(c) @navy.mil.

J. F. CALDWELL, JR.

Distribution:
SECNAV
UNSECNAV
DUSN(P)
ASN(RD&A, M&RA, FM&C, EI&E)
DON CIO
OJAG
NCIS
CNO
VCNO
OPNAV (DNS, N1, N2/N6, N3/N5, N4, N46, N09F, N96)
USFF
CPF
BUPERS
CNIC
NAVFAC
NETC
NAVSEA
NAVSAFECEN
PEO SHIPS (PMS 325)
NCIS STAAT

NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL COMMAND INSPECTION OF
UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY
18 SEPTEMBER – 1 OCTOBER 2014

Executive Summary

The Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) conducted a command inspection of the United States Naval Academy (USNA) from 18 September to 1 October 2014. We last inspected USNA in 2006. The team was augmented with subject matter experts, including personnel from Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Total Force Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education Requirements Division (OPNAV N12), Twenty-First Century Sailor Office (OPNAV N17), Chief of Chaplains (OPNAV N097), and International Engagement Branch (OPNAV N522); Navy Personnel Command (NPC); Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS); Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED); Naval Audit Service (NAVAUDSVC); Office of the General Counsel - Ethics (OGC-Ethics); U.S. Naval War College (NWC); Naval Postgraduate School (NPS); Office of Civilian Human Resources - Navy (OCHR); Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR); U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM); Naval Safety Center (NAVSAFECEN); Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC); Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC); Department of the Navy Chief Information Officer (DON CIO); and Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Security Training, Assistance and Assessment Team Atlantic (NCIS STAATLANT).

During our visit we assessed overall mission readiness per OPNAVINST 5450.330A (Missions, Functions and Tasks of the United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland), Title 10, U.S.C. Chapter 603 (U.S. Naval Academy), and DoDD 1322.22 (Service Academies). We assessed academic standing and preparations for their 2016 Middle States Commission on Higher Education (MSCHE) accreditation, compliance with Navy administrative programs, facilities, safety and environmental compliance, security programs, USNA Inspector General performance, and Sailor programs under the purview of senior enlisted leadership. Additionally, we conducted surveys and focus group discussions to assess the quality of work life (QOWL) for Navy military and civilian personnel. Midshipmen were included in focus group discussions but were not surveyed.

USNA's mission is to develop midshipmen morally, mentally and physically and to imbue them with the highest ideals of duty, honor and loyalty in order to graduate leaders who are dedicated to a career of Naval Service and have potential for future development in mind and character to assume the highest responsibilities of command, citizenship and government.

USNA is executing its mission well. We found a very dedicated and professional faculty and staff who are committed to their mission. We have identified a number of challenges facing the Academy, most of which they can correct themselves, but some of which will require outside assistance.

MISSION READINESS

Formal Program of Assessment

USNA has a formal program of assessment regarding its effectiveness in meeting its institutional mission. The Academy Effectiveness Board (AEB), established in 2006, continues to mature and develop increasingly more comprehensive assessments in a number of areas ranging from measuring effectiveness in developing midshipmen morally, mentally and physically and instilling the seven attributes of a midshipman, to measuring the professional competence of USNA graduates early in their careers. In support of analyzing data, the Academy has an Office of Institutional Research that conducts frequent surveys of midshipmen on a variety of topics and also evaluates the qualities of graduates. This is a powerful asset that can contribute significantly to the assessment program. We recommend that USNA consider making the AEB more inclusive (depending on the assessment topic) by pursuing greater involvement from the faculty and staff during assessment development. The AEB is a tremendous asset and presents powerful opportunities for the Superintendent and his Senior Leadership Team (SLT); our view is that the AEB could be used, with appropriate guidance and direction, to inform SLT decisions and recommendations to the Superintendent on increasingly difficult or cross-cutting issues such as resource allocation.

Yard Patrol (YP) 703 Class Training Device Support

Support for this class is incomplete, leaving the potential to operate these vessels unsafely and reducing long term sustainability of the class. No Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) is in place to provide true cost of operating and maintaining this class, track high failure rate items, or provide technical manual and wiring diagram support. Engineering Operational Sequencing System (EOSS) has only been issued for YP 703. NAVSEA has not issued EOSS for hulls 704-708. USNA has had to locally tailor EOSS (pen and ink changes) for hulls 704-708 to account for variations within the class. YP 703 Class stability data was not maintained by Academy staff, but was provided by NAVSEA PMS 325 during the week of the IG inspection.

USNA is at risk of not having sufficient YPs in its inventory, starting in 2025, to meet its training requirements. USNA's stated long term YP requirement is 18 (12 YP 676 Class, 6 YP 703 Class). By 2026, the 12 YP 676 class will reach end of service life. There is no YP replacement plan in place to ensure USNA maintains an inventory of 18 vessels. We recommend Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Director, Surface Warfare (OPNAV N96) and USNA coordinate to validate the Academy's YP requirement and determine a way ahead for new construction.

Travel Gift Compliance

USNA has made significant progress in reforming its gift acceptance practices and processes since the Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Defense (DoD IG) report on USNA adherence to contracting and gift policies was published in 2011, but some work remains for the execution of travel gifts. USNA accepts travel gifts correctly, but must improve documentation to ensure that the flow of a travel gift from receipt through travel execution is clearly auditable. We recommend that USNA modify its travel gift execution process, train

travelers and travel approvers, and ensure that gifted expenses are clearly distinguishable from government expenses prior to travel.

James B. Stockdale Center for Ethical Leadership

The Stockdale Center and USNA's Leadership Excellence Council should continue to enhance ties with the U.S. Naval War College (NWC)--the lead institution and process owner, responsible to the CNO, for core values and ethical leadership development. Importantly, the Director of the Stockdale Center is a member of the Leader Development Continuum Council (LDCC), convened by NWC. We encourage USNA to continue their collaboration with NWC outside the LDCC so that USNA lends its academic credibility to this important Navy and Marine Corps enterprise effort, and to help maintain the entire midshipman experience (curricula, lectures, conferences, etc.) on the cutting edge of ethics and leader development.

Full Time Equivalent (FTE) planning

The current authorized FTE level at USNA is 854. USNA leadership stated that an additional 26 FTEs are required to support information technology, academic staff technician, and admissions staff manning requirements in order to continue to meet its mission and graduate approximately 1000 high quality midshipmen each year. We did not validate this requirement, but note that authorized FTE levels steadily decrease from 854 in FY14 to 814 by FY19. We recommend that Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Manpower, Personnel, Education, and Training (OPNAV N1) and USNA continue to work together to validate the Academy's FTE requirement, and fund to that level through the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). While N1 typically funds to approximately the 854 FTE level in Program Objective Memorandum (POM) end game, this cannot be guaranteed in the future and makes long term planning and faculty and staff hiring difficult. This kind of uncertainty is also a potential threat to USNA accreditation. We further recommend that USNA undergo a Shore Manpower Requirements Determination (SMRD) to validate their support-related FTE requirements (administrative and technical support).

Civilian Personnel Management

Personnel performance management is not being conducted in accordance with Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 430 (5 CFR 430 (Personnel Management)) and associated Navy directives. Performance plans, individual development plans, and progress reviews are not consistently conducted as required. For example, a review of randomly selected Administratively Determined faculty records provided by USNA shows that from 2012 to 2014, only 68 percent of required Annual Ratings were completed.

Conference Attendance

The DON approval timeline for personnel to attend conferences is relatively long and is impeding USNA faculty attendance of professional conferences, negatively affecting faculty professional development and potentially their academic standing. This is a broader issue impacting all DON academics and scientists. These personnel attend conferences to present their professional work, participate in discussion panels, and maintain relevance and currency with the latest practices in their fields. The DON policy directs that requests to attend

conferences be submitted at least 30 days prior to the travel date. However, in many instances DON academics and scientists are not formally notified that they have been selected to present their work or otherwise participate in the conference until well inside the 30 day approval timeline. We note that the Director of Navy Staff (DNS) is working this issue with stakeholders.

ACADEMICS

Accreditation

USNA is in the early stages of preparing for its 2016 MSCHE accreditation site visit. The preparations are on track for accreditation although a number of staff and facility issues identified during the 2006 accreditation remain unresolved; specifically: technician manning shortfalls in engineering and science laboratories and completion of library facility improvements.

A USNA academic assessment program is in place to support continuous improvement of midshipman learning and development. The Academic Department continues its effort to comprehensively map curriculum outcomes to attainment of the seven attributes of a midshipman (selfless, inspirational, proficient, innovative, articulate, adaptive and professional). This process is a challenging long term effort, but we assess that USNA is making adequate progress toward the 2016 accreditation visit.

Admissions

The Academy has a well-established admissions process designed to support USNA goals of producing quality graduates for service as USN or USMC officers. This process received formal legal review by the Office of Judge Advocate General (OJAG) in June 2010 and September 2011. As a public institution, the Academy must always be prepared to justify its admissions criteria and process with quantifiable metrics as they relate to outcomes such as graduation rates and subsequent naval career success. Data collected by USNA about academic performance and professional development of midshipmen and their subsequent completion of professional milestones as Commissioned Officers should be assessed during periodic reviews to ensure that the process continues to result in the selection of high caliber candidates with strong potential as leaders in the naval service.

Honor Concept/System

The Honor Concept, and the system of midshipmen enforcing the standards of honorable behavior, is central to the mission of the Naval Academy. The honor system is a vibrant element of the Brigade of Midshipmen and the life of the Academy. Several faculty members we interviewed reported that they have grown reluctant to report apparent honor violations or to participate in the formal system due to the degree of scrutiny faculty members sometimes face as witnesses in Honor Board proceedings that relate to classroom requirements and academic coursework. Several midshipmen we interviewed noted inconsistent rules amongst different professors. Given these faculty and midshipmen perceptions, we recommend that USNA conduct a review of the Honor Concept implementation, execution, and associated system of enforcing its standards.

FACILITIES, ENVIRONMENTAL, ENERGY CONSERVATION, AND SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH (SOH)

Safety Organization and Training

USNA does not have a full time Safety Officer; instead two collateral duty Safety Officers are in place, one supporting the Brigade of Midshipmen and the other the Academy staff and faculty. While there is no formal requirement for the Academy to have a full time Safety Officer, given the size of the command, broad scope of safety programs (including ashore and afloat aspects), and the requirement to have a High-Risk Training Program in place, NAVINSGEN recommends that a safety professional be assigned to the Academy's Safety Officer billet.

The program lacks wholeness: a portion of the Academy's programs are supported by Naval Support Activity (NSA) Annapolis, but mission safety programs not supported by NSA Annapolis Safety Department are managed by Academy personnel. USNA does not conduct annual command-wide safety program self-assessments to assess mission safety programs not supported by NSA Annapolis (such as Laser Safety, Range Safety) and does not conduct required safety program oversight inspections of Naval Academy Preparatory School (NAPS).

High Risk Training

USNA has not promulgated a high-risk training (HRT) policy in accordance with OPNAVINST 1500.75C, Policy and Governance for Conducting High-Risk Training. USNA conducts a number of training events that require an HRT program including small arms and damage control. We recommend that the Naval Safety Center conduct an Assist Visit to help the Academy implement this program.

SECURITY PROGRAMS AND CYBERSECURITY/TECHNOLOGY

Cybersecurity

We noted several deficiencies (articulated below) and view this as a critical issue given the Academy's path to expand the cyber security curriculum and supporting USNA facilities.

Data at Rest (DAR)

(b)(7)(e)&(f)

Public Key Enabling (PKE)

Personally Identifiable Information (PII)

We found overall awareness of PII handling requirements to be low. Encryption of emails that contain PII is rarely done as required by DON CIO message DTG 032009ZOCT08, DON Policy Updates for Personal Electronic Devices (PED) Security and Application of Email Signatures and Encryption. This appears to be a training issue as many personnel were unaware that their email program had an encryption capability (USNA does not use NMCI Microsoft Outlook). USNA is also not providing oversight of NAPS in regards to PII.

USNA Visitor Access

We recommend that CNIC, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Director, Shore Readiness Division (OPNAV N46), and NCIS Security Training, Assistance, Assessment Team (STAAT) conduct a special assessment to determine the appropriate solution for visitor control at USNA that supports its mission and its role as a National Historic Landmark.

Industrial Security

Operations Security (OPSEC)

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT/COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS

Overall USNA's programs were solid. Commitment to these core programs is evident. However, there are several areas for improvement:

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program

Academy leadership, faculty, and staff are committed to ensuring an environment free of sexual assault. Sexual assault victims receive excellent care and support services at the Academy. Recognizing the unique features of the Academy, we nevertheless identified some recommendations related to their current approach in executing SAPR administrative and programmatic elements, mostly related to the number and roles of personnel involved in incident reporting and response procedures which could place victim confidentiality and privacy protections in jeopardy. More specifically:

- Some elements of USNA's SAPR instruction are in conflict with higher guidance in DoD, SECNAV and OPNAV SAPR instructions and should be resolved or formal variance exceptions to policy sought.

- Organization and membership of the Sexual Assault Case Management Group (SACMG) should be carefully reviewed against DoDI 6495.02 CH-1, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program Procedures, and SECNAVINST 1752.4B, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response, in order to ensure that only personnel with a need-to-know are involved in this important high-level coordination body.

- Watchstander training should be improved to ensure proper victim response protocols are followed to respond to reports of sexual assault (SA) per SECNAVINST 1752.4B, and OPNAVINST 1752.1B, Sexual Assault Victim Intervention (SAVI) Program.

- One USNA staff member with an administrative role in the SAPR program served as a Victim Advocate (VA) during a time when USNA VA positions were vacant. While trained and passionate about providing such direct victim service, this blurs lines between program management and victim response.

- USNA Sexual Assault Response Coordinators (SARC) would benefit from greater alignment with the broad and experienced network of CNIC SARCs that are used throughout the rest of the Navy.

- Too many personnel are involved in the SA reporting chain from the initial report by a victim to informing the Superintendent, potentially putting victim privacy rights at risk and creating an unintended barrier to reporting. By DoD, Navy and USNA instruction, the report should go from Victim Advocate or SARC to the Superintendent. Modifications are authorized in the case of unrestricted reports to account for initial notification of additional leaders such as the Commandant of Midshipmen or the Chief of Staff, but Brigade Company Officers and Company Senior Enlisted Advisors are not intended to be included in initial notification. However, our observations and interviews indicate that such personnel are often informed among the initial reporting chain.

Voting Assistance Program

USNA's Voting Assistance Program does not have an adequate number of unit voting assistance officers for the number of personnel assigned. USNA has not conducted required training or provided comprehensive services on absentee registration and other voting procedures as required by DoDINST 1000.04, Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP).

Suicide Prevention (SP) Program

Civilian and full-time contractor staff training in suicide prevention is not being performed in accordance with OPNAVINST 1720.4A, Suicide Prevention Program. We have seen this at other echelon 2 commands and believe OCHR training matrices need to be improved to make this requirement clearer. Watchstander and Duty Officer training has not been conducted to ensure proper crisis response protocols are in place to respond to suicide-related behavior calls and reports.

Travel Voucher Liquidation

We found that over 1000 travel vouchers have gone more than 30 days without approval following the completion of travel. Per DoD 7000.14-R, travel vouchers should be liquidated and travelers reimbursed for authorized travel expenses no later than 30 days after submission of an accurate and complete travel claim.

SURVEY AND FOCUS GROUP FINDINGS

Our survey and focus groups discussion found that quality of work life at USNA is comparable to the historical echelon 2 command average; quality of home life home (QOHL) is higher than the echelon 2 average. The USNA workforce is highly talented and profoundly dedicated to midshipmen development; however, manning/manpower, travel constraints, and procurement processes are perceived to adversely impact the mission, job performance, and quality of life. Rated on a 10-point scale, the USNA QOWL and QOHL are 6.75 and 8.46, respectively; the corresponding echelon 2 command historical averages are 6.59 and 7.81. Specific comments from focus groups and surveys were passed to USNA leadership and are presented in Appendix C.

During discussions with Academy and Brigade leaders including midshipmen, officers, and civilians, several noteworthy issues were raised. All leaders were clearly committed to the

Academy's mission and provided thoughtful feedback and recommendations. Some highlights are provided below, while others issues are listed throughout the report and in Appendix C.

Midshipmen leaders noted a favorable change over the last year in the engagement of the Brigade Senior Enlisted Leaders (SEL). According to the midshipmen, the SELs are high-caliber leaders who are approachable and accessible. While the SELs bear some responsibility for oversight of the Brigade, NAVINSGEN sees the greatest contribution of SELs in developing future leaders and contributing in the areas of operational training and midshipmen personal qualification standard (PQS). Company Officers underscored the imperative for quality operational training by describing the natural tension that exists in the midshipman summer experience between opportunities for operational training versus cultural awareness and exposure. Many midshipmen and Company Officers thought that a better approach to summer training would be to conduct Professional Training of Midshipmen (PROTRAMID) during youngster cruise. In our discussions with USNA leadership, we noted that the Commandant, with support from the Superintendent, has a process to assess summer training effectiveness in meeting the USNA mission. The Commandant should reflect on a broad range of inputs when tuning the balance between cultural immersion and operational summer training to ensure that readiness for service selection, preparation for operational assignment, and cultural awareness are all adequately considered.

