



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
1254 9TH STREET SE
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD DC 20374-5006

IN REPLY REFER TO:
5040
Ser N3/0805
5 Aug 14

From: Naval Inspector General
To: Distribution

Subj: COMMAND INSPECTION OF COMMANDER, NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE
COMMAND, 12-16 May 2014

Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 5040.3A
(b) SECNAVINST 5430.57G

1. The Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) conducts command inspections of echelon 2 commands to provide the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations with a firsthand assessment of Departmental risks and major issues relevant to policy, management, and direction as directed by reference (a). Reference (b) tasks NAVINSGEN with conducting inspections and surveys, making appropriate evaluations and recommendations concerning operating forces afloat and ashore, Department of the Navy components and functions, and Navy programs which impact readiness or quality of life for military and civilian naval personnel.

2. NAVINSGEN conducted a Command Inspection of Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command (CNSWC) 12 to 16 May 2014. This report documents our findings.

3. This report contains an Executive Summary, our observations and findings, and documented deficiencies noted during the inspection. An issue paper is included that highlights significant concerns that either point to a potentially broader Navy issue or, in our opinion, requires coordination among multiple commands to fully address. Finally, a summary of survey and focus group data, as well as a complete listing of survey frequency data, is included.

4. During our visit we assessed overall mission readiness (per OPNAVINST 5450.221D, Mission and Functions of Naval Special Warfare Command), compliance with Navy administrative programs, facilities, safety and environmental compliance, security programs, CNSWC Inspector General performance, intelligence oversight, and Sailor programs under the purview of senior enlisted leadership. Additionally, we conducted surveys and focus group discussions to assess command climate.

Subj: COMMAND INSPECTION OF COMMANDER, NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE
COMMAND

5. Our overall assessment is that CNSWC is executing its mission very well. We found a high performing and dedicated staff with a firm grasp on their responsibilities; a leadership team that is well-respected by the staff; and a command with a tangible, visible focus on their people including families. The CNSWC team is working effectively to support the current war effort while simultaneously planning for anticipated requirements to man, train, equip, and educate the future Force in support of U.S. Special Operations Command's (USSOCOM) Global Special Operations Forces Network. As projected by USSOCOM, the drawdown in Afghanistan does not mean a reduction in the demand for Naval Special Warfare (NSW) forces, but rather, a transition to a wider range of deployed locations and skills for the NSW force. Further details can be found in the Executive Summary and in the body of the report.

6. In the course of our inspection, we identified some deficiencies in security, sexual assault prevention and response, medical training, manning of Counterintelligence-Human Intelligence Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) 3913 personnel, and high risk training.


7. Corrective actions.

a. We identified 13 deficiencies during our inspection that require CNSWC's corrective action. Correction of each deficiency, and a description of action(s) taken, should be reported via letter by CNSWC no later than 1 November 2014. Deficiencies not corrected by this date or requiring longer-term solutions should be updated quarterly until completed. Additionally, NAVINSGEN provided CNSWC with 12 separate recommendations, for consideration, relating to Mission Essential Tasks, high risk training, security, and sexual assault and prevention. Follow up reporting on these recommendations is not requested.

b. This report includes one issue paper that requires actions by Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy for Policy (DUSN(P)), OPNAV N2/N6, and Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS). Appendix A: Issue Papers (page 18 of this report) provides detailed guidance on how to report completion of recommendations identified in the issue paper.

Subj: COMMAND INSPECTION OF COMMANDER, NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE
COMMAND

8. My point of contact is (b) (7) (c),
Inspections Division. (b) (7) (c) can be reached at (202) 433-
(b) (7) (c), DSN 288-(b) (7) (c), or via e-mail at (b) (7) (c)@navy.mil.



J. P. CALDWELL, JR.

Distribution:

SECNAV
UNSECNAV
DUSN(P)
ASN(RD&A, M&RA, FM&C, EI&E)
DON CIO
OJAG
NCIS
CNO
VCNO
OPNAV (DNS, N1, N2/N6, N3/N5, N4)
USFF
CPF
BUPERS
CNIC
NAVFAC
NAVSPECWAR



**NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL COMMAND INSPECTION OF
COMMANDER, NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE COMMAND
12 TO 16 MAY 2014**

~~**THIS REPORT IS NOT RELEASABLE** without the specific approval of the Secretary of the Navy. The information contained herein relates to the internal practices of the Department of the Navy (DON) and is an internal communication within the Navy Department. The contents may not be disclosed outside original distribution, nor may it be reproduced in whole or in part. All requests for this report, extracts therefrom, or correspondence related thereto shall be referred to the Naval Inspector General.~~

~~**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**~~

Executive Summary

The Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) conducted a command inspection of Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command (CNSWC) 12 - 16 May 2014. NAVINSGEN's last inspection of CNSWC was completed in 2008. The team was augmented with subject matter experts, including personnel from Chief of Naval Operations, Safety Liaison Office (OPNAV N09FB), Naval Education and Training, Center for SEAL (Sea, Air, and Land) and SWCC (Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewman) (NETC CSS), Naval Facilities and Expeditionary Warfare Center (MSCHQ N021), Naval Facilities Engineering Command Southwest (NAVFAC Southwest), Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, and Office of Civilian Human Resources (OCHR).

During our visit we assessed overall mission readiness (per OPNAVINST 5450.221D, Mission and Functions of Naval Special Warfare Command), compliance with Navy administrative programs, facilities, safety and environmental compliance, security programs, CNSWC Inspector General (IG) performance, intelligence oversight, and Sailor programs under the purview of senior enlisted leadership. Additionally, we conducted surveys and focus group discussions to assess the quality of work life (QOWL) for Navy military and civilian personnel.

CNSWC's mission is to organize, train, man, equip, educate, sustain, maintain combat readiness, and deploy assigned Active Component and Reserve Component Naval Special Warfare (NSW) forces and personnel to accomplish special operations missions assigned by Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and/or geographic combatant commanders employing special operations forces (SOF).

CNSWC is executing its mission very well. We found a high performing and dedicated staff with a firm grasp on their responsibilities; a leadership team that is well-respected by the staff; and a command with a tangible, visible focus on their people including families. CNSWC has made significant improvements since our last inspection in 2008. Their compliance programs are all assessed to be effective and compliant; their security programs are the best we have inspected in a number of years – all evidence of the significant leadership team engagement, commitment by the staff, and notably, solid execution of the CNSWC IG programs.

The CNSWC team is working effectively to support the current war effort while simultaneously planning for anticipated requirements to man, train, equip, and educate the future Force in support of USSOCOM's Global SOF Network. As projected by USSOCOM, the drawdown in Afghanistan does not mean a reduction in the demand for NSW forces, but rather, a "transition" to a wider range of deployed locations and skills for the NSW force. From our review, we have the following observations:

- CNSWC is keenly focused on this transition and the staff is aligned toward future mission readiness. We saw much evidence of this focus including the new Force Readiness Manual, the supporting inter-deployment readiness cycle (designed to support a

recurring steady state demand signal), a Force Capability and Capacity Review, and a renewed emphasis on NSW maritime skills/readiness after 12 years of land-centric combat operations.


- In supporting USSOCOM's Global SOF Network, there may be an increased demand for Navy Combat Support and Combat Service Support (CS/CSS) functions, especially when considering the increasingly distributed nature of operations and individual deployed locations.
- As we approach the end of combat operations in Afghanistan, the NSW community is particularly concerned with reductions in funding for Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF). CNSWC sees POTFF initiatives as critical to their mission and ethos to preserve the Force and families not only today, but into the future. This was a recurring theme during our visit with the CNSWC staff, subordinate commands, and ombudsmen; accordingly, we more fully describe this program in subsequent paragraphs.

Our survey and focus group discussions found that QOWL at CNSWC is higher than the historical echelon 2 command average. The high operational tempo, coupled with recent budgetary constraints and fiscal volatility, are perceived as threats to the mission and quality of life. Manning/manpower, workload/work hours, workspace, and POTFF were topics of chief concern. Rated on a 10-point scale, the CNSWC QOWL is 7.59; the echelon 2 command historical average is 6.54. Specific comments from focus groups and surveys were passed to CNSWC leadership and are presented in Appendix C.

MISSION READINESS

Counterintelligence-Human Intelligence (CI/HUMINT) Support

(b) (7) (f)



Preservation of the Force and Families (POTFF)

CNSWC's POTFF is an NSW Sailor and family resilience enhancement program concept with many aspects, including initiatives and programs that provide holistic psychological, spiritual, physical performance, and counseling support to NSW members (including non-SEAL service members) and their families. CNSWC assesses that this program has been successful in: (1) reducing destructive behaviors, (2) helping Sailors cope with the stresses of repeated deployments and combat operations, (3) facilitating a "reset" as they prepare for future deployments, (4) improving combat readiness with a comprehensive physical readiness program (currently known as the Human Performance Program) designed to both rehabilitate and prevent injuries, and (5) providing support to families (for partners and children) through

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

counselor and social worker support. CNSWC has some metrics that demonstrate the impact of these programs and they are continuing to develop additional metrics.

