DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
1254 9TH STREET SE
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD, DC 20374-5006

From: Naval Inspector General
To: Distribution

Subj: COMMAND INSPECTION OF COMMANDER, U.S. FLEET FORCES COMMAND

Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 5040.3A
(b) SECNAVINST 5430.57G

1. The Office of the Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) conducts Command Inspections of Echelon II commands to provide the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations with a firsthand assessment of Departmental risks and major issues relevant to policy, management, and direction as directed by reference (a). Reference (b) tasks NAVINSGEN with conducting inspections and surveys, making appropriate evaluations and recommendations concerning operating forces afloat and ashore, Department of the Navy components and functions, and Navy programs which impact readiness or quality of life for military and civilian naval personnel.

2. NAVINSGEN conducted a Command Inspection of Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFF) from 7 to 17 April 2015. This report documents our findings.

3. This report contains an Executive Summary, our observations and findings, and documented deficiencies noted during the inspection. An issue paper is included that highlights significant concerns that either point to a potentially broader Navy issue or, in our opinion, require coordination among multiple commands to fully address. Finally, a summary of survey and focus group data, as well as a complete listing of survey frequency data, is included.

4. During our visit we assessed overall mission readiness in execution of its Echelon II responsibilities per OPNAVINST 5440.77B, Mission, Functions, and Tasks of Commander, United States Fleet Forces Command (25 April 2012), the draft revision to that document in staffing, and other laws, policies, and regulations. We assessed compliance with Navy administrative programs; facilities, safety and environmental compliance; security programs; Inspector General functions; and Sailor programs under the purview of senior enlisted leadership. Additionally, we conducted surveys and focus group discussions to assess the quality of work life (QOWL) and home life (QOHL) for Navy military and civilian personnel.

5. Our overall assessment is that USFF is a highly professional team executing an enormous scope of responsibility to train, certify, and provide combat-ready Navy forces to Combatant Commanders that are capable of conducting sustained naval, joint, and combined operations in support of U.S. national interests.

Subj: COMMAND INSPECTION OF COMMANDER, U.S. FLEET FORCES COMMAND

USFF's principal role is to organize, supply, train, equip, administer, and maintain assigned naval forces and shore activities to generate required levels of current and future fleet readiness. The command is executing this difficult mission area well.

6. In the course of our inspection, we identified deficiencies in Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Program manning, Maritime Operations Center equipment, High Risk Training, Command Security, Information Security, Personnel Security, Industrial Security, Physical Security, Special Security Programs, Personally Identifiable Information, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response, Suicide Prevention, and Voting Assistance.

7. Corrective actions

   a. We identified 41 deficiencies during our inspection that require USFF corrective action. Correction of each deficiency, and a description of action(s) taken, should be reported via Implementation Status Report (ISR), OPNAV 5040/2 by USFF no later than 1 December 2015. Deficiencies not corrected by this date or requiring longer-term solutions should be updated quarterly until completed. Additionally, NAVINSGEN provided USFF with 24 separate recommendations for consideration, relating to Optimized Fleet Response Plan, Aviation Spares, *Slider* (a critical, GFM-unique software program), Warfare Development Centers, Deployment Health Assessment, Combined Joint Operations from the Sea, Centers of Excellence, Individual Augmentees, Command Security, Information Security, Personnel Security, Physical Security, Special Security Programs, Personally Identifiable Information, and Foreign Disclosure.

   b. This report includes one issue paper that requires actions by the Director, Navy Staff and the Naval Warfare Development Command (NWDC). Appendix A: Issue Papers (page 29 of this report) provides detailed guidance on how to report completion of recommendations identified in the issue paper.

8. My point of contact is Director, Inspections Division.

HERMAN A. SHELANSKI

Distribution:
SECNAV
UNSECNAV
DUSN(M)
DUSN(P)
ASN(RD&A, M&RA, FM&C, EI&E)
GC
DON CIO
OJAG
NCIS

Subj: COMMAND INSPECTION OF COMMANDER, U.S. FLEET FORCES COMMAND

Distribution: (Cont'd)
CNO
VCNO
OPNAV (DNS, N1, N2/N6, N3/N5, N4, N46)
USFF
CPF
BUPERS
FLTCYBERCOM
NWDC

NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL COMMAND INSPECTION OF
COMMANDER, U.S. FLEET FORCES COMMAND
7-17 APRIL 2015

Executive Summary

The Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) conducted a command inspection of Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFF) from 7 to 17 April 2015. Our last inspection of USFF was in 2008. The team was augmented with subject matter experts, including personnel from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), Information, Plans and Strategy (N3/N5), Shore Readiness (N46), Assessments (N81), and Family Readiness (N170C); Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CPF); U.S. Fleet Cyber Command (FLTCYBERCOM); Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC); Naval Safety Center (NAVSAFECEN); Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP); Special Security Office (SSO), Norfolk; Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) Security Training Assistance and Assessment Team (STAAT); and the Office of Civilian Human Resources (OCHR).

During our inspection, we assessed overall mission readiness in execution of echelon 2 responsibilities per OPNAVINST 5440.77B, Mission, Functions, and Tasks of United States Fleet Forces Command, and the draft revision. We assessed administrative programs, facilities, safety and environmental compliance, security programs, Inspector General functions, and Sailor programs under the purview of senior enlisted leadership. Additionally, we conducted surveys and focus group discussions to assess the quality of work life (QOWL) and home life (QOHL) for Navy military and civilian personnel.

MISSION READINESS

USFF is a highly professional team executing an enormous scope of responsibility to train, certify, and provide combat-ready Navy forces to Combatant Commanders that are capable of conducting sustained naval, joint, and combined operations in support of U.S. national interests.

USFF's principal role is to organize, supply, train, equip, administer, and maintain assigned naval forces and shore activities to generate required levels of current and future fleet readiness. They are executing this difficult mission area well.

USFF has developed and implemented the Readiness Kill Chain (RKC) for ensuring tight coordination across all stakeholders for preparing forces for deployment. The RKC is a repeatable methodology that endeavors to break down institutional stovepipes and increases communications between stakeholders; increases understanding of end-to-end readiness processes; ensures a common understanding of Navy readiness; and ensures that processes, policies, resources, and products deliver the right capability and readiness for mission requirements.

Navy has established Warfighting Development Centers (WDC) for Aviation, Surface, Subsurface, and Expeditionary Forces; Information Dominance is forthcoming. These WDCs are the Fleet's single warfare area authority for their assigned mission areas. Once fully staffed and aligned under their cognizant Type Commander (TYCOM), these WDCs will develop, validate,

standardize, publish, and revise Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Fleet use. Leveraging the full capability of each WDC is critical to ensuring the Fleet is ready to combat a high-end adversary.

USFF, in concert with CPF, is executing a CNO-approved plan to refine the Navy force generation model, transitioning the Fleet Response Plan to the Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP). Development of the OFRP was in recognition that current trends in maintenance and modernization execution, compressed training time, deployment lengths, and personnel churn were unsustainable in the long term. Fleet efforts to implement OFRP are well organized through Cross Functional Teams and frequent collaboration between Fleet stakeholders.

USFF has an established an effective Maritime Operations Center (MOC) and complementary battle rhythm that fully supports staffing and planning requirements. In concert with CPF, USFF is leading an effort toward MOC standardization. MOC standardization provides the Navy with a standard set of operational level missions, functions, tasks and processes, resulting in more efficient and effective capability and capacity across Fleet Headquarters. It provides a defined construct for the way Fleet Commanders organize and fight at the operational level. Today, each Fleet MOC is unique in configuration; the CNO has established a goal of 80% standardization between the MOCs world-wide.

USFF requires additional manning to support recent realignment, management, and execution of Navy's Human Intelligence (HUMINT) program from NCIS to the Office of Naval Intelligence. USFF's HUMINT manning currently consists of one civilian, temporarily assigned from the Naval Intelligence Activity (NIA), to assist in establishing the Fleet's HUMINT program. The validated manpower requirement for the Fleet HUMINT program is five permanent USFF HUMINT billets.

COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS

Overall, USFF programs are solid. While effective and well-managed, we identified an area for improvement in their Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program. Specifically, we found that delegation of authority to act as the Commander regarding sexual assault victim response and care for the staff should be established in writing and communicated to USFF command staff, as required by SECNAVINST 1752.4B.

FACILITIES, ENVIRONMENTAL, SAFETY, AND ENERGY CONSERVATION

USFF Facilities and Engineering

Although many USFF buildings are relatively old, we noted that the spaces assigned to USFF are in better condition than facilities assigned to other shore commands across the Navy, due in large part to the First Lieutenant's sound management of internal staff requirements and good coordination with Naval Support Activity (NSA) Hampton Roads Public Works Department. The USFF Shore Readiness Branch is effectively developing and integrating infrastructure and planning requirements across the staff and providing contingency engineering support to the MOC. The current initiative to assign the NAVFAC LANT Commander as the USFF Deputy

Commander's advisor on engineering matters is a positive step. We recommend that USFF and NAVFAC LANT consider formalizing the arrangement via a Memorandum of Understanding to clarify the specific roles and better leverage the capabilities of the NAVFAC LANT Fleet Civil Engineer, to include discussing the separate NAVFAC LANT O-6 liaison officer position in USFF N46.

Environmental Programs

USFF environmental programs are effective and well-managed across a very broad array of requirements. The staff is out in front of potential problems, making worthwhile outreach efforts, and working as the Navy's lead on environmentally responsible operations and training.

Command Safety Program

Overall, USFF safety programs are effective, and the Fleet Safety Campaign plan has energized the TYCOMs and their subordinate commands into action. Predictive analytics have been developed to move toward forward-looking indicators to complement proven historical measures. We noted that USFF does not have a High Risk Training (HRT) Program, and more importantly is not conducting oversight of HRT programs of lower echelon commands as required by OPNAVINST 1500.75C, Policy and Governance for Conducting High-Risk Training.

Energy Conservation

USFF shore and operational energy conservation programs are compliant with governing instructions and policies. The Operational Energy team is making progress toward SECNAV and CNO goals with positive engagement by the TYCOMs and Systems Commands (SYSCOM), in a manner similar to the success of the Fleet Safety Campaign Program.

# SECURITY PROGRAMS

Industrial Security

The USFF b7e ████████████████████████████████
██
██
████████████████████████

Physical Security

COMUSFLTFORCOMSTAFFINST 5530.2A, Physical Security Plan, designates ██████████ at USFF as ██████████████. The number of ██████████████████████████████ to meet ████████████████████, as required by ██████████████████████████ ██ ██

██████████ USFF campus b7e ████████████████████ ████████████

USFF issues access badges to its personnel and visitors for authorized entry into USFF spaces. USFF has not yet transitioned, but does have a plan to establish Common Access Card (CAC) access as directed by Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 12, Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors; the Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS) 201-2, Personnel Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors; Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Memorandum 05-24, Implementation of HSPD-12 – Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors; and OPNAVINST 5530.14E CH-2. b7e

[REDACTED]

Special Security Programs

USFF lacks a Special Security Officer (SSO); SECNAV M5510.30, Department of the Navy Personnel Security Manual, requires that commands in the DON accredited for and authorized to receive, process, and store SCI will designate an SSO. As an echelon 2 command, USFF has an oversight responsibility to subordinate command Sensitive Compartment information Facilities (SCIF). DoDM 5105.21 stipulates that one of the SSO's duties is to provide SCI security oversight of other SCIFs under the organization's security cognizance. Further, SECNAV M5510.30 requires commanding officers provide security oversight of subordinate commands.