Contents

Areas/Programs Assessed

- **Mission Performance**
  - Mission Readiness
  - Effectiveness Assessment Plan
  - Academy Foundations & Associations
  - Strategic Planning
  - Command Relationships and Communications
  - Intelligence Oversight
  - Total Force Management
  - Civilian Human Resource Services
  - Personnel Training/Qualifications
  - Continuity of Operations Plan
- **Academics**
  - Accreditation
  - Admissions
  - Honor Concept
  - Institutional Assessments
- **Facilities, Environmental, and Safety**
  - Facilities Management
  - Shore Infrastructure Planning and Management
  - Environmental Readiness
  - Energy Conservation
  - Safety and Occupational Health
- **Security Programs and Information Assurance**
  - Command Security
  - Industrial Security
  - Physical Security and Antiterrorism Force Protection
  - Operations Security
  - Personnel Security
  - Insider Threat
  - Counterintelligence Support
  - Information Security
  - Information Assurance and Personally Protected Information
- **Resource Management/Compliance Programs**
  - Comptroller Functions
  - Managers' Internal Control
  - Personal Property Management
  - Government Travel Charge Card
  - Government Commercial Purchase Card
  - Command Individual Augmentee Coordinator
  - Individual Medical Readiness
  - Naval Health Clinic Annapolis Support
  - Physical Readiness Program

- o Urinalysis Program
- o Command Managed Equal Opportunity
- o Suicide Prevention
- o Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
- o Hazing Policy Training and Compliance
- o Legal/Ethics
- o Voting Assistance Program
- o Cemetery Operations
- o Inspector General Functions
- o Post Deployment Health Reassessment
- o Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
- **Sailor Programs**
  - o Command Sponsorship
  - o Command Indoctrination
  - o Career Development Program

Observations and Findings

MISSION PERFORMANCE

The Mission Performance Team utilized survey and focus group responses, document review, group discussions, and face-to-face interviews to gather information and assess the mission performance of the United States Naval Academy (USNA). These findings were applied to the functions and tasks as assigned in or defined by the following:

- Title 10, U.S.C. Chapter 603 (United States Naval Academy)
- Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 1322.22 Change 1, Service Academies
- OPNAVINST 5450.330A, Mission, Functions and Tasks of the United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland (USNA MFT)

Our overall assessment is that USNA is executing its mission well. We found a very dedicated and professional faculty and staff who are committed to their mission. We've identified a number of challenges facing the Academy, most of which they can correct themselves, but some of which will require outside assistance and additional resources.

Formal Program of Assessment

USNA has a formal program of assessment regarding its effectiveness in meeting its institutional mission. This assessment program is required by OPNAVINST 5450.33A and Standard 7 of Excellence in Higher Education, Requirements of Affiliation and Standards for Accreditation, of the Middle States Commission on Higher Education (MSCHE). Overall coordination of the Academy's program of assessment is managed by the Academy Effectiveness Board (AEB). The AEB, established in 2006, continues to mature and develop increasingly more comprehensive assessments in a number of areas ranging from measuring effectiveness in developing midshipmen morally, mentally and physically and instilling the seven attributes of a midshipman, to measuring the professional competence of USNA graduates early in their careers. Specific assessments conducted or ongoing include:

- USNA Attributes of Graduates Assessment (47 Month Study)
- Naval Academy Preparatory School (NAPS) Baseline Analysis Study
- NAPS SAT/Placement Exams Study
- Equal Outcomes Study
- Academic Major Implementation Plan Monitoring (65:35 Study)
- Fleet/Schoolhouse Feedback Study
- USNA Engineering Graduate Survey

While the AEB is actively engaged in coordinating meaningful assessment, AEB products are limited in distribution and most analyses and findings are limited to the core study teams and the Senior Leadership Team (SLT). The AEB can be made more effective by greater interaction with the broader faculty to ensure that their expertise is regularly drawn upon to provide

valuable peer review and feedback on AEB products from study development through completion.

In addition, the Office of Institutional Research, Planning, and Assessment (OIR) maintains a robust data infrastructure and impressive capability for mining and analysis to support Academy Effectiveness Board (AEB) activities and external data calls. We believe OIR capabilities could play a greater role in a sustained effort to help answer tough institutional questions beyond the handful of current AEB assessments.

We recommend that USNA consider making the AEB more inclusive (depending on the assessment topic) by pursuing greater involvement from the faculty and staff during assessment development. The AEB is a tremendous asset and presents powerful opportunities for the Superintendent and his SLT; our view is that the AEB could be used, with appropriate guidance and direction, to inform SLT decisions and recommendations to the Superintendent on increasingly difficult or cross-cutting issues such as resource allocation.

Recommendation 1.   That the AEB become more inclusive and ensure that the broader USNA faculty and staff are more actively engaged during assessment development.

Recommendation 2.   That the SLT and Superintendent direct and encourage the AEB to assess and make recommendations on increasingly difficult and cross-cutting issues such as resource allocation.

Recommendation 3.   That the SLT provide greater oversight and coordination of AEB efforts by requiring the AEB to provide more regular updates and status reports on actionable AEB efforts at SLT meetings.

Yard Patrol (YP) 703 Class Training Device Support
Support for this class is incomplete, leading to potentially unsafe operation of these vessels and reducing long term sustainability of the class. Specifically:

- No formal Navy Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) is in place to provide true cost of operations and maintenance, track high failure rate items, or provide technical manual and wiring diagram support.
- Engineering Operational Sequencing System (EOSS) is in place for YP 703, but has not been issued for hulls 704-708 to account for variations within the class. Locally, USNA has tailored (pen and ink changes) EOSS for these hulls.
- YP 703 Class trim and stability data are not maintained by Academy staff but were provided by NAVSEA PMS 325 at the time of the IG inspection.
- No formal plan exists to sustain an inventory of 18 YPs. Planning is in progress to put 12 YP 676 class craft through the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) in FY16-18, but as of now this has not been funded. A replacement for the YP 676 class craft has not yet been approved.

Integrated Logistics Support (ILS)

The viability of the YP 703 Class craft as a training device is at risk because those craft are being maintained without formal Navy ILS. Without ILS, USNA is limited in its ability to predict total ownership costs, achieve reliable spares resupply, and conduct predictive maintenance planning. The original YP 703 Class specifications required the contractor to supply ILS; however, this support did not occur beyond the initial warranty period for individual crafts. Furthermore, initial expectations regarding Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) parts support proved problematic due to small purchase limits, high failure rates, and obsolescence among some equipment. Typically, ILS is delivered via the Navy Organizational Maintenance Management System-Next Generation (OMMS-NG). However, this system is unavailable due to lack of Navy Marine Corps Internet (NMCI) connectivity at the Academy's Waterfront Maintenance Activity. The Waterfront Maintenance Activity instead relies on the "Watch Captain" software suite as a management system which is designed to support a commercial marine repair facility or small boatyard rather than a Navy repair facility. We assess that this system is an insufficient substitute for OMMS-NG and does not provide the functionality to imitate Navy ILS. Without formal Navy ILS, support will remain limited, poor configuration management will persist, and the total cost of ownership will be unpredictable. This places long term viability of the YP 703 Class at risk.

Issue Paper A-1 addresses this issue in further detail.

Engineering Operational Sequencing System (EOSS)

The EOSS supporting operation of the YP 703 class craft is inadequate because the procedures, diagrams and status boards are tailored only for hull 703. Hulls 704 through 708 do not have craft-specific procedures for each YP. Follow-on YP 703 class craft have significant configuration differences from hull 703, rendering portions of the issued EOSS inaccurate or unusable for follow-on hulls. These craft cannot be operated safely without accurate EOSS in place. Of note, USNA has mitigated this risk by making pen-and-ink changes to copies of YP 703-specific EOSS for use on hulls 704-708, as a temporary measure, until craft-specific EOSS can be provided for these hulls.

Operating Sequencing Systems are required to be hull-specific and used on all surface ships per OPNAVINST 9200.3B, Operating Sequencing Systems. Although not commissioned vessels, YPs are Category "B" vessels per OPNAVINST 7220.14, Career Sea Pay and Career Sea Pay Premium, and are operated in a like manner to surface ships. Since EOSS is not funded for YP 703 class, Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (COMNAVSEASYSCOM) will not take action on routine and urgent feedback reports to develop hull specific EOSS for hulls 704 through 708.

Issue Paper A-2 addresses this issue in further detail.

Deficiency 1. **EOSS is only in place for the YP 703 hull and has not been tailored for hulls 704 through 708 to account for variations within the YP 703 Class. References: OPNAVINST 9200.3B, paragraph 1a; OPNAVINST 7220.14, Enclosure (2), paragraph 3.**

Assessment of YP Engineering Program Management and Watchstander Proficiency

YP craft have engineering main spaces with equipment that is potentially dangerous if not operated and maintained correctly. Fleet units are regularly inspected by Afloat Training Group to ensure that appropriate engineering program management and watchstander standards are maintained.   Engineering programs associated with the USNA YP class are not inspected by an engineering team to ensure watchstander proficiency and compliance with applicable standards.

NAVINSGEN did not inspect engineering program management; however, we noted shortfalls in the Engineering Operational Sequencing Systems (EOSS) and Tag-Out programs. Programs such as Fuel Oil Quality Management, Lube Oil Quality Management, Tag-Out, EOSS, Electrical Safety, Damage Control, Engineering Training and watchstander proficiency require review from an engineering assessment team, such as Afloat Training Group Atlantic, to ensure high engineering standards are being maintained.

Issue Paper A-3 addresses this issue in further detail.

YP 703 Class Trim and Stability Data

The maximum personnel load limits for the YP 703 class is in excess of the capacity listed in the manufacturer's American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) recommendations. DIVPRODEVINST 3120.2B, [USNA] Yard Patrol Craft (YP) Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), allows 50 personnel for the local Operating Area (Chesapeake Bay & Severn River) which is 10 more than the 40 personnel recommended in the ABS stability and loading report for all conditions.

Deficiency 2.   **Maximum safe personnel occupancy limits listed in DIVPRODEVINST 3120.2B (USNA YP 703 Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)) for local operations is incorrect. References: DIVPRODEVINST 3120.2B, Chapter 11, Section 11.2; ABS Stability Letter, dtd 8 March 2010.**

Long Term YP Craft Requirement

USNA is at risk of not having sufficient YPs in its inventory, starting in 2025, to meet its training requirements. USNA's stated long term YP requirement is 18 (12 YP 676 class, 6 YP 703 class). By 2026, the 12 YP 676 class vessels will reach end of service life. There is no YP replacement plan in place to ensure USNA maintains an inventory of 18 vessels. The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Director, Surface Warfare (OPNAV N96) and USNA are currently developing the requirement for the next class of YPs that will be validated by OPNAV N96. We recommend that OPNAV N96 and USNA continue to coordinate to validate USNA's YP requirement and determine a way ahead for new construction.

The current YP 676 class craft have reached or exceeded the end of their 30 year service life and the current inventory of six YP 703 class craft is far below USNA's stated requirement of 18.

At present, there is no approved plan to address the long term YP requirement. Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (SEA 05D4) tasked Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division (NSWCCD) Detachment Norfolk and Program Executive Office Ships (PMS 325) to

conduct a study comparing a SLEP of 12 existing YP 676 Class craft and a procurement of 12 new YPs. The SLEP option was determined to be the most cost effective approach. USNA intends to submit a POM 17 Issue Paper to fund the SLEP of 12 YP 676 class. Even if the SLEP is funded, the refurbished YP 676 class will only have their service life extended for an additional 10 years. Therefore, beginning in 2025 and completing in 2026, the USNA YP inventory will reduce to six YP 703 class craft; 12 below the requirement of 18.

Given the lead time for design and build of new construction craft, a decision on new YP construction is necessary at the earliest opportunity (POM 17) to mitigate any future gap. We recommend OPNAV N96 and USNA coordinate to validate USNA's future YP craft requirement and determine a way ahead to ensure sufficient YP inventory to meet the Academy's training requirements beyond 2025.

Issue Paper A-4 addresses this issue in further detail.

USNA Affiliated Non-Federal Entities

USNA has established formal relationships with a variety of Non-Federal Entities (NFE) whose mission and purpose relate to the USNA. Our review focused primarily on the relationship with the Naval Academy Foundation (Foundation), Naval Academy Alumni Association (Association), the Naval Academy Sailing Foundation, and the Naval Academy Athletic Association (NAAA). These organizations can and do accept gifts that they collect and use to benefit the USNA.

Naval Academy Foundation

Our review of the 2012 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Foundation and USNA, and of USNAINST 4001.5B, Acceptance of Gifts to the United States Naval Academy, indicate that the concerns raised in previous reviews of the USNA gift acceptance process have been addressed. The MOU clarified the relationship between the Foundation and USNA, removing problematic language concerning the Foundation's role in USNA's strategic planning process and USNA's role in the Foundation's acceptance of gifts. Language designating the Foundation as bearing "the primary fundraising responsibility for the [USNA]" was also removed. These changes clarify the separate status of the Foundation and USNA and help to mitigate any appearance of a lack of impartiality or the misuse of USNA resources under 5 CFR 2635.

NAAA and Athletics Compliance

NAAA is an NFE that is distinguished from other NFEs due to its unique purpose and relationship with USNA. We assess that this relationship is necessary for USNA to meet the requirement in OPNAVINST 5450.330A to field National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Division I sports teams and comply with NCAA rules and regulations. In 2013 this longstanding relationship was codified by Congress at 10 U.S.C. 6981. This law authorizes the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) to enter into contracts and cooperative agreements with NAAA for the purpose of supporting athletics and physical fitness programs. Specifically, the statute authorizes SECNAV, among other things, to:

- Select NAAA as a sole source.
- Allow NAAA to use USNA property.
- Allow NAAA to license, market and enter sponsorship agreements using Naval Academy markings.

The statute also codifies USNA's role with regard to NAAA's Board of Control (BOC), the body within NAAA that provides for institutional oversight of NAAA. The BOC satisfies NCAA requirements that each member college has an office responsible for providing oversight of the school's intercollegiate athletic programs.

NAAA principally operates the intercollegiate athletic program at USNA covering 33 varsity teams and 14 club level sports. It owns and maintains the playing field at Navy-Marine Corps Stadium and provides sports equipment to the Academy. Furthermore, it pays the coaches' salaries for the majority of varsity sports. A significant portion of NAAA support to USNA is funded through ticket sales, endorsements, and television and other revenue from its affiliation with the NCAA and other athletic governing bodies, namely the Patriot League (and the American Athletic Conference beginning in 2015). Additionally, NAAA receives 3.8 million dollars of appropriated funds to augment its operation of the Olympic sports (sports that don't generate income) at USNA. Currently, the Navy has a contract with NAAA, which is the legal vehicle covering the payment of appropriated funds to NAAA. The Navy and NAAA are currently drafting a cooperative agreement that will replace the existing contract and cover all aspects of the relationship and dealings between USNA and NAAA.

Recommendation 4.   **That USNA approve the draft cooperative agreement with NAAA to replace the existing contract and cover all aspects of the relationship and dealings between the USNA and NAAA.**

Gift Compliance

USNA has made significant progress in reforming its gift acceptance practices and processes since the Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Defense (DoD IG) report on USNA adherence to contracting and gift policies was published in 2011. USNA's gift acceptance process is operating in accordance with applicable gift acceptance statutes as well as the Navy implementing instruction on the acceptance of gifts, SECNAVINST 4001.2J, Acceptance of Gifts. However, USNA's process for executing gifts of travel and related expenses is difficult to audit for compliance with the Federal Manager's Financial Integrity Act of 1982, PL 97-255 and Financial Improvement Audit Readiness (FIAR) requirements required by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2010, PL 111-84.

Travel Gifts

OMB Circular A-136 provides the audit basis and rules to implement the legislation addressed above. DoD agencies must comply with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and financial statements must provide reasonable assurance that an agency is operating in compliance with GAAP.

During our assessment of travel gifts we observed the following:

- Approving Officials (AO) in the Defense Travel System (DTS) are approving travel without knowledge of gift details. In some instances, AOs are approving fund expenditure for travel that is actually a gift. Therefore, funds for travel gifts are not being reimbursed to the appropriate cost center line of accounting. There is no proper audit trail from gift acceptance to gift execution.
- Some travel gifts accepted as donations in kind are being converted to cash reimbursements in execution. This is not illegal; however, this makes the execution of the travel difficult to audit. If gifts are being converted to cash, a more auditable tracking process is necessary to properly account for the converted funds.
- Semi-annual travel gift reports submitted by USNA to the Office of General Counsel (OGC) are not accurate because they are based on travel cost estimates vice actual expenditures (Reference: SECNAVINST 4001.2J).
- USNA is not in full compliance with conference approval rules when travel gifts do not cover all expenses associated with an event, such as parking fees incurred at conferences that are not covered by the gift. Technically USNA is required to gain Department of the Navy Assistant for Administration (DON/AA) approval for any expense, regardless of amount, associated with attendance (Reference: SECNAV MSG DTG 072017Z).

We uncovered no evidence of fraud in the execution of travel gifts. However, the above findings illustrate that USNA travel gift auditability is insufficient and does not meet GAAP standards because full reconciliation to the cost center is necessary to achieve reasonable assurance of compliance with GAAP standards.

Deficiency 3.   **Semi-annual travel gift reports submitted by USNA to the Office of General Counsel (OGC) are not accurate because they are based on travel cost estimates vice actual expenditures. Reference: SECNAVINST 4001.2J, paragraph 12a.**

Deficiency 4.   **USNA is not fully compliant with conference approval rules when travel gifts do not cover all expenses associated with event. Conference travel with shared costs is not always approved by DON/AA prior to travel. Reference: SECNAV MSG DTG 072017Z.**

Recommendation 5.   **That USNA modify travel gift procedures to: (1) specify gift amounts by expense type and clearly identify government expenses, (2) specify the method of reimbursement from donor by expense type, (3) identify partial gifts in kind prior to travel, (4) ensure all known expenses are clearly identified and vetted prior to travel with reimbursements, and (5) ensure shared cost conference attendance receives necessary DON/AA approval prior to travel.**

Recommendation 6.   **That USNA vigorously enforce its policies as set forth in USNAINST 4001.5B to (1) include the offer/acceptance letter in substantiating records in DTS and (2) require gift of travel notification in the "Comments to Approving Official" in DTS.**

Recommendation 7.   **That USNA implement procedures to ensure that government expenditures and collections from donors are fully reconciled back to the cost center.**

James B. Stockdale Center for Ethical Leadership

The Stockdale Center seeks to promote and enhance the ethical development of current and future military leaders. Through research, consultation, innovation, dissemination, and facilitation, the Stockdale Center educates leaders to empower them to make courageous ethical decisions.   Elements under the cognizance of the Commandant of Midshipmen (specifically, the Divisions of Leadership Education and Development, Professional Development, and Character Development and Training) have the internally focused lead in midshipmen leadership and character development. USNA established the Leadership Excellence Council, chaired by the Director of the Stockdale Center, and including these three division directors, to "coordinate, integrate, and align all leader development efforts both internal and external to the Academy." Although this integrative effort is supported by the strong working relationship among the incumbents, the Superintendent should provide focus and oversight, and consider clarifying support relationships to maintain internal alignment. Furthermore, the Stockdale Center and USNA's Leadership Excellence Council should continue to enhance ties with the U.S. Naval War College (NWC)--the lead institution and process owner, responsible to the CNO, for core values and ethical leadership development. Importantly, the Director of the Stockdale Center is a member of the Leader Development Continuum Council (LDCC), convened by NWC. We encourage USNA to continue their collaboration with NWC outside the LDCC so that USNA lends its academic credibility to this important Navy and Marine Corps enterprise effort, and to help maintain the entire midshipman experience (curricula, lectures, conferences, etc.) on the cutting edge of ethics and leader development.