POTFF funding comes from a mix of USSOCOM Major Force Program 11 (MFP-11), Navy Major Force Program 2 (MFP-2), and Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) Major Force Program 8 (MFP-8) dollars. POTFF is viewed as very successful by CNSWC. However, SOCOM guidance for Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 interprets Congressional Appropriations Committee direction as restricting the use of MFP-11 funds for certain elements of POTFF. In the absence of specific authorization and appropriation, the loss of this funding of nearly \$1 million will reduce in scope the human physical performance and family counseling support components at the end of FY14. Additionally, BUMED intends to divest all non-clinical services (anonymous online resilience surveys, post-deployment retreats, and educational workshops) associated with this program after 4th quarter FY15. CNSWC is evaluating options to sustain these programs. In our view, CNSWC has proactively developed a thoughtful, comprehensive approach to deal with the unique challenges within the NSW community. POTFF puts people first and demonstrates commitment to the NSW team. Accordingly, we recommend Navy fund these POTFF initiatives.

CNSWC Coastal Campus Training Complex

CNSWC's facility Master Plan includes a 10-year \$700 million MFP-11 Military Construction (MILCON) funded program on the Naval Base Coronado Silver Strand Training Complex to develop a NSW Coastal Campus that will consolidate a wide range of training evolutions, several of which are currently conducted out of the San Diego area. This program also co-locates some of their west coast echelon 3 and 4 commands that are currently dispersed across the Naval Amphibious Base Coronado to this new facility. This program will notably improve CNSWC's space (square-footage) deficiencies in the San Diego metro area and improve overall force facility condition. More importantly, the Coastal Campus will provide proximity, privacy, and primacy to improve the effectiveness of NSW training.

To enable completion of the Coastal Campus, two infrastructure support projects identified and developed by Navy Region Southwest (NRSW) have been submitted to Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC) for inclusion in the Navy MILCON Program. These include:

- P-991 Coastal Campus Utilities Infrastructure (\$85.2 million) which develops vehicular and pedestrian roads and walkways; demolishes an existing bunker; and provides water, sewer, natural gas, and communications infrastructure.
- P-947 Coastal Campus Entry Control Point (ECP) (\$11 million) that constructs a new ECP at the north entrance.
- A third project will leverage the Defense Access Road Program to fund some offsite traffic improvements that must be in place by 2024.

Responsibility for financing of these projects has not yet been determined (MFP-11 or MFP-2) and funds have not been secured. However, CNSWC, Commander, Navy Region Southwest,

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

and CNIC are working to resolve funding responsibility to meet these infrastructure support requirements and ensure that ~\$100 million in enabling projects does not prevent the construction of ~\$700 million in CNSWC training and operational projects. This issue is nearing decision.

CNSWC Space Allocation

CNSWC space allocation is 42 percent of their Basic Facility Requirement (BFR) in the San Diego Metro area, the lowest space allocation percentage of any command in NRSW. However, the Coastal Campus Training Complex MILCON, previously addressed, will bring this allocation percentage up to approximately 95 percent.

COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS

Overall CNSWC's programs are impressive and there is evidence of a strong commitment toward these core programs. There are two areas for improvement:

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program

The command is committed to ensuring an environment free of sexual assault. The CNSWC SAPR instruction does not reflect the requirements of the program as documented in DoD, SECNAV, and OPNAV SAPR instructions. As a result, several SAPR roles and responsibilities are incorrect. There have been no reports of sexual assault at CNSWC over the past 48 months, and the command has not incorrectly handled any sexual assault cases as a result of these instruction discrepancies.

CNSWC is not completing pre/post deployment training on sexual assault and alcohol risk reduction factors for deploying staff members per OPNAVINST 1752.1B, Sexual Assault Victim Intervention Program, and DoDI6495.02 CH-1, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program Procedures.

High Risk Training (HRT) Program

CNSWC has not promulgated HRT policy in accordance with OPNAVINST 1500.75B, Policy and Procedures for Conducting High Risk Training. CNSWC has a draft HRT instruction in staffing. CNSWC has recently hired a full-time HRT Safety Officer as part of its effort to formalize their HRT program oversight.

CNSWC has a regular inspection schedule in place and is generally providing program oversight to ensure echelon 3 commands meet the minimum standards of OPNAVINST 1500.75B. However, we assess that CNSWC's oversight of one subordinate command (the Naval Special Warfare Center), which is responsible for a number of formal HRT courses, is insufficient to ensure that the Center operates in accordance with OPNAVINST 1500.75B.

Intelligence Oversight (IO)

NAVINSGEN conducted an IO inspection in conjunction with the Command Inspection. CNSWC has a very effective IO Program that meets requirements. Our separate IO report will identify recommendations for improvement in some aspects of program administration.

CNSWC Inspector General Performance

We conducted a quality assurance review of CNSWC IG Hotline and inspection programs and found them to be fully compliant. The IG Program is strong and meets all requirements.

Contents

Executive Summary.....	i
MISSION READINESS	ii
Counterintelligence-Human Intelligence (CI/HUMINT) Support	ii
Preservation of the Force and Families (POTFF).....	ii
CNSWC Coastal Campus Training Complex.....	iii
CNSWC Space Allocation.....	iv
Compliance Programs	iv
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program	iv
High Risk Training (HRT) Program	iv
Intelligence Oversight (IO)	iv
CNSWC Inspector General Performance.....	v
Areas/Programs Assessed.....	1
Observations and Findings.....	3
Mission Performance	3
Mission Readiness.....	3
Intelligence Oversight (IO)	7
Preservation of the Force and Families (POTFF).....	7
Personnel Training/Qualifications	8
Facilities, Environmental, Energy Conservation, and Safety and Occupational Health (SOH)	9
Overview	9
Shore Infrastructure Planning and Management	9
CNSWC Facilities	9
Environmental Readiness.....	10
Energy Conservation	11
Safety and Occupational Health.....	11
High Risk Training Assessment.....	12
Security Programs and Information Assurance	13
Command Security Programs	13
Industrial Security	14
Physical Security and Antiterrorism Force Protection (ATFP) Program.....	14

Operations Security (OPSEC).....	14
Emergency Action Plan (EAP).....	14
Information Assurance (IA) and Personally Identifiable Information (PII)	14
Resource Management/Compliance Programs	15
Post Deployment Health Reassessment (PDHRA)	15
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program	16
Sailor Programs	17
Appendix A: Issue Papers	18
Summary of Actions	18
APPENDIX B: Summary of Key Survey Results	22
Pre-Event Survey.....	22
Quality of Work Life	22
Command Climate Topics	24
Appendix C: Summary of Focus Group Perceptions	25
Focus Groups.....	25
Volatile Fiscal Environment.....	25
Manning/Manpower and Human Resources.....	25
Workload, Work Hours, Work Schedule, and Family Support.....	26
Facilities and Facilities Maintenance	26
Physical Fitness	26
Preservation of the Force and Families (POTFF).....	26
Leadership.....	26
Ombudsman Focus Group	27
Family Community	27
Family Resilience and Reintegration.....	27
Senior Leadership Engagement	27
APPENDIX D: Survey Response Frequency Report.....	28

Areas/Programs Assessed

- **Mission Performance**
 - Mission Readiness
 - Strategic Planning
 - Command Relationships and Communications
 - Intelligence Oversight
 - Total Force Management
 - Civilian Human Resource Services
 - Personnel Training/Qualifications
 - Continuity of Operations Plan
- **Facilities, Environmental, and Safety**
 - Facilities Management
 - Shore Infrastructure Planning and Management
 - Environmental Readiness
 - Energy Conservation
 - Safety and Occupational Health
 - High Risk Training Assessment
- **Security Programs and Information Assurance**
 - Command Security
 - Industrial Security
 - Physical Security and Antiterrorism Force Protection
 - Operations Security
 - Personnel Security
 - Insider Threat
 - Counterintelligence Support
 - Special Security Officer/Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
 - Information Security
 - Information Assurance and Personally Protected Information
- **Resource Management/Compliance Programs**
 - Comptroller Functions
 - Managers' Internal Control
 - Personal Property Management
 - Government Travel Charge Card
 - Government Commercial Purchase Card
 - Command Individual Augmentee Coordinator
 - Individual Medical Readiness
 - Physical Readiness Program
 - Urinalysis Program
 - Command Managed Equal Opportunity
 - Suicide Prevention
 - Drug and Alcohol Prevention
 - Hazing Policy Training and Compliance
 - Legal/Ethics

- Voting Assistance Program
- Inspector General Functions
- Post Deployment Health Reassessment
- Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
- **Sailor Programs**
 - Command Sponsorship
 - Command Indoctrination
 - Career Development Program

Observations and Findings

MISSION PERFORMANCE

The Mission Performance Team used survey and focus group responses, document review, and face-to-face interviews to assess Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command's (CNSWC) ability to accomplish its mission. We assessed mission readiness, manpower (civilian and military), strategic planning, command relationships and communications, staff training, and the Continuity of Operations Plan.

Our overall assessment is that CNSWC is executing its mission to organize, train, man, equip, educate, sustain, maintain combat readiness, and deploy assigned Active Component and Reserve Component Naval Special Warfare (NSW) forces and personnel to accomplish special operations missions assigned by Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM), and/or geographic combatant commanders employing special operations forces (SOF).

Mission Readiness

The Mission Performance Team assessed CNSWC's ability to conduct its mission per OPNAVINST 5450.221D, Mission and Functions of Naval Special Warfare Command. This instruction does not identify tasks associated with each function.

OPNAVINST 5450.221D, dated 2 February 2009, requires review and update. Per OPNAVINST 5400.44A, Navy Organization Change Manual, each command's mission, functions, and tasks instruction must be updated every three years. CNSWC's current signed mission and functions instruction is over five years old.

