DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
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From: Naval Inspector General
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Subj: COMMAND INSPECTION OF COMMANDER, NAVAL SAFETY CENTER,
       16-20 June 2014

Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 5040.3A
       (b) SECNAVINST 5430.57G

1. The Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) conducts command inspections of echelon 2 commands to provide the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations with a firsthand assessment of Departmental risks and major issues relevant to policy, management, and direction as directed by reference (a). Reference (b) tasks NAVINSGEN with conducting inspections and surveys, making appropriate evaluations and recommendations concerning operating forces afloat and ashore, Department of the Navy components and functions, and Navy programs which impact readiness or quality of life for military and civilian naval personnel.

2. NAVINSGEN conducted a Command Inspection of Commander, Naval Safety Center (COMNAVSAFECEN) 16 to 20 June 2014. This report documents our findings.

3. This report contains an Executive Summary, our observations and findings, and documented deficiencies noted during the inspection. Issue papers are included that highlight significant concerns that either point to a potentially broader Navy issue or, in our opinion, require coordination among multiple commands to fully address. Finally, a summary of survey and focus group data, as well as a complete listing of survey frequency data, is included.

4. During our visit we assessed overall mission readiness (per OPNAVINST 5450.180E, Mission and Functions of the Naval Safety Center), compliance with Navy administrative programs, facilities, safety, occupational health and environmental compliance, security programs, COMNAVSAFECEN Hotline program, and foundational Sailor programs under the purview of senior enlisted leadership. Additionally, we conducted surveys and focus group discussions to assess the quality of work life

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(QOWL) for Navy and Marine Corps military and civilian personnel.

5. Our overall assessment is that COMNAVSAFECEN is fulfilling its mission and functions of providing: (1) safety and risk management policy and guidance, (2) safety data services, (3) safety program services, and (4) media and marketing of safety. However, the Fleet Commanders' recent drive to improve operational safety culture throughout the Navy makes it imperative for the Department and COMNAVSAFECEN to re-evaluate the roles and responsibilities of the Safety Center. The Fleet is asking for much more from COMNAVSAFECEN than the above functions, and has communicated this through a number of documents. Our report highlights the critical tasks and issues facing COMNAVSAFECEN as it works to support Fleet initiatives to improve safety. Further details can be found in the Executive Summary and in the body of the report.

6. In the course of our inspection, we identified some deficiencies in Missions and Functions, manpower requirements, Premeditated Personnel Parachuting programs, safety reporting, General Military Training, Security, Personally Identifiable Information, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response, Individual Medical Readiness, Suicide Prevention, and Sailor programs.

7. Corrective actions.

    a. We identified 24 deficiencies during our inspection that require COMNAVSAFECEN's corrective action. Correction of each deficiency, and a description of action(s) taken, should be reported via letter by COMNAVSAFECEN no later than 19 December 2014. Deficiencies not corrected by this date or requiring longer-term solutions should be updated quarterly until completed. Additionally, NAVINSGEN provided COMNAVSAFECEN with four separate recommendations, for consideration, relating to Industrial Security, Personally Identifiable Information, and Sexual Assault Prevention and Response. Follow up reporting on these recommendations is not requested.

    b. This report includes four issue papers that require actions by Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Special Assistant for Safety Matters (OPNAV N09F); Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFF); Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CPF); Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP); Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC); Naval Education and Training Command (NETC); Systems Commands to include NAVSEA, NAVAIR and SPAWAR; and

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COMNAVSAFECEN. Appendix A: Issue Papers (page 22 of this report) provides detailed guidance on how to report completion of recommendations identified in the issue papers.

8. My point of contact is ███████ b7c
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**NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL COMMAND INSPECTION OF
COMMANDER, NAVAL SAFETY CENTER
16 TO 20 JUNE 2014**

Executive Summary

The Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) conducted a command inspection of Commander, Naval Safety Center (COMNAVSAFECEN) from 16 to 20 June 2014. We last inspected COMNAVSAFECEN in 2010 when we conducted a Health and Comfort Inspection (a limited-scope, two day review of the command). The team was augmented with subject matter experts, including personnel from U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Fleet Safety (USFF N03FS & N03FSB); U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Staff Judge Advocate (USFF N01L); Naval Facilities Engineering Command Atlantic (NAVFACLANT), Environmental Assessment Branch; Naval Education and Training Command (NETC); and the Office of Civilian Human Resources, Norfolk (OCHR Norfolk).

During our visit we assessed overall mission readiness per OPNAVINST 5450.180E (Mission and Functions of the Naval Safety Center), compliance with Navy administrative programs, facilities, safety, occupational health and environmental compliance, security programs, COMNAVSAFECEN Hotline program, and foundational Sailor programs under the purview of senior enlisted leadership. Additionally, we conducted surveys and focus group discussions to assess the quality of work life (QOWL) for Navy and Marine Corps military and civilian personnel.

MISSION READINESS

COMNAVSAFECEN fulfills its mission and functions of providing: (1) safety and risk management policy and guidance, (2) safety data services, (3) safety program services, and (4) media and marketing of safety. However, Commander, USFF and Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet's (CPF) recent drive to improve operational safety culture throughout the Navy makes it imperative for the Department of the Navy (DON) and COMNAVSAFECEN to re-evaluate the roles and responsibilities of the Safety Center.

The Fleet is asking for much more from COMNAVSAFECEN than the above functions, and has communicated this through a number of vehicles:

- USFF asked COMNAVSAFECEN to develop the Fleet Safety Campaign Plan (SCP) in March 2013; that campaign was recently approved by the Fleet Commanders and has just started to be implemented.

- Both USFF and CPF signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with COMNAVSAFECEN in May 2013 outlining responsibilities and coordination among all three organizations.

- USFF conducted a gap analysis to inform the direction and focus of the Fleet SCP and development of a more robust Fleet Safety Management System (SMS). USFF issued an Operational Order (OPORD) to task subordinate organizations with support of the Fleet Safety Campaign.

Overall, USFF aims to transform the Navy's safety culture through a formal Fleet SMS that reduces human error and prevents mishaps and safety related incidents. Through gap analysis the Fleet has identified the need for: (1) a greater emphasis on getting to the left of the problems, (2) management and awareness of risk and safety issues at lower tiers below Class A mishaps, (3) improved lessons learned sharing and dissemination across the Fleet and across communities as appropriate, (4) incorporation of useful measures of safety culture and climate, (5) analysis tools to aid commanders at the unit and operational levels, (6) more effective, timely and easy to use safety reporting systems, and (7) improvement in safety issue/deficiency follow-up and resolution.

In our view, the above transformation provides a tremendous opportunity for the Navy and the Marine Corps to examine COMNAVSAFECEN Missions, Functions and Tasks and required organizational construct, analysis tools, skillsets, and application of resources. Also in our view, COMNAVSAFECEN will be significantly challenged to meet these demands given the resident level of experience and capacity of the staff. COMNAVSAFECEN is largely stove-piped along community lines (aviation, afloat, etc.) and may need to consider an organizational realignment along functional lines (human factors, lessons learned, etc.).

We assess that the critical tasks/issues facing COMNAVSAFECEN include:

- Development of the Fleet SMS in the near term, and a fully functioning SMS across all of the Department of Navy in the longer-term.
- Improving Operational Risk Management (ORM). The current ORM model is not easily adapted to complex multi-unit operations. As such, an ORM "seam" can develop between two or more units conducting coincident operations, but making independent ORM evaluations, that can inadvertently place each unit at risk.
- Improving reporting tools and ease of reporting mishaps, hazards and near misses.
- Improving data trend analysis. The Fleet needs analysis that is predictive, rather than merely descriptive (required if COMNAVSAFECEN is to prevent mishaps).
- Tracking completion/status of Mishap Safety Investigation Report Recommendations (MISRECs) and Hazard Report Recommendations (HAZRECs) that are generated out of mishap and safety investigations. There are currently 217 Class A MISRECs that have not been implemented and reported as complete, some dating back to 2008.
- Disseminating lessons learned that penetrate and appropriately dwell in Navy training pipelines, sustainment training, acquisition and operating procedures.
- Fostering safety culture across the Navy. Navy safety culture is not uniform across warfare communities: some communities are better at identifying and sharing safety near misses and tracking mishap and hazard report data than others. COMNAVSAFECEN's own staffing reflects this inconsistency across communities: today it remains largely an aviation-centric organization.

The current Web Enabled Safety System (WESS) is a functioning tool for mishap data input, storage and limited data extraction. However, WESS has several limitations which frustrate the COMNAVSAFECEN staff's ability to conduct analysis, tracking and reporting. Examples include:

- The underlying software technology is dated and cumbersome, precluding trend analysis.
- WESS is unable to track both Aviation Mishap Board and Safety Investigation Board recommendations (MISRECs) through to completion.
- The Dive Jump Reporting System (DJRS) is unable to accept data from saturation dives or SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) dives; trend analysis is performed manually.

WESS limitations, along with many other factors, led to the decision to develop the Risk Management Information (RMI) system which is intended to modernize reporting, safety data collection and dissemination and safety program management. Continued detailed software development and planning is required to ensure that RMI is an effective replacement for WESS.

In our report we recommend the following:

- The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) and COMNAVSAFECEN, assess:

  o COMNAVSAFECEN's Missions, Functions and Tasks. Detailed Fleet and Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC) input are necessary to ensure COMNAVSAFECEN is correctly tasked to meet their requirements.
  o Greater staff representation at COMNAVSAFECEN by other warfare communities. COMNAVSAFECEN is an aviation-centric organization that requires broader representation from other warfare areas at the post-command level to facilitate mishap prevention across the DON.
  o The structure, capacity and resident experience level at COMNAVSAFECEN to develop and support the Fleet SMS, support the SCP, and support future safety requirements.

- COMNAVSAFECEN, in coordination the Fleet and CNIC, develop procedures to conduct ORM that supports multi-unit operations in order to preclude ORM "seams" among coincident units.

- COMNAVSAFECEN establish and sustain a process to track MISRECs (regardless of type or class of mishap) and HAZRECs through to implementation or resolution. This process must include regular status briefings to Navy and Marine Corps leadership via forums such as the Navy Executive Safety Board, CNO's Executive Group (CEG) Safety Quarterly Update Briefs, etc. While COMNAVSAFECEN proactively queries responsible commands for status, many safety issues are not being closed out. We recommend COMNAVSAFECEN provide a routine consolidated report to Fleet and Type Commanders to enhance follow-up. Additionally, COMNAVSAFECEN should:

  o Review outstanding MISRECs and edit, call complete or otherwise close out languishing and obsolete recommendations.
  o Expand tracking and reporting to include mishaps below Class A.

- COMNAVSAFECEN establish a working group consisting of the Fleet, Systems Commands, NETC, and CNIC with a goal to improve the effectiveness of safety lessons learned in the Department. Eighty percent of Navy Class A mishaps from 2011 to 2013 were attributed to errors associated with human factors. Improvements in the Department's safety lessons learned process are needed to reduce the number of mishaps and near misses associated with human factors.

SAFETY PROGRAM SERVICES
Helicopter Rope Suspension Technique (HRST)-Cast Safety. HRST-Cast programs are not included as part of Safety Surveys of Navy Premeditated Personnel Parachuting (P3) Program.

