DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
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IN REPLY REFER TO:
5040
Ser N3/1144
5 Nov 15

From: Naval Inspector General
To: Distribution

Subj: COMMAND INSPECTION OF NAVY INSTALLATIONS COMMAND

Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 5040.3A
 (b) SECNAVINST 5430.57G

1. The Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) conducts command inspections of echelon 2 commands to provide the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations with a firsthand assessment of Departmental risks and major issues relevant to policy, management, and direction as directed by reference (a). Reference (b) tasks NAVINSGEN with conducting inspections and surveys, making appropriate evaluations and recommendations concerning operating forces afloat and ashore, Department of the Navy components and functions, and Navy programs which impact readiness or quality of life for military and civilian naval personnel.

2. NAVINSGEN conducted a Command Inspection of Navy Installations Command (CNIC) from 12 May to 21 May 2015. This report documents our findings.

3. This report contains an Executive Summary, our observations and findings, and documented deficiencies noted during the inspection. Issue papers are included that highlight significant concerns that either point to a potentially broader Navy issue or, in our opinion, require coordination among multiple commands to fully address. Finally, a summary of survey and focus group data, as well as a complete listing of survey frequency data, is included.

4. During our visit we assessed overall mission readiness in execution of its echelon 2 responsibilities per OPNAVINST 5450.339, Missions, Functions and Tasks of Commander, Navy Installations Command (21 April 2011) and other laws, policy, and regulations. We assessed compliance with Navy administrative programs; facilities, safety and environmental compliance; security programs, Inspector General functions, and Sailor programs under the purview of senior enlisted leadership. Additionally, we conducted surveys and focus group discussions to assess the quality of work life (QOWL) and home life (QOHL) for Navy military and civilian personnel.

5. Our overall assessment is that CNIC is executing its diverse and complex mission as Navy's Shore Integrator while dealing with increasing requirements and flat or declining resources. Given that the vast majority of CNIC's programs have been resourced at the lowest level and CNIC supports the warfighter with nearly all common services across the Navy, marginal funding levels are affecting the quality of work and quality of life for military, civilian, and contractor personnel and their families at the 69 Navy installations worldwide.

Subj: COMMAND INSPECTION OF NAVY INSTALLATIONS COMMAND

6. In the course of our inspection, we identified deficiencies in Navy Mission Essential Task (NMET) and Defense Readiness Reporting System-Navy (DRRS-N) compliance, headquarters safety reporting relationships, overseas drinking water (ODW) certification, potable water conservation programs, the Navy Safe Harbor Program, unaccompanied housing conditions, Continuity of Operations (COOP) program, Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO), Priority Placement Program (PPP), military and civilian training and performance management, Shore Manning Requirements Document (SMRD), environmental planning staffing, Safety and Occupational Health, Command Security, Information Security, Industrial Security, Physical Security, Operations Security, Cybersecurity, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR), Suicide Prevention, Voting Assistance, Individual Medical Readiness, Inspector General functions, and command indoctrination.

7. Corrective actions

   a. We identified 59 deficiencies during our inspection that require CNIC's corrective action. Additionally, NAVINSGEN provided CNIC with 26 separate recommendations for consideration, relating to Mission, Functions, and Tasks; Warfare Enterprise Flag Officer (WEFO) representation; Naval Security Force; OCONUS CBRNE Coordinators; environmental manpower modeling; transportation management; workforce development and management; personnel training; information security; industrial security; physical security; operations security; insider threat; suicide prevention; and Senior Navy Voting Assistance Program responsibilities.

   b. Correction of each deficiency or adoption of recommendations, and a description of action(s) taken or rationale of why recommendations were not adopted, shall be reported via Implementation Status Report (ISR), OPNAV 5040/2 no later than 1 February 2016. Deficiencies not corrected or recommendations not adopted by this date or requiring longer-term solutions should be updated quarterly until completed.

   c. This report includes four issue papers that require actions by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Shore Readiness (OPNAV N46), Research, Studies and Analysis (OPNAV N14), and the Naval Safety Center (NAVSAFECEN). Appendix A: Issue Papers (page 40 of this report) provides detailed guidance on how to report completion of recommendations identified in the issue papers.

8. My point of contact is (b) (7)(C)
(b) (7)(C)

HERMAN A. SHELANSKI

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Subj: COMMAND INSPECTION OF NAVY INSTALLATIONS COMMAND

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**NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL COMMAND INSPECTION OF
COMMANDER, NAVY INSTALLATIONS COMMAND
12-21 MAY 2015**

Executive Summary

The Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) conducted a command inspection of Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC) from 12 to 21 May 2015. We last inspected CNIC in 2009. The team was augmented with subject matter experts, including personnel from the Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy, Policy (DUSN(P)); Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), Information Dominance (N2/N6BC), Energy and Environmental Readiness (N45), Shore Readiness (N46), Assessments (N81), Fiscal Management (N82), and 21st Century Sailor (N17); Chief of Naval Information (CHINFO); Naval Safety Center (NAVSAFECEN); Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS); and the Office of Civilian Human Resources (OCHR).

During our visit we assessed overall mission performance per OPNAVINST 5450.339, Missions, Functions and Tasks of Commander, Navy Installations Command; DoDI 4165.63, DoD Housing; OPNAVINST 3501.360A, Defense Readiness Reporting System-Navy; and other laws, policies, and regulations. We assessed compliance with Navy administrative programs, facilities, safety and environmental compliance, security programs, Inspector General functions, and Sailor programs under the purview of senior enlisted leadership. Additionally, we conducted surveys and focus group discussions to assess the quality of work life (QOWL) and home life (QOHL) for Navy military and civilian personnel.

Our overall assessment is that CNIC is executing its diverse and complex mission as Navy's Shore Integrator while dealing with increasing requirements and flat or declining resources. In this report, we identify a number of challenges facing CNIC, many of which they can correct themselves, but some of which require outside assistance.

MISSION PERFORMANCE

We note that additional requirements have been accumulating since the inception of CNIC in 2004, despite a shrinking pool of funds to meet those needs. CNIC N5 personnel estimated validated shore requirements at $12B, with roughly $8B in funds available. Navy commands have felt the resultant pinch on Base Operating Support (BOS), reflected in reduced Common Output Level (COL) funding levels. CNIC has appropriately applied the most funding to Air and Port Operations, child development, and family services. Galleys, Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR), and Fire and Emergency Services are funded at COL 3, while the remaining programs are funded at COL 4, including safety, security, emergency management, and all N4 facilities programs.

Given that the vast majority of CNIC's programs have been resourced at the lowest level and CNIC supports the warfighter with nearly all common services across the Navy, marginal funding levels are affecting the quality of work and quality of life for military, civilian, and contractor personnel and their families at the 70 Navy installations worldwide.

Operations

Air Operations (AO)

Air Operations is currently funded at COL 2 with CNIC headquarters manned at approximately 77% in stark contrast to our 2009 CNIC Command Inspection when six of six military and ten of eleven civilian headquarters positions were vacant. Regional and installation Air Operations are approximately 82% and 83% manned, respectively. The recently developed Air Operations and Port Operations Performance Pricing Model quantifies future budget requirements with far greater accuracy over previous bottom-up assessments done at installation and region levels.

Port Operations (PR)

Port Operations is currently funded at COL 2 with CNIC headquarters manned at approximately 80%, while regional and installations Port Operations are manned at approximately 95%. Operating at COL 3 funding levels in FY13 and FY14 resulted in $24M in deferred maintenance for boats and service craft across the CNIC enterprise. Restoration to COL 2 funding in FY15 and end of year funding in FY13 and FY14 reduced the deferred maintenance total to $6M to date. The Air Operations and Port Operations Performance Pricing Model enables decision makers to quantify risk in uncertain budget environments and to assess the impact of potential reduced funding profiles.

Defense Readiness Reporting System-Navy (DRRS-N)

CNIC's Navy Mission Essential Tasks (NMET) are neither current nor accurate as required by OPNAVINST 3501.360A, and some DRRS-N information is incomplete. However, the Commander's Assessment in DRRS-N is in compliance.

Shore Integrator

CNIC is an active participant in the Strategic Laydown and Dispersal (SLD) Working Group, collaborates effectively with warfare enterprises through Warfare Enterprise Flag Officer (WEFO) and Warfare Enterprise Action Officer (WEAO) members, and integrates warfare enterprise infrastructure priorities through the Shore Mission Integration Group (SMIG) process.

CNIC integrates and arbitrates the BOS and infrastructure requirements identified by the Fleet Readiness Enterprise, warfare enterprises, provider enterprise, Naval component commanders, and Joint combatant commanders to support current and future warfighting requirements. CNIC also identifies and resolves shore support capability overlaps and seams by actively engaging in the SLD plan's integration assessment as defined in OPNAVINST 3111.17, Strategic Laydown and Dispersal Plan for the Operating Forces of the U.S. Navy.

Public Safety

Antiterrorism/Force Protection (ATFP)

CNIC executes ATFP support delineated in OPNAVINST 5450.339. Persistent under-resourcing of the ATFP mission by CNIC's resource sponsor, OPNAV N4 (Fleet Readiness and Logistics), placed both programmatic and operational risk to the protection mission ashore for years. Under-resourcing hinders the Navy from meeting established minimum shore security

manpower requirements for Force Protection Condition (FPCON) ALPHA in the Continental United States (CONUS). Several external studies and reports support our conclusions. During our inspection, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) directed OPNAV N4 to increase funding for the ATFP mission in a memorandum dated 21 May 2015. The CNO decision is projected to add additional resources to increase manning to Mission Profile Validation-Protection (MPV-P) worldwide, supporting an additional 1641 Naval Security Force (NSF) personnel through incremental increases tentatively planned for FY16 and FY17. The CNO's decision is an important first step toward meeting minimum requirements and implementing needed changes in standardized NSF training and NSF professionalization initiatives from Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFF).

We are concerned that an increase in ATFP funding will result in future reductions in resources from the resource sponsor in other Public Safety areas, such as Emergency Management and Fire and Emergency Services. Such reductions may introduce undesired secondary and tertiary effects on the overall public safety missions tasked to Installation Commanding Officers (ICO) in the future. For example, a fully manned and trained NSF may not be effective if supporting communications and Command and Control (C2) architecture are not modernized and fully operational. Careful management of resources in ATFP, EM, and FES will be vital to ensure that mission, personnel, and families are best protected going forward.

We conclude the Navy's minimum shore protection manpower requirements model, the MPV-P, remains a viable, valid model for setting minimum protection requirements. Despite the austere fiscal environment, we assess CNIC is making reasonable programmatic decisions given constraints; however, we could not find communication between CNIC and the resource sponsor of actionable risk assessments in the protection mission.

Emergency Management (EM)
CNIC effectively executes EM support functions as delineated in OPNAVINST 5450.339. The EM program provides the backbone of the public safety functions at Navy installations and regions worldwide. The EM program is responsible for a wide range of functions, to include dispatch, installation EM staff, regional EM staff, Navy Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (NEPLO), Regional Operations Centers (ROC), Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE), and Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD).

CNIC recently lost its CBRNE Coordinators at several overseas locations due to loss of funding. Given the need for CBRNE expertise at Navy regions, this requires CNIC action.

Installation Safety Programs (SA)
CNIC is responsible for oversight and execution of installation safety functions at the 70 Navy installations and associated sites worldwide. This includes Navy occupational safety and health, explosive safety, recreational and off-duty safety, and traffic safety. The Resource Sponsor, OPNAV N46 (Shore Readiness), has taken deliberate risk in funding shore safety programs at COL 4. As a result, CNIC headquarters has directed regional Program Directors to provide certain recreational and off-duty safety services only if supplemental funding from other

sources are provided, in violation of OPNAVINST 5100.12J, Navy Traffic Safety Program, and OPNAVINST 5100.25C, Navy Recreational and Off-Duty Safety Program.

Issue Paper A-1 addresses this issue in further detail.

Facility Management

Environmental

Funding Priorities

In general, the environmental program funds efforts that directly support compliance oversight associated with applicable Federal, state, and local environmental requirements. The CNIC environmental program currently operates based on COL 4 and Environmental Readiness Level (ERL) 4 funding levels, which are barely adequate to meet legally mandated minimum requirements. Therefore, the risk of non-compliance is high due to emergent requirements, understaffing at echelon 3 and 4, and external constraints such as sequestration that put pressure on budgets already driven down to legally mandated minimums. The CNIC FY15 Operations Plan states that regions may need to de-scope or defer projects required by law (that by definition already provide compliance on a "just-in-time" basis). Moreover, CNIC's environmental staff reports that in FY14, a number of legally mandated projects would have gone unfunded if not for an unexpected congressional windfall of $20M.

Overseas Drinking Water

In 2009, a NAVINSGEN report found serious deficiencies in overseas drinking water (ODW) systems attributable to lapses in management, record keeping, and other issues associated predominately with Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) as the service provider for drinking water. This prompted the Navy Secretariat to mandate that ODW systems meet the same standards as U.S. systems. Subsequently, CNIC became the Navy's Executive Agent for drinking water worldwide, and began issuing policy to ensure ODW meets U.S. standards. A follow-on NAVINSGEN special study in 2013 found problems remaining in ODW systems and recommended establishment of an independent primacy agent reporting directly to the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV).

Despite a relatively slow start, progress has been made in the management and quality of overseas drinking water by working toward resolution of the original deficiencies in ODW systems along with a process that has been put in place to detect and resolve new issues that may arise. CNIC now acts as the Executive Agent in a three-tiered management structure to oversee ODW systems to include regularly scheduled sanitary surveys and granting of Certificates to Operate (CTO). Thus far, only six of 50 ODW systems have been granted a CTO. Sustained attention and funding is required so the remaining 44 water systems qualify for CTOs by the planned March 2016 deadline and to maintain the standards necessary to retain CTO status thereafter.

Facility Support

Facility Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (FSRM)

The CNIC FSRM program is generally underfunded based on the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Facility Sustainment Model (FSM) and deferred facility maintenance backlog. The OSD goal is to fund 90% of the full requirement annually; Navy has not budgeted to this level since 2011 and Facilities Sustainment (ST) budget allocated to regions results in some installations funded to 50-60% of FSM. Underfunding facilities sustainment accelerates degradation of the facility inventory, reduces service life, and increases the restoration and modernization requirement. When considered in conjunction with a declining Military Construction program and a reported FY14 facility maintenance backlog of over $39B (five times CNIC's annual operating and maintenance allocation), the Navy lacks a holistic strategy to deliberately program funds to recapitalize the shore infrastructure.

Facility Services (FX)

FX funding (grounds, custodial, solid waste management, pest control, and pavement clearance) was reduced in prior budget cycles, particularly during sequestration, with no accompanying reduction in the facility services requirement. During that time, the program goal was to keep installations operational with the minimum facility service levels to maintain health and safety while minimizing long-term material impacts to facilities. The Navy Quality of Service (QOS) initiative has subsequently restored some FX service levels above the lowest Common Output Level 4 (COL 4). For FY16, OPNAV established an FX program goal of COL 3 and resourced accordingly.

Energy Conservation Programs

CNIC is Navy's Executive Agent for shore energy conservation programs, which include the reduction of utility and petroleum consumption, and has made progress toward meeting Federal, DoD, and SECNAV energy goals. However, CNIC is behind pace in meeting the reduction of potable water consumption required by OPNAVINST 4100.5E, Shore Energy Management, which calls for a 26% reduction in water consumption between 2007 and 2020; the Navy is roughly 5% behind pace to meet this target. CNIC requires additional resources to install the utility meters necessary to meet higher guidance and achieve better accuracy that will ideally facilitate change in human behavior for maximum utility conservation.

Issue Paper A-2 addresses the metering issue in further detail.

Fleet and Family Readiness

Child and Youth Programs

CNIC is the Navy's lead for providing Child Development Centers (CDC), School Age Care (SAC), and Youth Programs. This is a well-run program subject to frequent, thorough oversight to ensure accreditation standards are met. The program managers provided documentation that demonstrated a history of comprehensive inspections at each of the Navy's 134 Child Development Centers and 103 Youth and School Age Care Centers.

Navy Wounded Warrior – Safe Harbor

This program was established in 2006 with congressional mandates set forth in the National Defense Authorization Acts of 2006 and 2008 to provide care to all wounded, ill and injured service members. Safe Harbor became a program of record in 2010, providing counseling, advocacy, and assistance to qualifying members and their families. However, supervisors of Recovery Care Coordinators (RCC) and Non-Medical Care Managers (NMCM) are O3s and an E8, which does not meet DoD instruction requirements.

Navy Gold Star Program

The Navy Gold Star Program was mandated in 2014 to provide referral services and support to the surviving family after the death of an active duty Sailor. However, annual program expenses of $2.1M are not funded as a program of record, and the 18 Full Time Equivalent Non-appropriated Fund (NAF) employees assigned to the program have been funded with labor lapse dollars. Since program launch, coordinators have provided over 2,200 hours of direct customer care to approximately 4,900 survivors.

Issue Paper A-3 addresses this issue in further detail.

Total Force Management

Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Programs

CNIC self-reported a weakness in EEO staffing and complaint processing timelines. CNIC's EEO payout for complaints was $348,522 in FY14, and the CNIC EEO staff estimated a notably higher EEO payout for FY15. CNIC is understaffed to fulfill the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's EEO Management Directive 110 requirement of completing 100% of investigations within the 180-day deadline. To rectify this situation, CNIC approved 10 additional EEO Specialist positions in FY17.