Counterintelligence (CI)

NCIS support to USFF for CI training is compliant.

Insider Threat

Following a review of the command security programs for SCI and non-SCI, we performed a horizontal examination of our findings to assess overall command security program readiness at USFF and identify items of interest which, if corrected, would raise the day-to-day effectiveness of security at USFF.

b7e

[REDACTED]

We recommend USFF perform a follow-up examination of the command's personnel security practices.

Operations Security (OPSEC)

We liked the command's OPSEC program; future collaboration between the OPSEC manager and Security Manager in promotion of security education will yield benefits for security of the USFF workforce.

Cybersecurity/Information Technology (IT) Acquisition & Network Management

USFF's Information Technology Procurement Request (ITPR) process is one of the best programs we have observed. USFF exercises effective fiscal controls and policies to its enterprise for the procurement of IT support assets and services.

Personally Identifiable Information (PII)

USFF does not have a formal Privacy Act Team (PAT) to b7e ███████████████████ ████████ and to establish best business practices as required by SECNAVINST 5211.5E, Department of the Navy (DON) Privacy Program.

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT

NAVINSGEN conducted a follow-up of the December 2013 Intelligence Oversight (IO) inspection of USFF. The command is compliant with Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities; DoD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons; United States Signals Intelligence Directive (USSID) SP00018; and SECNAVINST 3820.3E, Oversight of Intelligence Activities Within the Department of Navy. They have a solid program; all required training and reporting has been conducted.

SURVEY AND FOCUS GROUP FINDINGS

Our survey and focus group discussions found that QOWL at USFF is comparable to the historical echelon 2 command average; QOHL is higher than the historical echelon 2 command average. The USFF workforce is dedicated to the mission; however, manning/manpower, communication, and internet/corporate tools (supporting joint operations, tasker systems, and workflows) are perceived to most adversely impact the mission, job performance, and quality of life. Rated on a 10-point scale, the USFF QOWL and QOHL are 6.76 and 8.60, respectively; the corresponding echelon 2 command historical averages are 6.62 and 7.88. Specific comments from focus groups were passed to USFF leadership and are found in Appendix C.

Contents

Areas/Programs Assessed

- **Mission Performance**
  - Mission Readiness
  - Strategic Planning
  - Command Relationships and Communications
  - Intelligence Oversight
  - Total Force Management
  - Civilian Human Resource Services
  - Personnel Training/Qualifications
  - Continuity of Operations Plan
- **Facilities, Environmental, and Safety**
  - Facilities Management
  - Shore Infrastructure Planning and Management
  - Environmental Readiness
  - Energy Conservation
  - Safety and Occupational Health
- **Security Programs and Information Assurance**
  - Command Security
  - Industrial Security
  - Physical Security and Antiterrorism Force Protection
  - Operations Security
  - Personnel Security
  - Insider Threat
  - Counterintelligence Support
  - Information Security
  - Information Assurance and Personally Protected Information
- **Resource Management/Compliance Programs**
  - Comptroller Functions
  - Managers' Internal Control
  - Personal Property Management
  - Government Travel Charge Card
  - Government Commercial Purchase Card
  - Command Individual Augmentee Coordinator
  - Post Deployment Health Reassessment
  - Individual Medical Readiness
  - Physical Readiness Program
  - Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
  - Command Managed Equal Opportunity
  - Suicide Prevention
  - Navy Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention
  - Hazing Policy Training and Compliance
  - Legal/Ethics
  - Victim and Witness Assistance Program

- o Voting Assistance Program
- o Inspector General Functions
- **Sailor Programs**
  - o Command Sponsorship
  - o Command Indoctrination
  - o Career Development Program
  - o Sailor Recognition Program
  - o CPO 365

Observations and Findings

MISSION PERFORMANCE

The Mission Performance Team utilized survey and focus group responses, document review, group discussions, and face-to-face interviews to gather information and assess the mission performance of Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFF). These findings were applied to the functions and tasks as assigned in or defined by OPNAVINST 5440.77B, Mission, Functions, and Tasks of United States Fleet Forces Command.

Our overall assessment is that USFF is a highly professional team executing an enormous scope of responsibility to train, certify, and provide combat-ready Navy forces to Combatant Commanders (CCDR) that are capable of conducting sustained naval, joint, and combined operations in support of U.S. national interests. We reviewed the following areas:

- Navy Readiness (Man, Train, and Equip)
- Naval Operations Planning and Execution
- Navy Global Force Management
- Operational Intelligence
- Maritime Domain Awareness
- Warfighting Capability Requirements
- Defense Support to Civil Authorities
- Health Service Support
- Force Protection and Anti-Terrorism Executive Agent
- Nuclear Authority for Nuclear Weapons
- Nuclear Primary Commander
- Manning/Manpower
- Strategic Messaging/Communications
- Strategic Planning
- Continuity of Operations (COOP) Planning
- Military/Civilian Training
- Office of Civilian Human Resources (OCHR)/Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO)

Man, Train and Equip

USFF's principal role is to organize, supply, train, equip, administer, and maintain assigned Navy forces and shore activities to generate required levels of current and future Fleet readiness.

Readiness Kill Chain (RKC)

USFF has adopted RKC (Figure 1) as its principal mechanism to provide an integrated approach to readiness production and delivery of combat ready Navy forces to the CCDR. RKC is a repeatable methodology that endeavors to breaks down institutional stovepipes and increases communications across stakeholders; increases understanding of end-to-end readiness production; ensures a common understanding of Navy readiness; and ensures that processes, policies, resources, and products deliver the right capability and readiness for mission

requirements. The RKC methodology results in complete assessments and presentations enabling decision makers to improve forward-deployed readiness and resolve barriers in an informed and cost effective manner.

Figure 1: Readiness Kill Chain Overview

RKC is used to provide analysis and fact-based results that inform and enable resource decisions across organizations based on mission readiness. It can be used for continuous assessment of indicators to provide early identification and resolution of current and future readiness gaps. RKC is iterative in nature and must continually adapt to meet current and future fiscal climates and the changing requirements of the CCDRs.

The ability to assess and obtain RKC feedback from the CCDRs and Numbered Fleets is foundational to USFF's ability to produce combat ready Navy forces. Success will be determined by the integrated approach of Type Commands (TYCOM), Systems Commands (SYSCOM), Acquisitions Commands, Shore Commands, and the OPNAV staff.

Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP)
USFF, in concert with Commander, Pacific Fleet (CPF), is executing a Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)-approved plan to refine the Navy force generation model, transitioning the Fleet Response Plan to the OFRP (Figure 2). Development of the OFRP was in recognition that current trends in maintenance and modernization execution, compressed training time, deployment lengths, and personnel churn were unsustainable in the long term. When implemented, the new model will provide predictability for Fleet and supporting forces, maximize employability for sunk maintenance and training costs, as well as clarify the chain of command. The end state of OFRP is to provide consistent Carrier Strike Group (CSG) or

Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) employability by 2020, as well as align OFRP cycles for all Naval Forces.

Figure 2: Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP) Overview

Fleet efforts to implement OFRP are well-organized through Cross Functional Teams (CFT) and frequent collaboration between Fleet stakeholders with a great deal of analysis already accomplished. Development of the CSG Master OFRP Production Plan (MOPP)—a 9 year CSG production schedule—is complete, and the staff is developing similar MOPPs for ARGs. Independent Deployers will no longer have a separate training track, but will be included with overall CSG MOPP. Efforts are underway to identify resource barriers and shortfalls to achieving the end state.

Implementing OFRP necessitated changing a large number of resource models simultaneously (e.g., manning, maintenance scheduling, CSG Command and Control). While there will be pressure to continue to adjust the input levers to possibly improve localized aspects of OFRP, second, third and fourth order effects need to be well-understood and briefed to senior leadership prior to adjustments. This will require detailed analyses of alternatives in order to give senior decision makers the data required to make an informed decision.

<u>Recommendation 1.</u>   **That USFF permit the OFRP to execute complete CSG and ARG maintenance, work-up, and deployment cycles prior to making adjustments to the plan.**

APN-6 (Aircraft Procurement, Navy – Aircraft Spares & Repair Parts) Shortfall

OFRP requires five full CVN Aviation Consolidated Allowance Lists (AVCAL) with range and depth of 93/90%. Currently only three full AVCALs can be fielded, and those require significant cross-decking from other AVCALs and Shore Consolidated Allowance Lists (SHORECAL). The Naval Aviation Enterprise has identified an $800M APN-6 shortfall over the Future Year Defense Plan.

Recommendation 2.   That USFF coordinate with the Resource Sponsor, OPNAV N98 (Aviation Readiness), to fully fund Aviation Spares in order to meet ORFP requirements.

Global Force Management (GFM)

USFF has a well-established process for executing their world-wide duties as the Navy's Global Force Manager and is consistently aligned with the Joint Staff Force Allocation Decision Matrix.

The OFRP has shifted the focus of GFM Force Offering from starting with CCDR presence requirements and working backwards to develop the maintenance, training and certification schedules to starting with maintenance requirements and training entitlements to produce the sustainable force generation numbers which the Joint Staff is designating at the presence ceiling. By adhering to maintenance schedules, training entitlements and CNO-directed deployment lengths, the sustainable sourcing, when approved by the Joint Staff, may result in some CCDR's presence being lower than historically generated. Emergent requests for forces or deployment extensions must be balanced to mitigate the long term risk to the force and the ability to generate the future force.

The GFM computer program known as *Slider* is a critical, GFM-unique software program for scheduling. The embedded business rules allow USFF to develop, plan, and coordinate sourcing solutions to support CCDR requirements. A tailored version of *Slider* is also used by the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard. Developed by the Center for Naval Analysis, *Slider* has been largely funded by USFF. Slider is certified to operate on Navy-Marine Corps Internet (NMCI) and the management of *Slider* will transition to Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) the FY18/FY19 timeframe. Upgrades to *Slider* will be necessary to keep pace as the Joint Staff GFM Data Initiative establishes additional data requirements.

Recommendation 3.   That USFF coordinate with OPNAV N2/6 (Information Dominance) to transition *Slider* to an official Program of Record.

Recommendation 4.   That USFF continue to fund *Slider* until it becomes a Program of Record.