Deficiency 1. OPNAVINST 5450.221D requires review and update to maintain periodicity of 3 years per OPNAVINST 5400.44A, Section 3, Article 131, paragraph c(1).

CNSWC uses Mission Essential Tasks (METs) to execute its mission under its operational commander, CDRUSSOCOM. This mission, per USSOCOM Directive Number 10-1cc, dated 15 December 2009, is the same as its mission per OPNAVINST 5450.22 with the exception of recruiting, which USSOCOM specifically calls out separately from manning. CNSWC uses 41 separate USSOCOM-approved METs to delineate the tasks they complete in order to fully execute their mission. These METs are selected from the Universal Joint Task and Universal Navy Task Lists and were last approved 7 May 2014; USSOCOM approves these METs annually and reassesses every 30 days. We assessed CNSWC's ability to conduct these METs using specific standards approved by USSOCOM for each task.

The CNSWC mission and functions were assessed as being satisfactorily executed. Thirty-two of the 41 METs were assessed as being fully executed and meeting the associated standard(s),

six were assessed as being executed but not meeting the standard, and three were assessed as requiring modification to properly apply to CNSWC. Areas of note or areas of concern are discussed below.

The following six METs are being executed but are not meeting the associated USSOCOM standard(s):

- MET SN 4.1.1 specifies force-wide manning levels within CNSWC. CNSWC is below the prescribed manning level standard in the following areas:
 - Standard 8: Funded Reserve CWO/LDO billet manning (standard: >80%, actual: 42.9%).
 - Standard 9: Funded Reserve SEAL enlisted billet manning (standard: > 80%, actual: 72.1%).
 - Standard 10: Funded Reserve SEAL officer billet manning (standard: > 80%, actual: 60.9%).
 - Standard 11: Funded Reserve SWCC enlisted billet manning (standard: > 80%, actual 47.3%).

Deficiency 2. MET SN 4.1.1 prescribed manning percentages for Reserve SEAL, SWCC and CWO/LDO officer and enlisted billets are not being met. Reference: MET SN 4.1.1, Standards 8, 9, 10, and 11.

- MET SN 4.3.1 specifies force-wide retention rates within CNSWC. CNSWC is below the prescribed manning level standard in the following areas:
 - Standard 2: Overall SEAL retention (standard: >80%, actual: 78.3%).
 - Standard 3: Overall SWCC retention (standard: >80%, actual: 68.4%).

Deficiency 3. MET SN 4.3.1 prescribed standards for overall SEAL and SWCC, retention percentages are not met. Reference: MET SN 4.3.1, Standards 2 and 3.

- MET SN 2.1 addresses strategic intelligence activities. CNSWC is below the prescribed manning level standard (Standard 4) for Counterintelligence-Human Intelligence (CI/HUMINT) Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) 3913 personnel in support of NSW operations. The standard is >90%; (b) (7) (F)
- The overall inventory of Intelligence Specialist Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC 3913) CI/HUMINT Sailors is insufficient to fill billets authorized, per Bureau of Naval Personnel, Information Dominance Corps Branch (BUPERS 327), USSOCOM WFT – CI/HUMINT (NEC 3913) Inventory Update, 10 January 2014). (b) (7) (F)

- BUPERS has taken several actions to resolve the manning levels deficiency. Specifically, in 2012, NEC 3912 was removed as a pre-requisite for NEC 3913, providing a larger pool of potential volunteers; in 2013, a Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) was added for NEC 3913 in Zones B and C per NAVADMIN 081/14; and this year, a Special Duty Assignment Pay is being proposed for NEC 3913 personnel filling NSW billets.
- There are several challenges to establishing and maintaining a sufficient NEC 3913 inventory.
 - The NEC 3913 certification course, run by the Marine Corps, is 9 months long, but there is no career path in place to keep 3913 qualified personnel in subsequent CI billets after their initial assignment. These personnel would be professionally at-risk if they remained in a CI billet as they would miss other career milestones necessary for advancement. As a result, the 9 month investment to qualify a 3913 gets a poor return on investment, typically only a single tour per course graduate.
 - NEC 3913 Sailors have no access to advanced CI/HUMINT training. Additionally, there is no Navy “C” school for these Sailors to develop more advanced capabilities. Such a school would support a CI/HUMINT career path.
 - The Marine Air-Ground Task Force CI/HUMINT school is the only CI/HUMINT school that trains Navy and Marine Corps CI/HUMINT students. The Navy does not fill all of its allocated seats. As a result, the Navy is at risk of losing class seats if it cannot fill them with students as the Marine Corps continues to have a strong requirement for this capability and may seek to take back some of the Navy’s seats.
- NEC 3913 personnel complete the same qualifying school as Marine Corps CI/HUMINT personnel; however, they do not have the same level (b) (7) (f) as their Marine Corps counterparts.
 - SECNAVINST 3850.2C, Department of the Navy Counterintelligence, recognizes Marine Corps graduates of established CI certification courses, but was written before the Navy established NEC 3913, and therefore does not address Navy CI/HUMINT certification, nor grant the same tactical authorities and credentialing to the Navy CI program as it does for the Marine Corps CI program.
 - This instruction is undergoing revision. The stakeholders of the instruction have agreed that Navy uniformed CI personnel should have the same tactical CI authorities as their Marine CI counterparts; however, a revision of the instruction that formally allows these authorities has not been promulgated.
- This shortfall in CI/HUMINT enlisted personnel manning is discussed in detail in Issue Paper A-1.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Deficiency 4. MET SN 2.1 prescribed manning standard for CI/HUMINT NEC 3913 across CNSWC is not being met. Reference: MET SN 2.1, Standard 4.

- MET ST 5.1 addresses theater Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) requirements. Standard 3 requires that essential Command and Control (C2) nodes have redundant communications paths. At the time of our inspection, CNSWC maintained a single C2 connection with no redundancy from CNSWC to point of presence for connectivity into the global information grid at Naval Amphibious Base (NAB) Coronado. CNSWC personnel are aware of this lack of redundancy and are working with Navy Region Southwest to establish a second fiber optic conduit. Mitigations in place include a near-real-time backup available through the use of an onsite SOF deployable node-medium.

Deficiency 5. MET ST 5.1 prescribed standard requirement for essential C2 nodes to have redundant communication paths is not met. Reference: MET SN 5.1, Standard 3.

- MET NTA 4.12.9 addresses Medical and Non-Medical Personnel casualty care training. CNSWC is not meeting the following prescribed standard:
 - Standard 1: All SEAL/SWCC medics must complete a two week sustainment training course at Joint Special Operations Medical Training Center (JSOMTC) every two years. These medics are not uniformly completing the training every two years; however, no team or unit is deploying without a sufficient cadre of medics within training or refresher periodicity.

Deficiency 6. MET NTA 4.12.9 prescribed 100 percent standard for SEAL and SWCC Medic sustainment training force-wide within 2 year periodicity is not met. Reference: MET ST 4.12.9, Standard 1.

- MET AFTA 1.6.2.3 Standard 2 requires that human performance and sports medicine facilities be combined into a single facility. Not all CNSWC human performance and sports medicine facilities are combined. CNSWC is unable to meet this standard due to the recent suspension of all Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF) related Military Construction (MILCON) in accordance with USSOCOM Memorandum, Addendum to Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 Operations and Maintenance Fiscal Guidance, dated 1 May 2014.

Deficiency 7. MET AFTA 1.6.2.3 prescribed standard to combine Human Performance and Sports Medicine Facilities to support NSW operators is not met. References: MET ST 1.6.2.3, Standard 2 and USSOCOM Memorandum, Addendum to Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 Operations and Maintenance Fiscal Guidance, dated 1 May 2014.

The following three METs are being executed but require modification to properly apply to CNSWC:

- MET SN 7.1.2 assigns responsibility to CNSWC to maintain five critical NSW doctrinal publications. CNSWC is maintaining the five listed publications, but there are 14 additional critical NSW doctrinal publications that should be included in this standard.

Recommendation 1. MET SN 7.1.2 requires a modification to properly list the critical NSW doctrinal publications maintained by CNSWC.

- MET SN 7.1.3 requires CNSWC to determine needs for warfighting and military operations other than war (MOOTW), develop and prioritize solutions based on military judgment, cost benefit analysis, and new technology. This MET is not optimally assigned to the appropriate codes at CNSWC. It is assigned to N5 but should also be assigned to other codes as well, including N3 and N8.

Recommendation 2. CNSWC review and update MET SN 7.1.3 to reflect appropriate MET Standards assignment to CNSWC N-Codes (N3, N5, & N8).

- MET SN 7.2.4 incorporates four standards that apply to developmental, test and evaluation (DT&E) and operational test and evaluation (OT&E). The MET is assigned to CNSWC N8, but CNSWC staff confirmed that this MET should not apply to CNSWC as they are not responsible for DT&E and OT&E acquisition milestone decisions. We recommend this MET be reviewed, updated, or deleted.

Recommendation 3. CNSWC review, update, or delete MET SN 7.2.4 and Standards applying to DT&E and OT&E.