Personnel Training/Qualifications

Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) Qualifications

CNIC lacks an Acquisition Workforce Manager, does not track DAWIA requirements, and is unable to demonstrate compliance with DAWIA certification and training requirements as set forth in DoDI 5000.66, Operation of the Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Workforce Education, Training, and Career Development Program; DON Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) Operating Guide; and DON ASN(RD&A) Memorandum of September 30, 2014, Subj: FY15 DON DAWIA Goals.

General Military Training (GMT)

GMT is not completed by all military personnel as directed by OPNAVINST 1500.22G, General Military Training and NAVADMIN 264/13, FY14 General Military Training Schedule. CNIC headquarters staff was unable to provide FY13 GMT data and the FY14 GMT completion rate was 33%. FY15 GMT completion rate showed improvement at the time of our inspection, but remained well short of full compliance for the fiscal year.

Civilian Training

Civilian training requirements are not completed as directed by SECNAVINST 12410.25, Civilian Employee Training and Career Development, and the DON Office of Civilian Human Resources. CNIC headquarters was unable to provide FY13 data and FY14 civilian training completion rate was 37%. The command is on track to meet all FY15 civilian training requirements.

Manning and Manpower

Shore Manpower Requirements Determination (SMRD)

CNIC headquarters military manning was 100% filled and headquarters civilian staff manning was 85% filled. Surveys, focus group discussions, and interviews with leaders at CNIC indicate that the workforce feels stressed and overworked. We did not validate the headquarters staff manpower requirements, but note that CNIC has no record of an SMRD being performed. An SMRD provides a systematic means of determining and documenting manpower requirements based on Mission, Functions and Tasks. An SMRD is required to establish CNIC's baseline (peacetime) manpower requirements per OPNAVINST 1000.16K CH-1, Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures.

Civilian Performance Management

CNIC did not complete civilian performance plans or annual appraisals for FY14 in a timely manner.

FACILITIES, ENVIRONMENTAL, ENERGY CONSERVATION, AND SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH (SOH)

CNIC headquarters is executing shore related mission requirements at a generally acceptable level with respect to facilities, environmental, and energy conservation. However, static or declining funding levels and steadily increasing requirements are driving performance toward minimum compliance. SOH programs meet required program elements in accordance with applicable laws and regulations, but not all safety policies are met. Oversight of subordinate echelon 3 commands is marginally effective.

SECURITY PROGRAMS AND CYBERSECURITY/TECHNOLOGY

CNIC does not have a command security instruction in place as required by SECNAV M 5510.36, Department of the Navy Information Security Program and SECNAV M5510.30, Department of the Navy Personnel Security Program.

Information Security

Information security at CNIC is not compliant with governing directives. CNIC has not conducted physical oversight of subordinate commands' Information Security (INFOSEC) programs. CNIC's Emergency Action Plan (EAP) is their emergency plan for the protection of classified information, as required by SECNAV M5510.36, Exhibit 2B. We found that the EAP lacks specificity in several areas, making it difficult to determine who within CNIC is responsible for taking action.

Personnel Security

Personnel security at CNIC is not fully compliant with governing directives. CNIC does not have a formal personnel security program in place and has not conducted physical oversight of subordinate commands' personnel security programs.

Industrial Security

Industrial security at CNIC is not compliant with governing directives. Industrial Security at CNIC is ineffective and requires a comprehensive, formalized approach to ensure all security requirements are met for contracts, Contract Security Classification Specification forms (DD 254), and training. CNIC does not have an industrial security policy in place as stipulated in SECNAV M5510.36. Additionally, CNIC does not (b) (7)(E)

Physical Security

Physical security at CNIC is not compliant with governing directives. Key drivers towards non-compliance include lack of a (b) (7)(E) , lack of a physical security directive, lack of a consolidated list of all restricted areas at CNIC, and an ineffective key and lock program.

Operations Security

Operations security at CNIC is not compliant with governing directives. CNIC does not have a formal OPSEC program in place. CNIC has a qualified OPSEC Officer, but does not conduct required OPSEC training for assigned personnel. Additionally, CNIC does not (b) (7)(E)

CNIC does not review contracts for OPSEC elements (as appropriate) or provide oversight over subordinate command OPSEC programs.

Counterintelligence (CI) Support

Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) support to CNIC for CI training is compliant.

Insider Threat

Following a review of the command security programs, we performed a horizontal examination of our findings to assess overall command security program readiness at CNIC (b) (7)(E)

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Cybersecurity

CNIC's robust cybersecurity program is compliant with DON and DoD policy guidance.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT/COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS

The Resource Management/Compliance Programs Team assessed 18 programs and functions. Overall, CNIC's programs were solid and effective. The following exceptions were identified:

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR)

CNIC's SAPR program is not fully compliant with DoDI 6495.02 CH-1, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program Procedures, and SECNAVINST 1752.4B, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response. SAPR training required for military and for civilians who supervise service members has not been completed as required. In addition, specific watchstander and Duty Officer training should be conducted to ensure proper victim response.

Suicide Prevention

Required suicide prevention training for military, civilians and full-time contractor personnel has not been conducted as required by OPNAVINST 1720.4A, Suicide Prevention Program. Senior CNIC leadership has not regularly published messages, information, and guidance on suicide prevention and has not incorporated suicide prevention as a part of life skills and health promotion training. Further, CNIC should improve oversight of subordinate echelon suicide prevention programs.

Voting Assistance

CNIC's echelon 2 Voting Assistance program does not fully comply with DoDI 1000.04, Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP), and OPNAVINST 1742.1B, Navy Voting Assistance Program (NVAP). Deficient areas: records of annual training in voting matters, including dates and attendees, have not been retained as required; CNIC Voting Assistance Officer (VAO) has not established and maintained a standard email address of the required format to contact all Unit Voting Assistance Officers (UVAO); and the CNIC VAO does not monitor the voting programs of CNIC's subordinate commands and assist them as necessary as required of echelon 2 commands.

Individual Medical Readiness (IMR)

IMR management of headquarters personnel met standards and was trending in a positive direction at the time of our inspection. However, IMR of subordinate commands (echelon 3 and below) is not monitored by CNIC or reported to the Commander.

Specific CNIC responsibilities

CNIC has specifically-delineated responsibilities within the following six Navy programs:

- Navy Voting Assistance Program
- Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
- Suicide Prevention
- Command Individual Augmentee (IA) Coordinator

- Physical Readiness Program
- Navy Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention

CNIC is meeting their responsibilities in five of these six programs as identified in governing directives.

Navy Voting Assistance Program

Corrective actions are required in the execution of Senior Navy Voting Representative responsibilities identified in OPNAVINST 1742.1B. We note that the OPNAVINST is out-of-date in relation to DoDI 1000.04 of 13 September 2011. CNIC has the expertise to assist OPNAV N46 bring the Navy's instruction into alignment with current DoD and Federal guidance. The Navy Voting Assistance Program does not provide quarterly statistical information and records on voter registration assistance via the FVAP portal as required. The Navy is at roughly 50% reporting.

Issue Paper A-4 addresses this issue in further detail.

In addition, observations from our Area Visits, validated during interviews with CNIC personnel during this inspection, indicate an opportunity to improve placement of Installation Voting Assistance Offices throughout the Navy. These should be located in well-advertised, fixed locations that are physically co-located with other high-traffic offices for personnel of all services (from various tenant commands), family members, and DoD civilians.

CNIC Inspector General (IG) performance

We conducted a quality assurance review of the CNIC IG hotline program. Similar to most echelon 2 commands, the timeliness of CNIC's hotline investigations does not meet the DoD IG 90-day standard (hotline cases) or 180-day standard (Military Whistleblower Reprisal cases). Although CNIC internal oversight includes Managers' Internal Control (MIC), Command Evaluations (CE), and targeted inspections, CNIC IG has not executed comprehensive, on-site inspections of regional commands.

SURVEY AND FOCUS GROUP FINDINGS

Our survey and focus group discussions found that QOWL at CNIC is lower than the historical echelon 2 command averages, while QOHL is higher. Survey data and focus groups perceived the following issues as adversely impacting mission, job performance and quality of life: characteristics of leadership below the executive level, communication filters and manning/manpower (including the hiring process). Rated on a 10-point scale, the CNIC QOWL and QOHL are 6.13 and 8.39, respectively; the corresponding echelon 2 command historical averages are 6.63 and 7.91. Specific comments from focus groups and surveys were passed to CNIC leadership and are included in Appendices B and C.

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Areas/Programs Assessed

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Observations and Findings

MISSION PERFORMANCE

The Mission Performance Team utilized survey and focus group responses, document review, group discussions, and face-to-face interviews to gather information and assess the mission performance of Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC). This information was evaluated against the functions and tasks as assigned in OPNAVINST 5450.339, Missions, Functions, and Tasks of Commander, Navy Installations Command; DoDI 4165.63, DoD Housing Management; OPNAVINST 3501.360, Defense Readiness Reporting System-Navy; and other laws, policy, and regulations.

Our overall assessment is that CNIC is executing its diverse and complex mission as Shore Integrator while dealing with increasing requirements and flat or declining resources. We found a dedicated and professional staff at CNIC headquarters committed to the mission that includes the following areas:

- Operations, including Air Operations, Port Operations, and Operations Support
- Public Safety, including Emergency Management, Fire and Emergency Services, and Force Protection
- Facility Management, including Environmental and Facility Support
- Fleet and Family Readiness

We note that additional requirements have been accumulating since the inception of CNIC in 2004, despite a shrinking pool of funds to meet those needs. CNIC N5 personnel estimated validated shore requirements at $12B, with roughly $8B in funds available. This notable shortfall is visible in some form during each of NAVINSGEN's Command Inspections and Area Visits. Each of our inspected commands have felt the resultant pinch on Base Operating Support (BOS), reflected in the Common Output Level (COL) funding levels seen in Figure 1. CNIC has appropriately applied the most funding to Air and Port Operations, child development, and family services. Galleys, Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR), and Fire and Emergency Services are funded at COL 3, while the remaining 25 programs are funded at COL 4, including safety, security, emergency management, and all N4 facilities programs.

Common Output Levels are subjective measure to stratify the level of service provided, with full performance capability at COL 1 and not fully capable at COL 4. Given that the vast majority of CNIC's programs have been resourced at the lowest level and CNIC supports the warfighter with nearly all common services across the Navy, marginal funding levels are negatively affecting the quality of work and quality of life for military, civilian and contractor personnel and families at 70 Navy installations worldwide.

Figure 1. CNIC Shore Program Funding Profile, FY15.

Operations

Air Operations (AO)

Air Operations is currently funded at COL 2 with CNIC headquarters manned at approximately 77% in stark contrast to our 2009 CNIC Command Inspection when six of six military and ten of eleven civilian headquarters positions were vacant. Regional and installation Air Operations are manned at approximately 82% and 83%, respectively. Fiscal Year (FY) 14 and FY15 funds were increased to hire 64 additional General Schedule (GS) Air Traffic Controllers (ATC) to mitigate the negative impact of shore-to-sea manning initiatives and sequestration. ATCs are manned at 91%. The recently developed Air Operations and Port Operations Performance Pricing Model quantifies future budget requirements with far greater accuracy over previous bottom-up assessments done at installation and region levels. An Airfield Ashore Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) manual is being finalized to standardize policy and procedures across all shore airbases. CNIC Air Ops inspection team inspects all 60 air stations and outlying fields on a three-year cycle.

Port Operations (PR)

Port Operations is currently funded at COL 2 with CNIC headquarters manned at approximately 80% while regional and installations Port Operations are approximately 95% manned. Reduced manning at headquarters has been attributed to a high turnover rate due to limited upward mobility and lengthy hiring process. Operating at COL 3 funding levels in FY13 and FY14 resulted in $24M in deferred maintenance for boats and service craft across the CNIC enterprise.   Restoration to COL 2 funding in FY15 and end of year funding in FY13 and FY14 reduced the deferred maintenance total to $6M to date. The Air Operations and Port Operations Performance Pricing Model enables the decision maker to quantify risk in uncertain budget environments and to assess the impact of potential reduced funding profiles. The Port Operations Metrics Reporting Dashboard leverages the CNIC Gateway 2.0 (G2) enterprise portal

(b) (7)(E)

Operations Support, Training and Exercises (CX)

The Operations Support, Training and Exercise program is funded at COL 4 and was significantly impacted by CNIC EXORD 14-7, "CNIC N3 [Operations]-N7 [Training] Merger," of 20 December 2013. An earlier Commander established the former training program via a Program Decision Directive in 2010 at a baseline budget of $8M in FY11 and $21M in FY12. However, due to sequestration and other budgetary constraints, training requirements could not be adequately programmed in Program Objective Memorandum (POM)-13 and the budget steadily decreased from $21M in FY12, to $16.5M in FY13, to $12.7M in FY14, and finally $8.7M in FY15. Numerous functions were eliminated as a result of EXORD 14-7. Operations, Training, and Exercise functions that endure include: Emergency Operations Center-Incident Management Team courses (22 classes per year, approximately 820 students), Emergency Management Course (2 classes per year, approximately 60 students), and exercise support to ensure a minimum of one all-hazards and one Antiterrorism/Force Protection (ATFP) exercise on an annual basis in accordance DoDI 2000.16, DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Standards, and DoDI 6055.17, DoD Installation Emergency Management (IEM) Program CH-1.

Defense Readiness Reporting System-Navy (DRRS-N)

CNIC's Navy Mission Essential Tasks (NMET) are neither current nor accurate as required by OPNAVINST 3501.360A, Defense Readiness Reporting System-Navy, and some DRRS-N information is incomplete.

Most CNIC Training (N7) functions were divested during POM-14. Following CNIC N7 divestiture, some DRRS-N pillars are used as readiness tools more than others. (b) (7)(E) ██████████████████████████████████████ Although the Training pillar is developed, there may be an interface issue with the authoritative database as the information was not populated in DRRS on the day of the demonstration. The Facilities pillar is the most developed as it pulls data from the Internet Naval Facilities Assets Data Store (iNFADS) and the Ordnance pillar is being developed. Additionally, there are neither people to develop NMET Lists (NMETL) nor an annual systematic review and validation of NMETLs as required by instruction. Instead, issues are addressed on an ad hoc basis leading to inefficiency and inconsistency.

The Commander's Assessment in DRRS-N is in compliance with OPNAVINST 3501.360A. CNIC N5 provides oversight to ensure regions and installations report every 30 calendar days and if a significant degradation in readiness is expected to last more than 24 hours.

Deficiency 1. **CNIC does not systematically review and validate currency and accuracy of Navy Mission Essential Tasks (NMET) as required. Reference: OPNAVINST 5450.339, paragraphs 6a(5) and 9e.**

Deficiency 2. **CNIC is not maintaining accurate DRRS-N pillar data as required. Reference: OPNAVINST 3501.360A, paragraph 9f(1).**

Recommendation 1. **That CNIC update its Mission, Functions, and Tasks instruction (OPNAVINST 5450.339) to reflect several changes in its organization and mission.**

Shore Integrator

CNIC is responsible for shaping the future shore design as the shore integrator - one of their three main functions in OPNAVINST 5450.339, Mission, Functions and Tasks of Commander, Navy, Installations Command. To carry out this function, CNIC is an active participant in the Strategic Laydown and Dispersal (SLD) Working Group, collaborates with warfare enterprises through Warfare Enterprise Flag Officer (WEFO) and Warfare Enterprise Action Officer (WEAO) members, and integrates warfare enterprise infrastructure priorities through the Shore Mission Integration Group (SMIG) process.

CNIC integrates and arbitrates the base operating support and infrastructure requirements identified by the Fleet Readiness Enterprise, warfare enterprises, provider enterprises, Naval component commanders, and Joint combatant commanders to support current and future warfighting requirements. CNIC also identifies and resolves shore support capability overlaps and seams by engaging in the SLD plan's integration assessment as defined in OPNAVINST 3111.17, Strategic Laydown and Dispersal Plan for the Operating Forces of the U.S. Navy. CNIC is currently developing its own SLD instruction.

CNIC participates in the SLD working group to identify and analyze future operational, support, and readiness requirements such as people, maintenance, installation support, facility support, dependent support, etc. associated with implementing the CNO-approved SLD plan. Through constant dialog and an iterative process, SLD forms the basis for programming facility construction and modification, equipment procurement, and manpower and support functions. This aids in addressing potential shortfalls and minimizing impacts of changes at installations as a result of Navy decisions. Lessons learned from previous SLD decisions are applied to new locations.

WEFOs and WEAOs attend warfare enterprise Board of Directors meetings, and help define Integrated Priority Lists and align priorities. WEAOs also work with Naval Facilities Engineering Command and Program Executive Offices to predict future shore requirements based on new platforms such as the Ohio Replacement program.

CNIC also integrates and arbitrates base operating support and infrastructure requirements through the Shore Mission Integration Group (SMIG). The SMIG is an established, collaborative process whereby CNIC coordinates and prioritizes shore requirements in consultation with U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFF), U.S. Pacific Fleet, and Commander, Naval Education and Training Command among others. For example, SMIG business rules require that Navy region priorities include the top-3 warfare enterprise priorities in that region to ensure region priorities are aligned with warfare enterprises.

Recommendation 2. **That CNIC appoint a Regional Commander who is also a qualified Submarine Officer as the Undersea WEFO to help facilitate collaboration and parity with other WEFOs.**

Public Safety

Antiterrorism/Force Protection (ATFP)

CNIC executes ATFP support as delineated in OPNAVINST 5450.339. However, CNIC's resource sponsor, OPNAV N4 (Fleet Readiness and Logistics) has persistently under-resourced the ATFP mission, resulting in programmatic and operational risk to the ashore protection mission. Under-resourcing has hindered the Navy from meeting established minimum shore security manpower requirements for Force Protection Condition (FPCON) ALPHA in Continental United States (CONUS). Several external studies and reports support this conclusion, including a NAVINSGEN special study of ATFP, the report of findings of the USS MAHAN shooting, and USFF ATFP Assessment. During our inspection, CNO directed OPNAV N4 to increase funding for the ATFP mission in a memorandum dated 21 May 2015. The CNO decision is projected to add an additional 1641 Naval Security Force (NSF) personnel, which will increase manning to Mission Profile Validation-Protection (MPV-P) worldwide by FY18, with incremental increases tentatively planned for FY16 and FY17. The CNO's decision is an important first step toward meeting minimum requirements and implementing needed changes in standardized NSF training and NSF professionalization initiatives from USFF.