Recommendation 5.   That USFF coordinate with SPAWAR on improvements to *Slider* to ensure that Joint Staff requirements are being met.

Warfare Development Centers (WDC)

Navy has established WDCs for Aviation, Surface, Subsurface, and Expeditionary warfare; Information Dominance is forthcoming. These WDCs are the Fleet's single warfare area authority for their assigned mission areas. Once fully staffed and aligned under their cognizant

TYCOM, these WDCs will develop, validate, standardize, publish, and revise Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) for Fleet use. Naval Warfare Development Command (NWDC) remains the collection point for Fleet TTPs, and will coordinate with the WDCs and Naval Education and Training Command (NETC) for curriculum development. Leveraging the full capability of each WDC will be critical to ensuring the Fleet is ready to combat a high-end adversary.

Recommendation 6.   **That USFF coordinate with NWDC and WDCs to ensure TTPs are in place prior to introducing new operational capabilities to the Fleet.**

Recommendation 7.   **That USFF coordinate with NETC and WDCs to ensure schoolhouse curricula are developed and in place prior to the introduction of new operational and hardware capabilities to the Fleet.**

Training Ranges and Systems

USFF does not have access to a permanently instrumented range other than the Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center, which the submarine force utilizes heavily. However, USFF does have adequate portable telemetry capability to support live fire ranges for current generation gunnery and missile systems. New and future systems highlight two significant challenges:

- Physical range limitations. OPSEC concerns and security classification issues will drive much of Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) (and possibly Electromagnetic Rail Gun in the future) training to a synthetic environment. Being able to synthetically exercise NIFC-CA with live training in other warfare areas requires a translation device between Navy Warfare Development Command's (NWDC) Navy Continuous Training Environment (NCTE) and live range operating systems. That device is being developed now with an expected test rollout in September 2015. If validated, West Coast ranges will require a similar system.

- Opposition Forces (OPFOR). As the Navy gears its training for the high-end fight, there is a lack of late generation OPFOR in quantities representative of the threat. Requirements are currently being generated; it is likely that these will involve both hardware (jets on the ramp) and sophisticated synthetic training systems to generate multiple and varied threat tracks required for battle space management and deconfliction.

Issue Paper A-1 addresses this issue in further detail.

Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

USFF requires additional manning to ensure successful implementation of the Fleet HUMINT program due to the recent realignment of management and execution of Navy's HUMINT program from NCIS to Naval Intelligence. USFF's HUMINT manning currently consists of one civilian, temporarily assigned from the Naval Intelligence Activity, to assist in establishing the Fleet's HUMINT program. The validated manpower requirement of the Fleet HUMINT program

is five permanent USFF HUMINT billets, as identified in the Management Advisory Study (MAS) Report for U.S. Fleet Forces Command N2/N39 Priority Mission Areas.

Deficiency 1. **USFF's Fleet HUMINT program is undermanned.** **Reference: Management Advisory Study (MAS) Report for U.S. Fleet Forces Command N2/N39 Priority Mission Areas, November 2014 through March 2015.**

Joint Support

USFF is assigned three roles in the Joint arena. First and most significant, they are assigned as the Naval Component Commander (U.S. Naval Forces Northern Command, NAVNORTH) and Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) to U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) focused on Theater Security Cooperation (TSC), Maritime Homeland Defense (MHD) and Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) in addition to providing support to Maritime Homeland Security (MHS). USFF is also assigned to provide maritime operational planning and coordination support to U.S. Strategic Command, as well as U.S. Element North American Aerospace Defense Command.

The exercise VIGILANT SHIELD 15 generated 50 validated Lessons Learned; 43 are complete, 3 were forwarded to USNORTHCOM to improve staff processes and exercise design, and 4 involve participation by U.S. European Command and U.S. Pacific Command to improve seam and Command and Control issues at CCDR boundaries. USFF assesses its readiness to execute selected Mission Essential Tasks in Defense Readiness Reporting System-Strategic (DRRS-S), the Joint DRRS system, on a monthly basis; USNORTHCOM campaign plans are assessed on a quarterly basis by lines of effort.

USFF is providing satisfactory oversight of the Navy support to USNORTHCOM under the Joint Staff EXORD for very important persons (e.g., POTUS/VPOTUS) security support, ensuring Explosive Ordnance Disposal Groups 1 and 2 provide support without being overtaxed.

Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)

USFF/JFMCC-North is tasked by OPNAVINST 3440.16D, Navy Defense Support of Civil Authorities Program, and the USNORTHCOM DSCA Theater Campaign Plan to support DSCA planning and execution requirements. As identified in the CNO's Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, Maritime Security responsibilities and DSCA planning support will continue to be in high demand as NORTHCOM develops and refines CONPLAN 3500 and USNORTHCOM OPORD 01-13.

Deficiency 2. **USFF has not approved draft NAVNORTH supporting plans and annexes to NORTHCOM's CONPLAN 3500.**

Defense Support to the U.S. Coast Guard for Maritime Homeland Security

As required by OPNAVINST 5440.77B, USFF supports U.S. Coast Guard short duration (48 hours or less) requests for forces per Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security for Department of Defense Support to the United States Coast Guard for Maritime Homeland Security, dated 5 April 2006. Additionally, as

required by OPNAVINST 5440.77B, Coast Guard Defense Force East and West are integrated in daily and crisis maritime homeland defense planning and execution.

Recommendation 8.   **That USFF coordinate with Director, Navy Staff to update the annex to the 5 April 2006 Memorandum of Agreement to reflect changes since the disestablishment of SECOND Fleet and the designation of USFF as JFMCC.**

Maritime Operations Center (MOC)

USFF has an established an effective MOC and a complementary battle rhythm that fully supports staffing and planning requirements.

The major components of the USFF MOC include the Fleet Command Center (Watch Floor), Current Operations Center, Future Operations Center, Future Plans Center, a Maritime Intelligence Operations Center, and a Logistics Readiness Cell. The MOC provides the required command and control over the operational fleet and shore installations (when in an operational mode such as to support DSCA missions), supports the CCDRs, and enables the Commander's Decision Cycle. There is sufficient support across the entire USFF staff to man the MOC during day-to-day operations. In the event of an operation of significant length, the MOC can operate at full manning (MOC Condition I) for three to five days. After that, the MOC requires external augmentation coming from a pool of qualified reservists. USFF closely tracks and manages these reserve qualifications.

MOC communications with international partners is inefficient in its current state. The Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) is a collection of classified coalition networks, called enclaves, which enable information sharing through the use of email and Web services, instant messaging or chat, the Common Operational Picture service, and Voice over Internet Protocol. USFF lacks a configurable enclave for international partners, other than Mexico and NATO countries, which hinders communications and often precludes an integrated Common Operating Picture.

Deficiency 3.   **USFF lacks a configurable CENTRIXS enclave that can be used to operate with non-NATO and non-Mexico international partners.**

MOC Standardization

Per OPNAVINST 3500.42, Maritime Operations Center Standardization, USFF is leading, in concert with PACFLT, MOC Standardization across the Navy. MOC standardization provides a standard set of operational level missions, functions, tasks and processes, resulting in a more efficient and effective capability and capacity across Fleet Headquarters. It defines a construct for the way Fleet Commanders organize and fight at the operational level. Today, each of the Fleet's MOCs is unique in configuration. The CNO has established a goal of 80% standardization between the MOCs world-wide.

MOC Standardization will drive all Navy MOCs to a common system. The MOC Material Working Group, led by Commander, U.S. Naval Information Dominance Forces

(COMNAVIDFOR), has biweekly meetings to review the status of each MOC's systems, track progress toward the MOC Standard Baseline Build and address other systems issues. However, there is no single TYCOM responsible for MOC systems.

Additionally, there is no official training pipeline for MOC system operators and maintainers. COMNAVIDFOR has initiated the development of a Navy Training Support Plan to identify training required to instruct systems operators and maintainers. Additionally, COMNAVIDFOR has initiated a preventative maintenance program for MOC systems.

A new initiative generated by OPNAVINST 3500.42 tasks USFF to develop an Operational Level (OL) and Tactical Level (TL) Headquarters (HQ) exercise and training program to train MOCs and their direct subordinate HQ organizations. The Navy does not have an OL HQ synthetic training environment that will allow exercising of the MOCs outside of Combatant Command exercises. USFF has identified a potential solution and is working with OPNAV N2/N6 to obtain funding for this requirement. The cost is approximately $4.5M/year and is currently above core in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 17 build. OPNAV has indicated that this will be forwarded to OPNAV N81 (Assessment Division) for assessment.

Deficiency 4. **There is no Type Commander responsible for MOC hardware and software systems.**

Combined Joint Operations from the Sea

Commander, USFF is designated Director, Combined Joint Operations from the Sea, Center of Excellence (CJOS-COE). CJOS-COE is an international military organization sponsored by 13 nations, working under a Memorandum of Understanding and located within the USFF compound. CJOS-COE has been helpful to USFF in assisting the MOC to integrate the NATO Common Operations Picture (COP) into the USFF COP and in resolving the need to establish chat with collation forces. However, CJOS-COE is hindered by USFF security practices that limit international officer access to buildings and areas.

Recommendation 9. **That USFF review its security practices and develop protocols to enable international officers assigned to CJOS-COE access to required spaces.**

Nuclear Primary Commander

Deficiency 5. **COMUSFLTFORCOMSTAFFINST 5400.1C, Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command Standard Organization and Regulations Manual, Enclosure (1) does not capture the duties and responsibilities of the individual in the command who executes the Nuclear Primary Commander role. Reference: OPNAVINST 5440.77B, Missions, Functions, and Tasks of Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Enclosure (1), Paragraph 8.**

Recommendation 10. **That USFF correct administrative errors in the duties and responsibilities for the Nuclear Propulsion Examination Board (N01N) in COMUSFLTFORCOMSTAFFINST 5400.1C, Enclosure (1).**

Nuclear Weapons Certifying Authority

Recommendation 11. **That USFF correct administrative errors in the duties and responsibilities for the Chief Nuclear Weapons Inspector (N01NW) in COMUSFLTFORCOMSTAFFINST 5400.1C, Enclosure (1).**

Manning/Manpower

USFF headquarters (HQ) Unit Identification Code (UIC) authorizations is at 95% of requirements (853 of 895): 94% (271 of 289 requirements) officers, 97% (200 of 207 requirements) enlisted, and 96% (382 of 399 requirements) civil service. Compared to Navy stats (84% officers, 87% enlisted, and 95% civil service), USFF is operating above the benchmark for government civilians and military.

In order to validate and resource an activity's peacetime and mobilization requirement, a Shore Manpower Requirement Determination (SMRD) should be conducted per OPNAVINST 1000.16K CH-1, Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures, following a significant change in scope or purpose of a command's mission, for all Navy shore activities. This did not occur when USFF absorbed SECOND Fleet's functions. In 2010, a shore staffing study by a third party contractor was conducted to assess workload and manpower requirements determination on the combined USFF/C2F. While NAVMAC assessed the contractor's model as valid, OPNAV N1 never formally adopted the study in lieu of a SMRD.