Intelligence Oversight (IO)

An inspection of CNSWC's IO program was conducted as a separate and distinct event per SECNAVINST 3820.3E, Oversight of Intelligence Activities within the Department of the Navy. Review of the program confirms that CNSWC's practices and procedures meet IO requirements of Executive Order 12333, Presidential order guiding United States Intelligence Activities; DoD Directive 5240.01, DoD Intelligence Activities; DoD Regulation 5240.1-R, Procedures Guiding the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect U.S. Persons; and SECNAVINST 3820.3E. NAVINSGEN's full evaluation of the program and associated activities, as well as recommended improvements, was reported separately.

Preservation of the Force and Families (POTFF)

CNSWC's POTFF is an NSW Sailor and family resilience enhancement program concept with many aspects including initiatives and programs that provide holistic psychological, spiritual, physical performance and counseling support to NSW members (including non-SEAL service members) and their families. CNSWC assesses that this program has been successful in:

- Reducing destructive behaviors.

- Helping Sailors cope with the stresses of repeated deployments conducting combat operations and facilitating a “reset” as they prepare for future deployments.
- Improving combat readiness with a comprehensive physical readiness program (currently known as the Human Performance Program) designed to both rehabilitate and prevent injuries.
- Providing support to families (for partners and children) through counselor and social worker support.

CNSWC has some metrics that demonstrate the impact of these programs and is continuing to develop additional metrics.

POTFF funding comes from a mix of USSOCOM Major Force Program 11 (MFP-11), Navy Major Force Program 2 (MFP-2), and Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) Major Force Program 8 (MFP-8) dollars. POTFF is viewed as very successful by CNSWC. However, SOCOM guidance for Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 interprets Congressional Appropriations Committee direction as restricting the use of MFP-11 funds for certain elements of POTFF. In the absence of specific authorization and appropriation, the loss of this funding of nearly \$1 million will reduce in scope the human physical performance and family counseling support components at the end of FY14. Fourteen Human Performance contractors supporting this program were released between April and May 2014, and five Family Support contractors will stop working by 29 September 2014. Congressional Appropriations committee mandates that “service common” programs should be accommodated by the individual services. Separately, BUMED has indicated to CNSW their intent to divest all non-clinical services (anonymous online resilience surveys, post-deployment retreats, and educational workshops) associated with this program after 4th quarter FY15. These two independent events will dramatically reduce NSW family support structure and will eliminate their resilience workshops and retreats.

CNSWC is concerned that many outside NSW will not recognize the need to sustain these programs as the United States draws down from combat operations in Afghanistan. The drawdown and transition to Global SOF Network will not lessen the global demand for NSW forces, the strain on Sailors and their families, or the unique SOF physical readiness requirements. In our view, CNSWC has proactively developed a thoughtful, comprehensive approach to deal with the unique challenges within the NSW community. POTFF puts people first and demonstrates commitment to the NSW team. Accordingly, we recommend Navy fund these POTFF initiatives.

Personnel Training/Qualifications

General Military Training (GMT) is not completed by all military personnel as directed by OPNAVINST 1500.22G, General Military Training. CNSWC’s FY13 GMT completion rate was 54 percent. At the time of our inspection, CNSWC’s FY14 GMT completion rate was 77 percent and assessed as on track to meet end of fiscal year goals in accordance with OPNAVINST 1500.22G and NAVADMIN 264/13, FY-14 General Military Training Schedule.

CNSWC's civilian staff training FY13 completion rate was 91 percent. FY 14 training completion was 56 percent and assessed as on track to meet end of fiscal year goals.

Deficiency 8. CNSCW staff GMT (based on FY13 data) is not completed by all military personnel. Reference: OPNAVINST 1500.22G, paragraph 4c.

FACILITIES, ENVIRONMENTAL, ENERGY CONSERVATION, AND SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH (SOH)

The Facilities, Environmental, Energy, and Safety Team assessed management, oversight, compliance, and execution of programs associated with each subject area through document reviews, data analysis, site visits, focus group and survey comments, and interviews with the CNSWC facilities and safety staff.

Overview

NAVINGEN found that the CNSWC Facilities and Engineering Cell is executing all shore related mission requirements and is providing effective echelon 2 oversight and coordination of all required facilities planning and environmental planning/compliance. CNSWC SOH programs were found to meet all required program elements in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, and policies. CNSWC SOH oversight of subordinate commands was assessed to be effective. The CNSWC High Risk Training (HRT) program, and oversight of lower echelon HRT, is an area that requires improvement.

Shore Infrastructure Planning and Management

CNSWC effectively plans for and manages its shore infrastructure and provides effective oversight of lower echelons to support facilities requirements across the Force.

CNSWC Facilities

Across the CNSWC enterprise, assigned facilities represent 62 percent of the calculated Basic Facility Requirement (BFR), as defined in the Unified Facilities Criteria 2-000-05N, Facility Planning for Navy and Marine Corps Shore Installations. CNSWC has a total of 29 approved MILCON projects programmed in FY15; 19 (totaling \$837 million). If all 29 projects are funded and built, the CNSWC enterprise will improve their overall BFR, but will still face a notable facilities shortfall.

CNSWC's facilities challenges are primarily in Navy Region Southwest (NRSW) where they are at 55 percent of the BFR. In the San Diego metro area they are at 42 percent of BFR. The relatively low percentages are primarily driven by shortfalls in administrative, training and warehouse space. In order to create a short-to-mid-term solution to this notable space allocation deficit, CNSWC is using temporary modular structures (e.g., Building 603M) to provide workspace for headquarters staff personnel who do not have office space in the Headquarters (Building 624). Additional temporary modular structures are being employed across the NSWC west coast footprint to mitigate the space allocation deficits.

Discussions with a senior facility planner from Commander, Navy Region Southwest confirmed that CNSWC's space shortfall is the most severe of any command in the region. This space deficit largely results from a lag in infrastructure recapitalization and expansion to match CNSWC's notable mission growth over the last decade. A multi-year, multi-project MILCON program at Naval Base Coronado Silver Strand Training Complex (addressed below) will bring CNSWC to approximately 95 percent of its BFR requirement in both Navy Region Southwest and the San Diego metro area.

Military Construction

CNSWC's facility Master Plan includes a 10-year \$700 million MFP-11 (USSOCOM funded) MILCON program on the Naval Base Coronado Silver Strand Training Complex (SSTC) to develop a NSW Coastal Campus that will consolidate a wide range of training evolutions, several of which are currently conducted out of the San Diego area. This program also co-locates some of their west coast echelon 3 and 4 commands that are currently dispersed across NAB Coronado to SSTC. This program will notably improve CNSWC's space (square-footage) deficiencies in the San Diego metro area, improve overall force facility condition. More importantly, the Coastal Campus will provide proximity, privacy, and primacy to improve the effectiveness of NSW training.

To enable completion of the Coastal Campus, NRSW has identified, developed and submitted two infrastructure support projects to Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC) for inclusion in the Navy MILCON Program. These include:

- P-991 Coastal Campus Utilities Infrastructure (\$85.2 million) which develops: vehicular and pedestrian roads and walkways; demolishes an existing bunker; and provides water, sewer, natural gas, and communications infrastructure.
- P-947 Coastal Campus Entry Control Point (ECP) (\$11 million) that constructs a new ECP at the north entrance.
- A third project will leverage the Defense Access Road Program to fund some offsite traffic improvements that must be in place by 2024.

Responsibility for financing of these projects has not yet been determined (MFP-11 or MFP-2) and funds have not been secured. CNSWC, Commander, Navy Region Southwest (CNRSW), and CNIC are working to resolve funding responsibility to meet these infrastructure support requirements and ensure that ~\$100 million in utilities and security projects does not prevent the construction of ~\$700 million in CNSWC training and operational projects. This issue is nearing decision.

Environmental Readiness

The following environmental programs were reviewed and found to be compliant:

- Hazardous material/waste

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

- Spill prevention
- Storm water
- Drinking water
- Waste water
- Air pollution
- Environmental impact statements
- Environmental assessments
- Categorical exclusions
- Natural and cultural resources requirements for applicability, implementation, and monitoring within the CNSWC area of responsibility

CNSWC runs a strong and well-organized environmental program, providing effective oversight of its subordinate commands' environmental planning and compliance programs as required by OPNAVINST 5090.1D, Environmental Readiness Program Manual. Their environmental programs are operating in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, and policies. The command has no current or recent Notices of Violation pending with local, state, and federal regulatory agencies.

Energy Conservation

CNSWC is compliant with SECNAVINST 4101.3, Department of the Navy Energy Program for Security and Independence Roles and Responsibilities, and OPNAVINST 4100.5E, Shore Energy Management. Operational Energy and Shore Energy program areas were examined through document reviews and personal interviews.

Safety and Occupational Health

CNSWC SOH programs were assessed for compliance with Title 29, U.S.C. 651-678, Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, safety related rules, regulations, and standards promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and policies outlined in OPNAVINST 5100.23G CH-1, Navy Safety and Occupational Health Program Manual. During our inspection we reviewed the following aspects of SOH and found them to be compliant with governing directives:

- Command SOH policy
- SOH oversight of subordinate commands
- Headquarters SOH program
- Training and qualifications of safety professionals assigned to CNSWC
- Training and qualifications of collateral duty safety officers at subordinate commands
- Operational risk management
- CNSWC safety councils, committees, and working groups.
- Safety database input
- Safety trend analysis
- Safety self-assessment
- Explosive safety
- Diving safety

- Air safety (jump/parachute)
- Acquisition safety
- Traffic safety (including motorcycle safety)
- Recreational/off-duty safety

CNSWC maintains a robust Headquarters Safety Program and a mature SOH Program that effectively meets all required program elements in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, and policies listed above. CNSWC provides effective SOH oversight of subordinate commands.