We are concerned that an increase in ATFP funding will result in future reductions in resources from the resource sponsor in other Public Safety areas, such as Emergency Management and Fire and Emergency Services. Such reductions may introduce undesired secondary and tertiary effects on the overall public safety missions tasked to Installation Commanding Officers (ICO) in the future. For example, a fully manned and trained NSF may not be effective if supporting communications and Command and Control (C2) architecture are not modernized and fully operational. Careful management of resources in ATFP, EM and FES will be vital to ensure that mission, personnel and families are best protected going forward. CNIC's current organizational arrangement between ATFP, EM and FES appears stove-piped and poorly aligned to provide balanced, targeted public safety end states.

We conclude the Navy's minimum shore protection manpower requirements model, the MPV-P, remains a viable, valid model for setting minimum protection requirements. Despite the austere fiscal environment, we assess CNIC is making reasonable programmatic decisions given constraints; however, we could not find communication between CNIC and the resource sponsor of actionable risk assessments in the protection mission.

Organization and Resourcing of the NSF

CNIC organizes, equips, trains, and allocates resources to the NSF ashore to meet USFF requirements as directed in OPNAVINST 5450.339, paragraph 4. CNIC provides ATFP services to the Navy shore enterprise, which consists of 70 installations across 11 Navy regions.

Navy's ashore NSF is staffed at a level below the Navy minimum manning requirements for NSF posts worldwide, especially in CONUS. At the time of our inspection, CONUS installations were resourced to an average of 78.4% of MPV-P and for OCONUS installations (to include Hawaii and Guam), they were funded to an average of 91.0% of MPV-P. (b) (7)(E)

resources most OCONUS installations to FPCON BRAVO with U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) installations resourced to FPCON CHARLIE due to existing Combatant Commander (COCOM) requirements. NAVINSGEN CONUS Area Visits (and one Command Inspection) over the past two years noted the impact of CNIC's programmatic decision: all inspected CONUS installations were stressed to meet minimum NSF Law Enforcement (LE) response requirements for alarms at restricted areas and for significant LE events (like active shooter).

Additionally, MPV-P does not account for Auxiliary Security Force (ASF) personnel. ASF are assigned by the host installation and are resourced by Sailors from tenant commands. ASF personnel augment the NSF and are only allowed to perform AT and Physical Security duties, as stipulated in NTTP 3-07.2.1, Antiterrorism, Section 3.6 and NTTP 3-07.2.3, Navy Law Enforcement and Physical Security, Section 2.1. Therefore, ASF are excluded from the MPV-P. Due to under-resourcing, CNIC must rely more on ASF personnel (particularly in CONUS) to offset manpower shortfalls in several validated, but not funded NSF posts. ASF personnel provide relief to ICOs for non-LE functions (e.g., static guard posts); however, emergency calls/events may occur beyond the employment timeframes or exceed the capabilities of the ASF. ICOs are encouraged to enter into and exercise Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) with local LE agencies, where such LE agencies agree to enter into such agreements, to assist the ICO's protection mission and build stronger relationships with local communities. We are unaware of any comprehensive assessment of the operational impact on tenant commands' own mission performance due to ASF requirements levied by ICOs.

In order to provide the best possible resource solution under the fiscal environment, CNIC employs a rigorous Requirements-to-Resources Planning and Prioritization (R2P2) process which accounts for a wide range of MOAs, Navy policies, and other constraints. The R2P2 process directs allocation of a majority of ATFP funding towards OCONUS installations; in general, this makes sense given the typically higher FPCON and Required Operational Capability (ROC) levels of installations in OCONUS COCOM Areas of Responsibility (AOR). However, the past resourcing environment placed an overall programmatic and operational risk burden on CONUS ICOs. Recent incidents at the Washington Navy Yard and Naval Station Norfolk have brought into further question both the resourcing and readiness of the NSF.

Oversight and Risk Analysis of ATFP and LE
We reviewed several CNIC AFTP and LE inspection reports and could not find in those reports a link between the operational risk accepted by Installation Commanding Officers (ICO) and the resourcing decisions which were made by higher headquarters. This makes it difficult for Navy leadership to gauge the aggregate risk being accepted by various levels in the chain of command for ATFP. Both USFF and CNIC conduct installation-level ATFP assessments which focus on different aspects of the protection mission (CNIC's assessment is primarily compliance-based while USFF's assessment is primarily operational risk-based), but their reports are separately issued, with different target audiences.

USFF routinely assesses and reports to OPNAV the operational risks incurred by ICOs through a Higher Headquarter Operational Assessment (HHOA) process. We did not find a comparable level of programmatic risk assessment analysis performed by CNIC.

CNIC commenced Installation Protection Assessment Cell (IPAC) inspections at regions and installations in 2014, per CNICINST 5530.14A, CNIC Shore Protection Program, Chapter 11. The IPAC is primarily a compliance-based inspection, the results of which are used in a risk management process that crosses CNIC's lines of business. The IPAC has tremendous potential to provide ICOs headquarters-level AT expertise and advice on improving the training, readiness and employment of the NSF, but in its nascent state the IPAC has several shortcomings. We reviewed six IPAC reports during our inspection; in our opinion the IPAC does not give the ICO or CNIC a programmatic risk analysis, nor does it give the ICO a holistic assessment of the installation's security mission performance. Rather, it provides the majority of the IPAC reports provide the ICO a list of compliance deficiencies with no targeted desired end state to mitigate risk or to improve the efficacy of the installation's AT plan. Our observations during the inspection are supported by past area visits where we reviewed the status of installation corrective actions from IPACs; in those inspections, we noted that the installation was typically addressing the deficiencies as individual action items from a list of deficiencies vice a holistic plan of action to raise installation security readiness.

Training of the NSF

CNIC has taken several important steps toward raising the standard of training of the NSF. To address past shortfalls in the administration of NSF training requirements at its installations, CNIC implemented the Data Housing and Reporting Tool (DHART) to track required courses, Personnel Qualification Standards (PQS), lethal/non-lethal weapon qualifications, and other relevant documents. DHART is a useful tool in reducing administrative inefficiencies while providing an enterprise standard for LE administration.

Prior to 2013, civilian NSF personnel would attend local installation specific training academies whose curricula varied and were tailored to local LE requirements vice DoD requirements; this was subsequently identified by CNIC as a contributor to high attrition among civilian NSF personnel. To address the attrition of civilian NSF personnel, CNIC established the Uniform Police Training Program (UPTP) in October of 2013; this 12-week course of instruction replaced all separate installation command training academies and tailored the curriculum toward DoD vice local LE requirements. Graduates are fully trained and qualified on arrival to their assigned installation. Since its inception, over 145 civilians have successfully completed training through the UPTP. Additionally, CNIC is starting to hire civilian NSF at lower entry paygrades (GS-3 for example) to attract younger candidates, with career advancement opportunities. This initiative shows promise and should help address attrition problems with civilian NSF in CONUS.

To address professional development shortfalls with commissioned LE officers in the Navy, the Center for Security Forces (CENSEFOR) developed a Navy Security Force Officer (NSFO) course of instruction. Currently, there are four scheduled convenings for FY15 and three for FY16. In the future, the course will be included in the NSFO Limited Duty Officer (LDO) pipeline after graduation from the Limited Duty Officer/Chief Warrant Officer Academy. At the time of the

inspection, the Navy is considering inclusion of senior enlisted Master at Arms personnel (E7-E9) into the NSFO course as a "C" School.

In March 2015, USFF identified additional operational risks that reduce the effectiveness of the NSF:

- Lack of standardized training delivery processes across installations
- Wide variance of training team composition and capabilities
- Inconsistent sustainment training across all watch sections

To address these issues across the enterprise, CNIC is working closely with USFF to develop a Naval Security Force training manual. CNIC has developed a three-year certification plan to implement following approval of the NSF training manual. At this early stage, we assess this plan as executable, but it will require further analysis and action by stakeholders to address shortfalls today in training and certification resources required to achieve the three-year timeline.

While we agree with CNIC's initiative to standardize NSF training and certification, we are concerned about the staffing of the headquarters, region and installation training organizations that will implement any future changes and initiatives to NSF (and EM) training. Present manpower levels across the CNIC enterprise for the NSF training function may be inadequate to raise force standards and readiness. Of interest, the manpower associated with the training function is typically not factored into the MPV-P.

The CNIC headquarters Standard Organization and Regulations Manual (SORM), dated May 2013, assigned enterprise training responsibilities to the Director, Training and Readiness (N7). In this capacity, CNIC N7 planned and executed echelon 2 responsibilities for region and installation shore training and education, to include integrated exercises and readiness reporting in support of Warfighting Enterprises. In July 2013, CNIC conducted a re-alignment and Reduction in Force (RIF) which disestablished CNIC N7 and moved the training responsibilities to CNIC N36.

The RIF and re-organization reduced CNIC's ability to execute enterprise training, in particular AT and EM training. Prior to the RIF, CNIC N7 had 29 personnel on staff at headquarters to execute enterprise-wide training duties; following the RIF and re-organization, the headquarters training staff was reduced to six full-time equivalents (FTE), an 79% reduction in personnel. The RIF also impacted training positions at Navy regions: CONUS, the total number of training staff went from 20 to eight; OCONUS, the total number of training staff went from 16 to five. Higher priority installations (designated Groups One and Two) retained one training officer (for a total of 48 worldwide) while lower priority installations (Group Three) training officer positions were eliminated.

The RIF forced CNIC to make tough choices on what responsibilities it could adequately deliver in the area of enterprise training. Examples of reductions include the number of mobile training team courses offered to the enterprise, the number of contract instructors, the number of exercise planners, and curriculum development. While we concur with adding resources to

the manning of the NSF, the efficacy of training the protection mission and EM may still suffer without proper determination of the required number of training billets and associated resourcing necessary to carry out future training requirements across the CNIC enterprise.

Equipping the NSF

CNIC has one Physical Security Specialist (PSS) assigned as the NSF Equipment Manager, with one contractor assistant on staff. The PSS is responsible for ordering, testing, and certification of all NSF personal equipment (to include ASF and Reserve NSF personnel) for the entire CNIC enterprise.

The process to adjudicate LE equipment requisitions is lengthy and requires improvements in efficiency. For example, some Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and Police Officer web belts have taken up to eight months to be delivered to installations; this has negative impacts on installation post manning and LE employment. Currently, CNIC programs $6M per year for NSF equipment acquisition and sustainment to Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) Expeditionary Warfare Center (EXWC). The Navy uses a distribution system different from other DoD services; there are possible efficiencies to be gained by changing the process from which NSF equipment is procured to address the delivery problem in the Navy. Additionally, all NSF equipment requisitions today are being performed by hard-copy documents or through use of spreadsheets; this process contributes to inefficiencies in NSF equipment procurement. The Cataloging Online Logistics Tracking System (COLTS) computer software was developed for tracking the status of NSF equipment, from making equipment requisitions through delivery to the customer. COLTS is funded, with anticipated delivery and deployment in FY16.

Recommendation 3.   **That CNIC re-align its ATFP, EM, and FES functions in N3 to ensure proper integrated oversight and programmatic decision-making to optimally support the Navy's shore public safety mission.**

Recommendation 4.   **That CNIC finalize and implement standardized NSF ashore training and certification standards in support of USFF shore protection requirements.**

Recommendation 5.   **That CNIC conduct a manpower determination to assess the required number of training personnel throughout the CNIC enterprise to align with pending NSF training and certification requirements.**

Recommendation 6.   **That CNIC IPACs provide ICOs holistic assessments of an installation's security mission, training capabilities, provide programmatic and operational risk assessments, and provide a tailored plan of corrective action with a defined end state on raising an installation's security readiness.**

Recommendation 7.   **That CNIC examine alternative NSF equipment procurement processes to reduce equipment procurement times.**

Emergency Management (EM)

CNIC effectively executes its EM support functions as delineated in OPNAVINST 5450.339. CNIC's headquarters EM organization consists of 19 total billets (12 civilian, two military, and five contractors). At the time of our inspection, there were three civilian vacancies. EM is

funded to the COL 4 level, with an annual budget that decreased over the past three consecutive fiscal years ($73M in FY13, $70.5M in FY14, $61.5M in FY15).

The EM program provides the backbone of the public safety functions at Navy installations and regions worldwide. The EM program is responsible for a wide range of functions, to include dispatch, installation EM Staff, regional EM Staff, Navy Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (NEPLO), Regional Operations Centers (ROC), Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE), and Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD). LE and FES must retain interoperability with EM to ensure the Navy has a viable public safety function at each Navy installation.

CNIC recently eliminated its CBRNE Coordinators at several overseas locations due to a loss of funding described below. Given the need for CBRNE expertise at Navy regions, this requires CNIC action to correct. Of note, the Commander, Navy Region Japan (CNRJ) CBRNE Coordinator was utilized extensively in 2011 during the Fukushima Daiichi incident.

CNI 3440.17, Navy Installation Emergency Management Program Manual, indicates that some U.S. and overseas regions have contract CBRNE Coordinators provided by the CNIC EM and/or the NAVFAC CBRN program. These contract personnel are fielded to assist designated regional EM programs over a specified time in addressing CBRNE-specific hazards within their programs.

In the past, CNIC funded contract CBRNE coordinators for all regions with CBRNE preparedness and/or CBR defense programs, utilizing Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)/Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding. In 2010, decreases in funding and changes to rules on the use of GWOT/OCO funds forced CNIC to absorb the cost for CBRNE Coordinators; at that time, CNIC eliminated CBRNE support for all CONUS regions. While CONUS regions still maintain the requirement for a CBRNE Coordinator, the positions are unfunded.

From 2010-2014, OCO funds were used to maintain the CBRNE Coordinator positions for Commander, Navy Region Europe/Africa/Southwest Asia (CNREURAFSWA) (2 FTE); CNRJ (2 FTE); and Commander, Navy Region Marianas (CNRM) (1 FTE). In December 2014, CNIC N8 informed CNIC N3 that FY15 OCO could no longer be used for funding CBRNE Coordinators since the support does not meet OCO rules and regulations. As a stopgap measure, CNIC N3 realigned funding to cover the CBRNE Coordinator contract through the end of April 2015.

CNIC N3 recently submitted a request to obtain additional funding for another calendar year. Due to the lead times associated with obtaining funding, a gap exists today for CBRNE Coordinators at several overseas locations.

Recommendation 8. **That CNIC restore funding for CBRNE Coordinators at CNREURAFSWA, CNRJ, and CNRM.**

Installation Safety Programs (SA)

CNIC is responsible for oversight and execution of installation safety functions at 70 Navy installations and associated sites worldwide. This includes Navy occupational safety and health, explosive safety, recreational and off-duty safety, and traffic safety. The Resource Sponsor,

OPNAV N46 (Shore Readiness), has taken deliberate risk in funding shore safety programs at COL 4. As a result, CNIC headquarters has directed regional Program Directors to provide certain recreational and off-duty safety services only if supplemental funding from other sources are provided, in violation of OPNAVINST 5100.12J, Navy Traffic Safety Program, and OPNAVINST 5100.25C, Navy Recreation and Off-Duty Safety Program.

Issue Paper A-1 addresses this issue in further detail.

At CNIC headquarters, we noted the Safety Manager reports through the Operations Director instead of directly to the headquarters commander. By instruction, the organization should be structured to provide the Safety Manager with direct access to the commander.

Deficiency 3. **CNIC headquarters Safety Manager does not report directly to the headquarters commander. Reference: OPNAVINST 5100.23G CH-1, paragraph 0302.**

Facility Management

Environmental

Funding Priorities

In general, the environmental program funds efforts that directly support compliance oversight associated with applicable Federal, State, and local environmental requirements. Environmental projects that directly support environmental compliance are prioritized using Environmental Readiness Levels (ERL) 1 through 4 (ERL 4 projects are the minimum required to meet legal mandates, ERL 3 projects are derived from DoD and/or Navy policy, and ERL 1 and 2 projects are proactive in nature). The environmental program does not fund the costs to maintain and operate real property, plant equipment, and operation of municipal solid waste disposal facilities (to include recycling) even though such projects may be necessary to achieve environmental compliance. Such projects follow the COL system of prioritization in which COL 4 is not fully capable and higher COL levels represent increasing levels of mission capability/readiness.

The CNIC environmental program currently operates based on COL 4/ERL 4 funding levels. Funding levels are barely adequate to meet legally mandated minimum requirements. Therefore, the risk of non-compliance is high due to emergent requirements, understaffing at echelon 3 and 4, and external constraints such as Sequestration that put pressure on budgets already driven down to legally mandated minimums. The CNIC FY15 Operations Plan states that regions may need to de-scope or defer projects required by law (that by definition already provide compliance on a "just-in-time" basis). Moreover, CNIC environmental staff report that in FY14, a number of legally mandated projects would have gone unfunded if not for an unexpected Congressional windfall of $20M.