Civilian Manning

Full Time Equivalent (FTE) planning

USNA's ability to commission approximately 1000 high quality officers annually and maintain accreditation are potentially at risk because of planned FTE reductions from the current level of 854 to 814 in FY19 without sufficient validation of FTE requirements or assessment of the impact of planned FTE reductions. The current authorized FTE level at USNA is 854. USNA leadership stated that an additional 26 FTEs are required to support information technology, academic staff technician, and admissions staff manning requirements in order to continue to meet its mission. We did not validate this requirement during our short visit and found no evidence of any Navy-approved supporting documentation to validate staffing requirements at USNA. However, we did observe that authorized FTE levels steadily decrease from 854 in FY14 to 814 by FY19. While N1 typically funds to approximately the 854 FTE level in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) end game, this cannot be guaranteed in the future and makes long term planning and faculty and staff hiring difficult. This uncertainty may pose a potential threat to USNA accreditation. According to USNA leadership, aside from the faculty model which validates the current faculty requirements at 294 civilian and 294 military professors, a manning requirement determination has not been conducted to validate the civilian FTE requirements.

Recommendation 8. That USNA undergo a Shore Manpower Requirements Determination (SMRD) to validate their non-faculty FTE requirements. An SMRD provides a systematic means of determining and documenting manpower requirements based on Mission, Functions, and Tasks and projected personnel workloads.

Administratively Determined Positions

USNA classifies certain persons as administratively determined (AD) employees. The AD classification is used to facilitate hiring and advancement of civilian teaching faculty and senior management and governance positions within the academic enterprise as defined by DODI 1402.06, Civilian Faculty Positions in Department of Defense (DoD) Post-Secondary Educational Institutions. SECNAV authority over civilian faculty employment at the Naval Academy emanates from 10 U.S.C. 6952, which also allows delegation and subsequent redelegation of this hiring authority. Via Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) (ASN(M&RA)) memorandum of October 28, 2011, Subj: Request for Clarification of Authority, SECNAV delegated this hiring authority to Superintendent, USNA, but retained compensation setting for civilian faculty as governed by SECNAVINST 12534.1C, Civilian Faculty Pay Schedule for the U.S. Naval Academy, the Naval War College, the Naval Postgraduate School, and the Marine Corps University. USNAINST 12213.1, Excepted Service Hiring of Faculty and Instructors, incorporates the delegated authority from 10 U.S.C. 6952 and the definitions of DODI 1402.06 in clearly laying out Academy's process of hiring AD employees and of annual review. USNA currently has 475 persons listed as AD employees, 437 of which hold titled faculty positions. The remaining AD employees include both non-titled instructional faculty such as Senior Associate Athletic Director, Assistant Director of Athletics, and various coaches and management/governance faculty positions such as Chief Financial Officer, Director of Information Technology, Museum Director, and research assistants. While the Academy has an established and transparent process to classify certain persons as administratively determined (AD) employees, a review of the Academy's process by ASN(M&RA) is appropriate to ensure full and continued compliance with applicable laws and policies.

Recommendation 9. That USNA coordinate with ASN(M&RA) for formal review of USNA policies for excepted service hiring of Instructional Faculty and Management and Governance Faculty as delineated in USNAINST 12213.1.

Civilian Employee Performance Management

USNA is not in compliance with the Department of the Navy (DON) Interim Performance Management System and CNICINST 5300.2, CNIC Non-Appropriated Fund Personnel Manual. Performance plans, performance standards, mid-year progress reviews, individual development plans, and annual appraisals were not consistently completed for non-bargaining unit General Schedule (GS) employees, bargaining unit GS and wage grade (WG) employees, and non-appropriated fund (NAF) employees.

USNA's civilian employee workforce is comprised of four main categories of employees based on their pay programs and bargaining status:

- GS non-bargaining unit employees (approximately 60)

- GS and WG bargaining unit employees (approximately 447)
- Administratively Determined (AD) faculty/employees (approximately 398)
- NAF employees (approximately 400)

Separate performance management guidance and direction is promulgated for Navy employees based on their pay programs and union status. During our visit, we conducted a review of a random sample of records provided by the USNA Human Resource (HR) office, the Academic Dean's office, and the NAF HR office for the employee categories listed above. Our sampling determined:

- For AD Employees:
  - 71 percent of required Performance Standards from 2012 to 2014 were completed.
  - 68 percent of required Mid-year Progress Reviews from 2012 to 2014 were completed.
  - 68 percent of required Annual Ratings of Record from 2012 to 2014 were completed.
- For NAF employees: There was no evidence that individual development plans (IDP) were completed from 2012 to 2014.

Our review of non-bargaining unit and bargaining unit (GS and WG) employees confirmed that the following were not consistently completed between 2012 and 2014:

- Performance Plans
- Mid-year Progress Reviews
- Annual Appraisals

Of note, Performance Requirements and Annual Performance Appraisals for NAF employees were consistently completed from 2012-2014 as required by CNICINST 5300.2, Non-Appropriated Fund Personnel Manual and the Negotiated Agreement between USNA Business Services Division and Local #1923 American Federation of Government Employees.

Deficiency 5.   Performance Plans, Mid-year Progress Reviews, and Annual Appraisals were not consistently completed for non-bargaining unit GS employees as required by the DON Interim Performance Management System. References: Interim Performance Management System Covering Positions Transitioning to the General Schedule (GS) from the National Security Personnel System (NSPS), Version 2.0, September 2010; Interim Performance Management System Performance Appraisal Form User Manual, September 2011.

Deficiency 6.   Performance Standards, Mid-year Progress Reviews, and Annual Ratings of Record were not consistently completed for bargaining unit GS and WG employees. Reference: USNAINST 12430.5, Performance Management Program, paragraph 8.

Deficiency 7.   Performance Standards, Mid-year Progress Reviews, and Annual Ratings were not consistently completed for Administratively Determined (AD) employees. Reference: USNAINST 12430.4B, Performance Appraisal of Civilian Faculty Members, paragraph 5.

Deficiency 8.   Individual Development Plans for NAF employees were not completed during the period 2012-2014. Reference: CNICINST 5300.2, Enclosure (1), paragraph 220.

Recommendation 10.   That USNA centralize all HR Functions under one office vice having individual HR representatives dispersed to different Departments.

Recommendation 11.   That USNA centralize the location of all Employee Performance Files (EPF) and other associated records in the HR Office.

Recommendation 12.   That USNA develop a self-assessment program to regularly review personnel records and assess for accuracy and completeness.

Recommendation 13.   That USNA develop a tracking system to ensure that all performance management requirements are completed.

Conference Attendance

The DON approval timeline for personnel to attend conferences is relatively long and is impeding USNA faculty attendance of professional conferences, negatively affecting faculty professional development and potentially their academic standing. This is a broader issue impacting all DON academics and scientists. NAVINSGEN has heard similar concerns in a variety of command inspections and area visits including Naval District Washington (NSWC Carderock, Naval Observatory) and Naval Safety Center. These personnel attend conferences to present their professional work, participate in discussion panels, and maintain relevance and currency with the latest practices in their fields. The DON policy directs that requests to attend conferences be submitted at least 30 days prior to the travel date. However, in many instances DON academics and scientists are not formally notified that they have been selected to present their work or otherwise participate in the conference until well inside the 30 day approval timeline. We note that the Director of Navy Staff (DNS) is working this issue with stakeholders.

Issue Paper A-5 addresses this issue in further detail.

Information Technology Procurement

USNA is not in compliance with a variety of Information Technology (IT) Procurement policies, rules, and regulations. While the Academy is part of the .edu consortium, their networks and information technology infrastructure are considered government networks and subject to compliance with Clinger-Cohen Act requirements, Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and Department of Defense (DoD) and DON Chief Information Officer (CIO) policy requirements. During our inspection, we observed and USNA personnel confirmed the following:

- USNA is not following DON Information Technology Procurement Request (ITPR) and approval process guidance. For instance, they are not using Navy Information Dominance Approval System (NAV IDAS) for submitting IT procurement requests.

- USNA is not using the DON Application and Database Management System (DADMS) to register software, check for Functional Area Manager (FAM) approval to run on its network, and track use of any software beyond the allowable version limit (e.g., current version plus two older versions only).
- USNA is not making efforts to reduce the number of printers, fax machines, scanners and other multi-functional devices.
- USNA is not utilizing Navy Enterprise Licensing Agreements (ELA) for software purchases.

Furthermore, without a more concerted effort to comply with IT procurement rules, the ability of USNA to develop the Center for Cyber Security Studies and Cyber Curriculum is at risk.

Deficiency 9. **USNA is not following DON Information Technology Procurement Request and approval process guidance. Reference: NAVADMIN 295/13, Subj: Information Technology Procurement Request Approval Process Fiscal Year 2014 Guidance, paragraph 3.**

Deficiency 10. **USNA is not using DADMS to register software, check for Functional Area Manager (FAM) approval to run on its network, and track use of any software beyond the allowable version limit. Reference: GENADMIN MSG DTG R021936Z JAN 09, Subj: Implementation of Master Record Functionality in DADMS/DITPR-DON.**

Deficiency 11. **USNA is not making efforts to reduce the number of printers, fax machines, scanners and other multi-functional devices. References: DON CIO Memorandum of January 25, 2013, Subj: Mandatory Guidance Regarding Management of Department of the Navy Copiers, Printers, Fax Machines, Scanners, and Multi-Functional Devices; DON CIO Memorandum of March 26, 2012, Subj: Policy on Acquisition of Multi-Function Devices (MFD); DoD CIO Memorandum of February 17, 2012, Subj: Optimizing Use of Employee Information Technology (IT) Devices and Other Information Technologies to Achieve Efficiencies.**

Deficiency 12. **USNA is not utilizing Navy Enterprise Licensing Agreements (ELA) for software purchases. Reference: Assistant Secretary of the Navy (ASN), Research, Development & Acquisition/ASN, Financial Management & Comptroller/DON CIO Memorandum of February 22, 2012, Subj: Mandatory Use of Department of the Navy Enterprise Licensing Agreements.**

ACADEMICS

Accreditation/Assessment

USNA is currently in good standing with all of their accrediting bodies, to include the institution-wide accreditation by Middle States Commission on Higher Education (MSCHE) as well as the American Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET) and the American Chemical Society (ACS).

The Academy is in the early stages of preparing for its 2016 MSCHE accreditation site visit. The preparations are on track for accreditation although two issues identified during the 2006

accreditation remain unresolved; specifically: technician manning shortfalls in engineering and science laboratories and completion of library facility improvements.

Issue paper A-6 addresses this issue in further detail.

A USNA academic assessment program is in place to support continuous improvement of midshipman learning and development. The Academic Department continues its effort to comprehensively map coursework, lab technical support and library staffing positions to midshipman learning outcomes and attributes (selfless, inspirational, proficient, innovative, articulate, adaptive and professional). The assessment program is still a relatively underdeveloped program with inadequate run time to indicate that multiple continuous improvement processes have been effective. The assessment program has made excellent progress in some areas of academics but is not fully implemented by all faculty and academic programs and remains an uneven effort across divisions and programmatic areas. This process is a challenging long term effort but we assess that USNA is on a path to meet MSCHE standards in this regard for the 2016 accreditation visit. Critical to success of the assessment program is full use and integration of the OIR which has a robust data collection and analysis capability.

Admissions
The Academy's admissions process is designed to support USNA goals of producing quality graduates for service as USN or USMC officers. This process received formal legal review by the Office of Judge Advocate General (OJAG) in June 2010 and September 2011. The Admissions Board assesses admissions packages against desired attributes delineated in SECNAVINST 1531.2C, United States Naval Academy Curriculum and Admissions Policy. These include moral character, mental fitness, physical fitness and potential for leadership. This assessment of candidates is conducted by calculating what USNA refers to as the Whole Person Multiple (WPM), a well-established practice utilized by many other academic institutions, which takes candidate experiences and attributes into consideration.

As a public institution, the Academy must always be prepared to justify its admissions criteria and process with quantifiable metrics that relate the WPM to outcomes such as graduation rates and subsequent naval career success. USNA collects data about academic performance and professional development of midshipmen and their subsequent completion of professional milestones as Commissioned Officers. The Academy must continue to formally assess these data on a recurring basis to ensure the admissions criteria and process result in selection of high caliber candidates with strong potential as Navy and USMC leaders. Again, the Office of Institutional Research, Planning, and Assessment is in an exceptional position to support USNA's periodic review of the admissions function.

Recommendation 14.   That USNA continue to track midshipman academic and professional performance, graduation rates, and career performance of graduates to recurringly validate the admissions process to ensure selection of high caliber candidates best qualified for service as officers in the Navy and Marine Corps.

Recommendation 15.   That USNA have its admissions process undergo a legal review by OJAG on a recurring basis to ensure continued compliance with applicable law, DoD and Navy policy.

Honor Concept/System

The Honor Concept, and the system of midshipmen enforcing the standards of honorable behavior, is central to the mission of the Naval Academy. The honor system is a vibrant element of the Brigade of Midshipmen and the life of the Academy. Several faculty members that we interviewed reported that they have grown reluctant to report apparent honor violations or to participate in the formal system due to the degree of scrutiny faculty members sometimes face as witnesses in Honor Board proceedings that relate to classroom requirements and academic coursework. We could not discern how widespread this reluctance was across the faculty, but clearly some element of the faculty feel this way. USNAINST 1610.3H, 2010 Honor Concept of the Brigade of Midshipmen, permits informal counseling for certain infractions, but otherwise failure to report an honor violation is not in keeping with the instruction and impacts the ability of Brigade administration to monitor potential infractions and develop midshipmen as leaders of integrity.

Several midshipmen we interviewed noted inconsistent rules amongst different professors in terms of what is permissible regarding study guides, collaborative efforts on projects, etc. They further noted that that while some course syllabi clearly state what is permissible and what is not, other syllabi did not. A perceived lack of appropriate guidance has led to some confusion among midshipmen although we could not discern how widespread this perception was across the Brigade. At a minimum, this confusion could create a vulnerability in the honor system.

During our discussions with senior midshipman leaders (stripers), we noted a sense of ownership over the honor system. The stripers attributed the downward trend in the number of cases over the last 5 years to on-going efforts to educate the brigade and share lessons learned (Honor Wednesdays, XYZ cases, etc.).

Given the faculty and midshipmen perceptions noted above, we recommend that USNA conduct a review of the Honor Concept execution, implementation and associated system of enforcing its standards. NAVINSGEN recommends this review include an assessment of faculty and midshipmen perceptions as well as opportunities to improve the orientation, participation and liaison between the honor system and the faculty. It would also be appropriate to update rule sets or guidelines pertaining to study aids, collaborative efforts, etc.

Recommendation 16.   That USNA conduct an assessment of faculty and midshipmen perceptions of the Honor Concept/System, and take appropriate corrective action.

Recommendation 17.   That USNA review the orientation offered to faculty on the principles and expectations of the honor system and develop procedures for ensuring faculty reporting of potential honor infractions.

Recommendation 18.   That USNA review and consider the merits of appointing a faculty liaison to the Honor Organization to provide greater continuity, understanding and participation by the civilian faculty and staff in support of the honor system's intent.

Naval Academy Preparatory School (NAPS)

Overall, the interaction between the Academic Dean, Curriculum Advisory Committee (CAC) and concerned Department Chairs of USNA and the Dean of Academics and Faculty at NAPS is excellent. The exchange of information is open and professional. NAPS faculty try to understand the outcomes of each of the USNA foundational courses and then adjust their courses to prepare NAPS students for entry into the Academy. The faculty at NAPS and USNA are working together to properly design courses to the appropriate level of instruction. USNA tracks NAPS graduates through their time at the Academy to monitor the need for possible academic course adjustments at NAPS.

A Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) Prep course that NAPS students are currently required to take appears to be providing limited, if any, benefit based on student outcomes. Multiple-year research conducted by NAPS measuring the effectiveness of the course by comparing pre- and post-course SAT scores indicated no significant difference in scores (an approximately 40 point increase out of 1600 possible points). This time could possibly be used for more relevant coursework or other appropriate developmental activities.

Recommendation 19. **That USNA make a determination whether to terminate the requirement for NAPS students to take an SAT Prep course.**

Faculty Diversity

Overall, 72 of the 586 civilian and military faculty positions at USNA are filled by minority personnel, 12.3 percent. Nationally, minorities account for approximately 20.7 percent of full-time college faculty (based on data from U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), Winter 2011-12). Of 475 persons on the Administratively Determined (AD) schedule at USNA, 144 are female (30.3 percent). NCES data from Winter 2011-12 indicates that females represent 48.2 percent of faculty members nationally. Our interaction with USNA leaders and the Diversity Officer confirmed that the Academy is actively seeking to expand diversity among its faculty, both military and civilian.

USNA Faculty Handbook

10 U.S.C. 6595 provides that a faculty member who fails to report hazing or a violation of an Academy regulation by a midshipman shall, upon approval of the Secretary of the Navy, be dismissed by the Superintendent. This provision is not documented in the USNA faculty handbook. Some faculty members we interviewed were unaware of the requirement.

Recommendation 20. **That the USNA Academic Dean include the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 6595 in the Faculty Handbook.**

Military Orientation

Civilian faculty report that they were provided limited formal orientation to the Navy when they arrived at USNA. In the recent past, the Academy offered Fleet orientations for faculty with little or no naval experience. These orientations included ship and squadron visits in Norfolk. This program was stopped due to recent budget constraints. Discussions with faculty revealed

that a number of faculty members found these orientation visits an important means of understanding the complex environment in which USNA graduates will operate.