High Risk Training Assessment

HRT was assessed for compliance with OPNAVINST 1500.75B, Policy and Procedures for Conducting High Risk Training.

CNSWC has not promulgated HRT policy in accordance with OPNAVINST 1500.75B. CNSWC is designated as a Training Agency per OPNAVINST 1500.75B, paragraph 5.c. As a Training Agency, they are required to promulgate additional policy and procedural guidance governing HRT across its force. This amplifying policy and procedural guidance is required for a range of HRT issues, including:

- Developing and implementing safety oversight criteria.
- Incorporation of operational risk management and safety awareness training into instructor training.
- Establishment of and adherence to curricula safety requirements.
- Establishment of an instructor certification process.
- Establishment of a mishap analysis program to examine near miss/hit and mishap data.
- Ensuring members (military, officer and enlisted, civilian, and contractor) nominated as high-risk instructors meet suitability requirements.
- Cold and heat stress environmental mitigation relative to high-risk training events.
- Employment of contractors' scope of duties, to include periodic review of qualifications and skills.
- Training safety relative to pool and waterborne high-risk events.

CNSWC is developing an HRT instruction that will promulgate policy and program guidance across its force. CNSWC recently hired a full-time HRT Safety Officer and is in the process of formalizing its HRT Program. The HRT Safety Officer is knowledgeable on HRT issues and understands the requirements of the program.

CNSWC has a regular inspection schedule in place and is generally providing program oversight to ensure that echelon 3 commands meet the minimum standards of OPNAVINST 1500.75B. However, we assess that CNSWC's oversight of one subordinate command, Naval Special Warfare Center (the Center), which is responsible for a number of formal HRT courses, is insufficient to ensure that the Center operates in accordance with OPNAVINST 1500.75B.

- CNSWC has no record of conducting a HRT oversight inspection of the Center over the past three years. The Naval Safety Center conducted a HRT Assist Visit at the Center from 17-21 June 2013. CNSWC did not conduct an oversight inspection of the Center in 2013, but rather, used the findings of the assist visit to take credit for the oversight inspection. The conduct of an assist visit by the Naval Safety Center does not relieve CNSWC of its HRT oversight responsibilities of the Center. Additionally, there was no formal follow-up by CNSWC to ensure that the discrepancies identified during the assist visit, detailed in Naval Safety Center, Ser 04/0594, 22 July 2013, were corrected.
- Of note, during the assist visit, the Naval Safety Center identified the lack of CNSWC HRT oversight of the Center as a deficiency.

Deficiency 9. CNSWC has not promulgated HRT policy. Reference: OPNAVINST 1500.75B, paragraph 5c.

Deficiency 10. CNSWC has not provided sufficient oversight of the HRT Program at the Center. Reference OPNAVINST 1500.75B, paragraph 5c.

Recommendation 4. That CNSWC conduct a HRT oversight inspection of the Center to ensure compliance with OPNAVINST 1500.75B.

Recommendation 5. That CNSWC request a HRT Assist Visit from the Naval Safety Center.

SECURITY PROGRAMS AND INFORMATION ASSURANCE

The Security Programs and Information Assurance Team used survey and focus group responses, document review, and face-to-face interviews to assess these areas. CNSWC has robust security and information assurance programs. These programs are well run and effective.

Command Security Programs

CNSWC's command security programs are well managed with effective oversight over subordinate echelons. We observed a small security staff consisting of well trained and experienced professionals managing industrial, information, and personnel security programs for headquarters and providing oversight for the NSW enterprise.

Recommendation 6. That CNSWC require security self-assessments be submitted annually from subordinate echelons. Annual self-assessments allow for continued oversight and dialogue between CNSWC oversight inspections.

Recommendation 7. That CNSWC consider leveraging relationships with other commands in the same geographical area as CNSWC subordinate commands to conduct security assist visits and assessments.

Industrial Security

CNSWC's Industrial Security Program Instruction is currently in routing for final signature. Within the last two years, CNSWC brought all contractual authority up to the echelon 2 level and has developed their industrial security program to support. CNSWC generated a full-time equivalent (FTE) registry for the command to use in tracking all contracts and contractors. The FTE registry enables CNSWC to maintain situational awareness of all industrial personnel supporting the Force, including contracted personnel provided by other Services and government agencies. The Command Security Manager maintains all DD FORM 254s, Department of Defense Contract Security Classification Specifications, as required.

Deficiency 11. CNSWC does not have an Industrial Security Instruction. Reference: SECNAV M-5510.36, paragraph 11-1.

Recommendation 8. That CNSWC include Counterintelligence training and reporting requirements for all required contractors in all DD FORM 254, Department of Defense Contract Security Classification Specifications.

Physical Security and Antiterrorism Force Protection (ATFP) Program

CNSWC's Physical Security and ATFP programs are well managed and adequately manned to support oversight of subordinate echelons. NAVINSGEN observed a strong random antiterrorism measures program.

Recommendation 9. That CNSWC designate via letter, Building 624 as a Restricted Access Area beginning at the quarterdeck throughout the entirety of Building 624 (including posting of designation signs).

Operations Security (OPSEC)

CNSWC's OPSEC Program is a well-managed and administratively strong program with effective oversight of lower echelons.

Recommendation 10. That CNSWC periodically request an OPSEC survey from Naval Information Operations Command (NIOC) Norfolk, Naval OPSEC Support Team (NOST) to support continuous assessment of the program.

Emergency Action Plan (EAP)

NAVINSGEN observed that CNSWC maintains two separate documents identified as EAPs in two different departments. Both documents are similar in scope and direction.

Recommendation 11. That CNSWC coordinate between departments to consolidate the two separate documents into one CNSWC EAP.

Information Assurance (IA) and Personally Identifiable Information (PII)

NAVINSGEN observed well managed CNSWC IA and PII programs that provide oversight of subordinate echelons. The CNSWC staff is made up of well trained and experienced

professionals. An update to the CNSWC Cyber Security Instruction is in staffing that will reflect recent updates to the USSOCOM Cyber Security Instruction (USSOCOM M380-3), dated December 2013. The CNSWC Cyber Security Instruction meets all Navy and DoD Cyber security requirements.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT/COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS

The Resource Management/Compliance Programs Team assessed 18 programs and functions. Our findings reflect inputs from survey respondents, onsite focus group participants, document review, and face-to-face personnel interviews.

The following programs and functions are considered to be well administered and in compliance with applicable directives:

- Comptroller Functions
- Managers' Internal Control
- Personal Property Management
- Government Travel Charge Card
- Government Commercial Purchase Card
- Command Individual Augmentee Coordinator Program
- Individual Medical Readiness
- Physical Readiness Program
- Urinalysis Program
- Command Managed Equal Opportunity
- Suicide Prevention
- Drug and Alcohol Prevention
- Hazing Policy Training and Compliance
- Legal and Ethics
- Voting Assistance
- Inspector General Functions

Compliant programs with comment:

Post Deployment Health Reassessment (PDHRA)

CNSWC closely monitors PDHRA completion for headquarters personnel, as well as throughout the NSW force (BSO 88). Compliance by CNSWC (defined as PDHRA completion within the 90-180 day window following redeployment, as established by DoDINST 6490.03, Deployment Health) has improved markedly as compared to one year ago. PDHRA compliance for eligible headquarters personnel has been at 100 percent for nearly six months. However, the most recent monthly PDHRA compliance across BSO 88 was 66 percent (quarterly BSO 88 compliance was 76 percent and Navywide was 87 percent). Compliance for BSO 88 regularly falls below the U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFFC) target of 95 percent as set forth in NAVADMIN 007/12.

Internal and external challenges to further improving PDHRA compliance are being worked aggressively by CNSWC. First, coordination with USFFC (Navy's Executive Agent for Deployment

Health) will soon result in relief of CNSWC accountability for PDHRA compliance for NSW personnel assigned to certain Joint Special Operations Command frequent deployer billets. Second, CNSWC is working to make greater use of combining the Periodic Health Assessment (PHA) with Post Deployment Health Assessment (PDHA)/PDHRA when timeframes coincide, especially for NSW personnel who are frequent deployers as defined by OPNAVINST 6100.3, Deployment Health Assessment (DHA) Process. Third, NAVADMIN 231/13 added having a current PDHA and/or PDHRA, when applicable, as a requirement to participate in the Periodic Fitness Assessment (PFA). The new PFA requirement will not guarantee compliance (vice completion), but it will reinforce other efforts toward PDHRA timeliness.

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program

The CNSWC leadership team is committed to ensuring an environment free of sexual assault (SA) and is proactive in attacking sexual assault. CNSWC implemented a Force SAPR Program Manager role in addition to the required SAPR Program roles to oversee force wide training and provide subordinate compliance support down to the echelon 4 level. Some specific issues for improvement:

CNSWC SAPR Instruction

CNSWC's SAPR instruction, CNSWCINST 1752.1, dated 5 August 2010, is inaccurate and does not reflect the requirements of the program as documented in DoD, SECNAV, and OPNAV SAPR instructions. As a result, several SAPR roles, responsibilities, and processes at the command are incorrect, including those described below. Of note, since there have been no reports of sexual assault at CNSWC over the past 48 months, the command has not incorrectly handled any SA cases as a result of these instruction discrepancies.