REALIGNMENT OF NAVAL SCHOOL OF AVIATION SAFETY (SAS)
SAS was realigned from Commander, Naval Education and Training Command (CNETC) to COMNAVSAFECEN, effective 1 October 2013 per OPNAVNOTE 5400 (Ser DNS-33/13U102270, dated 27 August 2013) which established SAS as a Detachment of COMNAVSAFECEN. Military personnel were transferred to the COMNAVSAFECEN Detachment as of 1 October 2013. The functional transfer of funding (labor and non-labor), including civilian employees, will occur 1 October 2014.

- There is no detailed plan to ensure that SAS personnel are included in COMNAVSAFECEN administrative and personnel management programs, such as Sexual Assault Prevention and Response, Suicide Prevention, etc. COMNAVSAFECEN leadership is aware of the program incorporation issues; at the time of our inspection COMNAVSAFECEN was scheduled to conduct an assist visit to SAS in August 2014 to address these realignment issues.

- Mission and Functions. COMNAVSAFECEN Mission and Functions, OPNAVINST 5450.180E, dated 5 July 2012, requires review and update to incorporate the SAS realignment from NETC to COMNAVSAFECEN.

PERSONNEL TRAINING/QUALIFICATIONS
General Military Training (GMT) is not completed by all military personnel as directed by OPNAVINST 1500.22G, General Military Training. COMNAVSAFECEN's FY13 GMT face-to-face completion rate was 36 percent and the computer based training rate was 56 percent.

SHORE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION (SMRD)
COMNAVSAFECEN's manpower requirements have never been formally validated per OPNAVINST 1000.16K Change-1, Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures. Since 2003, COMNAVSAFECEN's mission has incrementally expanded: COMNAVSAFECEN incorporated the Navy Safety and Environmental Training Center (2003), COMNAVSAFECEN was assigned Navy's ORM model manager responsibilities (2010), COMNAVSAFECEN's mission shifted from "provides safety assistance and advises" to "prevents mishaps to save lives" (2012), and COMNAVSAFECEN incorporated the Naval School of Aviation Safety (2013).

COMNAVSAFECEN requires an SMRD to validate its manpower requirements in view of the above changes to mission.

COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS

Overall, COMNAVSAFECEN's programs were strong. Commitment to these core programs is evident; COMNAVSAFECEN's challenge will be to sustain this effort going forward. There are some areas for improvement:

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program

COMNAVSAFECEN fosters an environment free of sexual assault (SA). However, the SAPR program is not fully compliant.

- Some key SAPR program personnel are frequently absent for official travel.

- The COMNAVSAFECEN SAPR instruction contains guidance inconsistent with DoD, SECNAV, and OPNAV instructions.

- Watchstander and Duty Officer training was not conducted to ensure proper victim response protocols are followed respond per SECNAVINST 1752.4B, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response and OPNAVINST 1752.1B, Sexual Assault Victim Intervention (SAVI) Program.

- The required SARC briefing for the SAS Detachment established in October 2013 has not been received by the Commander and the SAS Officer-in-Charge.

As there were no reports of SA at COMNAVSAFECEN for over three years, there is no evidence that COMNAVSAFECEN incorrectly handled any SA cases as a result of the above administrative discrepancies.

Individual Medical Readiness (IMR)

COMNAVSAFECEN has not regularly monitored and reported IMR to the Commander and senior COMNAVSAFECEN leadership per DoDI 6025.19 CH-1, Individual Medical Readiness (IMR). A process to do so has recently been implemented by COMNAVSAFECEN.

Suicide Prevention (SP) Program

COMNAVSAFECEN does not have a SP Program in accordance with OPNAVINST 1720.4A, Suicide Prevention Program. SP training completion rates were 32 percent for military staff and zero percent for civilian staff during FY13. Watchstander and Duty Officer training was not conducted to ensure proper protocols are in place for suicide-related behavior calls and reports. COMNAVSAFECEN has a plan to complete required SP training during FY14.

Hotline Program

We conducted a quality assurance review of COMNAVSAFECEN hotline program and found it to be fully compliant.

SURVEY AND FOCUS GROUP FINDINGS

Our survey and focus groups discussion found that QOWL and home life (QOHL) at COMNAVSAFECEN are higher than the historical echelon 2 command average. The COMNAVSAFECEN workforce is passionately dedicated to naval safety; however, IT (infrastructure and corporate databases), manning/manpower, and travel constraints are perceived to adversely impact the mission. Rated on a 10-point scale, the COMNAVSAFECEN QOWL and QOHL are 7.60 and 8.74, respectively; the corresponding echelon 2 command historical averages are 6.58 and 7.58. Specific comments from focus groups and surveys were passed to COMNAVSAFECEN leadership and will be included in our report.

Contents

Areas/Programs Assessed

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- o Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
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Observations and Findings

MISSION PERFORMANCE

The Mission Performance Team used survey and focus group responses, document review, group discussion, and face-to-face interviews to assess Commander, Naval Safety Center's (COMNAVSAFECEN) ability to accomplish its mission. We assessed mission readiness, manpower (civilian and military), strategic planning, command relationships and communications, staff training, and the Continuity of Operations Plan. In addition, the Mission Performance Team evaluated COMNAVSAFECEN's ability to conduct its mission as defined in, and in accordance with, OPNAVINST 5450.180E, Mission and Functions of the Naval Safety Center.

Overall, COMNAVSAFECEN is performing its functions of providing:
- Safety and risk management policy and guidance,
- Safety data services,
- Safety program services, and
- Media and marketing of safety.

COMNAVSAFECEN's mission is to "prevent mishaps to save lives and preserve resources." This is challenging and complex. Aside from the authority to generate policy in the role of Chief of Naval Operations Assistant for Safety Matters (OPNAV (N09F)), COMNAVSAFECEN is predominantly tasked to maintain safety related databases, analyze trends, and collaborate with other organizations on safety related matters. Advice and products are disseminated largely "upon request."

Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFF) and Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet's (CPF) recent drive to improve operational safety culture throughout the Navy makes it imperative for the Department of the Navy (DON) and COMNAVSAFECEN to re-evaluate the roles and responsibilities of the Safety Center. USFF and CPF are asking for much more from COMNAVSAFECEN than the functions listed above, and have communicated this through a number of vehicles:

- USFF asked COMNAVSAFECEN to develop the Fleet SCP in March 2013; that campaign was recently approved by the Fleet Commanders and is now nearing initial implementation.
- Both USFF and CPF signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with COMNAVSAFECEN in May 2013 outlining responsibilities and coordination among all three organizations.
- USFF conducted a gap analysis to inform the direction and focus of the Fleet SCP and development of a more robust Fleet Safety Management System (SMS). USFF issued an Operational Order (OPORD) to task subordinate organizations with support of the Fleet Safety Campaign.

Commander, USFF endeavors to transform the Navy's safety culture through a formal Fleet SMS that reduces human error and prevents mishaps and safety related incidents. Through their gap analysis, the Fleet has identified the need for:

- A greater emphasis on getting to the left of safety issues,
- Management and awareness of risk and safety issues at lower tiers below Class A mishaps,
- Improved safety lessons learned sharing and dissemination across the Fleet and across communities as appropriate,
- Incorporation of useful measures of safety culture and climate,
- Analysis tools to aid commanders at the unit and operational levels,
- More effective, timely and easier to use safety reporting systems, and
- Improvement in safety issue/deficiency follow-up and resolution.

Such transformation provides a tremendous opportunity for the Navy and the Marine Corps to examine COMNAVSAFECEN Missions, Functions and Tasks and required organizational construct, analysis tools, skillsets, and application of resources.

We assess that the critical tasks/issues facing COMNAVSAFECEN include:

- Development of the Fleet SMS. This is a significant task and will require a long-term effort to effectively review, assess, and improve many aspects of Fleet occupational and operational safety. A longer term task is to develop a fully functioning SMS across all of the Department of Navy.
- Improving Operational Risk Management (ORM). We see an opportunity for COMNAVSAFECEN to take a greater role in effective use of ORM beyond the deck plate level to include assistance and assessment of ORM during complex multi-unit exercises and operations to include Composite Training Unit Exercises (COMPTUEX), Joint Task Force Exercises (JTFEX), etc.
- Improving reporting tools and ease of reporting mishaps, hazards and near misses. The current Web Enabled Safety System (WESS) is a functioning tool for mishap data input, storage and limited data extraction. However, WESS has several limitations which frustrate the COMNAVSAFECEN staff's ability to conduct analysis, tracking and reporting. Examples include:

  o WESS is unable to track mishap Safety Investigation Report recommendations (MISRECs) through to completion.
  o The Dive Jump Reporting System (DJRS) is unable to accept data from saturation dives or SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) dives; trend analysis is performed manually.

- Development and fielding of the Risk Management Information (RMI) system which will modernize reporting, safety data collection and dissemination, and safety program management, a response in part to WESS limitations. Detailed planning and software

development are required to ensure that RMI provides Navy and Marine Corps with the required capability.

- Improving data trend analysis. The Fleet needs analysis that is predictive, rather than merely descriptive (required if COMNAVSAFECEN is to prevent mishaps). For many applications, WESS only provides manual analysis of raw data.
- Tracking completion/status of MISRECs and Hazard Report recommendations (HAZRECs) that are generated out of mishap and safety investigations. There are currently 217 Class A MISRECs that are not reported as complete, some dating back to 2008.
- Disseminating lessons learned. These should penetrate and appropriately dwell in Navy training pipelines, sustainment training, acquisition and operating procedures. Hazard information must be timely, and the information must be more easily accessible and searchable. Of note, COMNAVSAFECEN is hiring a Lessons Learned Manager to improve their ability to manage this information.
- Fostering safety culture across the Navy. Navy safety culture is not uniform across warfare communities. All communities embrace safety, but some communities are better at identifying and sharing safety near misses and tracking mishap and hazard report data. COMNAVSAFECEN's own staffing reflects this inconsistency across communities: today it remains largely an aviation-centric organization.

We assess that COMNAVSAFECEN will be significantly challenged to meet these demands given the resident level of expertise, experience, and capacity of the staff. COMNAVSAFECEN's organization is primarily linear in nature and structured along warfare community lines. Given its roots as an aviation safety organization, the robust and experienced Aviation Directorate is not surprising. However, the Afloat and Shore/Ground Directorates are not manned with similarly experienced staff and safety data systems have less functionality. Issue Paper A-1 addresses COMNAVSAFECEN's Mission and Functions and associated staff structure.

Naval Safety Center Detachment, Naval School of Aviation Safety

OPNAVNOTE 5400, Ser DNS-33/13U102270, 27 August 2013, Establishment of Naval Safety Center Detachment Naval School of Aviation Safety (SAS), Pensacola, FL, directed COMNAVSAFECEN to incorporate SAS into its command organization. This incorporation represents a notable expansion of mission, funding requirements and personnel management program requirements for COMNAVSAFECEN. However, COMNAVSAFECEN's Mission and Functions instruction has not been updated to reflect the inclusion of SAS. At the time of the inspection, COMNAVSAFECEN did not have a detailed plan to integrate SAS with COMNAVSAFECEN. An improved integration effort is required to ensure that SAS and COMNAVSAFECEN:

- Solidify organizational relationships
- Remove potential or actual communication gaps
- Promote proper management of personnel programs such as Command Managed Equal Opportunity (CMEO), Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR), Urinalysis Program Coordinator (UPC), Physical Readiness Program (PRP), Personally Identifiable Information (PII), etc.