Recommendation 21.   That USNA explore ways to expand military orientation for faculty either by continuing Fleet orientation visits or seeking ways to conduct orientations on the Yard.

FACILITIES, ENVIRONMENTAL, ENERGY CONSERVATION, AND SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH

Facilities
Facilities and infrastructure at USNA are sufficient to support assigned missions. Several of the Academy facilities are relatively new or recently renovated; however, a number of them are aging and a challenge to maintain. During the NAVINSGEN inspection survey, focus group discussions, and interviews, concerns with the performance of heating, ventilation, and cooling (HVAC) systems and the declining material condition of older facilities were commonly expressed.

Facilities Condition
USNA facilities have an overall Installation Figure of Merit (IFOM) score of "fair" (78 on a 100 point scale) in the Facilities Readiness Evaluation System, in comparison to the Navy-wide average of 82, and 76 for the Naval Postgraduate School. Naval Support Activity (NSA) Annapolis appropriately prioritizes facilities funds to ensure support of the USNA mission. Several employees at USNA commented that building temperatures (most notably Rickover Hall and Nimitz Hall) were frequently too hot in the warmer months and too cold in the winter. USNA Public Works personnel are aware of concerns with HVAC maintenance, repair, and replacement. In addition, roof leaks and minor flooding were cited as recurring concerns. An aggressive team of Assistant Public Works Officers is working well with USNA Building First Lieutenants and Building Managers to capture these problems and develop service calls, minor works, and special projects to resolve issues.

Flagship Institution Agreement (FIA)
In 2005, the Flagship Institution Agreement was established, whereby Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC) and Naval District Washington agreed to fund USNA at 100 percent of the DoD Facility Sustainment Model and higher levels of restoration & modernization (RM) funding to support greater than normal requirements for facilities designated on the National Historic Register. The funding levels agreed upon in FIA were met during the past five years, with the exception of FY13 which was funded to approximately 66 percent of the requirement.

Testimony for the President's Fiscal Year 2015 Budget indicated that sustainment (ST) and RM funding levels at USNA are programmed approximately 30 percent below FIA agreed upon levels. Historically, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) reserve funding and end-of-year sweep-up funds have been used to ensure that FIA-specified funding levels are maintained. However,

additional project planning funds may be required for FY15 and beyond to ensure that end-of-year funding can be executed.

Environmental Readiness

Our inspection included a review of the following areas:

- Spill prevention
- Storm water
- Waste water
- Drinking water
- Air pollution
- Natural and cultural resources
- Environmental impact statements
- Environmental assessments
- Categorical exclusions
- Hazardous material
- Hazardous waste

Site visits, on-site interviews, input from CNIC Regional and Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) Headquarters environmental personnel, and document reviews, including a June 2014 external Environmental Management System (EMS) audit, indicate that the products and services delivered by the NSA Annapolis Public Works Department (PWD) Environmental Division effectively meet the mission requirements of USNA while maintaining compliance with applicable environmental regulations, instructions, and policies.

Energy Conservation

USNA energy conservation programs are compliant with governing instructions, directives, executive orders, and public law.

Safety and Occupational Health (SOH)

We assessed the following as they pertain to USNA:

- Command SOH policy
- SOH oversight of subordinate command
- Headquarters SOH program
- Training and qualifications
- Operational risk management
- Safety councils, committees, and working groups
- Safety database input
- Safety trend analysis
- Safety self-assessment
- Explosive safety
- Range safety
- Mishap investigation and reporting

- Mishap prevention
- Occupational health
- Fall protection
- Hazard abatement
- Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)/Third-party inspections
- Traffic safety (including motorcycle safety)
- Recreational/off-duty safety

Safety Organization and Training

USNA receives Base Operating Support (BOS) safety services from the NSA Annapolis Safety Department. Safety support provided by NSA Annapolis and industrial hygiene support provided by Naval Health Clinic Annapolis are good. USNA has assigned collateral duty Safety Officers for the Brigade of Midshipmen and for the USNA staff, but neither of these officers has completed the required Introduction to Navy Occupational Safety and Health (Ashore) course of instruction, CIN A-493-0050.

The Academy does not have an organizational chart that includes safety as a staff function, with the Safety Officer reporting to the Superintendent in accordance with OPNAVINST 5100.23G CH-1, Navy Safety and Occupational Health Program Manual. Further, USNA does not:

- Conduct annual command-wide safety program self-assessments to assess mission safety programs not supported by NSA Annapolis Safety Department (such as Laser Safety, Range Safety) in accordance with OPNAVINST 5100.23G CH-1.
- Conduct required safety program oversight inspections of NAPS.

USNA does not have a full time Safety Officer. The program lacks wholeness: a portion of the Academy's programs are supported by NSA Annapolis, but mission safety programs not supported by NSA Annapolis Safety Department are managed by Academy personnel. While there is no formal requirement for the Academy to have a full time Safety Officer, given the size of the command, broad scope of its safety programs (which have aspects of both safety ashore and afloat), and the requirement to have a High-Risk Training Program in place (addressed below), NAVINSGEN recommends that a safety professional be assigned to the Academy to serve in a designated Safety Officer billet. Of note, the Naval War College has a full time Safety Officer.

Issue Paper A-7 addresses this issue in further detail.

Deficiency 13. The collateral duty USNA Staff Safety Officer and Brigade of Midshipmen Safety Officer have not completed the required Introduction to Navy Occupational Safety and Health (Ashore) course of instruction, CIN A-493-0050. Reference: OPNAVINST 5100.23G CH-1, Section 0602e(2).

Deficiency 14. USNA does not have an organizational chart that includes safety as a staff function, with a Safety Officer reporting to the Superintendent. Reference: OPNAVINST 5100.23G CH-1, Section 0303, paragraph a(2).

Deficiency 15. USNA does not have a comprehensive self-assessment program to review the effectiveness of mission safety programs not supported by NSA Annapolis. Reference: OPNAVINST 5100.23G CH-1, Section 0505.

High-Risk Training

USNA conducts high risk-training (HRT) as defined by OPNAVINST 1500.75C, Policy and Governance for Conducting High-Risk Training, but does not have an HRT program in place. Examples of HRT conducted at USNA include weapons qualifications, damage control training, and some physical training conducted during Plebe Summer that has an associated Risk Assessment Code of 2 (or 3, with a severity level of I or II (i.e., death or severe injury)). OPNAVINST 1500.75C specifically identifies USNA as a Training Agency with specific HRT program responsibilities; as such USNA is required to promulgate policy and procedural guidance governing HRT for itself and NAPS.

We found the USNA Range Safety program to be compliant. Additionally, the Director of Athletics does promulgate a Notice governing responsibilities, procedures, supervision, Operational Risk Management assessment, risk mitigation, and medical support for Plebe Summer Physical Training. The planning and guidance in this Notice is a necessary element of an HRT program, but does not fully meet all of the requirements of such a program.

The Academy has a number of Extra Curricular Activities (ECA) which include small arms training by the Combat Arms Team, Self-Contained Underwater Breathing Apparatus (SCUBA) diving and parachuting. Although ECAs, these are high risk activities that could benefit from HRT program oversight.

Issue Paper A-8 addresses this issue in further detail.

Deficiency 16. USNA does not have an HRT program. Reference: OPNAVINST 1500.75C, paragraph 5.

Safety and Occupational Health Management Evaluation (SOHME)

USNA has not conducted a SOHME of NAPS, required by OPNAVINST 5100.23G CH-1, during the past three years.

Deficiency 17.   A Safety and Occupational Health Management Evaluation (SOHME) of the Naval Academy Preparatory School has not been conducted within required periodicity. Reference: OPNAVINST 5100.23G CH-1, Section 0904.

Hearing Conservation Program

USNA Rifle and Pistol Team and Combat Arms Team members are exposed to noise levels that are sufficiently high to potentially warrant enrollment of these team members into the Hearing Conservation Program (HCP). They are currently not in the HCP. Per NEHC-TM OEM 6260.51.99-2, Navy Environmental Health Center Technical Manual, Section C1.2.4.13.d(2), non-enrollment of these personnel requires consultation with an industrial hygienist, operational audiologist, or occupational medicine physician. This consultation will evaluate

noise levels as determined by sound level survey, approximate frequency and duration of the individual's exposure, and pertinent audiometric history (i.e., is there any evidence of a noise induced hearing loss?). The consultant will either make a professional judgment or arrange for further evaluation.

Recommendation 22.   That USNA formally consult with an industrial hygienist, operational audiologist, or occupational medicine physician for a determination as to whether Rifle and Pistol Team and Combat Arms Team personnel should be enrolled in the Navy Hearing Conservation Program due to the noise levels they are subjected to during practice and competition. Reference: OPNAVINST 5100.23G, CH-1, Chapter 18; NEHC Technical Manual, NEHC-TM OEM 6260.51.99-2.

Tagout Program

We observed that tagout audits at the Waterfront Maintenance Activity for the YP 703 Class craft were not being conducted per WRINST 3501.2B, [USNA Waterfront Readiness] Equipment Tag-Out Procedures, or on a bi-weekly basis in accordance with NAVSEA Technical Publication S0400-AD-URM-010/TUM, Tag-Out Users Manual, Revision 07.

Deficiency 18.   Tagout audit procedures are not consistently conducted in accordance with approved procedures at the Waterfront Maintenance Activity. References: WRINST 3501.2B, paragraph 3c(6) and paragraph 6; NAVSEA Technical Publication S0400-AD-URM-010/TUM, paragraph 1.7.4.

Public Private Venture (PPV) Family Housing

Navy Family Housing in the Annapolis area is provided by a limited partnership between the Navy and Lincoln Military Housing as a Public Private Venture (PPV). Lincoln Military Housing maintains 288 family housing units of various ages and sizes in ten different neighborhoods. After a careful review of PPV documents, on-site interviews with housing management, and inspection of units, we determined that PPV housing is in good material condition and is well managed by a government and contractor partner team that is responsive to tenant needs.

Some residents expressed concern during focus group discussions and in online survey results with the impending implementation of Office of Secretary of Defense's Resident Energy Conservation Program (RECP), particularly with utility billing procedures in PPV housing. Accuracy of metering was cited as the primary concern. The Navy Housing PPV Management team provided copies of communications with residents outlining the mock billing process and the investigations into metering anomalies. Senior leadership at USNA and NSA Annapolis are involved and working with the PPV management team to ensure resolution of metering issues before providing a 30-day advance notice of "live" RECP billing.

SECURITY PROGRAMS AND CYBERSECURITY/TECHNOLOGY

The Security Programs and Cybersecurity and Technology Team used survey and focus group responses, document review, and face-to-face interviews to assess the following areas:

- Personnel Security
- Information Security
- Industrial Security
- Operations Security
- Physical Security and Antiterrorism/Force Protection
- Insider Threat (specifically active shooter preparedness)
- Cybersecurity
- Personally Identifiable Information

Command Security Programs

NAVINSGEN reviewed compliance with mandatory personnel, information, industrial and operations security requirements. USNA has a full time command security officer and two security specialists. One person from the Human Resources Office also performs some security related functions to include data entry for staff and faculty personnel security investigations (PSI). During our inspection, a safe containing classified material was found open and unguarded. The Academy immediately conducted a Preliminary Inquiry (PI) and took corrective actions to prevent future occurrences.

Deficiency 19.   At the time of the inspection, USNA had between 300-400 PSIs out of date. Reference: SECNAV M-5510.30, Department of the Navy Personnel Security Program, Section 5-4.

Deficiency 20.   A safe containing classified information was found open and unguarded during the inspection. Reference: SECNAV M-5510.36, Department of the Navy Information Security Program, Section 10-3, paragraph 1c.

Deficiency 21.   Security Container Information forms (SF 700) Parts 2 and 2A were not stored in a General Services Administration (GSA) approved container. Reference: SECNAV M-5510.36, Section 10-12, paragraph 4.

Deficiency 22.   Activity Security Checklists (SF 701) and Security Container Check Sheets (SF 702) were not consistently used. Reference: SECNAV M-5510.36, Section 7-11.

Deficiency 23.   USNA is not providing oversight of security programs at the Naval Academy Preparatory School. References: SECNAV M-5510.36, Section 2-11 and SECNAV M-5510.30, Section 2-10.

Deficiency 24.   USNA is not maintaining records of annual security refresher training (b)(7)(f) (b)(7)(e)&(f) **. Reference: SECNAV M-5510.30, Section 4-9.**

Recommendation 23.   That USNA security personnel obtain refresher training utilizing Defense Security Service Security Training Education and Professional Portal (STEPP).

Recommendation 24. That prior to any planned installation of SIPRNET or higher classification computer systems, USNA conduct a self-assessment of its current security staffing and level of security expertise to determine if it is sufficient to properly establish and maintain those systems.

Industrial Security

(b)(7)(e)&(f)

(b)(7)(e)&(f)

Deficiency 25. (b)(7)(e)&(f) . References: SECNAV M-5510.36, Chapter 11; OPNAVINST 3432.1A, Operations Security, Enclosure (1), paragraph 5d.

Deficiency 26. USNA's Cyber Security Work Force Support Contract, signed 17 September 2014, does not specify the required clearance level for tier one access (administrator access). Contract must stipulate a Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI) is required for tier one access. Reference: SECNAV M-5239.2, Department of the Navy Information Assurance Program, section 3-5.

Recommendation 25. That USNA verify that all personnel currently with tier one access have a completed SSBI.

Operations Security (OPSEC)

(b)(7)(e)&(f)

Deficiency 27. (b)(7)(e)&(f) . Reference: OPNAVINST 3432.1A, paragraph 5.

Deficiency 28. USNA is not providing oversight of lower echelon OPSEC programs. Reference: OPNAVINST 3432.1A, Enclosure (1), paragraphs 5e, 5h; DoD Manual 5205.02-M, Enclosure 2, paragraph 6a(9).

Cybersecurity & Technology

USNA has a valid authority to operate (ATO) for the Academic and Professionally accredited Enterprise Education Enclave (AEEE). The AEEE is the home for the Midshipman Information Data System (MIDS) that includes Midshipman Personally Identifiable Information (PII).

Data at Rest (DAR)

(b)(7)(e)&(f)

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)/Public Key Enabling (PKE)

(b)(7)(e)&(f)

Administrator Rights

Administrator rights for individual computers that operate on the AEEE are not controlled by the Information System Security Officer (ISSO) as required by DON CIO policy. Administrator rights are granted to most users on their individual staff, faculty and midshipmen computers. By allowing each individual to have administrator rights for their own computer, potentially malicious software can be loaded by the user (either unintentionally or intentionally), putting sensitive information and PII information stored on the AEEE at risk.

Personally Identifiable Information (PII)

(b)(7)(e)&(f)

Most staff members do not know how to encrypt email on their government computer system.

Deficiency 29. (b)(7)(e)&(f)

References: DON CIO MSG DTG 312021Z JAN 09, Subj: Department of the Navy (DON) Enterprise Data at Rest (DAR) Solutions for all Non-NMCI Assets; CNO/N6 MSG DTG 151831Z APR 09, Subj: Purchasing and Deployment of Department of Navy (DON) Enterprise Data at Rest Solution, Mobile Armor; NAVADMIN 344/09, SUBJ: Deployment of Data at Rest (DAR) Encryption Solution for U.S. Navy Networks and Assets; CNO/N2N6MSG DTG 191626Z MAY 11, Subj: Data at Rest (DAR) Encryption Solution Waivers.

Deficiency 30. (b)(7)(e)&(f)

References: DON CIO MSG DTG 032009Z OCT 08, Subj: DON Policy Updates for Personal Electronic Devices (PED) Security and Application of Email Signature and Encryption; DoDI 8520.02, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Public Key Enabling (PKE); DON CIO MSG DTG

211312Z APR 11, Subj: DON Public Key Enablement Waiver Request Process for Unclassified Networks, Private Web Servers, Portals and Web Applications.

Deficiency 31. Administrator rights for individual computers that operate on the USNA AEEE are not controlled by the Information System Security Officer (ISSO). Reference: DON CIO MSG DTG 031648Z OCT 11, Subj: Acceptable Use Policy.

Deficiency 32. `(b)(7)(e)&(f)`   . Reference: SECNAVINST 5211.5E, paragraph 7h.

Deficiency 33. Emails containing PII are not routinely encrypted. Reference: DON CIO MSG DTG 031648ZOCT11, Subj: Acceptable Use Policy.

Deficiency 34. USNA does not provide oversight of the PII programs of Naval Academy Preparatory School. Reference: SECNAVINST 5211.5E, paragraph 7h.

Deficiency 35. The Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for AEEE, recently approved by DON CIO, is inaccurate. It lists a number of safeguards and technical controls that were not actually in place. This PIA requires updating and resubmission. Reference: SECNAVINST 5211.5E, paragraph 7m(7).

Recommendation 26. That USNA consider utilizing a Naval Reservist to fill the gapped Privacy Point of Contact (POC) until the position can be filled by a permanent fill.

USNA Visitor Access Control

`(b)(7)(e)&(f)`

`(b)(7)(e)&(f)`

Issue Paper A-9 addresses this issue in further detail.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT/COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS

The Resource Management/Compliance Programs Team assessed 18 programs and functions. Our findings reflect inputs from survey respondents, onsite focus group participants, document review, direct observation, and face-to-face personnel interviews.

The following programs and functions are considered to be well administered and in full compliance with applicable directives:

- Financial Management/Comptroller Functions
- Managers' Internal Control
- Government Travel Charge Card
- Government Commercial Purchase Card
- Command Individual Augmentee Coordinator Program
- Post-Deployment Health Reassessment
- Physical Readiness Program
- Command Managed Equal Opportunity
- Hazing Training and Compliance
- Legal and Ethics
- Inspector General Functions
- Cemetery and Columbarium Operations

USNA Inspector General (IG) Performance

We conducted a quality assurance review of USNA IG hotline program and found it to be compliant. USNA has an inspection program to self-assess program compliance per SECNAV 5040.3A, Inspections Within the Department of the Navy, however they have not formally inspected NAPS since at least 2011.