- The CNSWC Headquarters reporting chain for sexual assaults, as written, would not preserve confidentiality and is not in accordance with OPNAVINST 1752.1B, Sexual Assault Victim Intervention (SAVI) Program.
 - Officer SA victim reporting goes from the SAPR Victim Advocate (VA) or Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC) to the Chief of Staff (COS)/Commanding Officer of Enlisted Personnel or Executive Officer instead of directly to the Commander. The Officer SA victim reporting chain should not include additional personnel between the SAPR VA or SARC and the Commander. Per DoDI 6495.02 CH-1, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program Procedures, SECNAVINST 1752.4B, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response, and OPNAVINST 1752.1B, the victim's Commander shall be notified directly by the SAPR VA or SARC within 24 hours of an SA report.
 - The enlisted SA victim reporting procedure is compliant with OPNAVINST 1752.1B; however, the Chief of Staff (COS)/Commanding Officer of enlisted personnel's authority to act as the Commander regarding enlisted SA victim response and care should be in writing and formally communicated to both officer and enlisted personnel.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Sexual Assault Case Management Group (SACMG) Representation and Attendance

CNSWC SACMG representation and attendance procedures do not fully comply with governing SAPR Program instructions. Since CNSWC has not received an SA report in over four years, there has not been a requirement for recent SACMG attendance. However, through interviews and CNSWC SAPR program document review, NAVINSGEN observed that the COS/Commanding Officer of enlisted personnel or Executive Officer would attend the SACMG. Neither the COS/Commanding Officer of enlisted personnel nor Executive Officer have been authorized in writing to attend the SACMG on behalf of the Commander.

- Per DoDI 6495.02 CH-1, SECNAVINST 1752.4B, and OPNAVINST 1752.1B, the Commander must attend the SACMG and provide an update to SA victims within 72 hours after the SACMG.
- Alternatively, for enlisted SA victim cases, the COS/Commanding Officer of enlisted personnel may attend the SACMG on behalf of the Commander and provide the required update to victims.

Pre/Post Deployment Training

In the previous 18 months, 5 CNSWC personnel deployed to Outside [the] Contiguous United States locations for periods of 3 to 12 months. No pre/post deployment training was conducted regarding sexual assault prevention and response and alcohol risk reduction factors for deploying staff members per DoDI 6495.02 CH-1 and OPNAVINST 1752.1B.

Deficiency 12. The CNSWC SAPR instruction, CNSWCINST 1752.1, dated 5 August 2010, is inaccurate and does not reflect the requirements of the program as documented in DoDI 6495.02 CH-1, SECNAVINST 1752.4B, and OPNAVINST 1752.1B.

Deficiency 13. CNSWC does not provide pre/post deployment briefings for deploying staff members on sexual assault prevention and response and alcohol risk reduction factors.
References: DoDI 6495.02 CH-1 and OPNAVINST 1752.1B.

Recommendation 12. That the Command review the need for a separate, command-level SAPR instruction. It may be more appropriate and effective to cancel CNSWCINST 1752.1, adhere to DoD, SECNAV, and OPNAV instructions, and promulgate notices that specify procedures and issues that are unique to CNSWC.

SAILOR PROGRAMS

Brilliant on the Basics Programs were reviewed and behavior associated with good order and discipline was closely observed. Overall, command morale and perceptions of quality of life (QOL) were noted to be average. Enlisted Sailors displayed outstanding military bearing and maintained a professional appearance. The Command Sponsorship, Command Indoctrination, and Career Development Programs were found to be compliant.

Appendix A: Issue Papers

SUMMARY OF ACTIONS

Issue Papers that follow require responses to recommendations in the form of Implementation Status Reports (ISRs). If you are an Action Officer for a staff listed in Table A-1, please submit ISRs as specified for each applicable recommendation, along with supporting documentation, such as plans of action and milestones and implementing directives.

- Submit initial ISRs using OPNAV Form 5040/2 no later than 1 November 2014. Each ISR should include an e-mail address for the action officer, where available. This report is distributed through Navy Taskers. ISRs should be submitted through the assigned document control number in Navy Taskers. An electronic version of OPNAV Form 5040/2 is added to the original Navy Tasker Package along with the inspection report, upon distribution.
- Submit quarterly ISRs, including "no change" reports until the recommendation is closed by NAVINSGEN. When a long-term action is dependent upon prior completion of another action, the status report should indicate the governing action and its estimated completion date. Further status reports may be deferred, with NAVINSGEN concurrence.
- When action addressees consider required action accomplished, the status report submitted should contain the statement, "Action is considered complete." However, NAVINSGEN approval must be obtained before the designated action addressee is released from further reporting responsibilities on the recommendation.
- NAVINSGEN point of contact for ISRs is (b) (7) (c), Telephone: (202) 433 (b) (7) (c), DSN 288- (b) (7) (c), Facsimile: (202) 433-7974, E-mail: (b) (7) (c) @navy.mil.

Table A-1. Action Officer Listing for Implementation Status Reports

COMMAND	RECOMMENDATION NUMBER(S) XXX-14
DUSN(P)	017
OPNAV N2/N6	018, 020, 021
BUPERS	019

Issue Paper A-1: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) SUPPORT TO NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE (NSW)

- References:
- (a) Bureau of Naval Personnel, Information Dominance Corps Branch (BUPERS 327), USSOCOM WFT – CI/HUMINT (NEC 3913) Inventory Update, 10 Jan 14
 - (b) NAVADMIN 081/14, Selective Reenlistment Bonus and Policy Update, RMG DTG 101942Z APR 14
 - (c) SECNAVINST 3850.2C, Department of the Navy Counterintelligence, 20 Jul 05
 - (d) USSOCOM Memorandum, Naval Service Enabler for Special Operations Forces, 7 Jun 10

Issue: The DON strategic CI requirements process is not supporting Navy CI requirements for Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command (CNSWC) or other Navy units.

Background: Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) 3913 coded CI billets are not being sufficiently filled to support NSW or broader Navy CI requirements. Additionally, NEC 3913 CI personnel are not (b) (7) (f)

Discussion: The overall inventory of Intelligence Specialist Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC 3913) Counterintelligence-Human Intelligence (CI/HUMINT) Sailors is insufficient to fill billets authorized, per reference (a) and information provided by CNSWC. (b) (7) (f)

BUPERS has taken several actions to resolve the manning levels deficiency. Specifically, in 2012, NEC 3912 was removed as a pre-requisite for NEC 3913, providing a larger pool of potential volunteers; in 2013, a Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) was added for NEC 3913 in Zones B and C per reference (b); and in 2014, a Special Duty Assignment Pay is proposed for NEC 3913 personnel filling NSW billets.

There are several challenges to establishing and maintaining a sufficient NEC 3913 inventory.

- The NEC 3913 certification course, run by the Marine Corps, is 9 months long, but there is no career path in place to keep 3913 qualified personnel in follow on CI billets after their initial assignment. These personnel would be professionally at-risk if

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

they remained in a CI billet as they would miss other career milestones necessary for advancement. As a result, the 9 month investment to qualify a 3913 gets a poor return on investment, typically only a single tour per course graduate.

- NEC 3913 Sailors have no access to advanced CI/HUMINT training (the Joint CI Training Academy limits training to credentialed CI Agents). Additionally, there is no Navy “C” school for these Sailors to develop more advanced capabilities. Such a school would support a CI/HUMINT career path.
- The Marine Air-Ground Task Force CI/HUMINT school is the only DON CI/HUMINT school that trains Navy and Marine Corps CI/HUMINT students. Navy does not fill all of its allocated seats. As a result, the Navy is at risk of losing class seats if it cannot fill them with students as the Marine Corp continues to have a strong requirement for this capability and may seek to take back some of the Navy’s seats.

NEC 3913 personnel complete the same qualifying school as Marine Corps CI/HUMINT personnel; however, they do not have the same level of authority and credentialing as their Marine Corps counterparts.

- Reference (c) recognizes Marine Corps graduates of established CI certification courses, but was written before Navy established NEC 3913, and therefore does not address Navy CI/HUMINT certification, nor grant the same tactical authorities and credentialing to the Navy uniformed CI program as it does for the Marine Corps CI program.
- Reference (c) is being updated. The stakeholders of the instruction have agreed that Navy uniformed CI personnel should have the same tactical CI authorities as their Marine Corps CI counterparts.
- Once reference (c) is updated, or interim guidance is published granting Navy uniformed CI/HUMINT personnel the same tactical authorities and credentialing as their Marine Corps counterparts, further OPNAV-level guidance will be required to provide specific parameters associated with these authorities to mitigate risk. (b) (7) (f)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Per reference (d), as early as 2010, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), CNSWC, and U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) coordinated with the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) to program for enhanced support to SOF. (b) (7) (F)

[REDACTED] his included establishing several NCIS billets at NSWC headquarters and at lower echelon commands. (b) (7) (F)

[REDACTED] NCIS and CNSWC continue collaborative efforts to improve the situation.

Recommendations: 017-14. That Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy for Policy (DUSN(P)) revise and publish reference (c), or promulgate interim guidance that allows the Navy's uniformed CI personnel tactical CI authorities.

018-14. That OPNAV N2/N6 publish guidance for the Navy's tactical CI activities upon promulgation of authority from DUSN(P) that allows the Navy's uniformed CI personnel tactical CI authorities.