An SMRD determines the minimum manpower requirements needed to perform USFF's directed mission, functions and tasks (OPNAVINST 5440.77B) and its organizational relationships with its subordinate commands. USFF is undergoing certification of HQ MOC. During this certification, MOC manpower requirements will be reviewed and assessed in accordance with OPNAVINST 3500.42, Maritime Operations Center Standardization. USFF Manpower Analysis Team (USFFMAT) plans to conduct a manpower requirement analysis in concert with MOC standardization.

Deficiency 6. **USFF lacks a current SMRD as required by OPNAVINST 1000.16K, CH-1, Section 400, paragraph 5d and Section 402, paragraph 4b.**

Executive Agent (EA) Duties

In addition to its primary duty to train, certify, and provide combat-ready Navy forces, USFF is designated as EA on behalf of CNO for multiple areas of interest. USFF is effectively executing the EA assignments listed below, and in particular, NAVINSGEN highlights one EA duty that is being used to correct a long-standing issue related to inconsistent operations between the forward operating forces.

- Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection
- Cryptological Carry-on Program
- Defense Readiness Reporting System - Navy

- Fleet Assessments
- Maintenance and Modernization Execution
- Seabasing
- Combatting Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Damage Control
- Deployment Health Assessment
- European Phased Adaptive Approach Phase II
- Individual Augmentees
- Navy Ballistic Missile Defense Enterprise
- Tomahawk Land Attack Missile

Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM)

As the EA for TLAM, USFF (in concert with CPF) is leading an effort to standardize operations across the forward Fleets (C5F, C6F, C7F) and CONUS based training commands. Additionally, USFF interacts with U.S. Strategic Command (via Cruise Missile Support Activities Atlantic and Pacific) regarding TLAM mission planning concerns. As a result, training efficiency of firing units has increased since they only need to train to a single standard, as opposed to multiple standards depending on the Areas of Responsibility in which they are expected to deploy.

Deployment Health Assessment (DHA)

Following Naval Audit Service Audit Report N2011-0061, USFF developed a process to measure and ensure DHA compliance within timelines set forth in DoD and OPNAV policy. OPNAVINST 6100.3A, Deployment Health Assessment Process, designates USFF as EA and supported command for DHA. In that role, USFF is responsible for monitoring compliance with Pre-deployment health assessments (pre-DHA), conducted within 60 days prior to deployment; Post-deployment health assessments (PDHA), conducted within 30 days before or after return to home station; and Post-deployment health reassessments (PDHRA), conducted between 90 and 180 days after return to home station. USFF is also responsible for policy enforcement related to deployment health.

USFF is effectively meeting its EA responsibilities. However, the mobilization billet responsible for monitoring Navy DHA compliance and communicating status to subordinate commands was recently gapped for a five month period. This reduced overall Fleet compliance. While current compliance trends are rebounding with the capable effort of a mobilized reserve component officer, a more stable manning approach to this enduring, labor intensive requirement should be considered.

USFF focuses almost exclusively on achieving DHA timeline *compliance* (i.e, ensuring DHAs are accomplished within the associated required timelines noted above), with a metric goal of 95%. However, from the standpoint of identifying stress injuries and other health concerns that require further assessment or treatment, DHA *completion* is at least as relevant to providing service members with identification, assessment and treatment for deployment-related health concerns. While USFF collects completion rate data, reporting is confined to compliance rates,

potentially signaling to commands, service members and even health care providers that completing overdue DHAs is of no value.

Recommendation 12. **That USFF consider resourcing DHA compliance monitoring and policy enforcement with a permanent civilian employee to ensure program continuity or delegate compliance monitoring and responsibility to a subordinate command with sufficient manpower resources.**

Recommendation 13. **That USFF ensure completion of overdue DHAs receives appropriate emphasis.**

Individual Augmentees

OPNAVINST 1754.6, Personal and Family Readiness Support for Individual Augmentees and their Families, forms the basis for policy and assigned responsibilities for Navy support of IAs and their families. This outdated directive has been expanded, complemented and clarified through a series of NAVADMIN messages ("IA Grams") in the ensuing years, but not with a rewrite. In addition to a robust website of guidelines and resources for use by commands, IA Sailors, and Command IA Coordinators (CIAC), this series of IA Grams comprises an extensive program not only of supporting resources, but also of requirements and responsibilities. The diffuse nature of authoritative guidance on IA management and support makes this important program unwieldy, particularly as the number of IAs decreases, reducing frequency and familiarity with program elements.

OPNAVINST 3060.7B, Navy Manpower Mobilization/Demobilization Guide, is currently in rewrite and is anticipated to consolidate existing policy and procedural guidance for deployment of Navy personnel (active and reserve components) to augment Joint and Navy forces. This rewrite is anticipated to include the majority of relevant policy, roles, and responsibilities found in OPNAVINST 1754.6, the series of IA Grams, and other policy memoranda.

Recommendation 14. **That OPNAVINST 1754.6, OPNAVINST 3060.7, and related NAVADMINs be consolidated into an updated Navy Manpower Augmentation Guide (OPNAVINST 3060.7 series) and that OPNAVINST 1754.6 be cancelled.**

Intelligence Oversight (IO)

Concurrent with the command inspection, NAVINSGEN conducted a follow-up of the December 2013 IO Inspection of USFF's IO Program and found it to be compliant with governing guidance; Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, dated 4 Dec 1981; DOD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons; United States Signal Intelligence Directive 18 (USSID 00018); and SECNAVINST 3820.3E, Oversight of Intelligence Activities within the Department of the Navy (DON).

FACILITIES, ENVIRONMENTAL, ENERGY CONSERVATION, AND SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH (SOH)

The Facilities, Environmental, Energy, and Safety Team assessed management, oversight, compliance, and execution of programs associated with each subject area via document reviews, data analysis, site visits, focus group and survey comments, and interviews with members of the USFF staff and Naval Support Activity (NSA) Hampton Roads Public Works Department (PWD) staff. USFF is executing shore-related mission requirements well with respect to facilities, environmental, and energy conservation. SOH programs were found to meet program elements required by applicable laws, regulations, and policies.

USFF Engineer Organization

The USFF Shore Readiness Branch is effectively developing and integrating infrastructure and planning requirements, including integration of new platforms, across the staff, as well as providing sound contingency engineering support to the MOC. The current initiative to assign the Naval Facilities Engineering Command Atlantic (NAVFAC LANT) Commander as USFF Deputy Commander's advisor on engineering matters (Code N01CE) is a positive step toward aligning engineering functions and personnel to best leverage capabilities and synergies between the two commands. At the time of the inspection, the USFF N46 organization chart showed the assignment of the N46 Deputy Fleet Civil Engineer/NAVFAC Liaison Officer (LNO) position (a NAVFAC LANT asset) as a direct report to the N465 Environmental Director. We noted the lack of a Memorandum of Understanding between USFF and NAVFAC LANT regarding this position.

Recommendation 15.   That USFF and NAVFAC LANT formalize an agreement to clarify specific roles and better leverage the capability and experience of the N46 Deputy Fleet Civil Engineer/NAVFAC LNO position.

Facilities

Although many USFF buildings are relatively old, we noted that the spaces assigned to USFF are in better condition than most facilities assigned to other shore commands across the Navy, due in large part to the USFF First Lieutenant; sound management of internal staff requirements and good coordination with NSA Hampton Roads PWD. Additionally, availability of command funding for the facility manager to continually assess and monitor performance of USFF-assigned buildings and track repair and maintenance actions further enhances the quality of working conditions for USFF staff members. Finally, sound leverage of available Transient Personnel Unit (TPU) manpower to complete low-tech facility projects in USFF-assigned spaces further enhances the conditions of work spaces and, ultimately, USFF staff morale.

Environmental Programs

A review of operations at USFF was conducted considering environmental compliance and environmental planning documentation including:

- Hazardous material
- Hazardous waste

- Spill prevention
- Storm water
- Drinking water
- Waste water
- Air pollution
- Environmental impact statements
- Environmental assessments
- Categorical exclusions
- Natural and cultural resources requirements

USFF Environmental programs are effective and well-executed across a broad array of requirements. The staff is proactive in relation to potential problems, making worthwhile outreach efforts, and working as the Navy's lead on environmentally responsible operations and training.

Command Safety Program

Safety and Occupational Health

USFF SOH programs were assessed for compliance with 29 U.S.C. 651-678, Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, safety-related rules, regulations, and standards promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and policies outlined in OPNAVINST 5100.23G CH-1, Navy Safety and Occupational Health Program Manual.

We reviewed the following aspects of SOH and found them to be compliant with governing directives:

- Command SOH policy
- Operational risk management
- Safety councils, committees, and working groups
- Safety trend analysis
- Safety self-assessment
- Acquisition safety
- Traffic safety (including motorcycle safety)
- Recreational/off-duty safety
- Headquarters SOH program
- Training and qualifications of safety professionals assigned to USFF
- SOH oversight of subordinate commands
- Safety database input

USFF Safety Programs are not fully compliant. The USFF/Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CPF) Fleet Safety Campaign (FSC) plan has energized the Type Commanders (TYCOM) and their subordinate commands into action. The Fleet Operational Safety Board (FOSB), with monthly meetings, has proven to be an effective, well-attended, cross-functional team to motivate and report progress on USFF/CPF FSC Top Ten Priorities, such as reduction of procedural non-

compliance at the deckplates, prevention of collisions and groundings, and identification and management of leading risk indicators at the operational and tactical level. Additionally, some predictive analytics have been developed to move toward forward-looking indicators that will complement proven historical measures. USFF does not have a High-Risk Training (HRT) program, and more importantly is not conducting oversight of HRT programs of lower echelon commands as required by OPNAVINST 1500.75C, Policy and Governance for Conducting High-Risk Training.

Deficiency 7. **USFF is not conducting required oversight of High-Risk Training programs as required. Reference: OPNAVINST 1500.75C, paragraph 5d(3).**

Energy Conservation

USFF shore and operational energy conservation programs are compliant with governing instructions and policies. The Operational Energy Officer and his team are making progress toward SECNAV and CNO goals through positive engagement with the TYCOMs and Systems Commands (SYSCOM), in a manner similar to the success of the Fleet Safety Campaign Program.