Deficiency 1. COMNAVSAFECEN's Mission and Functions instruction (OPNAVINST 5450.180E) has not been updated to incorporate the realignment of the Naval School of Aviation Safety (SAS) as a detachment of Naval Safety Center. Reference: OPNAVNOTE 5400, Ser. DNS-33/13U102270, 27 August 2013.

Deficiency 2. COMNAVSAFECEN has not fully incorporated the Naval School of Aviation Safety into its command organization. Reference: OPNAVNOTE 5400, Ser DNS-33/ 13U102270, 27 August 2013.

Total Force Management

COMNAVSAFECEN staff manning is at 100 percent of billets authorized.

Shore Manpower Requirements Determination (SMRD)

An SMRD provides a systematic means of determining and documenting manpower requirements based on Mission, Functions and Tasks and projected personnel workloads. Neither COMNAVSAFECEN nor Budget Submitting Office/Field Support Activity (BSO 11/FSA) has any record of an SMRD being performed at the command. An SMRD is required to be updated, per OPNAVINST 1000.1K CH-1, following a significant change in scope or purpose of a command's mission. We assess that collectively the changes to COMNAVSAFECEN's mission since 2003 meet the criteria to conduct an SMRD. Specifically:

- In 2003, COMNAVSAFECEN assumed responsibility for the Navy Safety and Environmental Training Center.
- In 2010, COMNAVSAFECEN was designated as the Navy's Operational Risk Management Model Manager.
- In 2012, the COMNAVSAFECEN's mission statement was changed from "provides safety assistance and advises" to "prevents mishaps to save lives," reflecting a proactive stance.
- In 2013, COMNAVSAFECEN was directed to incorporate the Naval School of Aviation Safety (SAS) into its organization. We note that SAS is not properly staffed to support all of its collateral duties. While COMNAVSAFECEN will coordinate to mitigate this shortfall as required, a long-term view of SAS manning requirements is necessary.

An SMRD will baseline COMNAVSAFECEN manpower requirements and ensure that it is appropriately manned to fully support mission requirements.

Deficiency 3. COMNAVSAFECEN requires an SMRD in accordance with OPNAVINST 1000.1K CH-1, Chapter 400, paragraph 5d and Chapter 402, paragraph 4b.

Organizational Alignment

COMNAVSAFECEN is largely an aviation focused organization. This judgment was reinforced by focus group participants and interviews with the COMNAVSAFECEN staff. The aviation-centric orientation is amplified by the fact that:

- The COMNAVSAFECEN office that has oversight of Operational Risk Management, a component of naval safety that cuts across every operational aspect of the Navy and Marine Corps, is assigned to the Aviation Directorate.
- WESS modules that support Afloat safety are less robust than the modules supporting aviation safety.

In order to align Fleet-wide safety cultures, COMNAVSAFECEN requires broader representation from other warfare areas, especially at the post-command and senior enlisted levels of experience.

Few leaders at the Directorate-level at COMNAVSAFECEN have operational command experience. Other than the Commander, only six officers at COMNAVSAFECEN have had operational command. Four of these officers were naval aviators with prior command-at-sea. Afloat Directorate personnel are not as senior as their aviation counterparts and lack command-at-sea experience. The Commander, Deputy Commander, and Executive Director are all either active duty or retired naval aviators.

We assess that COMNAVSAFECEN will be significantly challenged to meet the demand of supporting USFF and CPF's Safety Campaign Plan, and other initiatives addressed above, given the resident level of experience and capacity of its staff. COMNAVSAFECEN is largely stove-piped along community lines (aviation, afloat, etc.) and may need to consider an organizational realignment along functional lines (human factors, lessons learned, etc.).

Issue Paper A-1 further addresses COMNAVSAFECEN staff structure, organization and capacity.

Operational Risk Management (ORM)

The current ORM model is not easily adapted to complex multi-unit operations. As such, an ORM "seam" can develop between two units conducting coincident operations, but making independent ORM evaluations, that can inadvertently place each unit at risk. These ORM "seams" can develop across the full spectrum of operations: from two adjacent "teams" at the same unit conducting coincident operations (such as a team of evaluators/certifiers assessing another team), to two units conducting a small exercise together, all the way to multi-unit operations during Fleet Exercises. While operational commanders intuitively assess risks and implement mitigation during large scale operations, this process is inconsistent, not formalized, and cannot be relied upon to appropriately mitigate risk.

Fleet Commanders require, and are seeking, a more fully integrated ORM across the spectrum of operations addressed above. In recent history, ORM seams have resulted in a number of significant Class A Mishaps. For example:

- USS MONTPELIER (SSN-765)/USS SAN JACINTO (CG-56) collision (13 Oct 2012) – A submarine and surface ship collision during an exercise. There was no overarching ORM for the exercise, scheme of maneuver, and water space de-confliction.

- Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit TWO dive incident (26 Feb 2013) – Two Navy divers died. This was a training event where a seam existed between the evaluation/certification team and the evaluated team. Seams existed between the unit's plan, the evaluator's plan (most difficult scenario that the unit does not know is coming) and the host facility. As a result, rescue divers were unable to perform safely due to changes to the plan that were driven by a scenario and external conditions.
- USS CHANCELLORSVILLE (CG-62) and BQM-74E drone (16 Nov 2013) – Drone controllers lost control of drone due to communications network configuration issues. Range control, drone controllers and ship personnel had multiple ORM seams that resulted in the mishap.

COMNAVSAFECEN, in coordination with USFF, CPF and Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC) must develop procedures to conduct ORM evaluations that support multi-unit operations in order to preclude ORM "seams" among coincident units.

Issue paper A-2 addresses development of multi-unit ORM to support exercises and real world operations.

Modernization of Safety Data Services

WESS is the program of record used to manage safety reporting and data. This system has a number of shortfalls and technical challenges, but is scheduled to be replaced by the RMI system starting in FY16. COMNAVSAFECEN has been diligent in its efforts to incrementally improve WESS, but the system is at its technological limits and must be completely replaced. Challenges with WESS include:

- The underlying software technology is dated and cumbersome for the COMNAVSAFECEN staff to conduct trend analysis, mishap tracking and reporting.
- Complex data calls require extraction of raw data followed by manual quantitative analysis. Trend analysis is conducted primarily by COMNAVSAFECEN staff members manually reviewing WESS report data fields.
- Safety data that is not captured or managed in WESS must be manually maintained by COMNAVSAFECEN personnel in locally generated Microsoft Access databases or Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. This is an inefficient process that severely limits timely and effective analyses of data.
- WESS modules vary in capability depending on functional area.
- The DJRS module is unable to accept data for saturation dives or SDV dives.

Risk Management Information (RMI) system

The RMI system is in development to replace WESS and other legacy safety applications not belonging to COMNAVSAFECEN such as the Enterprise Safety Applications Management System (ESAMS) starting in FY16 (enterprise-wide Full Operational Capability (FOC) for RMI is scheduled for FY18). RMI will correct WESS reporting, data collection and data analysis shortfalls. Planned RMI capabilities include:

- Capture of all required naval safety data for consolidation, management and compliance with higher directives. It will be the data tracking too for the SMS.
- Streamlining of reporting, analysis, identification and rapid dissemination of preventable mishap leading indicators both vertically and laterally across the enterprise
- Enterprise-wide ad hoc query and analysis of safety data
- Access to and utilization of non-safety, yet safety-related, databases for comparable analysis
- Automated unit-level Safety Program Management (Training Qualifications, Medical Surveillance, Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) inventories, etc.)
- Functional in a low band width environment

RMI requirements have been validated and the program is funded. The Business Case Analysis for RMI Streamlined Incident Reporting was certified by the Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD) Investment Review Board (Defense Business Council) on 21 February 2014. Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Energy, Installations and Environment (EI&E) memorandum to Director, Navy Staff (DNS) and Director, Marine Corps Staff, Funding for the Risk Management Information Program, dated 7 Feb 2014, re-emphasized RMI as a Secretary of the Navy priority and requested assurance of funding throughout the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).

If RMI is fully developed as planned and required funding is secured, it will be the appropriate material solution to address the current weaknesses in WESS. However, continued detailed planning by COMNAVSAFECEN and Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command is required to ensure that RMI software delivers the required capabilities.

Mishap Report/Hazard Report Tracking

MISRECs and HAZRECs are not being consistently acted upon by responsible commands. During the inspection, we observed 217 outstanding Class A MISRECs dating back to 2008 that have not been acted upon and implemented. COMNAVSAFECEN proactively queries responsible commands for MISREC status and maintains a comprehensive tracking system for Class A MISRECs, but they do not have authority to compel completion, direct that status reports be provided, or directly influence MISREC action from other commands. Consequently, many MISRECs remain open. Reasons that MISRECs remain open include:

- They are vague or overly broad, thus difficult to close out.
- They require complex technical solutions that require significant investment and program adjustments.
- Insufficient accountability. There is no formal process in place to regularly update Navy and Marine Corps leadership on the status of MISREC implementations.

Further, not all MISRECs are tracked by COMNAVSAFECEN. While the Aviation Directorate tracks all MISRECs regardless of category, the Afloat Directorate only tracks MISRECs from Class A mishaps or Class B mishaps where a Safety Investigation Board (SIB) was established.

Issue Paper A-3 addresses this issue in further detail.

Lessons Learned Dissemination

During FY11 and FY12, safety mishaps resulted in nearly $1.2B worth of damage for Navy. Approximately 80 percent of these mishaps were human factors related. Improvements in Navy's ability to ensure that safety lessons learned are readily available to personnel as they plan an operation, attend formal training, develop operating procedures, etc. will result in a substantial savings and improved operational readiness.

Lessons learned are currently disseminated via a variety of venues, including Safety Surveys, Safety Seminars, various safety publications and media tools, and selected COMNAVSAFECEN briefs. Safety Investigation Reports are distributed to communities of interest.

The current process of distributing safety lessons learned is insufficient. Lessons learned from safety mishaps currently have a shelf life (we cannot define it but COMNAVSAFECEN has anecdotal evidence that it may be as short of two years). Safety lessons learned must:

- Penetrate and appropriately dwell in Navy training pipelines, sustainment training, acquisition and operating procedures.
- Be easily accessible to personnel as they plan and prepare for operations, such as in an easily searchable lessons learned database with uncomplicated access by any user in the Fleet.

Of note, COMNAVSAFECEN is hiring a Lessons Learned Manager to improve their ability to manage this information.

Issue Paper A-4 addresses this issue in further detail.

Helicopter Rope Suspension Technique-Cast Safety

Helicopter Rope Suspension Technique (HRST)-Cast Safety programs are not included as part of Safety Surveys for Navy Premeditated Personnel Parachuting (P3) programs. NAVSAFECEN does include HRST-Cast assessments for USMC commands as part of its responsibilities outlined in MCO 3500.42B, Marine Corps Helicopter/Tiltrotor Rope Suspension Techniques (HRST) Policy and Program Administrations. There is no similar policy or guidance for Navy HRST-Cast programs. This is a significant gap in safety survey assessment that covers high risk training and operations, including Navy Special Warfare (NSW) and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) use of HRST-Cast equipment during the conduct of Special Patrol Insertion and Extraction (SPIE), fast-rope and rappel operations.

Deficiency 4.   Helicopter Rope Suspension Technique (HRST)-Cast Safety programs are not included as part of safety surveys for Navy Premeditated Personnel Parachuting (P3) programs.