019-14. That BUPERS further incentivize Sailors to volunteer for positions requiring NEC 3913.

020-14. That OPNAV N2/N6 consider coordinating with other Services to request CI/HUMINT support until Navy is able to fully develop its required inventory of NEC 3913 personnel.

021-14. That OPNAV N2/N6 consider establishing a formal career path for NEC 3913 personnel.

NAVINGEN POC: (b) (7) (c), USN
(202) 433-^{(b) (7) (c)}; DSN 288-^{(b) (7) (c)}
(b) (7) (c)@navy.mil

APPENDIX B: Summary of Key Survey Results

Pre-Event Survey

In support of the CNSWC Command Inspection held 12-16 May 2014, NAVINSGEN conducted an anonymous online survey of active duty military and DON civilian personnel from 12 March to 18 April 2014 to assess QOL and various topics that may be indicative of command climate or potential obstacles to job performance. The survey produced 315 respondents (125 military, 190 civilian). According to reported demographics the sample overrepresented the DON civilian workforce with a 5 percent margin of error at the 99 percent confidence level. Selected topics are summarized in the sections below. A frequency report is provided in Appendix D.

- The survey quantitatively assessed QOWL.
- The survey queried active duty military members about physical readiness and performance counseling.
- The survey queried civilians about their position description, performance counseling, human resource service center, and human resource office.
- The survey queried both military and civilians regarding topics such as working hours, resources, facilities, communication, travel, safety, training, command climate, and leadership.
- The survey included short answer questions regarding various topics such as supplies purchased with personal money, facilities in need of repair, and any additional comments or concerns regarding QOL.

Quality of Work Life

QOWL was quantitatively assessed using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is worst and 10 is best. The CNSWC average QOWL, 7.59 was higher than the 5-year echelon 2 average, 6.54 (Figure B-1).

The perceived impact of factors on QOWL rating is summarized in Table B-1. Factors of potential concern were identified by distributional analyses, where 20 percent negative responses served as a baseline. None of the factors were significantly higher than 20 percent. Percentages in Table B-1 that are lower than 20 percent are shown in bold text. Workload (23 percent) and advancement opportunities (19 percent) were the most frequently cited negative impacts on QOWL.




Figure B-1. Distribution of QOWL ratings from the pre-event survey. The x-axis lists the rating scale and the y-axis represents the number of survey respondents. Response percentages for each rating are shown at the base of each bar. Counts for each rating are shown above each bar. The most frequent rating is shown in blue.

Table B-1. Impact of Factors on Quality of Work Life Rating

Factor	Negative	Other
Job satisfaction	6%	94%
Leadership support	10%	90%
Leadership opportunities	14%	86%
Advancement opportunities	19%	81%
Workload	23%	77%
Work Hours/Schedule	11%	89%
Training opportunities	13%	87%
Awards and recognition	14%	86%
Command morale	8%	92%
Command climate	9%	91%

Notes: Perceived impact of factors on QOWL rating. Percentages of negative versus aggregate positive and neutral (Other) responses. Negative values in bold are significantly less than 20%.

Thirty-three percent of civilian respondents indicated that they frequently/always work more hours than they report because they cannot complete assigned tasks within normal work hours. An interesting comment from the survey related to workload, pay period reporting, and manning/manpower is provided below:

If we [are] supposed to support the warfighter with 40 hours a week of work, [but work more, then] all I can do is request OT [overtime]/CT[comp time], [w]hich I have been told not to. And if I cannot submit for OT/CT then how do I justify a manpower

increase [the] next time [a] manpower study happens? It's a "catch 22" situation that most civilians are in. We continue to do our job to the best of our abilities, but some of us feel like we are [firefighting] vice running programs and projects like other government agencies.

There were no survey comments (or discussion during focus groups) that adequately amplified advancement opportunities; however, differences in its perceived negative impact on QOL ratings were observed between subgroups. Civilian respondents (26 percent) identified advancement opportunities as a negative factor more often than military respondents (8 percent), and female respondents (27 percent) identified advancement opportunities as a negative factor more often than male respondents (15 percent).

Command Climate Topics

Table B-2 lists aggregate strongly agree and agree response percentages to survey questions addressing perceived job importance, as well as whether fraternization, favoritism, gender/sex discrimination, sexual harassment, or hazing occurs at CNSWC. Overall echelon 2 command inspection percentages over a 5-year period are shown for comparison. Excepting job importance, lower values are “better.”

- Perceived job importance at CNSWC was higher than the 5-year echelon 2 command inspection average.
- Perceived occurrence of fraternization, favoritism, gender/sex discrimination, sexual harassment, race discrimination, and hazing at CNSWC were lower than the 5-year echelon 2 command inspection percentages.

Table B-2. Perceived Job Importance and Occurrence of Behaviors Assumed to Impact Command Climate

Question Topic	NSWC	Echelon 2
Job Importance	91%	77%
Fraternization	4%	15%
Favoritism	22%	32%
Gender/Sex Discrimination	7%	14%
Sexual Harassment	2%	10%
Race Discrimination	2%	12%
Hazing	<1%	8%

Notes: Aggregate strongly agree and agree response percentages for selected command climate topics. Echelon 2 percentages from FY09-14. Excepting Job Importance, lower percentages are “better.” Bold values indicate a significantly higher or lower percentage than echelon 2.

Appendix C: Summary of Focus Group Perceptions

FOCUS GROUPS

On 8 and 9 May 2014, the NAVINSGEN conducted 11 focus groups at CNSWC, seven with various groupings of active duty military ranks, and four with various groupings of civilian grades. There were a total of 79 focus group participants; 46 military, 33 civilians. Each focus group was scheduled for one hour and consisted of one facilitator, two note takers, and in some cases, an observer. The facilitator followed a protocol script: (a) focus group personnel introductions, (b) brief introduction to the NAVINSGEN mission, (c) privacy, Whistleblower protection, and basic ground rules, (d) participant-derived list of quality of life topics, and (f) subsequent discussion of participant-derived topics. Note takers transcribed focus group proceedings, which were subsequently reviewed to elucidate themes.

- The CNSWC workforce is a highly dedicated and talented team with impressive knowledge and skills to support the mission.
- Many CNSWC challenges were perceived as external, often related to information requests, general training requirements, and achieving synergy between OPNAV and USSOCOM.
- The high tempo and recent budgetary constraints were perceived to negatively impact aspects of the mission (e.g., manning/manpower, facilities, and preservation of the force).

Volatile Fiscal Environment

Focus groups discussions were often connected to the volatile fiscal environment. While focus group participants recognized the need for the Government to reduce the overall budget and recover savings from the cost of war, focus group participants contended that the NSW cycle of operations and future mission success requires a stable investment. The recently imposed annual Program Objective Memorandum (POM) cycle and the fiscal instability of POM budgets in general were thought to impede workforce productivity, strategic planning, and the ability to maintain a proactive warfighting posture.

Manning/Manpower and Human Resources

Focus group participants mentioned gaps in manning, coupled with difficulties in identifying and hiring qualified personnel within the confines of the current human resources system. Some participants thought that the system, while understanding the need for rules and regulations, may not be agile enough to support special operations forces. The perception is that highly qualified candidates are not making it through the human resources screening process to qualify for vacant positions. In addition, once the hiring official selects a qualified candidate, delays in the human resources hiring process have caused candidates to decline the offer due to finding other employment in the interim. Our onsite assessment of manning/manpower and human resources are addressed in the Mission Performance section of the report.

Workload, Work Hours, Work Schedule, and Family Support

Focus group comments related to workload and work hours expressed dedication for supporting the mission while attempting to maintain a reasonable work-life balance. Some participants admitted that long work hours may be self-inflicted due to the NSW ethos and aforementioned dedication of the workforce. There was a strong perception that work must be done regardless of its impact on family-work life balance or compensation.

Some focus group participants reported working many hours on data/information requests that in their mind did not appear to make a difference, and participants questioned the logic and utility of the Navy's general training paradigm and its administrative Information Technology infrastructure. External data calls and aspects of mandatory training were perceived to consume time that in many instances could be better used to perform primary duties. All of these topics are commonly discussed during NAVINSGEN command inspection and area visit focus groups.

On a positive note, many focus group participants commended CNSWC leadership on work schedule flexibility in support of personal and family matters.

Facilities and Facilities Maintenance

Every focus group discussed in some manner the perceived inadequacy of the facilities, both in terms of physical workspace and basic maintenance services. A common theme was that the workforce had long since outgrown its workspace. Participants felt that there was insufficient space to conduct private conversations. To maintain cleanliness, military and civilian focus group participants reported cleaning their own spaces and removing trash, thus taking away even more of their time to perform primary responsibilities. Our onsite assessment of workspace is addressed in the Facilities, Environmental, Energy Conservation, Safety, and Occupational Health section of the report.

Physical Fitness

Military focus group participants praised the CNSWC culture of physical fitness and availability of resources to support physical readiness. Whether members are able to leverage this positive aspect of CNSWC is dependent on commute, workload, and work-family life balance choices.

Preservation of the Force and Families (POTFF)

Military and civilian focus group participants expressed concern for potential loss of MFP-11 funds to support POTFF and thought that service-provided support through MFP-2 funds may not meet the specific needs of the NSW community. Focus group participants strongly believed that a more holistic approach to POTFF is necessary to preserve the NSW community.