Environmental Manpower

CNIC pays for reimbursable manpower provided by NAVFAC to execute environmental programs at Navy regions and installations. Since requirements vary from installation to installation, it is not feasible to staff every installation with a full complement of environmental

professionals proficient in every environmental subspecialty. Instead, the regions provide reach-back capability for the installations as needed to fulfill environmental readiness mission areas.

Collectively, the manpower projects submitted by CNIC to OPNAV as part of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process are the single largest expense in the environmental program. Manpower requirements are submitted by each installation to their respective regions and ultimately to CNIC HQ. Presently, there is no mechanism to independently verify the manpower needs of each installation at the CNIC HQ level. A model is under development by CNIC HQ that would utilize objective requirements (e.g. number of environmental permits) as a means of estimating manpower requirements. The current manpower model estimates that CNIC enterprise-wide environmental manpower is at 80% of the full requirement, with at least one region manned at a level of just 65% of its full requirement. This suggests a need to reallocate manpower resources to mitigate the shortfall at the region(s) with the greatest need. Importantly, the model as currently designed is not scalable to correlate with COL/ERL funding levels. Given the relative cost of manpower to the program, a manpower model is clearly needed to independently verify manpower costs. However, since the entire environmental program is funded based on COL/ERL level, CNIC should make the manpower model scalable in a manner that allows manpower to be aligned with COL/ERL levels that are used to benchmark the rest of the environmental program.

Recommendation 9.   **That CNIC incorporate Common Output Level/Environmental Readiness Level in the development of a model to estimate environmental manpower requirements.**

Environmental Project Funding

Because funding is generally provided only for legally mandated projects on a just-in-time basis, funding is generally not provided for projects that are required solely as a matter of policy, that represent best practices, or are designed solely to reduce life cycle costs. In the short term, this produces a "bow wave" of unfunded requirements. For the Compliance and Services division, this presents several challenges:

- Emergent projects must be funded with money already earmarked for other legally mandated requirements that must in turn, be deferred or de-scoped in order cover the cost of the emergent requirements (as detailed in CNIC FY15 Operations Plan)
- Human health and safety issues that lack a legal requirement go unfunded until they receive higher headquarters or media attention
- Executing a program that does not fully comply with policies established by DoD and/or OPNAV M-5090.1, Environmental Readiness Program Manual, produces a loss of trust; regulators and ICOs expect that the Navy will follow its own policies
- Risk of regulatory violations increase by continually postponing implementation of best practices
- After years of funding constraints, staff in the field are more reluctant to seek funding for affected projects, which provides a false presumption regarding the fiscal health of the program

For example, since 2007, Navy policy (OPNAV M-5090.1) has been aligned with Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) guidelines that call for testing for lead in drinking water in priority areas. Since the Navy policy was driven by an EPA guideline rather than a law, it went largely unfunded until lead was discovered in drinking water at childcare facilities at Naval Station Norfolk and Joint Base Little Creek-Fort Story only after year-end funds became available for lead testing in FY12. CNIC now funds routine testing for lead in priority areas despite the fact that this is not a legally mandated requirement. Similarly, EPA has a stated guideline of 4 picocuries per liter for radon levels in the workplace. Navy policy is to test for radon in the workplace and mitigate if levels exceed the EPA guideline levels. Again, as a policy requirement, there is no funding for this requirement at COL 4/ERL 4 funding levels. However, recent discovery of radon levels exceeding EPA guidelines at Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA)-owned and operated facilities will likely drive funding of radon testing and remediation Navy-wide in the future.

Overseas Drinking Water

In 2009 and 2013 Special Study Reports, NAVINSGEN reported serious deficiencies in overseas drinking water (ODW) and recommended that the Secretary of the Navy establish an independent primacy agency directly reporting to SECNAV to oversee ODW.

During our 2014 NAVFAC Command Inspection, we consulted subject matter experts (SME) from CNIC, OPNAV, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations and Environment (ASN(EI&E)) regarding the current status of the ODW program. The SMEs concurred that the current system was adequate to oversee ODW and observed progress in resolving deficiencies identified in earlier NAVINSGEN reports. We also noted that additional run time is needed to produce a meaningful assessment of this relatively new oversight and management system.

One of the key ODW improvements is the Certificate To Operate (CTO), which is granted to an ODW system after a successful sanitary survey and review by a CNIC SME team. After receiving a CTO, the ODW system is re-evaluated on a regular basis in conjunction with new sanitary surveys in order to renew the CTO. Thus far, only six of 50 ODW systems have been granted a CTO. Sustained attention and funding is required so that the remaining 44 water systems qualify for CTOs by the planned March 2016 deadline and to maintain the standards necessary to retain CTO status thereafter.

Deficiency 4. **Forty-four of 50 Navy overseas water systems are not certified to operate as required by instruction. Reference: CNICINST 5090.1, U.S. Drinking Water Quality Standards for U.S. Navy Installations Overseas, paragraph 5a(2).**

Facility Support

Facility Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (FSRM)

The CNIC FSRM program is generally underfunded based on the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Facility Sustainment Model and deferred facility maintenance backlog. CNIC has robust governance of the facilities project development and prioritization process within and among the regions. CNIC is balancing the programmatic requirements for facility sustainment

with the installation expertise necessary to prevent safety hazards and mission impacts from aging facilities. As an increasing number of facility types receive special consideration in programming and budgeting, the remaining facilities will degrade at an accelerated rate.

When considered in conjunction with a declining Military Construction program, Navy generally lacks a holistic strategy to deliberately recapitalize the shore infrastructure. Given the wide variety of shore facilities, installations are applying resources to sustain mission support and respond to individual facility failures.

CNIC is challenged to evaluate and articulate the degree and imminence of shore facility failure resulting from deliberate financial risk decisions.

Best practices in this program area include thorough planning guidance to regions, a mature SMIG process and responsive execution within a program funded below the modeled requirement.

Facility Sustainment (ST)

The OSD Facility Sustainment Model generates the annual ST requirement based on information in the iNFADS database. Regions retain responsibility for ensuring accuracy of iNFADS. The OSD goal is to fund 90% of the full requirement annually. Navy has not budgeted to this level since 2011.

Several programs including maintenance dredging and ST funded special projects are funded from within the ST program sponsored by OPNAV N46. As a result, the remaining ST budget allocated to regions results in some installations being funded to as little as 50-60% of the facilities sustainment requirement. CNIC regulates the prioritization of ST investments by requiring a DD Form 1391 (FY Military Construction Project Data) and providing one-time authority for obligation of any project over $500K.

OPNAV N46 applied the concept of Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) in the POM17 sponsor program proposal (SPP) whereby limited ST resources are directed to the most critical components of the most mission critical facilities. In FY16 and FY17, these components include the building envelope to prevent water intrusion and preserve facility service life. Further, in the POM17 SPP, OPNAV N46 recognized that an increasing backlog of "failed" facilities with low facility condition index (FCI) created a burden on the overall ST portfolio. CNIC acknowledges that facility sustainment projects are not typically segregated down to individual facility components and often multiple systems are sustained by a single facility project. Further, CNIC remains committed to sustaining the inventory of facilities despite a reported facility maintenance backlog of over $39B in FY14. This is five times the amount CNIC receives annually to run the shore installation enterprise. Continued underinvestment in CNIC shore operations and maintenance will result in a burgeoning maintenance deficit.

CNIC differentiates ST-funded special projects from restoration and modernization (RM)-funded special projects by cause of deterioration and type of repair rather than by dollar threshold. These include dry dock certifications, roof replacements performed according to life-cycle, and runway milling and overlay.

Restoration and Modernization (RM)

The annual RM program generally fails to address any meaningful percentage of the overall deferred facilities maintenance backlog. Project prioritization is accomplished by the SMIG led by CNIC. Higher prioritization of several facilities categories to include Shipyards, Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise, Bachelor Quarters, and Strategic Laydown and Dispersal (SLD) limit the number of other Fleet provider projects programmed annually.

Underfunding ST generally accelerates degradation of the facility inventory, reduces service life, and increases the RM requirement. Some RM requirements are emergent to comply with new standards such as fire safety or access, and therefore reduce the amount of available funds for originally scheduled RM projects.

CNIC is committed to obligate FSRM at a steady rate throughout the fiscal year, a deliberate approach that enables the most cost-efficient execution. CNIC maintains the capacity to obligate facility projects and local sustainment late in the fiscal year if funding becomes available from within other budget line items. CNIC and NAVFAC have teamed in FY15 to develop a balanced program for an anticipated FSRM increase in FY16 and the capacity to execute additional projects above the program of record (POR) for FY15.

Facility Demolition (DE)

CNIC has consistently aimed to maintain a viable demolition program. For several budget cycles, OPNAV N46 has programmed only the minimum demolition required by Navy policy as offset for new footprint, but then liquidated the DE program for higher priority requirements. At the installation level, an abandoned facility does not necessarily present a safety hazard, but may require a small sustainment and base operating support budget.

Facility Services (FX)

Within the BOS budget, FX funding provides an array of facility services including grounds, custodial, solid waste management, pest control, and pavement clearance. The program endeavors to provide consistent service levels across installations and regions as well as uniform delivery of services throughout the fiscal year. Service levels are governed by COLs defined in the CNIC Operations Plan. Four standard COLs are further stratified with additional measures creating ten potential service levels. In FY15, FX is funded to COL 4 AM 3 (which equates to all COL 4 measures were funded).

FX funding was reduced in prior budget cycles, particularly during budget sequestration, with no accompanying reduction in the facility services requirement. During this time, the program goal was to keep installations operational with the minimum facility service levels to maintain health and safety while minimizing long-term material impacts to facilities. The Navy Quality of Service (QOS) initiative subsequently restored some FX service levels. For FY16, OPNAV established an FX program goal of COL 3 and resourced accordingly.

Most facility services are delivered by service contractors. Changes to facility service level outputs are not as flexible or scalable as implied by recent changes to funding levels. The FX program has leveraged the CNIC Requirements Integration Tool (RIT) hosted by CNIC N5 to build a bottom-up profile of FX COL 4 through COL 1 for the FX product lines.

Given the widespread appetite for increased facility service levels, CNIC governs service levels for installations by requiring a waiver for any service delivery above the specified COL level. Tenant commands may use their own operating budget to fund increased services. In FY15, tenant commands are funding approximately $8M in higher FX service levels Navy-wide according to the FX headquarters Program Director (compared to a $278M program). CNIC plans to continue monitoring additional spending by Navy tenant commands.

Some elements of the FX program may not be well-understood outside the shore enterprise to include the link between facility services and sustainment. Reduced cleaning, grounds maintenance and pest control accelerate degradation of facility systems requiring increased sustainment or restoration and modernization. Other impacts include reduced morale and productivity among the workforce who perform cleaning services themselves. These impacts are not well quantified.

Additionally, several services aggregated into the "other" FX product line have significant mission impact. For example, other FX includes fleet moorings and non-FSRM service work such as legacy window air conditioning systems.

Transportation (TR)

The CNIC transportation portfolio is relatively mature and funds predominantly GSA leased vehicles (approximately 90% of the TR inventory) procured through NAVFAC. Vehicle requirements are validated using the NAVFAC Transportation Review of Inventory Objective (TRIO) process which applies the annual utilization guidelines in DoDI 4500.36R, Management, Acquisition, and Use of Motor Vehicles. TRIO is conducted on a 3-year cycle. Standard output levels are governed by COL Standards as defined in the CNIC Operations Plan. The overall program requirement is approximately $194M with program funding at $164M (COL 4).

CNIC recently completed a TR working group study that developed a new TR dashboard of performance metrics and created a standardized funding profile for implementation at the regions. This enabled consistent application of any reductions to service levels across the enterprise. CNIC is centrally managing several elements of the TR portfolio to include shuttles, taxis, and rail equipment that are uncommon to most installations. In addition, the CNIC headquarters program director (HPD) is conducting assist visits to regions at a rate of one region per year.

TR program initiatives include vehicle fleet telematics to collect real-time usage data and NAVFAC pilot programs for energy efficient vehicles.

Recommendation 10. **That CNIC HPD conduct region assist visits on a three-year cycle to align with NAVFAC TRIO process periodicity.**

Utilities (UT)

Utilities constitute the largest individual Base Operating Support (BOS) service within the CNIC portfolio with FY15 funding of $998M (COL 4). UT is generally considered a "must-fund" requirement. Accurate UT forecasting is crucial in preventing erosion of funding for other BOS programs through execution year transfers. The UT requirement is a function of overall consumption and the Navy Working Capital Fund (NWCF) utility rates.

The UT funding requirement is developed using the heuristic asset management utilities requirements (HAMUR) web-enabled tool. HAMUR develops the baseline CNIC consumption using three years each of iNFADS facility data and CIRCUITS (Centralized and Integrated Reporting for the Comprehensive Utilities Information Tracking System) billing data. The tool is being submitted to OPNAV N81 (Assessment) for accreditation.

A challenge for the UT program director is alignment of utility rate setting to the annual programming and budgeting process. CNIC is participating in a working group with NAVFAC to understand and influence the rate-setting process. Other initiatives include advanced metering of facilities and a standard enterprise allocation methodology for non-metered facilities. NAVFAC has also initiated semi-annual regional utility commission meetings with supported commands.

Energy savings remain central to cost control within the UT portfolio. Measuring and validating savings mitigates the risk that estimated savings applied to the UT budget are not realized. The UT profile includes several non-commodity costs to include finance payments for third-party utility energy service contracts (UESC) and energy savings performance contracts (ESPC). CNIC and OPNAV N46 propose to "fence" these payments within the UT profile as part of the POM17 SPP. We think this approach is appropriate as a measure toward achieving DoD and SECNAV energy goals.

Collateral Equipment (FQ)

FQ is a Base Operating Support (BOS) function linked to the military construction (MCON) program. The requirement is documented in Block 12b of the DD Form 1391 (Other Appropriations) for MCON projects selected by the SMIG for a given fiscal year. FQ is programmed and budgeted on a two-year lead-time to align collateral equipment installation with the MCON project construction schedule. CNIC also maintains functional oversight of operational equipment to align program timelines.

Collateral equipment definitions are drawn from governing instructions and are well understood among functional experts including interior designers at NAVFAC Atlantic and NAVFAC Pacific. FQ program governance has been through the annual CNIC Project Planning and Assessment Guide. A new draft standard operating procedure (SOP) establishes new programming and execution guidance.

CNIC programs for the initial outfitting of new facilities only and strictly limits changes based on tenant preferences. Although many BOS functions are modeled, FQ is not a homogenous program for which a general model would provide acceptable granularity. FQ requirements are programmed for the specific equipment for individual MCON projects.

Energy Conservation Programs

CNIC is the Navy's Executive Agent for shore energy conservation programs, which include the reduction of utility and petroleum consumption, and has made progress toward federal, DoD, and Secretary of the Navy energy goals. To provide timely and holistic progress data to this end, CNIC has implemented several tools, including an energy dashboard. However, CNIC is behind pace in meeting the reduction of potable water consumption required by OPNAVINST

4100.5E, Shore Energy Management, which calls for a 26% reduction in water consumption between 2007 and 2020; the Navy is roughly 5% behind pace to meet this target. In addition, CNIC requires additional resources to install the utility meters necessary to meet higher guidance and achieve better accuracy that will ideally facilitate change in human behavior for maximum utility conservation.

Issue Paper A-2 addresses the metering issue in further detail.

Deficiency 5.   CNIC is behind pace in meeting targets for reduction of potable water consumption. Reference: OPNAVINST 4100.5E, paragraph 3b(3).

Fleet and Family Readiness

Child and Youth Programs

CNIC is the Navy's lead for providing Child Development Centers (CDC), School Age Care (SAC), and Youth Programs. This is a well-run program subject to frequent, thorough oversight to ensure accreditation standards are met. The program managers provided documentation that demonstrated a history of comprehensive inspections at each of the Navy's 134 Child Development Centers and 103 Youth and School Age Care Centers.

Fleet and Family Support Programs

Services provided under these programs include career support, crisis response counseling, sexual assault prevention and response counseling and training, and wounded warrior support programs, including Navy Gold Star and Safe Harbor programs. These programs are well-run and have received attention from DoD and higher-level leadership. Additional funds have been provided for the Safe Harbor program, which resembles the Army's approach to continuing care for active duty and retired ill and injured personnel.

Navy Wounded Warrior – Safe Harbor

This program was established in 2006 with congressional mandates set forth in the National Defense Authorization Acts of 2006 and 2008 to provide care to all wounded, ill and injured service members. Safe Harbor became a program of record in 2010, providing counseling, advocacy, and assistance to qualifying members and their families. However, supervisors of Recovery Care Coordinators (RCC) and Non-Medical Care Managers (NMCM) are O3s and an E8, which does not meet DoD instruction requirements.

Deficiency 6.   CNIC Recovery Care Coordinators and Non-Medical Care Managers are not O5/O6 or GS equivalent in five of six CONUS regions as required by instruction. Reference: DoDI 1300.24, Recovery Coordination Program, Enclosure 6, paragraph 2a(1).

Navy Gold Star Program

The Navy Gold Star Program was mandated by CNO in 2014 via NAVADMIN 194/14, Subj: Establishment of the Navy Gold Star Program. The program provides referral services and support to the surviving family after the death of an active duty Sailor. However, annual program expenses of $2.1M are not funded as a program of record, and the 18 FTE Non-appropriated Fund (NAF) employees assigned to the program have been funded with labor

lapse dollars. Since program launch, coordinators have provided over 2,200 hours of direct customer care to approximately 4,900 survivors. However, the budget Resource Sponsor, OPNAV N14 (Research, Studies and Analysis) has not yet funded this program in POM budget submissions, although the requirement has been included in OPNAV N14's FY17 budget request for approval in POM-17.

