NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
COMMAND INSPECTION OF
COMMANDER, OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
18 TO 29 JUNE 2012

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

From: Naval Inspector General
To: Commander, Office of Naval Intelligence

Subj: COMMAND INSPECTION OF COMMANDER, OFFICE OF NAVAL
        INTELLIGENCE

Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 5040.3A

1. In accordance with reference (a), the Naval Inspector
General (NAVINSGEN) conducted a Command Inspection of Commander,
Office of Naval Intelligence (COMONI) from 18 to 29 June 2012.
ONI's mission is to develop a penetrating understanding of our
adversaries and an unmatched knowledge of the environment to
amplify traditional naval combat capabilities and expand options
for operational commanders. ONI provides products and services
to meet Navy, Department of Defense, and national maritime
intelligence requirements, and performs other functions and
tasks as may be assigned by higher authority.

2. Overall, ONI with its subordinate commands is effective in
accomplishing its mission to meet both naval and national
intelligence requirements. Personnel at both echelon II and III
commands conveyed a solid understanding of their respective
missions and a general satisfaction that both individual and
collective efforts were important and making a difference.
Likewise, ONI's customers genuinely value the organization's
contribution to national security.

3. This report has two parts. Part one forwards our overall
observations and findings. Part two contains twelve issue papers
presenting specific findings and recommendations for senior
leadership. Part two also contains an issue paper action
summary matrix (Page 24) and a summary of actions providing
guidance for submission of corrective action via an
Implementation Status Report (ISR) (Page 26). <u>Commands are
tasked with submitting initial ISRs to NAVINSGEN not later than
18 March 2013.</u> The summary of survey data analysis for active
duty military and DON civilian personnel is included in
Appendix A (Page 50). The summary of focus group discussion
data analysis for active duty military and DON civilian
personnel is included in Appendix B (Page 77).

Subj: COMMAND INSPECTION OF COMMANDER, OFFICE OF NAVAL
        INTELLIGENCE

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J. P. WISECUP

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) conducted a command inspection of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)[1] from 18 to 29 June 2012. The inspection began with web-based personnel surveys conducted prior to our arrival. These surveys helped NAVINSGEN prepare for on-site Quality of Life (QOL) focus groups and provided background for the team to determine areas requiring further inspection. There were a total of 463 active duty military and Department of Navy (DON) civilian survey respondents. On a scale of 1 to 10, (where 1 = worst and 10 = best), active duty military and DON civilian personnel indicated their Quality of Work Life (QOWL) at 6.06, which is below the NAVINSGEN rolling average of 6.28. Their Quality of Home Life (QOHL) scored 7.83, which is higher than the NAVINSGEN rolling average of 7.02. To assess overall QOL we conducted a total of 16 focus groups comprised of 106 active duty military and DoN civilian personnel. Overall QOL scored 6.93, which is close to the NAVINSGEN average of 6.94. Based on these focus groups, top concerns were: leadership, organizational structure, advancement and professional development, military and civilian relationships, the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS), and communication.

2. ONI is still evolving following massive change in Naval Intelligence that began with "ONI transformation" which created echelon III subordinate commands in 2009 and then created the Information Dominance Corps in 2010. While our inspection findings address some necessary organizational restructuring, it is important to note that we found ONI and its subordinate commands to be effectively meeting mission requirements.

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[1] ONI is an echelon II command subordinate to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) staff. The ONI Commander reports to the Director of Naval Intelligence (CNO N2/N6). Key Naval Intelligence functions are performed within the ONI headquarters staff (if cross cutting such as resource management or collections) or at one of ONI's four collocated echelon III subordinate commands: Farragut Technical Analysis Center (TAC), Nimitz Operational Intelligence Center (OIC), Kennedy Irregular Warfare Center (IWC) and the Hopper Information Services Center (ISC). These echelon III commands established with longstanding Naval Intelligence "business lines" provide intelligence analysis, intelligence production and intelligence support services (e.g., SCI communications). Under the CNO staff effort, ONI is somewhat unique in that it is predominantly funded under the National Intelligence Program.

Subsequent to our inspection, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) directed (VCNO Memorandum, Ser N09/12U100535, of 24 Sep 12) the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) to realign aspects of the Naval Intelligence enterprise, including functions on the CNO's intelligence staff and at ONI. Ongoing dialogue with ONI and CNO N2/N6 staffs confirms that realignment planning process is examining all relevant organizational issues cited in this report.

3. ONI's Command and Control (C2) relationships, both up echelon to CNO N2/N6 and down echelon to echelon III, are of concern. While not evidenced in measurable mission impact, the presence of structural friction did prove to be a source of some negative climate perceptions we noted in our survey, focus groups and individual interviews. Some of the structural friction between ONI and echelon I is attributable to divergence between Navy's service-centric priorities and ONI's need to also be responsive to broader intelligence community requirements and fleet operational intelligence needs - we view this as a manageable fact-of-life. However, we also note that creation of the Information Dominance Corps (IDC) and the elevation of the DNI position came with an increased span of control and substantial organizational turmoil (both driving additional C2 friction). This dynamic requires continued CNO and ONI leadership follow-up to mature a more functional relationship.

4. Good News.

    a. Overall, ONI with its subordinate commands are effective in accomplishing their mission to meet both naval and national intelligence requirements. Personnel at both echelon II and III commands conveyed a solid understanding of their respective missions and a general satisfaction that both individual and collective efforts were important and making a difference. Likewise, ONI's customers genuinely value the organization's contribution to national security. Relations among the four echelon III commands are congenial and mutually supportive although there is healthy competition amongst those commands to expand both mission and resources. While ONI faces some specific resource challenges (and the uncertain fiscal outlook faced by all of DoD), the overall enterprise is well resourced by the intelligence community. Put differently, in contrast to NAVINSGEN's other recent inspections, we saw no indications naval intelligence resourcing is approaching mission readiness redlines.

b. The following programs were found to be solid and well managed with appropriate command attention:

- Command Individual Augmentee Coordinator (CIAC)

- Cyber Security Workforce (CSWF)

- Physical Readiness Program (PRP)

- Personal Property Management (PPM)

- Government Commercial Purchase Card (GCPC)

- Government Travel Charge Card (GTCC) Program

5. The following efforts - all addressed in "issue papers" as listed in the Action Summary Matrix, page (24) of the report - require action to become compliant and/or improve their effectiveness:

a. Mission and Functions. OPNAVINST 5450.334, *Mission and Functions of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)*, in place since 2003, predates the transformation that created the echelon III centers in 2009. OPNAVINST 5400.44A, *Navy Organizational Change Manual*, requires submission of a Mission, Functions, and Tasks (MFT) document for approval every three years. An update to the ONI MFT instruction is currently under review at OPNAV N2/N6. This MFT revision should be completed as soon as practicable, but in concert with efforts to implement the VCNO-directed realignment of Naval Intelligence.

b. Internal Relationships. While ONI's command relationships are roughly defined in informal organizational charts, revised versions of their fundamental organization documents (e.g., Standard Organization and Regulations Manual (SORM)) defining their organizational structure, billet descriptions and personnel responsibilities did not exist at the time of our inspection. The specific roles, authorities, and subordination of the Chief of Staff, Operations Officer and Executive Officer functions remain generally unclear within the organization - relative authorities of those positions to enforce rules and the Commander's decisions were entirely unclear to the workforce. A draft SORM was completed as of September 2012 but, appropriately, will be held in draft pending completion of the VCNO-directed realignment.

c. Navy Special Security Office (SSO Navy). SSO Navy was subordinated under ONI's Mission Support Directorate (MSD) during the ONI transformation. b7e

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███████████████. While not large enough to warrant creation of a separate command effort, the Navy SSO function is a unique business line under the Naval Intelligence enterprise that requires dedicated focus to succeed. The SSO Navy function should report directly to the Commander, Office of Naval Intelligence (COMONI) to ensure the enterprise is appropriately focused on world-wide SSO operational requirements and resourcing.

d. Human Resources (HR) Function. ONI faces HR challenges on multiple fronts including a complex HR hierarchy, fallout from relocation of civilian intelligence HR services away from Suitland, MD to Arlington, VA, and policy confusion following the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) directive to suspend pay for performance aspects of the recently implemented Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) program. Systemic problems include lack of coherency/continuity in dedicated HR staff, excessively long lead times to turn around recruit actions, and inequities driven by inconsistencies between Office of Civilian Human Resources (OCHR) (Title 5) and Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) DCIPS (Title 10) policy. CNO N2/N6 should coordinate with the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASN M&RA) to clarify and then definitively codify application of USD(I) DCIPS directives regarding the management of naval civilian intelligence personnel.

e. Civilian Professional Development Program (PDP). The ONI PDP faces challenges in training the civilian intelligence workforce, particularly analysts, in the skill sets needed to accomplish the mission. Unlike uniformed 183X officers and civilian analysts from other intelligence community agencies, ONI civilians do not have a "schoolhouse" with an experienced full time faculty dedicated to their professional development. Instead, ONI relies on commercial vendors and other agencies to train its analytic workforce. Approximately eight weeks of instruction is provided, as quotas can be obtained, over a new analyst's first two years onboard. CNO N2/N6 should explore enhanced training capacity at the Navy Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center in Dam Neck, VA.

f. Continuity of Operations (COOP) Plan. Several key elements required by Chief of Naval Operations and ONI COOP instructions were not being met prior to our inspection. This program requires command-level attention to ensure the "emergency essential" staff are identified, properly trained and practiced at executing a relocation event.

g. Parking Garage. One segment of the parking structure (initially completed in 1993) suffers from deterioration that could eventually affect its safety. An FY10 repair project temporarily stabilized the deteriorated segment. However, since that repair professional structural engineers have documented additional deterioration and urged corrective action. While some additional support brackets have been installed, most of the deficiencies remain uncorrected. NAVINSGEN has requested that Commander, Navy Installations Command and Commander, Naval Facilities Engineering Command provide a Plan of Action and Milestones to address the structural repair issues.

h. Safety and Occupational Health (SOH) Program Management and Oversight. OPNAV regulations mandate that a safety professional head the safety organization of an echelon II command. However, ONI's safety function is organized under the Mission Support Directorate and the Safety Officer function is a collateral duty. To adequately address OPNAV requirements, ONI needs a full time trained safety professional to effectively represent and support the headquarters commander in the management and administration of the command safety program.

i. Industrial Hygiene (IH) and Occupational Health (OH). ONI receives IH and OH support services from the Washington Navy Yard Branch Health Clinic. A review of ONI's August 2011 IH Survey indicated five individuals in the Imaging Services department were identified for placement in the hearing conservation program, but none of these individuals received an exam. Additionally, personnel in the Foreign Material Evaluation Branch who perform tasks such as cutting and observing foreign components have not followed up on direction regarding respiratory protection. ONI needs to follow-up on these safety requirements.

j. Safety and Occupational Health (SOH) Policy Statement. Within three months after assuming command, Commanding Officers are required to issue an SOH policy statement that reflects a commitment to safety. This policy statement is to be posted on official bulletin boards. COMONI needs to issue an SOH policy.

k. **Suicide Prevention.** The Suicide Prevention Program Coordinator (SPC) was appointed in writing in April 2012 ending a three month gap in the position. However, the SPC had not received mandatory training. Prior to the release of this report, NAVINSGEN verified that the SPC had been assigned a training quota to attend the required SPC training course (1 Dec 2012). Upon completion of SPC training, the program will be fully compliant with OPNAVINST 1720.4A, *Suicide Prevention Program*.

l. **Individual Medical Readiness (IMR).** IMR records for 18 ONI Unit Identification Codes reveal a fully medically ready rate (FMR) for ONI and subordinate commands of 67 percent. The FMR for ONI alone is 53 percent. Since the inspection, ONI has addressed core issues regarding their low FMR rate and has improved to an enterprise-wide FMR rate of 74 percent. However, this remains below the DoD minimum requirement of 75 percent and must be addressed by command leadership.

m. **Managers' Internal Control (MIC) Program.** Statements of Assurance made to the Director, Navy Staff contain no reportable conditions or material weaknesses. However, ONI's MIC Program lacked documentation on assessable units (AUs) and thus does not provide reasonable assurance regarding effectiveness and efficiency of operations, reliability of financial reporting, and compliance with applicable laws and regulations. Absent a written inventory of AUs, there is no visibility regarding assessment of internal controls and there is no basis to ensure that controls are in place to prevent instances of fraud, waste and mismanagement. Since our inspection, ONI has drafted a new MIC plan with identified AUs. The command must now monitor MIC program performance against these defined assessable units over the coming year.

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

COMMAND INSPECTION

PART 3 <u>DATA ANALYSIS</u>

<u>APPENDIX A</u>

<u>APPENDIX B</u>

PART 1

OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS

OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS

1. The Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) conducted a Command Inspection of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) from 18 to 29 June 2012. As the "Conscience of the Navy," NAVINSGEN conducts Command Inspections and Area Visits at Navy installations world-wide to provide senior leadership with independent evaluations of overall mission readiness, facility conditions, environmental and safety issues, healthcare services, program compliance, and Quality of Life (QOL) for Sailors, their families, and Department of the Navy (DON) civilians. Our primary objectives include identifying systemic Navy-wide issues, assessing the risks posed to DON, and providing value across all levels of command through on-site assistance, advice, and advocacy. The total temporary duty cost for this command inspection was $2,984.84.

2. Unless otherwise noted, observations herein are as of the last day of the Command Inspection. However, we also cite multiple post-inspection corrective actions implemented in response to our initial findings and out-brief. Subsequent to our inspection, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) directed[1] the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) to realign aspects of the Naval Intelligence enterprise including functions on the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) intelligence staff and at ONI. This report includes inspection findings that have direct relevance to that realignment..

3. The mission of ONI is to develop a penetrating understanding of our adversaries and an unmatched knowledge of the environment to amplify traditional naval combat capabilities and expand options for operational commanders. ONI provides products and services to meet Navy, Department of Defense, and national maritime intelligence requirements, and performs other functions and tasks as may be assigned by higher authority.

4. ONI is currently an echelon II command subordinate to the CNO staff. The ONI Commander (COMONI) reports to the Director of Naval Intelligence (CNO N2/N6). The ONI headquarters staff performs certain key Naval Intelligence functions[2] whereas ONI's four collocated echelon III subordinate commands, including the Farragut Technical Analysis Center (TAC), Nimitz Operational Intelligence Center (OIC), Kennedy Irregular Warfare Center (IWC) and the Hopper Information Services Center (ISC), focus on other functions. These echelon III commands established with longstanding Naval Intelligence "business lines" provide intelligence analysis, intelligence production and intelligence support services (e.g., Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) communications) to all Naval Intelligence "customers" including national and military leadership authorities, naval and joint operating forces, DoD Title 10 efforts, the full spectrum of interagency partners and allied/coalition warfighting efforts world-wide. Under the CNO staff effort, ONI is somewhat unique in that its main source of funding is the National Intelligence Program.

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[1] VCNO Memorandum, Ser N09/12U100535, of 24 Sep 12.

[2] These are cross cutting functions such as resource management or collections.