Cemetery and Columbarium Operations

Operations of the U.S. Naval Academy Cemetery and Columbarium are compliant with applicable laws, regulations and instructions. Review of the status of corrective actions from the NAVINSGEN inspection of the Naval Academy Cemetery and Columbarium, directed by the FY12 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and dated 30 March 2012, shows good progress toward resolving the observed record deficiencies. The USNA IG is scheduled to complete an inspection of the Cemetery and Columbarium in FY15, including full assessment of the status of all findings, recommendations and corrective actions from the 2012 NAVINSGEN report. NAVINSGEN will review the resulting USNA IG inspection report to determine closure of any follow-up and additional action.

The following programs were found to be not fully compliant:

Personal Property Management (PPM)

The USNA PPM program is in compliance with SECNAVINST 7320.10A, Department of the Navy (DON) Personal Property Policies and Procedures. The program properly accounts for 70

million dollars in USNA assets; however, this program was only brought into compliance in 2014.

Deficiency 36. **USNA failed to adhere to requirements to maintain accountable records within a compliant personal property system prior to 2014. Reference: SECNAVINST 7320.10A, paragraph 6b.**

Individual Medical Readiness (IMR)

IMR is well-managed in coordination with the supporting military treatment facility. However, regular reporting of IMR to senior USNA leadership as required by SECNAVINST 6120.3 CH-1, Periodic Health Assessment for Individual Medical Readiness, has not been performed.

Deficiency 37. **USNA has not regularly reported IMR to the Superintendent and senior Academy leadership. Reference: SECNAVINST 6120.3, CH-1, paragraph 3a.**

Navy Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention (NADAP) Program

USNA's alcohol and drug abuse prevention programs were found to meet governing directives with the exception of assignment of the Drug and Alcohol Program Advisor (DAPA) as a collateral duty. OPNAVINST 5350.4D, Navy Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control requires that the DAPA be a full-time position for commands with 500 or more members.

Deficiency 38. **USNA DAPA is a collateral duty rather than full-time position as required for a command of this size. Reference: OPNAVINST 5350.4D, paragraph 8p(6)(d).**

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program

Academy leadership, faculty, and staff are committed to ensuring an environment free of sexual assault. Sexual assault victims receive excellent care and support services at the Academy. Specific areas for improvement, mostly related to the number and roles of personnel involved in incident reporting and response procedures which could place victim confidentiality and privacy protections in jeopardy, are detailed below.

USNA SAPR Instruction

Elements of USNA's SAPR instruction, USNAINST 1752.2F, dated 12 September 2014, are incorrect and in conflict with the requirements of the SAPR program as directed in DoD, SECNAV, and OPNAV SAPR instructions. Examples include the reporting chain from victim to Superintendent, USNA Sexual Assault Case Management Group (SACMG) membership, and training requirements. These conflicts should be resolved or formal variance exemptions should be sought. In addition to USNAINST 1752.2F, the Academy has a separate SAPR instruction for the Brigade of Midshipmen, COMDTMIDNINST 1752.1G. This instruction is also incorrect and in conflict with governing instructions, exacerbating role and response confusion for midshipmen. We recommend that USNA review the utility of this instruction and consider incorporating any Brigade-unique elements into the USNAINST.

Training

Per DoDI 6495.02, CH-1, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program Procedures, and SECNAVINST 1752.4B, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response, SAPR training is required for civilians who supervise service members, required for all civilians, and, if feasible, highly recommended for DON contractors. USNA does not explicitly track completion of SAPR training for civilians who supervise service members. Overall civilian SAPR training completion was only 66 percent at the time of our on-site inspection; by the end of FY14 the reported completion rate was 96 percent.

Training of personnel performing certain roles within the SAPR program at USNA has not been performed as directed in DoDI 6495.02, CH-1, SECNAVINST 1752.4B, and OPNAVINST 1752.1B, Sexual Assault Victim Intervention (SAVI) Program. Specifically, the Data Collection Coordinator (DCC), SAPR Point of Contact (POC), SAPR Liaison, and members of the SACMG have not received required training, which should be facilitated by the Sexual Assault Response Coordinators (SARC).

Naval Academy Duty Officers (NADO) are trained in how to respond to incoming reports of SA. However, USNA has not conducted formal watchstander and Duty Officer training for personnel who stand the Brigade "Main Office" watch to ensure proper response to reports of sexual assault (SA) per SECNAVINST 1752.4B. Watchstanders receive the same SAPR General Military Training (GMT), command indoctrination SAPR training, and regularly scheduled SAPR training throughout the academic school year that all midshipmen receive. While this general training may introduce them to resources such as the USNA SAPR intranet page, watchstanders do not receive specific training in responding to incoming reports of SA and direct referral of sexual assault victims to a SARC or SAPR Victim Advocates (VA). Focused watchstander training would ensure readiness to respond appropriately in the event of a report of SA. Response protocols and prepared SAPR checklists should be placed in a watchstander binder to aid watchstanders.

Key Personnel Appointments

Key personnel positions, including DCC, SAPR Liaison, and SAPR POC, have not been appointed in writing by the Superintendent as required by OPNAVINST 1752.1B.

Sexual Assault Reporting Procedures

Reporting of SA at USNA inserts numerous personnel without a clear need-to-know into the response process. This places victim confidentiality and privacy protections in jeopardy and could be seen as a barrier to reporting and to seeking care. Per DoD and Navy SAPR policy, the SA reporting chain should go from victim to a SAPR VA, to the SARC, then the Superintendent. The actual SA reporting chain at the Academy is not clearly defined; staff and midshipmen are trained to directly contact a member of the SAPR Response Team, which USNA defines to include SAPR VA or SARC, if they are a victim of sexual assault. In the course of our interviews and observations, it was apparent that staff and midshipmen associate the term "SAPR Response Team" with a variety of personnel associated with the Academy's SAPR efforts, including administrative personnel within the SAPR program who are not appropriate to receive a report. Without a clearly defined, and tight, SA reporting chain, victim confidentiality is at risk.

The Chief of Staff (COS) can be included in the SA reporting chain in all instances of SA, and the Commandant of Midshipmen can be included for cases involving midshipmen. Their inclusion in this reporting chain is appropriate, but must be documented in writing and formally communicated to members of the command.

Leadership SARC Briefing

The Superintendent had not been briefed by the SARC within 30 days of taking command as required by the by DoDI 6495.02, CH-1, Enclosure (5), paragraph 3a and SECNAVINST 1752.4B, Enclosure (5), paragraph 3b. The Superintendent subsequently received the required SARC briefing on 23 September 2014. The COS received the SARC brief at the same time as the Superintendent.

Sexual Assault Case Management Group (SACMG) Representation and Attendance

USNA has constituted its own SACMG, separate from the NSA Annapolis installation SACMG. Per DoD and Navy instruction, the SACMG is intended to be a limited-attendance coordination meeting regarding individual SA victim case status. However, USNA SACMGs are attended by individuals who do not have a need to know for case details and are not required members as delineated in the governing DoDI. For instance, USNAINST 1752.2F states that SACMG "members shall include . . . a member of the victim's immediate chain of command (e.g., Company Officer or Senior Enlisted Leader); . . . the SAPR Program Manager and Deputy Program Manager . . ." This list of attendees is too broad. As a consequence, victim information and privacy is not optimally protected, potentially creating a further barrier to reporting.

Expedited Transfer

USNA does not employ a formal process for handling expedited transfer requests of SA victims as delineated in SECNAVINST 1752.4B, Enclosure (5), paragraph 6 and MILPERSMAN 1300-1200. Per these two references, a formal, documented process is required for all expedited transfers, including intra-command moves such as the transfer of a midshipman SA victim from one Company to another. Expedited transfer packages are not being forwarded to PERS-833 for record retention as directed in MILPERSMAN 1300-1200.

Data Collection and Reporting

We conducted an audit of 30 USNA SA cases to evaluate SARC compliance with data entry into the Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database (DSAID), used to track and report SA statistics to DoD leadership and to Congress. We found a total of 24 missing entries (e.g., gender, victim pay grade, investigative agency assigned, subject type) in nine critical data elements (a nearly 10% rate of missing data fields). Incomplete data entry impedes accurate aggregation and reporting on sexual assault trends.

Role Clarity

Roles and responsibilities of personnel in the USNA SAPR program are blurred. In some instances, personnel who are purely responsible for program management are inappropriately assuming roles within the realm of victim care. Specifically:

- USNA has established a SAPR Program Manager (PM) to advise the Superintendent and to provide administrative oversight of the USNA SAPR program. In the course of

advancing the SAPR program, the PM has become a prominent presence in nearly all aspects of SA educational and victim services efforts, in some measure overshadowing staff such as SARCs and SAPR VAs, who by DON standards should be the recognizable resources to whom victims, watch standers and victim support personnel should turn first. The PM is also informed of details of SA cases beyond purely administrative programmatic data and inappropriately attends the SACMG, which is a victim care coordination setting.

- A Deputy PM has been established as well. Because the Deputy PM has experience as a SAPR VA, and to fill a void created by the vacancies of two fulltime civilian VAs, she continues to perform VA services, potentially exacerbating institutional confusion over program administration versus victim response roles.

- USNA's two SARCs also serve as SAPR VAs, a role one of them previously held and for which both are properly trained. While this is permissible and they are fully dedicated to victim support, it may distract them from performance of primary SARC roles and responsibilities. USNA's SARCs are not aligned with CNIC, which oversees all other shore-installation SARCs throughout the Navy. Greater engagement with this broad and experienced network of SARCs would benefit USNA's SARCs in professional development and administrative oversight.

- Even as the two SARCs serve double duty as SAPR VAs, USNA has other trained uniformed and civilian (volunteer) VAs who are not being used on the VA watchbill.

USNA has developed a program known as "SAPR GUIDE" (Guidance, Understanding, Information, Direction & Education) to educate select midshipmen as trained peers to whom other midshipmen can turn for information about the SAPR program. Although there is an effort to ensure these SAPR GUIDEs do not act as counselors or as SAPR VAs, continuation of this program should be carefully reviewed by Academy leadership due to concern that these midshipmen could be approached to take reports of SA or otherwise provide victim support.

USNA uses a number of titles and terms under the umbrella of its SAPR efforts that do not align with recognized DoD and DON verbiage. These contribute to confusion and blurred lines of responsibility, and are potential impediments to victim confidentiality. For example, USNA uses the term "SAPR Liaison" to refer to a Cost Center Head/Director when they facilitate promulgation of SAPR related material to their staff. Per OPNAVINST 1752.1B, SAPR Liaison is a specific role with designated responsibilities that are unrelated to the way USNA uses the term.

SAPR VA Hiring
USNA's two salaried VA positions are unfilled. USNA currently hires SAPR VAs at the GS-9 level, whereas throughout DoD, SAPR VAs are generally hired at GS-11 or via Non-Appropriated Funds (NAF) at a commensurate pay scale. The Academy should review its current classification to enhance their prospect for hiring and retaining qualified SAPR VAs.

Deficiency 39.   The USNA SAPR instructions, USNAINST 1752.2F and COMDTMIDNINST 1752.1G, are incorrect and do not reflect the requirements of the program as documented in DoD, SECNAV and OPNAV SAPR instructions.

Deficiency 40.   Some personnel with SAPR roles at USNA (SACMG members, DCC, SAPR POC, and SAPR Liaison) have not received required training. Reference: DoDI 6495.02, CH-1, Enclosure (9), paragraph 1e and Enclosure (10); SECNAVINST 1752.4B, Enclosure (3), paragraph 2d; OPNAVINST 1752.1B, paragraph 9f(8).

Deficiency 41.   USNA does not conduct formal watchstander training for the "Main Office" watchstanders, to include midshipmen and Company Officers/Senior Enlisted Leaders, to ensure that proper response protocols are in place to respond to reports of sexual assault (SA). Reference: SECNAVINST 1752.4B, Enclosure (3), paragraph 2c(1); Enclosure (5), paragraph 3a; and Enclosure (10), paragraph 2d.

Deficiency 42.   Chief of Staff, USNA and Commandant of Midshipmen inclusion in SA reporting is not in writing and has not been formally communicated to personnel. Reference: OPNAVINST 1752.1B.

Deficiency 43.   Key SAPR program personnel (SAPR Liaison, SAPR POC, and DCC) are not formally designated by the Superintendent. Reference: OPNAVINST 1752.1B, paragraphs 8b(6) and 9f(3)-(4).

Deficiency 44.   The reporting chain from victim to Superintendent includes numerous personnel without an official need-to-know and does not maximally preserve victim confidentiality and privacy. Reference: DoDI 6495.02 CH-1, paragraphs 4n and 4o; Enclosure (4), paragraph 1c(1).

Deficiency 45.   The USNA SACMG is attended by individuals that are not directly involved with a specific SA case, do not have a "need to know" and are not required SACMG members. Reference: DoDI 6495.02 CH-1, Enclosure (9), paragraph 1c; SECNAVINST 1752.4B, Enclosure (9), paragraph 1c.

Deficiency 46.   USNA does not have a formal process to handle and report expedited transfer requests of SA victims in accordance with requirements. References: SECNAVINST 1752.4B, Enclosure (5), paragraph 6; MILPERSMAN 1300-1200.

Deficiency 47.   DSAID data entry on SA cases is incomplete, with many fields missing required information. Reference: SECNAVINST 1752.4B, Enclosure (6), paragraph 1h(22).

Best Practice

We noted that USNA has developed an innovative, interactive curriculum to educate midshipmen on the importance of accountability and responsibility in the prevention of sexual harassment and sexual assault. Highly trained, hand-picked peer educators lead small-group, discussion-based sessions that augment guest presentations in a tiered curriculum over the course of midshipmen's four year experience at the Academy. A central theme of this program, known as Sexual Harassment and Assault Prevention Education (SHAPE), is active bystander intervention which is approached from practical intervention tools to considerations for the future naval leader.

Recommendation 27.   That USNA review the need for a separate Brigade of Midshipmen SAPR instruction. It may be more appropriate and effective to cancel COMDMIDNINST 1752.1G, incorporate relevant items into the overarching USNAINST 1752.1 series, and promulgate notices that identify procedures and resources specific to the Brigade.

Recommendation 28.   That USNA use the NSA Annapolis installation SACMG for case management of SA cases involving staff (non-midshipmen) victims.

Recommendation 29.   That SAPR program roles and activities be reviewed and defined to ensure clarity and distinction among administrative, educational, prevention, response and victim advocacy responsibilities in accordance with DoDI 6945.02 CH-1, SECNAVINST 1752.4B, and OPNAVINST 1752.1B.

Recommendation 30.   That USNA ensure that SAPR VAs and SARCs are more clearly identifiable as the leads for immediate victim response. For example, SAPR VAs and SARCs could be prominently featured in command orientation and check-in procedures; SAPR posters and educational material throughout USNA's building and website should make contact information for SARCs/SAPR VAs prominent and de-emphasize other personnel that are not primary in initial SA victim response.

Recommendation 31.   That USNA align SARCs with CNIC for professional development and administrative oversight.

Recommendation 32.   That USNA SAPR program align terminology with DoD and DON recognized verbiage. The Academy's program use of its own SAPR terms tends to cause confusion regarding roles and responsibilities.

Recommendation 33.   That USNA review continuation of the SAPR GUIDE program.

Recommendation 34.   That USNA review their civilian SAPR VA position descriptions and pay scale to place them at a commensurate level with other civilian SAPR VA positions throughout Navy.

Noncompliant Programs:

Voting Assistance Program

The Voting Assistance Program is not being executed in accordance with DoDI 1000.04, Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP). USNA has two unit voting assistance officers (UVAO) for a command with over 5,000 personnel. The Federal Voting Assistance Program recommends additional UVAOs for commands with more than 25 personnel. USNA must review its Voting Assistance Program in coordination with CNIC Voting Action Officer to determine an appropriate number of UVAOs necessary to ensure that it effectively executes the intent of the program in accordance with DoDI 1000.04.

Deficiency 48.   Two UVAOs are insufficient to effectively execute the Voting Assistance Program. Reference: DoDI 1000.04, Enclosure 4, paragraph 2(f).

Deficiency 49.   USNA does not conduct oversight for their lower echelon subordinate command (Naval Academy Preparatory School). Reference: DoDI 1000.04, Enclosure 4, paragraph 2(f)(3).

Deficiency 50. USNA does not have absentee voter registration, ballot request and absentee ballot submission information, and deadlines in written format for those citizens who do not have access to online documents. Reference: DoDI 1000.04, Enclosure 4, paragraph 2(g)-2(i).

Deficiency 51. USNA does not have comprehensive command-wide voting awareness, assistance programs, and activities in support of the requirement to annually deliver SF 76s, "Federal Post Card Applications (FPCA)", by January 15.   Reference: DoDI 1000.04, Enclosure 4, paragraphs 2(m)(1) and 2(q).

Deficiency 52. USNA does not conduct annual training for all uniformed service members (including activated and Reserve personnel) on absentee registration and voting procedures. Reference: DoDI 1000.04, Enclosure 4, paragraph 2(s).

Recommendation 35.   That USNA follow the 2014-2015 Navy Voting Action Plan and attend upcoming FVAP workshops.

Recommendation 36.   That USNA coordinate with the Senior Navy Voting Representative (CNIC) to assist in determining the appropriate number of UVAOs for the Academy.

Suicide Prevention

Suicide Prevention Program

USNA's Suicide Prevention program requires greater oversight by the Suicide Prevention Coordinator (SPC). We note that the USNA Chaplain team provides tremendous support to suicide prevention efforts for the staff and midshipmen of the Academy.

Suicide prevention educational and support materials were not posted throughout Academy buildings (this was immediately corrected by USNA). Academy Senior Leadership has not regularly published messages, information and guidance on suicide prevention and has not incorporated suicide prevention as a part of life skills and health promotion training as required by OPNAVINST 1720.4A.

Watchstander/Duty Officer Training

USNA does not conduct formal watchstander and Duty Officer training for midshipmen and Company Officers/Senior Enlisted Leaders who stand the "Main Office" watch to ensure proper crisis response to suicide-related behavior calls and reports in accordance with OPNAVINST 1720.4A and as described in the Commanding Officer's Suicide Prevention and Response Toolbox (www.suicide.navy.mil).