Issue Paper A-3 addresses this issue in further detail.

Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR)

CNIC runs the Navy's shore fitness, liberty, and community support programs as a non-appropriated instrumentality, which allows them to run operations similar to their commercial counterparts with subsidizing from appropriated funding for certain programs (such as gyms, libraries, and child development services). These programs are well-organized and managed by a highly qualified staff worldwide, supported by a sound auditing program managed and executed at CNIC headquarters.

Family and Unaccompanied Housing

CNIC is Navy's Executive Agent for family and bachelor housing. The vast majority of Navy family housing units are operated by Navy's partners under a Public Private Venture (PPV) limited liability corporation; however, CNIC executes the programming, budgeting, maintenance and operation of the remaining Navy-owned family housing units at overseas locations. The overseas family housing program is well-run and has improved the average condition rating over the past five years in accordance with OSD guidance to ensure 90% of Navy-owned family housing units have a condition rating of "good" or better (Q1/Q2). Conversely, CNIC self-reported that Navy permanent-party unaccompanied housing (UPH), or barracks, condition rating was approximately 57% "good" or better (Q1/Q2) at the time of inspection. Additionally, the trajectory of UPH condition ratings remains well below OSD guidance for 90% of all Navy barracks to have a condition rating of Q1 or Q2 by 2022. Additional Operations and Maintenance, Navy (OM,N) repair funding or Military Construction (MILCON) funding will be needed to rectify this situation.

Deficiency 7.   **CNIC is not on a path to improve the average condition rating of Navy permanent-party unaccompanied housing to 90% Q1/Q2 condition rating as directed by Office of Secretary of Defense. Reference: Office of Secretary of Defense FY 2016 - FY 2020 Integrated Program/Budget Submission Guidance, paragraph 4.5.6.**

Continuity of Operations (COOP) Program

The CNIC COOP program is not fully compliant with SECNAVINST 3030.4C, Department of the Navy Continuity of Operations Program. The command Continuity of Operations instruction is dated 2011 and has not been reviewed annually as required. (b) (7)(E)

Deficiency 8.   **CNIC has not conducted annual review (and update as necessary) of its COOP instruction. Reference: OPNAVINST 3030.5B, paragraph 7a(1)(n)2.**

Deficiency 9.   **CNIC has not conducted annual exercise of its COOP** (b) (7)(E)
███   **Reference: OPNAVINST 3030.4C, paragraph 7a(1)(k)6.**

Total Force Management

CNIC is making progress on a workforce development program for echelon 2 and below civilian and military employees, and has created a tool that we consider a best practice. Cross-Functional Teams, comprised of senior members from various CNIC N-codes, focus on leadership development, competency development, and required training. These teams define training requirements, tracking mechanisms, and costs. Additionally, CNIC recently deployed a Center of Excellence in Workforce Development (CoE-WD). This interactive portal provides a variety of developmental tools for employees and supervisors, currently covering 13 of the 21 functional communities found within the DON. Because CNIC is a global organization, regional champions on both the East and West Coast of the U.S. contribute to portal content, which is available to employees and supervisors 24 hours a day/7 days a week. CoE-WD provides the following topics, tools, resources, and training information:

- Individual Development Plan (IDP) - Assistance with planning, establishing and monitoring competency based career plans that outline the methods and timeframe for completion of developmental activities. (DON requirement)
- Career Roadmap - An interactive tool to develop a career path using competencies and knowledge-skills-abilities (KSA) models relevant to certain job series and at what level potential advancement may occur
- Mentoring Program - Resources and guidance focusing on improving professional performance, personal development, career decision making, goal setting/attainment, etc. The CNIC Mentoring Program currently has 12 mentors and 7 protégés and is strongly encouraged by senior leadership.
- Developmental Assignment Program - Enables employees to learn about new tools, techniques and business processes through diverse job rotations and cross functional assignments
- Community Management Plan - Used in conjunction with an employee's IDP, this plan exposes the individual to guiding principles, management structure, and framework supporting competency based career development

CNIC is actively marketing the CoE-WD through its regions by distributing a quarterly newsletter to all CNIC employees and posting training opportunities from other federal agencies to leverage or augment the training courses available for the various competencies.

Recommendation 11.   That CNIC include succession planning in their strategic workforce planning program.

Recommendation 12.   That CNIC include COE-WD website capabilities as an integral part of their onboarding process for new employees and new supervisors, as well as annual supervisor-employee discussions of IDPs.

Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Programs

CNIC self-reported a deficiency in EEO staffing and complaint processing timelines. In their self-assessment EEO Score Card, CNIC indicates one of five pillars as green (Counseling) and the other four as red (Counselor Reporting, Accept or Dismiss, Request for Investigations, Completed Investigations). Reflective of this status, the CNIC EEO payout for complaints was $348,522 in FY14, and the CNIC EEO staff estimated a notably higher EEO payout for FY15. CNIC is understaffed to fulfill the EEO Management Directive 110 requirement of completing 100% of investigations within the 180-day deadline. Historical data on EEO complaint timelines was poor, but improving given FY13 at 26% timely and FY14 at 63% timely, with observable backlogs at the pre-complaint and accept/dismiss phase. To rectify this situation, CNIC approved 10 additional EEO Specialist positions in FY17.

Deficiency 10. **CNIC is not in compliance with Equal Employment Opportunity complaint processing timelines. Reference: EEO Management Directive 110, Chapter 5, paragraph II.A.**

Personnel Priority Placement (PPP) Program

Commanders of activities responsible for the HRO function at each installation are required upon arrival and not later than every 3 years thereafter to issue a written statement of support for the DoD PPP Program and ensure all recipients comply with the spirit, letter and intent of this program. CNIC headquarters Unit Identification Codes (UIC) 00052, 40582, and 4571A did not have a PPP command support statement on file. Following document request, a signed statement dated 18 May 2015 by the Commander was provided.

Deficiency 11. **CNIC headquarters did not have a command support statement on file at the time of inspection. Reference: Department of Defense (DoD) Priority Placement Program (PPP) Handbook Chapter 1, Section E.(13).**

Personnel Training/Qualifications

Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) Qualifications

As of 14 May 2015, CNIC had 22 military DAWIA-coded billets and 25 civilian Acquisition Workforce positions, none of which were DAWIA-coded. CNIC lacks an Acquisition Workforce Manager, does not track DAWIA requirements, and is unable to demonstrate compliance with DAWIA certification and training requirements as set forth in DoDI 5000.66, Operation of the Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Workforce Education, Training, and Career Development Program; DON Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) Operating Guide; and DON ASN(RD&A) Memorandum of September 30, 2014, Subj: FY15 DON DAWIA Goals.

Deficiency 12. **CNIC lacks a process to ensure DAWIA certification and training compliance and measure attainment of DON DAWIA FY-15 goals. References: DoD Instruction 5000.66, paragraph E2.1.3.4; DON DAWIA Operating Guide, Chapters 7, 8, and 13; and DON ASN(RD&A) Memorandum of September 30, 2014, Subj: FY15 DON DAWIA Goals, paragraph 2.**

Recommendation 13.   That CNIC designate a DAWIA Program Director (ideally an O-6 or GS-15 or equivalent) to oversee DAWIA command compliance per the DON Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) Operating Guide of 24 Jun 14, paragraph 3.2.2.

Financial Management (FM) Position Classification Review

A random sample of GS-5XX series Position Descriptions (PDs) from CNIC UICs 00052 and 40582 were reviewed for required FM Certification Program verbiage required by DoD. Additionally, GS-501 and GS-503 PDs were checked for the required standardized format prescribed by DON.

For UIC 00052, eight (8) of the eleven (11) original PDs selected did not contain the required DoD Certification verbiage, but the standardized format had been used. Once the lack of verbiage was reported to CNIC, updated PD coversheets (OF-8) were provided and the DoD verbiage was added.

Recommendation 14.   That CNIC validate required FM community verbiage throughout the performance rating cycle and make review for this language a part of ongoing supervisory review of position related information.

General Military Training (GMT)

GMT is not completed by all military personnel as directed by OPNAVINST 1500.22G, General Military Training and NAVADMIN 264/13, FY14 General Military Training Schedule. CNIC headquarters staff was unable to provide FY13 GMT data and the FY14 GMT completion rate was 33%. CNIC's FY15 GMT completion rate was 38% (Category One topics) and 47% (Category Two topics) at the time of our inspection.

Deficiency 13.   CNIC headquarters staff GMT Category One and Two topics are not completed by all military personnel. References: OPNAVINST 1500.22G, paragraph 4c and 6d(2); NAVADMIN 264/13; NAVADMIN 202.14.

Civilian Training

Civilian training requirements are not completed as directed by SECNAVINST 12410.25, Civilian Employee Training and Career Development, and the DON Office of Civilian Human Resources. CNIC headquarters was unable to provide FY13 data and FY14 civilian training completion rate was 37%. The command is on track to meet all FY15 civilian training requirements.

Deficiency 14.   CNIC civilian mandatory training requirements are not completed by all civilian personnel. Reference: SECNAVINST 12410.25, Civilian Employee Training and Career Development and DON Office of Civilian Human Resources, https://www.portal.navy.mil/donhr/TrainingDevelopment/Pages/MandatoryTraining.aspx.

Recommendation 15.   That CNIC ensure that civilian personnel are afforded sufficient time to complete training requirements.

Recommendation 16.   That CNIC ensure statements of work for contractor personnel contain required training as detailed in DoD, SECNAV, and OPNAV instructions.

Manning and Manpower

Shore Manpower Requirements Determination (SMRD)

CNIC headquarters military manning was 100% filled and headquarters civilian staff manning was 85% filled. Surveys, focus group discussions, and interviews with leaders at CNIC indicate that the workforce feels stressed and overworked. We did not validate the headquarters staff manpower requirements, but note that CNIC has no record of an SMRD being performed. An SMRD provides a systematic means of determining and documenting manpower requirements based on Mission, Functions and Tasks. An SMRD is required to establish CNIC's baseline (peacetime) manpower requirements.

Deficiency 15. **CNIC does not have record of a Shore Manning Requirements Document (SMRD). Reference: OPNAVINST 1000.16K CH-1, Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures, Section 400, paragraph 5d and Section 402, paragraph 4b.**

Civilian Performance Management

CNIC did not complete civilian performance plans or annual appraisals for FY14 in a timely manner. Among a random sample of 26 FY14 civilian personnel records, none of the 26 performance plans were established by the deadline of 30 October 2013 and only one of 26 annual assessments was completed by the deadline of 14 December 2014. However, we noted that 24 of 26 progress reviews were completed by the deadline of 31 May 2014.

Deficiency 16. **CNIC headquarters does not complete Annual Performance Plans and Annual Appraisals within prescribed timeframes. Reference: Interim Performance Management System DON Handbook, paragraph 6b.**

Deficiency 17. **CNIC headquarters is not providing required performance management training for supervisors. Reference: Public Law 111-84 (NDAA FY2010), Section 1113.**

FACILITIES, ENVIRONMENTAL, ENERGY CONSERVATION, AND SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH (SOH)

The Facilities, Environmental, Energy, and Safety Team assessed management, oversight, compliance, and execution of programs associated with each subject area via document review, data analysis, site visits, focus group and survey comments, and interviews with members of the CNIC headquarters staff. CNIC headquarters is executing shore related mission requirements at a generally acceptable level with respect to facilities, environmental, and energy conservation. However, static or declining funding levels and steadily increasing requirements are driving performance toward minimum compliance. SOH programs meet required program elements in accordance with applicable laws and regulations, but not all safety policies are met. Oversight of subordinate echelon 3 commands is marginally effective.

Facilities

The Facility Readiness Evaluation System indicates a condition rating of 86 for CNIC's headquarters facilities. This rating is above the average condition rating of 80 for other Washington Navy Yard (WNY) echelon 2 commands (scores ranged from 64 to 93) and above the average condition rating of 82 for all WNY facilities. Space allocation (available square footage) appeared sufficient and did not emerge as a significant mission impact in survey data or during on-site interviews.

Environmental Readiness

A review of operations at CNIC headquarters was conducted considering program oversight, environmental compliance, and environmental planning documentation including:

- Hazardous material
- Hazardous waste
- Spill prevention
- Storm water
- Drinking water
- Waste water
- Air pollution
- Environmental impact statements
- Environmental assessments
- Categorical exclusions
- Natural and cultural resources requirements

Due to the nature of their operations focused on policy, oversight, and training, the CNIC headquarters environmental program deals primarily with the proper storage, handling, and disposal of hazardous material, all of which are well-managed. Policy, oversight, and training of subordinate echelons was assessed as effective. CNIC headquarters does not use or have responsibility for petroleum storage or a hazardous waste accumulation area. Host installations (Naval Support Activity Washington and Naval Support Activity Mid-South) handle other environmental program responsibilities.

Energy Conservation

CNIC headquarters is compliant with OPNAVINST 4100.5E, Shore Energy Management, and SECNAVINST 4101.3, Department of the Navy Energy Program for Security and Independence Roles and Responsibilities.

Safety and Occupational Health

CNIC SOH programs were assessed for compliance with 29 U.S.C. 651-678; Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970; safety related rules, regulations, and standards promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration; and policies outlined in OPNAVINST 5100.23G CH-1, Navy Safety and Occupational Health Program Manual.

The following aspects of SOH are compliant with governing directives:

- Command SOH policy
- SOH oversight of subordinate commands
- Headquarters SOH program
- Training and qualifications of safety professionals assigned to CNIC headquarters
- Operational risk management
- Safety councils, committees, and working groups
- Safety database input
- Safety trend analysis
- Safety self-assessment
- Acquisition safety
- Traffic safety (including motorcycle safety)
- Recreational/off-duty safety

CNIC headquarters maintains an effective SOH Program that meets all required program elements in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, and policies listed above. Their SOH oversight of subordinate echelon commands requires improvement and should be included in a holistic inspection program of region commands (addressed later in the report).

SECURITY PROGRAMS AND CYBERSECURITY/TECHNOLOGY

The Security Programs and Cybersecurity and Technology Team used survey and focus group responses, document review, and face-to-face interviews to assess the following areas:

- Information Security
- Personnel Security
- Industrial Security
- Physical Security
- Special Security Programs
- Operations Security (OPSEC)
- Counterintelligence (CI) Support
- Insider Threat
- Cybersecurity
- Personally Identifiable Information (PII)

Command Security Office

CNIC has three billets in the security department: two GS-0080-13 Security Specialists and a GS-0080/0086-07 Security Assistant. Of the three, the Security Manager and Security Assistant positions are vacant with hiring actions currently being certified. Since January 2015, the office has been manned by one GS-0080-13. This Security Specialist provides services for an echelon 2 command of over 1,300 personnel. Due to the extensive workload, she has been unable to continue training or certification to maintain core security skill sets. Although this Security Specialist has attended the security manager course, continuing security education will bring her skill sets up to date and strengthen her knowledge on the pillars of security. By comparison, echelon 2 commands of comparable size typically have a security office of five to six personnel.

CNIC does not have a formal command security instruction in place; the minimum required elements of a command security instruction are found in SECNAV M 5510.36, Department of the Navy Information Security Program, Exhibit 2A and SECNAV M5510.30, Department of the Navy Personnel Security Program, Appendix C. CNIC's draft command security instruction has been in staffing for two years. We reviewed the draft instruction and recommended modifications to meet applicable DoD and SECNAV guidance.

Deficiency 18. **CNIC Security Office is understaffed and requires the hiring of a Security Manager and Security Assistant.**

Deficiency 19. **CNIC does not have a command security instruction in place. References: SECNAV M5510.36, Department of the Navy Information Security Program, Section 2-1, paragraph 5a; SECNAV M5510.30, Department of the Navy Personnel Security Program, Section 2-2, paragraph 2f.**

Information Security

CNIC provides initial and annual refresher security training to all command members.   Because of manning and fiscal constraints, CNIC has not conducted physical oversight of subordinate commands' INFOSEC programs. (b) (7)(E)

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CNIC's Emergency Action Plan (EAP) is their emergency plan for the protection of classified information, as required by SECNAV M5510.36, Exhibit 2B. We found that the EAP lacks specificity in several areas, making it difficult to determine who is responsible for taking action. Specifically, the EAP does not:

- Clearly designate persons authorized to decide that an emergency situation exists and to implement emergency plans;
- Delineate responsibilities by applicable N-Code;
- Clearly delineate employment of command security personnel;
- (b) (7)(E) ██████████████████████████████

Deficiency 20.   **CNIC does not provide information security oversight of subordinate commands. Reference: SECNAV M5510.36, Section 2-11, paragraph 1.**

Deficiency 21.   **CNIC does not have a formal process to include the security manager or other command subject matter experts in the review of official DoD information intended for public release. Reference: SECNAV M5510.36, Section 8-8.**

Deficiency 22. (b) (7)(E)

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████████████████████████████

Deficiency 23.   **CNIC does not ensure that performance evaluations of military and civilian personnel whose duties significantly involve the handling, creation or management of classified information document performance of those duties. References: DoDM 5200.01, Volume 1, Enclosure 2, paragraph 7h; SECNAV M5510.30, Section 2-2, paragraph 2k; and SECNAV M5510.36, Section 2.1, paragraph 5h.**

Recommendation 17.   **That CNIC update the command EAP for the protection of classified information to include specific duties and responsibilities of command personnel.**

Personnel Security

CNIC does not have a formal personnel security program in place. Because of manning and fiscal constraints, CNIC has not conducted physical oversight of subordinate commands' personnel security programs.