5. Our inspection began with web-based personnel surveys conducted prior to our arrival. These surveys helped plan on-site focus groups and provided background for the team to determine areas requiring further inspection. There were a total of 463 active duty military and DON civilian respondents to our on-line survey. On a scale of 1 to 10 (1 = worst and 10 = best), active duty military and DON civilian personnel survey respondents indicate their Quality of Work Life (QOWL) as 6.06, which is below our NAVINSGEN rolling average of 6.28. They indicated their Quality of Home Life (QOHL) as 7.83, which is higher than our NAVINSGEN rolling average 7.02. We conducted 16 on-site focus groups, with a total of 106 military and civilian participants, to assess overall Quality of Life (QOL) at ONI. Active duty military and civilian personnel focus group participants rated their overall QOL at 6.93, which is close to the NAVINSGEN average of 6.94. Top concerns identified during these focus groups were: leadership, organizational structure, advancement and professional development, military and civilian relationships, the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS), and communication.

I. AREAS/PROGRAMS ASSESSED

NAVINSGEN Teams assessed the following areas and programs:

Mission Performance
    Mission Readiness
    Strategic Planning Process
    Command and Control (C2) Relationships
    Communication
    Total Force Management
    Personnel Training/Qualification
    Continuity of Operations (COOP) Plan
    Command Security Programs

Facilities, Safety, and Security
    Facilities Management
    Security and Antiterrorism
    Safety and Occupational Health Program Management and Oversight

Resource Management/Quality of Life/Community Support
    Suicide Prevention
    Individual Medical Readiness (IMR)
    Command Individual Augmentee Coordinator (CIAC)
    Post Deployment Health Reassessment (PDHRA)
    Voting Assistance Program
    Legal and Ethics Program
    Command Managed Equal Opportunity (CMEO)
    Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program
    Drug and Alcohol Program Advisor (DAPA)

Urinalysis Program Coordinator (UPC)
Information Technology/Information Management/Information Assurance (IT/IM/IA)
Cyber Security Work Force (CSWF)
Personally Identifiable Information (PII)
Physical Readiness Program (PRP)
Command Evaluation and Review (CER) Program
Managers' Internal Control (MIC) Program
Personal Property Management (PPM)
Command Inspection Program
Government Commercial Purchase Card (GCPC) Program
Government Travel Charge Card (GTCC) Program

Brilliant on the Basics/Good Order and Discipline
Sailor Career Management Program

II. MISSION PERFORMANCE

1. <u>Introduction</u>. The Mission Performance Team assessed ONI's Mission Readiness, including their Mission, Functions, and Tasks (MFT) instruction; Strategic Planning Process; Command Relationships and Communications; Military and Civilian Manning and Manpower; Personnel Training and Qualification; Continuity of Operations (COOP) Planning; and Command Security Programs. The team met with leaders from ONI as well as the four echelon III business lines and the National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office (NMIO) for a customer-level perspective. The team also evaluated external relationships using input obtained from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV N2/N6), the intelligence community and fleet staffs.

The intent of the ONI transformation of 2009, which created four echelon III commands, was to strengthen focus (as individual command efforts) on four distinct Naval Intelligence business lines commonly referred to as the Warfare Centers:

- Farragut Technical Analysis Center (TAC)
- Nimitz Operational Intelligence Center (OIC)
- Kennedy Irregular Warfare Center (IWC)
- Hopper Information Services Center (ISC)

For efficiency reasons, the echelon II level retained specific cross-cutting functions such as resources, security and collections. However, in practice ONI remains a hybrid organization that in many respects still operates as one large command served by departments vice individual commands. Thus, while the focus of NAVINSGEN's visit was a Command Inspection of ONI as an echelon II entity, our survey, interviews and program review captured a snapshot of both echelon II and III in many cases. It is important to note that observations on "climate" in this report largely reflect the melded echelon II and III enterprise -- an enterprise that is still evolving and struggling to establish new identities following massive change in Naval Intelligence since 2009.

2. <u>Mission Readiness</u>. ONI's mission is to provide products and services to meet Navy, Department of Defense, and national maritime intelligence requirements. Additionally, their purpose is to develop a penetrating understanding of our adversaries and an unmatched knowledge of the environment to amplify traditional naval combat capabilities and expand options for operational commanders. Overall, we found ONI and its subordinate commands to be effective in accomplishing its mission to meet both naval and national intelligence requirements. Echelon II and III personnel conveyed a solid understanding of their respective missions and a satisfaction that both individual and collective efforts were important and making a difference. There is healthy competition among the four echelon III commands to expand both mission and resources.

OPNAVINST 5450.334, *Mission and Functions of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)*, in place since 2003, predates the transformation that created the echelon III centers in 2009. OPNAVINST 5400.44A, *Navy Organizational Change Manual*, requires submission of a Mission, Functions, and Tasks (MFT) document for approval every three years. An update to the ONI MFT instruction is currently under review at OPNAV N2/N6. This MFT revision should be completed as soon as practicable, but in concert with efforts to implement the VNCO-directed realignment of Naval Intelligence. The formal approval of the revised MFT by the Director, Navy Staff, will be tracked via an issue paper. Part 2, Issue Paper 1, OUT OF DATE MISSION, FUNCTIONS AND TASKS (MFT) INSTRUCTION, refers (Page 27).

3. <u>Strategic Planning Process</u>. ONI's strategic planning process is comprehensive. The planning process aligns the command's mission, vision, goals and core values and defines the Commander's priorities. Risk analysis and "change management," including alignment with new missions, such as cyber, are an integral part of the strategic planning process. The ONI Executive Committee reviews progress towards individual goals monthly.

4. <u>Command and Control (C2) Relationships</u>. We found ONI's external C2 relationships and communications, both up echelon to CNO N2/N6 and down echelon to echelon III, to be strained. While not evident in measurable mission impact, this was clearly a source of negative climate perceptions noted in our survey, focus groups and individual interviews. Specific C2 issues within ONI present the most potential for negative mission impact.[3]

Friction among ONI staff elements and the CNO N2/N6 staff was commonly noted in interviews and commentary, generally centered on the dynamics of the echelon I operational "tasking" and decision-making on Naval Intelligence issues. Structural friction existed well before the ONI transformation and is somewhat due to divergence between Navy's service-centric priorities and ONI's need to also be responsive to broader intelligence community requirements and fleet operational intelligence needs. Creation of the Information Dominance Corps (IDC) and the elevation of the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) position came with an increased span of control, as well as substantial organizational turmoil -- both impeding effective C2.

Likewise, we observed significant C2 friction among ONI and its subordinate centers. There is a visceral perception at both echelon II and III levels that the warfare center commanding officers

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[3] The VCNO-directed realignment of Naval Intelligence should address virtually all of the C2 issues.

are not empowered to independently run their lines of operations and manage their own resources and personnel. As with ONI's command relations up echelon, organizational change appears to be a root cause. Although rebranded as independent commands, the efforts reside in the same building and rely on the same cross-cutting support offices (resource management, human resources, etc.). The workforce (particularly long term civilians) has simply not seen a tangible cultural shift towards independence.

The relative rank of commanding officers[4] was also cited by some employees (in the survey and interviews) as problematic. However, since reestablishment in 1993, ONI has been almost exclusively commanded at the O6/CAPT level, despite being an O7/RDML billet, and ONI Directorate Heads (roughly corresponding to the current Warfare Centers) have also been headed by Captains. While current leadership (military and civilian) dynamics may be driving climate perceptions, the only fundamental change identified is lack of visible DNI/Flag-level involvement in day-to-day Naval Intelligence operations. This is a function of the IDC creation and N2/N6 merger.

Internally, ONI visibly suffers from a lack of organizational maturation following transformation. While ONI's command relationships are roughly defined in informal organizational charts, revised versions of their fundamental organization documents (e.g., Standard Organization and Regulations Manual (SORM)) defining their organizational structure, billet descriptions and personnel responsibilities did not exist at the time of our inspection. Specific roles, authorities, and subordination of the Chief of Staff, Operations Officer and Executive Officer functions remain generally unclear within the organization -- relative authorities of those positions to enforce rules and the Commander's decisions were entirely unclear to the workforce. To a lesser extent, personnel were unclear on the division of responsibilities and relative authorities of the Commander and Deputy Commander. A draft SORM was completed as of September 2012 but, appropriately, will be held in draft pending completion of the VCNO-directed realignment. A current SORM will help rebaseline internal C2 relations. Part 2, Issue Paper 2, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE DEFINITION, refers (Page 28).

Mission Team interviews and research identified two fundamental organizational constructs within ONI that require command attention:

(1) The roles and responsibilities of the nascent ONI Chief Information Office (CIO) overlaps with many legacy functions performed by the Hopper ISC. Although there were systematic efforts to align functions leading up to the CIO's formation, interviews with each organization revealed a gap in expectations that will require proactive command direction to enable an effective CIO function while also rebalancing, if necessary, efforts of the Hopper ISC.

(2) Subordination of Navy Special Security Office (SSO Navy) under ONI's Mission Support Directorate (MSD) during the ONI transformation ██████████████

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[4] Commanding Officers at echelon II and echelon III command are of O6/CAPT rank aside from the Senior Executive Service level TAC Director.

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██████████. Multiple interviews both internal and external to ONI addressed SSO Navy's performance. The consensus is SSO Navy is insular and distracted by day-to-day ONI staff process, is not positioned appropriately to provide meaningful support to Navy policy efforts.████████████████████████████ ███████████████████████ While not large enough to warrant creation of a separate command effort, the Navy SSO function is a unique business line under the Naval Intelligence enterprise that requires dedicated focus to succeed. SECNAVINST 5510.36A, *Department of the Navy (DON) Information Security Program (ISP) Instruction*, delegates COMONI responsibility for the security management, implementation, and oversight of SCI security programs on behalf of the DNI. In implementing the VCNO-directed restructure of Naval Intelligence, the SSO Navy function should report directly to COMONI to ensure the enterprise is appropriately focused on world-wide SSO operational requirements and resourcing. Direct interface with COMONI and the Deputy Commander will also bring SSO Navy into better alignment with the DNI's SCI Policy Advisor (CNO N2/N6 ISP) and the newly established DON Security Executive (DUSN/PPOI). Part 2, Issue Paper 3, ALIGNMENT OF NAVY SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICE (SSO), refers (Page 30).

5. <u>Communication</u>. Surveys, focus groups, and follow-on meetings across the board identified communication as a problem area. As with C2, we found communication issues closely related to climate within the overall enterprise.

   a. External Communication. The C2 section above addresses challenges in the evolution of echelon I through echelon III relations, with the creation of the IDC shortly after the ONI transformation in 2009. We note this change represented a cultural shift in that it established more formal communication boundaries among the DNI and intelligence subject matter experts resident at Suitland. COMONI heavily manages the flow of detailed analysis to the CNO staff, including actions taken in response to CNO taskings. As a result, some analysts stated they sensed a lack of ownership over their products and independence of their effort. However, we found no evidence that ONI oversight has altered analytical intent or conclusions. Lateral communication and intelligence support to the fleet, joint forces and directly to Navy Systems Commands (SYSCOMs) from the four echelon III centers is by all accounts sound.

   b. Internal Communication. Perception of ONI communication with the entire workforce is problematic despite an exceptionally robust corporate effort to transmit policy and other information. ONI has a professional communications director and produces multiple communication product lines targeting the entire workforce. COMONI provides a comprehensive weekly e-mail to the workforce and frequent adhoc updates as warranted. The NAVINSGEN inspection team struggled to reconcile ONI investment in corporate communication with overall employee perception of poor communications. A central theme in our pre-inspection survey was ONI leadership was not transparent; specifically, that accountability for misbehavior was inconsistent and that management was excessively secretive regarding results of disciplinary action. In reviewing survey results, focus group and meeting feedback, it became evident much of the workforce angst over communication actually stemmed

from a lack of closure on generally known incidents of misbehavior over the previous year. While leadership at both echelon I and II had largely dealt with the misbehavior (including Non-Judicial Punishment and civilian personnel actions), a lack of follow-up with the workforce led to workforce-wide speculation (up to and including the GG-15 and O6 levels) on outcomes; and that, ultimately, tainted all ONI communications efforts. ONI leadership must indentify and then address, within the constraints of privacy laws, those issues that the workforce generally knows about despite any presumed irrelevance to the command mission. Proactive front-line managers, tailored surveys and focus groups can all help identify the paramount workforce concerns, but the Commander must visibly encourage that dialogue.

6. Total Force Management.

a. Military Manning and Manpower (Active and Reserve Component). ONI manning and manpower is proactively managed at the echelon II level by ONI's Resource Management Office-Military Manning (ONI RMO-43). ONI RMO is responsible for a total of 30 echelon II Unit Identification Codes (UICs). RMO has taken proactive measures that drastically reduce the "crisis management" of Sailor projected rotation dates. The Executive Officer routinely communicates with Navy Personnel Command (NPC) Placement for personnel billet assignments or suppression actions where necessary. ONI's echelon II Commanding Officers generally feel RMO's engagement efforts yield appropriately trained Sailors reporting for assignment. While the program is well-managed, ONI is concerned that under the current NPC Officer Shore Distribution Plan (OSDP), ONI falls under the category "all other shore commands." This OSDP category corresponds to a 70 to 80 manning percentage. Through coordination with the IDC Placement Officer at NPC, ONI is pursuing the possibility of attaining higher priority to afford an 80 to 90 manning percentage. Additionally, ONI is concerned about the exposure of its 83 "special program" billeted personnel to Continuation Boards. ONI is working with OPNAV N132 to exclude "special program" personnel from these boards due to time and resources involved in gaining personnel fills with the specialized skill sets required.

At the time of our inspection, military manning including echelon III was 86 percent of Billets Authorized (BA) for officers and 93 percent of BA for enlisted personnel (see Table 1). Separately, echelon II was at 80 percent of BA for officers and 83 percent for enlisted personnel.

Table 1. *ONI Echelon III Military Manning*

CMD	OFFICERS			ENLISTED				
	BA	# FILLED	% FILLED	BA	NMP	COB	% FILL BA	% FILL NMP
ONI	49	39	80%	35	27	29	83%	107%
ISC	15	11	73%	153	156	155	101%	99%
IWC	19	16	84%	36	36	33	92%	92%
OIC	115	110	96%	80	81	91	114%	112%
TAC	19	11	58%	97	90	64	66%	71%
TOTAL	217	187	86%	401	390	372	93%	95%

b. Human Resources (HR) Function. At the time of our inspection, ONI's civilian fill rate was 88 percent. Through their dedicated focus, the command's senior leadership has improved their fill rate to 92 percent as of 1 November 2012. Yet ONI still faces HR challenges on multiple fronts including a complex HR hierarchy, fallout from relocation of HR services away from Suitland, MD to Arlington, VA., and policy confusion following the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which directed the suspension of pay for performance under the recently implemented Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS). Systemic problems include: lack of coherency/continuity in dedicated HR staff, long lead times to turn around recruit actions, and perceptions of inequity driven by inconsistencies between HR (Title 5) and USD(I) DCIPS (Title 10) policy.

ONI suffers from an evolving HR organizational structure. The Civilian Intelligence Personnel Office (CIPO), responsible for supporting all of Naval Intelligence, moved from Suitland to Naval Support Facility Arlington in December 2011. The move caused an 80 percent turnover (of 18-20 personnel onboard) in the CIPO staff. As of this report, CIPO continues to face high turnover and current CIPO personnel have little corporate experience in executing Title 10 HR functions. Our examination discovered that the burden of executing personnel actions has largely fallen on the ONI staff of approximately eight "HR service delivery personnel," although these are technically Series 300 (program management) billets -- this was not an intended outcome of the CIPO move. CIPO does maintain effective employee relations support to ONI.