Traffic Safety Program

During the inspection, COMNAVSAFECEN reported that they had not been receiving required reports from Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC) identifying the current status,

deficiencies, and corrective actions for all traffic, motorcycle, and Emergency Vehicle Operator Course training programs as required by OPNAVINST 5100.12J, Navy Traffic Safety Program. NAVINSGEN engaged with CNIC and found that these reports were being written as required, but were being posted on their website and not sent directly to COMNAVSAFECEN. COMNAVSAFECEN personnel now know where to access these reports.

General Military Training

COMNAVSAFECEN FY13 General Military Training (GMT) for Navy Personnel did not meet OPNAVINST 1500.22G, General Military Training Requirements and NAVADMIN 386/11, General Military Training. In FY13, COMNAVSAFECEN's face-to-face training completion rate was 36 percent and 56 percent for Computer Based Training. We assess that COMNAVSAFECEN is on track to meet FY14 goals in accordance with NAVADMIN 264/13, FY-14 General Military Training Schedule. At the time of the inspection, COMNAVSAFECEN FY14 face-to-face training completion rate was 53 percent and 44 percent for Computer Based Training.

Deficiency 5.   COMNAVSAFECEN did not meet Navy Personnel FY13 GMT requirements. References: OPNAVINST 1500.22G and NAVADMIN 386/11, General Military Training.

FACILITIES, ENVIRONMENTAL, ENERGY CONSERVATION, AND SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH (SOH)

The Facilities, Environmental, Energy, and Safety Team assessed management, oversight, compliance, and execution of programs associated with each subject area via document reviews, data analysis, site visits, focus group and survey comments, and interviews with the COMNAVSAFECEN facilities and safety staff.

Overview

COMNAVSAFECEN is sufficiently executing shore related mission requirements with respect to facilities, environmental, and energy conservation. COMNAVSAFECEN SOH programs were found to meet all required program elements in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, and policies. Additionally, COMNAVSAFECEN SOH oversight of subordinate commands was assessed as effective.

Facilities

Constructed and occupied in 1987, the COMNAVSAFECEN Headquarters facility (Building SP-91) on Naval Station Norfolk was designed specifically for the Naval Safety Center. This administrative building is listed in the Facility Readiness Evaluation System with a configuration rating of 92 and a condition rating of 76, which generates an Installation Figure of Merit (IFOM) score of 76. This rating is just below the average IFOM score of 77 for other Naval Station Norfolk echelon 2 and 3 commands (scores ranged from 63 to 93), but is above the average IFOM score of 73 for all Naval Station Norfolk facilities. Space allocation (available square footage) appeared sufficient and did not emerge as a concern or shortfall in survey data or during on-site interviews.

Facilities assigned to the Naval School of Aviation Safety (SAS) at Naval Air Station Pensacola (NASP) are limited to specific classrooms and offices in Building 633 and the entirety of Building 648, which is used for housing static displays for teaching aviation mishap forensic analysis. Building 633 is in good working condition, although the electrical wiring of certain classrooms has capacity issues and as currently configured will not support potential plans to install electronic tablet charging stations (COMNAVSAFECEN is aware of this issue and is working with SAS to correct). SAS is coordinating with COMNAVSAFECEN to determine a solution to wiring challenges in this building. Building 648 requires roofing repairs to better seal the building envelope and prevent leaks, and the installation of an operable heating, venting, and air conditioning (HVAC) system would improve the quality of work for instructors and students in this re-purposed, open-bay maintenance facility. The SAS Officer in Charge (OIC) is coordinating with the installation Public Works Officer to gain visibility and refine the scope of these SAS facilities requirements.

Environmental Readiness

A review of operations at COMNAVSAFECEN was conducted considering environmental compliance and environmental planning documentation including:

- Hazardous material
- Hazardous waste
- Spill prevention
- Storm water
- Drinking water
- Waste water
- Air pollution
- Environmental impact statements
- Environmental assessments
- Categorical exclusions
- Natural and cultural resources requirements for applicability, implementation, and monitoring

Due to the nature of their operations focused on policy, education, and training, COMNAVSAFECEN's environmental program deals primarily with the proper storage, handling, and disposal of Hazardous Materials (HM), all of which appears to be well managed. COMNAVSAFECEN does not use or have responsibility for petroleum storage or Hazardous Waste accumulation area. Other environmental program responsibilities are handled by the host installations (Naval Station Norfolk and NASP).

Energy Conservation

COMNAVSAFECEN is compliant with SECNAVINST 4101.3, Department of the Navy Energy Program for Security and Independence Roles and Responsibilities, and OPNAVINST 4100.5E, Shore Energy Management.

Safety and Occupational Health

COMNAVSAFECEN SOH programs were assessed for compliance with Title 29, U.S.C. 651-678, Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, safety related rules, regulations, and standards promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and policies outlined in OPNAVINST 5100.23G CH-1, Navy Safety and Occupational Health Program Manual.

During our inspection we reviewed the following aspects of SOH and found them to be compliant with governing directives:

- Command SOH policy
- SOH oversight of subordinate commands
- Headquarters SOH program
- Training and qualifications of safety professionals assigned to COMNAVSAFECEN
- Operational risk management
- COMNAVSAFECEN safety councils, committees, and working groups
- Safety database input
- Safety trend analysis
- Safety self-assessment
- Explosive safety

- Diving safety
- Air safety (jump/parachute)
- Acquisition safety
- Traffic safety (including motorcycle safety)
- Recreational/off-duty safety

COMNAVSAFECEN maintains an effective SOH Program that meets all required program elements in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, and policies listed above. COMNAVSAFECEN provides effective SOH oversight of their subordinate command, the Naval Safety and Environmental Training Center.

SECURITY PROGRAMS AND CYBERSECURITY/TECHNOLOGY

The Security Programs and Cybersecurity and Technology Team used survey and focus group responses, document review, and face-to-face interviews to assess the areas below. Although the transition of the Naval School of Aviation Safety located at Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL, from NETC to COMNAVSAFECEN has not been fully completed, we noted several instructions, administrative procedures and oversight relationships that require development or updating as this transition proceeds.

Command Security Programs

COMNAVSAFECEN's command security programs are compliant and provide oversight of their subordinate echelon, Naval Safety and Environmental Training Center. We observed a small, professional security staff providing the required level of support to the command. The Command Security Manager is a collateral duty of the Administration Officer.

Counterintelligence Awareness and Reporting (CIAR) Training

COMNAVSAFECEN FY13 CIAR training was not completed per DoDD 5240.06 CH-1, Counterintelligence Awareness and Reporting (CIAR). NAVINSGEN observed a plan in place to complete the FY14 CIAR training requirement in June 2014.

Deficiency 6.   **COMNAVSAFECEN did not complete FY13 counterintelligence awareness and reporting training. Reference: DoDD 5240.06 CH-1, Enclosure (3), paragraph 3.**

Industrial Security

Although COMNAVSAFECEN does not meet the requirements to have an industrial security program per SECNAV M-5510.36 Chapter 11, Department of the Navy Information Security Program, COMNAVSAFECEN does have warranted contracting officers and may have a future requirement for an industrial security program.

Recommendation 1.   **That COMNAVSAFECEN develop an appropriately sized industrial security program to include both a security review and a separate operational security review of contracts prior to vetting. References: SECNAV M-5510.36 Chapter 11 and OPNAVINST 3432.1A Enclosure (1), paragraph 5d.**

Operations Security (OPSEC)

NAVSAFECEN's OPSEC Program is managed by the Command Security Manager and is contained in the Command Security Instruction. b7e

Deficiency 7.   **COMNAVSAFECEN's OPSEC Program** b7e

Cybersecurity & Technology

COMNAVSAFECEN has a sound information technology (IT) and cybersecurity program that also provides oversight of its lower echelon command. The cyber-workforce is well trained and has the required certifications. NAVSAFECEN should ensure its IT policies and instructions are updated to reflect the IT assets and personnel assigned to SAS when they assume full responsibility for this command.

Deficiency 8. **One (IT system) authority to operate expired during the course of the inspection. Reference: SECNAVINST 5239.3B, para 4h.**

Personally Identifiable Information (PII)

The COMNAVSAFECEN PII program requires additional attention to ensure the command meets current guidance. Semi-annual spot checks are not consistently conducted and no record of subordinate command oversight was observed within the last 3 years. Observations during the inspection included: no cover sheets, posters or signs to support good PII management were found in printing, fax, and information board areas of the command.

Deficiency 9. **COMNAVSAFECEN has not consistently conducted semi-annual PII spot checks. Reference: ALNAV 070/07, Department of the Navy (DON) Personally Identifiable Information (PII) Annual Training Policy, DTG 042232Z OCT 07.**

Deficiency 10. **COMNAVSAFECEN does not conduct PII oversight of its lower echelon command, Naval Safety and Environmental Training Center. Reference: SECNAV 5211.5E, paragraph 7h(11).**

Recommendation 2. **That COMNAVSAFECEN provide cover sheets to all areas utilizing PII information. Reference: SECNAVINST 5211.5E, paragraph 18d(3).**

Recommendation 3. **That COMNAVSAFECEN place posters and/or signs around printers, fax machines, and trash areas to reinforce policy and guidance. Reference: SECNAVINST 5211.5E, paragraph 18d(3).**

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT/COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS

The Resource Management/Compliance Programs Team assessed 18 programs and functions. Our findings reflect inputs from survey respondents, onsite focus group participants, document review, and face-to-face personnel interviews.

The following programs and functions are considered to be well administered and in compliance with applicable directives:

- Financial Management/Comptroller Functions
- Managers' Internal Control
- Personal Property Management
- Government Travel Charge Card
- Government Commercial Purchase Card
- Command Individual Augmentee Coordinator Program
- Post-Deployment Health Reassessment
- Physical Readiness Program
- Urinalysis Program
- Command Managed Equal Opportunity
- Drug and Alcohol Program Advisor
- Hazing Policy Training and Compliance
- Legal and Ethics
- Voting Assistance
- Inspector General Functions

Program not fully compliant:

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program

The COMNAVSAFECEN leadership team is engaged and working to ensure an environment free of sexual assault. COMNAVSAFECEN civilian and military personnel receive SAPR training per OPNAVINST 1752.1B, Sexual Assault Victim Intervention (SAVI) Program. Command indoctrination SAPR training and required military and civilian General Military Training (GMT) is conducted for all personnel. Some specific areas for improvement:

COMNAVSAFECEN SAPR Instruction

COMNAVSAFECEN's SAPR instruction, COMNAVSAFECENINST 1752.1, dated 23 July 2010, is incorrect and does not reflect the requirements of the program as documented in DoD, SECNAV, and OPNAV SAPR instructions. As a result, several SAPR roles, responsibilities, and processes at the command are incorrect. Of note, since there have been no reports of sexual assault at COMNAVSAFECEN over the past three years, the command has not incorrectly handled any SA cases as a result of these instruction discrepancies.

Watchstander Proficiency Training

COMNAVSAFECEN has not conducted formal watchstander and Duty Officer training to ensure proper response to sexual assault (SA) per SECNAVINST 1752.4B, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response. Watchstanders only receive the SAPR GMT and command indoctrination SAPR training. Focused watchstander training would ensure readiness to respond appropriately in the event of a SA. Response protocols and prepared SAPR checklists are in place in the watchstander binder to aid watchstanders in properly handling SA reports.