Civilian and Military Training

Civilian staff and full-time contractor personnel do not receive Suicide Prevention training in accordance with OPNAVINST 1720.4A. The FY14 Suicide Prevention training completion rate for military is 84 percent.

Deficiency 53. USNA has not regularly published messages to provide suicide prevention guidance and information and has not incorporated suicide prevention as a part of life skills and health promotion training. Reference: OPNAVINST 1720.4A, paragraphs 5a(2)-(3) and 6h(4).

Deficiency 54. Watchstander and Duty Officer training was not being conducted to ensure proper crisis response to suicide-related behavior calls and reports. Reference: OPNAVINST 1720.4A, paragraphs 5b(1) and 5c.

Deficiency 55. Suicide prevention training is not being conducted for civilian personnel and full-time contractors. Reference: OPNAVINST 1720.4A, paragraphs 5a(1) and 6h(3).

Recommendation 37. That USNA revise the "Watchstander Suicide Prevention SOP" found in USNAINST 1720.1 in order to implement focused response protocols and prepared Suicide Prevention checklists for "Main Office" watchstanders and Duty Officers, placing these in watchstander binders to aid in properly handling suicide-related calls.

Travel Voucher Liquidation

In the course of our review of Government Travel Charge Card management, we found that over 1000 travel vouchers at USNA have gone more than 30 days without approval following the completion of travel. DoD 7000.14-R, DoD Financial Management Regulation, requires travel voucher submission within five working days of travel completion, with seven working days for the approving official to approve for payment or notify the traveler if the claim is not proper. Per DoD 7000.14-R, travel vouchers should be liquidated and travelers reimbursed for authorized travel expenses no later than 30 days after submission of an accurate and complete travel claim.

Deficiency 56. Travel vouchers are not being liquidated within prescribed timelines. Reference: DoD 7000.14-R, volume 9, paragraphs 031201A and 080801.

SAILOR PROGRAMS

Brilliant on the Basics Programs were reviewed and behavior associated with good order and discipline was closely observed. Overall, command morale and perceptions of quality of life (QOL) were noted to be average. Enlisted Sailors displayed proper military bearing and maintained a professional appearance.

Sailor Career Management Programs

Areas reviewed included the Command Sponsorship, Command Indoctrination, and Career Development Programs.

Command Sponsorship Program

This program is in compliance with OPNAVINST 1740.3C, Command Sponsor and Indoctrination Programs. The command has a designated coordinator responsible for assigning Sponsors to inbound military members. The Sponsor Coordinator has a system in place to ensure Sailors complete required Fleet and Family Support Center training before they are assigned Sponsorship duties.

Command Indoctrination Program (INDOC)

The USNA INDOC program is in compliance with OPNAVINST 1740.3C. The command has a command training team. Navy Pride and Professionalism training is conducted with Command INDOC, which is conducted within 30 days of reporting.

Career Development Program (CDP)

USNA's CDP is in compliance with OPNAVINST 1040.11D, Navy Enlisted Retention and Career Development Program. A rated Navy counselor is assigned and junior enlisted Sailors receive required Career Development Boards and guidance from senior enlisted leaders. NAVINSGEN observed records of CDP training, Career Development Team (CDT) meetings and monthly CDT member training.

Appendix A: Issue Papers

SUMMARY OF ACTIONS

Issue Papers that follow require responses to recommendations in the form of Implementation Status Reports (ISR). If you are an Action Officer for a staff listed in Table A-1, please submit ISRs as specified for each applicable recommendation, along with supporting documentation, such as plans of action and milestones and implementing directives.

- Submit initial ISRs using OPNAV Form 5040/2 no later than 1 April 2015. Each ISR should include an e-mail address for the action officer, where available. This report is distributed through Navy Taskers. ISRs should be submitted through the assigned document control number in Navy Taskers. An electronic version of OPNAV Form 5040/2 is added to the original Navy Tasker Package along with the inspection report, upon distribution.

- Submit quarterly ISRs, including "no change" reports until the recommendation is closed by NAVINSGEN. When a long-term action is dependent upon prior completion of another action, the status report should indicate the governing action and its estimated completion date. Further status reports may be deferred, with NAVINSGEN concurrence.

- When action addressees consider required action accomplished, the status report submitted should contain the statement, "Action is considered complete." However, NAVINSGEN approval must be obtained before the designated action addressee is released from further reporting responsibilities on the recommendation.

- NAVINSGEN point of contact for ISRs is Ms. Ruth Hilliard, Telephone: (202) 433-7941, DSN 288-7941, Facsimile: (202) 433-7974, E-mail: ruth.hilliard@navy.mil.

Table A-1. Action Officer Listing for Implementation Status Reports

COMMAND	RECOMMENDATION NUMBER(S) XXX-14
USNA	040, 041, 042, 043, 045, 046, 047, 048, 049, 050
PMS 325	040, 041
OPNAV N96	040, 041, 043
USFF	042
DON/AA	044
OPNAV N1	045, 047
OPNAV N46	046, 051
CNIC	046, 051
COMNAVSAFECEN	047, 048, 050
NCIS STAAT	051

ISSUE PAPER A-1: INTEGRATED LOGISTICS SUPPORT (ILS)

<table>
<tr><td style="text-align:right">References:</td><td>(a) N00024-06-R-2200, Training Patrol Craft (YP) Performance Specification, 16 Jun 05</td></tr>
<tr><td style="text-align:right">Issue:</td><td>The long term viability of the YP 703 Class craft as a training platform at USNA is at risk as these craft are being maintained without formal Navy Integrated Logistics Support (ILS). Without ILS, USNA is limited in its ability to predict total ownership costs, achieve reliable spares resupply, and conduct predictive equipment failure rate planning.</td></tr>
<tr><td style="text-align:right">Background:</td><td>Per reference (a), the original YP 703 Class specification required the contractor to initially provide ILS. This ILS support ceased after the initial warranty period; follow-on ILS was not funded by Chief of Naval Operations, Director, Surface Warfare (OPNAV N96). Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) parts purchases were the intended means of supporting these vessels; however, this approach proved problematic due to lead time to procure parts (most parts cost over 3 thousand dollars and require NAVSUP approval for purchase), higher than expected failure rates, and faster than anticipated equipment obsolescence.</td></tr>
<tr><td style="text-align:right">Discussion:</td><td>ILS is typically provided through the life of a vessel. Without ILS, USNA is limited in its ability to predict total ownership costs, achieve reliable spares resupply, conduct configuration management and conduct predictive maintenance planning. Without formal ILS support, we assess that parts support will remain limited, poor configuration management will persist, and the total cost of ownership will be unpredictable.

ILS support is provided via the Navy Organizational Maintenance Management System-Next Generation (OMMS-NG). However, OMMS-NG cannot be used by USNA as they do not have Navy Marine Corps Internet (NMCI) connectivity at the Waterfront Operations complex. USNA is using commercial software to order parts and track repairs to a limited degree. USNA will require OMMS-NG to support Navy ILS.</td></tr>
<tr><td style="text-align:right">Recommendation:</td><td>040-14. That USNA staff in coordination with Program Executive Office Ships (Support Ships, Boats and Craft) (PMS 325) and OPNAV N96 review YP 703 Class ILS requirements and pursue a formalized model and Information Technology solution to addresses shortcomings in configuration, cost, and quality management and supply chain reliability.</td></tr>
<tr><td style="text-align:right">NAVINSGEN POC:</td><td>(b)(6) & (b)(7)(c) , USN
(202) 433-(b)(6) & (b) ; DSN 288-(b)(6) & (b)
(b)(6) & (b)(7)(c) @navy.mil</td></tr>
</table>

ISSUE PAPER A-2: ENGINEERING OPERATIONAL SEQUENCING SYSTEM (EOSS)

<table>
<tr>
<td>References:</td>
<td>(a) OPNAVINST 9200.3B, Operating Sequencing Systems, 29 Jul 14
(b) OPNAVINST 7220.14, Career Sea Pay and Career Sea Pay Premium, 24 Dec 05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue:</td>
<td>YP 704 through YP 708 are not supported by EOSS, which was only developed for YP 703. Currently, USNA is using copies of YP 703 EOSS on the other vessels in the class. EOSS must be developed for hulls 704-708 to account for variations in equipment configuration and design within the class. USNA is at risk of personnel injury and equipment damage caused by improper system alignment or equipment operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background:</td>
<td>Operating Sequencing Systems are required to be hull specific and used on all surface ships per reference (a) paragraph 1a. Although not commissioned vessels, YPs are Category "B" vessels per reference (b), and are operated in a like manner to surface ships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion:</td>
<td>Follow-on YP 703 Class craft have significant configuration differences from hull 703, rendering portions of the issued EOSS inaccurate or unusable in follow-on hulls (704-708). Hull specific EOSS is required for each YP 703 Class vessel. Because EOSS is not funded for YP 703 Class, there is no means for USNA to obtain action on urgent and routine feedback reports to develop hull specific EOSS modified from the baseline hull 703 EOSS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation:</td>
<td>041-14. That USNA staff in coordination with Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, Program Executive Office Ships (Support Ships, Boats and Craft (NAVSEA PMS 325)) and Chief of Naval Operations, Director, Surface Warfare (OPNAV N96) develop tailored EOSS procedures for YP hulls 704 through 708 to account for variations within the 703 YP Class.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVINSGEN POC:</td>
<td>(b)(6) & (b)(7)(c), USN
(202) 433-(b)(6) & (b); DSN 288(b)(6) & (b)
(b)(6) & (b)(7)(c)@navy.mil</td>
</tr>
</table>

ISSUE PAPER A-3: YARD PATROL (YP) ENGINEERING ASSIST VISITS

References: (a) DIVPRODEVINST 3120.2B, USNA YP 703 Standard Operating
                   Procedures (SOP) (undated)

Issue: USNA YP engineering programs and watchstander proficiency is not
         independently evaluated by an engineering assessment team to ensure
         appropriate standards are maintained.

Background: YP craft have engineering main spaces with equipment that is potentially
              dangerous if not operated and maintained correctly. Fleet units are
              regularly inspected by Afloat Training Group to ensure that appropriate
              engineering program management and watchstander standards are
              maintained.

Discussion: Engineering programs associated with the YP class are not inspected by an
              engineering team to ensure compliance with applicable standards. USNA
              is unique in that it is an echelon 2 command with its own vessels and does
              not have an ISIC with an engineering assessment team. Consequently,
              there has been no formal inspection of YP SOP (reference (a)),
              engineering program management or watchstander proficiency.

              NAVINSGEN did not inspect engineering program management, however,
              we noted shortfalls in the Engineering Operational Sequencing Systems
              (EOSS) and Tag-Out programs. Programs such as Fuel Oil Quality
              Management, Lube Oil Quality Management, Tag-Out, EOSS, Electrical
              Safety, Damage Control, Engineering Training and watchstander
              proficiency require review from an engineering assessment team, such as
              Afloat Training Group Atlantic, to ensure high engineering standards are
              being maintained.

Recommendation: 042-14. That USNA coordinate with Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces
                   Command (USFF) to have Afloat Training Group Atlantic conduct periodic
                   engineering assist visits to review YP engineering program management
                   and watchstander proficiency and provide the Superintendent with
                   recommendations for improvement, as applicable.

NAVINSGEN POC: (b)(6) & (b)(7)(c), USN
                 (202) 433-(b)(6) & (b) ; DSN 288-(b)(6) & (b)(7)(c)
                 (b)(6) & (b)(7)(c) @navy.mil

ISSUE PAPER A-4: LONG TERM YARD PATROL (YP) CRAFT REQUIREMENT

References: (a) OPNAVINST 5450.330A, Missions, Functions and Tasks of the United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, 28 Dec 09

    (b) Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, SEA 05D4, Training Patrol Craft (YP) SLEP vs. New Procurement Cost Comparison, Ltr, Ser 05D/468, 18 Sep 2012

    (c) Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division Detachment Norfolk (NSWCCD) and Program Executive Office Ships (PMS 325), Training Patrol Craft (YP) Cost Comparison Service Life Extension Program vs. New Procurement, 16 Mar 2012

Issue: USNA is at risk of not meeting its professional development training mission because of a potential insufficient inventory of YPs in the near future.

Background: Per reference (a), USNA requires the ability to operate and maintain training devices that directly support the professional development of midshipmen. USNA utilizes YPs as a small unit leadership training laboratory and practical application setting for seamanship and navigation skill development. The current YP 676 class craft have reached or exceeded the end of their 30 year service life and the current inventory of 6 YP 703 class craft are far below USNA's stated requirement of 18 total training vessels. Per references (b) and (c), Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (SEA 05D4) tasked Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division (NSWCCD) Detachment Norfolk and Program Executive Office Ships (PMS 325) to conduct a study comparing a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) of 12 existing YP 676 class craft and a procurement of 12 new YPs. The SLEP option was determined to be the most cost effective approach.

Discussion: We assess that YPs, as currently used, provide a real world training experience that introduces midshipmen to the maritime environment, provides excellent leadership opportunity, and builds professional skills necessary for success as a naval officer. Commanding Officers of fleet units reporting as part of the Academy Effectiveness Board (AEB) Fleet/Schoolhouse Feedback Study commented frequently on the value of YP training as a factor that positively distinguished newly reported Ensigns from the USNA compared to other commissioning sources. Furthermore, Fleet Commanding Officers recommended more YP training time for prospective surface warfare officers.

USNA intends to submit a POM 17 Issue Paper to fund the SLEP of 12 YP 676 class. However, even if the SLEP is funded, the refurbished YP 676

class will only have their service life extended for an additional 10 years. Therefore, beginning in 2025 and completing in 2026, the USNA YP inventory will reduce to 6 YP 703 class craft; 12 below the total requirement of 18.

Given the lead time for design and build of new construction craft, a decision on new YP construction is necessary at the earliest opportunity (POM 17) to mitigate any future gap.

Recommendation: 043-14. That Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Director, Surface Warfare (OPNAV N96) and USNA coordinate to validate the YP craft requirement and determine a way ahead for new YP construction to maintain sufficient inventory through 2025.

NAVINSGEN POC: (b)(6) & (b)(7)(c)   , USN
(202) 433-(b)(6) & (b) ; DSN 288-(b)(6) & (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6) & (b)(7)(c)   @navy.mil

ISSUE PAPER A-5: CONFERENCE TRAVEL APPROVAL TIMELINES

References: (a) DON/AA Action memo to SECNAV of December 13, 2013, Subj: Delegation of Conference Approval Authority
(b) ASN(FM&C) Budget Guidance Memorandum BG 13-3B of March 25, 2014, Subj: Guidance for the Execution of FY 2014 Funds

Issue: Navy timelines required for professional conference attendance approval do not support the realities of academic and scientific communities.

Background: Beginning in FY13, in addition to directing travel budget restrictions, DON elevated approval authority and imposed strict timeline changes to the approval of mission-related travel.

Discussion: Per references (a) and (b), DON policy established that requests for approval to attend Non-DoD hosted conferences with total costs to Navy of less than $100K require DON/AA approval (total costs greater than $100K require SECNAV approval). DON/AA policy also requires that such requests must be received and ready for review in the tasker system by DNS-8 NLT 30 days prior to the first day of travel (NLT 120 days prior to travel for those requiring SECNAV approval).

Naval personnel in the academic, medical and scientific communities attend professional conferences not only to maintain currency, licensure and credentials, but also to present their professional work or to participate in discussion panels with other subject matter experts. Presentation of professional work is central to professional development, advancement and promotion in these communities, as well as supportive of Navy's standing in collaborative scientific environments. However, in many instances DON academics and scientists are not formally notified that they have been selected to present their work or otherwise participate in the conference until well inside the 30-day approval timeline required by DON/AA.

Recommendation: 044-14. That DON/AA revise the process of conference travel approval to support requests within 30 days of travel involving invitations to present professional work.

NAVINSGEN POC: (b)(6) & (b)(7)(c) , USN
(202) 433-(b)(6) & (b) ; DSN 288-(b)(6) & (b)(7)(c)
j(b)(6) & (b)(7)(c)@navy.mil

ISSUE PAPER A-6: ACCREDITATION BY MIDDLE STATES COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION

References: (a) Report to the Faculty, Administration, Board of Visitors, and Midshipmen of the United States Naval Academy (USNA), Middle States Commission on Higher Education (MSCHE), 20-24 Feb, 2006
(b) USNA Periodic Review Report (to MSCHE), Jun 2011

Issue: Two issues identified during the 2006 accreditation visit to USNA by MSCHE remain unresolved; specifically, technician manning shortfalls in engineering and science laboratories and completion of library facility improvements.

Background: USNA is accredited by MSCHE under a ten-year cycle of continuous review. Per reference (a), the MSCHE Visiting Team identified four (4) recommendations, two of which remain unresolved. These recommendations, and the relevant MSCHE Standard headings, are:

(1) Faculty (Standard 10). It is recommended that the Academy study the current situation for the library and other support staff, particularly for technicians in the engineering and science laboratories, and develop a long-range plan for adequate staffing into the future, including replacements resulting from retirements and resignations.

(2) Educational Offerings (Standard 11). The library, which was constructed in 1973, is in need of extensive renovation. A facility plan to upgrade the facility must be undertaken soon or USNA risks undermining its strong educational offerings.

Discussion: In 2011, USNA submitted a required Periodic Review Report (PRR) to MSCHE (reference (b)), providing detailed discussion and supporting documents in response to MSCHE's 2006 recommendations. The response reported the following:

(1) Faculty (Standard 10). Zero-based assessments of staffing requirements to include technical staff for laboratories and libraries were conducted in response to the Middle States Report. Modest hiring increases were accomplished but subsequent budgetary circumstances have threatened or undermined those gains.

(2) Educational Offerings (Standard 11). The 2009 Master Plan included whole-building renovation of the Nimitz Library in the period FY13-FY19.

As of September 2014, shortfalls in technician manning remain. Extensive library and plaza renovation are ongoing. HVAC design phase is complete but still awaiting funding for the next phase.

Recommendations: 045-14. That Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Manpower, Personnel,

Education, and Training (OPNAV N1) coordinate with USNA to ensure that staffing and faculty manning shortfalls identified during the 2006 MSCHE accreditation report are corrected or mitigated prior to the 2016 MSCHE accreditation site visit.