The role of the Office of Civilian Human Resources (OCHR) Human Resources Services Center (HRSC) East in supporting Naval Intelligence is also muddled. OCHR/HRSC engages at all levels (CIPO, ONI HR and ONI managers) to implement the spectrum of promotion, reassignment and recruitment (USAJOBS) actions. However, OCHR/HRSC is not adequately aligned with CIPO to provide OCHR oversight and deconflict Title 5/Title 10 regulatory friction.

Naval Intelligence converted to DCIPS in November 2008. Existing personnel and new hires were placed in DCIPS "pay bands." However, the October 2009 NDAA suspended "pay for performance" under DCIPS and transitioned the entire civilian community back to "GG grades" in October 2010. There remains a lack of definitive and coherent policy from USD(I) and CNO N2/N6 implementation guidance of the residual DCIPS structure. That policy vacuum has broad consequences on hiring actions, promotions, lateral movements and overall command climate regarding management of Naval Intelligence civilian personnel.

- HRSC is now using a strict application of Title 5 hiring standards versus DCIPS policy on individual competencies. As of our inspection, new hire actions were delayed (some as long as six weeks) after individuals received inaccurate offers. Some candidates actually had offers rescinded.

- DCIPS policy still cites the pay-band structure and that simply does not reconcile with application of Title 5 rules. For example, personnel hired with advancement potential as part of a career progression program can progress from GG7 to GG13 without recompetition. But personnel hired at the GG11 or GG12 level with full performance potential to the GG13 level must recompete to progress to GG13.

Title 5 restricts ONI's ability to promote to the next grade to one year time-in-grade versus DCIPS policy, which is competency based with no time-in-grade requirement. DCIPS policy does not allow for hiring professional positions at the GG-5. Yet HRSC and Title 5 qualifications standards do not always qualify selected hires at the GG-7 level, often leaving ONI no ability to hire at that level.

- Absent definitive guidance, the ONI staff developed extensive business rules to provide the employee and supervisor guidance necessary to execute the remaining DCIPS structure in a fair and equitable manner and to complete the process of remapping personnel back into the GG grade structure. A small but vocal element within ONI continues to express dismay that they were not remapped to a higher grade and/or step level.

HR confusion has diminished ONI's ability to attract, hire and retain the best and brightest to execute the mission. Employee angst over HR management has also eroded command climate and confidence in leadership. In restructuring to carry out the VCNO-directed realignment of Naval Intelligence, CNO N2/N6 should place particular focus on clarifying, reinvigorating and realigning if necessary, civilian intelligence personnel management. Part 2, Issue Paper 4, OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE (ONI) CIVILIAN HIRING CHALLENGES, refers (Page 32).

7. <u>Personnel Training/Qualification</u>.

a. General Military Training (GMT). At the time of inspection, GMT and documentation in Fleet Training Management and Planning System accounted for a 44 percent completion rate for FY12 mandated topics based on a population of 68 military personnel at the echelon II level. We note that completion rate had improved to 62 percent as of 1 November 2012. Our inspection also revealed that ONI had no designated Training Officer and that military and professional training lacked accountability and structure. By 10 August 2012, ONI had assigned officers to an ONI Command Training Team responsible for different GMT requirements such as Safety, Equal Opportunity (EO), and Drug and Alcohol Program Advisor (DAPA).

b. Civilian Training. Contrary to focus group perceptions, ONI's civilian training program is highly effective, demonstrates proactive team engagement and is considered by our inspection team to be on par with, or better than, professional development efforts at other echelon II commands. However, during our inspection, we noted little leadership participation in Command Indoctrination training. As of 10 August 2012, COMONI had directed ONI senior leaders to participate in Command Indoctrination training.

ONI's Civilian Professional Development Program (PDP) provides various training opportunities to all ONI echelon II and III commands. The PDP is comprised of over 15 civilian and contractor personnel who helped evolve the effort into an enterprise-wide, multi-disciplined program. The PDP expanded from analyst development and assimilation to include employee orientation, IT training, joint education and leadership training by leveraging resources from the intelligence community, Navy training, local universities including acquisition training, graduate

education and congressional seminars. Additionally, the ONI PDP has an informal civilian mentoring program available on SharePoint. Voluntary participation is highly encouraged for the civilian staff and military members.

A notable challenge for the ONI PDP is the requirement to train the civilian workforce, particularly the analysts, in the skill sets needed to accomplish the Navy's mission. SECNAVINST 12410.25, *Civilian Employee Training and Career Development*, states DON policy "to provide necessary training to ensure that its civilian workforce possesses the skills needed to meet current and projected performance requirements essential to optimum mission readiness." Unlike uniformed 183X officers and civilian analysts from other intelligence community agencies, ONI civilians do not have a "schoolhouse" with an experienced full time faculty dedicated to their professional development. Instead, ONI relies on commercial vendors and other agencies to train its analytic workforce. New analysts receive approximately eight weeks of instruction, as quotas can be obtained, during the first two years onboard. Part 2, Issue Paper 5, CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE ANALYST TRAINING, refers (Page 34).

    c. Acquisition Resources. ONI has 30 validated acquisition billets. The staff certification level is at 93 percent, which is below the 95 percent DON standard. Of note, ONI has initiated an effort to complement acquisition training through additional focused requirements-based training unique to sensitive acquisition and procurement programs. Like many government acquisition organizations, ONI Resource Management Office-Acquisition (RMO-3), faces a large number of contracts in the fourth quarter of the fiscal year. The current staffing level is appropriate for a steady flow of contracts throughout the year. However, recent continuing resolutions have shortened the acquisition cycle resulting in larger numbers of contract projects that strain RMO-3 capacity at the end of the fiscal year. Additionally, insufficient and poorly justified submissions from the work centers/commands and the need to process certain contracts through other organizations exacerbate the problem. RMO-3 is working on a contractor support plan to allow a surge capability to handle the increased volume of year end contract projects.

During our inspection, RMO-3 expressed concern that ONI's limited acquisition authority (reportedly capped at $150,000) hampered its ability to efficiently procure products and services to support the command mission. NAVINSGEN will refer this concern to ASN RD&A for further examination.

8.   <u>Continuity of Operations (COOP) Plan</u>. Prior to our inspection, several key elements required by OPNAV and ONI COOP instructions were lacking. The command's COOP coordinator was dismissed 10 January 2012 for performance and integrity issues associated with his position. At the time of our inspection, an interim coordinator was in place. This program requires command-level attention to ensure proper training in case the staff is required to execute a relocation event. ONI leadership should also review and exercise the alert, notification, deployment procedures, and operations and support capabilities to ensure the COOP plan is capable of supporting mission essential functions in an all-hazards environment and to ensure succession of leadership. Part 2, Issue Paper 6, CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS (COOP) PLAN COMPLIANCE, refers (Page 36).

Additionally, civilian employee position descriptions for Emergency Relocation Staff (ERS) and specific personnel are required to be designated as "emergency essential" by OPNAVINST 3030.5B, *Navy Continuity of Operations Program and Policy*. Part 2, Issue Paper 7, CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE POSITION DESCRIPTIONS FOR EMERGENCY RELOCATION STAFF, refers (Page 38).

9.   Command Security Program. Command Security Programs - ONI is compliant with security directives.

III. FACILITIES, SECURITY AND SAFETY

1.   Introduction. The Facilities, Safety and Security Team reviewed facility related functions, Utilities, Energy, Environmental Compliance, Housing, Parking, Security, and Safety and Occupational Health with findings provided below. NAVINSGEN reviewed a number of programs managed by Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC), and Commander, Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC). The reviews of NAVFAC programs were limited to ONI's headquarters building.

2.   Facilities Management. ONI occupies a portion of the National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC) located on the 226 acre Suitland Federal Center in Prince George's County, MD. The NMIC consists of a 42 acre Navy compound and a building measuring approximately 850,000 square feet. Construction of the NMIC was carried out in two phases: the original four story building (~ 600KSF) with a mechanical penthouse and stand-alone parking structure constructed in 1993; and a five story addition (~250KSF) with a mechanical penthouse constructed in 2011. The original 1993 facility design could house a workforce of approximately 1,900 personnel. As the workforce grew to approximately 3,000, it became impossible to fit additional personnel in the original structure and the increase in personnel justified the 2011 addition and approximately 700 new parking spaces to the stand-alone parking structure.

   a.   Parking Garage. In the early 1990s, the original NMIC construction project included an elevated parking garage. The original parking structure was built in two segments by different contractors. One segment of the parking structure suffers from deterioration that could eventually affect its safety.

This section was closed after the Regional Engineer identified cracking, concrete spalling exposing underlying reinforcement, and insufficient bearing of the concrete T-sections on the support beams until it could be reinforced and repaired through a $7M repair project in FY10.[5] A new project for the NMIC addition developed in 2011 includes an additional 700 spaces in the elevated garage. Though the FY10 repair project temporarily stabilized the deteriorated segment, given the concerns expressed by the Regional Engineer, the additional 700 parking spaces were never constructed.

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[5] CO NAVFAC, *Safety Concerns with the National Maritime Intelligence Center Parking Garage*, Ser 00/153, of 20 Feb 2009.

Figure 1: NMIC Garage - Main support beam on 2nd deck in state of failure

Figure 2: NMIC Garage - Detailed look at compromised rebar/pre-stressed bar (2nd deck main support beam)

Since the repair project in FY10, Garage Survey Reports prepared by professional structural engineers at EMCOR Group Inc., document additional deterioration of the structure (see Figures 1 & 2). While some additional support brackets have been installed, many other recommendations have been made for repairs that still require action. Some of the more

important repair recommendations dating back to April and July 2011, urged action as soon as possible to correct deficiencies that could affect personnel and property safety. Most of these deficiencies remain uncorrected. Part 2, Issue Paper 8, PARKING GARAGE AT THE NATIONAL MARITIME INTELLIGENCE CENTER, refers (Page 40).

b. Custodial Services. Survey data and focus group discussions identified problems with flooding and general cleanliness of the restrooms throughout the complex. ONI has renovated 8 of 16 restrooms in the older portion of the building, with many recently completed. The facilities staff attributed some of the issues of flooding and wear and tear in the restrooms to the overcrowding and overuse of the restrooms prior to construction of the new addition. With respect to restroom cleanliness, ONI has some concerns about the level of service provided in the janitorial contract. Specifically, the standard for cleaning restrooms once a day is predicated on a normal 8 hour day building occupancy. The NMIC is classified as an operational facility, not a typical administrative facility, with portions of the building operating 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. However, it should receive a level of service consistent with standards applied to operational facilities in other CNIC regions. CNIC is revising the standards for janitorial services Navy-wide in FY13. These revisions will actually reduce services for all CNIC customers. The new standards and business rules were not available at the time of this report.

c. Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning. Another issue mentioned in both focus groups and surveys concerned inadequate temperature regulation in the NMIC's new addition. Complaints are more common during the summer cooling season where temperature extremes within the building are more noticeable. ONI's facility staff, along with Public Works Department, Naval Support Activity Washington, is working together with the installation contractor to address the issues through a combination of modifications to fan powered induction units, system controls, and better air flow balancing.

3. <u>Security and Antiterrorism</u>. ONI ████████████████████████████████
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The ONI ██
██ Though the ONI plan is compliant in regards to required content, the plan's format does not emulate USFFC documentation. ██
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4. <u>Safety and Occupational Health Program Management and Oversight</u>. OPNAVINST 5100.23G, CH-1, *Navy Safety and Occupational Health (SOH) Program Manual*, requires a safety professional to head the safety organization of an echelon II command. The ONI safety officer provides safety management and oversight only as a collateral duty. The manager recently completed the SOH Training for Collateral Duty Safety Officers in June 2012. To adequately address OPNAV requirements, ONI needs a full time trained safety professional to

effectively represent and support the headquarters commander in the management and administration of the headquarters command safety program and provide oversight to lower echelon commands. Safety is not a senior staff function on the command's organizational chart. Rather, ONI's safety function is under the Mission Support Directorate (MSD) and the Safety Officer reports to a first-line supervisor in the MSD. Chapter 3 of OPNAVINST 5100.23G, CH-1 states, "shore activities receiving Base Operating Support safety services from their cognizant Navy Region shall establish an organizational chart that includes safety as a staff function, reporting to the Commanding Officer." ONI's organizational approach does not comply with SOH program requirements. Part 2, Issue Paper 9, SAFETY PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS AT HEADQUARTERS COMMANDS, refers (Page 43).

    a. Self-Assessments. ONI is in the process of compiling self-assessment information from its subordinate commands as required by OPNAVINST 5100.23G, CH-1 and as amplified in the Commander Naval Safety Center message, *Navy Safety Self Assessment Reporting Procedures for CY2011*, ALSAFE 067/11, of Nov 11.

    b. Enterprise Safety Applications Management System (ESAMS)/SOH Training. ONI uses ESAMS as a tool to provide computer-based SOH training. New employee indoctrination and safety stand-downs provide additional SOH training opportunities.

    c. Mishap Reporting. ONI has established a process using ESAMS for reporting mishaps. As of the date of this inspection, it contained only reports of minor mishaps.

    d. Traffic and Motorcycle Safety. ONI supports local and Navy traffic/motorcycle safety programs. ONI has appointed a motorcycle safety representative and has registered a total of 21 motorcycle owners in ESAMS. ONI Traffic and Motorcycle Safety programs meet all applicable requirements.

    e. Industrial Hygiene (IH) and Occupational Health (OH). IH and OH support services are provided by the Washington Navy Yard Branch Health Clinic, in accordance with OPNAVINST 5100.23G, CH-1 requirements. However, a review of ONI's August 2011 IH Survey indicated five individuals in the Imaging Services department were identified for placement in the hearing conservation program (HCP). Placement in the HCP requires a hearing examination, but none of these individuals received an exam. Additionally, personnel in the Foreign Material Evaluation Branch (FME) perform tasks such as cutting and observing foreign components. Although the 2011 ONI IH survey recommended that FME personnel should contact their safety officer for details pertaining to respiratory protection, they did not initiate contact. Part 2, Issue Paper 9, SAFETY PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS AT HEADQUARTERS COMMANDS, refers (Page 43).

    f. SOH Policy Statement. Maintaining an SOH program is an inherent command responsibility. Within three months of assuming command, the Commanding Officer (CO) is required to post an SOH policy statement on official bulletin boards that reflects a commitment to safety and to programs that prevent or minimize occupational mishaps. NAVINSGEN could not find any posted Command SOH policy. Part 2, Issue Paper 9, SAFETY PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS AT HEADQUARTERS COMMANDS, refers (Page 43).