Sexual Assault Reporting Procedures

The COMNAVSAFECEN reporting chain for SA victims is not in accordance with OPNAVINST 1752.1B. Specifically, COMNAVSAFECEN SAS Detachment reporting of SA victims goes directly from the SAPR Victim Advocate (VA) to the Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC) to the Officer in Charge (OIC), SAS to COMNAVSAFECEN or from the SAPR VA to the OIC prior to informing the Commander. COMNAVSAFECEN Headquarters reporting of SA victims goes from the SAPR VA to the SARC to the Commander or VA to the Commander. While the Headquarters SA victim reporting procedure is compliant with OPNAVINST 1752.1B, the SAS OIC's authority to act as the Commander regarding SA victim response and care for the SAS Detachment needs to be in writing and communicated to personnel throughout COMNAVSAFECEN at Norfolk and Pensacola.

Leadership SARC Briefing

COMNAVSAFECEN and OIC, SAS have not been briefed by the Pensacola SARC as required by NAVADMIN 181/13, Implementation of Navy Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program Initiatives, DoDI 6495.02 CH-1, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program Procedures, and SECNAVINST 1752.4B.

Sexual Assault Case Management Group (SACMG) Representation and Attendance

COMNAVSAFECEN SACMG representation and attendance procedures do not fully comply with governing SAPR Program instructions. Since COMNAVSAFECEN has not received an SA report in over three years, there has not been a requirement for recent SACMG attendance. However, through interviews and COMNAVSAFECEN SAPR program document review, NAVINSGEN observed that the Deputy Commander (DEPCOM) and OIC, SAS would attend their respective Installation SACMGs. Neither the DEPCOM nor the OIC, SAS have been authorized in writing to attend the SACMG on behalf of the Commander. Per DoDI 6495.02 CH-1, SECNAVINST 1752.4B, and OPNAVINST 1752.1B, the Commander must attend the SACMG and provide an update to SA victims within 72 hours after the SACMG.

Deficiency 11. **The COMNAVSAFECEN SAPR instruction, COMNAVSAFECENINST 1752.1, dated 23 July 2010, is incorrect and does not reflect the requirements of the program as documented in DoDI 6495.02 CH-1, SECNAVINST 1752.4B, and OPNAVINST 1752.1B.**

Deficiency 12. **Watchstander and Duty Officer training is not being conducted to ensure watchstander ability to properly respond to reports of sexual assault (SA). Reference: SECNAVINST 1752.4B, Enclosure (3), paragraph 2c(1); Enclosure (5), paragraph 3a; and Enclosure (10), paragraph 2d.**

Deficiency 13. OIC, SAS Detachment authority to act as the Commander regarding SA victim care and response is not in writing and has not been formally communicated to personnel. Reference: OPNAVINST 1752.1B.

Deficiency 14. COMNAVSAFECEN and OIC, SAS have not received the required SARC briefing within 30 days of assuming command. References: NAVADMIN 181/13, item 4e; DoDI 6495.02 CH-1, Enclosure (5), paragraph 3b and SECNAVINST 1752.4B, Enclosure (5), paragraph 3b.

Recommendation 4. That COMNAVSAFECEN review the need for a separate, command-level SAPR instruction. It may be more appropriate and effective to cancel COMNAVSAFECENINST 1752.1, adhere to DoD, SECNAV, and OPNAV instructions, and promulgate notices that identify procedures and resources specific to COMNAVSAFECEN.

Noncompliant Programs:

Individual Medical Readiness (IMR)

Regular monitoring and reporting of IMR to senior COMNAVSAFECEN leadership as required by SECNAVINST 6120.3 CH-1, Periodic Health Assessment for Individual Medical Readiness, was not being performed until two months before the NAVINSGEN inspection. An improved process for management and oversight of IMR has been put into place.

Deficiency 15. COMNAVSAFECEN has not regularly monitored and reported IMR to the Commander and senior COMNAVSAFECEN leadership. Reference: SECNAVINST 6120.3 CH-1, paragraph 3a.

Suicide Prevention

Suicide Prevention Program

COMNAVSAFECEN did not have a Suicide Prevention Program in place in accordance with OPNAVINST 1720.4A, Suicide Prevention Program, prior to 16 May 2014 when a command instruction was issued. Of note, the recently issued COMNAVSAFECEN Suicide Prevention Program Instruction contains inaccuracies that may impede effective suicide prevention response. There have been no reported suicide gestures, ideations or completed suicides in more than two years.

COMNAVSAFECEN Senior Leadership has not regularly published messages, information and guidance on suicide prevention and has not incorporated Suicide Prevention as a part of life skills and health promotion training as required by OPNAVINST 1720.4A.

Watchstander/Duty Officer Training

COMNAVSAFECEN does not conduct formal watchstander and Duty Officer training to ensure proper crisis response to suicide-related behavior calls and reports in accordance with OPNAVINST 1720.4A and as described in the Commanding Officer's Suicide Prevention and Response Toolbox (www.suicide.navy.mil). However, focused response protocols and prepared

Suicide Prevention checklists are in place in the watchstander binder to aid watchstanders in properly handling suicide related calls.

Military and Civilian Training

Suicide Prevention training requirements for military and civilian staff personnel have not been met in accordance with OPNAVINST 1720.4A. FY13 Suicide Prevention training completion rate for military was 32 percent and for civilians was zero percent. COMNAVSAFECEN is on track to complete FY14 required suicide prevention training requirements: military is 11 percent with scheduled training dates, civilian is 89 percent.

Deficiency 16. **COMNAVSAFECEN did not have a Suicide Prevention Program in place prior to 16 May 2014. References: OPNAVINST 1720.4A, paragraph 6h(1) and Commanding Officer's Suicide Prevention and Response Toolbox (www.suicide.navy.mil).**

Deficiency 17. **COMNAVSAFECEN has not regularly published messages to provide suicide prevention guidance and information and has not incorporated suicide prevention as a part of life skills and health promotion training. Reference: OPNAVINST 1720.4A, paragraphs 5a(2)-(3) and 6h(4).**

Deficiency 18. **Watchstander and Duty Officer training was not being conducted to ensure proper crisis response to suicide-related behavior calls and reports. Reference: OPNAVINST 1720.4A, paragraphs 5b(1) and 5c.**

Deficiency 19. **Only 32 percent of military and zero percent of civilian personnel and full-time contractors completed suicide prevention training in FY13. Reference: OPNAVINST 1720.4A, paragraphs 5a(1) and 6h(3).**

Alcohol and Drug Control Officer (ADCO)

NAVSAFECEN's Drug Abuse and Prevention Advisor (DAPA) and Urinalysis Program Coordinator (UPC) programs were found to meet all governing directives. However, NAVSAFECEN has not identified and appointed a trained Alcohol and Drug Control Officer (ADCO) at the echelon 2 level to monitor substance abuse prevention programs and support DAPAs and UPCs throughout echelon 2 and below per OPNAVINST 5350.4D, Navy Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control. Since NAVSAFECEN has only one small echelon 3 command (with only six active duty members assigned), and no echelon 4 commands, NAVSAFECEN could seek a waiver from Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention Office (OPNAV (N170A)) of the requirement to assign an ADCO. However, because the echelon 2 Naval School of Aviation Safety is geographically distant from the NAVSAFECEN's HQ and accommodates a significant transient population of assigned students who might be considered at risk, NAVINSGEN recommends that an ADCO be identified in support of a unified Navy Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention Program.

Deficiency 20. **COMNAVSAFECEN has not identified a trained ADCO to provide oversight and guidance for substance abuse prevention programs at echelon 2 and 3. Reference: OPNAVINST 5350.4D, paragraph 8m(1).**

SAILOR PROGRAMS

Brilliant on the Basics Programs were reviewed and behavior associated with good order and discipline was closely observed. Overall, command morale and perceptions of quality of life (QOL) were noted to be average. Enlisted Sailors displayed proper military bearing and maintained a professional appearance.

Sailor Career Management Programs

Areas reviewed included the Command Sponsorship, Command Indoctrination, and Career Development Programs.

Command Sponsorship Program

This program was not in compliance with OPNAVINST 1740.3C, Command Sponsor and Indoctrination Program. The Career Information Management System (CIMS) is not used to report and track sponsorship assignments. Additionally, command sponsors did not receive required Fleet and Family Support Center training prior to or during their assignment as sponsors.

Command Indoctrination Program (INDOC)

COMNAVSAFECEN's INDOC program is in compliance with OPNAVINST 1740.3C. NAVINSGEN observed COMNAVSAFECEN's Navy Pride and Professionalism training completion percentage was 85 percent.

Career Development Program (CDP)

COMNAVSAFECEN's CDP is not in compliance with OPNAVINST 1040.11D, Navy Enlisted Retention and Career Development Program. NAVINSGEN observed no record of CDP training, Career Development Team (CDT) meetings or monthly CDT member training per OPNAVINST 1040.11D. Additionally, the assigned command career counselor had not completed formal training in accordance with OPNAVINST 1040.11D; however, NAVINSGEN observed a class quota reservation in August 2014.

Deficiency 21.   **The Career Information Management System (CIMS) is not used to report and track sponsorship assignments. Reference: OPNAVINST 1740.3C, Enclosure (1), paragraph 2g(4).**

Deficiency 22.   **Sponsors did not receive required Fleet and Family Support Center training prior to or during their assignment as Sponsors. Reference: OPNAVINST 1740.3C, Enclosure (1), paragraph 2g(3).**

Deficiency 23.   **COMNAVSAFECEN had no record of quarterly CDT meetings. Reference: OPNAVINST 1040.11D, paragraph 7j(4).**

Deficiency 24.   **COMNAVSAFECEN had no record of monthly CDT member training. Reference: OPNAVINST 1040.11D, paragraph 7m(6).**

Appendix A: Issue Papers

SUMMARY OF ACTIONS

Issue Papers that follow require responses to recommendations in the form of Implementation Status Reports (ISRs). If you are an Action Officer for a staff listed in Table A-1, please submit ISRs as specified for each applicable recommendation, along with supporting documentation, such as plans of action and milestones and implementing directives.

- Submit initial ISRs using OPNAV Form 5040/2 no later than 1 December 2014. Each ISR should include an e-mail address for the action officer, where available. This report is distributed through Navy Taskers. ISRs should be submitted through the assigned document control number in Navy Taskers. An electronic version of OPNAV Form 5040/2 is added to the original Navy Tasker Package along with the inspection report, upon distribution.

- Submit quarterly ISRs, including "no change" reports until the recommendation is closed by NAVINSGEN. When a long-term action is dependent upon prior completion of another action, the status report should indicate the governing action and its estimated completion date. Further status reports may be deferred, with NAVINSGEN concurrence.

- When action addressees consider required action accomplished, the status report submitted should contain the statement, "Action is considered complete." However, NAVINSGEN approval must be obtained before the designated action addressee is released from further reporting responsibilities on the recommendation.