Leadership

Military and civilian focus group participants expressed positive views of CNSWC leadership on many levels, e.g., confidence, trust, and competence. Some participants were concerned however, about the loss of a Flag Deputy.

OMBUDSMAN FOCUS GROUP

On 14 May 2014, NAVINSGEN conducted a focus group for ombudsmen supporting NSW in the San Diego area. There were a total of 15 focus group participants. Participants verbally reported an average overall quality of life score of 6.53 (standard deviation = 1.56), using the previously described 10-point scale. The focus group was scheduled for one hour and consisted of a facilitator and a note taker. The facilitator followed a protocol script: (a) focus group personnel introductions, (b) brief introduction to the NAVINSGEN mission, (c) verbal assessment of quality of life rating, (d) participant-derived list of quality of life topics, and (e) subsequent discussion of participant-derived topics. The note taker transcribed focus group proceedings. Primary themes are summarized below.

Family Community

As indicated in our military and civilian focus groups, there is a deep sense of commitment to the family: "This is the definition of community. I don't know anyone from prior commands. From the moment I arrived, I mattered. You don't have to be the wife of a SEAL..."

- The Family Support Coordinator is perceived to be an integral component of POTFF.

"One thing that we can't afford to lose is our family coordinators. If anything, they need more support. They help us manage crises so that our husbands do not have to worry."

Family Resilience and Reintegration

There was a general concern that members sometimes do not realize that they need support services or are too proud to admit that they need help. Spouses also desired better coordination of leave during "decompression" (post-deployment), or before pre-deployment "recompression." Some felt that it is difficult to schedule leave in a manner that best utilizes some of the knowledge and skills gained from retreats. In any case, spouses expressed value in having knowledge to identify potential issues and coping strategies before problems become explosive.

- Spouses were strong advocates for pre- and post-deployment retreats.

Some spouses desired more child-centric support: "Kids are surrounded by a culture of death... Our children can't be protected from the words on daddy's arms or the mausoleum in the garage... Our kids are angry... We need these programs... Kids also have to worry about OPSEC."

Senior Leadership Engagement

Spouses thought that programs directed at family support are great; however, they would like to see more senior leadership engagement. Admirals Pybus and Losey were viewed as champions. Spouses desired periodic engagement with SECNAV and OPNAV staffs, especially when visiting the San Diego area. Periodic leadership engagement was perceived as part of the POTFF.

APPENDIX D: Survey Response Frequency Report

Numerical values in the following tables summarize survey responses to forced-choice questions as counts and/or percentages (%). Response codes are listed below in the order that they appear.

SD Strongly Disagree

D Disagree

N Neither Agree nor Disagree...

A Agree

SA Strongly Agree

- Negative

N Neutral

+ Positive

N Never

R Rarely

S Sometimes

F Frequently

A Always

Numerical values represent counts or percentages (%).
Response Codes:

SD	D	N	A	SA
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither...	Agree	Strongly Agree

N	R	S	F	A
Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Frequently	Always

Military		Civilian	
Male	Female	Male	Female
100	25	114	76
32%	8%	36%	24%

On a scale from 1 (worst) to 10 (best), please rate your Quality of Work Life (QOWL). QOWL is the degree to which you enjoy where you work and available opportunities for professional growth.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Count	5	2	8	18	23	16	46	88	63	55
%	1.54%	0.62%	2.47%	5.56%	7.10%	4.94%	14.20%	27.16%	19.44%	16.98%

For each of the factors below, please indicate whether they have a positive, neutral, or negative impact on your QOWL rating.

	+	N	-
Job satisfaction	244	54	18
Leadership support	213	70	33
Leadership opportunities	153	119	44
Advancement opportunities	111	145	60
Workload	141	103	72
Work Hours/Schedule	204	76	36
Training opportunities	170	104	42
Awards and recognition	147	126	43
Command morale	202	88	26
Command climate	202	86	28

My job affords me a reasonable amount of quality time with my family.

SD	D	N	A	SA
4	22	32	151	91
1.33%	7.33%	10.67%	50.33%	30.33%

Rank:

	E1-4	E5-6	E7-9	CWO	O1-3	O4-5	O6	Total
Count	5	23	33	8	12	31	13	125
%	4%	18%	26%	10%	25%	25%	10%	

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

My command gives me sufficient time during working hours to participate in a physical readiness exercise program.

SD	D	N	A	SA
1	11	9	28	76
0.80%	8.80%	7.20%	22.40%	60.80%

My current work week affords enough time to complete mission tasks in a timely manner while maintaining an acceptable work-home life balance.

SD	D	N	A	SA
6	13	15	55	36
4.80%	10.40%	12.00%	44.00%	28.80%

Grade:

	GS1-8	GS9-12	GS13-14	GS15	Other	Total
Count	2	65	96	22	5	190
%	1%	34%	51%	12%	3%	

My position description is current and accurately describes my functions, tasks, and responsibilities.

SD	D	N	A	SA
9	19	17	89	53
4.81%	10.16%	9.09%	47.59%	28.34%

I work more hours than I report in a pay period because I cannot complete all assigned tasks during scheduled work hours.

N	R	S	F	A
19	42	63	38	24
10.22%	22.58%	33.87%	20.43%	12.90%

The Human Resource Service Center provides timely, accurate responses to my queries.

SD	D	N	A	SA
12	26	69	51	26
6.52%	14.13%	37.50%	27.72%	14.13%

My (local) Human Resources Office provides timely, accurate responses to my queries.

SD	D	N	A	SA
13	12	44	66	49
7.07%	6.52%	23.91%	35.87%	26.63%

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

During the last performance evaluation cycle, my supervisor provided me with feedback that enabled me to improve my performance before my formal performance appraisal/EVAL/FITREP.

SD	D	N	A	SA
9	20	44	111	86
3.33%	7.41%	16.30%	41.11%	31.85%

The DON civilian recruitment process is responsive to my command's civilian personnel requirements.

SD	D	N	A	SA
22	41	137	77	22
7.36%	13.71%	45.82%	25.75%	7.36%

I have the tools and resources needed to do my job properly.

SD	D	N	A	SA
1	38	31	147	87
0.33%	12.50%	10.20%	48.36%	28.62%

Do you have adequate time at work to complete required General Military Training via Navy Knowledge Online (NKO) training?

Yes	No
219	59
78.78%	21.22%

Are you able to access NKO at work?

Yes	No
297	1
99.66%	0.34%

I am satisfied with the overall quality of my workplace facilities.

SD	D	N	A	SA
10	32	37	131	91
3.32%	10.63%	12.29%	43.52%	30.23%

My command is concerned about my safety.

SD	D	N	A	SA
1	0	26	142	131
0.33%	0.00%	8.67%	47.33%	43.67%

My command has a program in place to address potential safety issues.

SD	D	N	A	SA
0	5	23	141	131
0.00%	1.67%	7.67%	47.00%	43.67%

My job is important and makes a contribution to my command.

SD	D	N	A	SA
2	7	18	118	159
0.66%	2.30%	5.92%	38.82%	52.30%

My command attempts to resolve command climate issues.

SD	D	N	A	SA
10	12	42	123	113
3.33%	4.00%	14.00%	41.00%	37.67%

_____ is occurring at my command.

	SD	D	N	A	SA	Count
Job Importance	1%	2%	6%	39%	52%	304
Fraternization	22%	25%	50%	3%	1%	300
Favoritism	19%	24%	35%	14%	8%	299
Gender/Sex Discrimination	32%	33%	27%	4%	3%	299
Sexual Harassment	34%	35%	28%	2%	1%	299
Race Discrimination	34%	35%	28%	2%	1%	299
Hazing	40%	33%	26%	0%	0%	299

I have adequate leadership guidance to perform my job successfully.

SD	D	N	A	SA
11	20	30	121	122
3.62%	6.58%	9.87%	39.80%	40.13%

Communication down the chain of command is effective.

SD	D	N	A	SA
16	42	51	128	63
5.33%	14.00%	17.00%	42.67%	21.00%

Communication up the chain of command is effective.

SD	D	N	A	SA
12	32	53	141	62
4.00%	10.67%	17.67%	47.00%	20.67%

My superiors treat me with respect and consideration.

SD	D	N	A	SA
7	13	19	114	147
2.33%	4.33%	6.33%	38.00%	49.00%

My performance evaluations have been fair.

SD	D	N	A	SA
3	8	37	122	130
1.00%	2.67%	12.33%	40.67%	43.33%

The awards and recognition program is fair and equitable.

SD	D	N	A	SA
11	27	80	99	83
3.67%	9.00%	26.67%	33.00%	27.67%

Military and civilian personnel work well together at my command.

SD	D	N	A	SA
3	14	29	137	117
1.00%	4.67%	9.67%	45.67%	39.00%

My command's Equal Opportunity Program (EO - to include Equal Employment Opportunity & Command Managed Equal Opportunity) is effective.

SD	D	N	A	SA
4	7	63	127	99
1.33%	2.33%	21.00%	42.33%	33.00%

I know who to contact with an EEO/EO question or complaint.

SD	D	N	A	SA
2	14	22	147	115
0.67%	4.67%	7.33%	49.00%	38.33%

My command adequately protects my personal information.

SD	D	N	A	SA
4	5	49	127	115
1.33%	1.67%	16.33%	42.33%	38.33%