IV. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT/QUALITY OF LIFE/COMMUNITY SUPPORT

1. Introduction. The Resource Management/Quality of Life Team reviewed the following areas: Suicide Prevention, Individual Medical Readiness (IMR), Command Individual Augmentee Coordinator (CIAC), Post-Deployment Health Reassessment (PDHRA), Voting Assistance Program, Legal and Ethics Program, Command Managed Equal Opportunity (CMEO), Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program, Drug and Alcohol Program Advisor (DAPA), Urinalysis Program Coordinator (UPC), Information Technology/Information Management, and Information Assurance (IT/IM/IA), Cyber Security Workforce (CSWF), Personally Identifiable Information (PII), Physical Readiness Program (PRP), Command Evaluation and Review (CER) Program, Managers' Internal Control (MIC) Program, Personal Property Management, Command Inspection Program, Government Commercial Purchase Card (GCPC) Program, and Government Travel Charge Card (GTCC) Program. All observations and findings are as of the last day of the inspection, unless otherwise noted. We found programs to be in compliance with governing directives with exceptions, as noted in this report.

2. Suicide Prevention. The Suicide Prevention Program Coordinator (SPC) was appointed in writing in April 2012 ending a three month gap in the position. The SPC has not attended the required program training course. ONI has a standard operating procedure available for Duty Officers. Subordinate echelon oversight is adequate. NAVINSGEN recommends suicide prevention and crisis hotline posters be more prominently displayed throughout all buildings. Prior to the release of this report, NAVINSGEN verified that the SPC had received a training quota to attend the required SPC training course (1 Dec 2012). Upon completion of SPC training, the program will be fully compliant with OPNAVINST 1720.4A, *Suicide Prevention Program*. Part 2, Issue Paper 10, SUICIDE PREVENTION PROGRAM COORDINATOR (SPC) TRAINING, refers (Page 45).

3. Individual Medical Readiness (IMR). The IMR Coordinator is assigned in writing and appropriately monitors medical readiness of subordinate commands. We reviewed IMR records for 18 ONI Unit Identification Codes (UICs) and found the fully medically ready (FMR) rate for ONI and subordinate commands to be 67 percent. The FMR for ONI alone was 53 percent. Since the inspection, ONI addressed core issues regarding their low FMR rate and improved to an enterprise-wide FMR rate of 74 percent. However, this remains below the DoD minimum requirement of 75 percent as noted in DoD Instruction 6025.19, *Individual Medical Readiness*. Part 2, Issue Paper 11, INDIVIDUAL MEDICAL READINESS (IMR), refers (Page 46).

4. Command Individual Augmentee Coordinator (CIAC). The ONI CIAC is trained, assigned in writing, and engaged with all requirements of the program. The CIAC contacts Individual Augmentee family members and deployed service members by utilizing the Navy Family Accountability and Assessment System (NFAAS), and tracks all subordinate organization compliance. We note this program has strong leadership support.

5. Post Deployment Health Reassessment (PDHRA). PDHRA rates are 99 percent and compliant with all governing instructions.

6. Voting Assistance Program. The Voting Assistance Officer tracks compliance of lower echelon commands and the program undergoes review as part of ONI's command inspection

program. The Voter Information Management System is up to date for all ONI commands. ONI's Voting Assistance Program is in compliance with all governing instructions, including OPNAVINST 1742.1B, *Navy Voting Assistance Program*.

7. Legal and Ethics Program. ONI's legal staff provides ethics training, on a one-on-one basis or in small groups, to employees required to file public financial disclosure reports. Ethics training for new employees is part of a two day indoctrination course. Annual ethics training for employees required to file confidential financial disclosure reports is regularly scheduled and comprehensive in scope. As part of its effective public financial disclosure reporting system, ONI submits and reviews all public financial disclosure reports within applicable deadlines. Written procedures that detail the collection, review, and certification of financial disclosure reports would further enhance ONI's confidential financial disclosure reporting system. Also, ONI should describe in greater detail its criteria for identifying new entrant confidential disclosure filers. The ethics advice and counseling provided by the responsible legal staff is accurate, comprehensive, and timely. Recommendations to strengthen the ethics program include: Leadership should take a more active and visible role in the program by issuing regular or periodic written ethics guidance to all ONI employees, actively participating in annual ethics training, and ensuring ONI staff file their financial disclosure reports in a timely manner as required. Overall, ONI's ethics program is in compliance with the intent of the Joint Ethics Regulation and applicable Office of Government Ethics requirements.

8. Command Managed Equal Opportunity (CMEO). ONI's CMEO Managers are appointed in writing and have received the mandated training. Both are enthusiastic and take a proactive approach to educating personnel on Navy Equal Opportunity (EO) and diversity policies. At the time of the inspection, NAVINSGEN noted no systemic EO/Sexual Harassment issues within ONI or the echelon III commands, the most recent executive summaries were available, and the command had an Equal Employment Opportunity Policy. However, the ONI Equal Opportunity Advisor had not established appropriate oversight of the echelon III commands. Additionally, E-7 and above were not attending the required Navy Pride and Professionalism training. Since the inspection, NAVINSGEN verified that ONI has addressed these core issues and ONI is now in full compliance with OPNAV 5354.1F, *Navy Equal Opportunity (EO) Policy*.

9. Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program. The command is supported by the Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC) for Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling (JBAB), Washington, D.C. The JBAB SARC stated that COMONI is "highly responsive and extremely proactive." The SARC assists in the facilitation of annual and refresher training. SAPR training of military for FY12 is on track to meet annual requirements. However, civilian personnel who supervise military have not received SAPR training as required in OPNAVINST 1752.1B, *Sexual Assault Victim Intervention (SAVI) Program*. ONI's Chief of Staff, Judge Advocate General and Command Victim Advocates are well versed in procedures, reporting options and response requirements. Command Duty Officers (CDOs) and all watch standers interviewed were well informed and knowledgeable of procedures for fielding sexual assault reports. Additionally, the CDOs have written procedures available for reference. Although SAPR related posters were present in the spaces, neither was prominently displayed and one did not include SAPR/Hotline contact information. We recommend SAPR posters with Hotline contact

information be prominently displayed throughout the building. This program is in compliance with SECNAVINST 1752.4A, *Sexual Assault Prevention and Response.*

10. Drug and Alcohol Program Advisor (DAPA). At the time of the inspection, ONI did not have an assigned Alcohol and Drug Control Officer (ADCO) or a current written alcohol control/deglamorization policy. The required Alcohol and Drug Abuse for Managers and Supervisors (ADAMS) training had not been completed by required personnel in the past five years. Since NAVINSGEN's inspection, Navy training team provided all required training and all deficiencies were corrected by ONI. This program is now in compliance with OPNAVINST 5350.4D, *Navy Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control.*

11. Urinalysis Program Coordinator (UPC). At the time of the inspection, the command Urinalysis Program was not in compliance. The command UPC did not have access to the Alcohol and Drug Management and Information Tracking System (ADMITS). The Navy Drug Screening Program (NDSP) database was incomplete, reflecting only 458 personnel of the 559 personnel assigned to the command. This, in effect, exempted some personnel from the Navy's mandatory random urinalysis requirements. Also ONI was not conducting the minimum 15 percent per month testing of all assigned personnel under the random selection of individual service members (IR) premise code, was not using premise codes correctly, and had not properly documented uncollected samples. The command was not tracking reasons for no collection and/or "due back" dates for accountability and record purposes. Therefore, commanders were not notified when military members did not participate and military members who missed muster were not held accountable. Since the inspection, NAVINSGEN verified ONI made significant progress to correct all issues and is now in full compliance with OPNAVINST 5350.4D, *Navy Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control.*

12. Information Technology/Information Management/Information Assurance (IT/IM/IA). As of our inspection, the Hopper echelon II Information Services Center staff was performing many of the functions expected to be assumed by ONI's nascent CIO workforce – that issue is addressed more fully in the Mission Performance section of this report. The Hopper staff is knowledgeable of DON and Intelligence Community IT policies and procedures, and ensures strict adherence in the execution of their mission. These programs are in compliance with all Navy directives.

13. Cyber Security Workforce (CSWF). ONI's Information Assurance (IA) Manager, who is part of the Hopper Center staff, closely tracks headquarters and lower echelon command IA workforce certifications to maintain status quo and ensure future certifications and training requirements are accomplished. This resulted in ONI achieving 100 percent CSWF certification for the IA staff and approximately 86 percent for the privileged users, which is in line with Navy targets. ONI has added the appropriate Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) clauses to contracts to ensure contractor support personnel are trained and certified as required. This program is in compliance with SECNAVINST 5239.20, *Department Of The Navy Cybersecurity/Information Assurance Workforce Management, Oversight, and Compliance.*

14. <u>Personally Identifiable Information (PII)</u>. ONI's Privacy Act Coordinator is knowledgeable of the Navy's Privacy Program and provides updated PII guidance to the headquarters and echelon III commands in a timely manner via e-mail and other electronic means. The command's PII program provides oversight and accountability to ensure required elements including PII training and semiannual spot checks are executed. The command's Privacy Program Instruction (dated 1 Feb 2006) was updated and promulgated (ONIINST 5211.1C of 19 Sep 2012) to reflect program changes. The updated instruction provides additional guidance on PII breach reporting and the proper handling of PII. Although the command does not utilize recycle bins, spot checks of random work spaces and common areas did not reveal any accessible PII. This program is compliant with SECNAVINST 5239.3B, *Department of the Navy Information Assurance Policy* and all other supporting guidelines.

15. <u>Physical Readiness Program (PRP)</u>. The Command Fitness Leader (CFL) manages the program for approximately 93 echelon II personnel. All required documents such as CFL Course Certificate, designation letter and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) qualification card, medical waivers, safety plan, letters of notification and page 13s are on file and correctly completed. ONI PRP has four Assistant Command Fitness Leaders (ACFLs) to act as on-site monitors/leaders for physical training sessions, Fitness Enhancement Program (FEP) events, and administrative support. All ACFLs have CPR cards and other required qualifications. Additionally, the CFL provides training to ACFLs on Physical Fitness Assessment (PFA) procedures. No failures occurred over the last two cycles (fall 2011 and spring 2012). ONI's PRP is well managed and compliant with OPNAVINST 6110.1J, *Physical Readiness Program*, and all supporting physical readiness operating guides.

16. <u>Command Evaluation and Review (CER) Program</u>. ONI's CER program encompasses audit liaison and follow-up, the DON Hotline program, the Managers' Internal Control Program (MIC) and independent and special reviews in addition to Command Inspections. The ONI Inspector General (IG) built a CER program structured to support program oversight at lower echelon commands throughout the ONI Enterprise. The ONI IG provides the CER function for the echelon III commands, which are collocated. They host regular meetings with echelon III commands to ascertain high risk areas and develop an annual plan approved by the ONI Commanding Officer. As part of its Command Inspections Program, ONI uses a comprehensive inspection guide to assess the efficiency and integrity of lower echelons. ONI fully meets the requirements of OPNAVINST 5000.52B, *Command Evaluation Program*.

17. <u>Managers' Internal Control (MIC) Program</u>. The echelon II MIC Coordinator and Assistant Coordinators are appointed in writing and have completed required training. Previous Statements of Assurance made to the Director, Navy Staff, were also available for review and contain no reportable conditions or materiel weaknesses. However, required DON documentation of an inventory of assessable units (AUs) was missing from ONI's MIC Program. The omission of AUs creates a lack of report credibility to provide reasonable assurance regarding effectiveness and efficiency of operations, reliability of financial reporting, and compliance with applicable laws and regulations. Absent a written inventory of AUs, there is no visibility regarding assessment of internal controls and there is no basis to ensure that controls are in place to prevent instances of fraud, waste and mismanagement. As a result of this

inspection, a new MIC plan with identified AUs was drafted. The command must now monitor MIC program performance against these defined assessable units over the next year. NAVINSGEN found this program not compliant with SECNAVINST 5200.35E, *Department of the Navy (DON) Managers' Internal Control (MIC) Program*. Part 2, Issue Paper 12, MANAGERS' INERNAL CONTROL (MIC) PROGRAM, refers (Page 48).

18. Personal Property Management (PPM). As a major claimant, ONI headquarters command is effectively performing its responsibility in accordance with SECNAVINST 7320.10A, *Department of the Navy (DON) Personal Property Policies and Procedures*, and is conducting effective personal property management oversight across their claimancy. ONI has a solid system in place for disseminating current personal property guidance throughout their claimancy including the latest policies, procedures, standards and regulations that pertain to personal property accountability and financial requirements. Additionally, the command has an effective bar code tracking system to verify that various activities within the claimancy are performing required physical inventories. The PPM is appropriately designated in writing. PPM and assigned property personnel at all levels in the chain of command demonstrated adequate controls to ensure required management control objectives of (1) accountability of assets, (2) accurate financial reporting, (3) personal property system security and data integrity, (4) life cycle management of personal property assets and (5) compliance with personal property policies and procedures. This program is in compliance with SECNAVINST 7320.10A and all governing guidance and regulations.

19. Command Inspection Program. The ONI Inspector General (IG) clearly maintains a direct line of communication with the ONI Commanding Officer. ONI has no echelon III IGs, thus all Hotline, Command Evaluation and oversight functions for Nimitz OIC, Farragut TAC, Hopper ISC and Kennedy IWC reside within the headquarters staff. The ONI IG meets on a regular basis with the four collocated lower echelon commanders to ascertain high risk areas and areas of concern. Triennial inspections of the echelon III commands are conducted by Naval Reserve Augmentees, who utilize a comprehensive inspection plan to ensure independent assessments of efficiency and integrity. The headquarters IG staff inspects remote detachments on a triennial basis. NAVINSGEN conducted a quality assurance review in conjunction with our inspection that will be addressed via separate correspondence.

20. Government Commercial Purchase Card (GCPC). The ONI GCPC program consists of one level III Agency Program Coordinator (APC), two level IV APCs, one Head of Activity and 300 Cardholders. The current level III APC is experienced and does an outstanding job as the subject matter expert for ONI's GCPC program. The APC has been appointed in writing and all required training has been completed, is current and on file. All program Internal Operating Procedures (IOPs) have been reviewed by the level III APC to be sure they are aligned with NAVSUPINST 4200.99, *Department of the Navy (DON) Policies and Procedures for The Operation and Management of The Government-Wide Commercial Purchase Card Program*, and include all 13 required elements. The level III APC completes site visits to perform program reviews of the level IV and V APCs. The most recent DON Procurement Performance Management Assessment Program (PPMAP) checklist resulted in zero discrepancies and zero deficiencies. There is evidence of proper separation of function in the purchase process, as

required by the NAVSUPINST 4200.99, and the APCs are completing the Program Audit Tool (PAT) monthly and conducting semiannual reviews as required. Lower echelons have the major responsibility for purchasing. When infractions occur with the use of the GCPC, the command takes appropriate disciplinary actions. Overall the program is effectively and efficiently run and is in full compliance with all governing regulations.

21. <u>Government Travel Charge Card (GTCC) Program</u>. The level III APC is designated in writing and is performing monthly audits of lower echelon level IV and V APCs via the Citibank PAT. Currently, the headquarters level III APC oversees approximately 8,000 cardholders enterprise-wide, with approximately 2,600 active travel cardholders at the headquarters level. The program's structure allows ONI to maintain full oversight of cardholder activities throughout its claimancy. The delinquency rate has been less than one percent across the enterprise, which is well below the required two percent rate. The APC maintains all statements of understanding for travel cardholders so they are readily available for audit purposes. Further, the APC has put a premier emphasis on enforcing the split-pay option for travelers liquidating claims. The participation rate for split-pay for headquarters is 92.19 percent; and for the enterprise it is 93.62 percent. Both are well above the goal of 80 percent. ONI operates the GTCC program within Citibank and Navy Supply Systems Command guidelines. This program is in compliance with all governing instructions.