- NAVINSGEN point of contact for b7c ███████████████████████████
  ██

Table A-1. Action Officer Listing for Implementation Status Reports

COMMAND	RECOMMENDATION NUMBER(S) XXX-14
OPNAV N09F	022, 023, 025, 027
USFF	022, 026, 030
CPF	022, 026, 030
CNP	023, 024
CNIC	022, 026, 030
NAVSEA	030
NAVAIR	030
SPAWAR	030
NETC	030
COMNAVSAFECEN	022, 023, 024, 025, 026, 027, 028, 029, 030, 031

ISSUE PAPER A-1: COMNAVSAFECEN MISSIONS AND FUNCTIONS, AND STAFF STRUCTURE

References: (a) OPNAVINST 5450.180E, Mission and Functions of the Naval Safety
                   Center, 05 Jul 2012
              (b) COMNAVSAFECEN/COMUSFLTFORCOM/COMPACFLT 5440,
                   Memorandum of Agreement Regarding Supported-Supporting
                   Relationships of U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S. Fleet Forces and Naval Safety
                   Center, 08 May 2013
              (c) COMUSFLTFORCMDINST/COMPACFLTINST 5100.8, U. S. Navy Fleet
                   Safety Campaign Plan, 27 Jun 2014

Issue: COMNAVSAFECEN's Mission and Functions instruction requires review to
         ensure that COMNAVSAFECEN is appropriately tasked and staffed to
         provide the full range of safety support that is requested by Commander,
         U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFF) and Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet
         (CPF) in their effort to improve operational safety across Navy.

Background: Reference (a) delineates COMNAVSAFECEN's currently assigned Missions
              and Functions. Reference (b) established USFF, CPF and
              COMNAVSAFECEN as responsible parties for coordinating a Fleet Safety
              Management System (SMS) with subordinate Fleet commanders through
              the provision of direct liaison authority. Reference (c) established the
              Fleet Safety Campaign Plan (SCP) to implement a Fleet SMS.

Discussion: USFF and CPF's recent drive to improve operational safety culture
              throughout the Navy makes it imperative for the Department of the Navy
              and COMNAVSAFECEN to re-evaluate the roles and responsibilities of the
              Safety Center. USFF and CPF are asking for much more from
              COMNAVSAFECEN than what is currently delineated in reference (a) and
              have communicated this through a number of vehicles:

              ▪ USFF asked COMNAVSAFECEN to develop the Fleet SCP in March
                2013; that campaign was recently approved by the Fleet
                Commanders and is now nearing initial implementation.
              ▪ Both USFF and CPF signed reference (b) with the
                COMNAVSAFECEN in May 2013 outlining responsibilities and
                coordination among all three organizations.
              ▪ USFF conducted a gap analysis to inform the direction and focus of
                the Fleet Safety Campaign Plan, development of a more robust
                Fleet Safety Management System. USFF issued an Operational
                Order (OPORD) to task subordinate organizations with support of
                the Fleet Safety Campaign.

USFF and CPF aim to transform the Navy's safety culture through a formal Fleet SMS that reduces human error and prevents mishaps and safety related incidents. Through their gap analysis, the Fleet has identified the need for:

- A greater emphasis on getting to the left of safety issues,
- Management and awareness of risk and safety issues at lower tiers below Class A mishaps,
- Improved lessons learned sharing and dissemination across the Fleet and across communities as appropriate,
- Incorporation of useful measures of safety culture and climate,
- Analysis tools to aid commanders at the unit and operational levels,
- More effective, timely and easier to use safety reporting systems
- Improvement in safety issue/deficiency follow-up and resolution.

Critical tasks/issues facing COMNAVSAFECEN include:

- Development of the Fleet SMS. This is a significant task and will require a long-term effort to effectively review, assess, and improve many aspects of Fleet occupational and operational safety.
- Improving Operational Risk Management (ORM).
- Improving reporting tools and ease of reporting mishaps, hazards and near misses.
- Improving data trend analysis. The Fleet needs analysis that is predictive, rather than merely descriptive.
- Tracking completion/status of MISRECs and Hazard Report Recommendations (HAZRECs) that are generated out of mishap and safety investigations. (There are currently 217 Class A MISRECs that are not reported as complete, some dating back to 2008.)
- Disseminating lessons learned that penetrate and appropriately dwell in Navy training pipelines, sustainment training, acquisition and operating procedures. Hazard information must be timely, and the information must be more easily accessible and searchable.
- Fostering safety culture across the Navy. Navy safety culture is not uniform across warfare communities. All communities embrace safety, but some communities are better at identifying and sharing safety near misses and tracking mishap and hazard report data. COMNAVSAFECEN's own staffing reflects this inconsistency across communities: today it remains largely an aviation-centric organization.

COMNAVSAFECEN missions and functions require review and validation to ensure that COMNAVSAFECEN is appropriately tasked and staffed to support the Fleet's initiates to improve operational safety across Navy.

COMNAVSAFECEN will be significantly challenged to meet these demands given the resident level of expertise, experience, and capacity of the staff. COMNAVSAFECEN's organization is primarily linear in nature and structured along warfare community lines. Given its roots as an aviation safety organization, the robust and experienced Aviation Directorate is not surprising. However, the Afloat and Shore/Ground Directorates are not manned with similarly experienced staff and safety data systems have less functionality.

Recommendations: 022-14. That Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV N09F) and COMNAVSAFECEN assess COMNAVSAFECEN's assigned Mission and Functions. Detailed Fleet and Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC) input are necessary to ensure COMNAVSAFECEN is correctly tasked to meet their requirements.

023-14. That Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV N09F) and COMNAVSAFECEN, in coordination with Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP), assess the benefits of, and pursue, expanding surface and submarine warfare community representation on the staff at COMNAVSAFECEN. COMNAVSAFECEN is an aviation-centric organization that requires broader representation from other warfare areas at the post-command level to facilitate mishap prevention across the DON.

024-14. That COMNAVSAFECEN coordinate with CNP to identify billets within the Afloat and Shore/Ground Directorates appropriate for transition to post-command-at-sea Submarine and Surface Warfare Officers.

025-14. That Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV N09F) and COMNAVSAFECEN assess and take positive actions to improve, the structure, capacity and resident experience level at COMNAVSAFECEN to develop and support the Fleet SMS, support the SCP, and support future safety requirements.

NAVINSGEN POC: b7c

ISSUE PAPER A-2: OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT (ORM) TO SUPPORT MULTI-UNIT OPERATIONS

References: (a) OPNAVINST 3500.39C, Operational Risk Management, 02 Jul 2010
                   (b) OPNAVINST 5450.180E, Mission and Functions of the Naval Safety Center, 05 Jul 2012
                   (c) COMNAVSAFECEN/COMUSFLTFORCOM/COMPACFLT 5440, Memorandum of Agreement Regarding Supported-Supporting Relationships of U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S. Fleet Forces and Naval Safety Center, 08 May 2014
                   (d) Operational Risk Management: Performance Gaps and Barriers Analyses, Final Report, Oct 2006

Issue: The current ORM model is not easily adapted to complex multi-unit operations. As such, an ORM "seam" can develop between two units conducting coincident operations, but making independent ORM evaluations, that can inadvertently place each unit at risk.

Background: Reference (a) identifies COMNAVSAFECEN as the fleet "ORM model manager." References (a) and (b) require COMNAVSAFECEN to be available, upon request, to assist accession, training, and evaluation and assessment commands to effectively implement ORM throughout the training continuum and during fleet exercise evolutions. Reference (c) established Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces (USFF), Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CPF) and COMNAVSAFECEN as responsible parties for coordinating a Fleet Safety Management System (SMS) with subordinate Fleet commanders through the provision of direct liaison authority. Reference (d), prepared for COMNAVSAFECEN by the Human Performance Center (HPC) and Navy Personnel Research, Studies and Technology (NPRST), identified gaps in implementing ORM throughout the Navy enterprise.

Discussion: ORM is primarily implemented at the unit and personal level and is not easily adapted to large, complex, multi-unit operations. ORM evaluations are typically conducted at the unit level during multi-unit operations. A potentially dangerous seam can develop if unit level ORM evaluations and associated mitigation efforts are not coordinated/integrated with adjacent units conducting coincident operations.

These ORM "seams" can develop across the full spectrum of operations: from two adjacent "teams" in the same unit conducting coincident operations (such as a team of evaluators/certifiers assessing another team), to two units conducting a small exercise together, all the way to

multi-unit operations during Fleet Exercises. While operational commanders intuitively assess risks and implement mitigation during large scale operations, this process is inconsistent, not formalized, and cannot be relied upon to appropriately mitigate risk.

Fleet Commanders require, and are seeking, a more fully integrated ORM across the spectrum of operations addressed above. In recent history, ORM seams have resulted in a number of significant Class A Mishaps. Examples include:

- Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit TWO dive incident (26 Feb 2013) – Two Navy divers died. This was a training event where a seam existed between the evaluation/certification unit and the evaluated unit. Seams existed between the unit's plan, the evaluator's plan (most difficult scenario that the unit does not know is coming) and the host facility. As a result, rescue divers were unable to perform safely due to changes to the plan that were driven by a scenario and external conditions.
- USS MONTPELIER (SSN-765)/USS SAN JACINTO (CG-56) collision (13 Oct 2012) – A submarine and surface ship collision during an exercise. There was no overarching ORM for the exercise, scheme of maneuver, and water space de-confliction.
- USS CHANCELLORSVILLE (CG-62) and BQM-74E drone (16 Nov 2013) – Drone controllers lost control of drone due to communications network configuration. Range control, drone controllers and ship personnel had multiple seams that resulted in mishap. Uncoordinated, incomplete ORM contributed to a failure to mitigate risks, resulting in an uncontrolled drone.

Recommendations: 026-14. That COMNAVSAFECEN, in coordination with Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFF), Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CPF) and Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC) develop procedures to conduct ORM that supports multi-unit operations in order to preclude ORM "seams" among coincident units.

NAVINSGEN POC: b7c

ISSUE PAPER A-3: MISHAP REPORT/HAZARD REPORT RECOMMENDATION TRACKING

References: (a) OPNAVINST 5102.1D, Navy & Marine Corps Mishap and Safety
                        Investigation, Reporting, and Record Keeping Manual, 7 Jan 05
                   (b) OPNAVINST 3750.6S, Naval Aviation Safety Management System, 13
                        May 14

Issue: Mishap Report and Hazard Report Recommendations (MISRECs/HAZRECs)
           are not being consistently acted upon.

Background: MISRECs and HAZRECs are recommendations arising from Mishap and
                    Hazard Reports. These recommendations provide technical, material, or
                    procedural changes to mitigate the future risk of mishap recurrence. Per
                    references (a) para. 1005 and (b) para. 107, COMNAVSAFECEN is
                    responsible for administering the mishap and hazard recommendation
                    tracking program and monitoring completion of corrective actions
                    resulting from a Safety Investigation report (SIREP) submitted by a Safety
                    Investigation Board (SIB), and provides quarterly action
                    status summary reports of these corrective actions, via WESS, to the chain
                    of command.

Discussion: During the inspection, we observed 217 outstanding Class A MISRECs dating
                   back to 2008 that have not been acted upon and implemented.
                   COMNAVSAFECEN proactively queries responsible commands for MISREC status
                   and maintains a comprehensive tracking system for Class A MISRECs, but they do
                   not have authority to compel completion, direct that status reports be provided,
                   or directly influence MISREC action from other commands. Consequently, many
                   MISRECs remain open. Reasons that MISRECs remain open include:

- They are vague or overly broad, thus difficult to close out.

- They require complex technical solutions that require significant
  investment and program adjustments.

- Insufficient accountability. There is no formal process in place to
  regularly update senior Navy and Marine Corps leadership on the status
  of MISREC implementations. While reference (a) states that the chain of
  command will be updated quarterly on status of corrective actions from
  SIREPs via WESS, this information is not reaching senior leaders.