SECURITY PROGRAMS AND CYBERSECURITY/TECHNOLOGY

The Security Programs and Cybersecurity and Technology Team used survey and focus group responses, document review, site visits, and face-to-face interviews to assess the following areas:

- Information Security
- Personnel Security
- Industrial Security
- Physical Security
- Special Security Programs
- Operations Security (OPSEC)
- Counterintelligence (CI)
- Insider Threat
- Cybersecurity
- Personally Identifiable Information (PII)
- Foreign Disclosure

Command Security

Command Security Office

The USFF Command Security Office is manned with four personnel—one Command Security Manager, a Physical Security Officer, a Personnel Security Specialist, and one Security Assistant. At the time of the inspection, the office had two military personnel vacancies. The office is responsible to the Commander for information, personnel, industrial, and physical security matters at USFF, including subordinate command oversight responsibilities as delineated in SECNAV M5510.36, Department of the Navy Information Security Manual, and SECNAV M5510.30, Department of the Navy Personnel Security Manual. USFF is not providing sustained security oversight to its subordinate commands.

COMUSFLTFORCOMSTAFFINST 5400.1C, U.S. Fleet Forces Command Standard Organization and Regulations Manual (SORM), Enclosure (1), Requirement for the Command Security Manager, requirement N02.10.00075.D (Ensure protection of SCI) incorrectly assigns responsibilities to the Security Manager that belong to the Senior Intelligence Officer (N2/N39). Reference: DoDM 5105.21, Volume 1, Enclosure (2), paragraphs 6a and 6b.

Deficiency 8.   COMUSFLTFORCOMSTAFFINST 5400.1C, Enclosure (1), Requirement for the Command Security Manager, requirement N02.10.00075.F (Conduct annual security inspections) does not capture subordinate (e.g., echelon 3) command oversight requirements. References: SECNAV M5510.36, Section 2-11, paragraph 1; SECNAV M5510.30, Department of the Navy Information Security Manual, Section 2-2, paragraph 2j and Section 2-10, paragraph 1.

Deficiency 9.   COMUSFLTFORCOMSTAFFINST 3300.1, Anti-terrorism Plan, Paragraph 6a references an Appendix which does not exist in the instruction. Reference: COMUSFLTFORCOMSTAFFINST 3300.1.

Recommendation 16.   That USFF annotate on the command organization chart that the Command Security Manager has direct access to the Commander per SECNAV M5510.36, Section 2.3, paragraph 2.

Recommendation 17.   That USFF conduct an SMRD to determine additional security personnel to execute both command and subordinate command oversight duties in SECNAV M5510.36 and SECNAV M5510.30.

Information Security

Deficiency 10.   The USFF Emergency Action Plan (EAP) for the safeguarding of Communications Security (COMSEC) material b7e ███████████████████████
████████████████████████████   Reference: EKMS-1B, EKMS Policy and Procedures for Navy Electronic Key Management System Tiers 2 and 3, b7e ███████████
██

Deficiency 11. b7e ██
██
████████   Reference: United States Navy/United States Marine Corps IA PUB-5239-22/October 2003, Information Assurance Protected Distribution System (PDS) Publication,
b7e ███████████

Deficiency 12.   USFF's COMSEC EAP is not part of the command's overall EAP. Reference: EKMS-1B, Annex M, paragraph 2i.

Deficiency 13.   USFF is not providing information security oversight to their subordinate commands. Reference: SECNAV M5510.36, Section 2-11, paragraph 1.

Deficiency 14.   Several personnel were observed to have b7e ███████████████
██
██████████████████████████████████

Recommendation 18.   That USFF assess the capacity of PED lock boxes at USFF buildings for adequacy.

Personnel Security

During a review of Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) records of selected USFF personnel, we found several discrepancies between a person's access determination level (i.e., clearance level) and position designation (i.e., risk level of potential damage of the person's position).

One notable example revealed a personnel record in JPAS with a Top Secret (TS) access determination level with an associated position sensitivity of Non-Critical Sensitive (the second lowest risk level, normally associated with Secret level access or below). We also saw similar

problems in JPAS records for personnel indoctrinated for Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). We recommend that USFF Command Security Manager, Special Security Representative (SSR), and the Information Systems Security Manager (ISSM) coordinate with the Human Resources Officer (HRO) to resolve conflicts in personnel JPAS records and conduct an audit of civilian Position Descriptions (PD).

Deficiency 15. **There are mismatches between the access determination levels and position sensitivity determinations for several personnel in the Joint Personnel Authentication System (JPAS). Reference: SECNAV M5510.30, Section 1-5, paragraph 15e.**

Deficiency 16. **Three civilian Position Descriptions did not have the Special-Sensitive position sensitivity level reflected in PD, commensurate with a Top Secret/SCI access level. Reference: SECNAV-5510.30, Section 5-3, paragraphs 1a and 1b.**

Deficiency 17. **USFF is not providing personnel security oversight to their subordinate commands. References: SECNAV M5510.30, Section 2-2, paragraph 2j; and SECNAV M5510.30, Section 2-10, paragraphs 1 and 2.**

Recommendation 19. **That the USFF Security Manager, SSR, and ISSM coordinate with the HRO to review JPAS records for command personnel and audit civilian PDs for accuracy.**

Industrial Security

At the time of our inspection, there were b7e ▮▮ Because USFF has no Special Security Officer (SSO) assigned, b7e ▮▮

Deficiency 18. b7e ▮▮

Physical Security

COMUSFLTFORCOMSTAFFINST 5530.2A, Physical Security Plan, paragraph 15, designates b7 ▮▮▮ b at USFF as b7e ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮ The number of b7e ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮ meet b7e ▮▮▮

b7e ▮▮

b7e [redacted] USFF campus b7e [redacted]

[redacted]

OPNAVINST 5530.14E CH-2, b7e [redacted]

[redacted]

b7e [redacted] requires that all visitors to USFF must first check into command security for check-in and badging. b7e [redacted]

USFF issues access badges to its personnel and visitors for authorized entry into USFF spaces. USFF has not yet transitioned, but does have a plan to establish Common Access Card (CAC) access as directed by Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 12, Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, paragraph 1; the Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS) 201-2, Personnel Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors, paragraph 6; Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Memorandum 05-24, Implementation of HSPD-12 – Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, Attachment A, paragraph D; and OPNAVINST 5530.14E CH-2, Enclosure (1), Article 0210, paragraph f(1). b7e [redacted]

Deficiency 19. Many rooms in buildings at USFF b7e [redacted]

Deficiency 20. Multiple visitors were b7e [redacted]

Deficiency 21. Required annual physical security surveys for b7e [redacted]

Deficiency 22. USFF does not have b7e [redacted]

Deficiency 23. USFF does not use the Common Access Card (CAC) as the means for regularly assigned military, civilian and contractor personnel to gain entry into spaces at USFF.

References: HSPD 12, paragraph (1); FIPS 201-2, paragraph 6; OMB Memorandum 05-24, Attachment A, paragraph D; and OPNAVINST 5530.14E CH-2, Enclosure (1), Article 0210, paragraph f(1).

Deficiency 24. NSA Hampton Roads [b7e] ████████████████████████████
██
██

Deficiency 25. USFF does not have a written support agreement in place with [b7e] ██
██

Recommendation 20. That USFF evaluate the necessity of the [b7e] ████████████
██

Recommendation 21. That USFF submits [b7e] ████████████████████████████████
████

Special Security Programs

USFF has a Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) designated in writing who is overall responsible for the execution of the USFF SCI program. USFF has [b7e] ████████████ with one appointed SSR who oversees the [b7e] ████, provides administrative support to [b7e] ████████
[b7e] ████ and performs other support duties. We conducted an administrative cross-check of over [b7] ██ current and archived personnel security files for SCI-indoctrinated personnel assigned to USFF during the period from [b7e] ████████ Additionally, we conducted [b] certified [b7e] ████ inspections. Deficiencies related to [b7e] ████████ are reported via Naval message by [b7e] ████
████

USFF lacks an SSO; SECNAV M5510.30, Section 2-9 requires DON commands accredited for and authorized to receive, process and store SCI to designate an SSO. As an Echelon 2 command, USFF has an oversight responsibility to subordinate command SCIFs. DoDM 5105.21, Volume 1, Enclosure (2), paragraph 9a stipulates one of the SSO's duties is to provide SCI security oversight of other SCIFs under the organization's security cognizance. Further, SECNAV M5510.30, Section 2-10, requires commanding officers to provide security oversight of subordinate commands.

The manning of SCI security and administration at USFF is [b7e] ████████████████
████████████ In SSO Navy [b7e] ████
██
████████████████ the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance/ Director of Navy Intelligence (N2/N6) directed the [b7e] ████████████████████
██
████████████████████████████████

SSO Navy b7e

███
███
███
███
███

At the time of the inspection, USFF had b7e████████████████
██████████████████████████. Additionally, it is noted that b7e████████
███

A USFF Command Manpower Analysis Team (CMAT) Management Advisory Study (MAS), completed in February 2015 to determine the b7e████████████████████████
███

"...[t]his new workload includes leadership and oversight of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) facilities, information, and personnel needs across the USFF AOR."

USFF should hire an SSO. For comparison, b7e████████████████████
███
███
███

Deficiency 26. USFF does not have an SSO to perform required Special Security Duties. References: SECNAV M5510.30, Section 2-9; DoDM 5105.21, Volume 1, Enclosure (2), paragraph 9a.

Deficiency 27. There are no appointment letters for b7e███████████████
███████████████████████████████████████

Deficiency 28. One civilian file contained an SCI indoctrination form (DD 1847) on which the indoctrination dates did not match the dates populated into the member's JPAS summary page. Reference: DoDM 5105.21, Volume 3, Enclosure (2), paragraph 7.

Deficiency 29. Four originally signed DD 1847-1 Non-Disclosure Statement (NDS) forms were on local file which are required to be forwarded to b7e████████████████ Reference: Navy Department Supplement to DoD S-5105.21-M-1 (with BANIF 14-98 incorporated), paragraph 215, subsections a(3) and e(A).

Deficiency 30. Several civilians who are SCI-indoctrinated have JPAS summary pages that do not reflect Special-Sensitive for position sensitivity level. Reference: SECNAV-5510.30, Section 5-3, paragraphs 1a and 1b.

Deficiency 31. b7e██
███
███

Deficiency 32. b7e

████████████████████████████████████
████████████

Recommendation 22.   That USFF examine b7e

████████████████████████████████████

Operations Security (OPSEC)

The OPSEC program at USFF was assessed as compliant. The level of fleet oversight, support, and training provided by the OPSEC coordinator and his team is one of the best we have seen. USFF's program is leading the Navy's effort to revitalize the OPSEC program.

Counterintelligence (CI)

Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) support to USFF for CI training is compliant.

Insider Threat

Following a review of the command security programs for SCI and non-SCI, we performed a horizontal examination of our findings to assess overall command security program readiness at USFF and identify potential seams which would raise the probability of a successful insider threat event. We liked the command's OPSEC program; future collaboration between the OPSEC manager and Security Manager in promotion of security education will yield benefits for workforce security at USFF.

b7e

████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████

b7e

████████████████████████████████████
████████████████ b7e observations of b7e
████████████

possible causes of this issue include (but are not limited to): b7e
████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████

Multiple locations at USFF b7e
While not an explicit requirement, b7e
████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████

Similar deficiencies found b7e
████████████████████████

Further collaboration

between the ███ [b7e] ██████████████████████████████████
██████████████████ We recommend USFF perform a follow-up examination of the command's personnel security practices.