V. BRILLIANT ON THE BASICS/GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE

1. <u>Introduction</u>. The Brilliant on the Basics Programs were reviewed and behavior associated with good order and discipline was closely observed. Overall, command morale and quality of life were satisfactory. While some Sailors displayed lapses in military bearing during our visit, professional military appearance was generally good.

2. <u>Sailor Career Management Program</u>. Programs reviewed include the Career Development Board (CDB), Command Sponsorship and Command Indoctrination (INDOC) Programs.

    a. Career Development Boards (CDB). Sailors are receiving their required CDBs and properly submitting Perform to Serve (PTS) requests. The Command Career Counselor is adhering to OPNAVINST 1040.11D, *Navy Enlisted Retention And Career Development Program*, providing oversight to subordinate command career counselors, conducting monthly and quarterly training, making command visits and conducting an assessment of each subordinate command's program.

    b. Command Sponsorship Program. The command sponsorship program is effective. Impromptu interviews with junior Sailors supported this finding. However, this program had areas that needed improvement to be in full compliance with OPNAVINST 1740.3C, *Command Sponsor and Indoctrination Programs*. Specifically, sponsor critiques were not being completed by new personnel and command leadership was unable to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the program. NAVINSGEN Command Master Chief provided on-site training and advice to the sponsor coordinator to correct these deficiencies and improve program effectiveness.

c. Command Indoctrination (INDOC) Program. The command indoctrination program was initially found not in compliance with OPNAVINST 1740.3C, *Command Sponsor and Indoctrination Programs,* as not all personnel were attending Navy Pride and Professionalism training as required. Senior leadership was not attending INDOC to provide command philosophy/mission/vision to all new personnel. Additionally, attendees did not receive INDOC critique sheets, preventing senior leadership from assessing the program strengths and weaknesses. As of 10 August 2012, Commander, ONI assigned officers to an ONI Command Training Team responsible for GMT requirements and directed senior leaders to participate in Command Indoctrination training. NAVINSGEN provided on-site training to modify new check-in sheets to include the command SAPR coordinator, CMEO Advisor, and implement the use of separate check-in sheets for echelon III personnel. Based on ONI's post-inspection efforts, the Command Indoctrination program is now in compliance with OPNAVINST 1740.3C.

ISSUE PAPER ACTION SUMMARY MATRIX
ACTION COMMAND
INITIAL RESPONSE DUE TO NAVINSGEN 18 MARCH 2013

	ISSUE PAPER	ONI	CNO N2/N6	CNO N315	NMITC	CIPO	CNIC	NAVFAC	NSAW
1.	OUT OF DATE MISSION, FUNCTIONS AND TASKS (MFT) INSTRUCTION	X							
2.	ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE DEFINITION	X							
3.	ALIGNMENT OF NAVY SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICE (SSO)	X	X						
4.	OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE (ONI) CIVILIAN HIRING CHALLENGES		X			X			
5.	CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE ANALYST TRAINING	X	X		X				
6.	CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS (COOP) PLAN COMPLIANCE	X							
7.	CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE POSITION DESCRIPTIONS FOR EMERGENCY RELOCATION STAFF			X					

ISSUE PAPER ACTION SUMMARY MATRIX
ACTION COMMAND
INITIAL RESPONSE DUE TO NAVINSGEN 18 MARCH 2013

	ISSUE PAPER	ONI	CNO N2/N6	CNO N315	NMITC	CIPO	CNIC	NAVFAC	NSAW
8.	PARKING GARAGE AT THE NATIONAL MARITIME INTELLIGENCE CENTER						X	X	
9.	SAFETY PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS AT HEADQUARTERS COMMANDS	X							X
10.	SUICIDE PREVENTION PROGRAM COORDINATOR (SPC) TRAINING	X							
11.	INDIVIDUAL MEDICAL READINESS (IMR)	X							
12.	MANAGERS' INTERNAL CONTROL (MIC) PROGRAM	X							

SUMMARY OF ACTIONS

If you are an **Action Officer** for a staff listed below, please submit Implementation Status Reports (ISRs) as specified for each applicable recommendation, along with supporting documentation, such as plans of action and milestones and implementing directives.

    a. **Submit initial ISRs using OPNAV Form 5040/2 no later than 18 March 2013**. Each ISR should include an e-mail address for the action officer, where available. Electronic ISR submission to NAVIGInspections@navy.mil is preferred. An electronic version of OPNAV Form 5040/2 may be downloaded from the NAVINSGEN Web-site at www.ig.navy.mil in the Downloads and Publications Folder, titled Forms Folder, Implementation Status Report.

    b. **Submit quarterly ISRs, including "no change" reports until the recommendation is closed by NAVINSGEN.** When a long-term action is dependent upon prior completion of another action, the status report should indicate the governing action and its estimated completion date. Further status reports may be deferred, with NAVINSGEN concurrence.

    c. When action addressees consider required action accomplished, the status report submitted should contain the statement, "Action is considered complete." However, **NAVINSGEN approval must be obtained before the designated action addressee is released** from further reporting responsibilities on the recommendation.

    d. NAVINSGEN point of contact for ISRs is b7c ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮

COMMAND	RECOMMENDATION NUMBER(S) XXX-12
ONI	040, 041, 042, 043, 048, 049, 052, 053, 054, 055, 056, 057, 058, 059, 060, 061
CNO N2/N6	043, 044, 045, 047, 048
CNO N315	050
NMITC	048
CIPO	046
CNIC	051
NAVFAC	051
NSAW	052

PART 2

ISSUE PAPERS

ISSUE PAPER 1

SUBJECT: OUT OF DATE MISSION, FUNCTIONS AND TASKS (MFT) INSTRUCTION

REFERENCES: (a) OPNAVINST 5450.334, Mission and Functions of the Office of Naval
       Intelligence, of 6 Jun 03
     (b) OPNAVINST 5400.44A, Navy Organization Change Manual, of 13 Oct 11

PROBLEM: The existing Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) Mission, Functions and Tasks instruction, reference (a) predates the transformation that created the echelon III centers in 2009.

BACKGROUND: An update to ONI's Mission, Functions and Tasks (MFT) instruction is currently under review at OPNAV N2/N6. In accordance with reference (b), a MFT is required to be submitted for approval every three years.

RECOMMENDATIONS

040-12. That ONI revise mission and functions, reference (a), in accordance with reference (b).

NAVINSGEN POINT OF CONTACT: b7c

ISSUE PAPER 2

SUBJECT: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE DEFINITION

REFERENCE: (a) OPNAVINST 3120.32C, Standard Organization and Regulations of the U.S. Navy, of 11 Apr 1994
           (b) OPNAVINST 1000.16K CH-1, Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures, of 4 Oct 11

PROBLEM: The existing Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) organizational structure is not formally defined in accordance with reference (a).

DISCUSSION: In accordance with reference (a), Section 132 - Organization Structure; an effective organization will exhibit three basic features:

a. The general pattern of the organization should be designed to carry out the goals and objectives of the organization in the most effective and efficient way possible.

b. All essential functions of the organization must be delineated as to specific responsibilities for appropriate segments of the organization.

c. There must be a clear definition of individual duties, responsibilities, authority, and organizational relationships.

ONI has not formally defined individual duties and organizational relationships within the echelon II portion of the organization.

In accordance with reference (a), Section 132.1 - Steps in Setting Up the Organization; to establish an organization which accomplishes the above features, certain steps should be followed:

a. Prepare a written statement of missions, objectives and functional tasks necessary to accomplish these objectives.

b. Familiarize all involved in planning the organization with the principles of organization.

c. Group the functions logically so they can be assigned to appropriate segments of the organization.

d. Prepare organization manuals, including organizational charts and functional billet descriptions.

e. Document policies and procedures of the organization in writing.

f. Indoctrinate key personnel on their responsibilities, authority, and individual and group relationships.

g. Set up controls to ensure achievement of the organization's objectives.

h. Once established, the organizational structure should be continuously reviewed to ensure it is current with and responsive to changes in the assigned responsibilities of the command. Conduct manpower reviews at least annually and submit necessary manpower change requests per reference (b).

Within ONI, several of the above steps have not been followed including preparing a written statement of missions, objectives and functional tasks and preparing organization manuals, including organizational charts and functional billet descriptions.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

041-12. That ONI formally define individual duties and organizational relationships in accordance with reference (a).

042-12. That ONI prepare organization manuals, including organizational charts and functional billet descriptions in accordance with reference (a).

NAVINSGEN POINT OF CONTACT: b7c

ISSUE PAPER 3

SUBJECT: [b7e] ███████████████████████████

REFERENCES: (a) SECNAVINST 5510.36A, Department of the Navy (DON) Information
Security Program (ISP) Instruction, of 6 Oct 06
(b) Vice Chief of Naval Operations Memorandum, Deputy Director of Naval
Intelligence (DDNI) Reorganization, Ser N09/12U100535, of 24 Sep 12

PROBLEM: [b7e] ███
████████████████████████████████████ Upon Office of Naval Intelligence
(ONI) transformation, SSO Navy was subordinated as a departmental function under the ONI
Mission Support Directorate (MSD). [b7e] ████████ █ ███████████████████
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BACKGROUND: In reference (a), SECNAV tasks the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) to
administer the Navy's SCI program and assigns COMONI responsibility for the security
management, implementation, and oversight of SCI security programs on behalf of the DNI.
While reference (a) identifies the "ONI Director of Security and Corporate Services (ONI-5)" as
the SSO Navy, ONI transformation placed the effort as a departmental function under the ONI
MSD.

DISCUSSION: SSO Navy is a critical world-wide mission. [b7e] ████████████████
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RECOMMENDATION:

043-12. That, in implementing the restructure of Naval Intelligence as directed by reference (b),
CNO N2/N6 and COMONI [b7e] █████████████████████████████████████
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NAVINSGEN POINT OF CONTACT: b7c ███████████████

ISSUE PAPER 4

SUBJECT: OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE (ONI) CIVILIAN HIRING CHALLENGES

REFERENCES: (a) SECNAVINST 12900.2, Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS), of 11 Mar 2009.
(b) DoDINST 1400.25; Civilian Human Resources Manual (CHRM), Chapter 300

PROBLEM: ONI continues to encounter increasing challenges in its civilian hiring process that hinder its ability to properly resource mission requirements. In the fiscally challenged budget environment, ONI views HR support as a potential vulnerability to mission effectiveness.

BACKGROUND: The Naval Intelligence (NAVINTEL) community converted to the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) in November 2008. A pay banding/pay for performance system under Title 10 authorities, DCIPS Policy was not yet finalized during the conversion. In October 2009, the National Defense Authorization Act put DCIPS pay for performance on hold forcing a personnel system that was already in law under Title 5 authority, limiting the intelligence community's ability to compete for the unique skill sets required for the ONI mission. In October 2010, although the NAVINTEL community remained DCIPS, the community was transitioned back to General Graded – Excepted Service (GG) grades. These changes occurred without the corresponding policies necessary to execute the personnel processes. Absent the necessary policies, ONI staff members developed extensive business rules to provide the employee and supervisor guidance necessary to execute DCIPS in a fair and equitable manner.

Along with the policy/process concerns, HR challenges exist which resulted from the Civilian Intelligence Personnel Office (CIPO) move from the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) to Arlington, VA. The move resulted in HR support degradation due to high personnel turnover rates and subsequent lack of experienced staff.

DISCUSSION: The ONI civilian fill rate improved from 88 to 92 percent following our inspection – meeting ONI's FY12 staffing plan target. However, the following challenges remain:

1. Civilian Intelligence Personnel Office (CIPO) lacks experienced staff and is not adequately supporting ONI requirements. The CIPO staff encountered numerous personnel losses following the relocation to Arlington, VA, which led to ONI HR personnel taking on a broader role in the HR Service Delivery Model in support of all phases of the hiring process.

2. Policy inconsistencies at USD(I) and NAVINTEL have not provided clear guidance regarding DCIPS Title 10 policy, resulting in Human Resource Service Center (HRSC) East using standard Title 5, which causes challenges including:

a. Hiring: Qualification standards applied do not take into account competencies of the individual as outlined in USD(I) policy versus strict application of standard Title 5 qualification

authorities. ONI has new hires that are waiting to come onboard (some six weeks), who have received inaccurate offers and have had offers rescinded. Confusion resulting from a lack of codified policies and experienced CIPO staff diminishes ONI's reputation as a professional world class organization and reduces its ability to attract and hire the best and brightest to execute the mission.

b. Promotion: ONI's ability to promote to the next grade is restricted to one year time in previous grade versus DICPS policy, which is competency based and does not have a time in grade requirement.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

044-12. That CNO N2/N6 coordinate with the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASN M&RA) to clarify and then definitively codify application of USD(I) DCIPS directives regarding the management of naval civilian intelligence personnel.

045-12. That, in implementing the VCNO-directed realignment of Naval Intelligence, CNO N2/N6 should identify and implement measures to improve CIPO's ability to provide HR services to ONI.

046-12. That CIPO improve its alignment and collaboration with HRSC East to increase efficiencies in carrying out respective functions.

NAVINSGEN POINT OF CONTACT: b7c

ISSUE PAPER 5

SUBJECT: CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE ANALYST TRAINING

REFERENCES: (a) SECNAVINST 12410.25, Civilian Employee Training and Career
Development, of 5 Jul 11
(b) DoD Manual 3305.13-M, DoD Security Accreditation and Certification, of
14 Mar 11

PROBLEM: Under Title 10 there is a requirement for the Department of the Navy (DON) to organize, train, and equip forces for combat. Intelligence is a critical component in today's fight and Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) civilian analysts play a vital role in providing this support to the fleet. SECNAVINST 12410.25 states that it is DON policy "To provide necessary training to ensure that its civilian workforce possesses the skills needed to meet current and projected performance requirements essential to optimum mission readiness." Unlike uniformed 183X officers and civilian analysts from other Intelligence Community (IC) agencies, ONI civilians do not have a "schoolhouse" with an experienced full time faculty dedicated to their professional development. Instead, ONI relies on commercial vendors and subject matter adjuncts, as well as leverages any classroom space available at other IC agency schoolhouses, to train its analytic workforce. Approximately eight weeks of instruction is provided, as quotas can be obtained, over a new analyst's first two years onboard.

BACKGROUND: ONI and its subordinate Warfare Centers comprise 48 percent of the Naval Intelligence (NAVINTEL) enterprise. The NAVINTEL training command is the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center (NMITC). NMITC provides a 20 week basic intelligence course for newly commissioned intelligence officers, but does not train new civilian analysts. The cost of sending every new civilian analyst to Dam Neck, VA, for five months on Temporary Duty (TDY) is prohibitive (See Table 1).

DISCUSSION: Defense Intelligence is moving toward an accreditation and certification program for analysts similar to those established for security personnel in DoD Manual 3305.13-M. Once certification standards are set for analysts, the current ad hoc nature of ONI civilian training will accentuate their educational disadvantage when compared to both their active duty Navy and civilian IC counterparts, who have the benefit of a formal training pipeline at an accredited schoolhouse. IC certification for ONI analysts will become problematic.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

047-12. That CNO N2/N6 assume responsibility for resourcing the training of both the civilian and military components of the NAVINTEL/Information Dominance Corps (IDC) analytic workforce and assign NMITC as their Executive Agent.