Further, not all MISRECs are tracked by COMNAVSAFECEN. While the Aviation
Directorate tracks all MISRECs regardless of category, the Afloat Directorate only
tracks MISRECs from Class A mishaps or Class B mishaps where a Safety
Investigation Board (SIB) was established.

Recommendations: 027-14. That Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV N09F) direct, and COMNAVSAFECEN establish and maintain, a process to track Mishap Safety Investigation (regardless of type/class) and Hazard Report recommendations (HAZRECs) (regardless of category) from discovery to resolution and regularly brief Navy and Marine Corps leadership on recommendation status via forums such as the Navy Executive Safety Board, CNO's Executive Group (CEG) Safety Quarterly Update Briefs, etc.

028-14. That COMNAVSAFECEN regularly provide a consolidated report to Fleet and Type Commanders that includes a prioritized list of outstanding MISREC/HAZRECs, the echelon 2 or 3 command responsible, and status efforts to implement each recommendation.

029-14. That COMNAVSAFECEN review outstanding MISRECs and edit, call complete or otherwise close out languishing and obsolete recommendations.

NAVINSGEN POC: b7c ███████████████
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ISSUE PAPER A-4: SAFETY LESSONS LEARNED

References: (a) COMUSFLTFORCOM 281414Z MAR 13, PLANORD Directing COMNAVSAFECEN to Develop a Safety Campaign Plan

Issue: Navy requires improved lessons learned sharing and dissemination across the Fleet and across communities as appropriate to reduce mishaps.

Background: Reference (a) identifies Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFF) concern that there are insufficient incentives to share safety lessons learned within the Fleet and that there are many disincentives to the sharing of safety information.

Discussion: Approximately 80 percent of Navy mishaps during FY11 and FY12 were human factors related, with a total cost of nearly $1.2B to Navy. Improvements in Navy's ability to ensure that safety lessons learned are readily available to personnel as they plan an operation, attend formal training, develop operating procedures, etc. will result in a substantial savings and improved operational readiness. These lessons learned must penetrate and appropriately dwell in Navy training pipelines, sustainment training, acquisition and operating procedures.

Lessons learned must be easily accessible to all personnel conducting an evolution or operation. A web-based "google-like" safety lessons learned database would make this information must more readily useable to operators, training commands, systems commands, etc.

Recommendations: 030-14. COMNAVSAFECEN establish a working group which includes the Fleet, Navy Education and Training Command (NETC), Systems Commands (NAVSEA, NAVAIR, SPAWAR), and Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC) to improve safety lessons learned penetration and dwell in Navy training pipelines, sustainment training, acquisition and operating procedures.

031-14. COMNAVSAFECEN develop a searchable safety lessons learned database to provide easier accessibility to lessons learned for Fleet users, training commands, systems commands, etc.

NAVINSGEN POC: b7c

Appendix B: Summary of Key Survey Results

PRE-EVENT SURVEY

In support of the Commander, Naval Safety Center (COMNAVSAFECEN) Command Inspection held 16-20 June 2014, the Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) conducted an anonymous on-line survey of active duty military and Department of the Navy (DON) civilian personnel from 9 April 2014 to 9 May 2014. The survey produced 146 respondents (86 military, 60 civilian). According to reported demographics the sample represented the COMNAVSAFECEN workforce with a 5% margin of error at the 99% confidence level. Selected topics are summarized in the sections below. A frequency report is provided in Appendix D.

Quality of Life

Quality of life is assessed using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is worst and 10 is best. The overall COMNAVSAFECEN average quality of work life (QOWL), 7.60 was higher than the echelon 2 average, 6.58 (Figure. B-1). The overall COMNAVSAFECEN average quality of home life (QOHL), 8.74 was higher than the echelon 2 average, 7.58 (Figure B-2).

The perceived impact of factors on QOWL life rating is summarized in Table B-1. Factors of potential concern were identified by distributional analyses, where 20% negative responses served as a baseline. None of the factors were significantly higher than 20%. Percentages in Table 1 that are lower than 20% are shown in bold text. Advancement Opportunities (24%) was the most frequently cited negative impact on QOWL, with the impact perceived differently between military (12%) and civilian (42%) respondents. The negative impact of Training Opportunities on QOWL rating was also perceived differently between military (6%) and civilian (33%) respondents. Verbatim responses to short answer questions did not illuminate the nature of these subpopulation differences.

The perceived impact of factors on QOHL life rating is summarized in Table B-2.

Command Climate

Table B-3 lists strongly agree and agree response percentages to survey questions addressing perceived job importance, and whether fraternization, favoritism, gender/sex discrimination, sexual harassment, or hazing occurs at COMNAVSAFECEN. Overall echelon 2 command inspection percentages over a 5-year period are shown for comparison. Excepting job importance, lower values are "better."

- Perceived job importance at COMNAVSAFECEN was higher than the 5-year echelon 2 command average.

- Perceived occurrence of favoritism, sexual harassment, race discrimination, and hazing at COMNAVSAFECEN were lower than echelon 2 commands.

Figure. B-1. Distribution of quality of work life ratings from the pre-event survey. The x-axis lists the rating scale and the y-axis represents the number of survey respondents. Response percentages for ratings are shown at the base of the bar. Counts for each rating are shown above each bar. The most frequent rating is shown in blue.


Figure. B-2. Distribution of quality of home life ratings from the pre-event survey. The x-axis lists the rating scale and the y-axis represents the number of survey respondents. Response percentages for ratings are shown at the base of the bar. Counts for each rating are shown above each bar. The most frequent rating is shown in blue.

Table B-1. Impact of Factors on Quality of Work Life Rating

Factor	Negative	Other
Job satisfaction	**5%**	95%
Leadership support	**10%**	90%
Leadership opportunities	14%	86%
Advancement opportunities	24%	76%
Workload	**8%**	92%
Work Hours/Schedule	**1%**	99%
Training opportunities	17%	83%
Awards and recognition	**10%**	90%
Command morale	17%	83%
Command climate	12%	88%

Notes. Perceived impact of factors on quality of work life rating based on negative verses aggregate positive and neutral (Other) responses. Negative values in bold are significantly less than 20%.

Table B-2. Impact of Factors on Quality of Home Life Rating

Factor	Negative	Other
Quality of home	**2%**	98%
Quality of the school for dependent children	**5%**	95%
Quality of the childcare available	**1%**	99%
Shopping & dining opportunities	**2%**	98%
Recreational opportunities	**1%**	99%
Access to spouse employment	**4%**	96%
Access to medical/dental care	**1%**	99%
Cost of living	13%	87%

Notes. Perceived impact of factors on quality of home life rating based on negative verses aggregate positive and neutral (Other) responses. Negative values in bold are significantly less than 20%.

Table B-3. Perceived Job Importance and Occurrence of Behaviors Assumed to Impact Command Climate

Question Topic	COMNAVSAFECEN	Echelon 2
Job Importance	**94%**	78%
Fraternization	7%	14%
Favoritism	**19%**	32%
Gender/Sex Discrimination	5%	14%
Sexual Harassment	**1%**	9%
Race Discrimination	**1%**	12%
Hazing	**0%**	8%

<u>Notes</u>. Aggregate strongly agree and agree response percentages for selected command climate topics. Echelon 2 percentages from FY09-14. Excepting Job Importance, lower percentages are "better." Bold values indicate a significantly higher or lower percentage than Echelon 2.

Appendix C: Summary of Focus Group Perceptions

FOCUS GROUPS

On 10-11 June 2014 the NAVINSGEN conducted a total of 11 focus groups at COMNAVSAFECEN, six with various groupings of active duty military ranks, and five with various groupings of civilian grades. There were a total of 54 COMNAVSAFECEN focus group participants; 26 military, 28 civilians. Each focus group was scheduled for one hour and consisted of one facilitator and two note takers. The facilitator followed a protocol script: (a) focus group personnel introductions, (b) brief introduction to the NAVINSGEN mission, (c) privacy, Whistleblower statutes, and basic ground rules, (d) participant-derived list of topics perceived to be obstacles to job performance, mission, or quality of life, and (f) subsequent refinement and discussion of participant-derived topics with an emphasis on understanding the perceived impact. Note takers transcribed focus group proceedings, which were subsequently entered and tagged in a spreadsheet database to determine the total number of focus groups in which the same or comparable topic and its perceived impact were discussed. Similar focus groups were also conducted 10 June 2014 with Naval School of Aviation Safety (SAS) personnel in Pensacola.

Focus groups topics that were perceived to have the greatest impact on job performance, the mission, or quality of life are listed in Table C-1. For example, military and civilian focus groups at COMNAVSAFECEN and focus groups at SAS mentioned NMCI/IT (WESS and Other Databases) most often as having a major or moderate impact on job performance and the mission.

Table C-1. Perceived Impact of Focus Groups Topics

Topic	Impact		
	Major	Moderate	Minor
NMCI/IT (WESS, Other Databases)	🔵⚪🩵	🔵⚪	
Manning/Manpower	⚪	🔵⚪🩵	🔵
Travel	🔵	🔵🩵	🔵
Culture	⚪	🔵⚪	
Facilities		🔵⚪	🔵⚪
Communication		🔵⚪🩵	🔵
Training		⚪	🔵
Memorandum of Agreement		🔵⚪	

Notes. Descending order of perceived impact of topic and the number of focus groups in which the topic was discussed. Colored circles indicate that the topic was discussed in military focus groups at COMNAVSAFECEN (🔵), civilian focus groups at COMNAVSAFECEN (⚪), or focus groups at Pensacola (🩵).

NMCI/IT (WESS, Other Databases)

Major and moderate perceived impacts of IT infrastructure and databases on the mission and job performance were discussed in seven of the 11 focus groups at COMNAVSAFECEN and focus groups at SAS. Focus groups discussion addressed various aspects of IT infrastructure and design including, but not limited to: content, control, access, search, reliability, and reporting. For example, focus group participants voiced concern for dependence on remote hosting and the inability to access systems to implement operational mandates that could result in shutdown; difficulty in getting work done when the Web Enabled Safety System (WESS) is down—both for internal and external users. According to focus groups participants, WESS produces substantive delays in data input and validation that impedes workforce productivity and creates backlogs. The helpdesk was perceived to offer little assistance due to its inability to accurately identify the status of, and troubleshoot, WESS. Focus group participants also noted several shortcomings in WESS search capability and its resultant output, even to the point of questioning its value to customers. A replacement for WESS is under development; however, focus groups participants were apprehensive about adequately identifying requirements for the system; data input, analysis, and outputs.

Manning/Manpower

Perceived shortfalls in manning/manpower were reported in six of 11 focus groups at COMNAVSAFECEN and focus groups at SAS, with multiple perceived impacts on the mission. There were several reports claiming that COMNAVSAFECEN is one-deep in positions, making it more difficult to serve customers and accommodate the perceived expanding demand associated with the Strategic Initiative and recent MOA with Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFF) and Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CPF). Civilian focus group participants claimed that 76 of 94 DON civilian billets are gapped (others reported 16 gapped billets), and that travel is essentially being "subsidized" by these vacancies. Focus groups participants questioned when the last Shore Manpower Requirements Determination (SMRD) was performed. One participant claimed that the last SMRD was over 10 years ago. Our on-site inspection found there is no SMRD on record from BSO-11/FSA for the COMNAVSAFECEN UIC 63393.

Some military participants also offered that COMNAVSAFECEN is too aviation-centric and that the mission would be better served if COMNAVSAFECEN had post-command billets from surface/subsurface communities.