Recommendation 23. **That USFF perform a personnel security program assessment for both non-SCI and SCI programs, using as a guide the one-time Navy-wide personnel security assessment tasking directed by ALNAV 079/13, Subj: Required Department of the Navy Personnel Security Review.**

Cybersecurity/Information Technology (IT) Acquisition and Network Management

USFF has a comprehensive Cybersecurity program that complies with all DON and DoD policy guidance. The Cybersecurity staff is dedicated, knowledgeable, and executes their mission at a high level of performance.

The command's Information Technology Management and Information Security Continuity of Operations (COOP) Plan is well-organized, validated, and effective.

USFF's Information Technology Procurement Request (ITPR) process is one of the best programs we have observed. USFF exercises effective fiscal controls and policies for its enterprise in the procurement of IT support assets and services.

Deficiency 33. **System Authorization Access Request-Navy (SAAR-N) forms for applicants are signed by the Information System Security Manager (ISSM) before the Command Security Manager validates an applicant's background information; this precludes the ISSM from meeting his duties. Reference: DoDI 8500.01, Cybersecurity, Enclosure (3), paragraph 19c.**

Personally Identifiable Information (PII)

USFF's PII program is not fully compliant. The PII coordinator is dedicated and highly motivated, but struggles to execute the PII program for USFF headquarters while also providing oversight to subordinate commands given current additional collateral duties.

Deficiency 34. **USFF does not have a formal Privacy Act Team (PAT) to** ███ [b7e] ██████████
██████████████████ **and establish best business practices.** ███ [b7e] ██████
██

Deficiency 35. **USFF does not maintain an auditable record of PII semi-annual spot checks. Reference: ALNAV 070/07, Department of the Navy (DON) Personally Identifiable Information (PII) Annual Training Policy, paragraph 1b.**

Deficiency 36. **USFF has not provided justification for forms that require** ███ [b7e] ████
██. **References: DoDI 1000.30, Reduction of Social Security Number (SSN) Use Within DoD, Enclosure (2), paragraph 2c(13);**

DON CIO MSG DTG 192101Z JUL 10, Subj: Department of the Navy Social Security Number (SSN) Reduction Plan For Forms Phase One, paragraph 3.

Foreign Disclosure

Foreign Disclosure (FD) is compliant at USFF. USFF has one full-time civilian Foreign Disclosure Officer (FDO) with one reservist (on 90-day orders) in a supporting role. USFF has foreign disclosure and visit approval authority over all of its subordinate commands and for the Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Center of Excellence (CJOS-CE). The USFF FDO administers and manages the Fleet level FD program, consisting of 21 echelon 3 subordinate commands and 123 echelon 4 subordinate commands. b7e

The FDO is undermanned to meet the USFF foreign disclosure responsibilities. The FDO handles b7e , has oversight on all foreign visits across the USFF enterprise b7e and conducts foreign disclosure training to subordinate units (~1,500 personnel trained annually). USFF leverages reserve support to address shortfalls; b7e The projected decline in reserve support makes the reservist option a non-sustainable option going forward.

USFF N2/N39 commissioned a Management Advisory Study (MAS), conducted by the USFF Command Manpower Analysis Team (USFF CMAT) in December 2014. The CMAT study concluded that the FDO requires an additional three FTEs to effectively support the growing FDO demand at USFF. We agree with this recommendation.

Recommendation 24.   **That USFF take action to hire additional FDOs to support the command's foreign disclosure workload.**

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT/COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS

The Resource Management/Compliance Programs Team assessed 18 programs and functions. Our findings reflect inputs from survey respondents, onsite focus group participants, document review, direct observation, and face-to-face personnel interviews.

The following programs and functions are considered to be well administered and in full compliance with applicable directives:

- Financial Management/Comptroller Functions
- Managers' Internal Control
- Government Travel Charge Card
- Government Commercial Purchase Card
- Personal Property Management
- Command Individual Augmentee (IA) Coordinator Program
- Deployment Health Assessment
- Individual Medical Readiness
- Physical Readiness Program
- Navy Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention
- Hazing Training and Compliance
- Legal and Ethics
- Victim and Witness Assistance Program
- Command Managed Equal Opportunity
- Inspector General Functions

The following programs were found to be not fully compliant:

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response

While effective and well-managed, the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program has room for improvement. Commanders or Commanding Officers (CO) have certain personal responsibilities in sexual assault victim response and care, including for example attendance at Sexual Assault Case Management Group (SACMG) meetings. If authority to act as the Commander, USFF is going to be delegated—for instance to the Deputy Commander for officer victims and the Assistant Chief of Staff (as CO of Enlisted Troops) for enlisted victims—this should be established in writing and communicated to personnel throughout the command in accordance with SECNAVINST 1752.4B, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response, and DoDI 6495.02, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program Procedures.

Deficiency 37. Delegation of authority to act as the Commander regarding sexual assault victim response and care has not been established in writing and communicated to personnel throughout USFF. References: SECNAVINST 1752.4B; DoDI 6495.02, Enclosure (9).

Deficiency 38. Specific pre- and post-deployment training related to sexual assault awareness, risk reduction and available resources is not being conducted for deploying staff

personnel as required. References: SECNAVINST 1752.4B, Enclosure (10), paragraphs 3d and 3e; DoDI 6495.02, Enclosure (10), paragraphs 3e and 3f.

Deficiency 39. SAPR training required for civilians who supervise service members is not being tracked at USFF. Reference: SECNAVINST 1752.4B, Enclosure (10), paragraph 6.

Suicide Prevention

Deficiency 40. Full-time contractor personnel are not receiving suicide prevention training as required. Reference: OPNAVINST 1720.4A, paragraph 5a(1).

Voting Assistance Program

Deficiency 41. Records of annual training in voting matters, including dates and attendees, have not been retained for at least 1 calendar year. Reference: DoDI 1000.04, Voting Assistance Program, Enclosure (4), paragraph 2s(3).

SAILOR PROGRAMS

Brilliant on the Basics Programs were reviewed and behavior associated with good order and discipline was closely observed. Overall, command morale and perceptions of quality of life (QOL) were noted to be average. Enlisted Sailors displayed proper military bearing and maintained a professional appearance.

Sailor Career Management Programs

Areas reviewed included the Command Sponsorship, Command Indoctrination, and Career Development Programs.

Command Sponsorship Program

This program was in compliance with OPNAVINST 1740.3C, Command Sponsor and Indoctrination Program. The Career Information Management System (CIMS) is used to report and track sponsorship assignments. Additionally, command sponsors receive required Fleet and Family Support Center training prior to or during their assignment as sponsors.

Command Indoctrination Program (INDOC)

USFF's INDOC program is in compliance with OPNAVINST 1740.3C. NAVINSGEN observed USFF's Navy Pride and Professionalism training completion percentage was 85 percent.

Career Development Board (CDB)

USFF's CDB Program is in compliance with OPNAVINST 1040.11D, Navy Enlisted Retention and Career Development Program.   The Command Career Counselor is documenting completion in CIMS as required and tracks the upcoming CDBs with enough preparation time for thorough individual interaction with the service members.

Appendix A: Issue Paper

SUMMARY OF ACTIONS

Issue Papers that follow require responses to recommendations in the form of Implementation Status Reports (ISR). If you are an Action Officer for a staff listed in Table A-1, please submit ISRs as specified for each applicable recommendation, along with supporting documentation, such as plans of action and milestones and implementing directives.

- Submit initial ISRs using OPNAV Form 5040/2 no later than 1 December 2015. Each ISR should include an e-mail address for the action officer, where available. This report is distributed through Navy Taskers. ISRs should be submitted through the assigned document control number in Navy Taskers. An electronic version of OPNAV Form 5040/2 is added to the original Navy Tasker Package along with the inspection report, upon distribution.

- Submit quarterly ISRs, including "no change" reports until the recommendation is closed by NAVINSGEN. When a long-term action is dependent upon prior completion of another action, the status report should indicate the governing action and its estimated completion date. Further status reports may be deferred, with NAVINSGEN concurrence.

- When action addressees consider required action accomplished, the status report submitted should contain the statement, "Action is considered complete." However, NAVINSGEN approval must be obtained before the designated action addressee is released from further reporting responsibilities on the recommendation.

- NAVINSGEN point of contact for ISRs is b7c

Table A-1. Action Officer Listing for Implementation Status Reports

COMMAND	RECOMMENDATION NUMBER(S) XXX-15
USFF	015
NWDC	016
DNS	017

ISSUE PAPER A-1: TRAINING RANGES AND SYSTEMS

Issue: U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFF) does not have access to training ranges or systems of sufficient fidelity to permit operational forces to train to the full capability of new systems and weapons that are being developed to counter high-end threats.

Background: USFF does not have access to a permanently instrumented range other than the Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center, which the submarine force utilizes heavily. While USFF does have adequate portable telemetry capability to support live fire ranges for legacy generation gunnery and missile systems, range systems do not exist for newer and future gunnery and missile systems.

Discussion: Physical range limitations. Operations Security (OPSEC) concerns and security classification issues will drive much of Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) (and possibly Electromagnetic Rail Gun in the future) training to a synthetic environment. Being able to synthetically exercise NIFC-CA with live training in other warfare areas requires a translation device between Navy Warfare Development Command's (NWDC) Navy Continuous Training Environment (NCTE) and live range operating systems. That device is being developed now with an expected test rollout in September 2015. If validated, West Coast ranges will require a similar system.

Opposition Forces (OPFOR). As the Navy gears its training for the high-end fight, there is a lack of late generation OPFOR in quantities representative of the threat. Requirements are currently being generated; it is likely that these will involve both hardware (jets on the ramp) and sophisticated synthetic training systems to generate multiple and varied threat tracks required for battle space management and deconfliction.

Recommendations: 015-15. That USFF provide NWDC with detailed analyses of required training range improvements to provide adequate proficiency training for operators against high end threats.

016-15. That NWDC develop a comprehensive program or methodology for training on next generation systems and weapons in a Live/Virtual/Constructive environment.

017-15. That Director, Navy Staff (DNS) identify a resource sponsor to support Fleet development of a Live/Virtual/Constructive training

environment.

NAVINSGEN POC: b7c

APPENDIX B: Summary of Key Survey Results

PRE-EVENT SURVEY

In support of the Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFF) Command Inspection held 7-17 April 2015, the Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) conducted an anonymous on-line survey of active duty military and Department of the Navy (DON) civilian personnel from 4 February 2015 to 13 March 2015. The survey produced 308 respondents (154 military, 154 civilian). According to reported demographics the sample slightly overrepresented the USFF civilian workforce with approximately 5.8% margin of error at the 99% confidence level. Selected topics are summarized in the sections below. A frequency report is provided in Appendix C.