048-12. That CNO N2/N6, NMITC, and ONI explore options to improve civilian analyst training, with emphasis at the mid-grade level.

Table 1. Basic Analyst Training Comparison

Organization	Schoolhouse	Length of Program
a. U.S. Navy Officers	Navy and marine Corps Intelligence Training Center (NNMITC)	20 weeks
b. CIA	Sherman Kent School	16 weeks
c. NAS	National Cryptologic School	700 hours over 3 years
d. DIA	Joint Military Intelligence Training	8-10 weeks plus on-line instruction
e. NGA	National Geospatial Intelligence College	5 weeks initial, followed by 7-10 wks of specialization
f. FBI	FBI Academy	18 weeks
g. NASIC	Name - contracted to Advanced Technical Intelligence Center specialization	5 weeks basic and 5 weeks GEOINT
h. NGIC	None	8-10 weeks
i. ONI	None - leverages IC schoolhouses, adjunct instructors and contractors	8 weeks over 2 years

NAVINSGEN POINT OF CONTACT:

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ISSUE PAPER 6

SUBJECT: CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS (COOP) PLAN COMPLIANCE

REFERENCES: (a) OPNAVINST 3030.5B, Navy Continuity of Operations Program and Policy, of 20 Oct 09
(b) ONIINST 3010.4A, Office of Naval Intelligence Continuity of Operations Program, of 25 Nov 09

PROBLEM: Several key elements of the Continuity of Operations Plan required by references (a) and (b) have languished.

BACKGROUND: The command's COOP coordinator was dismissed for performance and integrity issues associated with his position as COOP coordinator. An interim coordinator is in place.

DISCUSSION: Contrary to references (a) and (b), the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) COOP plan is missing the following elements:

1) COOP training and exercises are not clearly identifiable.

2) All emergency relocation staff (and alternates) have not conducted an annual visit/orientation to the alternate site or sites.

3) The alert, notification, and deployment procedures, operations and support capabilities at the alternate facility have not been tested annually.

4) ONI should establish a system of metrics to evaluate continuity requirements and certify program readiness.

5) Annual program evaluations have not been recently accomplished to ensure compliance with appropriate references.

6) ONI should apply a risk-based framework across all continuity efforts in order to identify and assess potential hazards, determine what levels of risk are acceptable, and prioritize and allocate resources among organizations.

7) Document and report all costs required to acquire, operate, and maintain COOP-related capabilities and facilities for the three COOP phases to the appropriate higher level COOP office of primary responsibility (OPR).

8) Develop procedures for expending funds, executing contingency contracts, and emergency procurement during COOP events.

9) Include COOP funding as an item in the annual budget submission. Identify and justify estimates through prescribed budget exhibits and appropriate informational elements.

10) Ensure a process exists to identify, document, communicate with, and train continuity and noncontinuity personnel on their emergency procedure responsibilities.

11) Ensure procedures exists to contact and account for all staff in an emergency event.

12) Provide an electronic copy of the unit's COOP plan to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans, and Strategy (CNO (N3/N5)) or Immediate Superior in Command (ISIC) annually; or sooner if updated.

13) Using the assigned Human Resources (HR) staff member, ensure civilian employee position descriptions for assigned Emergency Relocation Staff (ERS) team members are annotated to designate the position as "emergency essential."

14) Using the assigned organization's contracting officer, ensure contractor statements of work stipulate which positions are designated as "emergency essential" for COOP execution.

15) Ensure security provisions and procedures for personnel, physical, operational, and information security are addressed and integrated into COOP planning and execution.

RECOMMENDATION:

049-12. That ONI review and comply with references (a) and (b) to establish a viable COOP plan.

NAVINSGEN POINT OF CONTACT: b7c

ISSUE PAPER 7

SUBJECT: CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE POSITION DESCRIPTIONS FOR EMERGENCY
           RELOCATION STAFF

REFERENCE: (a) OPNAVINST 3030.5B, Navy Continuity of Operations Program and Policy,
                 of 20 Oct 09
             (b) DoDD 1404.10, DoD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce, of 23 Jan 09
             (c) OPNAVINST 3440.17, Navy Installation Emergency Management
                 Program, of 22 Jul 05

PROBLEM: Civilian employee position descriptions for Emergency Relocation Staff (ERS) are
required by reference (a) to be designated as "emergency essential." There is confusion and
ambiguity as to whether the use of "emergency essential" in reference (a) is equivalent to the
Emergency Essential (E-E) designation described in reference (b). Contributing to the
assumption that the terms apply to the same condition, reference (c) includes reference (b) in its
list of references.

BACKGROUND: A recently inspected echelon II command recognized and implemented the
requirements of reference (a) to ensure civilian employee position descriptions for assigned ERS
team members were designated as "emergency essential." However, the constraints of collective
bargaining and the sheer number of employees affected have limited progress. Following
NAVIG discussion with CNO N315, clarification of references (a) and (b) highlighted a need to
remove ambiguity between meanings of "emergency essential" in each reference.

Reference (a), paragraph 7.a.(1).(n).3., states, "Using the assigned Human Resources (HR)
staff member, ensure civilian employee position descriptions for assigned ERS team
members are annotated to designate the position as 'emergency essential';".

Reference (b), paragraph 4.d.(1)., states, "Emergency Essential (E-E). A position-based
designation to support the success of combat operations or the availability of combat-
essential systems in accordance with section 1580 of Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.)
(Reference (e)) and will be designated as Key in accordance with paragraph 4.d.(5)."

Reference (b) is clear in describing Emergency Essential personnel as those supporting
combat operations and/or supporting combat systems.

Clarification was provided by CNO N315: reference (a) uses the description, "emergency
essential" personnel to identify personnel filling mission essential billets, identified by their
organization Emergency Relocation Staff (ERS) as they relate to Continuity of Operations
(COOP) Plan response. These personnel provide subject matter expertise, in support of their
organization's Mission Essential Functions (MEF).

RECOMMENDATION:

050-12. That CNO N315 revise reference (a) regarding civilian position descriptions assigned as
Emergency Relocation Staff (ERS) team members.

NAVINSGEN POINT OF CONTACT: b7c

ISSUE PAPER 8

SUBJECT: PARKING GARAGE AT THE NATIONAL MARITIME INTELLIGENCE
          CENTER

REFERENCE: (a) Commanding Officer Naval Facilities Engineering Command Letter,
                 Safety Concerns with the National Maritime Intelligence Center
                 Parking Garage, Ser 00/153, of 20 Feb 09

PROBLEM: The Office of Naval Intelligence's elevated parking garage shows continued signs
of deterioration as highlighted in several "garage survey reports" performed by a contracted
structural engineer and requires structural repairs on an emergent basis.

BACKGROUND:

1. The National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC) and its associated elevated parking garage
were constructed in 1993. The elevated garage was constructed by two separate contractors: one
completing work on the first deck and part of the second deck before going out of business. A
second contractor completed the rest of the structure in 2005 using a separate design.

2. In 2008, the Regional Engineer visited the NMIC garage, and in February of 2009 issued
reference (a) noting that the "original section was constructed with inadequate bearing support
between the beams and the planks." Reference (a) recommended that NMIC shut down the
affected sections (about 600 of the 1200 spaces) as soon as practical.

3. The Base Operating Support (BOS) Services contractor, EMCOR, Inc., has subcontracted
with EMCOR Government Services for licensed structural engineers to perform a quarterly
assessment of the parking garage in order to define the scope of remedial repairs necessary to
help protect the structure against deterioration and to ensure that it is safe for use by vehicles and
pedestrians.

DISCUSSION:

1. A review of several Quarterly Assessments noted the structural engineer's increasing
concerns about the progressive deterioration of the support beams. Their reports recommended
repairs as soon as possible in a number of locations and cautioned that worsening corrosion
could lead to catastrophic failure. The deterioration was evident during the site visit and as seen
in Figures 1 and 2.

2. Following a review by Navy structural engineers from the Naval Facilities Engineering
Command (NAVFAC) and the Naval Support Activity, portions of the parking garage were shut
down. Commander Naval Installations Command (CNIC) and NAVFAC initiated a study to
reevaluate the safety of the garage and initiate repairs as necessary.

Figure 1: NMIC Garage - Main support beam on 2nd deck in state of failure

Figure 2: NMIC Garage - Detail look at compromised rebar/pre-stressed bar (2nd deck main support beam)

RECOMMENDATION:

051-12. That CNIC and NAVFAC provide a Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M) to address structural issues at the elevated garage at the National Maritime Intelligence Center, including a logistics plan for interim parking, and provide a copy to NAVINSGEN.

NAVINSGEN POINT OF CONTACT: b7c ██████████████

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SUBJECT: SAFETY PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS AT HEADQUARTERS COMMANDS

REFERENCE: (a) OPNAVINST 5100.23G, CH-1, Navy Safety and Occupational Health
(SOH) Program Manual, of 21 Jul 11

PROBLEM: The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) command safety organization is not
established in accordance with Navy SOH program requirements.

BACKGROUND:

1. Reference (a) requires a headquarters (HQ) command to establish a comprehensive SOH
program and designate a well qualified SOH professional to head the safety organization. The
SOH professional needs to be able to effectively represent and support the Commanding Officer
(CO) in the management and administration of the HQ safety program. The command's head
SOH professional is tasked with various responsibilities that include establishing and
coordinating safety policies, fostering safety awareness, performing subordinate command SOH
management evaluations and reviewing self-assessments, serving on safety councils and
committees, and coordinating with the servicing medical facility any recommended/required
occupational health services, such as medical surveillance examinations, which are based on the
industrial hygiene (IH) survey report. This command's 2011 periodic IH survey report evaluates
the effectiveness of implemented workplace hazard controls and the need for identified workers
to continue medical surveillance.

2. The Naval Support Activity Washington (NSAW) safety office provides Base Operating
Support (BOS) safety services to ONI and its four subordinate commands that are on-site. The
level of BOS safety services NSAW provides to ONI is based on a needs assessment. This
assessment ensures that NSAW provides SOH support, services and guidance that meet ONI's
request within the budget and capability of NSAW. Also, the assessment is a draft document and
not established through a formal written agreement such as an Intra Service Support Agreement
or a Memorandum of Understanding. BOS safety services include building safety inspections,
and traffic and motorcycle training.

DISCUSSION:

1. A number of deficiencies observed in the ONI safety program can be attributed to the safety
officer's lack of SOH training. The deficiencies for SOH and IH are addressed in the following
paragraphs 1 and 2. Completing a Collateral Duty Safety Officer training course does not
qualify an individual to lead a HQ safety program. Qualifications for a competent SOH
professional are identified in paragraphs 0602d (2) of reference (a). Other deficiencies observed
include the lack of a current SOH Management Evaluation (a 3 year requirement), the CO SOH
Policy is not posted on an official bulletin board within 3 months of assignment, and the
organizational chart does not include safety as a staff function. Commands that receive BOS
safety services from a Navy Region need to establish an organizational chart that includes safety
as a staff function, reporting to the CO. The safety organization can provide the CO with
situational awareness of safety matters.

2. A review of the 2011 ONI IH survey resulted in discrepancies in the hearing conservation and respiratory protection programs. Five individuals assigned to the Imaging Services department are enrolled in the hearing conservation program (HCP). However, none of the HCP enrollees have received a hearing examination as required. Eight individuals assigned to the Foreign Materials Evaluation (FME) Branch perform job tasks that may require respiratory protection. The IH survey recommended that FME personnel contact safety for details pertaining to respiratory protection. However, none of the workers followed through on the recommendation and the safety officer found unapproved 3M 8721 disposable dust masks in the work space. Personnel are not allowed to supply their own respirators.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

052-12. That NSAW and ONI complete the needs assessment for BOS safety services and establish a formal document as an Intra Service Support Agreement or Memorandum of Understanding as required by OPNAVINST 5100.23G, CH-1, ch. 3.

053-12. That ONI ensure the headquarters command safety program fully complies with the requirements of OPNAVINST 5100.23G, CH-1.

054-12. That ONI develop and execute a training plan to ensure compliance with the training requirements for a full time safety professional as a headquarters command safety manager that complies with OPNAVINST 5100.23G, CH-1, ch. 6.

055-12. That ONI restructure its organizational chart of staff functions to include safety as required by OPNAVINST 5100.23G, CH-1, ch. 3.

056-12. That ONI coordinate with the servicing medical facility to ensure that personnel enrolled in the Hearing Conservation Program comply with the requirements of OPNAVINST 5100.23G, CH-1, ch. 18.

057-12. That ONI establish a comprehensive respiratory protection program and appoint a qualified respiratory protection program manager (RPPM) in writing or negotiate with the Navy Region to provide Respiratory Protection Program (RPP) service for the few employees who use respiratory protection to ensure compliance with OPNAVINST 5100.23G, CH-1, ch. 15.

NAVINSGEN POINT OF CONTACT: b7c ████████████

ISSUE PAPER 10

SUBJECT: SUICIDE PREVENTION PROGRAM COORDINATOR (SPC) TRAINING

REFERENCE: (a) OPNAVINST 1720.4A, Suicide Prevention Program, of 4 Aug 09

PROBLEM: The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) suicide prevention program coordinator (SPC) has not attended required program training.

BACKGROUND: Per reference (a), command suicide prevention programs shall be implemented to reduce the risk of suicide, to minimize adverse effects of suicidal behavior on command readiness and morale, and to preserve mission effectiveness and war-fighting capability.

In accordance with reference (a), SPC's shall receive SPC training, as established by OPNAV (N135), as soon as possible after designation.

DISCUSSION: During a recent Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) command inspection visit, NAVINSGEN staff observed that the ONI SPC had not completed SPC training and therefore may not be able to meet the following requirements as defined in reference (a):

1. Training - increasing awareness of suicide concerns, improving wellness and ensuring personnel know how to intervene when someone needs help.

2. Intervention - ensuring timely access to needed services and having a plan of action for crisis response.

3. Response - assisting families, units and service members affected by suicide behaviors.

4. Reporting - reporting incidents of suicide and suicide-related behaviors.

RECOMMENDATION:

058-12   That ONI establish and maintain a suicide prevention program that meets all critical elements per reference (a).

NAVINSGEN POINT OF CONTACT: b7c

ISSUE PAPER 11

SUBJECT: INDIVIDUAL MEDICAL READINESS (IMR)

REFERENCES: (a) DoDINST 6025.19, Individual Medical Readiness (IMR), of 3 Jan 06
(b) SECNAVINST 6120.3, Periodic Health Assessment for Individual Medical Readiness, of 1 Dec 09
(c) NAVADMIN 233/07, Individual Medical Readiness, of 1 Sep 07
(d) OPNAVINST 6120.3, Preventive Health Assessment, of 5 Dec 01

PROBLEM: Per references (a) through (d), Individual Medical Readiness (IMR) records reviewed during the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) visit indicated that several of the commands were below the mandated minimum target of 75 percent fully medically ready.