Deficiency 24. CNIC does not (b) (7)(E)

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Deficiency 25. **CNIC has not updated Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) with member Information Technology (IT) position determination levels to include IT-I, IT-II and IT-III. Reference SECNAV M5510.30, Section 5-2, paragraph 6.**

Deficiency 26. **CNIC does not provide personnel security oversight of its subordinate commands. Reference: SECNAV M5510.30, Section 2-10, paragraphs 1 and 2.**

Industrial Security

Industrial Security at CNIC is ineffective in practice and requires a comprehensive, formalized approach to ensure all security requirements are met for contracts, Contract Security Classification Specification forms (DD 254), and training. CNIC is required to have an industrial security policy in place, as stipulated in SECNAV M5510.36, Section 11-1, which states "Commanding Officers shall establish an industrial security program if their command engages in classified procurement with U.S. industry, educational institutions or other cleared U.S. entities, both at the prime and sub-level,…or when cleared DoD contractors operate within areas under their direct control. Command security procedures shall include appropriate guidance…to ensure that classified information released to industry is safeguarded."
(b) (7)(E)

DD 254s are required for classified contracts, per SECNAV M5510.36, Section 11-10. We found several instances of unclassified contracts at CNIC that contained DD254s. DD 254s are not required for unclassified contracts and, in some instances, DD 254s in unclassified contracts add unnecessary requirements and cost to a contract.

Of the DD 254s we reviewed for classified contracts, we found one notable example where block 13 (Security Guidance) of the DD 254 provided no specific, actionable guidance to the contractor on what government security regulations are germane to the proper execution of the classified contract. The minimum requirements for what information is required in block 13 of a DD 254 are found on page 11A-2 of SECNAV M5510.36.

The process used at CNIC for the check-in and check-out for contractor personnel is one of the best such practices we have observed in the past year.

Deficiency 27. **CNIC does not have an industrial security policy in place. Reference: SECNAV M5510.36, Section 11-1.**

Deficiency 28. **CNIC does not** (b) (7)(E)

Deficiency 29. **DD 254s are being generated in support of unclassified contracts where contractors do not require access classified to information. Reference: SECNAV M5510.36, Section 11-10.**

Deficiency 30. **The Contracting Officer's Representative (COR) did not adequately review the statement of work to understand the security requirements of the contract to support creation of a DD 254. Reference: SECNAV M-5510.36, Section 11-5, paragraph 1(a).**

Deficiency 31. DD 254s were completed with improper blocks checked or with block 13s missing pertinent information. Reference: SECNAV M5510.36, Section 11-5, paragraphs 1(b) and 1(c).

Deficiency 32. Contractual documents did not stipulate specific security requirements. Reference: SECNAV M5510.36, Section 11-5, paragraphs 1(a), 1(b), and 1(c).

Deficiency 33. The Contracting Officer's Representative (COR) did not have an accurate account of active unclassified/classified/IT contracts at CNIC. Reference: SECNAV M5510.36, Section 11-5.

Recommendation 18. That CNIC Command Security Personnel and CORs complete online courses in Industrial Security through the Defense Security Services (DSS) Academy's Security Training, Education and Professionalization Portal (STEPP). (http://www.cdse.edu/stepp/index.html)

Physical Security

Physical security at CNIC is not compliant with governing directives. Key drivers towards non-compliance include lack of (b) (7)(E)   lack of a physical security directive, lack of a consolidated list of all restricted areas at CNIC, and an ineffective key and lock program.

As reported (b) (7)(E)

CNIC has (b) (7)(E)

Deficiency 34. CNIC does not have an established physical security policy in place. References: OPNAVINST 5530.14E CH-2, Enclosure (1), Article 0102, paragraph a; and CNICINST 5530.14A, CNIC Ashore Protection Program, Article 0105, paragraph b.

Deficiency 35. CNIC contains at (b) (7)(E)

Deficiency 36. CNIC does not have an effective key and lock program in place. Reference: OPNAVINST 5530.14E CH-2, Enclosure (1), Article 0209.

Recommendation 19. That CNIC evaluate (b) (7)(E)

Operations Security

CNIC does not have a formal an OPSEC program in place. CNIC has a qualified OPSEC Officer, but does not conduct required OPSEC training for assigned personnel. Additionally, CNIC does not (b) (7)(E)

The lack of an OPSEC program at CNIC headquarters (b) (7)(E)

CNIC does not review contracts for OPSEC elements (as appropriate) or provide oversight over subordinate command OPSEC programs.

As an echelon 2 command with major worldwide responsibilities and services, CNIC meets the definition of a Level III OPSEC program, as defined in DoD 5205.02-M, DoD Operations Security (OPSEC) Program Manual, Enclosure 3, paragraph 3c which states "A Level III program consists of a full-time managed and resourced OPSEC program. Due to the level of oversight it has for subordinate units and/or the sensitivity of the mission, this program requires substantial effort. A Level III program shall meet all the Level I and Level II requirements."

We reviewed CNIC's draft OPSEC instruction. If approved and fully implemented, the document would meet basic program consistent with current OPNAV guidance. However, the draft OPSEC instruction would be insufficient to meet standards outlined in upcoming SECNAV OPSEC policy due for release in early FY 16.

Deficiency 37.   CNIC does not have an OPSEC instruction. Reference: OPNAVINST 3432.1A, Enclosure (1), paragraph 5n.

Deficiency 38.   CNIC does not (b) (7)(E)

Deficiency 39.   CNIC does not have a (b) (7)(E)

Deficiency 40.   CNIC's OPSEC Officer does not formally review contracts for OPSEC requirements. References: DoD 5205.02-M, Enclosure 6, paragraph 1a; and OPNAVINST 3432.1A, Enclosure (1), paragraph 5d.

Deficiency 41.   CNIC does not provide OPSEC oversight of subordinate commands. References: OPNAVINST 3432.1A, Enclosure (1), paragraphs 5e, 5h; DoD 5205.02-M, Enclosure 2, paragraph 6a(9).

Deficiency 42.   CNIC's OPSEC Officer is not assigned full-time as required for a Level III OPSEC Program. Reference: DoD 5205.02-M, Enclosure 3, paragraph 3c.

Deficiency 43. CNIC does not coordinate between OPSEC program managers/coordinators, Public Affairs personnel, contracting specialists, and personnel responsible for the review and approval of information intended for public release. Reference: DoDD 5205.02E, DoD Operations Security (OPSEC) Program, Enclosure 2, paragraph 11l.

Deficiency 44. CNIC does not conduct required specialized training for OPSEC program managers/coordinators, Public Affairs personnel, contracting specialists, and personnel responsible for the review and approval of information intended for public release. Reference: DoDD 5205.02E, DoD Operations Security (OPSEC) Program, Enclosure 2, paragraph 11l.

Recommendation 20.   That CNIC establish an internal OPSEC Working Group that includes personnel from ATFP, Command Security, OPSEC, Industrial Security and Public Affairs.

Recommendation 21.   That CNIC arrange a follow-up assist visit with OPNAV and Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy (Policy) (DUSN (P)) to ensure that CNIC's OPSEC program is properly aligned with Navy and CNIC enterprise security needs.

Recommendation 22.   That CNIC utilize Naval OPSEC Support Team (NOST)-developed OPSEC training products with the CNIC workforce until the Command's OPSEC program is more robust.

Counterintelligence (CI) Support

Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) support to CNIC for CI training is compliant.

Insider Threat

Following a review of the command security programs (industrial/personnel/physical/information), we performed a horizontal examination of our findings to assess overall command security program readiness at CNIC (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

Recommendation 23.   That CNIC pursue collaboration among the Command Security Manager, the Information Systems Security Manager (ISSM) and OPSEC Program Manager on all common security areas to enhance the command's day-to-day security readiness.

Cybersecurity

CNIC has a robust cybersecurity program that complies with DON and DoD policy guidance. CNIC's ISSM demonstrated a firm grasp of the requisite knowledge to execute the responsibilities relating to cybersecurity. One minor deficiency is identified below.

Deficiency 45. Various media devices (e.g., copiers, printers, facsimile machines, removable media) were not properly marked according to content and classification. This includes unclassified, but sensitive, information. References: DoDM 5200.01, Volume 4, Enclosure 3, paragraph 2c(3)(g)1; DoDM 5200.01, Volume 4, Enclosure 3, paragraphs 4c(1) and 4c(3); DoDM 5200.01, Volume 3, Enclosure 2, paragraph 14; SECNAV M5510.36, Section 6-11, paragraph 3; and SECNAV M5510.36, Section 6-34, paragraph 2a.

Information Technology Acquisition

CNIC IT acquisition processes are compliant. The Chief Information Officer is utilizing the IT acquisition procedures and ensuring organization programs and operations are able to make full and appropriate use of information assets.

Personally Identifiable Information (PII)

The PII program is compliant with SECNAVINST 5211.5E, Department of the Navy (DON) Privacy Program. Permanent PII coordinators are billeted for all Navy regions; this action is a positive step to address oversight issues noted in previous area visits for PII.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT/COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS

The Resource Management/Compliance Programs Team assessed 18 programs and functions. Our findings reflect inputs from survey respondents, onsite focus group participants, document review, direct observation, and face-to-face personnel interviews.

The following programs and functions are considered to be well administered and in full compliance with applicable directives:

- Financial Management/Comptroller Functions
- Managers' Internal Control
- Government Travel Charge Card
- Government Commercial Purchase Card
- Personal Property Management
- Command Individual Augmentee Coordinator Program
- Deployment Health Assessment
- Navy Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention
- Legal and Ethics
- Victim and Witness Assistance Program
- Physical Readiness Program
- Command Managed Equal Opportunity
- Hazing Training and Compliance
- Inspector General Functions

The following programs were found to be not fully compliant:

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR)

Our engagement with CNIC confirmed that the command is committed to maintaining an environment free of sexual assault (SA) and that victims would receive excellent care and support services. CNIC effectively had no headquarters SAPR program until it was re-established with the appointment of a new SAPR Point of Contact in March 2014.

SAPR training is required for military and for civilians who supervise service members by DoDI 6495.02 CH-1, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program Procedures, and SECNAVINST 1752.4B, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response. This training has not been completed as required, with completion percentages from FY14 ranging from 34 % for civilian supervisors of military to 59% for military service members. Specific watchstander and Duty Officer training should be conducted to ensure proper victim response.

Deficiency 46. **SAPR training required for military and for civilians who supervise service members has not been completed. References: DoDI 6495.02 CH-1, Enclosure (10), paragraph 2b and SECNAVINST 1752.4B, Enclosure (10), paragraph 2b.**

Deficiency 47. **Watchstander and Duty Officer training has not been conducted to ensure proper victim response protocols are in place to respond to reports of sexual assault.**

Reference: SECNAVINST 1752.4B, Enclosure (3), paragraph 2c(1); Enclosure (5), paragraph 3a; and Enclosure (10), paragraph 2d.

Suicide Prevention

Management of CNIC's suicide prevention program lapsed, but has been rejuvenated with the appointment of a new Suicide Prevention Coordinator in late FY14. There are now many elements of an effective program. Nevertheless, several deficiencies and recommendations were identified. Suicide prevention training completion rates for FY14 were 53% for military and 0% for civilian staff.

Deficiency 48. Required suicide prevention training for military, civilians and full-time contractor personnel has not been conducted. Reference: OPNAVINST 1720.4A, Suicide Prevention Program, paragraph 5a(1), 6h(3) and Enclosure 3, paragraph 1.

Deficiency 49. Senior CNIC leadership has not regularly published messages, information and guidance on suicide prevention and has not incorporated suicide prevention as a part of life skills and health promotion training. Reference: OPNAVINST 1720.4A, paragraphs 5a(2)-(3) and 6h(4).

Deficiency 50. An Assistant Suicide Prevention Coordinator has not been designated in writing as required by CNIC's own instruction, and as recommended by OPNAVINST 1720.4A. References: CNICINST 1720.4, Commander, Navy Installations Command Suicide Prevention Program, paragraph 3a; OPNAVINST 1720.4A, paragraph, 6h(2).

Recommendation 24. That CNIC update CNICINST 1720.4 to align response measures with OPNAVINST 1720.4A as well as to correct and validate relevant contact information for suicide-related behavior response resources.

Voting Assistance

CNIC's echelon 2 Voting Assistance program is not fully compliant with governing directives.

Deficiency 51. Records of annual training in voting matters, including dates and attendees, have not been retained for at least 1 calendar year. DoDI 1000.04, Federal Voting Assistance Program, Enclosure 4, paragraph 2s(3).

Deficiency 52. CNIC VAO has not established and maintained a standard email address of the form <Vote@(unit).(Service).mil> or similar format to contact all Unit Voting Assistance Officers (UVAO). Reference: DoDI 1000.04, Enclosure 4, paragraph 2r.

Deficiency 53. CNIC Voting Assistance Officer (VAO) does not monitor the voting programs of CNIC's subordinate commands and assist them as necessary as required of echelon 2 commands. Reference: OPNAVINST 1742.1B, Navy Voting Assistance Program (NVAP), paragraph 4e(2).

Individual Medical Readiness (IMR)

IMR management of headquarters personnel was on an improving trend and was adequate at the time of our inspection. However, IMR of subordinate commands (echelon 3 and below) is not monitored by CNIC or reported to the Commander.

Deficiency 54. **CNIC does not monitor and report IMR status of subordinate regional (echelon 3) commands. References: DoDI 6025.19, Individual Medical Readiness (IMR), Enclosure (2), paragraph 6a; SECNAVINST 6120.3 CH-1, Periodic Health Assessment for Individual Medical Readiness, paragraph 3a.**

Specific CNIC responsibilities

CNIC has specifically-delineated responsibilities within the following six Navy programs:

- Navy Voting Assistance Program
- Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
- Suicide Prevention
- Command Individual Augmentee (IA) Coordinator
- Physical Readiness Program
- Navy Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention

CNIC is meeting their responsibilities in all of these programs as identified in governing directives, although some corrective actions are required as described below.

Navy Voting Assistance Program

Corrective actions are required in execution of Senior Navy Voting Representative responsibilities identified in OPNAVINST 1742.1B.

The OPNAVINST is out-of-date in relation to DoDI 1000.04 of 13 September 2011, Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP). While OPNAV N46 owns the Navy instruction, CNIC is in the best position to bring a revision into alignment with current DoD and Federal guidance.

Issue Paper A-4 addresses this issue in further detail.

Deficiency 55. **The Senior Voting Assistance Officer (SVAO) who executes much of the Commander's responsibility as Senior Navy Voting Representative does not meet the required pay grade (a civilian GS-13 or higher or, if active duty, O-4 or above). Reference: OPNAVINST 1742.1B, paragraph 4e.**

Deficiency 56. **The Navy Voting Assistance Program is not fully compliant with providing quarterly statistical information and records on voter registration assistance via the FVAP portal. Reference: DODI 1000.04, Enclosure 4, paragraphs 2z and 2ab(5).**

Deficiency 57. **A Navy component-wide means of communicating effectively and expeditiously in disseminating voting information has not been established, in particular for**

communicating with unit Voting Assistance Officers in deployable units. Reference: DoDI 1000.04, Enclosure 4, paragraph 2j.

In addition, observations from our Area Visits, validated in interviews with CNIC personnel during this inspection, indicate an opportunity to improve placement of Installation Voting Assistance Offices throughout the Navy. These should be located in well-advertised, fixed locations that are physically co-located with other high-traffic offices for personnel of all services (from various tenant commands), family members, and DoD civilians.

Recommendation 25. That VIMS (Voting Information Management System), which has not been upgraded since 2005, be upgraded to enable improved tracking, reporting, and continued evaluation of command voting assistance programs.

Recommendation 26. That CNIC seek to improve placement of Installation Voting Assistance Offices throughout the Navy.

CNIC Inspector General (IG) performance

Hotline Program

We conducted a quality assurance review of the CNIC IG hotline program. Similar to most echelon 2 commands, the timeliness of CNIC's hotline investigations does not meet the DoD IG 90-day standard (hotline cases) or 180-day standard (Military Whistleblower Reprisal cases).

DON Inspection Program

We found evidence of energetic leadership engagement and the use of a variety of command self-assessment approaches, as well as elements that partially address subordinate command oversight. Lower echelon oversight, however, is incomplete.

SECNAVINST 5040.3A, Inspections within the Department of the Navy, requires echelon 2 commands to develop and implement an inspection program. The DON Inspection Program instruction further states that outside authority inspections "are necessary and useful to verify objectively and independently mission capability and performance," operational and materiel readiness, and the effectiveness and efficiency of subordinate commands. As the Immediate Superior in Command of 11 region commands, strong CNIC leadership engagement and individual staff level support needs to be formalized in a comprehensive command inspection program that includes the identification of an inspection program manager, establishment of an inspection plan, identification and implementation of standardized inspection processes, as well as, establishment of reporting requirements and methodology to track corrective actions to completion.

Deficiency 58. CNIC does not have a formal, organized command inspection program as required by SECNAVINST 5040.3A, Inspections within the Department of the Navy, Paragraph 9f(1).

SAILOR PROGRAMS

Brilliant on the Basics Programs were reviewed and behavior associated with good order and discipline was closely observed. Overall, command morale and perceptions of quality of life (QOL) were noted to be average. Enlisted Sailors displayed proper military bearing and maintained a professional appearance.

Sailor Career Management Programs

Areas reviewed included the Command Sponsorship, Command Indoctrination, and Career Development Boards.

Command Sponsorship Program

This program is in compliance with OPNAVINST 1740.3C, Command Sponsor and Indoctrination Programs. The command has a designated coordinator responsible for assigning Sponsors to inbound military members. The Sponsor Coordinator has a system in place to ensure Sailors complete required Fleet and Family Support Center training before they are assigned Sponsorship duties.