Quality of Life

Quality of life was assessed using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is worst and 10 is best. The overall USFF average quality of work life (QOWL), 6.76, was comparable to the historical echelon 2 average, 6.62 (Figure B-1). The overall USFF average quality of home life (QOHL), 8.60, was higher than the historical area visit average, 7.88 (Figure B-2).

The perceived impact of factors on QOWL rating is summarized in Table B-1. Factors of potential concern were identified by distributional analyses, where 20% negative responses served as a baseline. Advancement Opportunities was most frequently identified as a negative impact on QOWL rating; however, differences in negative responses percentages between Civilian-Military and Male-Female were observed (compare bold subgroup values with their counterpart in Table B-1).

The perceived impact of factors on QOHL rating is summarized in Table B-2.

Job Importance and Workplace Behaviors

Table B-3 lists aggregate strongly agree and agree response percentages to survey questions addressing perceived job importance, and whether fraternization, favoritism, gender/sex discrimination, sexual harassment, or hazing occur at USFF. Overall echelon 2 percentages over a 5-year period are shown for comparison. Except for job importance, lower values are "better."

- Perceived job importance at USFF was comparable to the historical echelon 2 value.

- Perceived occurrence of fraternization, gender/sex discrimination, sexual harassment, race discrimination, and hazing at USFF was lower than historical echelon 2 values.

Figure B-1. Top: Distribution of quality of work life ratings from the pre-event survey. The x-axis lists the rating scale and the y-axis represents the number of survey respondents. Response percentages for ratings are shown at the base of each bar. Counts for each rating are shown above each bar. The most frequent rating is shown in blue.


Figure B-2. Distribution of quality of home life ratings from the pre-event survey. The x-axis lists the rating scale and the y-axis represents the number of survey respondents. Response percentages for ratings are shown at the base of each bar. Counts for each rating are shown above each bar. The most frequent rating is shown in blue.

Table B-1. Negative Impacts on Quality of Work Life Rating

Factor	Military	Civilian	Male	Female
Job satisfaction	19%	13%	16%	12%
Leadership support	15%	20%	16%	20%
Leadership opportunities	17%	23%	19%	20%
Workload	17%	26%	20%	21%
Work Hours/Schedule	19%	11%	14%	12%
Advancement opportunities	18%	**40%**	26%	34%
Awards and recognition	14%	**32%**	19%	29%
Training opportunities	12%	**32%**	21%	24%
Command morale	19%	19%	16%	24%
Command climate	12%	18%	11%	**22%**

Notes. Perceived impact of assessed factors on quality of work life rating based on negative (percentages shown) versus aggregate positive and neutral responses. Low percentages are "better." Factors in bold are significantly different than a 20% baseline; higher values in bold indicate significant differences between subgroups.

Table B-2. Negative Impacts on Quality of Home Life Rating

Factor	Negative	Other
Quality of home	**2%**	98%
Quality of the school for dependent children	**3%**	97%
Quality of the childcare available	**4%**	96%
Shopping & dining opportunities	**2%**	98%
Recreational opportunities	**1%**	99%
Access to spouse employment	**6%**	94%
Access to medical/dental care	**4%**	96%
Cost of living	**10%**	90%

Notes. Perceived impact of assessed factors on quality of home life rating based on negative versus aggregate positive and neutral (Other) responses. Low Negative percentages are "better." Negative percentages in bold are significantly different than a 20% baseline.

Table B-3. Perceived Job Importance and Occurrence of Workplace Behaviors

Question Topic	USFF	ECH 2
Job Importance	84%	80%
Fraternization	**4%**	14%
Favoritism	24%	30%
Gender/Sex Discrimination	**6%**	13%
Sexual Harassment	**0%**	8%
Race Discrimination	**0%**	10%
Hazing	**1%**	7%

Notes. Aggregate strongly agree and agree (SA+A) response percentages for selected command climate topics. Echelon 2 (ECH 2) percentages are historical NAVINSGEN findings. Except for Job Importance, lower percentages are "better." Bold values indicate a significantly different distribution of SA+A responses than historical ECH 2 values.

Mission Tools & Resources

Table B-4 lists aggregate strongly disagree and disagree response percentages to survey questions probing the adequacy of tools and resources that support the mission. Items of potential concern were identified by distributional analyses, where 20% negative responses served as a baseline.

Table B-4. Tools and Resources to Accomplish the Mission

Items	Inadequate	Other
People	24%	76%
Training	22%	78%
Workspace	**9%**	91%
Computer	17%	83%
Software	23%	77%
Internet	17%	83%
Intranet	14%	86%
Equipment	**8%**	92%
Materials & Supplies	**9%**	91%

Notes. Aggregate strongly disagree and disagree (Inadequate) response percentages to perceptions on the adequacy of mission tools and resources. Smaller percentages are "better." Inadequate percentages in bold are significantly different than a 20% baseline.

APPENDIX C: Summary of Focus Group Perceptions

FOCUS GROUPS

On 7-8 April 2015, NAVINSGEN conducted focus groups at USFF, seven with various groupings of active duty military ranks and five with various groupings of civilian grades (make-up sessions were offered to accommodate work schedules). There were a total of 72 USFF focus group participants; 34 military, 38 civilians. Each focus group was scheduled for one hour and included one facilitator and two note takers. The facilitator followed a protocol script: (a) focus group personnel introductions, (b) brief introduction to the NAVINSGEN mission, (c) privacy, non-attribution, and basic ground rules statements, (d) participant-derived list of topics having the most impact on the mission, job performance, or quality of life, and (e) subsequent refinement and discussion of participant-derived topics with an emphasis on understanding the perceived impact. Note takers transcribed focus group proceedings, which were subsequently entered and coded in a spreadsheet database by the Analysis Team Lead to determine the total number of focus groups in which the same or comparable topic and its perceived impact were discussed.

Table C-1 lists focus groups topics that were expressed as a major impact on the mission, job performance, or quality of life in at least two focus groups. Military and civilian focus groups at USFF mentioned Manning/Manpower most often as having a major negative impact on the mission, job performance, and/or quality of life.

Table C-1. Participant-Derived Focus Group Topics Expressed as a Major Impact on the Mission, Job Performance, or Quality of Life.

Topic	Impact		
	Major	Moderate	Minor
Manning/Manpower	●●●●○	●●○○○	
Communication	●●○○	●●○○	○
Internet/Corporate Tools	○○	●●●○	
Awards/Recognition	○○	●●○	●
Leadership	●○	○○○	
Professional Knowledge & Development	○○	○○	
Performance Management	●●	○○	
Parking	○○	●○	●○
Advancement/Promotion	●○	○	○

<u>Notes</u>. Descending order of the number of focus groups topics that were expressed as a major impact on the mission, job performance, and/or quality of life in at least two groups. Colored circles indicate active duty military (●) and civilian (○) focus groups at USFF.

Manning/Manpower

Ten focus groups expressed manning/manpower shortfalls with various perceived adverse effects on, but not limited to: work hours, work schedule (watchstanding), ability to accommodate a vast and seemingly expanding mission scope, and quality of life (work-home life balance; stress). In general, focus group comments related to manning/manpower were expressed in terms of perceived reductions in the workforce without commensurate reductions in mission scope. A few participants strongly suggested that the USFF Shore Manpower Requirements Determination (SMRD) is out-of-date and does not reflect current manning requirements. Perceived shortfalls or allocation of existing Information Systems Technician (IT) and Yeoman (YN) staffing were especially noted as producing negative impacts on the ability to perform the mission and/or quality of life.

Communication

Focus group participants who are able to attend Battle Rhythm events reported that it has a major *positive* impact on the mission and job performance by providing situational awareness of mission activities. However, focus group participants who are unable to attend Battle Rhythm events reported that the slide deck product does not sufficiently capture bottom lines and topic conversation in a form that can aid the development of work products.

Focus group participants expressed major negative impacts on mission (product delays), job performance (productivity), and quality of life (discontent) as a function of difficulties in receiving sufficient top-down guidance to better clarify work efforts, as well as limited freedom to engage in horizontal communications across directorates during product development.

Lower graded civilian focus group participants were critical of the composition of and communication ("no feedback") from the Civilian Advisory Board. Civilian focus group participants also recommended that the Board be composed of a range of grades.

Participants acknowledged that the Chief of Staff communicates with the command through a range of media and events. There were no comments regarding the effectiveness of these efforts.

One participant reported that the lack of feedback from leadership on the quality or usefulness of their work efforts has major a negative impact on quality of work life: "Even if it's just a 'thanks' to justify the work being done."

Internet/Corporate Tools

Focus group participants offered several comments related to internet and other corporate tools perceived to negatively impact mission and job performance. Challenges in interaction with joint commands were claimed such as connectivity to planning tools and absence of secure voice-over-internet-protocol (VoIP). Our on-site inspection activities indicated that at least one of these shortfalls was recently addressed by purchasing special Navy-Marine Corps Internet (NMCI) seats that enable connectivity to the Joint Operations Planning Execution System (JOPES). Remaining shortfalls in connectivity are related to NMCI or facilities infrastructure.

Although expressed as a moderate negative impact, several participants indicated that there are inadequate corporate workflow tools. Direction was reported as being received verbally and tracking often reported as either nonexistent or by individually-derived spreadsheets. Participants who are unable to attend Battle Rhythm events described the promulgation of the slide deck as insufficient; participants would like to have access to formal summaries of Battle Rhythm dialogue in addition to third-party notes from supervisors or co-workers.

Participants also expressed moderate disappointment with NMCI access and performance as well as restricted cell phone use.

Awards/Recognition

Civilian focus groups expressed major or moderate quality of life concerns associated with awards/recognition. Four out of five civilian focus groups thought that the awards process lacks transparency, especially with respect to the logic applied during decision-making. Participants in supervisory positions expressed disappointment in reductions in their employee award options—the inability to reward all of their "superstars" either through step increases, on-the-spot and other monetary awards, or credit hours.

The perception that Musicians (MU) are not seriously considered for Sailor of the Quarter was discussed as a moderate or minor negative impact on quality of life in two military focus groups, but was indicated as a potential major impact on promotion.

Leadership

Several focus group participants expressed that executive leadership is reluctant to allow decision-making below the FO/SES level, which is thought to produce product delays, increased workloads as a result of product revisions that could have been more easily moderated, and inadvertently promoting a reactive vice proactive posture.

Professional Knowledge & Development

Four focus groups expressed major and moderate negative impacts on job performance and quality of life related to the perceived paucity or absence of professional training opportunities (some participants reported availability of training for job requirements). Participants did not express a clear understanding of the process by which professional knowledge and development opportunities are prioritized or approved. A majority of participants who engaged in discussion on this topic expressed that opportunities for professional knowledge and development would have to be pursued on one's own time with personal funds.