BACKGROUND:

1. IMR assesses an individual service member's, or larger activity's readiness level, measured against established metrics applied to key elements of health and fitness that are used to determine "deployability" in support of contingency operations. Readiness is checked by completing Periodic Health Assessments (PHA) that measure an individual's status based on an absence of deployment limiting conditions. Areas monitored include dental classification, immunization completion, physical fitness and a series of laboratory based measures to determine general health status.

2. Medical readiness is measured by the following criteria: *Fully Medically Ready (FMR)*, current in all categories measured including dental. *Partially Medically Ready (PMR)*, lacking one or more easily obtainable elements such as an immunization. *Not Medically Ready (NMR)*, existence of a chronic or prolonged deployment limiting condition and *Medically Indeterminate (MI)*, unable to establish a health status due to missing records or an overdue periodic health assessment.

3. Per reference (a), the minimum goal for overall medical readiness is that 75 percent of service members are fully medically ready, with the ideal goal being 100 percent.

DISCUSSION: Interviews with IMR coordinators and review of the Medical Readiness Reporting System (MRRS) revealed that the average medical readiness status for ONI was 53 percent and there was little echelon II oversight of subordinate IMR activities. Although the command has made great improvements since the inspection, overall command FMR is 74 percent.

RECOMMENDATION

059-12. That Commander, Office of Naval Intelligence ensures headquarters command and subordinate command oversight of IMR to comply with DoD standards.

NAVINSGEN POINT OF CONTACT: b7c

ISSUE PAPER 12

SUBJECT: MANAGERS' INTERNAL CONTROL (MIC) PROGRAM

REFERENCES: (a) DoDINST 5010.40, Managers' Internal Control Program (MICP) Procedures, of 29 Jul 10
                (b) SECNAVINST 5200.35E, Department of the Navy (DON) Managers' Internal Control (MIC) Program, of 8 Nov 06
                (c) SECNAV M-5200.35, Department of the Navy Managers' Internal Control Manual, of Jun 08

PROBLEM: Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) is not meeting the requirements of references (a) through (c) regarding the Managers' Internal Control (MIC) program. This reduces its ability to provide reasonable assurance regarding effectiveness and efficiency of operations, reliability of financial reporting, and compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

BACKGROUND:

1. References (a) through (c) provide the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) policies and procedures for the establishment of a MIC program encompassing the Government Accountability Office's five standards for internal control: (1) Control Environment, (2) Risk Assessment, (3) Control Activities, (4) Information and Communications, and (5) Monitoring.

2. The design, operation, and documentation of the organization's programs should provide reasonable assurance that it is conducting proper stewardship of U.S. government resources. The Office of Naval Intelligence MIC program is lacking key program elements necessary to provide such reasonable assurance.

DISCUSSION:

1. NAVINSGEN inspection found that ONI lacks a robust MIC program and is only partially meeting the requirements of reference (b). For example, they do not have and were unable to provide any identified assessable units (AUs) by which the MIC coordinator reports program compliance and reasonable assurance to the Commander for ONI's internal controls. ONI has reported compliance to the Director, Navy Staff, but cannot produce any substantiating documents to support its Statement of Assurance (SoA). The MIC program should be a stand-alone program that incorporates other controls, for a more well-rounded review of command risk areas, such as the Command Inspection (CI) Program.

2. Implementation of all MIC program requirements should enable ONI to achieve its mission goals by strengthening internal controls, thereby enabling early identification of potential problems, while providing the commander with reasonable assurance of efficiency and effectiveness.

3. As a result of the NAVINSGEN Inspection, ONI has a new draft MIC program, but it lacks sufficient run time to provide the reasonable assurance required.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

060-12. That ONI continue to develop and fully implement a more robust MIC program, with all elements including AUs, that meet the requirements of reference (b) and (c).

061-12. That ONI report MIC program effectiveness to NAVINSGEN, after a period of one year, from the date establishing their MIC program. Also, provide NAVINSGEN with a copy of ONI Statement of Assurance (SoA) provided to the Director, Navy Staff for 2013.

NAVINSGEN POINT OF CONTACT: b7c

PART 3

DATA ANALYSIS

APPENDIX A

SUMMARY OF SURVEY DATA ANALYSIS

ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY

AND

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

SUMMARY OF SURVEY DATA ANALYSIS
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY AND DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

1. <u>Overall Observations and Methodology</u>. The Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) conducted an on-line survey of active duty military and Department of the Navy (DON) civilian personnel from 18 April to 18 May 2012 in support of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) Command Inspection held from18 to 29 June 2012. There were a total of 463 survey respondents, consisting of 372 DON civilian personnel (80.3%) and 91 active duty military (19.7%). The survey respondents consisted of 295 (63.7%) males and 168 (36.3%) females.

2. <u>Quality of Life</u>. The active duty military and DON civilian personnel survey respondents rated their Quality of Work Life (QoWL) at 6.06 on a scale of 1 to 10 ('worst' to 'best'), which is below the NAVINSGEN average of 6.28. The respondents indicated their Quality of Home Life (QoHL) at 7.83, which is higher than the NAVINSGEN rolling averages of 7.02.

3. Survey Topics

    a. The survey included demographic questions such as gender, age, and whether the respondent is military or civilian.

    b. Both military and civilians were asked to rate their quality of work life (QoWL) and their quality of home life (QoHL).

Job satisfaction was rated as the main factor having a positive impact on their QoWL as indicated by 65.1 percent of the survey respondents. Leadership support was the main factor having a negative impact on QoWL as indicated by 46.1 percent with command climate being the second with 40.9 percent. Additionally, the survey respondents indicated that their QoHL was most positively impacted by the quality of their home at 70.6 percent. Recreational opportunities were the second highest with 48.1 percent. Cost of living was the factor having the largest negative impact indicated by 76.8 percent.

    c. Military members were asked questions regarding physical readiness, performance counseling, and the voter assistance program.

    d. Civilians were asked questions regarding their position description, performance counseling, human resource service center, and human resource office.

    e. Both military and civilians were asked questions regarding topics such as working hours; resources; facilities; communication; and leadership.

    f. Those survey respondents indicating they are supervisors are asked additional questions regarding their supervisor training.

g. In addition to multiple choice questions there were a few open ended questions regarding various topics such as: Supplies purchased with personal money, facilities in need of repair, and any additional comments or concerns regarding quality of life. Answers to these questions were used to help guide the inspection team and to guide some of the focus group questions.

ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY AND DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

1. On a scale from 1 (worst) to 10 (best), please rate your current Quality of Home Life (QOHL). QOHL is the degree to which you enjoy where you live and the opportunities available for housing, recreation, etc.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
1		0.4%	2
2		1.5%	7
3		1.7%	8
4		2.8%	13
5		5.0%	23
6		4.8%	22
7		14.5%	67
8		**33.5%**	**155**
9		17.7%	82
10		18.1%	84
	Mean		7.351
	Standard Deviation		1.917
	Valid Responses		**463**

2. Please indicate up to three main factors that have a **positive** impact on your QOHL:
(Choose three or less)
(Respondents were allowed to choose **multiple** responses)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Quality of home		**70.6%**	**324**
Quality of the school for dependent children		28.1%	129
Quality of the childcare available		6.5%	30
Shopping & dining opportunities		47.5%	218

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Recreational opportunities		48.1%	221
Access to spouse employment		18.1%	83
Access to medical/dental care		21.6%	99
Cost of living		16.6%	76
Other		12.9%	59
	Valid Responses		**459**

3. Please indicate up to three main factors that have a **negative** impact on your QOHL: (Choose three or less)
(Respondents were allowed to choose **multiple** responses)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Quality of home		15.9%	70
Quality of the school for dependent children		13.2%	58
Quality of the childcare available		6.4%	28
Shopping & dining opportunities		15.7%	69
Recreational opportunities		10.2%	45
Access to spouse employment		10.0%	44
Access to medical/dental care		13.0%	57
Cost of living		**76.8%**	**338**
Other		30.7%	135
	Valid Responses		**440**

4. On a scale from 1 (worst) to 10 (best), please rate your Quality of Work Life (QOWL). QOWL is the degree to which you enjoy where you work and available opportunities for professional growth.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
1		3.2%	15
2		5.2%	24
3		8.4%	39
4		8.6%	40

	Chart	Frequency	Count
5		13.4%	62
6		12.1%	56
7		16.4%	76
8		**20.1%**	**93**
9		7.8%	36
10		4.8%	22
Mean			6.000
Standard Deviation			1.171
Valid Responses			**463**

5. Please indicate up to three main factors that have a **positive** impact on your QOWL: (Choose three or less)
(Respondents were allowed to choose **multiple** responses)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Job satisfaction		**65.1%**	**293**
Leadership support		26.0%	117
Leadership opportunities		8.7%	39
Length of workday		30.7%	138
Advancement opportunities		10.0%	45
Training opportunities		29.1%	131
Awards and recognition		8.7%	39
Perform to Serve (PTS)		3.3%	15
Command climate		6.4%	29
Quality of the workplace facilities		25.3%	114
Parking		22.4%	101
Frequency of deployments/Individual Augmentations (e.g. IAMM or GSA)		1.8%	8
Other		10.9%	49
Valid Responses			**450**

6. Please indicate up to three main factors that have a **negative** impact on your QOWL: (Choose three or less)
(Respondents were allowed to choose **multiple** responses)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Job satisfaction		15.7%	69
Leadership support		**46.1%**	**203**
Leadership opportunities		13.6%	60
Length of workday		9.8%	43
Advancement opportunities		32.3%	142
Training opportunities		9.1%	40
Awards and recognition		24.8%	109
Perform to Serve (PTS)		3.0%	13
Command climate		40.9%	180
Quality of the workplace facilities		13.4%	59
Parking		18.2%	80
Frequency of deployments/Individual Augmentations (e.g. IAMM or GSA)		1.8%	8
Other		19.5%	86
	Valid Responses		**440**

7. Gender:
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Male		**63.7%**	**295**
Female		36.3%	168
	Valid Responses		**463**

8. I am:
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Military		19.7%	91
Civilian		**80.3%**	**372**
Contractor		0.0%	0
		Valid Responses	**463**

9. Rank:
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
E1 - E4		7.8%	7
E5 - E6		30.0%	27
E7 - E9		16.7%	15
CWO2 - CWO5		0.0%	0
O1 - O3		**31.1%**	**28**
O4 - O5		11.1%	10
O6 & Above		3.3%	3
		Valid Responses	**90**

10. My command gives me sufficient time <u>during working hours</u> to participate in a physical readiness exercise program.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		**42.2%**	**38**
Agree		38.9%	35
Neither Agree nor Disagree		7.8%	7
Disagree		7.8%	7
Strongly Disagree		3.3%	3
		Valid Responses	**90**

11. My supervisor conducts semiannual performance counseling with me.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Yes		**78.9%**	**71**
No		21.1%	19
		Valid Responses	**90**

12. During my semiannual performance my supervisor provides me with feedback that will enable me to improve my performance prior to my annual performance appraisal (EVAL/FITREP).
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		22.2%	20
Agree		**38.9%**	**35**
Neither Agree nor Disagree		24.4%	22
Disagree		10.0%	9
Strongly Disagree		4.4%	4
		Valid Responses	**90**

13. In general, how have you or those you supervise been affected by Perform to Serve (PTS)?
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Positively		15.6%	14
Not applicable/neither positively or negatively		**65.6%**	**59**
Negatively		18.9%	17
		Valid Responses	**90**

14. I know who my command Voting Assistance Officer is.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Yes		**53.3%**	**48**

No		46.7%	42

	Valid Responses	**90**

15. I voted in the last election.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Yes		**62.2%**	**56**
No		37.8%	34

	Valid Responses	**90**

16. Why did you not vote in the last election?
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
I choose not to		**47.1%**	**16**
I didn't know how to		5.9%	2
Other		**47.1%**	**16**

	Valid Responses	**34**

17. Grade:
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
GS 1 - 8 or NSPS equivalent		1.6%	6
GS 9 - 12 or NSPS equivalent		21.1%	78
GS 13 - 14 or NSPS equivalent		**65.6%**	**242**
GS 15 or NSPS equivalent		10.6%	39
ST		0.0%	0
SES		0.0%	0
WD/WG/WS/WL		0.0%	0
NAF		0.0%	0
Other		1.1%	4

	Valid Responses	**369**

18. My position description is current and accurately describes my functions, tasks, and responsibilities.

(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		17.9%	66
Agree		**51.8%**	**191**
Neither Agree nor Disagree		12.7%	47
Disagree		9.2%	34
Strongly Disagree		4.6%	17
Don't Know		3.8%	14
		Valid Responses	**369**

19. My supervisor establishes my critical elements and conducts at least one performance progress review during the annual performance rating cycle.

(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		30.6%	113
Agree		**50.9%**	**188**
Neither Agree nor Disagree		11.7%	43
Disagree		4.9%	18
Strongly Disagree		1.9%	7
		Valid Responses	**369**

20. The Human Resource Service Center provides timely, accurate responses to my queries.

(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		3.0%	11
Agree		18.4%	68
Neither Agree nor Disagree		**53.1%**	**196**
Disagree		16.8%	62

59

Strongly Disagree		8.7%	32
		Valid Responses	**369**

21. My (local) Human Resources Office provides timely, accurate responses to my queries.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		4.9%	18
Agree		20.3%	75
Neither Agree nor Disagree		**46.9%**	**173**
Disagree		19.2%	71
Strongly Disagree		8.7%	32
		Valid Responses	**369**

22. I have the tools and resources needed to do my job properly.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		10.7%	49
Agree		**51.2%**	**234**
Neither Agree nor Disagree		12.0%	55
Disagree		20.1%	92
Strongly Disagree		5.9%	27
		Valid Responses	**457**

23. I have adequate leadership guidance to perform my job successfully.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		14.4%	66
Agree		**42.7%**	**195**
Neither Agree nor Disagree		17.9%	82
Disagree		13.6%	62

Strongly Disagree		11.4%	52
		Valid Responses	**457**

24. My current workday is __ hours. (Actual time spent at work not including commute time.)
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
6-8		33.3%	152
9-10		**61.3%**	**280**
11-12		4.2%	19
13-14		1.3%	6
15+		0.0%	0
		Valid Responses	**457**

25. My current work week is normally __ days.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
4		4.4%	20
5		**94.5%**	**432**
6		0.7%	3
7		0.4%	2
		Valid Responses	**457**

26. My job is important and makes a contribution to my command.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		37.6%	172
Agree		**41.8%**	**191**
Neither Agree nor Disagree		11.4%	52
Disagree		6.3%	29

61

Strongly Disagree		2.8%	13
		Valid Responses	**457**

27. My command/organization is properly resourced (e.g., people, tools, training, supplies, etc.) to conduct its mission.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Yes		33.9%	155
No		**50.1%**	**229**
Don't Know		16.0%	73
		Valid Responses	**457**

28. You indicated that your command was not properly resourced, what resources are lacking? (Choose all that apply)
(Respondents were allowed to choose **multiple** responses)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
People		**81.5%**	**189**
Tools/Equipment		29.3%	68
Training		40.5%	94
IT Resources		44.4%	103
Spare Parts		2.2%	5
Supplies		19.0%	44
Other		24.6%	57
		Valid Responses	**232**

29. Have you ever purchased mission-related work supplies, tools, parts or equipment with your own money?
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Yes		27.3%	124
No		**72.7%**	**331**
		Valid Responses	**455**

62

30. If you have purchased supplies or tools with your money, please provide a list of items, cost, and why (e.g., printer ink, $20, easier to go buy than going through the supply system).