Command Indoctrination Program (INDOC)

This program is not in compliance with OPNAVINST 1740.3C. A very thorough check-in sheet ensures that all service members and new check-ins to the command meet each program holder. However, this does not cover Navy Pride and Professionalism, Suicide Awareness, Antiterrorism and Force Protection, and other requirements outlined in OPNAVINST 1740.3C.

Deficiency 59. **CNIC does not conduct an indoctrination program that meets all requirements for inclusion of specified topics, including Navy Pride and Professionalism, Suicide Awareness, and Antiterrorism and Force Protection. Reference: OPNAVINST 1740.3C, paragraph 4b and Attachment 2 to Enclosure 2.**

Career Development Board (CDB)

CNIC's CDB Program is in compliance with OPNAVINST 1040.11D, Navy Enlisted Retention and Career Development Board. A collateral duty Career Counselor is assigned and junior enlisted Sailors receive required Career Development Boards and guidance from senior enlisted leaders.

Sailor Recognition Programs

This program is established in accordance with OPNAVINST 1700.10M, Sailor of the Year Program, and is satisfactory.

CPO 365

There is no significant participation in CPO 365 within the Chief Petty Officer Mess. First Class and Chief Petty Officers participate with the base and Naval District Washington (NDW) for CPO 365, one Senior Chief holds a chairperson position within the regional CPO 365 Program, and others claim to participate as travel allows. The opportunity to shape the Chiefs Mess through CPO 365 for the enterprise does not appear to be a priority to the (b) (7)(E) .

Appendix A: Issue Papers

SUMMARY OF ACTIONS

Issue Papers that follow require responses to recommendations in the form of Implementation Status Reports (ISRs). If you are an Action Officer for a staff listed in Table A-1, please submit ISRs as specified for each applicable recommendation, along with supporting documentation, such as plans of action and milestones and implementing directives.

- Submit initial ISRs using OPNAV Form 5040/2 no later than 1 January 2016. Each ISR should include an e-mail address for the action officer, where available. This report is distributed through Navy Taskers. ISRs should be submitted through the assigned document control number in Navy Taskers. An electronic version of OPNAV Form 5040/2 is added to the original Navy Tasker Package along with the inspection report, upon distribution.

- Submit quarterly ISRs, including "no change" reports until the recommendation is closed by NAVINSGEN. When a long-term action is dependent upon prior completion of another action, the status report should indicate the governing action and its estimated completion date. Further status reports may be deferred, with NAVINSGEN concurrence.

- When action addressees consider required action accomplished, the status report submitted should contain the statement, "Action is considered complete." However, NAVINSGEN approval must be obtained before the designated action addressee is released from further reporting responsibilities on the recommendation.

- NAVINSGEN point of contact for ISRs is (b) (7)(C) ██

Table A-1. Action Officer Listing for Implementation Status Reports

COMMAND	RECOMMENDATION NUMBER(S) XXX-15
OPNAV N46	018, 020, 021, 022, 024
OPNAV N14	023
NAVSAFECEN	021
CNIC	018, 019, 020, 021, 024

ISSUE PAPER A-1: INSTALLATION SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PROGRAM FUNDING

References: (a) OPNAVINST 5450.339, Mission, Functions, and Tasks of Commander, Navy Installations Command, 21 Apr 11
(b) OPNAVINST 5100.23G CH-1, Navy Safety and Occupational Health Program Manual, 21 Jul 11

Issue: Installation Safety (SA) program funding is currently set at $5M below the $49M Common Output Level (COL) 4 threshold, which is negatively impacting the ability of Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC) to provide adequate program performance.

Background: Per reference (a), CNIC is required to provide safety services and support functions common to all installations. CNIC's specific installation safety responsibilities are outlined in reference (b), distinguishing installation safety from mission safety unique to other echelon 2 commands (e.g., construction safety within Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC)). CNIC installation safety supports its own employees and every Navy installation tenant on CNIC-hosted bases. However, COL 4 funding and echelon 1 resourcing decisions have resulted in non-compliance with certain program requirements, acceptance of additional risk, and adverse impacts to mishap prevention efforts. CNIC's arena goes well beyond office spaces, with hazards at CNIC installations including electrical, confined space, and fall hazards, among others.

Discussion: Risk indicators on SA program performance include a notable rate of military injuries for CNIC personnel, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) citations, low scores on the CNIC safety perception survey, and negative feedback from Navy tenant commands who are not receiving sufficient base operating support (BOS) safety services to protect their workers and meet basic OSHA compliance.

Given limited resources to run shore programs, OPNAV N46 (Shore Readiness) has set CNIC Safety funding controls at or below COL 4 for the past several budget cycles. In a private industry business case cost analysis, OSHA found that investing in safety provides between 1:4 and 1:10 return on investment. The savings derived from installation safety funding levels at or below COL 4 are increasing the costs to other Navy organizations and Department of Defense budget items (e.g., Defense Health Program, workers compensation). Ensuring OSHA compliance at COL 4 would require an investment of $49M; however, CNIC Safety is currently funded at $44M in FY15. Funding levels are reflected in a number of BOS Safety services not provided at tenant commands,

including Navy and DoD requirements more restrictive than OSHA minimums, safety awareness initiatives for traffic safety and MWR, and training related to traffic and recreation and off-duty safety.

Current funding is straining CNIC's ability to track and remedy violations of federally-mandated requirements, as evidenced by ten open OSHA citations identified during FY13. Furthermore, CNIC military injury rates are the second highest in the Navy as detailed in the Navy and Marine Corps Public Health Center report on FY14 injuries at CNIC.

CNIC has garnered key successes in installation safety programs—most notably, establishment and multi-faceted use of the Enterprise Safety Applications Management System (ESAMS). Navy safety leadership is currently in the process of developing a DON-wide safety data management system, which is intended to combine the functionality of ESAMS with other integrated risk management information (RMI) features and enhancements. When fully developed and tested by users, the integrated suite of DON RMI modules will replace ESAMS. However, the transition to RMI is critical, as ESAMS currently has more than 500,000 users in over 3,000 Navy organizations worldwide.

Recommendations: 018-15. That CNIC and OPNAV N46 include validated safety requirements in determining estimates when establishing budget controls to support CNIC's ability to ensure all OSHA compliance is tracked, mitigation strategies established, and open deficiencies resolved.

019-15. That CNIC develop a plan to reduce their rate of preventable military injuries.

020-15. That CNIC, in coordination with OPNAV N46, review the out-year funding of ESAMS and DON RMI systems and ensure a sound transition plan, including full data transfer of at least 5 years of ESAMS records.

021-15. That CNIC, OPNAV N46, and Naval Safety Center collaborate to transition ESAMS and Web-Enabled Safety System (WESS) to a single safety data management system.

NAVINSGEN POC: (b) (7)(C)

ISSUE PAPER A-2: FUNDING FOR UTILITY METERING

References: (a) Public Law 110-140, "Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007," 19 December 2007
(b) Public Law 109–58, "Energy Policy Act of 2005," 8 August 2005
(c) Public Law 112-81, "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012," 31 December 2011
(d) DUSD(I&E) Memorandum of 16 April 2013, Subj: Utilities Meter Policy

Issue: Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC) is not properly resourced to meet federal and Department of Defense (DoD) guidance regarding utility metering.

Background: CNIC is the Navy's Executive Agent for shore energy conservation programs, which include the reduction of utility and petroleum consumption. Section 1301 of reference (a) outlines policy for metering to better monitor energy consumption behaviors. Section 103 of reference (b) outlines metering requirements in federal buildings and Section 2827 of reference (c) provides requirements for capture of baseline energy consumption at DoD installations. Reference (d) provides specific DoD goals for individual facility metering for electric and natural gas utilities.

Discussion: With respect to utility metering, CNIC requires more resources to accurately measure electrical, water, steam, and natural gas consumption to the individual facility level. The referenced public laws have established guidance aimed at increasing the fidelity of utility consumption data. CNIC has been executing metering projects in keeping with this guidance, as well as toward meeting Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) goals. OSD has established a goal of at least 85% electrical metering by 2020 and CNIC's goal is 95%. However, CNIC estimates electrical metering at the individual facility level is currently at 80%. The OSD goal for natural gas is 60%. For other utilities (including natural gas), CNIC has established a goal of 75% at the individual facility level. CNIC estimates natural gas metering at the individual level is currently at 45%. Since CNIC's annual shore utility budget exceeds $1B, the ability to get specific utility consumption measurements is the best means to influence human behavior and further reduce energy cost and consumption.

Recommendations: 022-15. That OPNAV N46 increase the funding profile for utility metering projects to better meet relevant metering guidance.

NAVINSGEN POC: (b) (7)(C)

(b) (7)(C)

ISSUE PAPER A-3: NAVY GOLD STAR PROGRAM FUNDING

References: (a) NAVADMIN 194/14, Subj: Establishment of the Navy Gold Star Program, 1 October 2014
(b) Section 562 of Public Law 109-163, "National Defense Authorization Act of 2006," 6 January 2006
(c) DoDI 1300.18, Department of Defense (DoD) Personnel Casualty Matters, Policies, and Procedures, 14 Aug 09

Issue: Navy Gold Star Program annual expenses of $2.1M are currently unprogrammed, and the 18 Full Time Equivalent (FTE) Non-appropriated Fund (NAF) employees assigned to the program have been funded with labor lapse dollars.

Background: The Navy Gold Star Program was mandated in 2014 by the Chief of Naval Operations via reference (a). The program provides referral services and support to the surviving family after the death of an active duty Sailor and connects those individuals to their Navy family for as long as they would like. Reference (b) directs the Services to provide enhanced support to survivors of active duty death. Reference (c) instructs the Services to establish a dedicated, long-term support program to support family members of active duty death.

Discussion: The Navy Gold Star program not only positively impacts the lives of the survivors, but through numerous outreach and education efforts, improves community relations and clearly demonstrates the Navy's loyalty toward and care for its active duty Sailors and their families. Since program launch, coordinators have provided over 2,200 hours of direct customer care to approximately 4,900 survivors. However, the budget Resource Sponsor, OPNAV N14 (Research, Studies and Analysis) has not yet funded this program in Program Objective Memorandum (POM) budget submissions. This program has been included in OPNAV N14's FY17 budget request for approval in POM 17.

Recommendation: 023-15. That OPNAV N14 request and seek approval for programmed funds for the Navy Gold Star Program to ensure Navy families continue to receive support following the loss of an active duty member.

NAVINSGEN POC: (b) (7)(C)

ISSUE PAPER A-4: NAVY VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM INSTRUCTION

References: (a) DoDI 1000.04, Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP), 13 Sep 11
(b) OPNAVINST 1742.1B, Navy Voting Assistance Program (NVAP), 15 May 07
(c) 2014-2015 Navy Voting Action Plan

Issue: The Navy Voting Assistance Program instruction is out-of-date in relation to the governing DoD instruction.

Background: Reference (a) establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities for the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) and applies to the Military Departments, among other entities. Reference (b) guides the Navy Voting Assistance Program (NVAP), but refers to the 2004 version of reference (a) and does not reflect DoD Voting Program guidance as promulgated in the 2011 version. Reference (c) is issued annually to coordinate voting assistance efforts across the Navy.

In 2014, the CNIC Navy Voting Action Officer (VAO) directed installation and unit VAOs to follow reference (a) when it contradicts reference (b). The Navy Voting Program Office further mitigates this by providing guidance via reference (c) to clearly detail differences between the DODI and current OPNAV instruction and to ensure Navy VAOs execute the program in accordance with reference (a) requirements.

Discussion: Revision of OPNAVINST 1742.1B should address changes in fleet and regional shore installation management, placing added emphasis on program oversight of afloat units. The revision should also update the NVAP self-assessment checklist to include effectiveness measures and a data collection template that reflects the type of voter assistance program data and reporting format required by DoD.

While OPNAV N46 owns the Navy instruction, CNIC is in the best position to bring a revision into alignment with current DoD and Federal guidance.

Recommendation: 024-15. That OPNAV N46 coordinate with CNIC to revise the Navy Voting Assistance Program instruction, OPNAVINST 1742.1 series.

NAVINSGEN POC: (b) (7)(C)

APPENDIX B: Summary of Key Survey Results

PRE-EVENT SURVEY

In support of the Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC) Command Inspection held 12-21 May 2015, the Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) conducted an anonymous on-line survey of active duty military and Department of the Navy (DON) civilian personnel from 3 March 2015 to 10 April 2015. The survey produced 426 respondents (48 military, 378 civilian). According to reported demographics, the sample represented the CNIC workforce with less than 5% margin of error at the 99% confidence level. Selected topics are summarized in the sections below. A frequency report is provided in Appendix D.

Quality of Life

Quality of life was assessed using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is worst and 10 is best. The overall CNIC average quality of work life (QOWL), 6.13, was lower than the historical echelon 2 average, 6.63 (Figure B-1). The overall CNIC average quality of home life (QOHL), 8.39, was higher than the historical area visit average, 7.91 (Figure B-2).

The perceived impact of factors on QOWL rating is summarized in Table B-1. Factors of potential concern were identified by distributional analyses, where 20% negative responses served as a baseline. Command Morale (41%) and Command Climate (40%) were most frequently identified as a negative impact on QOWL rating; however, differences in negative response percentages between Civilian-Military and Male-Female were observed (compare bold subgroup values with their counterpart in Table B-1). These findings, when coupled with verbatim survey comments, indicate lingering command climate and civilian workforce challenges.

The perceived impact of factors on QOHL rating is summarized in Table B-2.

Figure B-1. Distribution of quality of work life ratings from the pre-event survey. The x-axis lists the rating scale and the y-axis represents the number of survey respondents. Response percentages for ratings are shown at the base of each bar. Counts for each rating are shown above each bar. The most frequent rating is shown in blue.


Figure B-2. Distribution of quality of home life ratings from the pre-event survey. The x-axis lists the rating scale and the y-axis represents the number of survey respondents. Response percentages for ratings are shown at the base of each bar. Counts for each rating are shown above each bar. The most frequent rating is shown in blue.

Table B-1. Negative Impacts on Quality of Work Life Rating

Factor	Overall	Military	Civilian	Male	Female
Job satisfaction	16%	10%	17%	15%	17%
Leadership support	**32%**	21%	33%	26%	37%
Leadership opportunities	**30%**	15%	32%	24%	**36%**
Workload	**29%**	21%	30%	29%	29%
Work Hours/Schedule	**13%**	19%	12%	13%	13%
Advancement opportunities	**38%**	15%	**41%**	31%	**44%**
Awards and recognition	**34%**	4%	**38%**	29%	39%
Training opportunities	**29%**	19%	30%	25%	33%
Command morale	**41%**	33%	42%	34%	47%
Command climate	**40%**	25%	**42%**	30%	**49%**
Quality of workplace facilities	24%	8%	26%	20%	29%

Notes. Perceived impact of assessed factors on quality of work life rating based on negative (percentages shown) versus aggregate positive and neutral responses. Low percentages are "better." Overall values in bold are significantly different than a 20% baseline; higher values in bold indicate significant differences between subgroups.

Table B-2. Negative Impacts on Quality of Home Life Rating

Factor	Negative	Other
Quality of home	**2%**	98%
Quality of the school for dependent children	**3%**	97%
Quality of the childcare available	**3%**	97%
Shopping & dining opportunities	**3%**	97%
Recreational opportunities	**6%**	94%
Access to spouse employment	**7%**	93%
Access to medical/dental care	**3%**	97%
Cost of living	**31%**	69%

Notes. Perceived impact of assessed factors on quality of home life rating based on negative versus aggregate positive and neutral (Other) responses. Low Negative percentages are "better." Negative percentages in bold are significantly different than a 20% baseline.

Job Importance and Workplace Behaviors

Table B-3 lists aggregate strongly agree and agree response percentages to survey questions addressing perceived job importance, and whether fraternization, favoritism, gender/sex discrimination, sexual harassment, or hazing occurs at CNIC. Overall echelon 2 percentages over a 5-year period are shown for comparison. With the exception of job importance, lower values are "better."

- Perceived job importance at CNIC was higher than the historical echelon 2 value
- Perceived occurrence of favoritism was higher than the historical echelon 2 value
- Perceived occurrence of hazing at CNIC was lower than the historical echelon 2 value

Table B-3. Perceived Job Importance and Occurrence of Workplace Behaviors

Question Topic	CNIC	ECH 2
Job Importance	**86%**	80%
Fraternization	11%	13%
Favoritism	**49%**	30%
Gender/Sex Discrimination	14%	13%
Sexual Harassment	6%	8%
Race Discrimination	12%	10%
Hazing	**2%**	7%

Notes. Aggregate strongly agree and agree (SA+A) response percentages for selected command climate topics. Echelon 2 (ECH 2) percentages are historical NAVINSGEN findings. With the exception of Job Importance, lower percentages are "better." Bold values indicate a significantly different distribution of SA+A responses than historical ECH 2 values.

Mission Tools & Resources

Table B-4 lists aggregate strongly disagree and disagree response percentages to survey questions probing the adequacy of tools and resources that support the mission. Items of potential concern were identified by distributional analyses, where 20% negative responses served as a baseline. People (41%) and Training (38%) were most frequently identified as inadequate resources.

Table B-4. Tools and Resources to Accomplish the Mission

Items	Inadequate	Other
People	**41%**	59%
Training	**38%**	62%
Workspace	18%	82%
Computer	18%	82%
Software	24%	76%
Internet	20%	80%
Intranet	20%	80%
Equipment	**14%**	86%
Materials & Supplies	**15%**	85%

Notes. Aggregate strongly disagree and disagree (Inadequate) response percentages to perceptions on the adequacy of mission tools and resources. Smaller percentages are "better." Inadequate percentages in bold are significantly different than a 20% baseline.