Travel

Recent funding for travel was perceived to be in a constant state of flux, impacting work schedules with the fleet. According to some focus groups participants the fluctuation in the ability to fund travel has also forced COMNAVSAFECEN to be more selective about what mishaps investigations/training/surveys need to be conducted onsite. (There does not appear to be a formal process—advanced planning—to determine when on-site advice and assistance is necessary.) Military members reported that they do most of the travel—up to 9-10 months per year and throughout the summer, making it more challenging to balance work with family life. Also of moderate concern was the challenge to travel in order to maintain professional

development and interactions with safety-related organizations external to DOD (e.g., Human Factors & Ergonomics Society). Our on-site inspection discovered that 3 conferences have been attended in FY14.

Culture

Related to the aforementioned discussion on manning/manpower, some focus groups participants felt that COMNAVSAFECEN is aviation-centric and lacks surface/subsurface perspectives. Several participants also claimed that it was a challenge to accommodate differences in standards of reporting between various warfighter communities.

Facilities

Several focus groups discussed obstacles to job performance, the mission, and quality of work life as affected by workplace facilities (e.g., power, condition of bathrooms/showers, climate control, paint peeling off of walls), and perceived slow response time and/or substandard quality of contracted work. Military focus groups reported that junior sailors are performing facilities maintenance duties to partially compensate for gaps in service. During focus groups discussions on the topic of facilities and facilities maintenance it did not appear that participants had visibility on scheduled improvements or whether the command is holding responsible parties accountable.

Communication

Some focus groups participants felt that communication within the command is compartmentalized and stove-piped by codes/communities, while other participants reported that they are too busy with their own workload to be concerned with understanding other code/community priorities. A few focus groups participants reported that there is no command calendar for planning schedules, surveys, etc. One military focus group participant spoke about *external* communications. According to this individual, there are occasions in which the first time that a ship/unit is alerted to a new/updated policy related to safety is from COMNAVSAFECEN rather than communicated by their TYCOM, although it was unclear whether there is any follow-up to determine whether the TYCOM had pushed the information.

Training

One civilian focus group participant summarized training in the following words: "Why do the paperwork when you know it will be turned down?" Focus group participants generally believed that departments don't have much input or authority in decisions involving training. According to civilian focus groups the Comptroller "manages" training, which is approved through the Executive Director. These sentiments may explain why 33% of civilian survey respondents identified Training Opportunities as a negative impact on QOWL rating.

A few participants expressed concern that they have not received enough training to adequately assess the safety of a program.

Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)

The MOA between COMNAVSAFECEN, USFF, and CPF is viewed by some focus group participants as downgrading COMNAVSAFECEN to a lower echelon of USFF, and/or forcing COMNAVSAFECEN to assume more of an inspection posture. Focus group participants in two groups generally thought that FFC "tasked" COMNAVSAFECEN to "put the Safety Campaign together." While participants agreed with the notion of a safety campaign, they voiced concern about "mission creep" and its impact on workload and current product quality. On a positive note, one participant thought that the MOA is an advantage for external communications by leveraging USFF's 4-Star to push information.

Other Focus Groups Topics

Other focus groups topics that were discussed are briefly described below in alphabetical order.

Advancement/Promotion: One military focus group was concerned that members are less likely to be promoted if stationed at COMNAVSAFECEN.

Awards/Recognition: Two civilian focus groups felt that the civilian force is not duly recognized for their efforts and are "just doing [their] job." Leadership has purportedly informed workers that only "above and beyond" performance will be recognized. There is a strong perception that supervisor input is often ignored. Focus groups participants felt that recognition does not have to be in the form of time or money, but merely by acknowledgement of a job well done.

Defense Travel System: A military focus group felt that travel vouchers are difficult to complete in the requisite time (especially during peak travel months) and that the challenge of voucher submission and approval is a function of variation in rules between codes.

Family-Work Life Balance: One military member thought that the heavy and variable summer travel schedule makes it difficult to plan family events.

Gym: One military member noted that there is no gym on the east side of the base.

Hiring Practices: One civilian focus group felt that there was a lack of transparency in the hiring process and that the Executive Director makes all hiring decisions whether by name or bid.

Indoctrination: One military member thought that indoctrination was insufficient and informal (no written policy). As an example, the member received no training on WESS.

Leadership: One civilian focus group was pleased that the command supports physical fitness.

Military-Civilian Relationship: In three military focus groups, perceptions regarding the relationship between military and civilians were varied. Participants were generally impressed with the professional quality of the civilian workforce, while a few participants thought that the perspective of the civilian force with respect to safety is limited, primarily based on a pre-9/11

mentality. A few military members thought that it would help to have civilians work with the travel teams.

Mission: One civilian focus group expressed confusion regarding the COMNAVSAFECEN mission and questioned how COMNAVSAFECEN should operate as an echelon 2 command. Some of the participants thought that COMNAVSAFECEN is performing at the tactical level.

Pay: One civilian focus group claimed that civilians working for the Marine Corps are at higher grades and thus receive higher pay for equivalent Navy civilian positions.

Position Description: One civilian focus group claimed that "other duties as assigned" becomes a catch all, and that it is difficult to have an accretion of duty approved.

Taskers: One civilian focus group claimed that 214 taskers have been issued in FY14, making it more difficult to perform normal duties.

Appendix D: Survey Response Frequency Report

Numerical values in the following tables summarize survey responses to forced-choice questions as counts and/or percentages (%). Response codes are listed below in the order that they appear.

SD Strongly Disagree

D Disagree

N Neither Agree nor Disagree…

A Agree

SA Strongly Agree

- Negative

N Neutral

+ Positive

N Never

R Rarely

S Sometimes

F Frequently

A Always

	Military		Civilian	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
	80	6	36	24
	55%	4%	25%	16%

On a scale from 1 (worst) to 10 (best), please rate your Quality of Work Life (QOWL). QOWL is the degree to which you enjoy where you work and available opportunities for professional growth.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Count	1	3	4	6	10	8	26	33	27	28
%	1%	2%	3%	4%	7%	5%	18%	23%	18%	19%

For each of the factors below, please indicate whether they have a positive, neutral, or negative impact on your QOWL rating.

	+	N	-
Job satisfaction	117	23	7
Leadership support	99	33	15
Leadership opportunities	72	54	21
Advancement opportunities	45	67	35
Workload	95	40	12
Work Hours/Schedule	128	18	1
Training opportunities	89	33	25
Awards and recognition	78	55	14
Command morale	89	33	25
Command climate	91	38	18

On a scale from 1 (worst) to 10 (best), please rate your Quality of Home Life (QOHL). QOHL is the degree to which you enjoy where you live and the opportunities available for housing, recreation, etc.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Count	1	0	0	3	2	2	9	37	38	54
%	1%	0%	0%	2%	1%	1%	6%	25%	26%	37%

For each of the factors below, please indicate whether they have a positive, neutral, or negative impact on your QOHL rating.

	+	N	-
Quality of home	129	15	3
Quality of the school for dependent children	86	54	7
Quality of the childcare available	54	91	2
Shopping & dining opportunities	127	17	3
Recreational opportunities	132	13	2
Access to spouse employment	79	62	6
Access to medical/dental care	125	20	2
Cost of living	81	47	19

My current work week affords enough time to complete mission tasks in a timely manner while maintaining an acceptable work-home life balance.

SD	D	N	A	SA
2	5	2	23	54
2%	6%	2%	27%	63%

Rank:

	E1-4	E5-6	E7-9	CWO	O1-3	O4-5	O6	Total
Count	1	2	35	3	14	25	6	**86**
%	1%	2%	41%	16%	29%	29%	7%	

My command gives me sufficient time during working hours to participate in a physical readiness exercise program.

SD	D	N	A	SA
0	0	0	13	73
0%	0%	0%	15%	85%

My current work week affords enough time to complete mission tasks in a timely manner while maintaining an acceptable work-home life balance.

SD	D	N	A	SA
2	5	2	23	54
2%	6%	2%	27%	63%

Grade:

	GS1-8	GS9-12	GS13-14	GS15	SES	Other	Total
Count	10	31	17	2	0	0	**60**
%	17%	52%	28%	3%	0%	0%	

My position description is current and accurately describes my functions, tasks, and responsibilities.

SD	D	N	A	SA
2	8	9	28	13
3%	13%	15%	47%	22%

I work more hours than I report in a pay period because I cannot complete all assigned tasks during scheduled work hours.

N	R	S	F	A
20	16	15	4	4
34%	27%	25%	7%	7%

The Human Resource Service Center provides timely, accurate responses to my queries.

SD	D	N	A	SA
3	7	30	10	9
5%	12%	51%	17%	15%

My (local) Human Resources Office provides timely, accurate responses to my queries.

SD	D	N	A	SA
2	3	25	13	16
3%	5%	42%	22%	27%

During the last performance evaluation cycle, my supervisor provided me with feedback that enabled me to improve my performance before my formal performance appraisal/EVAL/FITREP.

SD	D	N	A	SA
1	9	18	46	52
1%	7%	14%	37%	41%

I have the tools and resources needed to do my job properly.

SD	D	N	A	SA
8	15	16	56	50
6%	10%	11%	39%	34%

I am satisfied with the overall quality of my workplace facilities.

SD	D	N	A	SA
6	34	26	56	23
4%	23%	18%	39%	16%

My command is concerned about my safety.

SD	D	N	A	SA
0	5	5	49	86
0%	3%	3%	34%	59%

My command has a program in place to address potential safety issues.

SD	D	N	A	SA
2	1	8	58	76
1%	1%	6%	40%	52%

My job is important and makes a contribution to my command.

SD	D	N	A	SA
1	2	6	55	81
1%	1%	4%	38%	56%

_____ is occurring at my command.

	SD	D	N	A	SA
Job Importance	1%	1%	4%	38%	56%
Fraternization	33%	21%	40%	5%	2%
Favoritism	28%	21%	32%	15%	3%
Gender/Sex Discrimination	38%	25%	32%	3%	1%
Sexual Harassment	40%	33%	26%	1%	0%
Race Discrimination	40%	33%	26%	1%	0%
Hazing	47%	31%	22%	0%	0%

I have adequate leadership guidance to perform my job successfully.

SD	D	N	A	SA
1	6	15	55	68
1%	4%	10%	38%	47%

Communication down the chain of command is effective.

SD	D	N	A	SA
3	16	23	60	43
2%	11%	16%	41%	30%

Communication up the chain of command is effective.

SD	D	N	A	SA
3	13	29	62	38
2%	9%	20%	43%	26%

My performance evaluations have been fair.

SD	D	N	A	SA
1	0	21	59	64
1%	0%	14%	41%	44%

The awards and recognition program is fair and equitable.

SD	D	N	A	SA
3	8	37	54	43
2%	6%	26%	37%	30%

Military and civilian personnel work well together at my command.

SD	D	N	A	SA
1	8	19	69	48
1%	6%	13%	48%	33%

My command's Equal Opportunity Program (EO - to include Equal Employment Opportunity & Command Managed Equal Opportunity) is effective.

SD	D	N	A	SA
3	2	27	57	56
2%	1%	19%	39%	39%

I know who to contact with an EEO/EO question or complaint.

SD	D	N	A	SA
1	3	10	58	73
1%	2%	7%	40%	50%

My command adequately protects my personal information.

SD	D	N	A	SA
0	1	14	64	65
0%	1%	10%	44%	45%