Performance Management

Various military participants expressed a major negative impact on quality of life as a function of perceived inequities in the Sailor of the Quarter process and its impact on ranking boards. Civilian participants also expressed perceived deficiencies in performance management (e.g., outdated position descriptions, no supervisor feedback on appraisals, absence of merit-based pay awards, although they were categorized as moderate negative impacts on quality of life).

Parking

Parking was expressed in four civilian and two military focus groups as negatively affecting quality of life across all impact categories. Civilian participants reported that the addition of Naval Air Forces Atlantic placed greater stress on the availability of parking proximal to USFF and indicated that there are no viable commuting alternatives than driving one's car to work. Participants reported extended search periods up to 20 minutes and/or walking distances up to a half mile. Focus group participants also expressed major impacts in terms of perceived inequities between civilian and contractor punishment (or lack thereof in the latter cohort) for parking infractions: civilians reported that "contractors can park anywhere and not get ticketed." Some participants thought that a parking garage would afford more spaces and consume less real estate.

Advancement/Promotion

Advancement/Promotion was expressed in three civilian groups as negatively affecting quality of life across all impact categories. Major impacts were expressed by the lowest graded civilian participants who indicated that it is difficult to compete for higher-graded positions and expressed a perception that this is due to either a lack of training or that these positions are being filled by retired military (contractors filling positions was expressed as a moderate negative impact).

Participants in an officer focus group expressed that assignment to USFF has been good for promotion competitiveness and screening for command.

Other Focus Group Topics with Expressed Major Impact

Work Hours/Schedule (1 Major, 4 Moderate). Enlisted military participants generally expressed a need to spend more time with family during shore duty. Military participants acknowledged that work hours/schedule is challenged by watch schedules.

Hiring Process (1 Major, 2 Moderate, 1 Minor). Four of five civilian focus groups expressed concerns related to the hiring process in terms of process transparency, feedback, and timeliness from the development of an announcement to getting a new hire on station. Several participants indicated that the current system is in need of an overhaul. Focus group participants expressed a desire to be able to track progress through the system.

Knowledge/Tasker Management (1 Major, 1 Moderate). Two focus groups expressed shortfalls in knowledge management, including tasker systems. Participants reported that workflow tools to augment the flow of communication and progress on work efforts do not exist. Participants also reported that taskers from existing, archaic systems are often received with expired or short due dates that make everything a high priority.

Workload (1 Major, 1 Moderate). Two enlisted focus groups expressed concern regarding workload—that it cannot be completed during normal work hours: "Nine to five is [normal work hours], but the day starts when everyone goes home." Mandatory training and slow

NMCI performance were described as potential root causes of increased workload, and were also viewed as impediments to progress on "normal job" activities.

Teamwork/Unit Cohesion (1 Major, 1 Moderate). Two focus groups expressed disappointment in the lack of teamwork/unit cohesion in the process of completing mission products. "'Stovepipes of excellence.' Lack of collaboration across directorates… Too many layers to get to the answer." One focus group participant indicated outstanding teamwork within their directorate.

Executive Dining Facility (1 Major). One military focus group expressed that the "Executive Dining Facility is great!"—a major *positive* impact on quality of life.

Physical Readiness (1 Major). One enlisted focus group participant claimed that USFF support for physical training (PT) has a *positive* impact on health and quality of work life. "If I PT, I feel great! And it shows through my work."

Sponsorship/Mentorship (1 Major). CPO 365 integration with Naval Support Activity Hampton Roads (professional development and physical training) was noted as *positive* influence on quality of work life.

Telework/Telecommuting (1 Major). One focus group participant expressed that teleworking has a *positive* effect on quality of work life.

Facilities (1 Major). One focus group participant expressed a major negative impact on quality of work life due to mold and its presumed association with illness. General comments were also made concerning workplace temperature, claimed to drop as low as 50°F during winter and "extremely hot" in the summer. Participants claimed that military members are permitted to go home when such workspace temperature control challenges occur, but not civilian employees.

Job Security (1 Major). One focus group participant expressed a concern for job security as more work is shifted to contractors as DON civilians approach retirement.

APPENDIX D: Survey Response Frequency Report

Numerical values in the following tables summarize survey responses to forced-choice questions as counts and/or percentages (%). Response codes are listed below in the order that they appear.

SD   Strongly Disagree

D   Disagree

N   Neither Agree nor Disagree

A   Agree

SA   Strongly Agree

-   Negative

N   Neutral

+   Positive

N   Never

R   Rarely

S   Sometimes

F   Frequently

A   Always

	Military		**Civilian**	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
	121	33	101	53
	39%	11%	33%	17%

On a scale from 1 (worst) to 10 (best), please rate your Quality of Work Life (QOWL). QOWL is the degree to which you enjoy where you work and available opportunities for professional growth.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Count	7	14	13	18	37	25	53	69	41	31
%	2.27%	4.55%	4.22%	5.84%	12.01%	8.12%	17.21%	22.40%	13.31%	10.06%

For each of the factors below, please indicate whether they have a positive, neutral, or negative impact on your QOWL rating.

	+	N	-
Job satisfaction	190	69	49
Leadership support	183	71	54
Leadership opportunities	125	122	61
Workload	122	120	66
Work Hours/Schedule	181	81	46
Advancement opportunities	88	131	89
Awards and recognition	102	135	71
Training opportunities	123	117	68
Command morale	133	116	59
Command climate	142	121	45
Quality of workplace facilities	128	119	61

On a scale from 1 (worst) to 10 (best), please rate your Quality of Home Life (QOHL). QOHL is the degree to which you enjoy where you live and the opportunities available for housing, recreation, etc.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Count	1	1	4	3	10	7	28	58	89	107
%	0.32%	0.32%	1.30%	0.97%	3.25%	2.27%	9.09%	18.83%	28.90%	34.74%

For each of the factors below, please indicate whether they have a positive, neutral, or negative impact on your QOHL rating.

	+	N	-
Quality of home	266	37	5
Quality of the school for dependent children	186	114	8
Quality of the childcare available	115	182	11
Shopping & dining opportunities	260	43	5
Recreational opportunities	256	48	4
Access to spouse employment	171	119	18
Access to medical/dental care	248	49	11
Cost of living	182	94	32

My command gives me sufficient time during working hours to participate in a physical readiness exercise program.

SD	D	N	A	SA
13	13	24	50	54
8%	8%	16%	32%	35%

My current work week affords enough time to complete mission tasks in a timely manner while maintaining an acceptable work-home life balance.

SD	D	N	A	SA
12	17	18	66	41
8%	11%	12%	43%	27%

My position description is current and accurately describes my functions, tasks, and responsibilities.

SD	D	N	A	SA
8	14	11	93	27
5%	9%	7%	61%	18%

I work more hours than I report in a pay period because I cannot complete all assigned tasks during scheduled work hours.

N	R	S	F	A
42	34	43	25	9
27%	22%	28%	16%	6%

The Human Resource Service Center provides timely, accurate responses to my queries.

SD	D	N	A	SA
6	14	81	42	10
4%	9%	53%	27%	7%

My (local) Human Resources Office provides timely, accurate responses to my queries.

SD	D	N	A	SA
6	12	59	58	18
4%	8%	39%	38%	12%

The DON civilian recruitment process is responsive to my command's civilian personnel requirements.

SD	D	N	A	SA
26	41	164	62	12
9%	13%	54%	20%	4%

During the last performance evaluation cycle, my supervisor provided me with feedback that enabled me to improve my performance before my formal performance appraisal/EVAL/FITREP.

SD	D	N	A	SA
19	29	47	99	75
7%	11%	17%	37%	28%

I am satisfied with the overall quality of my workplace facilities.

SD	D	N	A	SA
9	45	45	149	57
3%	15%	15%	49%	19%

My command is concerned about my safety.

SD	D	N	A	SA
3	11	35	135	121
1%	4%	11%	44%	40%

My command has a program in place to address potential safety issues.

SD	D	N	A	SA
1	8	47	155	94
0%	3%	15%	51%	31%

My job is important and makes a contribution to my command.

SD	D	N	A	SA
9	12	29	127	128
3%	4%	10%	42%	42%

_____ is occurring at my command.

	SD	D	N	A	SA
Fraternization	25%	32%	39%	4%	1%
Favoritism	17%	28%	31%	18%	6%
Gender/Sex Discrimination	34%	36%	24%	5%	1%
Sexual Harassment	38%	38%	24%	0%	0%
Race Discrimination	38%	38%	24%	0%	0%
Hazing	46%	34%	20%	1%	0%

The following tools and resources are adequate to accomplish the command's mission.

	SD	D	N	A	SA
People	7%	17%	11%	37%	29%
Training	6%	16%	18%	40%	19%
Workspace	1%	8%	17%	46%	27%
Computer	4%	13%	11%	44%	27%
Software	4%	19%	12%	42%	23%
Internet	4%	13%	12%	49%	22%
Intranet	4%	10%	23%	43%	20%
Equipment	1%	7%	17%	50%	25%
Materials & Supplies	2%	7%	15%	50%	26%

I have adequate leadership guidance to perform my job successfully.

SD	D	N	A	SA
16	21	40	124	105
5%	7%	13%	41%	34%

Communication down the chain of command is effective.

SD	D	N	A	SA
22	50	55	126	52
7%	16%	18%	41%	17%

Communication up the chain of command is effective.

SD	D	N	A	SA
15	46	75	123	46
5%	15%	25%	40%	15%

My performance evaluations have been fair.

SD	D	N	A	SA
6	15	50	130	104
2%	5%	16%	43%	34%

The awards and recognition program is fair and equitable.

SD	D	N	A	SA
16	40	95	94	60
5%	13%	31%	31%	20%

Military and civilian personnel work well together at my command.

SD	D	N	A	SA
5	14	32	141	113
2%	5%	10%	46%	37%

My command's Equal Opportunity Program (EO - to include Equal Employment Opportunity & Command Managed Equal Opportunity) is effective.

SD	D	N	A	SA
2	7	87	130	79
1%	2%	29%	43%	26%

My command adequately protects my personal information.

SD	D	N	A	SA
0	7	54	150	94
0%	2%	18%	49%	31%

My superiors treat me with respect and consideration.

SD	D	N	A	SA
9	16	26	135	119
3%	5%	9%	44%	39%

My command attempts to resolve command climate issues.

SD	D	N	A	SA
5	13	91	121	75
2%	4%	30%	40%	25%

I have adequate time at work to complete required training.

SD	D	N	A	SA
13	43	47	156	46
4%	14%	15%	51%	15%

Do you supervise Department of the Navy (DON) civilians?

Yes	No
81	224
27%	73%

When did you receive civilian supervisory training?

<12mos	1-3 yrs	>3 yrs	Never
33	32	9	8
40%	39%	11%	10%