_____

_____

_____

31. Approximately, how many miles per month do you use your personal vehicle for mission related travel? (Not including travel for TAD/TDY.)

(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
0		**45.2%**	**205**
1-10		17.8%	81
11-20		11.0%	50
21-30		8.4%	38
more than 30		17.6%	80
		Valid Responses	**454**

32. You indicated you use your vehicle for mission related travel; are you reimbursed for this travel?
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Yes		37.7%	95
No		**62.3%**	**157**
		Valid Responses	**252**

33. I am satisfied with the overall quality of my workplace facilities.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		14.3%	65
Agree		**52.5%**	**238**
Neither Agree Nor Disagree		15.2%	69
Disagree		14.1%	64

| Strongly Disagree | | 3.8% | 17 |
| | **Valid Responses** | | **453** |

34. If you know of facilities that are in need of repair please provide information regarding base, building number, floor, room number, and nature of problem. (Example: Washington Navy Yard, building 172, 2nd floor, men's shower (room 201), no hot water.)

_____
_____
_____

35. My organization has an effective safety program.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		5.5%	25
Agree		**45.3%**	**205**
Neither Agree nor Disagree		42.6%	193
Disagree		6.2%	28
Strongly Disagree		0.4%	2
		Valid Responses	**453**

36. I know how to report an unsafe or unhealthy work condition.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		11.3%	51
Agree		**60.5%**	**274**
Neither Agree nor Disagree		15.2%	69
Disagree		11.9%	54
Strongly Disagree		1.1%	5
		Valid Responses	**453**

37. Reported unsafe or unhealthy work conditions are corrected promptly.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		5.5%	25
Agree		35.1%	159
Neither Agree nor Disagree		**49.2%**	**223**
Disagree		9.1%	41
Strongly Disagree		1.1%	5
		Valid Responses	**453**

38. I know who to contact at my command regarding safety questions or concerns.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Yes		**68.2%**	**309**
No		31.8%	144
		Valid Responses	**453**

39. I know what Operational Risk Management (ORM) is?
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		24.5%	111
Agree		**35.3%**	**160**
Neither Agree nor Disagree		11.5%	52
Disagree		22.7%	103
Strongly Disagree		6.0%	27
		Valid Responses	**453**

40. I know when to apply the principles of Operational Risk Management (ORM).
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		22.7%	103
Agree		**33.8%**	**153**

Neither Agree nor Disagree	16.3%	74
Disagree	20.5%	93
Strongly Disagree	6.6%	30
Valid Responses		**453**

41. My job affords me a reasonable amount of quality time with my family.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		18.7%	84
Agree		**58.9%**	**265**
Neither Agree nor Disagree		13.3%	60
Disagree		6.7%	30
Strongly Disagree		2.4%	11
	Valid Responses		**450**

42. Morale at my command has a positive impact on my QOWL.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		8.2%	37
Agree		**28.2%**	**127**
Neither Agree nor Disagree		19.3%	87
Disagree		26.2%	118
Strongly Disagree		18.0%	81
	Valid Responses		**450**

43. Communication down the chain of command is effective.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		4.2%	19
Agree		**29.6%**	**133**
Neither Agree nor Disagree		17.6%	79
Disagree		27.1%	122

Strongly Disagree		21.6%	97
	Valid Responses		450

44. Communication up the chain of command is effective.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		3.6%	16
Agree		**29.6%**	**133**
Neither Agree nor Disagree		26.0%	117
Disagree		24.0%	108
Strongly Disagree		16.9%	76
	Valid Responses		450

45. My superiors treat me with respect and consideration.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		20.2%	91
Agree		**46.9%**	**211**
Neither Agree nor Disagree		13.3%	60
Disagree		11.6%	52
Strongly Disagree		8.0%	36
	Valid Responses		450

46. My performance evaluations have been fair.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		21.1%	95
Agree		**46.9%**	**211**
Neither Agree nor Disagree		16.2%	73

Disagree		10.2%	46
Strongly Disagree		5.6%	25
		Valid Responses	**450**

47. The awards and recognition program is fair and equitable.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		7.8%	35
Agree		**26.9%**	**121**
Neither Agree nor Disagree		26.4%	119
Disagree		22.2%	100
Strongly Disagree		16.7%	75
		Valid Responses	**450**

48. Military and civilian personnel work well together at my command.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		14.0%	63
Agree		**51.3%**	**231**
Neither Agree nor Disagree		19.3%	87
Disagree		11.8%	53
Strongly Disagree		3.6%	16
		Valid Responses	**450**

49. My command's Equal Opportunity Program (EO - to include Equal Employment Opportunity & Command Managed Equal Opportunity) is effective.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		9.6%	43
Agree		32.9%	148
Neither Agree nor Disagree		**46.2%**	**208**

68

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Disagree		7.6%	34
Strongly Disagree		3.8%	17
		Valid Responses	**450**

50. I know who to contact with an EEO/EO question or complaint.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		22.7%	102
Agree		**59.6%**	**268**
Neither Agree nor Disagree		10.0%	45
Disagree		7.3%	33
Strongly Disagree		0.4%	2
		Valid Responses	**450**

51. I am aware of or know how to find my local IG Hotline number.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		20.2%	91
Agree		**51.8%**	**233**
Neither Agree nor Disagree		10.4%	47
Disagree		15.6%	70
Strongly Disagree		2.0%	9
		Valid Responses	**450**

52. A grievance/complaint in my command will be handled in a fair, timely, and just manner.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		7.6%	34
Agree		32.2%	145
Neither Agree nor Disagree		**42.0%**	**189**

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Disagree		10.4%	47
Strongly Disagree		7.8%	35
		Valid Responses	**450**

53. My command adequately protects my Personally Identifiable Information (PII).
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		14.0%	63
Agree		**52.9%**	**238**
Neither Agree nor Disagree / Don't Know		28.4%	128
Disagree		3.1%	14
Strongly Disagree		1.6%	7
		Valid Responses	**450**

54. My command conducted a command climate assessment within the past 2 years.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

| Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Yes		**89.3%**	**401**
No		0.7%	3
Don't Know		10.0%	45
		Valid Responses	**449**

55. My command's leadership provided feedback to command personnel on the results of our command climate assessment.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Yes		**78.2%**	**351**
No		6.2%	28
Don't Know		15.6%	70
		Valid Responses	**449**

56. My Command implemented an action plan to resolve command climate issues.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Yes		32.7%	147
No		16.5%	74
Don't Know		**50.8%**	**228**
		Valid Responses	**449**

57. Fraternization is occurring at my command/organization.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

| Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		7.1%	32
Agree		17.8%	80
Neither Agree nor Disagree / Don't Know		**61.9%**	**278**
Disagree		10.5%	47
Strongly Disagree		2.7%	12
Not Answered			1
		Valid Responses	**449**

58. Favoritism is occurring at my command/organization.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		22.5%	101
Agree		28.5%	128
Neither Agree nor Disagree / Don't Know		**33.9%**	**152**
Disagree		12.2%	55
Strongly Disagree		2.9%	13
		Valid Responses	**449**

71

59. Gender/sex discrimination is occurring at my command/organization.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		6.2%	28
Agree		12.7%	57
Neither Agree nor Disagree / Don't Know		**48.1%**	**216**
Disagree		24.5%	110
Strongly Disagree		8.5%	38
		Valid Responses	**449**

60. Sexual harassment is occurring at my command/organization.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		5.1%	23
Agree		10.5%	47
Neither Agree nor Disagree / Don't Know		**52.1%**	**234**
Disagree		21.4%	96
Strongly Disagree		10.9%	49
		Valid Responses	**449**

61. Race discrimination is occurring at my command/organization.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		4.7%	21
Agree		5.6%	25
Neither Agree nor Disagree / Don't Know		**48.1%**	**216**
Disagree		26.9%	121
Strongly Disagree		14.7%	66
		Valid Responses	**449**

62. Hazing is occurring at my command/organization.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		0.7%	3
Agree		1.1%	5
Neither Agree nor Disagree / Don't Know		**47.4%**	**213**
Disagree		32.1%	144
Strongly Disagree		18.7%	84
		Valid Responses	**449**

63. Do you supervise Department of the Navy (DON) civilians?
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Yes		16.3%	73
No		**83.7%**	**376**
		Valid Responses	**449**

64. How many DON civilians do you supervise?
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Less than 5		24.0%	18
5 - 10 civilians		**32.0%**	**24**
11 - 20 civilians		16.0%	12
More than 21 civilians		28.0%	21
		Valid Responses	**75**

65. When did you receive civilian supervisory training?
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Never		18.9%	14
Within the last 12 months		**33.8%**	**25**
Between 1 and 4 years		32.4%	24

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
More than 4 years ago		14.9%	11
		Valid Responses	**74**

66. Have you been a selecting official for a DON civilian vacancy?
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Yes		19.2%	86
No		**80.8%**	**361**
		Valid Responses	**447**

67. The DON civilian recruitment process is responsive to my command's civilian personnel requirements.
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Strongly Agree		0.7%	3
Agree		11.9%	53
Neither Agree nor Disagree / Don't Know		**57.0%**	**255**
Disagree		17.0%	76
Strongly Disagree		13.4%	60
		Valid Responses	**447**

68. How would you rate your access to the Internet from work?
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Unlimited access to all required websites for information/work purposes		**62.6%**	**280**
Limited access to all required websites for information/work purposes (i.e., in port, only a few workstations, etc.)		37.1%	166
No access		0.2%	1
		Valid Responses	**447**

69. Does your command routinely conduct required training (e.g., anti-terrorism, DOD Information Assurance, personal financial management, personal occupational safety & health, etc.)?
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Yes		**99.3%**	**444**
No		0.7%	3
		Valid Responses	**447**

70. Do you have adequate time at work to complete required General Military Training via Navy Knowledge Online (NKO) training?
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Yes		**87.0%**	**389**
No		13.0%	58
		Valid Responses	**447**

**71.** Are you able to access NKO at work?
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

| Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Yes		**99.6%**	**445**
No		0.4%	2
		Valid Responses	**447**

72. How often do you use NKO?
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Daily		1.8%	8
Weekly		6.9%	31
Monthly		32.4%	145
Only when I can't find information elsewhere or only when absolutely necessary		**56.8%**	**254**

Never		2.0%	9

		Valid Responses	447

73. How easy is it to find information you are looking for on NKO?
(Respondents could only choose a **single** response)

Response	Chart	Frequency	Count
Very easy		3.1%	14
Easy		23.5%	105
Neither easy or difficult		**41.8%**	**187**
Difficult		24.6%	110
Very Difficult		6.9%	31
		Valid Responses	**447**

74. Please provide any comments or concerns impacting your quality of life/quality of work life.

_____
_____
_____

APPENDIX B

SUMMARY OF FOCUS GROUP DATA ANALYSIS

# ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY

AND

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

SUMMARY OF FOCUS GROUP DATA ANALYSIS
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY AND DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

1. Overall Observations and Methodology. The Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) Focus Group Team conducted 26 active duty military and civilian focus groups or round tables comprised of 5 military, 10 civilian, and one (1) mixed military/civilian groups. A total of 106 personnel, consisting of 21 enlisted, 24 officers, and 61 civilians participated in these focus groups on a variety of quality of home life and quality of work life topics.

2. Quality of Life. The active duty military and Department of the Navy (DON) civilian personnel focus group participants rated their overall Quality of Life at 6.93, which is close to the NAVINSGEN average of 6.94. The distribution of scores can be seen in the chart below.

3. Major Concerns. Major concerns for active duty and DON personnel focus groups include: Leadership, organizational structure, advancement/professional development, military/civilian relationships, and communication. The Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) was identified in the civilian focus groups. The personnel support detachment and awards/recognition was identified as issues for the military members.

    a. Leadership was the number one issue discussed during the focus groups. A total of 10 out of the 16 focus groups indicated leadership as an issue. Participants stated that there seems to be no one in charge. In several groups, participants indicated that mid-level management does not have decision making authority and the "Front Office" makes the decisions. Participants also stated that the O6s are in charge of O6s.

b. Organizational Structure was indicated as an issue in 8 of the focus groups. Some participants stated that they believe the new organizational structure was designed so more people could get a command pin. Many stated that the organizational structure is not well defined and that echelon II and III often duplicate functions. The lack of a "Flag Officer" in charge was stated as an issue, especially when working with foreign countries that have "3 Star" equivalents with whom the meet and discuss issues. Participants also stated that it is hard to tell what the structure is because of constant reorganizing. Participants also indicated that the leadership often changes – an example given related to an echelon III commands and that there were a number of Commanding Officers within a 3 year period.

c. Advancement and professional development was also discussed in 8 of the focus groups. Some of the enlisted members stated that civilians do not seem to understand how much time it takes to prepare for advancement exams. Other participants stated that they do not receive feedback on the work they do so they do not know if they are doing a good or bad job. Others indicated that they do not feel as though the higher ups care about their careers. Additionally, others stated that there is no upward mobility.

d. The relationship between military and civilian relationship was indicated as an issue in 8 of the focus groups. Military members stated that they feel marginalized because they are only at ONI for a few years, especially when compared to the amount of time that civilians remain at ONI. Civilians stated that the feel as though their input is not needed or wanted by the military. The military stated that civilians don't know the military structure, nor do they know how to supervise military. The civilians stated that the military don't know how to supervise civilians. On a positive note in one of the military focus groups participants stated that the civilians in the analytic work area are a good source of knowledge and can be very helpful and sharing.

e. Communication was discussed in 6 of the focus groups. There were good and bad comments regarding communication. Some felt that communication is not a priority and is more of an afterthought. Some stated that communication from COMONI is good, but that the information does not always filter down quickly so they do not learn about taskers until the last minute. This results in very little time to conduct the necessary analysis. Some also stated that strategic communication is occurring, but it is not very well known. The participants indicated that communication is getting better thanks to town hall meetings as well as other forms of communication.

f. The Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) was discussed as a problem in 7 of the 10 civilian groups. Participants do not believe that the system is good because it takes too much time to enter data resulting in people not put in enough information. Additionally, several felt that managers are changing scores so that certain people get bonuses. They also indicated that they do not believe bonuses are distributed fairly. Some stated that more than 50% of the managers got bonuses, while only 20% of the analysts received bonuses. Participants stated that if DCIPS was eliminated morale would increase.

g. The Personnel Support Detachment (PSD) was identified as an issue in 3 of the 5 military focus groups. Participants stated that the staff at PSD is unprofessional, rude and not helpful. Participants indicated that it can take months to correct BAH issues. Participants stated that the customer service at PSD is horrendous.

h. The Awards and recognition were also discussed as issues during the 3 of the 5 military focus groups. Participants stated that getting awards for military members can be extremely difficult because there are so many layers to get through the process. Several stated that they believe that civilians get many more awards and recognition than military members. Some of the members stated they are not necessarily asking for formal awards, but would appreciate it if they were simply recognized for a job well done.

i. Additional topics raised by the focus group participants included: Training, hiring practices/human resources, facilities, favoritism, and telework. The amount of time to update and change instructions was also discussed.