046-14. That Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Director, Shore Readiness Division (OPNAV N46) coordinate with Commander, Navy Installation Command (CNIC) and USNA to ensure that Academy library facility shortfalls identified in the 2006 MSCHE accreditation report are corrected prior to the 2016 MSCHE accreditation site visit.

NAVINSGEN POC: (b)(6) & (b)(7)(c) , USN
(202) 433-(b)(6) & (b) ; DSN 288-(b)(6) & (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6) & (b)(7)(c) @navy.mil

ISSUE PAPER A-7: FULL-TIME SAFETY OFFICER FOR USNA

Reference: (a) OPNAVINST 5100.23G CH-1, Navy Safety And Occupational Health Program Manual, 21 July 2011

Issue: USNA does not have a full time Safety Officer. Given the size of the command and broad scope of safety programs at the Academy, NAVINSGEN recommends that a full time safety professional be assigned to USNA to serve as Safety Officer.

Background: USNA receives Base Operating Support (BOS) safety services from the Naval Support Activity (NSA) Annapolis Safety Department. Safety support is provided by NSA Annapolis and industrial hygiene support by Naval Health Clinic Annapolis. USNA has assigned collateral duty Safety Officers for the Brigade of Midshipmen and for the USNA staff and faculty.

Discussion: USNA's safety program lacks wholeness. Some Academy safety programs are directly supported by the NSA Annapolis Safety Department, but a number of safety programs that are considered "mission safety" programs per reference (a) are not. Various personnel at USNA are responsible for the safe execution of individual programs. There is no central coordination or oversight of the efforts of these personnel executing mission safety programs (e.g., laser safety, range safety).

A full time Safety Officer for USNA is not required per reference (a). While there is no formal requirement for the Academy to have a full time Safety Officer, given the size of the command and broad scope of its safety programs (which have aspects of both safety ashore and afloat), the requirement to have a High-Risk Training Program in place, and safety oversight responsibilities for the Naval Academy Preparatory School (NAPS), NAVINSGEN recommends that a safety professional be assigned at the Academy to serve in a designated Safety Officer billet. Of note, the Naval War College has a full time Safety Officer.

Recommendation: 047-14. That Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Manpower, Personnel, Education, and Training (OPNAV N1) and USNA, in consultation with Commander, Naval Safety Center (COMMNAVSAFECEN), determine if the scope of safety responsibilities at the Academy requires a full time Safety Officer who reports directly to the Superintendent. If so, we recommend that a safety professional serve as the Safety Officer.

NAVINSGEN POC: (b)(6) & (b)(7)(c) , USN
(202) 433-(b)(6) & (b) ; DSN 288-(b)(6) & (b)
(b)(6) & (b) (7)(c) @navy.mil

ISSUE PAPER A-8: HIGH-RISK TRAINING (HRT) PROGRAM

Reference: (a) OPNAVINST 1500.75C, Policy and Governance for Conducting High-Risk Training, 22 Aug 2014

Issue: USNA does not have an HRT program as required by reference (a).

Background: USNA conducts high risk-training (HRT) as defined by reference (a), but does not have an HRT program in place.

Discussion: Examples of HRT conducted at USNA include weapons qualifications, damage control training, and some physical training conducted during Plebe Summer that has an associated Risk Assessment Code of 2 (or 3, with a severity level of I or II (i.e., death or severe injury)). Reference (a) specifically identifies USNA as a Training Agency with specific HRT program responsibilities; as such USNA is required to promulgate policy and procedural guidance governing HRT for itself and the Naval Academy Preparatory School (NAPS).

Of note, we found the USNA Range Safety program to be compliant. Additionally, the Director of Athletics does promulgate a Notice governing responsibilities, procedures, supervision, Operational Risk Management assessment, risk mitigation, and medical support for Plebe Summer Physical Training. The planning and guidance in this Notice is a necessary element of an HRT program, but does not fully meet all of the requirements of such a program.

The Academy has a number of Extra Curricular Activities (ECA) which includes small arms training by the Combat Arms Team, Self-Contained Underwater Breathing Apparatus (SCUBA) diving and parachuting. Although ECAs, these are high risk activities that could benefit from HRT program oversight.

Recommendations: 048-14. That Commander, Naval Safety Center (COMNAVSAFECEN) conduct an HRT Assist Visit with USNA to assist the Academy in establishing a formal HRT program in accordance with OPNAVINST 1500.75C.

049-14. That USNA conduct an HRT inspection of NAPS.

050-14. That USNA, in consultation with COMNAVSAFECEN, review Academy Extra Curricular Activities involving small arms live fire, SCUBA diving and parachuting, and others as appropriate, to determine which, if any, should be included in its HRT program.

NAVINSGEN POC: (b)(6) & (b)(7)(c) , USN

(202) 433-(b)(6) & (b) ; DSN 288-(b)(6) & (b)

(b)(6) & (b)(7)(c) @navy.mil

ISSUE PAPER A-9: VISITOR ACCESS TO THE U.S. NAVAL ACADEMY (USNA)

References: (a) Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) Memorandum Change 4 of April 22, 2014, Subj: Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 09-012, "Interim Policy Guidance for DoD Physical Access Control"
(b) CNICINST 5530.14A, Ashore Protection Program, 29 May 2013

Issue: (b)(7)(e)&(f)

Background: (b)(7)(e)&(f)

Discussion: (b)(7)(e)&(f)

(b)(7)(e)&(f)

Recommendation: 051-14. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Director, Shore Readiness Division (OPNAV N46), Commander, Naval Installation Command (CNIC), and Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Security Training, Assistance and Assessment Team (NCIS STAAT) conduct a special assessment to determine appropriate solution for visitor control at USNA.

NAVINSGEN POC: (b)(6) & (b)(7)(c) , USN
(202) 433-(b)(6) & (b) ; DSN 288-(b)(6) & (b)
(b)(6) & (b)(7)(c) @navy.mil

Appendix B: Summary of Key Survey Results

PRE-EVENT SURVEY

In support of the Commander, Naval Academy (USNA) Command Inspection held 22 September 2014 to 1 October 2014, the Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) conducted an anonymous on-line survey of active duty military and Department of the Navy (DON) civilian personnel from 13 July 2014 to 25 August 2014. The survey produced 540 respondents (202 military, 338 civilian). According to reported demographics the sample represented the USNA workforce with less than a 5 percent margin of error at the 99 percent confidence level. Selected topics are summarized in the sections below. A frequency report is provided in Appendix D.

Quality of Life

Quality of life was assessed using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is worst and 10 is best. The overall USNA average quality of work life (QOWL), 6.75 was comparable to the echelon 2 average, 6.59 (Figure B-1); however, the average QOWL for military respondents, 7.41 was higher than the civilians (6.36) and males (6.97) was higher than females (6.44). The overall USNA average quality of home life (QOHL), 8.46 was higher than the echelon 2 average, 7.81 (Figure B-2).

The perceived impact of factors on QOWL life rating is summarized in Table B-1. Factors of potential concern were identified by distributional analyses, where 20 percent negative responses served as a baseline. Advancement Opportunities (33 percent) was the most frequently cited negative impact on QOWL; however, its negative impact was perceived differently between military (15 percent) and civilian (43 percent) respondents. Other military-civilian and male-female subgroup differences in perceived negative impacts on QOWL rating are summarized in Table B-2.

The perceived impact of factors on QOHL life rating is summarized in Table B-3. Not surprisingly, cost of living in the geographic area was broadly identified (44 percent) as a negative impact on QOHL rating.

Command Climate

Table 3 lists aggregate strongly agree and agree response percentages to survey questions addressing perceived job importance, and whether fraternization, favoritism, gender/sex discrimination, sexual harassment, or hazing occurs at USNA. Overall echelon 2 command inspection percentages over a 5-year period are shown for comparison. Excepting job importance, lower values are "better."

- Perceived job importance at USNA was higher than the 5-year echelon 2 command average.

- Perceived occurrence of fraternization, favoritism, gender/sex discrimination, sexual harassment, race discrimination, and hazing at USNA were comparable to echelon 2 commands.

Figure. B-1. Distribution of quality of work life ratings from the pre-event survey. The x-axis lists the rating scale and the y-axis represents the number of survey respondents. Response percentages for ratings are shown at the base of the bar. Counts for each rating are shown above each bar. The most frequent rating is shown in blue.

Figure. B-2. Distribution of quality of home life ratings from the pre-event survey. The x-axis lists the rating scale and the y-axis represents the number of survey respondents. Response percentages for ratings are shown at the base of the bar. Counts for each rating are shown above each bar. The most frequent rating is shown in blue.

Table B-1. Impact of Factors on Quality of Work Life Rating

Factor	Negative	Other
Job satisfaction	**10%**	90%
Leadership support	**26%**	74%
Leadership opportunities	24%	76%
Advancement opportunities	**33%**	67%
Workload	23%	77%
Work Hours/Schedule	**11%**	89%
Training opportunities	**28%**	72%
Awards and recognition	**29%**	71%
Command morale	**32%**	68%
Command climate	**29%**	71%
Quality of workplace facilities	20%	80%

Notes. Perceived impact of factors on quality of work life rating based on negative verses aggregate positive and neutral (Other) responses. Negative values in bold indicate a poor "fit" when using a 20% baseline.

Table B-2. Differences in the Perceived Negative Impact of Factors on Quality of Work Life Rating as a Function of Subgroup

Factor	Military	Civilian	Male	Female
Leadership support	14%	**33%**	-	**-**
Leadership opportunities	9%	**33%**	18%	**32%**
Advancement opportunities	15%	**43%**	-	**-**
Work Hours/Schedule	**17%**	7%	-	**-**
Training opportunities	20%	**33%**	-	-
Awards and recognition	21%	**34%**	-	-
Command morale	18%	**42%**	-	**-**
Command climate	16%	**37%**	-	-
Quality of workplace facilities	14%	**24%**	-	-

Notes. Differences between the distribution of military-civilian and male-female subgroups in the identification of factors that have a negative impact on quality of work life rating.

Table B-3. Impact of Factors on Quality of Home Life Rating

Factor	Negative	Other
Quality of home	**3%**	97%
Quality of the school for dependent children	**4%**	96%
Quality of the childcare available	**3%**	97%
Shopping & dining opportunities	**3%**	97%
Recreational opportunities	**2%**	98%
Access to spouse employment	**6%**	94%
Access to medical/dental care	**5%**	95%
Cost of living	**44%**	56%

Notes. Perceived impact of factors on quality of work life rating based on negative verses aggregate positive and neutral (Other) responses. Negative values in bold indicate a poor "fit" when using a 20% baseline.

Table B-4. Perceived Job Importance and Occurrence of Behaviors Assumed to Impact Command Climate

Question Topic	USNA	Echelon 2
Job Importance	**89%**	78%
Fraternization	13%	14%
Favoritism	38%	31%
Gender/Sex Discrimination	13%	14%
Sexual Harassment	11%	9%
Race Discrimination	11%	11%
Hazing	6%	8%

Notes. Aggregate strongly agree and agree (SA+A) response percentages for selected command climate topics. echelon 2 percentages from FY10-14. Excepting Job Importance, lower percentages are "better." Bold values indicate a significantly different distribution of SA+A responses than echelon 2.

Appendix C: Summary of Focus Group Perceptions

FOCUS GROUPS

From 15 to 17 September 2014 the NAVINSGEN conducted a total of 24 focus groups at USNA, nine with various groupings of active duty staff military ranks, 11 with various groupings of civilian grades, and one with each class of midshipmen. There were a total of 190 USNA focus group participants; 52 military, 115 civilians, 23 midshipmen. Each focus group was scheduled for approximately one hour and consisted of one facilitator and two note takers. The facilitator followed a protocol script: (a) focus group personnel introductions, (b) brief introduction to the NAVINSGEN mission, (c) privacy, Whistleblower statutes, and basic ground rules, (d) participant-derived list of topics that were expressed as having the most impact (positive or negative) on the mission, job performance, or quality of life, and (e) subsequent refinement and discussion of participant-derived topics with an emphasis on understanding the perceived impact. Note takers transcribed focus group proceedings, which were subsequently entered and coded in a spreadsheet database to determine the total number of focus groups in which the same or comparable topic and its perceived impact were discussed. Following (a) through (c), midshipmen focus groups consisted of an open discussion on participant experiences at the academy with potential topic prompts associated with the mission statement.

Table C-1 lists focus groups topics that were expressed as a major impact on the mission, job performance, or quality of life in at least two military staff and/or DON civilian focus groups. For example, military staff and civilian focus groups at the USNA mentioned Manning/Manpower most often as having major or moderate impacts on the mission, job performance, or quality of life.

Table C-1. Participant-Derived Focus Groups Topics Expressed as a Major Impact on the Mission, Job Performance, or Quality of Life.

Topic	Impact		
	Major	Moderate	Minor
Manning/Manpower	●●○○○○○○	●●○○	
Travel	●●●○○○		
Procurement	●○○○○	○	
Advancement/Promotion	●○	●○	
Parking	●○	●●	●●
Leadership	●●	○	
NMCI/IT	●○		

Notes. Descending order of the number of focus groups topics that were expressed as a major impact on the mission, job performance, or quality of life in at least two groups. Colored circles indicate active duty military staff (●) and civilian (○) focus groups at USNA.

Manning/Manpower

Perceived shortfalls in manning/manpower were expressed as major and moderate impacts on the mission and job performance in 12 focus groups. There were several comments claiming that the current Full Time Equivalent (FTE) constraint is flawed, does not account for both existing and emerging requirements, thus exacerbating workload demands that either cannot be achieved or are overstressing the workforce to a breaking point (in some instances). Manning/Manpower issues were expressed as having several negative impacts across the entire workforce. Impacted areas included, but were not limited to: personnel to maintain and repair information technology equipment and Yard Patrol (YP) craft; provide base security; and support faculty. FTE constraints make it more difficult to hire and develop junior faculty from which to select for tenure positions and to replace faculty approaching retirement. The FTE constraints also place a greater administrative and laboratory/class work preparation burden on the faculty. Brigade Senior Enlisted Leaders (SEL) reported instances of assignment gaps and lack of face-to-face turnover that limit their effectiveness in their midshipman mentoring role.

Travel

Perceived shortfalls in the travel request approval process were expressed as major impacts on the mission and job performance in six focus groups. "If I were ruler for a day, allow President of [Naval Postgraduate School] and [Naval War College], and Superintendent of USNA to make decisions on academic travel vice routing it through the Navy…" Some focus groups participants indicated that travel decisions should be made at lower levels within the Academy. The process of routing travel requests through the Department of Navy Assistant for Administration (DON/AA) is perceived as overly burdensome, with several impacts noted. Presentations and participation at professional conferences are viewed as necessary activities to advance knowledge and collaborations in subject areas of interest to the Academy, enhance the prospect of advancement and attaining tenure, and maintain respect within academic domains. Some faculty have research grants that can be used to fund travel without DON/AA approval, but they find the internal USNA travel approval process to be onerous. Delays in approval may result in higher conference fees. Travel restrictions were also noted as potentially impeding the academy's ability to attract new faculty hires and were considered a potential reason for current faculty to seek positions at other institutions of higher learning. "I pay for [travel] myself. But a junior [faculty member] can't afford to do that… The [current travel] policy is not designed for an academic environment. The [travel] policy discourages travel." In addition to the approval process, significant delays in travel voucher payments (up to 3-6 months) were expressed in two focus groups.

Procurement

Procurement challenges were expressed as major and moderate impacts on the mission and job performance in six focus groups summarized by the following series of quotes: "Our jobs are very dependent on DoD systems that are outdated and antiquated… Purchasing is so difficult that it is a part-time job… [An employee] made a flow chart of the multilayered nature of procurement… It's worth my time to buy things out of pocket to get the job done. I know that it is wrong, but I feel that there is no other choice." Other participants within the six groups agreed and claimed that they have also purchased items for classes or laboratory

efforts. Members in these groups also claimed that technicians are retiring or seeking to find alternative employment to get out of purchasing: "Decisions are not made at the appropriate level. We are supposed to be a world-class institution. This process [negatively] affects new hires and requires much more time spent on administrative duties instead of your [primary] job." Some civilian participants also expressed that, compared to DoD Electronic Mall (the web based online ordering system used by USNA personnel), items can often be purchased more quickly and at lower unit cost at local stores.

Advancement/Promotion

Comments in two military focus groups on the subject of advancement/promotion were centered on the perception that USNA is "career suicide" for junior officer aviators.

Two civilian focus groups expressed major and moderate effects on quality of life due to the lack of opportunities for upward mobility at USNA. This issue is intensified by the aforementioned perceived shortfalls in manning/manpower and increased collateral duties in that many civilian employees are being asked to do more without additional pay or recognition. There was a general perception among civilians that only military members are recognized. Civilian participants also thought that hiring more contractors and the imposed FTE limit made it more difficult for lower graded civilian employees to advance.

Parking

Two focus groups expressed major impacts on quality of life and, vaguely, the mission or job performance, as a result of inadequate parking (essentially wasting man hours trying to find a parking place). Some focus groups participants who offered commentary admitted that parking challenges are complicated by the current wave of construction.

Leadership

Two officer focus groups unanimously expressed significant positive impacts across mission, job performance, and quality of work life as a result of the Commandant and Deputy Commandant of Midshipmen's leadership. Their clear intent, receptiveness to ideas, newly enacted emphasis on highlighting positive outcomes, and trust in different subordinate leadership styles were noted as producing an outstanding command climate.

One civilian focus group expressed a moderate concern that many officers who supervise civilians have not received supervisory training and that military supervisors do not know how to write performance evaluations. Eleven military respondents from our pre-event survey indicated that they never received civilian supervisor training.

NMCI/Information Technology (IT)

Several participants in one civilian focus group expressed that NMCI/IT access restrictions affect teaching and visiting colleagues. A few participants reported that IT restrictions and shortfalls negatively affect research and midshipmen capstone projects; however, our inspection did not reveal major impediments to midshipman development as a result of IT restrictions.

Civilian participants also expressed a desire to use personal OS X (Apple) based computers rather than Personal Computer (PC) computers, and that perhaps an alternate network could be established to support personal devices. "Hackers are winning because access is limited due to protocols... We have created our own denial of service." There was also an expressed concern that Non- Appropriated Funds (NAF) employees do not have sufficient computer access to complete training requirements.