APPENDIX C: Summary of Focus Group Perceptions

FOCUS GROUPS

On 5 May (Millington) and 12-13 May (Washington Navy Yard: WNY) 2015, NAVINSGEN conducted focus groups with various groupings of active duty military ranks and with various groupings of civilian grades (make-up sessions were offered to accommodate work schedules). There were a total of 60 CNIC focus group participants: 14 military, 36 civilians. Each focus group was scheduled for one hour and included one facilitator and two note takers. The facilitator followed a protocol script: (a) focus group personnel introductions, (b) brief introduction to the NAVINSGEN mission, (c) privacy, non-attribution, and basic ground rules statements, (d) participant-derived list of topics having the most impact on the mission, job performance, or quality of life with (e) subsequent refinement and discussion of participant-derived topics with an emphasis on understanding the perceived impact. Note takers transcribed focus group proceedings, which were subsequently entered and coded in a spreadsheet database by the Analysis Team Lead to determine the total number of focus groups in which the same or comparable topic and its perceived impact were discussed.

Table C-1 lists focus groups topics that were expressed as a major impact on the mission, job performance, or quality of life in at least three focus groups. Military and civilian focus groups at CNIC mentioned Leadership most often as having both major positive and major negative impacts on the mission, job performance, and/or quality of life.

Table C-1. Participant-Derived Focus Group Topics Expressed as a Major Impact on the Mission, Job Performance, or Quality of Life.

Topic	Impact		
	Major	Moderate	Minor
Leadership	●●●●● (1 blue, 4 gray)	● (1 gray)	● (1 blue)
Communication	●●●● (4 gray)	●●●● (1 blue, 3 gray)	●● (1 blue, 1 gray)
Manning/Manpower	●●●● (1 blue, 3 gray)		●● (1 blue, 1 gray)
Hiring Process	●●● (3 gray)	● (1 gray)	
Telework/Telecommuting	●●● (3 gray)	● (1 gray)	● (1 gray)
Mission	●●● (1 blue, 2 gray)		

Notes. Descending order of the number of focus groups topics that were expressed as a major impact on the mission, job performance, and/or quality of life in at least three focus groups. To better represent the proportion of military and civilians in the CNIC population, military results were combined into a single group. Colored circles indicate active duty military (●) and civilian (●) focus groups at CNIC.

Leadership

Seven focus groups expressed positive and negative impacts on mission, job performance, and quality of work life as a function of CNIC leadership. The Commander's leadership style and communication initiatives were expressed as a positive; however, several focus group participants included the caveat that upper and middle management are not always "in sync" with the admiral's vision. Excessive self-preservation and lack of honesty in other executive leaders and middle management were expressed as negative impacts on job performance and quality of life. Self-preservation in particular was expressed as an impediment to seeking bottom up information, novel courses of action, communication among co-workers, and unit cohesion. Representative quotes: "If you take care of people, they will take care of the mission." "They [supervisors] are so busy doing the work that they don't have time to lead." (Several focus group participants expressed that two supervisors are negatively impacting job performance and morale. See related comments in *Command Climate*.)

Communication

Ten focus groups expressed positive and negative aspects of communications within CNIC. Top-down communication efforts (e.g., All Hands, Brown Bags) from the Commander were expressed as positive forms of communication; however, focus group participants expressed that other forms of top-down information and bottom-up information from staff are unduly filtered. The perception that information is unduly filtered (participants acknowledged that some filtering is necessary) was expressed as a negative impact on job performance (product delays) and quality of work life (command climate). In addition, the Gateway Portal (G2) was criticized for its lack of user-friendliness and difficulty in searching for relevant items. Participants generally described G2 as a tool with which one cannot find anything within its database unless one knows exactly what to search for. Representative quotes: "I thought that consolidation would improve communications. But many double-digit codes have no idea what anyone else is working on or what are the priorities… They have tunnel vision…" "[The] ability to communicate [among N-codes] is much better than 9 years ago. It's hard to communicate the complexity of the organization in a single form." "Middle management is a broken link. You have to request permission to do your job." "[The Commander] is not given the full [bottom up] info."

Manning/Manpower

Four focus groups expressed major negative impacts on mission (deferred tasks; knowledge, skills, and abilities of workforce), job performance (product quality), and quality of life (increased workload, overtime) as a function of inadequate manning/manpower. Participants expressed vacancies (especially in Human Resources (HR)) across the enterprise, insufficient administrative support personnel, as well as steady or increased requirements despite manning reductions. Participants questioned whether manning/manpower is accurate given the scope of the CNIC mission. Representative quotes: "We are told, 'Do more with less.' Are we staffed appropriately for the job being done?" [Manpower reviews] are conducted without change."

Hiring Process

Three civilian focus groups expressed various negative impacts on mission (command climate, workforce), job performance (experience) and quality of life (morale, income) associated with different aspects of the hiring process. All participants commenting on this topic expressed that the entire hiring process takes too long, especially given the aforementioned perceptions on CNIC manning/manpower. Focus group participants in Millington also expressed that candidate ratings are not always based on merit but rather on favoritism due to affiliations with the current workforce. Focus group participants at the WNY expressed dissatisfaction with the process of selecting or extending candidates for/in overseas positions when other qualified candidates at headquarters seek overseas experience.

Telework/Telecommuting

The ability to telework was expressed as a major positive workforce multiplier and boost to both productivity and quality of life. However, perceived inconsistencies in telework application—differences from department to department, deviations from Office of Personnel Management guidance, and high-level supervisor micromanagement—were expressed as negative impacts on job performance (productivity) and quality of life (morale). Participants expressed that the telework policy is under revision, but feared that the new policy would enable more upper management micromanagement over the process.

Mission

Two focus groups expressed major positive impacts on quality of life as a function of the CNIC mission (providing operational and family readiness ashore through various resources such as Morale, Welfare, and Recreation; family services; installation facilities supporting force deployments). Several participants, often at the end of sessions, mentioned that supporting Sailors and families is an important mission. However, some participants expressed that topics negatively impacting workforce morale (e.g., command climate) are slowly eroding the positive influence of the mission.

Other Focus Group Topics with Expressed Major Impact

Command Climate (2 Major). Two individuals serving in leadership roles, one at the WNY and one at Millington, were expressed as having a major negative impact on command climate.

Human Resources (1 Major, 2 Moderate). Focus group participants expressed general frustrations with various facets of HR customer support; timely review of requirements, processes not being followed, insufficient customer feedback in the form of status reports, insufficient advocacy in correcting employee records. One group opined that employee relations staff might not possess adequate knowledge in dealing with the different types of CNIC employees and/or that that HR might be understaffed. Another group expressed that communication with HR staff is in Millington is challenging, thus making it more difficult to get things done.

Military-Civilian Relationship (1 Major, 1 Moderate, 1 Minor). Military personnel expressed difficulties working with civilian supervisors on matters that are not points of contention with military supervisors (e.g., work hours, military meetings and responsibilities, taking care of junior personnel). Military and civilian focus group participants expressed that some supervisors do not have adequate training about relating to different aspects of the military and civilian workforce. (See also, *Performance Management*.)

Parking (1 Major, 1 Moderate, 1 Minor). Focus group participants expressed frustration in securing a parking space at the WNY while passing several unused red (reserved) spaces.

Acquisitions/Procurement (1 Major, 1 Moderate). A focus group participant in one group expressed a major negative impact on quality of work life when submitting product requirements to contracting that are arbitrarily changed. In a separate focus group the combined absence of contracting authority within CNIC and the questionable value of the Contract Acquisition Management Office, were generally expressed as a moderate negative impact on the mission (intent lost in communications) and quality of work life (frustration working through the process).

Funding (1 Major, 1 Moderate). "The Navy is taking significant risk in the ashore infrastructure." Several risks associated with inadequate funding were expressed as major negative impacts on the mission (deferred tasks); roof leaks, electrical problems, piers. The general theme of conversation on this topic was that funding levels are not available for preventative maintenance, only repair. Participants did not claim catastrophic failure as a result of inadequate funding, but rather the potential to "become much worse without attention." One focus group expressed that Sailors are living in "poor conditions"—worse than other services. Most representative quote: "Facilities maintenance needs a long-term plan."

Internet/Corporate Tools (1 Major, 1 Moderate). Focus group participants in Millington expressed major negative impacts on mission (deferred tasks) and job performance (delays, loss of productivity) due to outdated software and challenges working with entities outside of Navy-Marine Corps Internet (NMCI) (must access several external sources to get the job done). Participants in Millington expressed that there is no process to stay on top of software technologies used by external customers. "One size fits all does not work." Participants in another focus group described similar frustrations with internet/corporate tools as having a moderate negative impact on job performance, including the G2 system.

Performance Management (1 Major, 1 Moderate). Military and civilian focus group participants expressed shortfalls in performance management processes. Civilian focus group participants in Millington expressed a major negative impact on the mission as a function of perceived inaccuracies in performance descriptions and jobs performed that are not commensurate with grade level. Military participants expressed moderate frustrations associated with the timeliness of FITREP processing and debrief, and lack of mentorship from senior military personnel.

Policies/Process (1 Major, 1 Moderate). Civilian focus group participants expressed major and moderate impacts on job performance and quality of life associated with inconsistencies in the application of internal policies or "business rules": "Sometimes you don't know if a business rule is written—can be announced along the way... If an N-code does not like a business rule it is exempted... We go through five different business rules, none of which is law, and the N-code gets frustrated... What is the purpose of the business rule? Who can waive it?

Workspace (1 Major, 1 Minor). Focus group participants in two groups expressed a major/minor negative impact on quality of work life as a function of lack of privacy in the workplace. The major impact was expressed as supervisor-employee conflicts in open, cubicle spaces.

Base Access (1 Major). "The gates [at WNY] have been better recently; however, it was crazy from January to March during the transition of NAVSEA coming back on WNY." (Focus group notes do not address whether this topic is currently having a major negative impact on quality of life.)

Facilities (1 Major). One focus group expressed a major impact on quality of work life associated with "big cockroaches" on the first floor of WNY Building 111 and rodents on the second floor. However, it was unclear in focus group notes whether these negative conditions still exist, or that removing vending machines to mitigate produced a positive outcome.

Maternity Leave (1 Major). One civilian focus group expressed major negative impacts on mission and quality of life as a function of inadequate maternity leave for civilian employees, making it more difficult to attract quality female employees to work at CNIC (expressed as a broader DOD issue). The current maternity leave policy was expressed as being unfriendly to family planning. Civilian participants expressed that active duty receive maternity leave, and that the civilian cap on leave makes it more difficult to build up leave to use for maternity.

Work Hours/Schedule (1 Major). One supervisor focus group in Millington expressed that some employees put in long hours covering multiple time zones across the globe, and that the accumulating effect (fatigue) negatively impacts quality of life. Upon query, participants in one focus group reported working on average more than 10 hours per day in order to stay on top of the workload.

APPENDIX D: Survey Response Frequency Report

Numerical values in the following tables summarize survey responses to forced-choice questions as counts and/or percentages (%). Total may exceed 100% due to rounding error. Response codes are listed below in the order that they appear.

SD	Strongly Disagree
D	Disagree
N	Neither Agree nor Disagree…
A	Agree
SA	Strongly Agree

-	Negative
N	Neutral
+	Positive

N	Never
R	Rarely
S	Sometimes
F	Frequently
A	Always

	Military		Civilian	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
	38	10	166	212
	9%	2%	39%	50%

On a scale from 1 (worst) to 10 (best), please rate your Quality of Work Life (QOWL). QOWL is the degree to which you enjoy where you work and available opportunities for professional growth.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Count	24	24	30	36	60	34	63	73	43	39
%	5.63%	5.63%	7.04%	8.45%	14.08%	7.98%	14.79%	17.14%	10.09%	9.15%

For each of the factors below, please indicate whether they have a positive, neutral, or negative impact on your QOWL rating.

	+	N	-
Job satisfaction	249	109	68
Leadership support	187	103	136
Leadership opportunities	134	165	127
Workload	139	163	124
Work Hours/Schedule	267	103	56
Advancement opportunities	86	179	161
Awards and recognition	103	178	145
Training opportunities	143	159	124
Command morale	107	145	174
Command climate	111	145	170
Quality of workplace facilities	170	152	104

On a scale from 1 (worst) to 10 (best), please rate your Quality of Home Life (QOHL). QOHL is the degree to which you enjoy where you live and the opportunities available for housing, recreation, etc.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Count	5	4	8	4	18	14	30	93	106	144
%	1.17%	0.94%	1.88%	0.94%	4.23%	3.29%	7.04%	21.83%	24.88%	33.80%

For each of the factors below, please indicate whether they have a positive, neutral, or negative impact on your QOHL rating.

	+	N	-
Quality of home	365	51	10
Quality of the school for dependent children	199	214	13
Quality of the childcare available	132	281	13
Shopping & dining opportunities	329	84	13
Recreational opportunities	311	90	25
Access to spouse employment	218	180	28
Access to medical/dental care	339	75	12
Cost of living	196	99	131

My command gives me sufficient time during working hours to participate in a physical readiness exercise program.

SD	D	N	A	SA
4	5	7	21	11
8%	10%	15%	44%	23%

My current work week affords enough time to complete mission tasks in a timely manner while maintaining an acceptable work-home life balance.

SD	D	N	A	SA
6	8	7	20	7
13%	17%	15%	42%	15%

My position description is current and accurately describes my functions, tasks, and responsibilities.

SD	D	N	A	SA
29	79	55	134	81
8%	21%	15%	35%	21%

I work more hours than I report in a pay period because I cannot complete all assigned tasks during scheduled work hours.

N	R	S	F	A
33	86	115	91	52
9%	23%	31%	24%	14%

The Human Resource Service Center provides timely, accurate responses to my queries.

SD	D	N	A	SA
63	72	164	66	11
17%	19%	44%	18%	3%

My (local) Human Resources Office provides timely, accurate responses to my queries.

SD	D	N	A	SA
60	85	127	85	19
16%	23%	34%	23%	5%

The DON civilian recruitment process is responsive to my command's civilian personnel requirements.

SD	D	N	A	SA
75	94	172	56	14
18%	23%	42%	14%	3%

During the last performance evaluation cycle, my supervisor provided me with feedback that enabled me to improve my performance before my formal performance appraisal/EVAL/FITREP.

SD	D	N	A	SA
38	54	80	124	69
10%	15%	22%	34%	19%

I am satisfied with the overall quality of my workplace facilities.

SD	D	N	A	SA
21	71	72	184	68
5%	17%	17%	44%	16%

My command is concerned about my safety.

SD	D	N	A	SA
7	29	84	203	93
2%	7%	20%	49%	22%

My command has a program in place to address potential safety issues.

SD	D	N	A	SA
8	36	131	172	69
2%	9%	31%	41%	17%

My job is important and makes a contribution to my command.

SD	D	N	A	SA
6	11	43	157	201
1%	3%	10%	38%	48%

_____ is occurring at my command.

	SD	D	N	A	SA
Fraternization	12%	22%	54%	8%	4%
Favoritism	6%	15%	30%	29%	20%
Gender/Sex Discrimination	15%	31%	40%	10%	5%
Sexual Harassment	20%	33%	41%	4%	1%
Race Discrimination	20%	27%	42%	8%	4%
Hazing	31%	30%	37%	1%	1%

The following tools and resources are adequate to accomplish the command's mission.

	SD	D	N	A	SA
People	11%	30%	15%	29%	14%
Training	13%	25%	25%	27%	10%
Workspace	5%	12%	19%	43%	20%
Computer	6%	11%	13%	43%	27%
Software	7%	17%	15%	38%	24%
Internet	7%	12%	15%	41%	25%
Intranet	8%	13%	27%	33%	20%
Equipment	5%	9%	20%	43%	23%
Materials & Supplies	4%	10%	16%	47%	22%

I have adequate leadership guidance to perform my job successfully.

SD	D	N	A	SA
40	60	78	141	103
9%	14%	18%	33%	24%

Communication down the chain of command is effective.

SD	D	N	A	SA
52	106	85	134	39
13%	25%	20%	32%	9%

Communication up the chain of command is effective.

SD	D	N	A	SA
43	118	106	117	32
10%	28%	25%	28%	8%

My performance evaluations have been fair.

SD	D	N	A	SA
13	31	84	163	125
3%	7%	20%	39%	30%

The awards and recognition program is fair and equitable.

SD	D	N	A	SA
42	84	138	103	49
10%	20%	33%	25%	12%

Military and civilian personnel work well together at my command.

SD	D	N	A	SA
14	26	110	175	90
3%	6%	27%	42%	22%

My command's Equal Opportunity Program (EO - to include Equal Employment Opportunity & Command Managed Equal Opportunity) is effective.

SD	D	N	A	SA
11	36	175	134	57
3%	9%	42%	32%	14%

My command adequately protects my personal information.

SD	D	N	A	SA
11	24	115	183	80
3%	6%	28%	44%	19%

My superiors treat me with respect and consideration.

SD	D	N	A	SA
21	51	70	159	115
5%	12%	17%	38%	28%

My command attempts to resolve command climate issues.

SD	D	N	A	SA
21	50	101	168	72
5%	12%	25%	41%	17%

I have adequate time at work to complete required training.

SD	D	N	A	SA
34	100	79	163	35
8%	24%	19%	40%	9%

Do you supervise Department of the Navy (DON) civilians?

Yes	No
126	285
31%	69%

When did you receive civilian supervisory training?

<12mos	1-3 yrs	>3 yrs	Never
15	61	32	18
12%	49%	25%	14%