One military focus group expressed that the USNA Google services are good; however, they are not available in the barracks. Enlisted focus groups participants reported using personal phones for work (email and text messaging) that can produce a cost burden when data limits are exceeded.

Other Focus Groups Topics with Expressed Major Impacts

Topics not previously mentioned that were expressed in one focus group as a major impact on the mission, job performance, or quality of life are briefly described below in alphabetical order.

Evaluation: One civilian focus group expressed that the evaluation system is inadequate to motivate and retain faculty and does not seem to have any incentives or enough steps. Within the current system participants thought that it will be difficult to retain and recruit new faculty. Some faculty reported that they are looking elsewhere for employment.

Funding: One civilian focus group expressed that the Cyber academic major was added without an increase in appropriated funds or a reduction in other requirements to offset its cost.

Medical: A military member noted that there is no sick call and expressed major disappointment in being sent home and given an appointment the next day.

Personnel: Two military focus groups unanimously agreed that the high quality of officers and senior enlisted leaders on the Brigade staff serve as good role models.

Position Descriptions: Some civilian participants claimed vague or inaccurate position descriptions (see also, Leadership).

Uniform: Sailors that work in NWUs may not wear them in the ceremonial area; however, focus group participants reported that midshipmen have been seen wearing NWU's in the ceremonial area. Some military focus groups also expressed that the mandatory uniform change also makes members more easily identifiable when meeting with people who oversee sensitive topics such as the Command Managed Equal Opportunity office, Command Master Chief, legal office, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response personnel, etc.

Work Hours/Schedule: Work schedule includes many extracurricular activities that were expressed as having the potential to negatively impact quality of life with the family. However,

some participants also thought that the extracurricular activities presented very enjoyable entertainment for the family.

Workload: Increases in workload were expressed as a result of perceived shortfalls in Manning/Manpower.

Other Focus Groups Topics with Expressed Moderate Impacts

Topics not previously mentioned that were expressed in at least one focus group as a moderate impact on the mission, job performance, or quality of life are briefly described below in alphabetical order.

Communication: Lower graded civilians in three focus groups expressed feelings of being out of the loop or receiving late information for requirements.

Facilities: Some of the facilities were critiqued in terms of their general appearance and operability (e.g., elevators); and facility services in terms of poor customer service (e.g., three weeks just to get a single light bulb replaced; elevator maintenance and repair). The pre-event survey also indicated facilities concerns.

Food Services/Options: Although there are food options in Annapolis, military participants expressed that there are not many food options at USNA or NSA Annapolis.

Hiring Practices: Some civilian participants expressed general disappointment in the number of flex openings versus full-time positions.

Training: Five focus groups expressed that various forms of training have moderate impacts on the mission, job performance, or quality of life. General military training for military and civilians were expressed in three focus groups as essentially having little value. One military focus group expressed that the training SELs receive at Naval Station Great Lakes before reporting as Brigade SELs is not optimized for the role they play at USNA. Sexual Harassment and Assault Prevention and Education (SHAPE) training for midshipmen was expressed in one group as having a positive impact on the mission. Training outside of general military and civilian training requirements for the purpose of improving work skills and abilities was perceived as nonexistent in several civilian focus groups.

Varsity Athletics: Some focus groups participants expressed that the USNA has a tendency to overemphasize football/lacrosse; students miss class and have considerable demands to support varsity sports. Some participants claimed that it is easier to get excused from class than a sporting event.

Midshipmen Focus Groups

Focus groups were conducted separately with First Class (1/C), Second Class (2/C), Third Class (3/C), and Fourth Class (Plebes) Midshipmen (MIDN). All classes lauded the academic, physical, spiritual, and personal support services, and were generally impressed with the staff and

facilities (notwithstanding a bed bug infestation in Bancroft Hall that midshipmen thought was being well-handled). Midshipmen focus group participants generally expressed a fairly upbeat view of their experiences at the USNA, with each class imparting some unique perspectives and/or critiques that seemed to be in alignment with their development. Not surprisingly, Plebes described a well-structured, intense agenda from Plebe Summer into their first month of academics that was anticipated to be a struggle, while noting: "We have everything to fix a problem before you have it." Another Plebe claimed: "Plebe summer helped shape me. I don't have a military background. It changed my perspective—made me realize why I am here… The leadership styles [experienced during Plebe Summer] helped me shape how I want to be and don't want to be like as a leader." One Plebe didn't care too much for the Signatures activity but concluded that it has a dual purpose: "You are not supposed to succeed all of the time, just struggle with it." Plebes noted variances between Companies (e.g., levels of physical training) but viewed it as a beneficial means to set Companies apart from the outside while bringing members together from within. Plebes were generally excited about beginning their naval career.

Third Class MIDN expressed variability between Companies as natural in that no person or group can be exactly the same. Plebe year was primarily viewed by 3/C MIDN as a challenge on how to manage time while learning basic information about the Navy and core academics. Professional knowledge was particularly noted as beneficial for their summer cruise. "Memorization? I initially thought it was ridiculous. But it has been useful." Third Class MIDN participants expressed excitement in applying what they had learned to their summer cruises and experiencing actual work at sea. Another 3/C MIDN offered: "It took a while for me. I didn't realize why… But now I know where they are going with this… Now it's more of a mentor role since we know what [Plebe year] is all about. As Youngsters we help [Plebes] out when they are lost." While the 3/C MIDN focus group participants expressed that they have more time for academics and extracurricular activities, they also described a new responsibility where every Plebe has a chain beginning with a Youngster that encourages leadership development through horizontal and vertical organizational dialog. "The balance of the mission shifts every year. It's a good approach… Plebe year was more structured, now you're more on your own."

Second Class MIDN focus group participants were appreciative of the newly received pay and thus expressed a greater interest in financial matters. For example, one 2/C MIDN questioned why they were forced to buy items, such as various garment bags that were never used, and others questioned the effectiveness of the financial management brief. While most of the 2/C MIDN participants thought that financial counseling and related services were decent, a couple of 2/C MIDN would have preferred additional education and forums to further discuss the subject. Reflections on how to best manage one's time seemed to be center stage again given the pressures of the academic major and participation in intramurals and other activities. Several participants wished that they either would have taken better advantage of advanced preparatory classes in high school and/or preparing for validations tests at the Academy. Second Class MIDN generally expressed that major courses are taught well; however, some participants had reservations about the utility of core courses in that they didn't think that much was learned. Positive comments about Company Officers and senior enlisted leaders

were the norm in the 2/C MIDN focus group; however, some participants were at odds with the manner in which the mentorship program is executed, specifically within companies that assign mentors. Participants strongly expressed that mentors should be sought out and selected first by the prospective mentee and then by mutual agreement between the two parties. Second Class MIDN participants expressed appreciation for the freedom to express their opinions up the chain of command, but were somewhat cynical regarding power to influence change.

First Class MIDN focus group participants unanimously expressed dramatic improvements in brigade morale as a result of the leadership styles of the Commandant and Deputy Commandant of Midshipmen. 1/C MIDN expressed that prior to their arrival they felt like a "number," but now senior Brigade leadership, including Company Officers and senior enlisted leaders, provide more mentorship and assistance. "Over four years you observe a lot of interactions between juniors and seniors—learn about good and bad traits. Learning about how you want to be led teaches you how you want to lead." 1/C MIDN expressed a desire for more leadership opportunities in the second and third classes: "When we were [3/C] we were seen as the 'dead' year." 1/C MIDN are trying to change that perception and are grappling with the obstacles and challenges to afford more leadership opportunities to junior classmates.

Expressed disappointments were generally discussed in terms of poor planning or the desire to expand core coursework to make it more meaningful. A few 1/C MIDN thought that instructors taught core courses in a manner to "pass" MIDN rather than to "teach" subject matter with more applications. One 1/C MIDN bemoaned his perception that navigation and leadership are not viewed as favorably as other academics within the Brigade and posited that these classes were not taught as well as they could be given their importance in developing naval officers (time ran out to further explore this comment). First Class MIDN participants were also critical of the core cyber course(s), viewing them as politically driven rather than academically driven. Some of the 1/C MIDN thought that the initial cyber course could have been more efficiently accomplished in a 3-day crash course during "zero block" versus consuming six hours of an academic semester.

One 1/C MIDN provided a nice summary of experiences to date: "Plebe summer was a shock but an effective wake-up call. I grew up a lot by Thanksgiving—established myself much more than my friends at home." The midshipman went on to describe the Youngster year as somewhat of a "slump" (other Youngster participants referred to it as the "dead year" in that their time was not as busily managed as when they were a Plebe). The midshipman claimed that the Youngster year "is the year you must realize why you came here is not the reason you stay. The thought of becoming a MIDN 2/C and helping to correct and guide Plebes made a big difference. It started making me think like a leader." The 1/C MIDN voiced pride in academic and military achievements during the Second Class year: "Second Class is prep for how hard you will have to work to be an officer; academics, training Plebes, administrative—I got to see how it all happens." The midshipman then offered the following thought regarding the final year: "Some people don't get it—don't want to buy-in… Being a good example is the best that I can do—provide guidance and give [my juniors] opportunities to excel." The midshipman left us

with a caveat in that not all midshipman are worthy of commission, but that it was not fault of an academy that affords numerous support and developmental opportunities.

The NAVINSGEN team also conducted round table discussions with Company Officers and Brigade leaders including Company Commanders. These groups indicated strong commitment to the Academy's mission and provided many insightful thoughts and recommendations which are captured below.

Company Officers noted the incredible demands on midshipman schedules and saw great value in the abundance of opportunities provided to midshipmen at USNA. Among these opportunities was an impressive summer training menu; however, a tension exists in the summer training program between opportunities for cultural awareness and preparation for service selection. Some Company Officers felt that the Academy was drifting too far away from fleet operational experiences. When asked about other areas for improvement, some commented that USNA breeds a culture of micromanagement stemming from a high-visibility environment, administrative creep, and fundamentally restrictive delegations of authority. They recommended that Academy leadership continue to assess whether authorities were being delegated to the correct level for execution (e.g., granting emergency leave, approval of midshipman requests). One member of the group commented that, "We do well at what we pay attention to," highlighting the phenomenal leadership and communication opportunity available in the Company Officer corps; keeping these leaders involved and engaged plays a critical role in the Academy's success.

Brigade midshipman leaders cited three elements that are the best part of the USNA experience: summer training, abundance of personal development opportunities, and leadership opportunities in the Hall and Plebe Summer. These leaders demonstrated responsibility for running the Brigade and clearly understood their authorities; collectively their comments indicated a leadership team that had spent some time reflecting on their responsibilities. Often their toughest challenge was that midshipmen consistently want to know "why'' certain policies are being implemented or executed. The most significant takeaway was that midshipmen noted a favorable change in the last year in the engagement of the SELs, where the SELs are more approachable, more accessible, and better caliber leaders. Some noted problems with Bancroft Hall amenities: slow internet, temperature control, and pest infestation. Company Commanders cited improvements in the last year in handling of alcohol related issues (e.g., 21st Birthday Club Training, replacing the "0-0-1-3" rule with responsible usage concepts, ability to return to Bancroft Hall). Some questioned the usefulness and practicality of midshipman PQS given all the demands on midshipmen time. One leader on the Brigade Staff thought the Academy could do more to open up space in the core curriculum providing individuals with greater opportunities to pursue academic interests and also challenged the notion of quotas for unique postgraduate education (especially at Oxford or other noteworthy institutions). These latter comments about academic were also echoed to some extent in other discussions and interviews.

Appendix D: Survey Response Frequency Report

Numerical values in the following tables summarize survey responses to forced-choice questions as counts and/or percentages (%). Response codes are listed below in the order that they appear.

SD   Strongly Disagree

 D   Disagree

 N   Neither Agree nor Disagree…

 A   Agree

SA   Strongly Agree

 -   Negative

 N   Neutral

 +   Positive

 N   Never

 R   Rarely

 S   Sometimes

 F   Frequently

 A   Always

Military		Civilian	
Male	Female	Male	Female
152	50	170	168
28%	9%	31%	31%

On a scale from 1 (worst) to 10 (best), please rate your Quality of Work Life (QOWL). QOWL is the degree to which you enjoy where you work and available opportunities for professional growth.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Count	15	24	35	26	59	47	82	102	93	57
%	2.78%	4.44%	6.48%	4.81%	10.93%	8.70%	15.19%	18.89%	17.22%	10.56%

For each of the factors below, please indicate whether they have a positive, neutral, or negative impact on your QOWL rating.

	+	N	-
Job satisfaction	387	119	55
Leadership support	262	150	148
Leadership opportunities	212	216	133
Advancement opportunities	133	244	183
Workload	229	203	128
Work Hours/Schedule	367	133	61
Training opportunities	165	236	159
Awards and recognition	139	256	165
Command morale	219	160	181
Command climate	219	179	162
Quality of workplace facilities	310	138	112

On a scale from 1 (worst) to 10 (best), please rate your Quality of Home Life (QOHL). QOHL is the degree to which you enjoy where you live and the opportunities available for housing, recreation, etc.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Count	3	4	8	6	16	20	48	114	148	173
%	0.56%	0.74%	1.48%	1.11%	2.96%	3.70%	8.89%	21.11%	27.41%	32.04%

For each of the factors below, please indicate whether they have a positive, neutral, or negative impact on your QOHL rating.

	+	N	-
Quality of home	440	82	18
Quality of the school for dependent children	251	270	19
Quality of the childcare available	176	348	16
Shopping & dining opportunities	437	87	16
Recreational opportunities	427	101	12
Access to spouse employment	260	249	31
Access to medical/dental care	411	104	25
Cost of living	87	216	237

My job affords me a reasonable amount of quality time with my family.

SD	D	N	A	SA
19	46	70	230	164
4%	9%	13%	43%	31%

My command gives me sufficient time during working hours to participate in a physical readiness exercise program.

SD	D	N	A	SA
4	13	15	61	110
2%	6%	7%	30%	54%

My current work week affords enough time to complete mission tasks in a timely manner while maintaining an acceptable work-home life balance.

SD	D	N	A	SA
6	34	23	78	61
3%	17%	11%	39%	30%

My position description is current and accurately describes my functions, tasks, and responsibilities.

SD	D	N	A	SA
26	47	55	138	70
8%	14%	16%	41%	21%

I work more hours than I report in a pay period because I cannot complete all assigned tasks during scheduled work hours.

N	R	S	F	A
52	59	73	63	88
16%	18%	22%	19%	26%

The Human Resource Service Center provides timely, accurate responses to my queries.

SD	D	N	A	SA
30	53	160	74	18
9%	16%	48%	22%	5%

My (local) Human Resources Office provides timely, accurate responses to my queries.

SD	D	N	A	SA
35	56	128	86	30
10%	17%	38%	26%	9%

The DON civilian recruitment process is responsive to my command's civilian personnel requirements.

SD	D	N	A	SA
70	82	268	79	26
13%	16%	51%	15%	5%

During the last performance evaluation cycle, my supervisor provided me with feedback that enabled me to improve my performance before my formal performance appraisal/EVAL/FITREP.

SD	D	N	A	SA
37	53	91	164	94
8%	12%	21%	37%	21%

I have the tools and resources needed to do my job properly.

SD	D	N	A	SA
34	99	67	212	123
6%	19%	13%	40%	23%

I am satisfied with the overall quality of my workplace facilities.

SD	D	N	A	SA
36	74	77	235	110
7%	14%	14%	44%	21%

My command is concerned about my safety.

SD	D	N	A	SA
11	34	78	233	176
2%	6%	15%	44%	33%

My command has a program in place to address potential safety issues.

SD	D	N	A	SA
5	21	100	266	140
1%	4%	19%	50%	26%

My job is important and makes a contribution to my command.

SD	D	N	A	SA
6	21	31	196	279
1%	4%	6%	37%	52%

_____ is occurring at my command.

	SD	D	N	A	SA
Fraternization	12%	28%	47%	8%	5%
Favoritism	9%	21%	33%	22%	16%
Gender/Sex Discrimination	21%	35%	31%	9%	4%
Sexual Harassment	27%	31%	32%	9%	2%
Race Discrimination	27%	31%	32%	9%	2%
Hazing	33%	31%	31%	5%	1%

I have adequate leadership guidance to perform my job successfully.

SD	D	N	A	SA
47	81	82	194	129
9%	15%	15%	36%	24%

Communication down the chain of command is effective.

SD	D	N	A	SA
82	118	92	166	70
16%	22%	17%	31%	13%

Communication up the chain of command is effective.

SD	D	N	A	SA
SD	D	N	A	SA
73	101	107	189	58

My performance evaluations have been fair.

SD	D	N	A	SA
15	29	104	229	150
3%	6%	20%	43%	28%

The awards and recognition program is fair and equitable.

SD	D	N	A	SA
53	108	159	144	63
10%	20%	30%	27%	12%

Military and civilian personnel work well together at my command.

SD	D	N	A	SA
24	45	79	221	158
5%	9%	15%	42%	30%

My command's Equal Opportunity Program (EO - to include Equal Employment Opportunity & Command Managed Equal Opportunity) is effective.

SD	D	N	A	SA
22	34	234	148	89
4%	6%	44%	28%	17%

I know who to contact with an EEO/EO question or complaint.

SD	D	N	A	SA
21	60	86	237	123
4%	11%	16%	45%	23%

My command adequately protects my personal information.

SD	D	N	A	SA
32	42	153	206	94
6%	8%	29%	39%	18%

My command attempts to resolve command climate issues.

SD	D	N	A	SA
52	84	160	143	88
10%	16%	30%	27%	17%

The sexual assault prevention program at my command is honest/fair, and there are adequate resources and services available for potential victims of sexual assault.

SD	D	N	A	SA
7	11	110	237	161
1%	2%	21%	45%	31%

Do you supervise Department of the Navy (DON) civilians?

Yes	No
108	417
21%	79%

When did you receive civilian supervisory training?

>4 yrs	1-4 yrs	<12 mos	Never
20	34	37	17
19%	31%	34%	16%

My command attempts to resolve command climate issues.

SD	D	N	A	SA
52	84	160	143	88
10%	16%	30%	27%	17%